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Ps. CXIX 169. כדברך חביבני

JOH. XVII. 17. ὁ λογος ὁσος αληθεια εστι.

ΑΚΡΟΓΩΝΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ.

THE WORKS

OF

THE REV. DANIEL WATERLAND, D.D.

FORMERLY

MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
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TO WHICH IS PREFIXED A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

WILLIAM VAN MILDERT, D.D.

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

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CHRISTIANITY VINDICATED

AGAINST

INFIDELITY:

PART I.

A CHARGE

DELIVERED TO THE

CLERGY OF MIDDLESEX,

AT THE

PRIMARY VISITATION,

Held May 19, 1731.

A CHARGE

DELIVERED TO THE

CLERGY OF MIDDLESEX, &c.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

AS we are here met together for the honour of God, and for the service of his Church, it may be proper for me to say something of the state of religion, and the controversies depending. We live in a disputing age, and *infidelity* has been long growing upon us. It began with exploding *mysteries* in general, and from thence proceeded to a denial of our Lord's *divinity* in particular. Low notions of the person of Christ are apt to bring in low notions of his *merit* and *satisfaction*, and of the use and value of the Christian *sacraments*, which represent and apply them. And when *faith* in Christ's blood is once depreciated or frustrated, it is natural to set up *works*[a], not only as the *conditional*, but as the *efficacious*, or even *meritorious* cause of salvation. The next step is to exalt *morality* in opposition to *faith*, and mere morality in opposition to *instituted* religion; which again prepares the way for looking upon all *revealed* religion as *needless* or *useless*, which comes to the same thing with denying its *truth*, because an all-wise God can do nothing *in vain*. Such is the connection or gradation of error, when once men desert the rules of reason and sobriety, to follow their own wanderings; such the obvious and easy descent from disputing the *essentials* of revealed religion, to denying the *whole*. So now our main

[a] Certe omnes illi qui *divinitatem* Christi in dubium vocant, non possunt non *satisfactionem* quoque, et justificationem per *fidem* solam negare, seque adeo ad *opera* legis recipere: quod vel Socinianorum exemplo patet. *Jo. Francisc. Buddæi Eccl. Apostolica*, p. 130.

concern is, to defend *revelation* against *infidelity*; which, one would think, should be a very easy matter; as indeed it is, if reason and argument may prevail. But yet much may be done on the other side, by a dexterous application to the passions and weaknesses of mankind: for corrupt nature is a prevalent principle, and will always make a strong party in the world; for which reason, it concerns us, my Reverend Brethren, as watchful guardians of the flock of Christ, to be jealous over it, at this time, with a godly jealousy, and to use our best endeavours to preserve the unwary from the wiles and artifices of such as "lie "in wait to deceive." Many are the ways and means of defending Christianity, well known to this learned body, and as successfully made use of, both in preaching and writing. I shall content myself with singling out one argument from the rest, and one much made use of both by ancients and moderns. I shall explain it presently, after first taking notice of the nature of the debate now on foot between Christians and Infidels. It appears to be in substance much the same with what the ancient Jews and Christians were employed in against the infidels of their times. For the present unbelievers are setting up what they call *natural religion*, to rival *supernatural; human reason* in the heart of man, in opposition to *divine reason* laid down in the word of God; or to say all in short, *Pagan darkness* in opposition to *Scripture light*. When the Pagans of old presumed in like manner upon their seeming wisdom and their imaginary attainments, despising the only true wisdom from above, in comparison of their *own;* the good Jews and Christians, in their respective times, represented to them, that their boasted wisdom was, for the most part, *human folly;* and that whatever they really knew or taught, deserving any praise, they had mostly *borrowed* it from *divine revelation*, while they meanly and ungratefully disowned it; but that it was very wrong in them to drink only of the polluted streams, instead of coming directly to the fountain-head, and madness to prefer the faint reflections of a cloud before the open sunshine. This is a famous topic among the ancient Apologists, and has been frequently made use of since, as I have already hinted. And this is what I incline to entertain you a while with at present. I the rather choose it, because this topic has been disputed in part by some, and obscured by others, and seems to want a little clearing and settling: neither indeed is it to be admitted entire and in the gross, without proper

qualifyings and distinctions. I shall first fairly and fully represent it, as it stood among the ancient Apologists, and shall next endeavour to pass a clear and right judgment upon it, and to take off unreasonable exceptions to it.

I shall begin with the Jewish Apologists, who led the way, and who gave the first hints, which the Christians coming after laid hold of and improved.

Aristobulus, an Alexandrian Jew, as is said, and a Peripatetic philosopher, preceptor also to Ptolemy Philometor, about 160 years before Christ, affirms directly, that both Pythagoras and Plato had copied many things from Moses's Law, transferring the same into their own philosophy[b]. And to make it appear the more probable, he suggests that the Hebrew Scriptures, or rather some extracts of them, had been translated into Greek before the time of Alexander the Great, and even before the rise of the Persian Monarchy: a fact, which learned men have been much divided upon formerly, and do not now commonly admit[c]. But unless he had good proof of it, it was needless for him to insist upon it, since his main argument did not require it; for Pythagoras and Plato might have borrowed many things at second or at third hand from the Jewish Church, without having a sight of the Jewish Scriptures; and Aristobulus might have learned from the testimony of Megasthenes, a Pagan writer, who lived about 150 years before him, that the Greek philosophers had borrowed many of their notions from the Jews[d]. The same Aristobulus elsewhere intimates, that not only Pythagoras and Plato, but Socrates also, and Orpheus, and Hesiod, and Homer, and Linus had drank at the same fountains, enriching their

[b] Aristobulus apud Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 110, 111. ed. Oxon. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. ix. cap. 6. lib. xiii. cap. 12.

[c] Vid. Huet. Dem. Evang. Prop. iv. p. 132, 133. Nourrii Apparat. ad Bibl. Max. vol. i. p. 389. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. lib. iii. cap. 12. p. 316. Prolegom. ad Grab. Septuag. tom. ii. c. 1. prop. 1. Hodii Text. Bibl. p. 570, &c. Jenkin's Reasonableness, &c. vol. i. p. 93. There is little reason to doubt, but that at least part of the Bible was translated into Greek before the time of Alexander the Great. *Ibid.*

[d] *Ἅπαντα μέν τοι τὰ περὶ φύσεως εἰρημένα παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς Ἑλλάδος φιλοσοφοῦσι. τὰ μὲν παρ' Ἰνδοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Βραχμάνων, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Συρίᾳ ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων Ἰουδαίων. Clem. Alex. Strom.* lib. i. p. 360. Conf. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. ix. cap. 6. p. 410.

N. B. The same words are quoted by Cyril of Alexandria, as Aristobulus's own words, (Cyrill. contr. Jul. lib. iv. p. 134.) probably because Aristobulus had quoted them from Megasthenes; for Clemens and Eusebius both quote them as Megasthenes's, and the very manner of expression shews that they are not Aristobulus's own. See Hody de Bibl. Text. p. 54.

theology from the holy Scriptures[e]; nay, and that Aristotle's philosophy had taken several things from the Law of Moses and from the Prophets[f], or *depended* upon them.

I am aware, that a learned writer[g] of our own has hinted his suspicion that the writings going under the name of Aristobulus were a forgery of the second century: and another very considerable author[h] seems in a great measure to favour the suspicion. But other as learned writers[i] think, that the suspicion is not sufficiently grounded, or is far from probable: and some have professedly undertaken to clear up the objected difficulties, and to assert the genuineness of the writings ascribed to Aristobulus[k]. I make not myself a party or a moderator in that dispute: neither is it necessary that I should, since little depends upon it as to our present argument If Aristobulus's pieces are genuine, then he is the first man of the ancient Apologists (whom we have any remains of) that so managed the dispute in favour of revelation against the Pagans: if not, Josephus then leads the way, whom I come next to mention.

Josephus, in his two books against Apion, is very full and particular upon the same argument. He observes, that the famous Pythagoras, the father of the Pagan philosophy and theology, was well acquainted with the Jewish institutes, and was a great admirer and follower of them[l]: which he confirms by the testimony of the Pagan biographer Hermippus, who, in his life of Pythagoras, had observed that that philosopher had taken several of his notions from the Jews, adopting them for his own[m].

Josephus himself adds, that it is said with truth, that that philosopher[n] *transferred many of the Jewish rules into his own phi-*

[e] Apud Euseb. Præp. Evangel. lib. xiii. cap. 12.

[f] Aristobulus apud Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 705.

[g] Hody de Bibl. Text. Original. lib. i. cap. 9. p. 49. et lib. iv. p. 570.

[h] Prideaux, Connect. p. ii. lib. i. p. 38, &c. Conf. Carpzov. Crit. Sacr. p. 490.

[i] Fabric. Bibl. Græc. lib. iii. cap. 11. p. 281. Wolfii Biblioth. Hebr. vol. i. p. 215.

[k] Whiston's Append. to the Literal Accomplishment, p. 134, &c. 141, &c.

[l] Πυθαγόρας τοίνυν ὁ Σάμιος ἀρχαῖος ὢν, σοφίᾳ δὲ καὶ τῇ περὶ τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ πάντων ὑπειλημμένος διενεγκεῖν τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων, οὐ μόνον ἐγνωκὼς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν δηλός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζηλωτὴς αὐτῶν ἐκ πλείστου γεγενημένος. *Joseph. contr. Ap.* lib. i. cap. xxii. p. 453.

[m] Ταῦτα δ' ἔπραττε καὶ ἔλεγε, τὰς Ἰουδαίων καὶ Θρακῶν δόξας μιμούμενος, καὶ μεταφέρων εἰς ἑαυτόν. *Hermipp. ap. Joseph. ibid.* p. 453. This Hermippus lived about 250 years before Christ. See Hod. Bibl. Text. p. 11.

[n] Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος πολλὰ τῶν παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις νομίμων εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μετενεγκεῖν φιλοσοφίαν. *Ibid.* p. 453.

He seems here to allude to what

losophy; thereby confirming what Aristobulus had said before. A little after, he observes from Clearchus, a disciple of Aristotle, how that philosopher in his travels had struck up an acquaintance with a Jew of extraordinary worth, and had learned much from him[o]. Which again confirms what Aristobulus reports of Aristotle's philosophy, that it derived several things from the Law and Prophets[p].

From Josephus the Jew, I may now proceed to Christian Fathers and Apologists. Justin Martyr, in his first Apology, expresses himself thus: "Moses is older than any of the Greek "writers: and as to what the philosophers and poets have said, "either of the *immortality of the soul*, or of *punishments* after "death, or of contemplation of *heavenly* things, or the like doc-"trines, they took their hints from the Prophets, whom they "consulted and built upon; and by this means some seeds of "truth seem to have been scattered amongst all: though at "the same time it is evident, from their notorious disagreeing "amongst themselves, that they understood not those things to "any degree of exactness[q]."

The same Justin, in his Paræneſis, dwells upon the argument more at large; observing that Orpheus, and Homer, and Solon, and Pythagoras, and Plato had all been in Egypt, and had there learned to improve their theology by the help of Moses's writings. He first asserts it in the general[r], and then goes on to speak more distinctly to every particular[s]: and when he comes in the close, to assign his reason for insisting so much upon this topic, he tells his readers, that it was to convince the Greeks, that there was no learning true religion from them, who had nothing considerable of their *own* to boast of; and as to what they had

had been said by Aristobulus, Πυθαγόρας πολλὰ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν μετενέγκας εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δογματοποιΐαν. *Aristobul. ap. Clem. Alex. Strom.* i. p. 111. This I note as a probable argument to prove that Aristobulus's pieces were then extant; only Josephus would not name him, because the testimony of one of his own side would have weighed little with the adversary.

[o] Joseph. contr. Apion. lib. i. c. 22. p. 454, 455. Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 358. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. ix. cap. 5, 6.

[p] See the preceding page.

[q] Πρεσβύτερος γὰρ Μωσῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν Ἕλλησι συγγραφέων· καὶ πάντα ὅσα περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς, ἢ τιμωριῶν τῶν μετὰ θάνατον, ἢ θεωρίας οὐρανίων, ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων δογμάτων, καὶ φιλόσοφοι καὶ ποιηταὶ ἔφασαν, παρὰ τῶν προφητῶν τὰς ἀφορμὰς λαβόντες, καὶ νοῆσαι δεδύνηνται, καὶ ἐξηγήσαντο. ὅθεν παρὰ πᾶσι σπέρματα ἀληθείας δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἐλέγχονται δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς νοήσαντες, ὅταν ἐναντία αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς λέγωσιν. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. cap. 57. p. 86. edit. Oxon. p. 67. Cant.

[r] Just. ad Græc. cohort. cap. xv. p. 76. edit. Oxon.

[s] Just. ibid. cap. xv. xvi.—xxxv.

borrowed from Moses and the Prophets, they had so disguised and disfigured it, that they had almost spoiled it[t]. I speak his sense, though not his very words.

Next to Justin, follows his scholar Tatian, who expresses the same thought more distinctly, and is the best comment upon him. He observes[u], that it were much more advisable for the Pagans to take Moses himself for their guide, than to follow the Greek philosophers so much younger, and who had drawn their best things from him, and not in the best manner, not like skilful men: for that many of their sophists, led by vain curiosity, had come to Moses and other Jewish sages for instruction, but had laboured to adulterate it when they had done; either to make a show of saying something of their own, or else to cover up what they did not well understand, under a mist of words, sophisticating the truth with devised fables. To proceed.

Theophilus Bishop of Antioch, about the year of our Lord 180, takes notice that the Pagan poets and philosophers coming after the sacred Prophets had stolen the doctrine of *eternal punishments* from them, in order to give the more strength and weight to their own writings[x]. In another place, he intimates, that they had derived the notion of the *unity of God* and of a future *judgment* from the same fountain[y]. The like he says afterwards in respect of the doctrine of the general *conflagration*, that the Heathen poets *stole* the notion from the Law and the Prophets[z].

[t] Τοῦ χάριν μνημονεῦσαι τούτων νυνὶ προήχθην, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ἵνα γνῶτε τὴν ἀληθῆ θεοσέβειαν οὐ δυνατὸν παρὰ τούτων μανθάνειν τῶν μηδὲ ἐν οἷς ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐθαυμάσθησαν, ἴδιόν τι γράψαι δυνηθέντων, ἀλλὰ διά τινος ἐκείνης ἀλληγορίας ὑπὸ Μωσέως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν προφητῶν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν συγγράμμασιν ἀπηγγελκότων. *Just. Parænn.* cap. xxxv. p. 118.

[u] Καὶ χρὴ τῷ πρεσβεύοντι κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πιστεύειν, ἤπερ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς πηγῆς ἀρυσαμένοις Ἕλλησιν, οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν, τὰ ἐκείνου δόγματα. πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ' αὐτοὺς σοφισταὶ κεχρημένοι περιεργίᾳ, τὰ ὅσα περὶ τῶν κατὰ Μωσέα, καὶ τῶν ὁμοίως αὐτῷ φιλοσοφούντων ἔγνωσαν, ἃ καὶ παραχαράττειν ἐπειράσθησαν. πρῶτον μὲν, ἵνα τὶ λέγειν ἴδιον νομίζωνται· δεύτερον δὲ, ὅπως τὰ ὅσα μὴ συνίεσαν, διὰ τινὸς ἐπιπλάστου ῥητολογίας παρακαλύπτοντες, ταῖς μυθολογίαις τὴν ἀλήθειαν παραπρεσβεύωσι. *Tatian. ad Græc.* cap. lxi. 135. edit. Oxon.

[x] Ὧν τιμωριῶν προειρημένων ὑπὸ προφητῶν μεταγενέστεροι γενόμενοι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἔκλεψαν ἐκ τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν, εἰς τὰ δόγματα αὐτῶν ἀξιόπιστα γενηθῆναι. *Theoph. ad Autol.* lib. i. c. 19. p. 62. edit. Hamb.

[y] Πλὴν ἐνίοτέ τινες τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκνήψαντες ἐξ αὐτῶν, εἶπον ἀκόλουθα τοῖς προφήταις, ὅπως εἰς μαρτύριον αὐτοῖς τε καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις περί τε Θεοῦ μοναρχίας καὶ κρίσεως, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔφασαν. *Theoph.* lib. ii. c. 11. p. 114. Conf. 262.

[z] Καὶ περὶ ἐκπυρώσεως κόσμου, θέλοντες, καὶ μὴ θέλοντες, ἀκόλουθα ἐξεῖπον τοῖς προφήταις, καίπερ μεταγενέστεροι γενόμενοι, καὶ κλέψαντες ταῦτα ἐκ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν. *Theoph.* lib. ii. c. 55. p. 260.

But of all the ancient Fathers and Apologists, there is none more copious upon this argument than Clemens of Alexandria. It is very frequent with him to call the Pagan philosophers and poets, *thieves* or *plagiaries*, for their stealing so plentifully from the Jewish Church, to adorn their own writings, at the same time not acknowledging the obligation[a]. He presses the charge home upon particular men by name, or bodies of men: upon Pythagoras[b] chiefly and Plato[c], as the two principal men: but upon Numa[d] also, and Thales[e], and Socrates[f], and Cleanthes[g], and Antisthenes[h]; upon Xenophon[i], and Aristotle[k], and the whole sect of the Stoics[l]. He makes the like charge upon the heathen poets in general[m]; and particularly upon Orpheus[n], Linus[o], Musæus[p], Homer[q], Hesiod[r], and Pindar[s]. His proofs of the facts are not all of the same kind, nor of the same weight. What he urges from external confessions or testimonies of Pagans themselves, as from Megasthenes[t], Clearchus[u], Numenius[x], and Plato himself[y], must be owned to be solid and convincing, so far as it reaches. As to the artificial arguments or presumptions drawn from the *similitude* of thoughts or expressions, taking in the superior antiquity of Moses, and the certainty of the fact that many both *poets* and *philosophers* had been in Egypt, where they might have learned something at first or second hand from the Jews: these and the like considerations have their weight and credibility, but may sometimes easily be extended too far.

The particular doctrines, notions, or principles, which Clemens supposes to have been thus borrowed by the Pagans from the Jews, or from sacred Writ, are such as I shall just briefly mention: first, the main substance or best part of their *ethics* or *morality*[z]; next, their most considerable *laws*[a], either in Minos's, or Lycurgus's, or Zaleucus's, or Solon's[b]; mercy towards *brute beasts*[c]; then the *Unity* of God[d]; the *Trinity* also[e],

[a] Clem. Alex. p. 369, 377, 378, 429, 650, 663, 699, 700, 733, 737. ed. Oxon. [b] Ib. p. 60, 355, 358, 477, 662, 663. [c] Ibid. p. 60, 176, 223, 224, 355, 358, 419, 662, 701, &c. 710. [d] Ibid. p. 358, 359. [e] Ibid. p. 704. [f] Ibid. p. 701. [g] Ibid. p. 60, 715. [h] Ibid. p. 60. [i] Ibid. p. 60. [k] Ibid. p. 358, 705. [l] Ibid. p. 699. 708. [m] Ibid. p. 658. [n] Ibid. p. 659. 692. [o] Ibid. 659. [p] Ibid. p. 659. [q] Ibid. p. 659, 707, 709. [r] Ibid. p. 659, 708. [s] Ibid. p. 295. [t] Ibid. p. 360. [u] Ibid. p. 358. [x] Ibid. p. 411. [y] Ibid. p. 355, 358, 697. [z] Ibid. p. 469. [a] Ibid. p. 422. [b] See p. 422. compare p. 356. [c] Ibid. p. 477. [d] Ibid. p. 714, &c. [e] Ibid. p. 711.

and the sacredness of the *seventh day*[f]; the *omnipresence* or *overruling* power of the Deity[g]; the doctrine also of the *resurrection*[h], and of *future judgment*[i], and of the everlasting *punishments* in *hell*[k], with the blessedness of *heaven*[l]: add to these the notion of good and evil *angels*[m], and of the *creation* of the world[n], and of the general *conflagration*[o]. Some obscure knowledge of all these doctrines, Clemens supposes to have been conveyed by *Scripture*, or hearsay, or tradition, from the Hebrews to the Gentile world; but that the Pagans had much depraved or disguised the doctrines so received.

Tertullian, of the same century, prosecutes the same argument in few, but in strong words. He tells the Pagans, that they borrowed their *laws*, such as were of most value, from the older laws of Moses[p]. In another place he asks, which of their *poets* and which of their *sophists* had not drank at the fountain of the Prophets[q]? And he further says, that from thence it was that the philosophers had quenched their learned thirst: but he intimates withal, that they had corrupted and mangled what they had so taken, and had endeavoured to wrest and warp it to their own hypotheses[r], not sufficiently considering that a *Divine* writing is privileged from ill usage, and ought not to be so profaned.

Minutius Felix expresses the same thought, observing, that the philosophers had taken several things from sacred Writ, but had adulterated what they took, and delivered it but by halves[s].

Origen discovers the same sentiments, in more places than one of his treatise against Celsus. He refers to Hermippus,

[f] Clem. Alex. p. 713.
[g] Ibid. p. 723, 724.
[h] Ibid. p. 711. [i] Ibid. p. 722.
[k] Ibid. p. 700, 701.
[l] Ibid. p. 722.
[m] Ibid. p. 701.
[n] Ibid. p. 701.
[o] Ibid. p. 711, 712.
[p] Dum tamen sciatis ipsas quoque lege vestras, quæ videntur ad innocentiam pergere, de *divina* lege ut antiquiore, formam mutuatas: diximus jam de Mosis ætate. *Tertull. Apol.* c. xlv. p. 372. edit. Haverc.
[q] Quis poetarum, quis sophistarum, qui non de prophetarum fonte potaverit? Inde igitur et philosophi sitim ingenii surrigaverunt. *Tertull. Apol.* c. xlvii. p. 396. Conf. ad Nation. l. ii. c. 2.
[r] Si quid in sanctis offenderunt digestis, exinde regestum pro instituto curiositatis ad propria verterunt, neque satis credentes *divina* esse quo minus interpolarent, neque, &c. *Ibid.* p. 396.
[s] Animadvertis philosophos eadem disputare quæ nos dicimus: non quod nos simus eorum vestigia subsecuti, sed quod illi de *divinis* prædicationibus *prophetarum*, umbram interpolatæ veritatis imitati sunt. Sic etiam conditionem renascendi sapientium clariores, Pythagoras, et præcipuus Plato, corrupta et dimidiata fide tradiderunt, &c. *Minuc. F.* c. xxxiii. p. 189, 190. edit. Cant.

which Josephus had before done, as a voucher, that Pythagoras had borrowed his philosophy in part from the Jews[t]. In another place he intimates that Plato probably might have learned some things from the Jews in Egypt, which he afterwards disguised for fear of giving offence to the Greeks[u]. He elsewhere speaks more positively of Plato's borrowing some of his expressions or notions, either directly from *Scripture*, or at second hand from his converse with the Hebrews[x]. And he takes notice also of Numenius (a Pythagorean of the second century) his speaking respectfully of the Jews[y], and of his borrowing several things from Moses and the Prophets[z].

Our next author is Lactantius, who, though he agrees with the other Fathers and Apologists in the main thing, that the Pagans did borrow from the Hebrews several of their best notions, yet he seems to differ from them in some considerable circumstances. For his opinion appears to be, that they did not receive those doctrines at first hand, by reading the *Scriptures* themselves, neither yet at the second hand, by conversing with the Hebrews, but by a more remote and obscure channel of conveyance, by uncertain hearsay, or blind and very corrupt tradition[a]; so that the Pagan philosophers did not themselves deprave what they had so taken, but they received it depraved, and could not make it better than they found it. This appears to be Lactantius's real sense of the matter. Accordingly he denies that ever Pythagoras or Plato resorted directly to the Jews, or (as his argument seems to imply) that they conversed at all with them.

[t] Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἕρμιππον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ νομοθετῶν ἱστορηκέναι, Πυθαγόραν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπὸ Ἰουδαίων εἰς Ἕλληνας ἀγαγεῖν. *Origen. contr. Cels.* l. i. p. 13.

[u] Origen. cont. Cels. l. iv. p. 190.

[x] Origen. cont. Cels. l. vi. p. 288. conf. lib. vii. p. 351, 352.

[y] Origen. ibid. lib. i. p. 13.

[z] Origen. ibid. p. 198.

[a] Nullas enim literas veritatis attigerant; sed quæ prophetarum vaticinio tradita in sacrario Dei continebantur, ea de *fabulis* et *obscura opinione* collecta, et depravata (ut veritas a vulgo solet variis sermonibus dissipata corrumpi, nullo non addente aliquid ad id quod audierant) carminibus suis comprehenderunt. *Lactant. Inst.* l. ii. c. 10. p. 95. edit. Cant.

Quia mysterium divini sacramenti nesciebant, et ad eos mentio *resurrectionis* futuræ *obscurorum ore* pervenerat, eam vero temere ac leviter auditam, in modum commentitiæ fabulæ prodiderunt. Et tamen iidem testati sunt, non auctorem se certum sequi; ut Maro qui ait: *Sit mihi fas audita loqui.* Quamvis igitur veritatis arcana, in parte corruperint, tamen ipsa res eo verior invenitur, quod cum *prophetis* in parte consentiunt; quod nobis ad probationem rei satis est. *Id.* l. vii. c. 22. p. 397.

[b] Unde equidem soleo mirari, quod cum Pythagoras, et postea Plato, amore indagandæ veritatis accensi ad Ægyptios, et Magos, et Persas usque penetrassent,—ad Judæos tamen non accesserint, penes quos tunc

Some have gladly laid hold on this passage of Lactantius, disliking the hypothesis of the other Fathers, and looking upon this single opinion of Lactantius, as weighty in itself, and sufficient to counterbalance all the rest[c]. Others, on the contrary, think that Lactantius has betrayed great ignorance[d] in what he has said, and that his single opinion is of small weight against many more valuable writers. Some have endeavoured to excuse him in this affair, and to reconcile him with the other Fathers, by saying, that he might mean only that Pythagoras and Plato did not go into Judæa, however they might have conversed with Jews in Egypt or elsewhere[e]. But Lactantius probably meant, that they never conversed with the Jews at all; and his argument seems to require that he should mean so. In short then, we must either give up Lactantius, as to those particular facts relating to Pythagoras and Plato, or else set aside a number of other more considerable authorities. But as to his main notion, that the Pagans, many of them, borrowed their best principles from revelation *remotely*, and by obscure *tradition*, rather than by reading of sacred Writ, or conversing directly with Jews; there appears to be both sense and truth in it; of which I shall say more when I come to pass a judgment upon the general argument.

I may next mention the learned Eusebius, who, in his celebrated treatise of Evangelical Preparation, takes in almost every thing that others had said before him, relating to our present topic. His tenth book in particular is very diffuse and copious, in shewing that Plato and other philosophers had borrowed much the greatest and best part of their *theology* and *ethics* from the holy Scriptures. His eleventh book is taken up in specifying the particulars wherein Plato's doctrine agrees with sacred

solos [religio] erat, et quo facilius ire potuissent. Sed aversos esse arbitror Divina providentia, quia nondum fas erat alienigenis hominibus religionem Dei veri, justitiamque cognoscere. *Lactant.* lib. iv. cap. 2. p. 176.

[c] See Marsham Can. Chron. sect. xix. p. 152. Franeq. edit. Clerici Epist. Crit. vii. p. 228. Hodii Text. Bibl. lib. iv. p. 571.

[d] Nec enim satis didicerat Lactantius sive Pythagoræ, sive Platonis res, cum eos minime Judæos accessisse scripsit. Id quod ex sequentibus fiet manifestum. *Selden. de Jur. N. et Gent.* lib. i. cap. 2. p. 14.

Splendide ergo halucinatur Lactantius, cum *mirari* se ait, &c. Conceptis enim verbis tradit Porphyrius, in vita Pythagoræ, Ægyptios, Arabes, Chaldæos et Ebræos ipsum adiisse, &c. *Huet. Dem. Evang. Prop.* iv. p. 45.

Splendide enim, quum id scriberet, erravisse Lactantium, non modo ea quæ produximus testimonia arguunt, sed et res ipsa loquitur, &c. *Witsii Ægyptiaca*, lib. iii. cap. 13. p. 276.

[e] See Baltus, Défense des SS. Peres accusés de Platonisme, l. iv. p. 612, *Nourrii Apparat. ad Bibl. Max.* vol. i. p. 386, 387.

Writ; and his twelfth and thirteenth books carry on the comparison.

I pass over Athanasius and Philastrius, whom I shall have occasion again to mention: I omit Ambrose[f] also, and Austin[g], and Cyril[h], who have some things to our purpose, that I may come the sooner to Theodoret, who has treated this argument as closely, as learnedly, and as judiciously as any of the ancients, in his Therapeuticks. He observes, that the most celebrated Pagan sages, Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Thales, Solon, and Plato, had all travelled, in their times, into Egypt, and had there been instructed about the true God and true religion; not by the Egyptians only at second hand, but at first hand also by the Hebrews themselves. And for proof thereof, he appeals to the testimonies or confessions of Pagans, such as Plutarch, Porphyry, and Numenius[i]. He makes mention also of Pythagoras's having been *circumcised*[k] during his stay in Egypt, a rite which the Egyptians (he says) must have taken from the Hebrews. As to Plato in particular, Theodoret frequently takes notice, how much that philosopher had improved his own sentiments and enriched his works by what he had learned of the Jews[l]. And he sometimes hints the like of Anaxagoras also, and Socrates, and Orpheus[m]. He takes notice further, that the philosophers which lived after Christ, namely, Plutarch, Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, and Atticus, had not only been instructed by the *Old Testament*, (as Plato before them had been,) but by the *New Testament* also, improving their philosophy with what they had stolen from both[n]. So much for Theodoret.

I need not descend lower, to writers of the sixth, seventh, or later centuries. Enough has been produced from the earliest Apologists, (Jews and Christians,) to give us a just idea of the argument, and of what they intended by it. It is now proper I should come to perform what I have promised; namely, to examine strictly what real truth or force there is in it.

This inquiry is the more necessary, because there may be an

[f] Ambros. Serm. ii. in Psalm. 118. Epist. l. 1. Ep. 6.

[g] Austin. de Doctr. Christian. lib. ii. cap. 43. Retract. lib. ii. cap. 4. De Civit. Dei, lib. viii. cap. 11.

[h] Cyrill. Alexand. contr. Jul. lib. i. p. 29—34. Lib. ii. p. 47. edit. Lips.

[i] Theodoret. Therapeut. Serm. i. p. 466, 467. edit. Paris.

[k] Theodor. ibid. p. 467. Conf. Clem. Alex. Strom. i. c. 15. p. 354.

[l] Theod. ibid. p. 489, 490, 495, 498, 505, 506, 567.

[m] Theodoret. Therapeut. Serm. i. p. 490, 491, 492, 495.

[n] Theodoret. ibid. p. 499, 500, 505, 573. &c.

extreme either way, either by extending the argument too far, laying more stress upon it than it can justly bear; or not allowing enough to it, but throwing a kind of slight and contempt upon it. Two very considerable writers, Sir John Marsham[o] and Dr. Spencer[p], appear to have slighted it too much. They have not only called in question the prevailing opinion of the ancient Apologists, but they have run directly counter to it; pretending that the Pagans did not borrow from the Jews, but that the Jews rather copied after the Egyptians or other Pagans, in such instances as both agree in: a strange way of turning the tables, confounding history, and inverting the real order of things. But their pleas and pretences have been distinctly and solidly confuted by the learned Witsius[q]. The celebrated Le Clerc[r] has in a great measure fallen in with the two gentlemen before mentioned, having a favourite hypothesis of his own to serve, as they also had theirs. But a learned Frenchman[s] took the pains to examine his reasonings, and to unravel his fallacies. The most specious and plausible pretence, which those three learned moderns have gone upon, is, that the Jews were a small and a contemptible people[t], and that therefore it is much more likely that they should take rules from the other great and flourishing states, than the contrary. But it is not a fair account of the Jews, to call them a contemptible people, from the testimony only of a few prejudiced writers, their bitterest adversaries, and too much given to romancing; such as Tacitus, for instance, whom Tertullian wittily styles *mendaciorum loquacissimus*[u], and justly too, so far as concerns our present argument. Josephus has well vindicated his nation (in his two books against Apion and elsewhere[x]) from such unworthy reproaches, and has abundantly shewn how much the Jews were respected and honoured, even in the decline of their state, among the heathen countries of greatest figure and fame: and Scripture itself bears testimony to the times going before. Certainly God's design was, that that nation should be honoured above all nations in the sight of the heathen, for the excellency

[o] Marsham. Can. Chron. sect. ix. p. 152.

[p] Spencer de Leg. Hebr. p. 285, 650. edit. Cant. 1727.

[q] Witsii Ægyptiaca, p. 277, &c. Conf. Carpzov. Introd. ad Libr. Bibl. par. i. p. 45, 105, &c. 483.

[r] Clerici Epist. Crit. vii. p. 216, &c.

[s] Baltus Défense des SS. Peres, &c. l. iv. 608, &c.

[t] See Spencer, 285, 286. 650.

[u] Tertullian. Apol. cap. xvi. p. 157.

[x] Joseph. Antiq. Jud. lib. xii. cap. 3, 4.

of their laws, and the dignity of their constitution. So thought Moses, when he said, "Behold, I have taught you statutes and "judgments;——keep therefore and do them; for this is your "wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, "which shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great "nation is a wise and understanding people[y]." If this be truth and fact, (and no one can question it that believes the holy Scriptures,) then undoubtedly the nations all around Judæa might be ambitious to learn from those, whose wisdom they should so much admire: and it might be strongly argued from this single text, that the thing would be so of course. However, this and the other considerations before mentioned may at least be sufficient to take off the first and principal objection against the thing in general. There are other slighter objections, not so much affecting the main cause, as the management of it, or the excesses some have run into, which may all be avoided by proper cautions and distinctions, and a just stating of the case, which is what I am now coming to.

It may be admitted, that both ancients and moderns have sometimes extended the comparison between Scripture and Pagan philosophy too far, have imagined several parallelisms, where there really were none; as there is a great deal of room for fancy in such cases, and it is very easy to exceed.

It may be allowed also, that some moderns especially, otherwise great and learned men, have often strained a point too far, in endeavouring to deduce all the heathen *mythology* from Scripture history. Huetius, for instance, to name no more, has undoubtedly exceeded in that way, and has been justly censured for it by the more judicious[z].

It may further be admitted, that such as have treated this argument (whether ancients or moderns) have not always been careful to distinguish the several channels by which revealed light was conveyed to the Gentile world; or have not been content to rest in generals, when they might most safely and prudently have done it. That *supernatural* notices and *revealed* light were communicated, more or less, to the bulk of mankind, in every age, is most certain and uncontestable: but whether directly by *Scripture*, or by other more *oblique* or more *remote* means, may often admit of a dispute. The Pagans might be

[y] Deut. iv. 5, 6. [z] See Fabricius, Biblioth. Antiquar. p. 29. Buddæus, Analecta, p. 12, 13, 57, 71.

instructed in divine things, either by reading the *Scriptures*, or by conversing with Jews, or by conversing with other nations that had been acquainted with Jews, or by means of public edicts of several great *princes* that had favoured the Jews; or lastly, by *tradition* handed down to them from Abraham, or from Noah, or from the *first parents* of mankind. Now since revealed light, more or less, might break out upon the Pagan world all these several ways; it is not necessary in every case, to determine which way it came; much less can it be necessary to believe that every Pagan *philosopher* or *poet* had seen the holy Scripture, only because he had hit upon some things consonant to Scripture, and such as probably were not owing to mere natural light.

But to be a little more particular, give me leave to say something distinctly of the several channels of conveyance before mentioned.

I. The first of them is undoubtedly the best and surest, viz. the reading of the *Scriptures*. It is reasonable to believe, that such philosophers as lived after Christianity became generally known, did improve their philosophy, both religious and moral, from the Old and New Testament, or at least from what they had, some way or other, learned of Jews or Christians. Many of the junior Platonists, as Numenius, Apuleius, Maximus Tyrius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, thus refined and improved their theology from Christian principles, in order to combat Christianity the more successfully, turning against her her own artillery[a]. We may observe also, (as has been often observed,) that the Pagan *morality* was much improved after Christianity appeared; as may be seen by the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, Plutarch, and Marcus Antoninus: which may be justly attributed either to their having had a sight of the holy Scriptures, or to their having learned something of the principles and manners of Christians, by conversation with them, or from common fame. There is a remarkable letter of Julian's, which may give us a just idea of this matter, and of the emulation raised among the Pagans, by the excellency of the Christian morals[b].

II. To go a step further backwards, it is reasonable to think, that from the time that the Hebrew Scriptures had been translated into Greek, either in *whole* or in *part*, (277 years, at least,

[a] See Baltus, Défense des SS. Peres, l. iv. c. 6. p. 475, &c. Gale's Court of the Gentiles, pt. ii. b. 3. c. 4.

[b] Julian. ad Arsacium Pontif. Galat. Epist. xlix. p. 429. edit. Lips.

before Christ,) I say, from that time it is reasonable to think, that the Pagans improved their theology and morality, more or less, by them[c]. It has indeed been suggested by a learned writer, that even the Greek version of the Seventy was altogether unknown to the learned Pagans for many years after, or entirely neglected by them[d]. But his reasonings on that head are short of proof, and have been, in a great measure, confuted[e]; so that I need not say more of them.

III. I am next to observe, that though it were supposed that the Pagans never read the Scriptures, yet they might become acquainted, in some degree, with the Jewish doctrines, by conversing with Jews dispersed into distant quarters. And if Pythagoras, or Plato, or Aristotle, or others, learned something of the Jewish theology or morality this way, it comes to the same thing in the main; for then they owed such knowledge, in the last resort, to Divine revelation.

IV. But supposing that those or other Pagans had neither read the Jewish Scriptures, nor conversed directly with Jews; yet if they had conversed with Egyptians, or Persians, or Phœnicians, or Chaldeans, or others that had been before instructed by the Hebrews, they might in that way come at the knowledge of revealed truths. The Egyptians had many opportunities, at various times, of imbibing the Jewish principles, and adopting their rites[f]. The Persians also, especially from the time of Cyrus, (536 years before Christ,) had, or might have had, a competent knowledge of the true God, and the true religion from the Jews, and might communicate the same to others. Accordingly, some learned men have thought that Pythagoras fetched his knowledge of Divine things from thence, taking them from the Magians, and particularly from Zoroastres[g], that is, at second

[c] Ptolemæus Rex Ægypti——jussit conscribi, atque poni in templum, ut venientibus de Achaia, atque aliis provinciis, philosophis, poetis, et historiographis cupientibus, legendi copia non negaretur. Unde et maxime argumenta sumentes philosophi, poetæ, atque historiographi, sicuti voluerunt, ad sua Paganitatis mendacia transtulerunt, aliisque nominibus rudes puerorum animos edocentes, legem Dei divinam irritam seculo facere properarunt, impietatisque semina in sono verborum, in periculosis sententiis confirmarunt; quorum causa dicebat et Dominus, *fures atque latrones eos fuisse* in omnibus, atque ab omnibus cognoscendos. *Philastr. de Hæres.* cap. cxxxviii. p. 305. Conf. Clem. Alex. 366, 368.

[d] Hody de Bibl. Text. p. 101.

[e] See Basnage's Hist. of the Jews, lib. v. cap. 6. sect. 16. p. 417. lib. vi. cap. 5. sect. 9. p. 490.

[f] See Witsii Ægyptiaca, lib. iii. cap. 12. p. 261,—&c.

[g] See Prideaux, Connect. part i. b. iv. p. 228, 229.

hand from the Jews. The Phœnicians likewise, being near neighbours to the Hebrews, might learn many things of them, and convey the same to the Greeks or other nations. And thus some learned men account for what Orpheus and Linus may have written consonant to Scripture doctrine[h].

Add to this, that it has been generally the method of Divine providence, from the time that the Jews grew up to be a people, to notify the true God, and the true religion by them, to the princes and potentates of the world, either in the very capital of their empire, as at Nineveh, Babylon, &c. or in such place and manner as should render the thing most notorious. It cannot be doubted, but that the fame of the true God and true religion must have spread, that way, over a great part of the Gentile world. The several public edicts of Artaxerxes[i], Darius[k], Cyrus[l], the elder Darius[m], and of Nebuchadnezzar[n], makes the supposition unquestionable[o]; to say nothing of other princes before and after them.

V. Another channel of conveyance was *tradition* down from Abraham, who was the grand restorer of true religion, before sunk in Chaldea, (and perhaps in several other places,) and father of many and great nations. He has this testimony given him by God himself, in Genesis: "I know him, that he will "command his children and his household after him, and they "shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment[p]." We want ancient history to inform us more particularly how religion was scattered about the world by this means; only we may be certain in the general, that so it was. If the whole nation of the Assyrians were the posterity of Abraham, so called from Ashurim[q], descended from Abraham by Keturah, (as an ancient writer in Josephus[r] asserts, and a learned modern[s] now lately has undertaken to maintain,) we may then the more easily

[h] Cum Phœnicibus vetus Atticæ incolis, Ionum antiquissimis, intercessisse commercium Grotius docuit. Linum a Phœnice venisse tradunt veteres: et Orpheus sua a Phœnicibus hausit; Phœnices ab Hebræis. *Wits. Ægypt.* p. 174. Vid. Grot. de Verit. Rel. Christian. lib. i. cap. 16. p. 32.

[i] Ezra vii. 12, 13.

[k] Ezra vi. 10.

[l] Ezra i. 1, 2. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23.

[m] Dan. vi. 25, 26.

[n] Dan. iv. 1, 2. iii. 29.

[o] See Postscript to second part of Scripture Vindicated, vol. iv. p. 289, &c.

[p] Gen. xviii. 19.

[q] Gen. xxv. 3.

[r] Joseph. Antiq. Jud. lib. i. cap. xv. p. 44. edit. Havercamp.

[s] Joh. Frider. Schroerus. Imperium Babylonis et Nini, sect. ii. p. 105, &c.

account for the quick repentance of the Ninevites, upon the warning given them by a *single* prophet of Israel, as well for their manner of expressing their repentance; not like *idolaters*, but true worshippers[t]: they had not altogether forgot the religion of their fathers. This, I say, may be a probable account of that remarkable affair; unless we choose rather, as some do[u], to resolve it all into the acquaintance they before had with the nation of the Jews, and the awful sense they were under of the many wonderful works God had wrought for that people. But I proceed.

VI. There is yet another more general way by which *revealed* religion, in some of the principal heads or articles of it, has been diffused through the world; I mean *tradition* delivered down from Noah, or from the *first parents* of the whole race, who received it immediately from God. The doctrine of *one* true God *supreme* might probably come this way, and be so diffused to all mankind[x]. The like may be said of the doctrine of an overruling *providence*, and of the *immortality* of the *soul*, and a future state of *rewards* and *punishments*. These general principles, so universally believed and taught in all ages and countries, are much better referred to *Patriarchal tradition*, than to any later and narrower source[y]. I know not whether the same observation might not be as justly made of some other doctrines; as

[t] See Jonah iii. 5, 8, 9. Matt. xii. 41.

[u] Etenim cum Nineve emporium fuerit per totum orientem celeberrimum, et cum ipsis Judæis quoque incolis ejus commercia intercesserint, religionis Judaicæ profecto ignari esse non poterant.——Atque istud sane eo mihi fit verisimilius, quod Jonæ divinam iram annuntianti statim habuerint fidem, et ad ejus præscriptum mores suos composuerint. Credisne, si religionem Judaicam, aut pro *inepta* habuissent, aut *falsa*, aut nulla ejus imbuti fuissent notitia, eos virum Judæum mandata numinis ad eos perferentem tam facile fuisse admissuros? Næ, qui istud asseruerit, indolem hominum parum exploratam habet. *Budd. Parerga*. p. 426. Compare Lowth on Jon. iii. 3.

[x] Discat ergo Faustus, vel potius illi qui ejus literis delectantur, *monarchiæ* opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere; sed gentes non usque adeo ad falsos Deos esse delapsas ut opinionem amitterent *unius veri Dei*, ex quo est omnis qualiscunque natura. *Augustin. cont. Manich.* lib. xx. cap. 19. p. 345.

[y] Certum est multos ritus et traditiones Ethnicorum longe antiquiores esse ecclesia Judaica, ideoque a Judæis eos hæc non desumpsisse, sed potius a *communi fonte*, nempe a *patriarchis;* quorum multi, ut Terachus Abrahami pater, in idololatriam degenerarunt. Nihilominus multas retinuerunt *traditiones laudabiles:* ut de *uno Deo* cæteris omnibus superiore, de *immortalitate animarum*, et de *judicio* post mortem secuturo, ac de *virtute heroica*. Has traditiones multo probabilius esse videtur eos ab antiquissimis patriarchis, Japheti, Chami, imo et Semi posteris idololatricis accepisse, quam a Judæis. Antiquissima Ægyptiorum et Romanorum templa sine *imaginibus* fuere: *decimas* Cabiris datas fuisse constat ex Dion. Halicarnassensi. *Cumberland. Origin. Antiq.* p. 451. Conf. Witsii Ægyptiaca, lib. ii. cap. 15.

of the *creation* of the world[z], and *corruption* of human *nature*[a], and perhaps of several more of slighter consideration.

Besides *doctrines*, there have been common *rites* and customs derived very probably from the same general source, because widely (or in a manner universally) spread among mankind; such as the custom of *sacrifices*, and of some regard paid to one day in *seven*, and of dedicating a *tenth* or *tithe* to God.

That *sacrifices* were a part of the Patriarchal religion, not owing to *human* invention, but to *Divine* appointment, has been so often and so strongly argued, and the pretences to the contrary so fully and so justly exploded[b], that there remains but little room for dispute upon that head.

As to the sacredness of the *seventh* day, there appear footsteps of it among the earliest nations; though the reason of the thing was not sufficiently understood by the Gentiles in later times. Aristobulus[c], Philo[d], Josephus[e], take notice of the *universality* of the notion and practice, and it is by them made use of as an argument to shew, how the Pagans had borrowed from the Hebrews. They might better have said, how *both* had borrowed from the same common fountain of *Patriarchal* tradition. And this will be the best way of compromising the dispute between such moderns as pretend that the Hebrews borrowed the custom of reckoning time by *weeks* from the Egyptians[f], and those, on the other hand, who say, with more probability, that the Egyptians borrowed it from the Hebrews[g]. The truth seems to be, that neither borrowed from each other, in this particular, but that both of them drew from the same common original, Patriarchal tradition[h].

[z] Vid. Witsii Ægyptiaca, p. 170—174. Grotius de Verit. R. Ch. lib. i. cap. 16.

[a] Vid. Buddæi Selecta Juris N. et Gent. p. 242—244. Huetii Quæst. Alnet. lib. ii. cap. ix. p. 165.

[b] Vid. Johann. Meyer. Diatribe de Festis, cap. i. per tot. Sam. Basnag. Exercit. Historico-crit. p. 676. Buddæi Select. Juris Nat. p. 231, &c. Eccles. Apostol. p. 141. Carpzovii Introduct. ad Libr. Bibl. par. i. p. 111, &c. Frid. Bucheri Antiq. Bibl. p. 388. Shuckford's Sacred and Profane Hist. vol. i. p. 79, &c.

[c] Aristobulus apud Euseb. Præp. Evan. lib. xiii. cap. 12. p. 667.

[d] Philo de Vit. Mos. lib. ii. p. 656, 657. De Mund. Opif. p. 20.

[e] Οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐ πόλις Ἑλλήνων οὐδετισοῦν, οὐδὲ βάρβαρος, οὐδὲ ἐν ἔθνος, ἔνθα μὴ τὸ τῆς ἑβδομάδος, ἣν ἀργοῦμεν ἡμεῖς, τὸ ἔθος οὐ διαπεφοίτηκε, *Joseph. contr. Apion.* lib. ii. cap. 39. p. 494. Conf. Theoph. Antioch. ad Autol. lib. ii. cap. 17. p. 134. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 713.

[f] Marsham Can. Chron. sect. ix. Spencer de Leg. Hebr. lib. i. cap. v. p. 73, 74.

[g] Joh. Meyer de Festis, cap. v. p. 105. Witsii Ægyptiaca, 241, 242.

[h] Re accuratius pensitata, haud difficulter intelligimus, non quidem ab Ægyptiis, ut Herodotus asserit, sed ab Ebræis illorumque *majoribus*,

I mentioned a third article, near akin to the other, and probably coeval with it, namely, that of paying a *tithe* to God. I shall account for it in the words of the learned Dean Prideaux, who had well considered it, and was very able to judge of it. He says thus:

"A *seventh* part of our time having, from the beginning of "the world, been consecrated by God himself to his public wor-"ship; from that time there was a necessity of consecrating "also a part of our substance for the support thereof[i].—I doubt "not, from the beginning such a certain part was, by the first "parents of mankind, consecrated to this purpose[k].—And if we "consider of how general a practice the payment of tithes an-"ciently was, amongst most nations of the earth, for the support "of the worship of those gods they adored, and the many in-"stances we have of this usage among the Syrians, Phœnicians, "Arabians, Ethiopians, Greeks, Romans, and other nations; "there is no other rational account to be given how so many "different people of *various languages*, and *various customs* from "each other, and who also worshipped *various deities*, should "all come to agree so exactly in this one matter; but that it "had been an ancient institution, *sacredly* observed by the *first* "*fathers* of mankind, and after the flood transmitted by them "in a lasting *tradition* to the nations descended from them[l]." Thus far that judicious writer, who further intimates, that the Patriarchs, probably, had a *Divine* direction for fixing upon that proportion of their substance, and for settling the rule.

What has been observed of the *theology* and *rituals* derived down by tradition, may in a great measure be applied to *morals* also: for there can be no reasonable doubt made, but that the soundest and best part of the Pagan Ethics came down to them in the same way, and so were remotely owing to *Divine revela-*

quin *primis parentibus* quibus hancce legem positivam promulgaverat Deus, notitiam ejus ad omnes dimanasse gentes. Illis enim suffragari nequeo, qui antiquorum quæ afferri solent testimonia de *septimo die* post lunæ ortum, aut die Apollini in fastis sacro, capiunt. *Budd. Select.* p. 235.

Such as would see more of this matter, may consult Grotius de Verit. Rel. Chr. lib. i. cap. 16. p. 41. Selden. de Jur. Nat. et Gent. lib. iii. cap. 15–23. Huet. Dem. Evang. Prop. iv. cap. xi. p. 126.

[i] Prideaux's Original and Right of Tithes, p. 1.

[k] Ibid. p. 7.

[l] Prideaux's Original and Right of Tithes, p. 10. As to the universality of the practice, see Selden of Tithes, chap. iii. Spencer de Leg. Hebr. lib. iii. cap. 10. p. 720, &c. Huet. Quæst. Alnet. lib. iii. cap. 3. p. 322, &c.

tion, as hath been sufficiently argued both by *ancients*[m] and *moderns*[n], and I need not repeat.

The sum then of all is this; that the Gentile world, before Christ came, had, at sundry times, and in divers manners, some beams of Divine light sent them from above, to help the dimness of the light of nature. And what through *Scripture* or *tradition*, what by direct or indirect conveyances, they were never entirely destitute of supernatural notices, never left to the mere *light of nature*, either for forming a knowledge of God and religion, or for directing their life and manners. It remains now only to draw a few corollaries from what has been here advanced.

I. From hence may be observed, upon how precarious a bottom the unbelievers of our times have built their notion of the *sufficiency* of natural light. They plead that it is sufficient, because the bulk of mankind, for many ages formerly, had *nothing else:* a manifest error in point of *fact*, and for which they have not so much as the appearance of *proof*.

If it be said, (though it is saying wrong,) that we ought to prove the *affirmative*, I have endeavoured to shew how far we can go towards it. But the truth is, they ought to prove the *negative*, since they rest their cause upon it, and have little else to support it. If it appears but probable or possible that the bulk of mankind should have been instructed in such a way as I have been mentioning, that is enough for us: but they that build the *sufficiency* of natural light upon this supposition, that mankind from the creation, for the most part, had *no other light* but that, must either prove that they *had not*, or they do nothing. They must either make good their *premises*, or give up their *conclusion*. If they build upon a *negative*, they must *prove* the *negative*, or they will be found to build upon the sand.

II. It may next be observed, that the infidels of our days, in setting up *natural* light to rival *supernatural*, commit the same error as the Pagans of old did. All that they have to boast of, as demonstrable now by natural light, was, very probably, discovered first by *revelation:* and it is both ungrateful and unreasonable to oppose revelation with what has been *borrowed* from

[m] Clem. Alex. Eusebius.

[n] Jenkin's Reasonableness, vol. i. p. 376. Nicolls Confer. par. ii. p. 164. Gale's Court of the Gentiles, book i. p. 15. book ii. p. 88, &c. Postscript to second part of Scripture Vindicated, vol. iv. p. 289.

it. But that is not the worst of the case: for revelation once set aside, the result will be (as it ever used to be) the taking up with a *part* of religion, and a part of morality, instead of the *whole*, and then corrupting even that *part* with *adulterous* mixtures. Natural light cannot *demonstrate* all that revealed light has discovered, either of *religion* itself, or the *sanctions* of it: besides, natural reason, left to itself, will undoubtedly bring in many corruptions, as past experience sufficiently testifies: and it is certain, that the wisdom of *man* will never come up to the purity or perfection of the wisdom of *God*. Men will not, if they could, neither can they, if they would, carve out so pure a religion for themselves, as God, in the holy Scriptures, has carved out for them.

III. But I must further observe, that our modern unbelievers are in one point very singular, and come far short in that article, of the sagacity and good sense of their Pagan predecessors. None of the ancient unbelievers ever pretended to set up the mere wisdom of man, as such, to the wisdom of God; never thought that *revelations* were either not desirable, or that they were altogether *needless*, or *useless*. They generally pretended to revelation, of one kind or other, and were not so weak as to imagine that their *natural* parts or endowments were sufficient to supersede all use of *supernatural* notices, if such might be had. The common reason of mankind would have strongly remonstrated against such a plea; and it would have been thought betraying any cause, to make use of it. For to pretend to believe that there is a *God*, and a *providence*, and a *future state*, and at the same time to desire no external revelation from God, no instructions from heaven, (as needing none, and being wise enough without any,) is so wild and so extravagant a thought, that nothing can match it or compare with it. But such will commonly be the fate of attempting any *new* ways of *opposing* Divine revelation, as well as of *defending* it; because indeed the best in each kind have been long since anticipated: and both *believers* and *unbelievers* must now be content with traversing over again the same *beaten* tracks, or they will take into worse, and will but expose their cause, instead of serving it.

IV. I shall conclude therefore with recommending to you, my Reverend Brethren, the old and well tried principles of the *ancient* Apologists. They never had a thought that all revealed religion had been confined, for so many ages past, to the Jews

only: but they looked upon the Jews as the proclaimers and publishers of true religion to the rest of the world. The Israelites were a *kingdom of priests*, an *holy nation*[o]. They were made the preachers of righteousness to other nations, in order to convey the main substantials of religion all over the world; as is more than once intimated in Scripture itself[p]. It is in this view that the ancient Apologists, both Jews and Christians, considered this matter. Josephus therefore observes, that "like as the "Divine Being pervades the whole universe, so the Divine law "(given by Moses) passes through all mankind[q]."

Of the same mind was Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, of the second century; who says, "Moses, the servant of God, was the "proclaimer (minister) of the Divine law to all the world, but "principally to the Hebrews, otherwise called Jews[r]."

To the same purpose speaks Origen, of the next century: "Moses's writings have brought many to the faith, even among "those that were aliens from the commonwealth of Israel: "because indeed the original lawgiver, who delivered his laws "to Moses, was no other than God himself, the Creator of the "universe, as the same writings testify. And it was meet, that "the Maker of all the world, giving laws to all the world, should "send such efficacy along with them, as should work its way "among all nations[s]."

Athanasius, of the following century, expresses the same thought, in terms still clearer, and, if possible, stronger.

"The law was not intended for the Jews only, neither were "the prophets sent only for their sakes: but the prophets were "sent to the Jews, and were persecuted also by the Jews, while "they were in reality a kind of sacred school to all the world,

[o] Exod. xix. 6.

[p] See the texts to this purpose, cited in Jenkin's Reasonableness, &c. vol. i. and in the Postscript to Scripture Vindicated, vol. iv. part ii. p. 289. 292.

[q] Καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ Θεὸς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου πεφοίτηκεν, οὕτως ὁ νόμος διὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων βεβάδικεν. *Joseph. contr. Apion.* lib. ii. cap. 39. p. 494. *Conf. Phil. de Vit. Mos.* lib. i. p. 603.

[r] Τούτου μὲν οὖν τοῦ Θείου νόμου διάκονος γεγένηται Μωσῆς, ὁ καὶ θεράπων τοῦ Θεοῦ, παντὶ μὲν τῷ κόσμῳ, παντελῶς δὲ τοῖς Ἑβραίοις, τοῖς καὶ Ἰουδαίοις καλουμένοις. *Theophr.* lib. iii. cap. 8. p. 308. conf. cap. x. p. 312.

[s] Τοῦ δὲ Μωσέως τὰ γράμματα πολλοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ἀναστροφῆς κεκίνηκε πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι, κατὰ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τῶν γραμμάτων, ὁ πρῶτος αὐτὰ νομοθετήσας, καὶ Μωσεῖ παραδοὺς, Θεὸς ὁ κτίσας τὸν κόσμον ἦν. Καὶ γὰρ ἔπρεπε τὸν ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργὸν, νόμους τεθειμένον ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, δύναμιν παρασχεῖν τοῖς λόγοις, κρατῆσαι τῶν πανταχοῦ δυναμένην. *Orig. contr. Cels.* lib. i. p. 15.

"as to what relates to the knowledge of God, and the concerns "of the soul[t]."

I shall add but one writer more, the judicious Theodoret, of the fifth century, who, speaking of the Jews, says, "God or-"dained this nation, to be a guide to all nations in Divine "knowledge. For like as he appointed sometimes Moses, and "at other times Joshua, and then Samuel, and afterwards one "or other of the prophets, to take the charge of this people, "and by a single man, of approved wisdom, benefited the whole "brotherhood: so by the single nation of Israel did God vouch-"safe to call all nations, partakers of one common nature, to "become partners also in the same common religion[u]."

From hence may be clearly seen what the current notion was among the ancient most judicious advocates for Divine revelation; namely, that though the Law of Moses was in a peculiar manner designed for one people, (because the select preachers of righteousness, the ministers or publishers of religion, were to be kept a distinct order of men from the rest,) yet the most necessary points of revealed religion, which concerned mankind in general, were to be communicated, more or less, to all the world, and that by means of the Jews, after they grew up to be considerable. Other nations or persons, ordinarily, were not obliged to become Jews: and therefore Moses did not insist upon it with his father-in-law Jethro; neither did Elisha expect it of Naaman the Syrian, nor Jonas of the Ninevites, nor Daniel of Nebuchadnezzar; neither did the prophets insist upon it with the Chaldeans, Egyptians, Sidonians, Tyrians, Edomites, or Moabites; as Grotius has well observed[x]: but though they were

[t] Οὐδὲ γὰρ διὰ Ἰουδαίους μόνους ὁ νόμος ἦν, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτοὺς μόνους οἱ προφῆται ἐπέμποντο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Ἰουδαίους μὲν ἐπέμποντο, καὶ παρὰ Ἰουδαίων ἐδιώκοντο· πάσης δὲ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἦσαν διδασκάλιον ἱερὸν τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ γνώσεως, καὶ τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν πολιτείας. *Athen. contr. Gent.* cap, xii. p. 57. ed. Bened.

[u] Τῶν γὰρ ἐθνῶν ἁπάντων τοῦτο τὸ ἔθνος θεογνωσίας ἐχειροτόνει διδάσκαλον. Καὶ καθάπερ εἰς τοῦδε τοῦ ἔθνους ἐπιμέλειαν, νῦν μὲν ἐξελέξατο τὸν Μωϋσῆν, νῦν δὲ τὸν Ἰησοῦν, καὶ πάλιν τὸν Σαμουὴλ, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἄλλον τῶν προφητῶν, καὶ δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου φιλοσοφίαν ἀσκοῦντος, ἅπαντας εὐεργέτει τοὺς ὁμοφύλους· οὕτω δι' ἑνὸς ἔθνους τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα φύσιν, εἰς τὴν εὐσεβείας κοινωνίαν ἐκάλει. *Theodor. de Provid. Serm.* x. p. 454. Conf. p. 456.

[x] Grotius de Jur. N. et G. lib. i. cap. 1. sect. 16. Grot. de Verit. R. Chr. lib. v. cap. 7.

The words of Clemens of Rome (an apostolical man) are so just, and so moderate, and so proper to compose all contests on this head, that they are well worth the quoting in this place.

Ἀτενίσωμεν εἰς τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ἴδωμεν ὡς ἔστι τίμιον τῷ Θεῷ αἷμα αὐτοῦ, ὅ, τι διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν

not obliged to become Jews, they were obliged to admit the *true* God, and the most *substantial* parts of true religion; the knowledge of which had been handed down by *tradition*, and was often renewed and revived by means of the Jews, who were the standing witnesses and memorials of it.

The consideration of these things may, I conceive, be of good use for the preserving just and worthy ideas of the Divine wisdom and goodness in his dispensations towards mankind, and for the more effectual silencing the ignorant or malicious cavils of unbelievers.

To be short: our adversaries can never prove that revelation was *needless*, unless they could first prove that there had been no *revelation*; because they cannot know what natural light could have done without it, unless they could first shew that it ever was without it. Revelation might, for any thing they can tell, have been absolutely necessary to *discover*, even that *natural religion* which they plead for, and which appears so easy and obvious to the understanding, now it has been discovered. But if revelation was ever *needful* for that purpose, then, by the tacit confession even of our adversaries, it must be *true*; and if it be *true*, then we are obliged to embrace the *whole* of it as God has given it us, and not a *part* only, according to every man's judgment or fancy; which is what these gentlemen seem to be aiming at under all their disguises.

However that be, they have certainly taken the wrong way to

ἐκχυθὲν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ μετανοίας χάριν ὑπήνεγκεν. Ἀνέλθωμεν εἰς τὰς γενεὰς πάσας, καὶ καταμάθωμεν, ὅτι ἐν γενεᾷ καὶ γενεᾷ, μετανοίας τόπον ἔδωκεν ὁ δεσπότης τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπιστραφῆναι ἐπ' αὐτόν. Νῶε ἐκήρυξεν μετάνοιαν, καὶ οἱ ὑπακούσαντες ἐσώθησαν. Ἰωνᾶς Νινευῖταις καταστροφὴν ἐκήρυξεν, οἱ δὲ μετανοήσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν, ἐξιλάσαντο τὸν Θεὸν ἱκετεύσαντες, καὶ ἔλαβον σωτηρίαν, καίπερ ἀλλότριοι τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄντες. Clem. Rom. Epist. i. cap. vii. p. 32.

Which may be Englished thus: "Let us look up steadfastly to the "blood of Christ, and let us consider "how precious in God's sight his "blood is, which, being shed for our "*salvation*, hath obtained the privi-"lege of repentance for all the world. "Run we back to all past ages, and "there we may learn, that in every "age the Lord gave place for repent-"ance to as many as would turn to "him. Noah preached up repentance, "and they that hearkened unto him "were saved. Jonah denounced de-"struction against the Ninevites, and "they, repenting of their sins, and "praying, appeased God, and were "saved, though aliens from God."

I may hereupon remark as follows: I. That as many as are saved upon their *repentance*, are yet saved by and through the *blood* of *Christ*. Repentance is the *conditional* cause of it, Christ's death the *efficacious* and *meritorious*.

II. That such privilege of being saved, upon true repentance, through Christ, was not confined to the Jews only, but was extended to all mankind, in all ages, according to Clemens.

come at their point, have committed an ὕστερον πρότερον in their main argument; pretending to disprove a fact, by arguing that the thing was *needless*, when there is no possible way of proving the thing *needless*, but by first disproving the fact.

An additional Illustration to Note [h] p. 20, *from* Archbishop Sharpe, vol. iv. Serm. 12. p. 272, 273. *relating to the* traditional *Computation of Time by* Weeks.

"WHAT account can be given of *all the world's* computing "their time by *weeks*; that is, counting *seven days*, and then "beginning again: I say, what possible account can be given of "this, but that original distribution of time that God had ob-"served in the works of the creation, and had delivered to the "*first parents* of mankind, and they to their children. For men "to reckon time by *days* and *nights*, is obvious to sense; nay, "and to compute time by *months* and *years*, hath a sufficient "foundation in it from nature; for mankind cannot avoid the "observing the course of the *moon* and of the *sun*, which makes "*months* and *years*: but why they should count *seven days*, and "then begin again, *that* hath no foundation in nature, but must "be taught them from the *tradition* of their fathers, which could "have no other original than that which I am now insisting on. "And yet this way of computing time by a *weekly* revolution, "obtained throughout all the world, as far as we can judge, from "the very beginning of time. That the *Patriarchs* did so some "hundreds of years before the law of the *Sabbath* was given to "the children of Israel, we have sufficient evidence from sundry "texts of Scripture. That all the ancient nations of which we "have any history, Egyptians, Chaldeans, Greeks, Romans, nay, "and the barbarous nations too; I say, that they did so like-"wise, is proved to us from the ancientest records that are "extant about them. This practice now, that had no foundation "in nature, obtaining thus universally throughout the whole "world, and that from time immemorial, is to me a demonstra-"tion that they had it from the *first parents* of mankind, and "that it was founded in God's institution of the *seventh* day "being set apart for his service.

"I do grant indeed, they did not know the true reason why

" they thus counted their days by *sevens:* for the tradition of " the *creation* of the world, and the institution of the *Sabbath,* " was in time and by degrees lost among them. But yet thus " still they computed their time: and we that have the holy " Scriptures know upon what grounds that computation was " begun."

What Dr. Williams also has, upon the same argument, in his Second Sermon *of his first year's course of* Boyle's Lectures, *is well worth the perusing,* p. 23, &c.

An additional Note to p. 26. *from* Dr. Sherlock's Discourse on the Knowledge of Christ, p. 19, 20, 21.

" GOD chose the posterity of Abraham to be a *public* and " constant demonstration of his power, and providence, and care " of good men. For when God chose the posterity of Abraham " to be his peculiar people, he did not design to *exclude* the rest " of the world from his care and providence, and all possible " means of salvation; as the Apostle argues in Rom. iii. 29. " *Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles?* " *Yes, of the Gentiles also.* Which argument, if it have any " force in it, must prove God's respecting the Gentiles before " the preaching of the Gospel, as well as since; because it is " founded on that *natural relation* which God owns to all man- " kind, as their merciful Creator and Governor; which gives the " Gentiles as well as Jews an interest in his care and providence.

" This plainly evinces, that all those particular favours which " God bestowed on Israel, were not owing to any *partial* fond- " ness and respect to that people: but the design of all was, to " encourage the *whole world* to worship the *God of Israel,* who " gave so many demonstrations of his power and providence. " For this reason God brought Israel out of Egypt, with *great* " *signs* and *wonders,* and a *mighty hand,* (when he could have " done it with less noise and observation,) that he might the " more gloriously triumph over the numerous *gods* of Egypt, and " all their *enchantments* and *divinations,* and that he might be " honoured on Pharaoh and all his host. For this reason he

" maintained them in the wilderness at the constant expense of " *miracles*, fought all their battles for them; and many times by " weak and contemptible means overthrew great and puissant " armies, drove out the inhabitants of Canaan, and gave them " possession of that good land. I say, one great and principal " design of all this was, to convince *the world* of the majesty and " power of the *God of Israel*, that they might renounce their " foolish *idolatries* and country *gods*, and consent in the worship " of that *one God*, who alone doth wondrous things. This " account the Psalmist gives of it, that God wrought such visi- " ble and miraculous deliverances for Israel, to make his glory " and his power known among the Heathen: *The Lord hath made* " *known his salvation, his righteousness hath he openly shewed in the* " *sight of the heathen*. Psalm xcviii. 2. *That the heathen might fear* " *the name of the Lord, and all the kings of the earth his glory:* " i. e. That all nations might worship God, and all kings submit " their crowns and sceptres to him. Psalm cii. 15. That by this " means they might be instructed in that important truth: *That* " *the Lord is great, and greatly to be praised, that he is to be feared* " *above all gods: for all the gods of the nations are idols*, but *he* " *made the heavens*. Psalm xcvi. And as God set up the people " of Israel, as a visible demonstration to all the world of his " power and providence, so he committed his *laws and oracles* to " them; from whence *the rest of the world*, when they pleased, " might fetch the best rules of life, and the most certain notices " of the Divine will. In such ways God instructed *the world*, in " former ages, by the *light of nature*, and the *examples of good* " *men*, and the *sermons of the prophets*, and the public example of " a *whole nation*, which God chose for that purpose."

CHRISTIANITY VINDICATED

AGAINST

INFIDELITY:

PART II.

A

SECOND CHARGE

DELIVERED TO

THE CLERGY

OF THE

ARCHDEACONRY OF MIDDLESEX.

A

SECOND CHARGE

DELIVERED TO

THE CLERGY

OF THE

ARCHDEACONRY OF MIDDLESEX, &c.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

THE growth of *infidelity* has for two or three years last past been more talked of than ever; and I am afraid there has been too much occasion for it. Yet I am willing to believe, that the advances supposed to have been lately made on that side, carry a great deal more of noise and show in them, than of real strength. *Deism* may perhaps have become fiercer or bolder than formerly; and it may be owing, not so much to any additional advantages it has really gained, as to the disappointments it has met with.

If we look between thirty and forty years backwards, we shall find that the complaints of good men then ran in very high and strong terms. "It is dreadful to think (says a noted "author of that time[a]) what numbers of men are poisoned by "infidel principles. For—they begin to talk them in shops "and stalls; and the cavils of Spinoza and Hobbes are grown "common even to the rabble." What more deplorable could

[a] Nicholls's Conference with a Theist, Pref. p. 5.

be said of us at this day? The like complaints were made some time after, about twenty years ago: "That *infidelity* had taken "deep root, had been cultivated with care, had spread its "branches wide, shot up to an amazing height, and brought "forth fruits in great abundance. The Mosaic account of the "creation was represented as mere *allegory* and *fable*: the *inspi-* "*ration* of holy Writ so explained as to amount to a denial of it; "the authority of the present *Canon* of Scripture disputed; the "spuriousness of several passages, and some books of it, more "than insinuated; *priests*, without distinction, traduced as im- "posers on the credulity of mankind; and those religious ordi- "nances which they were appointed to dispense, even the chief "of them, *Baptism* and the *Supper of the Lord*, spoken of with "such a degree of ungodly mockery and insolent scorn, as filled "the hearts of good Christians with horror and astonishment: "nay, *religion* itself was, in some of the loose writings, so "described, as if it were nothing but a melancholy *frenzy* and "pious *enthusiasm*[b]." Such were the representations made in those days. Yet Christianity (God be thanked) has still kept up its head, has reigned triumphant all the time; and I trust will reign, and that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

I know not whether these licentious principles were the proper produce of our own soil, or may not be rather said to have been transplanted hither from abroad[c]; where, it is certain, they had taken root and spread for a hundred years or more, before they met with any favourable reception, or made any public figure in this grave and serious, and for the most part well disposed kingdom. Mr. Hobbes has been reputed the first or principal man that introduced them here, or however that openly and glaringly espoused them[d]. And it is not unlikely

[b] Representation of the present State of Religion by a Committee of Convocation, A. D. 1711. Compare An Inquiry into the Causes of the late Growth of Infidelity, written in 1705.

[c] "It seems to have been brought "over hither from some of our neigh- "bouring countries, together with the "rest of our fashions." *Inquiry into the Causes*, &c. p. 3.

[d] Anglorum primus est (faxit Deus, sit ultimus) qui impietatem palam ostentare ausus est. *Parker, Disputat. de Deo*, p. 219.

In the account of the Growth of Deism, written in 1696, it is said, "It is now three years since you and "I had a serious discourse concern- "ing the rise and progress of Deism, "which is an opinion of *late years* "crept into England, though not so "widely spread here as in other parts "of Europe," p. 1.

The Inquiry dates the growth of them from about the year 1660. *Inquiry*, &c. p. 7.

that he imbibed his loose principles in France and Italy, as he also composed his famed pieces while residing in *foreign* parts. *Deism* seems to have sprung up abroad about the middle of the sixteenth century. A learned foreigner takes notice of the rise of the sect in his time; and he wrote in 1563. His account of them is as follows: "There are several who profess to believe, "that there is a certain *Deity*, or *God*, as the Turks and Jews "do: but as for *Jesus Christ*, and all the doctrine testified by "the Evangelists and Apostles, they take them for fables and "dreams.—They have entertained some opinions concerning "religion, which are more extravagant than those of the Turks, "or any other *infidels*. I hear that some of this band call "themselves *Deists*, a *new* word in opposition to that of *Atheists*. "—These Deists of which we speak ridicule all religion; though "they accommodate themselves to the religion of those with "whom they are obliged to live, out of *complaisance* or *fear*. "Some amongst them have a sort of notion of the *immortality* "of the soul: others agree with the *Epicureans* in that, as well "as on the Divine *providence* with regard to mankind. I am "struck with horror, when I think that there are such monsters "among those that bear the name of Christians[e]." Thus far Peter Viret: for he is the man that gives this account of the modern Deists: and notwithstanding their complimenting themselves with a new plausible name, he scruples not to call their system of doctrine an *execrable Atheism*. Not intending, I presume, that they directly disowned the being of a God, (for he intimates the contrary,) but that they did it *consequentially*, or that they did as effectually undermine and destroy all the *influences* of religion, as if they had been professed Atheists: and so, in effect, their doctrine amounted to the same thing, but gave less offence. What *Atheism* chiefly aims at, is to sit loose from *present* restraints and *future* reckonings: and those two purposes may be competently served by *Deism*[f], which is but a more

[e] See Bayle's Dictionary in Peter Viret, p. 2973.

[f] "It is certain that *infidelity*, as it "is at present countenanced and "maintained by those that would be "called the Freethinkers of the age, "does give as much encouragement "to immorality as most *libertines* "either need or desire. *Atheism* in-"deed makes shorter work of it, and "at one blow cuts asunder all the ties "of religion and duty. But that is "too bold a step: it thwarts not only "the common principles of *reason*, "but even the general bent and incli-"nation of human nature. It is an "affront to *good breeding* and *civility*, "as well as to *good sense* and common "*morality*: whereas *infidelity* will an-"swer the ends and designs of *liber-*

refined kind of *Atheism*. For when a man presumes to take God's business out of his hands, and under the name of *reason* prescribes both the *laws* and the *sanctions*, as his own fancy or inclination shall suggest; it is obvious to perceive, that God is as much excluded this way from being *Lord over us*, as if his existence were denied. And therefore, in this view, *Atheism* and *Deism* amount very nearly to the same thing, having the same effect in application and practice; for which reason, some conclude both under the same name[g]. The good man, before mentioned, was struck with horror at the thought of there being such *monsters* as he had described; men bred up to *Christianity*, and acquainted also with *pure* and *reformed* Christianity. An infidel under *Paganism* might have something to plead from the *impurities* allowed of in the Pagan worship, and from the mass of *superstition* and *imposture* under which the remains of *true religion* lay buried: but what colourable excuse can any person invent for his *infidelity* under the brightest sunshine of the Gospel? None certainly. For, to use the words of a famous writer, and no bigot in the cause, "Unless the *reigning passion* of his soul, or "some prodigious *stupidity* obstruct, he must see, that embracing "the Gospel profession is infinitely a more reasonable choice "than the way he is in[h]." I know not how far an affectation of *singularity*, or an ambition to be thought *wiser* than the rest of the world, may have carried some persons. A few shining characters in history, of any kind, have often drawn after them a considerable number of very unequal imitators. There have been some extraordinary geniuses, who, by correcting *vulgar errors*, have acquired immense reputation. This perhaps may have stirred up others to aim at the same glory, by rejecting

"*tinism* as well, but does it in a softer "and a gentler way. For there being "no *authentic* body or system of the "laws of *natural religion*, every man "may believe as much or as little of "it as he thinks fit; he is left to judge "for himself how far the obligation "of its duties extends, and no doubt "will find out some favourable excep-"tions for his own darling lusts and "vices." *Inquiry into the Cause*, &c. p. 4.

"These loose notions——first ap-"peared abroad without any *disguise*, "among those that set up for wits of "the age, who declared themselves "avowed Atheists. This was too "gross to become popular, though it "appeared too open and barefaced: "but being not long after deserted "as an indefensible cause, by some of "its greatest advocates, it daily lost "ground, and by degrees was mo-"delled and new licked into that "shape wherein it now appears, and "passes current for *Deism*, though "little differing, in reality, from what "it was before." *Ibid.* p. 7.

[g] See Gastrell's Boyle's Lecture Sermons, vol. i. p. 251, 252.

[h] Bayle's Miscellaneous Reflections on a Comet, vol. ii. p. 392.

any thing *vulgar*, though ever so *true* and *right:* as if it were any commendation to be singularly *injudicious;* or as if, because it is honourable to *exceed* the common standard, it were honourable likewise only to *differ* from it, or *not to come up to it;* which is manifestly the case of our modern Deists, however highly they may please to think of themselves. For they have not so *clear* a discernment, nor so *true* a taste, nor so *correct* a judgment (whatever the reason be) as common Christians have. They have *proved* nothing of what they boast of, nor ever will: they have frequently discovered warm inclinations to maintain their principles, but have been as frequently disappointed. Take but away their rhetorications and equivocal expressions, their misrepresentations and misreports, their ostentation and their scurrilities, and their cause will be left in a manner destitute. One *advantage* indeed they have over us, that they run the same way with corrupt nature, and it is easy to drive down a precipice, while it is hard to climb up an ascent: on which account they can never fail to have their disciples, such as they are; for Epicurus also before them had his[i]. But then they have their *disadvantages* also, in other respects, and those many and great; so that, upon the whole, they will have the less reason to triumph. 1. For, in the first place, notwithstanding the *depravity* of human nature, prone to listen to bad counsels, there are yet (God be thanked) great numbers of honest and conscientious Christians, who fear God, and reverence his holy Word, and upon whom these new teachers can make no impressions at all, excepting only of horror and detestation. 2. Besides those, there may be other knowing and sensible men, who, if they have less affection for religion, (being taken up with the world,) will yet give no countenance to *infidelity;* either for fear of risking the reputation of their *judgment*, or for the regard they bear to the interests of *society*, which can never subsist upon infidel principles. 3. Add to this, that there may be a great many more, who, though viciously given, will yet never be mad enough to run those desperate lengths, so as to throw off all regards to *revealed* religion, and all prospects of *heaven;* but will rather choose, for a time, to "hold the truth in unrighteousness,"

[i] Epicuri disciplina multo celebrior semper fuit, quam cæterorum: non quia *veri* aliquid afferat, sed quia multos popularе nomen *voluptatis* invitat: nemo enim non in vitia pronus est. Propterea, ut ad se multitudinem contrahat, apposita singulis quibusque moribus loquitur. *Lactant.* lib. iii. cap. 17. p. 145.

reconciling themselves to it by the hopes of *repentance*, or by *self flattery*, or other delusive expedients: it is as difficult almost, in a country so enlightened as ours is, to be superlatively wicked, (which a man, generally speaking, must be to turn Atheist[k], or apostate,) as it is to be superlatively good. 4. Further still, there may be several more, who, though delighted with loose and profane pamphlets, may yet have no real value or esteem for the writers; as men may love the treason, while they dislike the traitor. Many will despise the man that shall undertake to defend in cold blood, what they, with a kind of conscious guilt and shame, commit only in the heat of appetite or passion. The patronizing *infidelity* and *irreligion*, which is patronizing all that is bad, will for ever be disreputable and odious employment in the general opinion of mankind[l]; while religion and virtue, for their own intrinsic worth, must always have crowds of *admirers*, though perhaps few *followers*.

For this reason, the patrons of irreligion and infidelity in every age, down from Epicurus to the present times, have been forced in a great measure to conceal their sentiments, and to put on disguises to the world; well knowing, that they can never hope to overturn religion and virtue, without pretending a zeal for them all the time. Epicurus himself could write as devoutly in favour of *sanctity* and *Divine worship*, and of *virtue* also, as any believer could do, while he was really destroying them[m]. In like manner, our modern *Deists* plead vehemently for *morality*, that one might be tempted almost to think that they were really in good earnest: but their rejecting the best

[k] "When a man is come to that pass "as to wish himself an Atheist, and "make the last efforts on conscience, "he is at the very *crisis* of malice; a "higher degree is not incident to the "human soul: and unless God works "miracles to convert him, he sticks "at no kind of iniquity, although "possibly he may not obtain his full "wish: so that such a one is incom-"parably further removed from the "way of salvation, than an Atheist "bred and born, or a simple unbe-"liever." *Bayle's Miscellan. Reflect. on a Comet*, p. 364, 365.

[l] Hence it was that the wiser and better sort even of Pagans detested the Epicureans, as debauchers of manners, and the bane of youth, and a scandal to the very name of *philosophy*. See Suidas in Ἐπίκουρος, and Athenæus, lib. xii. 547.

[m] At etiam de *sanctitate*, de *pietate* adversus Deos, libros scripsit Epicurus. At quomodo in his loquitur? Ut Coruncanium, aut Scævolam, Pontifices Maximos, te audire dicas; non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem.——At etiam liber est Epicuri, de *Sanctitate*. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Quæ enim potest esse *sanctitas*, si Dî humana non curant? *Cicer. de Natur. Deor.* c. xli. xliv. p. 100, 107. edit. Davies.

and only complete system of *morality* that ever the world was blessed with, and their taking *morality* out of *God's* hands into their *own*, in order to curtail and mutilate it; and above all, their sapping the *authority* which it properly stands upon, and their undermining the *sanctions* which alone can ever keep it alive in the world[n]; all these circumstances too plainly shew, that their encomiums upon morality are only magnificent professions, like Epicurus's devotions, pompous appearances, solemn show, or, at the best, sound without sense. For the amount of all is, to *compliment* virtue or morality very highly, but to *starve* it at the same time, leaving it little or nothing to subsist upon. But without some such colourings as these, they could never set up for writers in a knowing age, nor bear a part in debate: the readers would be shocked[o] at once, upon the first sight of what they are doing; and the exposing their principles to open view, would save their adversaries the labour of a confutation. So it is not merely for the sake of guarding against legal censure, that these gentlemen so studiously affect *disguises;* but it is to prevent, if possible, the *exposing* a bad cause, which cannot bear the *light:* and to lay in for evasions and subterfuges, for the carrying on a dispute about their *meaning,* when all besides is at an end. This however is no small difficulty in their way, to be thus constrained to act a part; to write just plain enough to be understood, (for without that they do nothing,) and yet not so plain as either fully to discover the whole scene, or to foreclose all retreat, or to leave no colour for declaiming against hard censures, when they come to be pressed. But by frequent trials and long experience, they have learned to manage with competent dexterity.

They set out commonly, or conclude, with pompous declarations of their more than ordinary concern for *reason* and *truth;* full of *truth* in their professions, to supply their want of it else-

[n] See Scripture Vindicated, vol. iv. part ii. p. 202.

[o] This is as good as owned by some of them in their private letters. "More detriment than advantage has "been done to the cause of *Deism* by "an *open* profession to it.—One rule, "I think indeed, ought always to be "observed, that we should keep the "persons we have a design upon, "as long as possibly we can, from "knowing that we ourselves are of "those sentiments to which we would "bring them.——L———t has often "talked to him against *Christianity,* "but he was only *shocked* at the dis-"course: which confirms what I was "saying before, that the way to con-"vince a prejudiced man, is not to "let him know your own sentiments, "but draw him in first, before he "knows where he is, till it is too late "to step back." *Two Letters from a Deist to his Friend,* p. 2, 18, 20.

where: that now *seeking the truth*, is almost become as much a phrase amongst these gentlemen, as *seeking the Lord* once was among another set of refiners. There is undoubtedly some advantage to be gained in this way; otherwise it would never have been the common pretext of all *detractors*[p] and *deceivers* whatsoever: neither would such men as Celsus and Hierocles[q] (sharp and subtle disputants) have made use of it; neither could the sect of the Manichees have ever imposed upon so *acute* a man as St. Austin, though in his younger days, by it[r]. Nevertheless, it must be said, that *boasting* is no argument of *sincerity*, but is itself a *suspicious* circumstance. *Honest* men have no need to boast of their integrity, while their dealings abundantly declare it: neither need *faithful* writers tell of their uncommon zeal for *truth*, because an author is proved by his work, and it is good manners to suppose, that a reader has some discernment.

Another very common artifice which those gentlemen make use of is, to usher in their crudities under the name and umbrage of the *men of sense*. I cannot blame them for affecting to appear in good company: but as they have no commission for making so free with persons of that character, and as the whole amounts only to proclaiming *themselves* considerable, which their readers should be left to judge of; it seems to me, that such an offence against modesty and manners is a stronger argument against them, than any self-commendations can ever be for them.

The same gentlemen who take so much pains to recommend themselves as abounding in *sense*, and *reason*, and *truth*, are as

[p] Prætexit quidem vir acutissimus præcipuum *veritatis* studium, cui nihil præferat, cui omnia submittat: sed ignoscat mihi, si dixero, etiam *maledicentissimum* quemque illud præ se ferre, nec ullo alio unquam nomine suam velare obtrectationem: quid enim aliud dixerit Zoilus olim, quid Socratis accusatores, quid infames illi *delatores* sub tyrannis. Tiberio, Nerone, Domitiano, quam solo se veritatis et utilitatis publicæ studio duci ad alios ita palam increpandos et accusandos? *Perizon. contra Cleric. in Quint. Curt. Vindicat.* p. 13, 14.

[q] The pompous titles they gave to their invectives against the Christians are well known, both pretending a very particular zeal for *truth*.

[r] Quid enim me aliud cogebat annos fere novem, spreta religione quæ mihi puerulo a parentibus insita erat, homines illos sequi ac diligenter audire, nisi quod nos *superstitione* terreri, et *fidem* nobis ante *rationem* imperari dicerent; se autem nullum premere ad *fidem*, nisi prius discussa et enodata *veritate*. Quis non his pollicitationibus illiceretur, præsertim adolescentis animus cupidus *veri*, etiam nonnullorum in schola doctorum hominum disputationibus superbus et garrulus; qualem me tunc illi invenerunt, spernentem scilicet quasi aniles fabulas, et ab eis promissum *apertum* et *sincerum verum* tenere atque haurire cupientem? *Aug. de Util. credendi*, tom. viii. p. 46. ed. Ben.

solicitous, on the other hand, to invent some *odious* names for what they dislike. They never acquaint their readers (though the more ancient Epicureans were sometimes frank enough to do it[s]) that their aim is to destroy *religion* and *conscience*, and the *fear of God;* but they give it out, their whole quarrel is against *credulity* or *bigotry*, against *superstition* or *enthusiasm*, against *statecraft*, *priestcraft*, or *imposture;* names which they are pleased to affix, for the most part, to true religion and godliness. And when they have thus shifted off the blame to others which belongs only to themselves, in order to blacken their opposers, and to wash themselves white; they then begin to play their machinery upon the ignorant unguarded readers. Now since their main strength lies in the frequent repetition of these ill-sounding names, upon a presumption that the world is more governed by *names* than by *things*, and that it is the easiest thing in nature to carry on an imposture of *words;* I shall entreat your patience while I endeavour to unravel the mystery of those affected names, considering them one by one, in the same order as I have mentioned them. And I hope to make it appear, that the guilt which those gentlemen would load us with, is not *ours*, but *theirs;* and that it ought therefore to be thrown back upon the proprietors. This certainly is a very fair and equitable method of defence on our side, to retort the blame, which belongs not to us, upon the accusers themselves, with whom it should rest.

1. I begin with *credulity*, a kind of cant word, (as they use it,) and made to stand for a serious belief of what Moses and the Prophets, of what Christ and his Apostles have taught us. It has been no new thing for the most *credulous* men imaginable to anticipate the charge of *credulity*, fixing it upon others, in order to throw it off from themselves. It was remarkable in the Pagans, who were themselves all over *credulity*, that they assumed a bold air, and fell foul upon the Christians as *credulous* men. Arnobius (besides many other of the Fathers) takes notice of it, and handsomely retorts it[t]. The Manichees also,

[s] Lucretius, lib. i. 63, &c. with Creech's notes.

[t] Et quoniam ridere nostram *fidem* consuestis, atque ipsam *credulitatem* facetiis jocularibus lancinare; dicite, O festivi, et meraco sapientiæ tincti, et saturi potu,—nonne vestrum quicunque est, huic vel illi *credit* auctoribus? Non quod sibi persuaserit quis verum dici ab altero, velut quadam fidei adstipulatione tutatur?—Cum igitur *comperti* nihil habeatis et *cogniti*, omniaque illa quæ scribitis et librorum comprehenditis millibus, *credulitate* asseveretis duce, quænam hæc est judicatio tam injusta, ut no-

who were silly enough to *believe* that *God* and *matter* were two *coeternal* principles, that *souls* were part of the Divine substance, and that *sun* and *moon* were to be adored, (besides many other points of doctrine too ridiculous to bear the mentioning[u],) even they had the confidence to charge the churches of *Christ* with *credulity*, the better to cover their own dotages. And now what shall we say to the same charge revived against us by modern *infidels?* As to the word *credulity*, it denotes, according to its just and proper acceptation, any *rash* or *wrong* belief, taken up *against* reason or *without* reason. If this be a true explication of the name, (as it undoubtedly is,) then I humbly conceive that we stand clear of the indictment; and that our impeachers are themselves the men whom they would feign us to be. I do not know any more *credulous* men living, than they generally are. Indeed, we call them *unbelievers*, because they believe not what they ought to believe; otherwise they are great *believers* in their way, and, for the most part, men of a very large faith. It cannot be pretended that they believe *less* than we, since our creeds *reversed* (which usually makes theirs) are as long creeds as before; like as traversing the same ground backwards measures the same number of paces. He that believes, for instance, that there is *no heaven*, *no hell*, *no future state*, *no Providence*, *no God*, is as much a *believer*, in his way, as the most religious men can be in theirs. Infidels have their articles of belief as well as we, and perhaps more than we: so the difference seems not to lie so much in the *quantity* of faith, theirs or ours, as in the *quality*.

Bring we therefore this matter to a fair issue, that it may be clearly seen which of the contending parties are the *credulous* believers. Let the adversaries produce Epicurus's creed, or Hobbes's[x], or Spinoza's[y], or any other, fairly and fully drawn out, and let us compare. I am verily persuaded that such their creeds, represented at full length, will be found to contain more, and more frightful articles, than the Trent Creed itself, or even

stram derideatis *fidem*, quam vos habere conspicitis nostra in credulitate communem? *Arnob.* lib. ii. p. 47, 48. edit. Lugd.

[u] The English reader may see the monstrous creed of the Manichees briefly summed up in Nye's Defence of the Canon of the New Testament, p. 88, &c.

[x] Hobbes's Creed of Paradoxes and palpable Absurdities has been collected into one summary view by several writers. See, among others, Kortholtus de Tribus Impostoribus, p. 93 ad p. 139; Reimman. Histor. Atheismi, p. 444.

[y] Spinoza's marvellous creed may be seen, in a good measure, collected in Kortholtus de Trib. Impostoribus, p. 139 ad p. 208; Bayle's Dictionary, in the article *Spinoza*.

the Mahometan. A learned foreigner has taken the pains to digest one of the infidel creeds into three and twenty articles[z], eight of them *negative*, and fifteen *affirmative:* there is scarce an article amongst them but what is big with many and shocking absurdities. By which it may appear, that those over censorious gentlemen do not want *faith* where they have *inclination;* but while they strain out *gnats*, can swallow *camels*. They can readily assent to things more incredible or impossible than any to be met with in *romance* or *legend:* indeed nothing is too absurd for their belief, when they have a mind to it. They can believe, for instance, that Moses (a wise man by all accounts) could be weak enough to attempt the imposing a *forgery* and *lying* history upon a whole nation, endeavouring to persuade them out of their senses at once; and that he did not only attempt it, but succeeded in it too, and palmed his imposture upon all the people, none gainsaying it, nor discovering it; that the same imposture had the good fortune to pass unsuspected upon the people of the Jews for many ages, and came at length to be received even by Christ himself, who entirely confided in it, and staked all his character upon it, where he says; "Had ye believed Moses, ye "would have believed me: for he wrote of me. But if ye believe "not his writings, how shall ye believe my words[a]?"

[z] Symbolum Fidei Tolandicæ.

Articuli Negantes.

1. *Nego* spiritus incorporeos. 2. Mentem æternam et præstantissimam. 3. Providentiam numinis divini. 4. Immortalitatem animæ humanæ. 5. Pœnas et præmia in vita futura. 6. Authentiam et divinæ Scripturæ originem. 7. Miracula Mosis et Christi. 8. Mosem fuisse autorem Pentateuchi.

Articuli Affirmantes.

1. *Affirmo* mundum aut naturam rerum esse solum numen, neque genitum neque interiturum. 2. Religionem esse pulchrum politicorum commentum. 3. Atheismum esse naturalem notitiam et sapientissimorum virorum religionem. 4. Religionem vulgi esse superstitionem. 5. Religionis institutores et sacrarum legum latores esse vafra et subdola ingenia. 6. Omnium religionum sacerdotes, et sacrorum mysteriorum interpretes esse simulatæ pietatis vanos ostentatores, qui ex errore alieno quæstum faciunt. 7. Religionis cultores et numinis cœlestis veneratores, esse ignavum et imbecille hominum genus. 8. Quæcunque pro supernaturalibus habentur et in Deum vertuntur, esse res mere naturales. 9. Quæ pro miraculis venditantur et creduntur, esse fraudes impostorum, vel effecta morbi melancholici in testibus qui ea viderunt vel audierunt. 10. Autographa Veteris et Novi Testamenti intercidisse. 11. Mosem et Scriptorem Pentateuchi fuisse Pantheistas; aut, ut recentiores loqui amant, Spinozistas. 12. Mosis scripta explicanda et corrigenda esse ex exoticorum libris. 13. Certiorem fidem adhibendam esse Strabonis diligentiæ, quam Mosis, uti pie creditur, autoritati. 14. Atheum esse meliorem civem quam Theistam. 15. Religionem reipublicæ nocere. *Fayi Defens. Religionis contra Joh. Toland*, p. 248, 249, 250.

[a] John v. 46, 47.

But because the same gentlemen, who make Moses an impostor, must of consequence make Christ and his Apostles impostors also, let us next observe, how *credulous* they appear to be in this point too, as well as in the former. Not to mention a multitude of other absurdities, they must believe "that a despicable company of wilful impostors and deceivers, men of a "hated nation and religion, without learning and discipline, "without skill and experience, without any of the arts of pleasing and recommending themselves to mankind, should run "down all the wit and power and policy of the world; and "preaching a most despised and incredible and seemingly ridiculous doctrine, directly contrary to all the worldly interests "and humours of men, to their religion and customs, and to "their reason and philosophy too, should propagate the belief of "it far and wide through the earth, so that there was scarce a "nation in the whole compass of the globe, but what, in whole "or in part, received this *fiction* as the most sacred truth of "God, and laid all the stress of their salvation upon it[b]."

I borrow this representation from a very judicious writer and close reasoner, who pursues the same turn of thought a great way further[c], setting forth in the strongest and most lively colours the numerous and intolerable absurdities which *infidels* must admit of; thereupon observing, very justly and pertinently, that "their so much boasted aversion to all kind of *bigotry* and "*credulity* is mere jest and scene, and that they are either some "of the most fondly credulous persons in the world[d]," or worse; "credulous to a prodigy," and might as well "go on to the "fictions of a Popish legend or a Turkish Alcoran[e]." These are the men who are pleased to reproach the Church of Christ with *easiness* of belief, for believing *mysteries* and *miracles*. It is true, we do believe *mysteries*, few and well attested; while they believe many and palpable absurdities[f]. We admit *miracles*

[b] Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, p. 363.

[c] Ditton, ibid. p. 364—371.

[d] Ditton, ibid. p. 374.

[e] Ditton, ibid. p. 375.

[f] Mr. Bayle, speaking of Spinoza, has some just reflections, apposite to our present purpose, and worth the inserting.

"The most disdainful censurers of "other men's thoughts are very indulgent to themselves. Doubtless "he (Spinoza) derided the *mystery* of "the *Trinity*, and wondered that so "many people could speak of a *nature* "terminated by *three hypostases*: and "yet, properly speaking, he ascribed "as *many persons* to the *Divine nature*, "as there are *men* upon earth.—Spinoza could not bear the least obscurity of *Peripatism*, *Judaism*, or "*Christianity*; and yet he heartily "embraced an *hypothesis* which reconciles two things so contrary to

also, assigning a cause more than equal to the effect; while they are forced to admit the same effects, or things more marvellous, independent of their proper or adequate causes; which is admitting *contradictions*. In short then, we believe what we can prove by good authority, and no more: they believe what they please. Let them therefore first clear their own accounts, and then proceed, if they see proper, to charge the churches of Christ, as such, with *credulity*.

2. Another party word and term of reproach, near akin to the former, is *bigotry:* a calumny thrown upon us for our steadfast adherence to Moses and the Prophets, to Christ and his Apostles, to God blessed for ever. In the mean while, to whom or to what do our accusers adhere, that we should be *bigots*, and not they? *Bigotry* means, in common acceptation, a warm or obstinate adherence to things or persons, to principles or party, *against* reason or *without* reason. By this definition we desire to be tried, and to join issue with our adversaries: and let the indifferent world judge whether Christians or infidels are most properly *bigots*.

The lower class of *unbelievers* appear to have as tame and as implicit a faith in their new instructors, as it is possible for men to have; that is, they are *bigoted* to them, and led blindfold by them. They believe every *tale* that is but confidently told them against religion, or the ministers of it: they accept of any *sophistry* that is offered them, and submit to any delusion or imposition upon their judgment and understanding. They often take dictates for arguments, mere assertions for proofs, equivocating for reasoning, and sound for sense. While they are afraid of being *guided* by priests, they consent to be *governed* by

" one another, as the *square* and *cir-* " *cular* figures, and whereby an in- " finite number of *inconsistent* attri- " butes, and all the *variety* and *anti-* " *pathy* of the thoughts of mankind " are true at the same time of *one* and " the *same* most simple and indivisible " substance." *Bayle in Spinoza*, 2791, 2792.

A celebrated author has a reflection of like kind, in the words here following:

" It must certainly be something " else than *incredulity* which fashions " the taste and judgment of many " gentlemen, whom we hear censured " as Atheists, for attempting to philo- " sophize after a newer manner than " has been known of late. For my " own part, I have ever thought this " sort of men to be in general more " *credulous*, though after another man- " ner, than the mere *vulgar*. Besides " what I have observed in conversa- " tion merely, with the men of this " character, I can produce many *ana-* " *thematized* authors, who, if they " want a true Israelitish faith, can " make amends by a Chinese or In- " dian one." *Characteristics*, vol. i. p. 345.

anti-priests; who demand a much greater submission from them than we can pretend to: for we are content and thankful, if our people will but observe us in what is evidently true and right, while they expect to be believed and followed in what is palpably false and wrong. From hence may appear the bigotry of the inferior sort among the Deists.

As to the leading men themselves, they generally follow the track of their predecessors, and appear to be zealous *bigots* to their *systems*, to their *creeds*, to their *paradoxes*, to their *party*; all which they adhere to as pertinaciously as we can do to our Bible. They have Pagan historians to rest their faith upon, instead of Moses and the Evangelists; they have Pagan morals to answer to the Divine Sermon on the Mount, and Pagan or Jewish calumnies to set against our Christian evidences. They have Epicurus and Celsus, Porphyry and Julian, for their guides and leaders in many things, as we have the *sacred* writers in all. Hobbes and Spinoza seem to be their chief instructors among the moderns; and it has been observed by knowing judges, that Hobbes himself was little more than a disciple of Epicurus[g] in his system of religion, or irreligion. The like may be shewn, and has been shewn[h] in some measure, of the present advocates for infidelity. Now, indeed, if they have reason for preferring those their guides and teachers to ours, then we are the *bigots*: but if it has been manifested a thousand times over, as I presume it has, that the *proofs* are on our side, and that it is impossible to come at any, as to the main things, on theirs; then we humbly conceive that the *bigotry* lies at their door, and we appeal from the seat of calumny to the truth and reason of things. Let them shew that they have as good grounds for following the doctrines of Epicurus, or any other ancient or modern infidel, as we have for following Christ. Such was the challenge which Arnobius long ago made to the Pagans, who presumed to oppose their philosophers to Christ and his Apostles[i]: and such we make to every unbeliever at this day.

[g] Hoc probe scio, ipsum nihil nobis obtulisse nisi quod apud veteres in Epicuro reprehensum inveniamus. Ut enim Epicurus omnia a Democrito surripuisse dicitur, ita Hobbius omnia Epicuri flagitia ingenti fastu tanquam sua recudit; atque ut nova videantur, novis nominibus (quorum ille, ut sunt novatores omnes, egregius artifex) appellare affectavit. *Parker, Disputat. de Deo*, p. 86.

[h] Scripture Vindicated, vol. iv. part 2. p. 284, &c.

[i] Et quid est quod in hac parte, aut vos plurimum habeatis, aut nos minus? Vos Platoni, vos Cronio, vos Numenio, vel cui libuerit creditis: nos credimus et acquiescimus *Christo*.

Perhaps they will say, that they follow no one's authority implicitly or absolutely, but collect from all what they like best. This might shew they are no bigots to mere *human* authority; neither are we: but then they may be bigots to their own *passions*, or *prejudices*, or *party*, in rejecting *Divine* authority sufficiently attested; while there is no *bigotry* in submitting to the *highest reason*, and in adhering to God. Balance reasons with reasons, evidences with evidences, facts with facts, and thereupon judge where truth and credibility, where error and bigotry lie. It is easy to raise *objections* to any thing; as it is easy to be ignorant, or unattentive, or humoursome, or perverse: but the great point is, whether those objections, surmises, or suspicions, *comparatively*, have any weight, or how much, when put into the scale against solid arguments. There then rests the whole thing: let our accusers shew that the *reasons* are all on their side, and then we shall readily admit, that all the *bigotry* is on ours: but till this be done, (and it is impossible it ever should,) the charge which they bring against us is as easily retorted as made, and with much more truth and justice; which will always be the case, as often as Christianity is impeached upon this article.

3. Another famous term of reproach, which *unbelievers* asperse us with, is *superstition*; a name which often stands for *Christianity*, or for all *revealed* religion, in their nomenclature. But the word properly imports any *religious excesses*[k], either as to matter, manner, or degree. There may be a *superstitious awe*, when it is wrong placed, or is of a wrong kind, or exceeds in measure: and whenever we speak of a superstitious *belief*, or *worship*, or *practice*, we always intend some kind of religious *excess*. Any *false* religion, or false part of a true one, is a species of *superstition*, because it is *more* than should be, and betokens *excess*. Hence it has been usual for persons of some religion, to style all but their own, *superstition*, as being *false* in their account: and they that admit no religion as true, make superstition the common name for all. The contrary extreme

Iniquitas hæc quanta est, ut cum utrique auctoribus stemus, sitque nobis et vobis unum et socium *credere*, vobis velitis dari, quod ita ab illis dicatur accipere, vos ea quæ proferuntur a *Christo*, audire et spectare nolitis. Atqui si causas causis, partes partibus voluerimus æquare, magis nos valemus ostendere quid in *Christo* fuerimus secuti, quam in *philosophis* quid vos. Ac nos quidem in illo secuti hæc sumus: opera illa magnifica, &c. *Arnob. adv. Gent.* lib. ii. p. 49.

[k] See Vossii Etymologicum, in *Superstitio*.

to excess is *defect*, or want of religion, and is called *irreligion*, *profaneness*, *impiety*, *apostasy*, *atheism*, according to its respective circumstances and degrees. The due mean between the two extremes is true and sound religion. Now since the Christian religion is most evidently *true*, (if any ancient facts whatever can be proved to be true,) we do insist upon it, that it is properly *religion*, and not *superstition*: and that a disbelief of it, where it is sufficiently promulgated, is irreligion, profaneness, madness. This then is a short and a clear answer to our adversaries upon the present head; that they can never maintain the charge of *superstition* against Christian believers, as such; but we can easily make good the charge of *profaneness* or *irreligion* against them. But besides that, I may venture perhaps to add, that they are not so clear even of *superstition* itself as is commonly imagined: for *infidelity* and *superstition* are, for the most part, near allied, as proceeding from the same weakness of judgment, or same corruption of heart. Those guilty fears and apprehensions of an avenging Deity, which drive some persons into *superstition*, do as naturally drive others of a more hard and stubborn temper into *infidelity*, or *atheism*[l]. The same causes working differently in different persons, or in the same persons at different times, produce both[m]: and it has been a common observation, justifiable by some noted instances, that no men whatever have been more apt to exceed in *superstition*, at the sight of danger, than those who at other times have been most highly *profane*.

But I may further observe, that *superstition* (*practical* superstition at least) may be more directly charged upon *many* or *most* of our accusers, as it is their avowed principle to comply *outwardly* with any public and authorized *superstitions* whatever. Epicurus and his followers conformed readily to the popular superstitions[n], being willing enough to compound at that rate to

[l] See Smith's Select Discourses, p. 25. and p. 41, &c.

[m] A late ingenious author has well expressed and illustrated the observation, as follows:

"*Atheism* and *superstition* are of "the same origin: they both have "their rise from the same cause, the "same defect in the mind of man, our "want of capacity in discerning truth, "and natural ignorance of the Divine "essence. Men that from their most "early youth have not been imbued "with the principles of the true religion, or have not afterwards continued to be strictly educated in the "same, are all in great danger of falling either into the *one* or the *other*, "according to the *difference* there is "in the *temperament* and *complexion* "they are of, the *circumstances* they "are in, and the *company* they converse with." *Second Part of the Fable of the Bees*, p. 374.

[n] Vid. Plutarch. contr. Epicur. Opp. tom. ii. p. 1102. Origen. contr. Cels. lib. vii. p. 375.

save themselves harmless. I have before observed of the leaders of the modern Deists abroad, that they accommodated themselves to the prevailing religions wheresoever they lived. Hobbes and Spinoza are known to have advised and inculcated the same doctrine, making the *magistrate's* religion the sovereign rule for outward practice[o]. Mr. Toland observes of Atheists, (and he knew them well,) that their principle is, to stand up for all *established* religions, by all means, right or wrong[p]. The author of the Oracles of Reason and his friends profess the same principle of conformity to the religion of one's country, whatever it be[q]. Some have openly, and with great immodesty, even boasted of it[r]; interpreting it to such a monstrous latitude, that the same person might indifferently go to a Popish chapel, or a Turkish mosque, or to an Indian pagod. Among the noted *characteristics* of *atheistical* men, this commonly makes one, that they follow the religion of the *magistrate*, value it not as *true*, but as *established*, and regard it only as an instrument of *state policy*[s].

[o] Vid. Kortholtus de Tribus Impostoribus, p. 208, &c.

[p] Atheus, commodo suo intentus, nunquam a *stabilita* religione dissentiet; cui omnes alios, ne suspectus evadat, per fas et nefas velit conformes. *Toland. Adeisidæmon*, p. 78.

[q] See Blount's Miscellanies, p. 202, 203. Compare Nicholls's Conference, part ii. p. 193.

[r] Colo Deum talem qualem princeps vel respublica me jubet. Si Turca, Alcoranum; si Judæus, Vetus Testamentum; si Christianus, Novum Testamentum veneror pro lege et religionis meæ norma. Papa si imperans, Deum credo *transubstantiatum;* si Lutherus, Deus mihi particulis *in*, *cum*, et *sub* circumvallatur; si Calvinus, signum pro Deo sumo. Sicque cujus regio, in qua vivo, ejus me regit opinio, &c. *Autor Meditation. Philosoph. &c. apud Budd. Isagog.* p. 1390.

[s] Those *characteristics* are numbered up in twelve articles, by a learned foreigner.

1. Omni occasione data, negare aut in dubium vocare *supernaturalia;* miracula, &c.

2. Sacræ Scripturæ autoritatem imminuere, aliisque suspectam et contemptam reddere; Scripturam cum Scriptura et cum ratione committere, et inde elicere contradictiones.

3. Metum omnem et justam solicitudinem omnibus excutere, nil nisi hilaritatem et securitatem commendare.

4. Immortalitatem animæ rationalis negare.

5. Providentiam Dei accusare, vel vocare in dubium.

6. Mysteria religionis Christianæ exagitare, et scurriliter traducere.

7. Ab Ecclesiæ Ministris abhorrere, et eorum colloquia declinare.

8. Atheismos aliorum cupide enarrare, et argumenta pro Atheismo tanquam indissolubiles subtilitates admirari.

9. *Religionem aliquam strenue simulare, et gravissime contra eos qui Atheismi ipsos insimulant, contestari.*

10. *Religionem non alio nomine urgere, quam quatenus ad rationem status facit.*

11. Atheismi impugnationes et increpationes ægre ferre.

12. Libros gentilium libentius quam Christianorum legere, et sacræ Scripturæ lectionem aversari.

Adjiciunt plerique, non seorsim esse spectanda hæc criteria, sed conjunctim, si velimus sincerum ex iis ferre judicium. Reimman. Histor. Atheismi, p. 17, 18.

Now one might have expected of those gallant gentlemen, who had undertaken to assert the dignity of human nature, and to rescue mankind from the slavery of *superstition*, that they more especially should have abhorred the practice, or even the appearance of it. For what is the use of their superior wisdom, and their elevation of thought above the *vulgar*, if it be not to inform practice and conduct life? The strongest objection against *superstition*, and the worst circumstance of it, is, that it leads men to ridiculous and absurd *practices*, such as dishonour God, and debase the dignity of man, and do mischief to the world. *Speculative* superstition is an innocent, harmless thing, in comparison of *practical*: and therefore what glory is there in discarding the former only? They that reject superstition in *theory*, and yet retain it in *life*, and that upon *principle* too, do but expose their own *folly* and *falseness* both in one. There can scarce be conceived a more contemptible figure in nature, than a man railing at all *superstitions*, and at the same time practising, and persuading others to practise, all that come. Might he not much more decently forbear censuring the public *religions*, or *superstitions*, than thus fall to *censuring* first, and then to *practising* what he condemns, and last of all, to instructing *others* to do the same thing? Such persons have no reason to value themselves upon any supposed superiority in *notion* or *sentiment*, because there cannot be a more abject or pusillanimous *principle* than what they espouse: and why should they condemn others for being *superstitious*, and that but in *part*, while their own practice is *totally* such? I do not charge all the Deists with such practices or principles; I know they are divided upon that article: but so many at least as do espouse them may prudently be silent on this head. Such unsincere and inconsistent conduct cannot be the conduct of good *moral* men, or men of *probity*[t]. But I pass on.

4. Next to the charge of *superstition* follows *enthusiasm*, an-

[t] An odd sort of apology the Pantheisticon makes for such kind of dissimulation. The sum of it is, that religious men are *mad*, or *fools*, and therefore infidels may humour them, and comply with them *outwardly*, as nurses do with froward *children*. Pantheistæ, quæ eorum est moderatio, non aliter cum hominibus *deliris* et *pertinacibus* agunt, ac *nutriculæ* cum balbutientibus suis alumnis.—Qui *infantulis*, in hisce nugis non *adblandiuntur*, iis injucundi sunt et exosi.—Hinc necessario evenit, ut *aliud sit in pectore* et privato consessu, *aliud in foro* et publica concione. *Pantheisticon*, p. 79, 80. How decently may such persons exclaim against *pious frauds*, or *religious cheats!*

other term of reproach, and often made a name for the *true religion* of *Christ*, by men disposed to defame and to destroy it. There have been unhappy persons, whose heads have been disturbed with religious *melancholy* or devout *phrensies;* the flights and sallies of an overheated imagination and a distempered mind. From hence weak or wicked men have taken the handle to ascribe all religion to *enthusiasm* or *fanaticism;* that is, to a kind of phrensy, or dotage. But to such a suggestion, so far as concerns Moses and the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, we answer, that those excellent personages, by their whole *conduct*, gave sufficient proofs that they were no *enthusiasts*, never disordered in mind. Besides, we insist upon it, that sallies of imagination never did, never could produce any such sound and consistent doctrines as they taught, never wrought such *miracles*, never uttered such *prophecies:* neither can the *facts* which we appeal to be contested, without shaking the faith of all history, and retiring to universal *scepticism*, which would be madness indeed. There cannot be a wilder thought than for a man to imagine that the world was converted by lunatics and madmen; "that men hurried by the impetus of a wild extravagant fancy, "were masters of all that *conduct* and *management*, that *argument* "and *address*, which was requisite to bring those astonishing "effects about. Or if he finds it too hard to suppose that a "company of distracted men should ever be able to argue with "so much art and force, as to overpower all the wisdom and "learning of the world; then he must think the rest of man-"kind, who believed them, to be *mad*, as well as they; that they "were convinced and persuaded by mere *enthusiasm*, that they "mistook downright raving for the strongest reason, and a "chain of absurd incoherent falsities, for bright and evident de-"monstrations of truth; that all the sages, statesman, and "philosophers, who embraced Christianity in great numbers, as "well as the poor and illiterate, believed they had proofs which "they had not; thought things were plain and clear to them "which were not; fancied irresistible strength, majesty, and "eloquence, in an empty noise and sound of words, made by a "company of poor distempered men, who neither knew nor "cared what they said[u]."

[u] Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, p. 364. compare p. 310, &c. See also Nicholls's Conference, part ii. p. 230, &c. Fayi Defens. Relig. cont. Toland, c. xiii. p. 71. Campbell's Discourse proving that the Apostles were no enthusiasts.

But if any persons notwithstanding can have confidence enough to charge the Founder of our religion, or the sacred writers, with *enthusiasm*, that is, with *madness*, may it not be proper to ask, what kind of complexion the men are of, who make such a groundless charge; and whether they are not the *visionaries*, rather than the other. There may be an *irreligious* phrensy, as well as a *religious* one; and the imagination may be as soon heated with a spirit of *profaneness*, as with the fervours of *piety*. A very learned and judicious writer has said, that there are enthusiastical, or fanatical Atheists, and that "all manner of "Atheists whatsoever, and those of them who most pretend to "reason and philosophy, may in some sense be justly styled both "*enthusiasts* and *fanatics:* forasmuch as they are not led or "carried on into this way of atheizing by any clear dictates of "their reason or understanding; but only by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, a "certain *blind and irrational impetus*, they being, as it were, "*inspired* to it by that lower *earthly life* and *nature*, or the "*spirit of the world*, or *mundane spirit*.——The mundane spirit, "or earthly life, is *irrational* sottishness; and they who are "atheistically *inspired* by it (how abhorrent soever they may "otherwise seem to be from *enthusiasm* and *revelations*) are not-"withstanding really no better than a kind of bewitched *enthu-"siasts* and blind *spiritati*, that are wholly ridden and acted by a "dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life.—Nay, they are "*fanatics* too, however that word seem to have a more peculiar "respect to something of a *Deity;* all Atheists being that blind "goddess Nature's fanatics [x]."

The observation is cited and approved by a *noble* writer, who has been thought not partial on the side of religion. He says, that *Atheism* itself is *not exempt* from *enthusiasm*, but there have been *enthusiastical* Atheists[y]. He repeats it elsewhere[z], and confirms it more at large. The same noble author scruples not to say, that "to deny the magistrate a *worship*, or take away a "*national* Church, is as mere *enthusiasm* as the notion which sets "up persecution[a]."

To confirm what has been hinted of the *enthusiasm* of these men, who charge us with it, let but any one seriously consider the Pantheistic system, (which is reported by those that should

[x] Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. p. 134.
[y] Characteristics, vol. i. p. 52.
[z] Ibid. vol. iii. p. 63, 64. [a] Ibid. vol. i. p. 17.

know, to be a favourite system amongst them, and as fashionable as any[b],) whether it be not as wild *enthusiasm* as ever was invented and published to the world. It supposes God and nature, or God and the whole universe, to be one and the same substance, one *universal being;* insomuch that men's souls are only *modifications* of the Divine substance: from whence it follows, that what men will, God wills also; and what they say, God says; and what they do, God does[c]. Was there ever any raving enthusiast that discovered greater extravagance? This doctrine first owed its birth to Pagan darkness[d], and revived afterwards among the Jewish cabalists[e]: from thence it was handed down to Spinoza, who was originally a Jew, and from him it descended to the author or authors of the Pantheisticon; who, while they are themselves the greatest *visionaries* in nature, yet scruple not to charge the Christian world with *enthusiasm.*

There is another, though a more pardonable instance of *fanaticism,* or *enthusiasm,* among some modern Deists, relating to *virtue,* considered as subsisting, and in an eminent degree too, independent on hopes and fears, or on future rewards and penalties[f]: a chimerical notion, and betraying the greatest ignorance both of men and things. What but some egregious warmth of imagination could ever induce any man to conceive, that he might be capable of practising a nobler kind of virtue than Abel, or Enoch, or Noah, or Abraham, or even Christ himself, considered in his human nature? All these owed their brightest instances of virtue to *faith*[g], to the respect they had to the "recompense of reward[h]," to the "joy that was set before "them[i];" which is a *just* and *rational* principle, suited most certainly to the circumstances of this life. Possibly in a life to come, virtue and pleasure may constantly coincide, where we

[b] Parisiis plurimum versantur [Pantheistæ] itidem Venetiis; in omnibus Hollandiæ urbibus, maxime certe Amstelodami; et nonnulli, quod mireris, in ipsa curia Romana: sed præcipue, et præ aliis locis omnibus, Londini abundant, ibique sedem, et quasi arcem suæ sectæ collocant. *Pantheisticon,* p. 42.

[c] See the *Pantheistic* principles drawn out more at large by Mr. Bayle in the article *Spinoza,* and well confuted, p. 2792.

[d] See Buddæus's Analecta Histor. Philosoph. in exercitat. de Spinozismo ante Spinozam, p. 317, &c. Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. p. 306, 344. Bayle's Dictionary in Spinoza, p. 2782.

[e] See Buddæus, ibid. p. 346, &c. Reimman. Hist. Atheismi, p. 45, 46, 47.

[f] Ad beate vivendum sola sufficit virtus; suaque sibi est satis ampla merces. *Pantheisticon,* p. 57. Comp. Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 25, 367.

[g] See Hebr. xi. 4, &c.

[h] Hebr. xi. 26.

[i] Hebr. xii. 2.

suppose all to be uniformly virtuous, and where there will be no clashing, no interfering, no trials, no conflicts: but in this life, undoubtedly, virtue, in any high degree of perfection, is present *self-denial*, and cannot be made *rational*, that is, cannot be *virtue*, (for *virtue* and *folly* are not the same thing,) without taking into consideration *future* prospects[k]. It is romantic to talk of a new kind of virtue never yet practised, nor practicable: or if it were, *caprice*, or *convenience*, or *vainglory*, not *virtue*, is the name for it. For if it be founded on *worldly* considerations, it is *convenience* only, or *vainglory*; and if it be founded on no considerations, it is *caprice*: and between these two there is no medium, in this case, but *faith* in a world to come. The ancient Stoics, having but dark and fluctuating views of another life, were, in a manner, driven into that dry doctrine of *virtue being constantly its own reward*, in order to solve the difficulties concerning *Providence*. The Epicureans, absolutely rejecting both Divine *Providence* and a *future state*, made *pleasure*, worldly pleasure, the reward of virtue, that they might not seem altogether to desert the cause; and their virtue proved accordingly. The Sadducees, among the Jews, came nearer to the Stoical principles, having fallen into them, as it seems, unawares, through a kind of *enthusiastic* affectation of soaring above common sense. The Mystics followed, and deviated in like manner with the former, by over-refining and subtilizing plain things. After them came a set of *enthusiasts* amongst us, in the ill times, who revived the same principles, and were solidly confuted by several of our able and learned Divines[l]. The Deists seem to fall in sometimes with

[k] Hæc causa est, cur præceptis eorum nullus obtemperet; quoniam aut ad *vitia* erudiunt si voluptatem defendunt; aut si *virtutem* asserunt, neque *pœnam* minantur nisi solius turpitudinis, neque virtuti ullum præmium pollicentur, nisi solius honestatis et laudis, cum dicant, non propter aliud, sed propter *seipsam* expetendam esse virtutem.——Non enim tantum *religionem* asserere noluerunt, verum etiam sustulerunt, dum specie *virtutis falsæ* inducti, conantur animos omni *metu* liberare. *Lactant.* lib. iii. cap. 26. p. 165, 166.

"Although it be true, that as things "now stand, and as the nature of "men is framed, good men do find "a strange kind of inward pleasure "and secret satisfaction of mind in "the discharge of their duty, and in "doing what is virtuous; yet every "man that looks into himself, and "consults his own breast, will find, "that this delight and contentment "springs chiefly from the hopes which "good men conceive that an holy "and virtuous life will not be unre-"warded; and without these hopes, "*virtue* is but a *dead* and *empty* "name." *Tillotson*, Serm. cxxi. p. 121.

[l] Bishop Bull's Posth. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 593. Wilkins's Sermon on Heb. xi. 26. Sharrock de Fin. &c. p. 70, &c. Boyle's Seraph. Love, p. 118. South's Serm. vol. iv. p. 178. Tillotson's Posth. Serm. cxxi. p. 121.

the Stoics and sometimes with the Epicureans, following virtue (as they say) either for its *beauty*, or for the *present pleasure* attending it, abstracted from the consideration of *future* rewards; that so they may carry on a *show* of supporting morality, while they are paring away the ground upon which it stands. If they are sincere and honest in their doctrine, it is a spice of *enthusiasm*; and if they are not, it is worse.

I may further observe, that there appears besides, in the present advocates for Deism, a very particular turn of mind, such as seems not to differ, in any thing material, from a spirit of *enthusiasm*; if it is not grave banter or solemn grimace. Their way is, to sanctify their flights of fancy, their own roving inventions, under the sacred name of *reason*, which they style also, in part, *Divine inspiration*[m], and in the whole, *internal revelation*[n]. Hereupon they presume to talk as familiarly of God's mind and laws, and with as warm an assurance, as if they had been rapt up into the third heaven, or had sate in council with the Almighty. They prescribe, according as their fancies dictate, where they know nothing what services God ought to expect[o], what indulgences he should make to *warm desires*[p], what *penalties* he may appoint here or hereafter[q]. They enter caveats against his being *arbitrary*[r], so as to enact any thing which they see not the *reason* for; and against his playing the *tyrant*[s], either by imposing *positive* laws without their *consent*[t], or by abridging them of their *natural* right[u], (that is, of what they might otherwise enjoy upon the *permissive* law of nature,) or by interposing in matters *indifferent*[x], (which every petty prince or state may do,) or by *punishing* the incorrigible for sins *past*[y]. This is taking great lengths of freedom with the high and tremendous Deity, such as one would not expect from any but the

"Though a man were never so "much in love with virtue, for the "native *beauty* and *comeliness* of it; "yet it would strangely cool his affec-"tion to it, to consider, that he should "be *undone* by the match; that when "he had it, he must go a *begging* with "it, and be in danger of *death* for the "sake of that which he had chosen "for the felicity of his life." *Tillotson, ibid.*

[m] Christianity as Old &c. p. 182, 194, 330.

[n] Ibid. p. 3, 8, 67, 70, 369.

[o] Ibid. p. 3, 105, 115, 116, 124, 125.

[p] Ibid. p. 345.

[q] Ibid. p. 38, &c.

[r] Ibid. p. 30, 35, 61, 65, 114, 116, 125, 130, 370.

[s] Ibid. p. 29, 30, 32, 38, 70, 122, 176, 188.

[t] Ibid. p. 113. Compare Script. Vindicat. vol. iv. part 2. p. 260. and Puffendorf, book iii. ch. 4. sect. 4. p. 254.

[u] Ibid. p. 113, 134.

[x] Ibid. p. 132, 135, 171, 370.

[y] See Second Address, p. 7.

wildest *enthusiasts*. Indeed, all claims to any *internal* notices exclusive of God's *written* word, whether they be entitled *inspiration*, or *internal revelation*, or *inward light*, or *reason*, or *infallibility*, or what else soever; I say, all such claims brought to exclude Scripture, are *enthusiastic* and *fanatical*, false and vain.

But some perhaps may ask, can those then be *enthusiasts* who profess to follow *reason*? Yes, undoubtedly, if by reason they mean only *conceits*. Therefore such persons are now commonly called *reasonists* and *rationalists*, to distinguish them from true *reasoners* or *rational* inquirers. For their great fault is, that they will not suffer *reason* to have its *free* course or *full* exercise, nor allow it sufficient *light*. *Reason* desires and requires all useful *notices*, and all the friendly *intimations* that can be procured: but these her most insidious adversaries, under a false plea of *sufficiency*[z], confine her to short measures, and shut up the avenues of improvement: by which it plainly appears, that they are just such friends to *reason* as they are to *morality*; friends to the *name*, and that is all. They follow *reason*, as they profess: but we maintain, that *reason* itself directs us to take in *Scripture*, when we have it before us, for our *light* and our *guide*. Who then is the friend to *reason*? he that flatters her with empty *compliments*, or he that follows her *rules*?

5. From the article of *enthusiasm*, I proceed next to two other terms of reproach, namely, *state-craft* and *priest-craft*, nearly allied to each other, (for which reason I mention them together,) and frequently made use of by unbelievers, in order to render true religion odious or suspected. It has often been suggested, that religion owed its birth and progress to the subtle contrivances of *politicians* and *priests*. Indeed *priests* seem to have come in the later, to bear their share in the scandal. Formerly, *princes* only, or *lawgivers*, were marked out as the most likely persons to have wrought those marvellous effects upon mankind.

[z] The common pretences about the *sufficiency* of reason, for furnishing out a complete system of *religion* and *morality*, seem to have just as much sense in them, as if a man should pretend to draw out a complete system of *optics*, setting aside all the instructions brought in by facts and observations; or a complete system of *philosophy* or *medicine*, throwing out the informations of *history* and *experiments*. The Scripture accounts are as necessary to be superadded to *abstract reason*, in order to form a *complete* system of *religion* and *morality*, as those other accounts are to complete the respective *arts* and *sciences*: and if *reason* requires that these should be taken in, it is running counter to *reason*, and destroying the *use* of it, to leave them out. Therefore the pretences of these gentlemen to *reason* are mere fallacies and impositions upon their readers.

In the very nature of the thing, *religion* should be conceived prior to *priesthood* appointed to serve in it: unless we were to suppose some previous and special designation of the persons by Almighty God. In the natural course of things, if religion was all of human invention, it must have been invented before *priests* were appointed or made. For example: Evander, suppose, and Numa, invented and formed several religions, or superstitions, and then appointed the Luperci, Potitii, Pinarii, Salii, &c. to administer. I say then, that religion, in such a case, must naturally go before priesthood: which is true, though the *inventor* should *appoint* himself. And therefore Critias was so far in the right, when he thought of fathering religion upon human policy, to ascribe the invention of it to *lawgivers*[a] or *politicians*, not to priests. Critias was one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, (in the days of Socrates, whose most unworthy pupil he had once been,) a wicked and profligate man, by all accounts[b], a perfect Atheist[c]. There could not be a fitter person to set on foot the conceit, that all religion was a trick of state. Euripides, in one of his plays, introduces Sisyphus, an ungodly wretch, as saying the same thing[d], agreeably to his character: for there is no reason to suspect with Plutarch[e], (or whoever is the author,) that Euripides there expressed his own sentiments under disguise[f]. I shall not here waste your time in confuting that chimerical notion of Critias and his atheistical companions. It was exploded by all sober men as soon as started: it is sufficiently answered, even by Sextus Empiricus[g], a Pagan sceptic; but has been since more abundantly confuted and exposed by several learned moderns[h]. The Academic, in Cicero, occasionally makes mention of it, as an impious suggestion, contrived to overturn all religion[i]. Now, as to our particular case, there needs no further

[a] Sextus Empiricus, adv. Physic. lib. ix. p. 562. edit. Fabric.

[b] See Bayle's Dictionary in *Critias*.

[c] Plutarch. de Superstitione, Opp. tom. ii. p. 171. Sext. Empiric. p. 182, 562. Theoph. Antioch. lib. iii. p. 292. edit. Hamb.

[d] Euripides in Sisyphus, p. 492. edit. Barnes.

[e] Plutarch. de Placit. Philosoph. tom. ii. p. 880.

[f] Euripides has been well defended by Barnes, in Notis ad Euripid. p. 492, 493; Fabricius, in Not. ad Sext. Empiric. p. 562; Bayle, in *Euripides* and *Critias;* Stillingfleet, Origin. Sacr. part ii. p. 49; Reimman. Hist. Atheism. p. 123.

[g] Sext. Empiric. p. 556.

[h] Stillingfleet, Origin. Sacr. part ii. ch. 1. Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. p. 691, &c. Tillotson, Serm. i. p. 16. fol. edit. Fabricius de Veritat. Relig. Christianæ, c. ix. p. 317. Fayi Defens. Relig. contr. Toland, p. 51, 52.

[i] Quid? ii qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus reipub-

answer more than to observe, that it would be infinitely absurd to resolve *Christianity* into *state-craft*, when it is certain and unquestionable fact, that Christianity subsisted for 300 years together, independent of the secular powers, and in defiance to the united *state-craft* of all the world. I shall just take notice, that those *atheistical* objectors, in their blind zeal against religion, happened to lay their indictment wrong. It is true, that many tricks have been played with religion, by princes, states, and people; and many superstitions, false worships, and impostures have owed their birth to those causes: so it was not *religion*, but the *corruptions* of religion, which came in by *state-craft*. Jeroboam, for instance, among the Jews, and Numa among the Romans, served up some *impostures* of their own, superadding them to the old foundation, grafting their own superstitions upon the ancient religion. For the fault has been, (and it resolves into the *depravity* of human nature,) that men generally have not been content with religion, as it came at first *pure* out of the hands of God, but they would have the correcting and refining of it (as they fancied) to themselves; either to accommodate it to their own particular taste, or to serve some other sinister and secular ends. It is the same thing, in the main, with what *infidels* are now doing, and have been doing all along; only with this difference, that *politicians* carried the humour not quite so far: for they were content with *corrupting* religion, while nothing will serve these other gentlemen, but *discarding* it all but the *name*, under pretence still of improving and refining it. There is the same *secular craft* in both cases, only exerting itself in a different way: for both agree in the main leading principle; which is, to take religion into their *own* hands, and to deal with it as they please, abandoning the guidance of *God*, to follow their own *inventions*.

6. But it is time for me now to pass on from *state-craft* to the other more famous article of the two, entitled *priestcraft*. It is a favourite word amongst our modern *unbelievers*, and has been thought to make no small figure in their writings. The *ends* proposed by haranguing upon this abusive topic seem to be, first, to wound *religion* through the sides of its ministers; next, to give vent to some uneasy *passions;* and lastly, if possible, to draw in

licæ caussa, ut quos *ratio* non posset, eos ad officium *religio* duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt? *Cicer. de Natura Deor.* cap. xlii. p. 102. edit. Davis.

the unsuspecting, unguarded *laity*, as parties to the quarrel against their *guides*. Now as to this compound word *priestcraft*, (since there is a necessity of condescending to these minutenesses,) I take it to mean some *fraud* of priests, in imposing *false facts*, or *false doctrines*, or *false claims* upon the world, under the name of *religion*, for their own humour, ambition, or advantage. The charge of such *sacerdotal* craft hath often been unjustly laid by *anti-sacerdotal* pride or resentment: thus Korah and his company charged Aaron, God's high priest, very injuriously, with *taking too much upon him*[k]; that is to say, with *ambition* or *priestcraft*. Nevertheless, there are instances of priestcraft *justly* charged, and in the same Scriptures: there were many *false* priests, such as the priests of Baal, and such as Jeroboam by his wicked policy set up; in both which there was undoubtedly guile and priestcraft. There were also *true* priests, but very ill men, who misbehaved in their office, and made an infamous merchandise of their holy function: such were Hophni and Phinehas, the two sons of Eli; who are therefore justly chargeable with *priestcraft*, and are perhaps the first examples of it on record. But as the charge is of a very high and heinous nature, it ought never to be made upon mere surmises or suspicions, nor without plain and full proof. It cannot, I presume, be proved that either Christ or his Apostles craftily imposed any *false facts*, or *false doctrines*, or *false claims* upon the world. They were persons as far removed as possible from *craft* and *guile*, in their whole conduct and character: neither could any human device or subtlety, without direct assistance from above, have ever converted the world as they did. *Christianity* therefore in itself is certainly no *priestcraft*; and this is sufficient for us to insist upon, in opposition to Deists. For could they prove ever so much *priestcraft* upon the Christian Clergy, it is all foreign and impertinent to their cause, while *Christianity* itself stands clear of the imputation. A dissenting *Christian*, who should desire a further reformation, might *pertinently* exclaim against the priestcraft of the Christian Clergy, if there were occasion for it: but in a *Deist*, the complaint is beside the purpose; because his quarrel, primarily and properly, is not with the *modern Clergy*, but with *Christ* and his *Apostles*, and with *Christianity* itself. As

[k] Numb. xvi. 3.

soon as ever a man discovers himself to be an *infidel*, his complaints against the modern Clergy become *bruta fulmina*, frivolous remonstrances, such as answer themselves. For when it is observed, that those who complain so tragically of the *tyranny* of the Christian and Protestant Clergy, complain also as heavily of the *tyranny* of all *positive* institutions, and of all *revealed* religion, and deal as rudely almost with the *sacred* writers themselves, and even with *God* most high, as they had before done with Christian *priests;* this is clearing up the whole affair to the meanest capacity, and is a more sensible argument in favour of the Clergy, abused with so much better company, than any other apology whatsoever: because now it appears that the principal ground of the displeasure against them is, that they are *Christians.*

We deny not however, that *priests* may be corrupt, as well as *laics*, for both are *men.* What profession is there which may not, or has not, or will not frequently be abused? *Kings* have often debased the throne of majesty; *senators* have betrayed their most weighty trusts; *judges* have defiled the bench of justice: even *prophets* have misused their prophetic dignity; and one *apostle*, of twelve, disgraced the apostolate itself. How then can it be expected, that *priests* should never shame their order; unless they could plead exemption from human infirmities, or had the privilege to be impeccable? But supposing them ever so corrupt, what argument does it carry with it for the purposes of *Deism?* What if lawyers should be found to pervert both law and justice? does it follow that our legal privileges are all so many *nullities*, that Magna Charta is a *fiction*, and the Statute-book an *imposture?* I presume, such logic is too light to bear in that case: and I see no reason why it should be of more force in the other. The faults of Christian *priests* or of *Christians* are no argument against the *profession*, but against the *professors* only, as every one knows, and as has been said a thousand times over: and therefore complaints on that head are foreign and impertinent (were they otherwise ever so just) in the mouths of Deists; though few besides themselves are observed to exaggerate as they do.

There are indeed those who would persuade us, that there is scarce such a thing as a Deist in the kingdom, but that they who are suspected to impugn Christianity, "only write against

"priestcraft[1]." It seems they are at length sensible how incompetent the plea is, and how foreign to the cause of infidelity.

We might be heartily glad, my Reverend Brethren, to find the report true: for then how amicably might we unite together, our accusers and we, in condemning and exploding that odious thing, *priestcraft*, to end all disputes. I have no inclination to magnify the number of Deists: I am willing rather to hope they will appear but as an handful of men in comparison. Yet some there certainly are who write against both Testaments, and in such an unfriendly manner, that if they were the most avowed infidels, they could not do more. These men we call Deists, a name of their own choosing to avoid a worse. Some would have us add the epithet of *Christian* to it, and to style them *Christian Deists*[m]: a phrase which it will be hard to make sense of, as here applied, more than of *Christian Pagans*, *Christian Mahometans*, or *Christian Infidels*. Indeed the word *Deist* or *Theist*, in its original signification, implies merely the belief of a *God*, being opposed to *Atheist*: and so there may be *Deists* of various kinds, according to the respective religions which they receive, over and above that prime article. There may be *Pagan Deists*, and *Jewish Deists*, and *Mahometan Deists*, and *Christian Deists*; meaning such persons as respectively embrace those several religions, above the belief of a God. But those that reject all traditional religions, and yet profess to believe in God, are merely *Deists*, or emphatically such, without any additional epithet to distinguish them: or if an epithet must be added, they should be styled *Epicurean* Deists, or *infidel* Deists, or something of like kind. To call them *Christian Deists* is a great abuse of language; unless Christians were to be distributed into two sorts, *Christians* and *No-christians*, or *Christians* and *Anti-christians*.

It is very true, what a late writer says, that these gentlemen do "profess to be Christians[n]:" and it were strange if they should not in a *Christian* country, where the very name is venerable; especially considering that even Hobbes and Spinoza, and others of like principles, did so before them. They understood the policy of introducing *new* doctrines, gradually and imperceptibly, under the cover of the *old* names: so they re-

[1] Examination of the facts, &c. in the Bp. of Chichester's Sermon, p. 58.

[m] Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 361, 371.

[n] Examination of the Bishop of Chichester's Sermon, p. 58.

tained the *terms*, but shifted the *ideas* as they pleased. They retained the name, but laboured to destroy the *thing* under affected and foreign names, viz. *credulity, superstition, priestcraft*, and the like, as I have been shewing.

As to *priestcraft*, which we are now upon, if these gentlemen have any where observed it, they may bear the more patiently with it, because it is much the same thing with what themselves are deeply engaged in; as they are labouring to impose *false facts, false doctrines*, and *false claims* upon the world, under the name of *religion*, for their own humour, ambition, or advantage. Neither is it to the purpose to plead, that "nobody is paid to "maintain Deism," or that "no interest attends it[o];" for be that ever so true or certain, in the sense intended, (which might bear some dispute,) yet if the maintainers of *Deism* may be supposed to gratify either their *vices*, or their *vanity*, or their *resentments*, they have then an *interest* to serve in doing it; they are *paid* in such a way as most pleases them; and none can be paid higher. When any man indulges his predominant passions to the utmost, be the instance what it will, he thinks himself well *paid* in doing it, and he is a *gainer* so far, in his own account, because he gains his end[p].

[o] Examination of the Bishop of Chichester's Sermon, p. 60.

[p] A fine writer turns the argument upon them another way: "There is "something so ridiculous and per-"verse in this kind of zealots, that "one does not know how to set them "out in their proper colours. They "are a sort of *gamesters*, who are "eternally upon the fret, though they "*play for nothing*. They are per-"petually teazing their friends to "come over to them, though at the "same time they allow that neither "of them shall get any thing by the "bargain. In short, the *zeal* of "*spreading* Atheism is, if possible, "more absurd than *Atheism* itself." *Addison's Evidences*, &c. p. 223. Another very ingenious writer hints the same thing more briefly thus: "One "would think that libertines, of all "men, should be unconcerned in "making *proselytes*; since they ex-"pect no *future* reward for their la-"bour, and to succeed in it, would "be only to spoil their *present* mar-"ket." *Inquiry after Wit*, p. 90.

The turn of the thought in both appears to be very just, as to any real or lasting interest here or hereafter: but yet those gentlemen have an interest to serve in what they do, and they know what they *play for*, so long as they run no great risks in a temporal account, and are regardless of the future. It is a pleasure to some, merely to be *talked of*, as men of uncommon sentiments. Most have a fondness for their own conceptions, though never so much out of the way; and they expect to be highly *admired* for them: some affect to *surprise* the public with *paradoxes*, and they are sure to gratify some of the looser sort, and to obtain their *applauses*. Add to this, that it is a *relief* to many, to fence as much as possible against their inward fears, doubts, and misgivings, by any strained declamations: and as they are *uneasy* to find that religion is held in honour, or priests in esteem, they may be inclinable to try how far it may be practicable to turn the current of *public repute*, or however to bear

But perhaps there may be some reflection insinuated against the maintainers of *Christianity*, as they are *paid* for doing it. The fact is true, and it is an honour to them, that they are paid by the *public*. It is an argument that what they teach is conformable, in the main, to the general sentiments of the *wisest* and *best* men amongst us, is the sense of the *legislature*, and voice of the *whole nation*; not *private persuasions*: a circumstance, as I conceive, very much in their favour, and, other things supposed equal, a presumption that *truth* is with them, rather than the contrary. Besides such public allotments are so many testimonies given to the dignity and usefulness of their ministry, like as in other useful and honourable employments, *civil* and *military*. And what can be the reason that *Deism*, which has subsisted now for 2000 years, or more, (reckoning from the days of Epicurus,) should never yet meet with any kingdom or state, among Pagans, Jews, Mahometans, or Christians, that should judge it a thing proper to be supported at the public charge, or *worth* the *rewarding?* I forbear to say more. Let those gentlemen then go and tell it abroad, as much or as often as they please, that the ministers of Christ are *paid* for defending Christianity, or *hired* to do it, (for so they love to express it[q];) it is all very well, so long as the *labourers* are *worthy* of their *hire*[r]. And when those other gentlemen shall please to produce any thing as useful to society as *Christianity* is, and as beneficial to mankind, here and hereafter, then may they also reasonably hope for the like *honour* of being *paid* by the public for it. It is neither mean nor blameworthy in the general, to take rewards for *good* services; but it is always a fault to serve as volunteers in *bad* ones. Those that defend Christianity do the thing that is *right*, (whatever their motives be;) while those that either corrupt it, mutilate it, or discard it, do *wrong*, which makes a sensible difference. As to *motives*, here or there, the favourable presumption will always lie on the side of the *religious*, that their motives are not merely *secular*, because they believe in a judgment to come, which their accusers despise. Christians *may* act purely upon secular motives, but infidels of course *will*: therefore let them not reproach us on this head.

up against it, for a time. These things considered, I do not think it so hard to account for some men's *zeal in spreading* Atheism or Deism, as for their being *Atheists* or *Deists*.

[q] Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 165, 233, 234, 305.

[r] Luke x. 7.

I have but one thing further to add upon the subject of *priestcraft*, namely, that after all the clamours which have been raised about it in this *Protestant*[s] kingdom, I cannot yet perceive any great danger there is of it; except it be from that very quarter from whence all the clamour comes. Indeed if *Deism* should once spread among the *laity*, it may in time insinuate itself further; and then probably *priestcraft* may be the consequence: for the most noted masters of that *craft* (such for instance as Pope Leo the Tenth) have been shrewdly suspected to have been *Deists* or *Infidels* in masquerade, by some loose sayings which they dropped. The sons of Eli before mentioned, as infamous for *priestcraft*, "were sons of Belial; they knew not "the Lord[t]:" they were practical infidels, if not more. Wherever there is most *infidelity*, there in all likelihood will be the most craft and guile of every kind. Men that seriously *fear God* and reverence *sacred Writ*, will of course abhor both *priestcraft* and *anti-priestcraft*: but *infidels*, in a sacerdotal capacity, or out of it, may be prepared for any *cunning craftiness* whatever. Therefore, I say, the introducing and propagating of *infidelity* is the likeliest means to bring in *priestcraft*. The same thing is further evident in another view: *indifference* to all religions saps the principles of the Reformation, and tends to prepare men equally, either for *no religion*, or for any *corrupt* religion that may offer. Besides, all *confusion* and *distraction* in religion amongst us weakens the *Protestant* interest; and whatever that loses, another interest gains. So that *infidelity* in this light can serve only to pave the way for the return of antiquated *superstitions*, and to bring *priestcraft* in again at a back door. Con-

[s] The words of a learned Protestant abroad may here be properly inserted:

An est religio *reformata* politiæ in totum adaptata? An in verbi divini præconum emolumentum concinnata, quorum stipendia plerisque in locis ad assem usque definita sunt? An est horum pietas ars et purus putus quæstus? An vendunt sacra? An falsis miraculis et fabulis anilibus vulgus imperitum decipiunt, nisi pias conciones de Deo et Christo, de nostri Salvatoris ejusque Apostolorum miraculis, de pœnis et præmiis post mortem, commenta esse velit *Adeisidæmon*, qui, nisi me fallit mens, id non diffitebitur? An fraudes et mendacia aucupantur ii qui populo nudam veritatem ex sacris literis exponunt?——Ubinam igitur sunt tot et tantæ fraudes et nundinationes omnium religionum sacerdotum, et eorum qui sacris præsunt, et unquam aut usquam præfuerunt, ne quidem exceptis Judæis, Christianis, et Reformatis (qui redivivi sunt Christiani) ab *Adeisidæmone* tam confidenter decantatæ, et tam audacter exprobratæ? Nullibi, ut puto, extant, nisi in deliris Atheorum cerebellis, et in religionis hostium scommatibus et convitiis. *Fayi Defens. Relig. cont. Toland.* p. 60, 61.

[t] 1 Sam. ii. 12.

sistent men these all the while! to be perpetually declaiming against *priestcraft*, and at the same time labouring to the utmost (knowingly or ignorantly) to introduce it. To be short, the only sure way to keep out *priestcraft* is to exclude *infidelity;* to reverence the *Bible;* to support a *Protestant* government and a *Protestant* Clergy; to esteem those of the Clergy that honour God, and deserve well of their function; and when any of them misbehave, either to cover their faults, or to prosecute them in legal form, that so all *scandals* may be put away from us.

7. The seventh and last article of impeachment against the Christian religion is that of *imposture:* an odious charge, a compendious calumny, all reproaches in one. I need not be long in answering it, having in a great measure anticipated myself already under the former heads. That there is an *imposture* somewhere is very certain: and the only question is, who are the *impostors?* Reckon up the *marks* and *characters* of an imposture[u]: apply them, first, to Christ and his doctrine and followers, and see whether they will fit; and next apply them to Hobbes, Spinoza, &c. and their doctrines and followers, and see whether they will not fit. What can we think of men who set themselves up, in the name of God, *uncalled*, and as *rival teachers* to Moses and the Prophets, to Christ and his Apostles: who recommend their own loose systems in the room of *God's word*, and substitute their reveries in the place of the *Bible:* whose *religion* is nobody knows what, because it is to be what every man shall carve out for himself by his own *internal light;* and likely to be as *various* as men's capacities, tempers, circumstances, or faces: whose *morality*, short and superficial at the best, is further defective as wanting a proper *authority* to support it, and *sanctions*[x] to bind it, and so is next to no *morality;*

[u] They are reckoned up by Dr. Prideaux, as follows:

1. That it must always have for its *end* some carnal interest.

2. That it can have none but *wicked* men for the authors of it.

3. That both these must appear in the very *contexture* of the imposture itself.

4. That it can never be so framed, but that it must contain some palpable *falsities*, which shall discover the falsity of the rest.

5. That wherever it is first propagated, it must be done by *craft* and *fraud*.

6. That when intrusted with many conspirators, it can never be long concealed.

7. That it can never be established, unless backed with force and violence. *Prideaux, Letter to Deists*, p. 7.

[x] It is doubtful whether those gentlemen, many of them, admit any *future* state at all. To say nothing of Acosta, or other single writers that absolutely rejected it, the Pantheists (who are thought to make the most considerable body) plainly discard it, if we may judge from their own sys-

and whose *virtue* is little more than an *idea*, or a dead and empty name[y]. Whose *God* is either *universal nature*, (no God at all, in any proper sense[z],) or else a kind of Epicurean Deity, tied up from interposing at all by *miracles*, and from issuing out any positive laws, and from making any rule or order in things *indifferent* here, and from doing *exemplary* justice upon sinners hereafter: for such his vindictive *justice* is profanely miscalled or misconstrued *spite*, *wrath*, *malice*, *revenge*, *tyranny*[a], and the like. As Epicurus's principal aim, after courteously acknowledging a *Deity*, was to divest him of his rule and governance, and to *disarm* him of his *terrors*[b]; so modern *Deism* evidently centres in the same design, and differs only in a few slight circumstances, as to the manner of pursuing it.

Now what is all this wild doctrine, this compound of profaneness and absurdities, (so solemnly delivered out in the face of the world,) but a *fraud* and imposition upon the public, a *cheat* upon the populace, a formal *imposture*[c]? And if I be not very much mistaken, it is an imposture of a more *pernicious* nature, and of a more *fatal* tendency, (were it possible it should ever prevail,) than any other noted imposture whatsoever, ancient or modern. *Mahometism*, *Paganism*, and *paganized* Christianity, amidst a great deal of rubbish, have yet retained the prime

tems. "Ut omnium rerum nobis "initium ortus attulit, sic adferet "mors exitum: ut horum nihil ad "nos ante ortum pertinuit, sic nihil "post mortem pertinebit." *Pantheisticon*, p. 71. Some that seem to admit a future state, yet plainly reject future *penalties*. See Two Letters from a Deist to his Friend, p. 2, 17, 19. The author of Christianity as Old &c. declares against all future penalties, but such as shall be for the *amendment* of the party, (ch. iv.) which may amount to declaring against all, unless he admits a *purgatory*; which he has not yet mentioned. He declares also against punishment having any *retrospect*, because "what is "past cannot be helped," (Second Address, p. 7.) which, in effect, is declaring against all proper *punishment* for sins; and is exempting the *obstinate* and *incorrigible*, who most deserve punishment, from being punished at all.

[y] See Scripture Vindicated, vol. iv. part 2. p. 286, &c.

[z] See Wollaston's Religion of Nature delineated, p. 76.

[a] See Christianity as Old &c. p. 38, 42.

[b] Tu denique, Epicure, Deum *inermem* facis, omnia illi *tela*, omnem detraxisti *potentiam*; et ne cuiquam metuendus esset, projecisti illum extra motum. Hunc igitur inseptum ingenti quodam et inexplicabili muro, divisumque a contactu, et a conspectu mortalium, non habes quare verearis: nulla illi nec tribuendi, nec nocendi materia est. *Seneca de Benef.* lib. iv. cap. 19. p. 436.

[c] Cæterum, ut olim obtrectatoribus ethnicis *imposturas* Christianismo objicientibus, reponebat Origenes (lib. vi. contr. Celsum) ipsos *impostores* esse omnium maximos; ad eundem modum et nos in novos illos philosophos [Hobbium, Spinosam, &c.] hanc facem retorquemus, *fraudumque* eos et *impostorum* postulamus. *Kortholt. de tribus Impostoribus magnis*, p. 3, 4.

fundamentals of *virtue* and *godliness*; viz. the belief of a *God* and a *providence*, the *immortality* of the *soul*, and a *future judgment*, together with *eternal* rewards and punishments: but *infidelity*, or modern *Deism*, (which is little else but revived *Epicureism*, *Sadducism*, and *Zendichism*,) is so exceeding loose upon the heads aforementioned, that one knows not what solid foundation it leaves, or whether any, for *virtue* and *godliness* to rest upon. In this view, therefore, it must appear the most *pernicious* imposture that the world has yet known.

Then as to the *method* of promoting it, it is such as threatens the destruction of all *sincerity* and common *probity*. The strength of it lies wholly in falsification, stratagem, and wile. It cannot be *pleaded for* decently, without *disowning* it, verbally, at the same time, and without making it pass for the very reverse of what it really is. Never was there such an abuse of *good words*, or such a misapplication of *bad ones*, in any other cause, nor ever will be. *Truth, reason, morality, virtue, natural religion, internal revelation, Christianity*, are all of them made names or titles for *libertinism* and *irreligion*; while *credulity, bigotry*, &c. are made the names for true *religion* and *godliness:* which is miscalling evil *good*, and good *evil*, in a detestable manner, and to a degree beyond example. These things considered, I scruple not to repeat, that there never was a greater or a more unnatural *imposture* offered to the world, than what is seen in modern *deism*, or *infidelity*.

I do not hereby intend to deny all *degrees* in infidelity, or to condemn all equally: the infidel schemes are various, and some worse than others. *Pantheism*, for instance, and *Hobbism* are scandalously bad, scarce differing from the broadest *Atheism:* and *Fatalism*, in effect, is but little better. There may be modester schemes than these. But yet take the best and most refined system of *Deism*, that either has been or can be invented, and what is it (in our present circumstances) but the *folly of man*, set up in opposition to the *wisdom of Heaven?* a confused medley of jarring sentiments, huddled up together blindly and presumptuously, *without* God and *against* God? I mean no reflection here upon *natural religion;* which (*abstracted* from revealed, after borrowing much from it) is an excellent thing[d],

[d] There are several good systems of *natural religion*, but three more particularly, drawn up by three able men, Cumberland, Wilkins, and Wollaston; who all took a rational and consistent way, and such as must in-

and worthy of all acceptation so far as it goes. *Natural religion* and modern *Deism* are not the same thing, but widely different. It were much to be wished, that *Deists* were *sincerely* in the interests of *natural religion:* they could not long be *Deists*, if they were. For, not to mention several other considerations, I shall only observe here, that it is a clear and self-evident dictate of *natural religion*, to believe and embrace whatever God has *revealed* or shall *reveal*, as soon as sufficient proof shall be made of its being so. "Whatever is immediately *revealed* from God, "must, as well as any thing else, be treated as *what it is;* which "it cannot be, if it is not treated with the *highest* regard, *believed*, "and *obeyed*[e]."

I have now, my Reverend Brethren, run through the several opprobrious aspersions and odious imputations cast upon *Christianity*, endeavouring all the way to shew, not only that they are

evitably terminate, when properly pursued, in a serious belief of Divine revelation. On the other hand, *Deism*, which rejects all Divine revelation, must as inevitably terminate, if *consistently* pursued, in downright *Atheism;* as Dr. Clarke has well shewn in his Evidences of natural and revealed Religion, p. 19—33. fourth edit.

One might be apt to expect, since the *Deists* talk so much of the *perfection* of natural religion, that they should be willing at least to adopt the most *perfect* systems of it, such as I have mentioned; rather than leave it to every day-labourer to draw one out for himself. But they have reasons perhaps for not doing it. For,

1. The *morality* in those systems is so extensive, strict, and pure, that they might almost as well be *Christians*, (in point of *restraint*,) as be obliged to submit to all the rules there prescribed.

2. If they were once to admit such a thread of clear and close reasoning, and resolve to pursue it as far as it would carry them, they could not avoid being *Christians*. For the proofs of Christianity stand upon as clear a foot as *natural religion* itself does, especially in its remoter branches: besides that, the law of *nature*, or *reason*, will now of course take in *revelation*, and make it one of its own dictates.

3. The principal aim and design of the *Deists* would be defeated and frustrated, as it seems, were they to espouse any such *certain* scheme, that should be admitted, as a *common* rule for all men. The three excellent writers before named, intended one *common* invariable rule, such as none should swerve from; but infidelity appears to admit of no common and invariable system, but to affect an *independent*, *personal*, *various* religion, according as every man may fancy: [see Literal Scheme, p. 435.] and the result will be, that every one shall be left to do *what seemeth him good in his own eyes*. Which, perhaps, is the true reason, why every man is to have the forming of the rule to *himself*, by his own *internal light*, without the help of external revelation from God, or instruction from men. See Christianity as Old &c. p. 277, 279, 280, 281, 295, 296, 305, 309, 379.

Upon the whole, *Deists* are neither for a *revealed* religion, nor for a *natural* one, justly so called, but for as many *natural religions*, as there are men of different circumstances and abilities. They are for a *personal* religion of their *own* carving, or none: which is not espousing *natural religion*, in any proper sense, but *libertinism* only and *irreligion*, under the name of the religion of nature.

[e] Wollaston, p. 211.

wrongfully charged upon Christians, but that they are, for the most part, *justly* chargeable upon the accusers themselves; who have been sending their readers upon a false pursuit after *credulity*, *bigotry*, &c. where they are not, only to turn their eyes off from observing where they really are. True religion will ever shine, whether considered in itself, or compared with the misshapen schemes set up against it; and those who are not yet duly apprised of its *absolute* value may yet perceive enough of its *comparative* excellency over *infidelity;* as a man that doubts even of true coin may know a plain counterfeit when he sees it, and may be certain of thus much at least, that one is no way comparable to the other.

I shall only add, that if we take a survey of mankind in former ages, we shall find, that though they had the same inclinations to *ease* and *pleasure* as we may now have, and the same aversion to *restraints;* and though they were as willing to get rid of the terrible apprehensions of *God* and a *world to come*, as any of us now can be; yet so strong were the impressions of religion every where, that *infidelity* could not maintain its ground, even in the darkest times of *Paganism;* much less can it be able to do it now. Or supposing it might, yet what could its patrons expect to gain by it in conclusion, after once the wanton humour should go round, but to fall, with others, in the universal ruin? In the mean while, it is observable, that they are themselves, in some measure, sensible of the *use of religion*, as often as their own liberty, property, or reputation is concerned, and they then claim with some earnestness the *benefits* of it; condemning others as profane, wicked, or impious, (words without *sense*, or however without *force*, upon their principles,) who are but suspected to treat them wrongfully. It is only when they consider themselves as *actors*, that religion appears so grievous a *restraint;* for when they look upon themselves as *sufferers*, it is as great a *relief:* and then that religion, which at other times is ill thought of, as an enemy to *liberty*, is found to be the best and surest friend to it. To conclude, since their *licentious* principles are condemned absolutely by all mankind but themselves, and by themselves also at times, and in particular circumstances; more needs not be said to shew how erroneous and pernicious they are, and how justly odious in the sight both of God and man.

A

DISCOURSE

OF

FUNDAMENTALS,

BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF

TWO CHARGES

DELIVERED TO THE

MIDDLESEX CLERGY,

AT THE EASTER VISITATIONS OF 1734 AND 1735.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

UPON a serious and attentive review of the general state of religion amongst us, and of the particular controversies now depending, I could not think of any subject more useful, or at this time more seasonable, than the subject of *fundamentals*. The name is a noted name, frequently occurring in religious debates: but the notion is often left obscure, and the application is so various among contending parties, that it may be difficult to fix any certain rule for it, though it is allowed, on all hands, that much depends upon it.

Lord Verulam, at the beginning of the last century, expressed his judgment of the great *importance* of distinguishing rightly between points *fundamental* and points of *further perfection*; so he worded the distinction, though, I think, not accurately. At the same time he complimented the Divines of that age, as having done their parts to entire satisfaction upon that article[a]. But upon more mature consideration, twenty years after, or nearly, he apprehended that some further improvement was still wanting, and so he recommended it, among the *desiderata* in theology, to the care and diligence of succeeding Divines[b].

The subject has since passed through many learned and judicious hands[c], most of them complaining of the perplexities appearing in it, but all bearing testimony to the great weight and importance of it[d].

[a] See Advancement of Learning, p. 320, 321. first ed. A. D. 1605.

[b] Augmentum Scientiarum, lib. ix. p. 532, 533. ed. Paris. A. D. 1624.

[c] 1635. Mede's Letters, Opp. vol. ii. p. 1064—1074.

1638. Chillingworth, part i. chap. 3rd, p. 115.

1650. Johann. Hoornbeeck, Socin. Confut. tom. i. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 181. Exercitat. Theolog. p. 712, &c.

1654. Dr. Hammond, Opp. vol. i. p. 275.

1665. Bp. Stillingfleet, Rat. Account, part i. chap. 2, 3, 4.

1680. Lambert. Velthuysius, Opp. vol. i. p. 693.

1682. Dean Sherlock, Vindic. of Stillingfleet, chap. 5.

1693. Dr. Clagett, vol. ii. Serm. second and third.

1694. Frid. Spanheim. Fil. Opp. tom. iii. p. 1289, &c.

1696. Puffendorf. Jus feciale Divinum: sive de Consensu et Dissensu Protestantium.

1697. Witsius. In Symbolum Apostol. p. 9, &c.

1719. Alphons. Turretin de Articulis Fundamentalibus.

[d] *Ardua* satis et tamen *necessaria* est disquisitio de dogmatibus et erroribus *fundamentalibus*. Hinc enim pendent disputationes et deliberationes

The very name of *fundamental* carries in it some confuse general idea of *weight* and *significancy;* which again rises in proportion to the dignity of the subject whereunto it belongs. Every *art* or *science*, every *society*, *system*, or *constitution*, has its *fundamental* rules, laws, principles, or constituents, which it rests upon, and whereby it subsists. The word *fundamental*, in such cases, seems to mean the same thing with *essential*, and to denote that wherein the very *essence* or *subsistence* of the subject spoken of is contained. And as there is a just distinction to be made between *essentials* and *circumstantials*, so is there the like just distinction to be made between *fundamentals* and *extra-fundamentals*, or *non-fundamentals*. When we apply the epithet *fundamental* either to religion in general or to Christianity in particular, we are supposed to mean something *essential* to religion or Christianity; so necessary to its being, or at least to its well-being, that it could not subsist, or not maintain itself tolerably without it.

There is in Scripture itself, as well as in the reason of the thing, ground sufficient for distinguishing between points fundamental to Christianity and points of smaller moment. There are the *weightier* matters, and the matters *less weighty;* some things deserving our most *earnest heed*, others requiring no more than ordinary or common care. I shall not take up your time in commenting upon the several *texts* which appear to have intimated the distinction, or to have expressed it in terms[e]. The whole tenor of the New Testament abundantly authorizes the distinction, while it lays a very particular stress upon some doctrines more than upon others, and while it condemns the contrary tenets as *subversive* of the Gospel, or as *frustrating* the *grace* of God, or as rendering the false teachers altogether unworthy of Christian communion. The whole conduct of our Lord's Apostles sufficiently declares the same thing: but I shall instance only in St.

de *libertate prophetandi*, de *tolerantia* et *moderatione*, de *hæresi*, de *secessione*, de *scismate*, de *unione* et *syncretismo* ecclesiarum, de *excommunicatione*, &c. *Voetius*, Disp. 5. Conf. Spanheim. p. 1289.

Res sane *difficilis*, sed cujus difficultas *incredibili* quadam utilitate compensatur. Nam, primo, Te dogmatum *fundamentalium* a cæteris distinctio, in *praxi* magnopere adjuvabit. Secundo, Ea res ad Christianorum *concordiam* munitam viam parabit: quomodo enim pacis iniri consilia, antequam illud in genere decernatur, *quid sit dogma fundamentale*, nec intelligi quidem potest. *Steph. Gausen. Dissert. Theolog.* p. 104. edit. Halæ.

[e] See the texts brought together and descanted upon in Hoornbeeck, Socin. Confut. lib. i. cap. 9. p. 188, &c. Velthuysius, Tract. de Fundament. p. 705. Frid. Spanheim. tom. iii. 1058. 1305. Turretin. de Fundam. p. 7, 8.

Paul, that I may not be tedious in a plain case. There were in the days of the Apostles, Judaizers of two several kinds; some thinking themselves obliged, as Jews, to retain their Judaism along with Christianity, others conceiving that the Mosaical law was so necessary, that it ought to be received, under pain of damnation, by all, whether Jews or Gentiles. Both the opinions were wrong; but the one was *tolerable*, and the other was *intolerable*. Wherefore St. Paul complied in some measure with the Judaizers of the first sort, being willing, in such cases, "to be-"come all things to all men[f]:" and he exhorted his new converts of the Gentiles to bear with them, and to receive them as brethren[g]. But as to the Judaizers of the second sort, he would not "give place to them by subjection, no not for an hour, lest "the truth of the Gospel" should fatally suffer by it[h]. He anathematized them as subverters of the faith of Christ, and as a reproach to the Christian name[i]. This single instance may suffice to point out the distinction between *fundamentals* and *non-fundamentals*; and to illustrate the use of it in practice.

The primitive churches afterwards had the same distinction all along in their eye, as might be made appear from numerous and plain testimonies[k]. But their ordinary conduct in admitting persons to communion, or rejecting them from it, according to that rule[l], is a plain and sensible argument drawn from certain fact, which supersedes all further inquiries. Unity in the *fundamental* articles of faith was always strictly insisted upon as one necessary condition of church membership: and if any man openly and resolutely opposed those articles, or any of them, he was rejected as a deserter of the *common faith*, and treated as an *alien*.

From hence then it may appear, that the *distinction* which we are now upon is *ancient* and *well grounded*: and of what *moment* it is may be collected from hence, that the previous question, in almost every dispute concerning *church communion*, depends upon it. Nor need we wonder if much pains has been taken by many to perplex and entangle it: for they who are most afraid

[f] See 1 Cor. ix. 19—23. Acts xvi. 3. xxi. 21—26.

[g] See Rom. xiv. xv. Coloss. ii. 16, 17.

[h] Gal. ii. 5, 21.

[i] Gal. i. 7, 8, 9. v. 12.

[k] See many of those testimonies collected in Frid. Spanheim. tom. iii. 1059, 1306. Hoornbeeck, Socin. Confut. lib. i. cap. 9. p. 210. Turretin. p. 9.

[l] See Bingham, Christian Antiquities, b. xvi. chap. i.

of being condemned by the rule will declare against it, or will warp and pervert it, to make it serve their own purposes. Hence it is that we have almost as many different rules for determining *fundamentals*, as there are different sects or parties; and that which might otherwise serve (if all men were reasonable) to end all differences, has itself been too often made one principal bone of contention.

But though perverse disputers may at any time raise clouds and darkness, and there is no rule so clear, but a wrangler may contrive a thousand ways to perplex and entangle it; yet if the point can but be once settled upon a *rational* foot, the clearing it so far will suffice among the *honest* and *reasonable* part of mankind; and it is an end worthy of our thoughts and care[m]. It is morally certain that all schemes or projects for any *perfect union* of Christians, however well intended or wisely laid, will at length fail in the issue, (through the almost infinite variety of capacities, tempers, interests, passions, prejudices,) just as all schemes for an *universal peace* throughout the world (or only over all Europe) will of course fail of effect: nevertheless, we ought evermore seriously to seek after *peace*, whether religious or secular, and to promote the same by instruction, counsel, and endeavour, as far as *possible*, or *reasonable*, leaving the event to God. And therefore there is no reason for throwing aside any *useful* means of making peace, though some persons will not admit of them, and others may turn them into a matter of more strife.

As the distinction between doctrines *fundamental* and *non-fundamental* is undoubtedly just in the general, and is confessed, in a manner, by all parties to be a good *previous* rule for settling the terms of *Christian communion*, there is certainly a way of clearing it from all *reasonable* exceptions, however difficult it may be to come at that way. *Error* may run men into inextricable mazes, and commonly does so: but *true* and *right* principles, regularly and aptly pursued, will always find a clear exit. I proceed then to the business in hand.

It will be needless here to distinguish between the fundamentals of *natural* and *revealed* religion, because revealed takes

[m] *Optari* id magis potest quam *sperari* inter Christianos ut conveniatur vel in *judicio* de *necessariis* et *fundamentalibus* religionis, vel ut in iis ab omnibus unanimiter stetur—— Adeo aliud est, quid hic alibique *fieri debeat* videre et monere; aliud, quid *fieri possit*, vel *eventurum* videatur, indicare. *Hoornbeeck*, lib. i. cap. 9. p. 199.

in both, and both, so considered, fall into one. It will be equally needless to distinguish nicely between the several fundamentals of *faith, worship*, and *morality*, because all of them indifferently are *essential* to Christianity, and ought equally to be insisted upon, as terms of *Christian communion*. But it may be highly needful to distinguish fundamentals considered in an *abstract* view, as essentials of the Christian *fabric* or *system*, (in which view it is, that they are most properly called *essentials* and *fundamentals*,) and fundamentals considered in a *relative* view to particular persons, in which respect they are frequently called *necessaries*, as being ordinarily necessary to salvation. For though the *fundamentals* and the *necessaries* do really coincide, and are indeed the same thing, (*equal* capacities and opportunities *supposed*,) yet so great is the variety of capacities and opportunities in different persons, that one rule and measure of *necessaries* will not equally serve for all. The want of observing this very useful distinction between *fundamentals* as such in an *abstract* view, and *necessaries* as such in a *relative* view, has unhappily occasioned much confusion in our present subject: and therefore the surest and readiest way to clear it up to satisfaction will be to attend carefully to the distinction now mentioned[n]. Fundamentals in their *abstract* view are of a fixed determined nature as much as Christianity itself is, and may be ascertained by plain and unalterable rules; but fundamentals in their *relative* view to persons will always vary with the *capacities* and *opportunities* of the persons. There is no certain judgment to be made as to particular men, either with respect to their *heads* or their *hearts*: neither can we presume to determine in special how far the Divine mercies may extend[o] towards *idiots*,

[n] Bp. Stillingfleet means the same thing in the main, though he words it differently, where he distinguishes between what things are *necessary* to the salvation of men *as such*, or considered in their *single* or *private* capacities; and what things are *necessary* to be owned in order to salvation by *Christian societies*, or as the *bonds* and *conditions* of *ecclesiastical communion*. Whereupon he further adds: "The want of understanding "this *distinction* of the necessity of "things has caused most of the per-"plexities and confusion in this con-"troversy of fundamentals." *Stillingfleet, Rat. Account*, part i. chap. 2. p. 49.

[o] Ad salutem quæ præcise exigantur, ita ut sine iis et explicite et huc vel eo usque agnitis, nemo a Deo salvetur vel salvari possit, ecquis determinabit? sc. *minimum quod sic*. Neque *Dei consiliarius* aliquis existit, vel *Judex salutis aut damnationis* ab ipso est constitutus, ut non modo doceat necessaria ad salutem creditu factuque, (quod omnium doctorum est,) sed *definiat* cum quo et quanto sive *vitio*, sive *errore*, aliquis non possit ad salutem admitti, vel possit.

Ad salutem quæ requirat Deus, et

or men next to *idiots;* towards *enthusiasts*, or others not far from *enthusiasts;* towards even sensible and learned men erring *fundamentally*, but under some *unconquerable* prejudice or disorder of mind[p]. In this view, there is no fixed measure of *fundamentals:* or to speak more properly, though *fundamentals* as such are fixed and established in the very nature or reason of things, yet *necessaries* as such are not so; neither need they be. The way then is, to abstract from *persons*, and to consider *fundamentals* under a distinct view, as referring to the *fabric* of Christianity. All parties almost one way or other, one time or another, do admit of the like distinction, making the *terms* of *communion* somewhat stricter than the necessary *terms* of *salvation:* that is to say, they exclude many from communion as erring *fundamentally*, whom notwithstanding they do not, they dare not condemn absolutely to everlasting perdition.

The reason is, because they can make no certain estimate of the *infirmities* or *incapacities* which the men may unhappily lie under, nor of the *allowances* which an all-seeing God may please to make to them upon that score. The Romanists, who are commonly the most severe in their censures of any men whatever, yet sometimes do make a distinction between excluding men absolutely from *Christian communion*, and peremptorily sentencing the same men to *eternal damnation*[q]. The Remonstrants,

quæ nobis velit esse cordi, verbum ejus copiose tradit: at quid *ipse velit facere*, et quomodo aut quousque vel pro *misericordia* cum hominibus agere aut *justitia*, ipsi relinquendum duco. Loquor de *præcisa* ultimi termini in peccato vel errore ad salutem vel damnationem *definitione;* mihi quidem, quicquid alii aliter censeant, visum semper inscrutabile. *Hoornbeeck, Exercit. Theolog.* p. 713.

[p] It may be noted, that though the Scripture says absolutely, "He that "believeth not shall be damned," and the Athanasian and other creeds have followed the like absolute form of expression, yet from other places of Scripture, and from the nature of the thing, it is plain that such forms of expression are always to be understood with grains of allowance for *invincible ignorance* or *unavoidable infirmity*, as all the Divine *laws* concerning either matters of *faith* or matters of *practice* are to be understood: they bind according to what a man *hath*, or *might have* if he would; and not according to what he *hath not* and *could not* have. This exception is so just and evident, that it was sufficient for *Scripture* or *creeds* to *suppose* it generally, rather than to *mention it:* for every one's common sense will readily supply it.

[q] Non esse æqualiter definitos aut definiendos *terminos communionis cum ecclesia invisibili* atque adeo cum Christo et gratia Dei; et *terminos communionis cum ecclesia externa visibili*, docet disputatio nostrorum cum pontificiis, quod excommunicati possint esse in ecclesia; et altera, de salute majorum nostrorum sub papatu. Quin et ipsi *pontificii* moderatiores, Græcos aliosque Orientales extra communionem ecclesiæ positos, ab omni salute non excludunt: immo ne *reformatos* quidem, ex sensu Cassandri, Renati Benedicti et qui illos sequuntur. *Voetius*, Disput. 5.

who in debate, and to serve a cause, love to confound *fundamentals* with *necessaries*, or *fundamentals* of *communion* with *fundamentals* of *salvation*, are yet observed to distinguish them in practice: for they receive not Jews, Turks, Pagans, or wild sectaries professing Christianity, as friends or brethren, and yet they presume not to exclude them absolutely from all possibility of being saved[r]. All which shews, that a distinction ought to be made between *fundamentals* considered in their *abstract* nature, as *essential* parts of the Christian system, and *fundamentals* considered in a *relative* view to the salvation of particular persons.

Having thus far cleared the way, by separating from the subject what belongs not to it, (but has been unwarily or insidiously brought in, to perplex and confound it,) I may now proceed to the explaining the *ratio* of a *fundamental* truth or error, and to the fixing some certain *rule* whereby to discover or determine what kind of doctrines or positions properly fall under such denomination.

"A *fundamental doctrine* is such a doctrine as is in strict "sense of the *essence* of Christianity, without which the whole "building and superstructure must fall; the belief of which is "necessary to the very being of Christianity, like the *first prin-* "*ciples* of any *art* or *science*[s]." So says a learned and judicious writer: and this may serve for a good general description of what *fundamental* means, as likewise for a first principle or *postulatum*, to proceed upon in our further inquiries.

The next step we advance to, and which bears an immediate connection with the former, is, that such doctrines as are found to be *intrinsical* or *essential* to the *Christian covenant* are *fundamental truths*, and such as are plainly and directly *subversive* of it are *fundamental errors*.

To be more particular, the *Christian covenant* may be con-

[r] Hactenus non vidimus tales Judæos a societate Remonstrantium gehennæ adjudicatos. Idem dicendum est de Gentilibus, Mahumetistis, Samaritis, Henric-Nicolaitis, David-Joristis, Franckistis, Stephelianis, Weigelianis, Pontificiis moderatoribus, Anabaptistis, Torrentianis, &c. Aut omnes illos a Deo et cœlo necessario exclusissimos pronuntient, aut communione et fraternitate sua dignos judicent; et consequenter dilectionem illam suam ac moderationem Remonstranticam ilico exerceant, invitando et reipiendo illos in communionem suam. *Voetius*, ibid.

[s] Sherlock, Vindicat. of the Def. of Stillingfleet, p. 256.

Articuli *fundamentales* ea sunt religionis capita quæ ad ejus *essentiam* seu *fundamentum* ita pertinent, tantique sunt in ea *momenti*, ut iis demptis stare nequeat religio, vel saltem *præcipua* quadam planeque *necessaria* sui parte destituatur. *Turretin.* p. 2, 3.

sidered as containing or including the several articles here following. 1. A Founder and principal Covenanter. 2. A subject capable of being covenanted with. 3. A charter of foundation. 4. A Mediator. 5. Conditions to be performed. 6. Aids or means to enable to performance. 7. Sanctions also, to bind the covenant, and to secure obedience.

I. The first article to be considered is, the *Founder* and principal Covenanter: for without this, there could be no such *covenant* as is here supposed; a covenant of grace and salvation made with mankind by God the Father, in and by Christ Jesus[t]. Hence it is evident, that the *existence* of a *Deity* is a *fundamental* article of doctrine; and to deny or to disbelieve it is to err *fundamentally*. In the belief of a Deity is included the belief of all such *perfections* or *attributes* as without which God cannot be understood to be *God:* and therefore to disown such perfections as are necessarily and plainly contained in the idea of a *Divine* Being, is the same in effect with disowning the *existence*, and so is erring fundamentally. To this head belongs the belief of God's being our *Creator*, *Preserver*, and likewise *Inspector* over our thoughts, words, and actions[u]: and consequently the denial of any one or more of these articles must be numbered among the errors *fundamental*.

But besides the *existence* and *providence* of some Divine Being thus considered in the general, (which even the soberer kind of Pagans made part of their creed,) it is further *fundamental* in the *Christian system* to acknowledge a Deity in *special;* namely, *Jehovah*, God both of the Old and New Testament, and *Father of Christ,* in opposition to the false Gods, either of *heathens* or *heretics*[x]. For it is not sufficient for a *Christian* barely to know or believe that there is a God, but to understand also *who* is *God*[y]. Faith in *Jehovah* as being both *God of Israel* and *Father of Christ Jesus*, is an *essential* in Christian theology, and *fundamental* to the Christian covenant: from whence also it is evident, that the Simonians, Cerinthians, Marcionites, Manichees, and as many others as presumed to contest this article, erred *fundamentally*.

[t] How the Christian religion carries in it a *covenant* of this kind, see explained at large by Baron Puffendorf, Jus feciale Divinum, sect. xx. p. 92, &c. sect. xxxvii. p. 134, &c. English translation, entitled, An Essay towards the Uniting of Protestants, p. 87, &c. 129, &c.

[u] Vid. Velthuysius, p. 747, 748, 756.

[x] Velthuysius, p. 749.

[y] Vid. Hoornbeeck, Socin. Confut. lib. i. cap. 9. p. 217.

II. A covenant between God and man supposes and implies that man is a party *capable of being covenanted with*, has *freedom of will* sufficient to denominate him a *moral* agent, apt to discern between *good* and *evil*, and *choosing* which he pleases. Therefore the doctrines of *free-will* (thus understood) and of the *essential* differences between *moral good* and *evil* are *fundamental* verities; and to disown them, or either of them, is to err *fundamentally*[a].

III. The *charter* of *foundation* is undoubtedly an *essential* of the covenant: and therefore, of course, the admittance of the *sacred oracles*, which are the *charter* itself, (or at least the only *authentic* instrument of conveyance,) is essential to the covenant: consequently, to reject, or disbelieve the *Divine authority* of sacred Writ, is to err fundamentally.

IV. The belief of a *Mediator* of the Christian covenant is manifestly an *essential*, and needs no proof. The acknowledging of the blessed *Jesus* as *Messiah* and *Mediator* is plainly *fundamental*, according to the old tenor both of the Old and New Testament; and to deny it is to throw up Christianity at once.

But further, the acknowledging such a Mediator as the Scripture very clearly describes, a *Divine* Mediator, a Mediator who is *very God* and *very man*, while one Christ, is *fundamental* also in the Christian system. "We must know and believe of this "Mediator, that he is *true God* and the second Person in the "sacred Trinity, and that he is also true man, and that the "same, who is both God and man, is yet but one Person. The "places of Scripture are numberless which prove that the Me-"diator of the new covenant is *God*, which give to him that "name in the *proper sense* of it, and ascribe to him such *works* "as can be ascribed to none but God. And this indeed is what "the very nature of the *covenant* required, for as much as no "*creature* whatever could be of so great dignity as to be worthy "and fit to bear the person of all mankind with an effect so "great as even to equal the creation of them[b]."

To deny the real and proper *Divinity* is of consequence to err *fundamentally*. It is in effect "rejecting the chief Person of "the covenant upon whom our salvation depends, and does "therein overthrow the whole covenant[c]."

[a] See Clagett, vol. ii. Serm. 2. p. 56, 57, 58. Velthuysius, p. 75.

[b] Puffendorf. sect. xli. p. 145. Lat. edit. 138. Engl. edit. Compare Sherlock, Vindicat. &c. p. 261—270.

[c] Puffendorf. ibid. p. 143. Lat. p. 135. Engl.

To this head belongs the doctrine of *expiation, atonement*, or *satisfaction*, made by Christ in his blood: a *fundamental* article of Christianity, fully expressed, frequently and earnestly inculcated quite through the New Testament. To advance one's *own* righteousness in *opposition* to justification by the *meritorious* sacrifice of Christ, or as *sufficient* without it, is plainly altering the *terms* of *acceptance*, and *frustrating* the covenant in Christ's blood, as it is making him to have "died in vain[d];" which is subverting the whole Gospel.

"A religion *with a sacrifice*, and a religion *without a sacrifice*, "differ in the whole kind. The first respects the *atonement* of "our past sins and our daily infirmities; it respects God as the "*judge* and *avenger* of wickedness, as well as the rewarder of "those who diligently seek him: the other is a kind of *phi-* "*losophical* institution, to train men up in the practice of piety "and virtue. A religion *without a sacrifice* is at most but half "as much as a religion *with a sacrifice:* and that *half* wherein "they agree are of a quite different nature from each other.— "The *practical* part of religion is vastly altered by the *belief* or "*denial* of the sacrifice and expiation of Christ's death[e]." In a word, to deny the *expiation*, or *satisfaction*, is to renounce the Christian covenant, and is refusing to be saved upon the Gospel terms; which undoubtedly must be erring *fundamentally*.

V. The conditions of the covenant on our part are very plainly *essential* to the covenant itself. Consequently, the doctrines of *repentance* and a *holy life* are fundamental doctrines[f]. Whatever tenets or principles do directly and evidently overthrow the necessity of *holiness*, or of *evangelical obedience*, do at the same time subvert the Gospel covenant, and are therefore grievous and fatal errors, errors in the *foundation*.

VI. The *aids*, or enabling *means*, without which the covenanter cannot perform the conditions, must of course be looked upon as *essential* to the covenant. The *two Sacraments* in this view, considered as enabling *means* of *grace*, are essential to the covenant: therefore the discarding the *two Sacraments*, or either of them, and the denying their *use* or *necessity*, is erring funda-

[d] Gal. ii. 21. Compare Gal. i. 6, 7, 8, 9.

[e] Sherlock, Vindicat. p. 282, 283. Conf. Hoornbeeck. Socin. Confut. p. 253. Velthuysius, p. 756, 758, 769. Puffendorf. sect. li. p. 171. Lat. 160. Engl.

[f] See Puffendorf, sect. l. 54, 55, 56. Velthuys. p. 790.

mentally[g]. I might perhaps come at the same conclusion more directly, by considering the *Sacraments* as *seals of the covenant*, and so bearing in that view an immediate relation to it and connection with it. But I know not whether the premises might not admit of some dispute; besides that a metaphorical expression is not so clear a ground to build an argument upon: though at the same time I make no question but that the *two Sacraments* are very justly styled, and really are, *seals of the covenant*.

Among the necessary *aids* must be reckoned the assistance or guidance of God's *Holy Spirit*, as the chief of all aids, and what contains all other: this therefore is a *fundamental* principle. And because this cannot be rightly understood without admitting that the Holy Spirit is *omnipresent, all-sufficient*, and, in a word, strictly *Divine*, therefore the *Divinity* of the Holy Ghost is a *fundamental* article of the Christian covenant, and to disown it is to err *fundamentally*[h].

And since it is manifest from the whole tenor of Scripture, that there is but *one God*, one Lord *Jehovah*, it is evident that the doctrine of *three* real Persons in *one* eternal Godhead is a *fundamental* doctrine of Christianity. Of this I have largely treated elsewhere[i]; but I may here take leave to add the excellent words of Baron Puffendorf, a person of exquisite judgment, and very far from being a bigot to any churchmen: "In this "article of *three Persons* in *one Divine essence* lies the *foundation* "of genuine Christian religion; which being taken away this "falls to the ground, and nothing will remain but somewhat of "an exact *moral philosophy*. For if there are not more Persons "than one in the Divine essence, there is *no Saviour, no redemp-* "*tion, no faith, no justification*[k]." Good reason there is why the Christian churches would never communicate either with the Samosatenians and Arians of old time, or with the Socinians of later date: a noble writer of our own has very justly observed, "That by this very thing, that they disbelieve the article of the "*Holy Trinity*, they make themselves uncapable of the *commu-* "*nion* of other Christian people of the Nicene faith: and we

[g] Of Baptism in particular, see Puffendorf. Jus. fecial. sect. lii. liii. and Clarke's Sermons, vol. ix. p. 86. Of the Eucharist as essential, see Puffendorf. ibid. sect. lvii. and Velthuysen, p. 800.

[h] See Sherlock, Vindicat. p. 271, 294. Velthuysius, p. 783, 789, 794.

[i] Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity, vol. iii. p. 389.

[k] Puffendorf. sect. lii. p. 174. Lat. p. 162. Engl.

" cannot so much as join with them in good prayers, because we " are not agreed concerning the Persons to whom our devotions " must be addressed. And Christendom never did so lightly " esteem the article of the *Holy Trinity*, as not to glory in it, " and confess it publicly, and express it in all our Offices. The " *Holy Ghost*, together with the *Father* and the *Son*, must be " worshipped and glorified[l]." But I proceed.

VII. In the seventh and last place, I am to observe, that the *sanctions* proper to bind the covenant, and to give it its due force and efficacy, must needs be looked upon as *essential* to the covenant. Accordingly, the doctrine of a *future state* must be a fundamental doctrine, as it is the principle of all religion: for without it there can be no sufficient inducement to the *constant* and *conscientious* practice of virtue and piety. The doctrines also of a *resurrection*, and final *judgment* by Christ our Lord, together with the doctrines of a *heaven* for the righteous, and a *hell* for the ungodly, are *fundamental* points of Christian theology. To deny or disbelieve these doctrines is to overturn the *covenant*, because it directly tends to defeat and frustrate the *end* and *use* of it, undermining its binding force, and sapping its influences, depriving it of its life, strength, and energy.

Thus far I have proceeded in pointing out some of the *fundamental verities*, together with the *fundamental errors* opposite thereto, and known by their contraries. By the same rule, and upon the same general principles, it may be easy to draw out more, as often as occasion shall require. It is not necessary to exhibit any complete *catalogue*[m] either of fundamental truths or errors: it is sufficient that we have a *certain* rule to conduct by, whenever any question arises about church communion, heresy, schism, or the like. The ablest physicians would not perhaps undertake to give us an exact catalogue or determinate number of all the *essentials* of human life[n], or of all the *fatal* distempers or *mortal* wounds incident to the animal frame: but they could easily give in a competent list of either kind; and when any

[l] Lord Viscount Hatton. In the Preface to his Psalter, p. 17.

[m] See Chillingworth, part i. cap. 3. sect. 13, 53. Frid. Spanheim. p. 1312, &c. Turretin. p. 21, &c.

[n] Quis dixerit, quid præcise alimentorum ad vitam sustinendam requiratur? Neque tamen ob illam ignorantiam periculum est ne nos fame consumi sinamus. Sed et quis dixerit quot *ciborum* genera, et quot *venenorum* species in orbe reperiuntur? Quod tamen non impedit quo minus et *cibis* uti et *venenis* abstinere optime possimus. Quid mirum ergo, si de cibis animi salutiferis erroribusque exitialibus idem dicatur? *Turretin.* p. 23, 24.

particular case comes before them, they can for the most part judge, by the rules of their art, what means may be necessary to preserve life, and what will as naturally tend to destroy it. In like manner, though Divines take not upon them to number up with exactness all the verities *essential* to the life of Christianity, or all the errors *subversive* and *destructive* of it, yet they can specify several in each kind with unerring certainty, and have certain rules whereby to judge, as occasion offers, of any other; and this suffices in the essentials of *faith*, as well as in the essentials of *practice*.

There may be some difficulty in marking out the exact partitions which divide *fundamentals* from *non-fundamentals*, as they differ only in the degree of *more* and *less* weighty: but then there is also the like difficulty in settling the precise boundaries between *lawful* and *unlawful*, *right* and *wrong*, *virtue* and *vice*, in many particular instances; which yet is no just objection to the undertaking, nor accompanied with such difficulties as need make any considerate casuist despair.

Besides, whatever perplexities may sometimes arise in *theory*, there will be few or none in *practice*, since in case of just and reasonable *doubt*, whether such or such an article be *fundamental* or otherwise, the known rule is, to choose the *safer* side. If it be further asked, which is the *safer* side, that of *truth* or of *peace*; I scruple not to give it on the side of *peace*, which ordinarily is of greater value (as more depends upon it) than the supporting or securing the outward profession of a *non-fundamental* truth, or which does not certainly *appear* to be fundamental[o]. When I speak of *doubtful* cases, I would not be understood of *doubtful doctrines*, (for such are not fundamental,) but of such cases where the *truth* of the doctrine is at least *morally certain*, and the *importance* of it only *doubtful*. In such cases and instances, reasons of *peace* and *charity* (as I humbly conceive) ought to prevail, rather than break communion for the sake of such truth as cannot be clearly proved a *fundamental* one[p]. Till

[o] Est hic prudenter procedendum, ne *fidei* in non-necessariis et sæpe dubiis ac incertioribus dogmatibus ita consulamus, ut lædamus *charitatem*, et eos forte damnemus quos Christus summus judex absolvit. *Vitringa, Observ. Sacr.* lib. v. cap. 9. p. 140.

[p] Placuit et theologis distinctio in necessaria ad *salutis consecutionem* et quæ insuper talis ad *communionem ecclesiæ*: quandoque enim, retento fundamento, non excludi judicio humano a *salute*——quos tamen recipi in *externam* cum ecclesia *communionem*, unionis, ordinis, disciplinæ, ædificationis ratio prohibeat. In quo, si unquam alias, observandam esse, ut moderatæ prudentiæ, sic Christianæ

good proof can be made of its being *fundamental*, it may reasonably pass for a *non-fundamental:* and they who reject it, or refuse to accept it, may notwithstanding be received as *Christian brethren*, yea and ought to be received as such, if there be no other greater reason for excluding them. For I may note by the way, that though a disagreement in *fundamentals* is one bar to communion, and a very just one, yet it is not the only one which may be supposed. If any *non-fundamental* error should be rigorously insisted upon, so far as to *require* us to deny any certain truth, or if any *sinful* terms whatever be imposed; a breach of communion must follow of course, (since it is necessary to avoid a *lie*, and to obey *God* rather than *man*,) and the *imposers* in such cases are the *dividers*. So likewise in case of *impure* worship or flagrant *immoralities*, (though all the *essentials* of *faith* might remain secure,) it may be necessary to refuse communion with such and such men, or bodies of men. But I have no occasion to consider those or the like cases, which lie out of the compass of our present inquiry. The subject of *fundamentals* was all that I undertook to state and clear as briefly as might be, and to observe how far *Church communion* hangs upon that single article, waving the consideration of other articles, as foreign to the point in hand. I am willing to hope that what has been said may be found sufficient with persons of discernment, for determining the *formal reason* of a fundamental truth or error; and for the settling a safe and easy rule to distinguish the same from what is not fundamental. I have not room to consider particular cases and instances, wherein some difficulties may occur: but if the *general* rule laid down be right and clear, that suffices; neither is the rule to be rejected on account of *accidental* difficulties which may sometimes happen to arise about the application of it.

But for the further illustrating or confirming the rule laid down, it may be now proper to compare it with *other rules*, some differing in *words* only, (being the same in *substance* with it,) others differing in the main thing, and some of them very widely. As to those other rules which appear to coincide with what I have offered, or scarcely to differ from it, it will be sufficient barely to mention them in passing.

charitatis, ac mutuæ *tolerantiæ* legem, ——prudens quisque theologus facile largitur; satiusque peccari in charitatis *excessu* (nisi intercedat totius ecclesiæ salus) quam in *defectu*. *Spanheim. Opp.* tom. iii. p. 1311.

Some learned and judicious writers resolve the *ratio* of a fundamental article into its essential connection with the general and comprehensive article of *salvation by Christ*[q]: which in reality amounts to the same with resolving it, as I have done, into the nature of the *Christian covenant*. Others characterize fundamental doctrines as being "necessary to the love of God "towards us, or to that love of ours towards him, which consists "in keeping his commandments[r]." Which again comes to the same with resolving the *ratio* of a fundamental into the *covenant* of grace: for maintaining that *covenant* in all its *essential* parts or branches, is most effectually maintaining the principles of consummate *amity* between *God* and *man*. Our very judicious Mr. Mede resolves the *formal reason* of a fundamental into the necessary connection which it has with the acts and functions of *Christian life*[s]: but he owns at the same time, that if it be resolved into the necessary connection it has with the *Christian covenant*, it is all one with the other, differing only in the manner of expression. Baron Puffendorf, in his excellent treatise upon the subject of Union among Protestants, every where resolves the *ratio* of a fundamental, just as I have, into the doctrine of the *Christian covenant*. But I proceed to consider several other *rules* or *ratios* which have been offered by learned men, and which are more or less widely differing from what I have laid down. It will be proper not only to mention them, but to confute them likewise, by pointing out their faults or defects.

I. Some, to make short work, and to cut off all disputes at once, have been pleased to refer us to the *definition of the Church*, as the surest or the only rule for determining what is *fundamental*, and what not. But it is certain that the *definition* even of the *primitive churches*, after the Apostles, is merely *declarative*, not *effective*; makes no fundamental article, but declares only what was supposed to be so previously to that declaration: and therefore we must look higher for the *formal reason* of a fundamental. The judgment of the *primitive churches* is, no doubt, of great use and weight, as they drew from the fountain head, and well understood the true and genuine principles of the Christian system: and it is of great moment to observe what doctrines they *received* as fundamental truths, and what they *rejected* as

[q] Dean Sherlock, Vindicat. p. 259, 302.

[r] Whitby, Comm. on 1 John ii. 5.

[s] See Mede to Hartlib. Letter lxxxviii. p. 1072. Compare Dr. Clagett, vol. ii. Serm. 2. p. 37.

fundamental errors; because there is good reason to believe, all circumstances considered, that they judged very rightly in both cases. But still since their judgment must finally be submitted to the test of *Scripture* and *right reason*, and cannot be admitted but as consonant thereto, it is very plain that the *ratio* of a fundamental rests not ultimately in their *judgment* or *definition*, but in the nature of the doctrine itself, and the credentials which it brings with it, by which all the rest must be tried. The *definition* therefore even of the *primitive churches* can never be justly looked upon as the proper or adequate rule.

As to the *definition* of any modern church, (the Roman for instance,) the pretences urged in favour of it are altogether frivolous and vain. To boast of *infallibility* against a thousand demonstrations that such church *may err*, and in fact *has erred*, and yet *does err*, is a ridiculous *vanity* at the best, not to call it by a worse name. And it is very odd to imagine that their *definitions* are an unerring rule, when they cannot be more certain, on one hand, that any such definitions were ever made, or are now extant, than we are, on the other hand, that they are *false* and wrong, and some of them even palpably *absurd*[t].

II. There are those who take *Scripture truths* and *fundamental truths* to be tantamount and reciprocal, conceiving that every thing asserted in *sacred Writ* is *fundamental*, because the whole Scripture *was written for our learning*[u], and cannot be *contradicted* in any part, without giving the lie to the *Holy Spirit* of God. But this opinion, however pious in appearance, is none of the most solid or judicious. It confounds the *truth* or *usefulness* of what is said with the *importance* or *necessity* of it; as if there were no difference between the *weightier* matters and the matters *less weighty*. Scripture contains points of an *inferior* moment, as well as those of an *high nature:* and all the truths contained in it are neither equally *clear* nor equally *important*[x]. There are

[t] If the reader would see more in answer to this first pretence, he may please to consult Bishop Stillingfleet, Rat. Ac. part i. c. 2. p. 47, &c. Frid. Spanheim. Opp. tom. iii. p. 1330. Alphons. Turretin. de Fundament. c. iii. p. 10, 11.

[u] Rom. xv. 4.

[x] Omnia quæ in Scripturis occurrunt non sunt æque ad *salutarem fidem*, aut ad unionem ac *communionem Ecclesiasticam* necessaria; nec omnia pari necessitate fidelibus discenda et inculcanda: quod colligimus ex 1 Cor. iii. 10, 12, 15. Phil. iii. 15, 16. 2 Tim. i. 13. 1 Tim. vi. 3. Tit. i. 1. Accedat hæc ratio, quod uti in omnibus disciplinis, sic etiam in Scripturis *essentialia* et *οἰκεῖα* religionis, sive axiomata sive præcepta, a commentariis sint distinguenda. Multa enim ibi tractantur occasionaliter, non ex professo,

many incidental verities, *historical*, *geographical*, *genealogical*, *chronological*, &c. which common Christians are obliged rather implicitly to admit, or not to deny, than explicitly to know, or treasure up in their minds. There may be thousands or millions of these *inferior* truths[y] in sacred Writ, which it may suffice to believe in the gross, under this one general proposition, *Whatsoever Scripture declares, or teaches, is infallibly true and right.* If any person, without any ill meaning, should dispute or deny many of those occasional *inferior* points, (misinterpreting the texts, and retaining all the while a just veneration for the *authority* of holy Scripture,) he might be thought a bad critic or commentator, rather than a bad Christian: but were the same person to dispute or deny the *necessity* of *holiness*, or the doctrine of a *resurrection*, or of a *future judgment*, (misinterpreting the texts whereon those doctrines are built,) he might be, and would be justly suspected as guilty of *profane levity* and *heretical pravity*, notwithstanding any pretended veneration for Scripture he might presume to boast of. And what is the reason of the difference in the two cases now mentioned? plainly this: that in one case, the *main substance* of the Christian faith, worship, morality would suffer little or no detriment, but in the other case would suffer very much. Some truths are valuable for the sake only of *greater*, which they may accidentally be joined with, or resolve into; while those *greater* are valuable for their own intrinsic weight and worth. Hence it is, that *creeds*, *catechisms*, *confessions*, and other *summaries* of true religion, take in only the principal *agenda* and *credenda*, leaving out the truths of an inferior class; though *scriptural*, and *infallibly* certain, and of the same *Divine authority* with the other. Those inferior points may by *accident* become fundamental[z], if the denying them, in some certain cir-

per cognitionem, ut vocant, *divisivam*, in ordine ad Deum et *spiritualia*. *Voetius*, Disput. 5. Conf. Hoornbeeck. lib. i. c. 9. p. 188. Puffendorf. sect. 60. Spanheim. tom. iii. p. 1330. Turretin. p. 7, 11.

[y] "Accidental, circumstantial, occasional objects of faith, millions whereof there are in holy Scripture: such as are to be believed not *for themselves*, but because they are *joined with others* that are necessary to be believed, and are delivered by the *same authority* which delivered these." *Chillingworth*, chap. iv. sect. 3. p. 172.

"Such as pastors are not bound to teach their flocks, nor their flocks bound to know and remember; no nor the pastors themselves to know them or believe them, or not to disbelieve them, *absolutely* and *always*, but *then only* when they do see and know them to be delivered in Scripture as Divine revelations." *Chillingworth*, ibid. p. 173.

[z] "To acknowledge any proposition to be of *Divine* revelation and authority, and yet to *deny* or *disbelieve* it, is to offend against this

cumstances, should inevitably carry with it a denial of the *Divine authority* of sacred Writ: but that, and the like *accidental* circumstances excepted, they are of slight moment in comparison, neither would it be justifiable to break communion with any man for differing from us in things only of that kind[a].

I may further add, that the rule which I have been here considering appears to be faulty in *defect*, as well as in *excess:* for as every Scripture tenet is not fundamental, so neither does Scripture, strictly speaking, contain *all* fundamental truths. The *certainty* of the *canon* in general, and the *authenticity* of the sacred code, are *fundamental* articles, and are *previous* to those which Scripture itself contains: and our obligation to receive them resolves into this *fundamental* principle of *natural* religion, that we are bound to receive with reverence whatever God shall *sufficiently* make known to us as his law, word, and will. But I proceed.

III. A third pretended rule for determining *fundamentals* is to admit every thing *expressly* taught in Scripture, and nothing but what is so: which differs from the former, as there is a difference between saying *every thing* taught, and every thing *expressly* taught. However this rule also is faulty, and that both in *excess* and *defect*. It is faulty in *excess*, as making many more fundamentals than there really are: for there may be thousands of very *express* verities in holy Scripture which in themselves are not fundamental, having no *immediate* connection with the Christian *covenant*, no direct concern with or influence upon faith, worship, or morality. It is faulty likewise in the other extreme, of *defect*, as not taking in *all* that is really fundamental. The *sense* of Scripture is *Scripture;* and such sense may be *certain* and *indubitable*, when it is not *express:* and if the point of doctrine contained in it be of the *important* kind, nearly affecting the *vitals* of Christianity, it is a *fundamental* article. Some *consequences* are so direct, plain, and immediate, that they even

"*fundamental* article and ground of "faith, that *God is true*. But yet a "great many of the *truths* revealed "in the Gospel—a man may be *igno-* "*rant* of, nay *disbelieve*, without "danger to his salvation; as is evi- "dent in those who, allowing the *au-* "*thority*, differ in the *interpretation* "and meaning of several texts of "Scripture not thought fundamental." *Locke, Reas. of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 540. fol. Compare p. 580.

[a] In loco Rom. xv. 4. et toto capite xiv. fuse docet Paulus infirmos in fide tolerandos, neque alium in finem additur, *nam quæcunque scripta sunt* &c. quam ut documentis in Scriptura contentis, ad mansuetudinem et tolerantiam Christianam erudiamur. Quod ipsum ostendit dissensum aliquem in capitibus *non momentosis*, quanquam *Scripturæ* traditis, haudquaquam capitale esse. *Turretin*. p. 12.

force their way into every attentive and well disposed mind. It has been frequently manifested[b], and ought now to be acknowledged as a *ruled* case, that clear *consequential* proof is very little short of *express* text, (if it be at all so,) either as to value or certainty: not to mention that *express* text, (or what some may call so,) may often mislead us, if we make not use of *reason* and *argument*, that is to say, of *consequences*, to draw out and ascertain the true and just meaning. It may indeed be allowed, that *fundamental* doctrines ought not to be rested upon consequences really *obscure*, or very *remote:* neither ought persons to be charged with *capital* errors for holding some tenets, which *obscurely*, or at a *distance* only, appear to strike at the foundation. Therefore Divines have distinguished fundamental errors into two sorts, as being either *in the foundation*, or *near the foundation*[c]; while those which are more remote, being *besides* the *foundation*, or *distant* from it, are reckoned among the *non-fundamental* errors, as not affecting the *vitals*, or *essentials* of Christianity, except it be in so *distant* or *obscure* a manner, that a person may reasonably be supposed *not to see* such consequence, or seriously to *abhor* it. But if any person holds a tenet which plainly, directly, and at *first consequence*, destroys a *fundamental* article, he is altogether as blamable as if he erred against the *express* text, in a point of like *importance*[d]. But I pass on.

IV. Another pretended rule is, that whatever Scripture has expressly declared *necessary*, or commanded us to believe under pain of *damnation*, or of *exclusion* from Christian communion, that is *fundamental*, and nothing else is. Now as to the first part, it is certain, that whatever Scripture has thus strongly bound upon us is *fundamental:* but it is not true, on the other hand, that whatever Scripture has not so bound upon us is *not fundamental*. So then this rule is faulty in *defect*, as narrowing

[b] Dallæus de Fidei ex Scripturis Demonstratione, par. i. c. v—xiii. p. 31—91. Hoornbeeck. Socin. Confut. p. 210, &c. Voetius, Disput. 5. Frid. Spanheim. tom. iii. p. 1337. Cumming, Dissertation of Scripture Consequences. Turretin. de Fundament. p. 17.

[c] Error *in fundamento* ille est, qui *directe* aut plures, aut unam thesin *fundamentalem* negat atque oppugnat.

Error *circa fundamentum* est, qui non negat *directe* thesin, illam tamen antithesin tenet qua stante et defensa, *indirecte*, et per *primam consequentiam* thesis illa evertitur.

Error *super fundamento*, vel *præter fundamentum* est, quo aliquid statuitur quod per *remotiorem* aut *obscuriorem* consequentiam, et *eminus*, pugnat cum thesi fundamentali, eamque plus aut minus lædit aut concutit, aut saltem radit ac tangit. *Voetius, de Artic. et Error. fundam.* sect. 5. Conf. Hoornbeeck. Socin. Confut. p. 210.

[d] Vid. Turretin. p. 17.

the foundation more than is just or proper. God's plainly revealing any doctrine carries in it the force of a strict *command* to assent to it as true, whenever we think of it as revealed: and if such doctrine be found to bear an *intrinsical* or *essential* connection with the doctrine of the *Christian covenant*, that single consideration, added to the former, is sufficient to make out its *importance*, and to signify to every man of common discernment the *fundamental* nature of such article, without any additional declaration from sacred Writ. However it may perhaps be justly said, that, in a general way, all the *essentials* of the Gospel are declared to be *necessary to salvation* in one single text, which declares the belief of the Gospel necessary: "He "that believeth *it* not, shall be damned." Mark xvi. 16. What are the essential articles must be learned from other places, or from the nature of the thing itself; but whatever they are, they are here declared to be *necessary*. But of this matter I have professedly treated elsewhere[e], and need not repeat; except you will give me leave, thus far, to say, what I there prove, that "the *importance* of any doctrine is not to be judged of merely "from the *declarations* of Scripture concerning its *necessity*, but "from the *nature* and *quality* of the doctrine itself, and the *rela-* "*tion* it bears to the *other parts* of revealed religion, and from "the mischiefs likely to ensue upon the opposing of it."

V. Some very considerable Protestant writers[f], in their disputes with the Romanists, have often referred to the Creed called the Apostles', both for the *rule* and the *sample* of fundamentals. But then it ought to be observed, in the first place, that the most which those excellent persons intended by it is, that the Creed contains all *necessary* matters of *simple belief:* which if admitted, does not sufficiently answer our present purpose with respect to the question of *Church communion:* for fundamentals of *worship* and of *Christian morality* must be considered in this case, as well as fundamentals of *mere faith*. Add to this, that the Apostles' Creed rather *supposes* than *contains* the article of the *Divine* authority and inspiration of Scripture, and therefore is no complete catalogue or summary of fundamentals. Besides, it may be justly questioned whether it really contains or includes all the fundamentals of *simple belief* which

[e] Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity, vol. iii. c. 3. p. 446—450.

[f] Such as Petit, Usher, Davenant, Calixtus, Chillingworth, Stillingfleet, Tillotson, Whitby, &c.

are to be found in holy Scriptures[g]: or if it does now, it did not always; for it was once much *shorter*. And creeds never were intended as perfect *catalogues* of *fundamentals*, but were compiled with other views and for other purposes[h]. I may add further, that were the Roman Creed ever so complete a catalogue of fundamentals, when *rightly* understood, yet since that creed is *verbally* admitted by all parties and denominations of Christians, and by some that err *fundamentally* even in point of *simple belief*, (as by Arians, Socinians, Sabellians, &c. who warp the general expressions of the Creed, as they do Scripture texts also, to their respective persuasions,) the Creed so misinterpreted and misapplied will be of very little service to us, for the distinguishing *fundamental* articles from *non-fundamental*. Those learned Divines, who have spoken the most highly of its perfection and use, have always supposed that it ought however to be *rightly* understood, according to the true meaning and intent of the compilers that drew it up, and of the churches which made use of it: otherwise the design of it is in a great measure lost or frustrated[i].

From what hath been observed, we may certainly conclude that the *rule* which refers us to the Apostles' Creed is a wrong rule, as it is faulty in *defect*, shortening the number of *fundamentals* more than is meet: at the same time it appears also, in some other respects, to be peccant in *excess*, taking in some articles which seem not to merit a place among *fundamentals*. Such for instance are the articles of Christ's suffering under

[g] Ad quæstionem propositam respondemus, *non omnes articulos necessarios*, si id solum quod expressum est consideres, *symbolo* contineri. Nihil enim hic est de *verbo Dei* quod fidei nostræ proximum objectum, norma, et fons est; quodque præterea *fundamentum* Apostolorum et Prophetarum dicitur, Ephes. ii. 20. Nihil de *peccato* et *miseria* nostra, cujus cognitio tamen ut unice *necessaria* inculcatur, Jerem. iii. 13. Nihil de *justificatione per fidem*, sine operibus legis, cujus tamen notitiam tanti faciebat *Apostolus*, ut præ ea, reliqua omnia ut damnum et stercora reputaret, (Phil. iii. 8, 9.) et Christi exsortes esse, et a gratia excidisse declaret, quicunque per legem justificari volunt. Gal. v. 4. Nihil etiam de *Dei adoratione et cultu*, et *praxi novæ vitæ*, quæ exerceri rite non possunt, nisi et cognoscantur, et *necessaria* esse credantur. *Witsius in Symb. Apostol.* p. 17.

[h] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 188. Crit. Hist. of the Athanas. Creed, vol. iii. p. 252. Remarks on Clarke's Catechism, vol. iv. p. 39. Importance, vol. iii. p. 536.

[i] Si qui ex nostris dixerint *omnes fundamentales articulos in symbolo contineri*, id non eo dixerunt sensu, quasi *verborum* symboli recitationem mox pro sufficienti Christianismi signo haberent: nam fides nostra non in *verbis*, sed in *sensu* sita est, non in *superficie* sed in *medulla*, non in sermonum *foliis*, sed in *radice* rationis. *Witsius ubi supra*, p. 17.

Pontius Pilate, and of his *descent into hell*, whatever it means: for though they are *Scriptural truths, theological verities*, or *articles of religion*, yet that they are properly *articles of faith*, of the essential and fundamental kind, (more than several other *Scripture truths* left out of the creeds,) does not appear[k]; neither does their *perspicuity*, or intrinsic *dignity*, or *use*, give them a clear preference above many less noted articles of religion which might be named[l].

VI. Some have been of opinion, that the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the two first verses, gives us a complete list of fundamentals, under four or five articles, viz. *repentance, faith in God, baptism* with *confirmation, resurrection*, and *judgment*[m]. But this opinion appears to be founded only in the *equivocal* sense of the name *fundamental*, and the want of distinguishing between the *elementaries* and the *essentials* of Christianity. The Apostle is there speaking of *milk* as opposed to *strong meat*, of doctrines proper to *babes* in Christ, as opposed to doctrines fit for *grown men:* he is not speaking of points *essential* to the Christian system, as opposed to points *not essential*. The first *elements* of Christianity are not the same with *fundamentals*, in the sense we here take the word, as signifying *essentials:* therefore that passage out of the Hebrews is wide of our present purpose, and mostly foreign to the business in hand. It may indeed be allowed, that the *elementary* doctrines there specified are so many *essentials* likewise: but there are other *essentials*

[k] Vid. Turretin. de Fundam. p. 14.

[l] See more upon this argument in Voetius, de Artic. et Error. fundam. sect. 5. Hoornbeeck. Socin. Confut. tom. i. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 256. tom. ii. Prolegom. p. 65.

[m] "The doctrine of *fundamentals* "(about which learned and contentious men have raised great disputes) is really from this passage of "the Apostle exceedingly clear and "manifest. For the *only* fundamental "doctrines of Christianity (viz. those "covenanted about at Baptism) are "plainly these: that *we have faith* "*towards God*, that we *repent from* "*dead works;* that we have the acceptableness of this repentance assured to us through Christ in the "ministration of the *Word* and *Sacraments*, styled here by the Apostle "the doctrine of *Baptisms* and of "*laying on of hands;* and, lastly, "that we live as becomes such persons as are in continual expectation "of a *resurrection from the dead*, and "of *eternal judgment:* these, I say, "are plainly the *only* fundamentals "of Christianity: about these there "can be no controversy; in these "there can be no ignorance, no not "among persons of the *meanest* capacity. And besides these, whatever other doctrines are *occasionally* "taught, or eagerly *disputed* about, "they cannot be of the *foundation* of "religion, but men may *differ* concerning them with *peace* and *charity*, "and yet every one hold fast the *root* "of their *confidence*, the *assurance* of "their *salvation* in these undisputed "doctrines of faith and obedience." *Clarke's Posthumous Sermons*, vol. ix. serm. iv. p. 90.

besides those; neither was it the Apostle's design to number them up in that place. In that short summary of *elementary* principles, no express mention is made of the doctrine of Christ *crucified*, which the Apostle elsewhere lays a very particular stress upon[n]; no mention of *justification* by the merits and death of Christ, in opposition to justification by mere works, though an *essential* of the Gospel in St. Paul's account[o]; no express mention of any thing more than what some *heretics* condemned by St. Paul as such[p], and others in like manner condemned by St. John[q], might have owned, or probably did own. Therefore the Apostle's list of *elementaries* in that place is no list of *fundamentals* properly so called, no catalogue of *essentials*. And whereas it is suggested, that those were the *only* fundamental doctrines stipulated in *Baptism*, that cannot be true, since it is acknowledged that what concerns the *dignity of the person of Christ* is omitted in that catalogue[r]: for who can imagine that *Baptism* in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, does not carry in it a plain intimation of the *dignity of the person of Christ*, and a stipulation to pay him the like honour, worship, and service, as we pay to the *Father*; or that such doctrine and such worship are not *essentials* in the Christian system? And whereas it is further suggested, that those four or five articles there mentioned by the Apostle are such as admit of *no controversy*, and that in these there *can be no ignorance*, no not among persons of the *meanest capacity*; it may pertinently be replied, that there was great *controversy*, even in the Apostles' days, about one of them, namely, about the doctrine of the *resurrection*, which some *heretics* of that time interpreted to a *metaphorical* sense, and in effect vacated and frustrated it: and it is notorious at this day, that some *Christians*, so called, do very *ignorantly* (for it were hard to say that they do it *maliciously*) reject *water-baptism*, and throw off the *use* or *necessity* of both *Sacraments*. So that it is in vain to offer any catalogue of *fundamentals* which may not or has not been *controverted*, in whole or in part, by some that call themselves *Christians*; or to think of settling the rule of fundamentals by considering what may be called the *undisputed* doctrines of faith and obedience. But this by the way only; we shall have more of that matter presently,

[n] 1 Cor. ii. 2.
[o] Gal. i. 7, 8, 9. Gal. v. 4. Phil. iii. 8, 9.
[p] Gal. i. 7, 8, 9.
[q] 2 John 10.
[r] Clarke's Sermons, vol. ix. p. 71, 94.

in its proper place. All I shall observe further here is, that if the articles in Hebr. sixth are to be understood in the *inclusive* way, and with all that they may be supposed to comprehend, or contain, then indeed they may be said to include all the fundamentals, and more; for even the single article of *faith towards God*, in the reductive way, contains every thing: but if they are to be taken in the *exclusive* way, (as is plainly intended by those who refer to them as a rule for fixing *fundamentals*,) then it is certain, that they come vastly short of a complete catalogue. But I proceed.

VII. Some persons observing, that converts in the apostolical times were admitted to Baptism upon the confession of a single article, namely, that *Jesus is the Messiah*, with two or three concomitant articles, have concluded from thence, that such a *general* belief is sufficient to *make* a man a *Christian*, and therefore also to *keep* him so: from whence also it is further insinuated, that such a confession gives a man a claim to *Christian communion*, and that nothing beyond that ought to be absolutely insisted on as *fundamental*, or made a *term* of *communion*[s].

But this reasoning is faulty in many respects. 1. It proves too much to prove any thing: for, by the same argument, there would be no absolute need of any belief or confession at all; *Baptism* alone (as in *infants*) is sufficient to *make* one a Christian, yea, and to *keep* him such, even to his life's end, since it imprints an *indelible* character in such a sense as never to need repeating. 2. Admitting that a very short creed might suffice for *Baptism*, it does not follow that the same may suffice all along to give a man a right to *Christian fellowship;* especially when he is found to hold such principles as tend to *overthrow* that very confession. The whole of Christianity may be virtually implied or included in that single article, of admitting *Jesus* to be *the true Messiah;* and therefore the denying any *important* point of the Christian faith is in effect revoking or

[s] "The belief of *Jesus of Nazareth* "*to be the Messiah*, together with "these concomitant articles of his "*resurrection, rule*, and coming again "to *judge the world*, are all the faith "required as *necessary* to justifica-"tion." *Locke*, vol. ii. p. 538. Compare p. 540, 566, 578.

"Nothing can be absolutely *neces-"sary* to be believed, but what by "this new law of faith God of his "good pleasure hath made to be so: "and this, it is plain by the preach-"ing of our Saviour and his Apostles "to all that believed not already in "him, was only the believing the *only* "*true God*, and *Jesus to be the Mes-"siah* whom he hath sent." *Locke*, vol. ii. p. 581. Compare p. 615.

recanting that very article. 3. The *forms* of admission into any society, (though they commonly draw after them an obligation to submit to all the *fundamental* laws, rules, or maxims of such society,) are not properly the *fundamentals* themselves: and though a man may have a right to be *received* as a member upon his passing through such forms, it does not follow that he has a right to *continue* a member, and to participate of the privileges thereto belonging, while he refuses to submit to the *essential* rules or maxims of the society, or makes it his endeavour to subvert or destroy them. It is one thing to say what may be barely necessary at *admission*, and another to say what may be necessary *afterwards*. General professions may suffice at first, as a pledge and earnest of more *particular* acknowledgments to come after: and if those do not follow, it amounts to a kind of retracting even that *general* security. 4. It may be further observed, that neither Simon Magus, nor the ancient Judaizers whom St. Paul anathematized[t]; neither Alexander, nor Hymenæus, nor Philetus, (who denied the general *resurrection* and were delivered over to Satan for it[u],) neither the Docetæ of the apostolical age, who denied Christ's *humanity* and were rejected by St. John[x]; nor even the impious Nicolaitans whom our Lord himself proscribed as unfit for Christian communion: none of those (so far as appears) ever directly threw up their baptismal profession, or denied, in such a sense, that *Jesus* was the *Messiah*, or ceased to be *Christians* in the large import of the name, so as to want to be *rebaptized:* and yet certainly they had forfeited all right to *Christian communion*, and were justly rejected as deserters and aliens, for teaching doctrines *subversive* of the Christian religion. Therefore again, that short creed, or single article, however sufficient it might be to *make* a nominal Christian, or to *keep* him so, was yet never allowed sufficient to entitle a subverter of the faith to the right hand of fellowship, or to supersede an explicit acknowledgment of other Gospel doctrines, as *fundamental* verities. 5. Lastly, I observe, that to deny *Jesus to be the Messiah*, is in effect to renounce Christianity, and to revert to *Judaism*, or *Paganism*, or worse: and therefore the insisting upon that confession only without any thing more, as a *term* of *communion*, is as much as to say, that all but downright *apostates* are to be received as *Christian brethren*, so far as *faith*

[t] See Importance &c. vol. iii. p. 401. [u] Ibid. p. 402, 459.
[x] Ibid. p. 402, 547.

is concerned: a consequence too absurd for any sober and considering man to admit; and so I need not say more of it, but may pass on to a new article.

VIII. Another pretended rule or criterion for determining fundamentals, is *universality of agreement* among *Christians* so called: to throw out what is *disputed*, and to retain only what *all agree in*. A rule as *uncertain* in its application and use, as it is *false* in its main ground: for how shall any one know what all sects and denominations of Christians agree in, or how long they shall do so? Or if that could be known, are we to be guided by the floating humours, fancies, follies of *men*, or by the unerring wisdom of *God*? What article of faith is there which has not heretofore, or may not again be disputed? Or what *creed* can there be pitched upon, be it ever so short, that can please all[y], or that some perverse sect or other may not controvert? The Romanists allow the *Church governors* to augment the number of *fundamentals* at discretion by their *definitions:* on the other hand, these Universalists, still worse, seem to allow any the wildest sectaries to *abridge* the number as they please, (by disputations,) and not for themselves only, but for all Christendom: for whatever is *disputed* by any of them, is by the supposition to be thrown out as *unnecessary* or *non-fundamental*. A strange expedient for healing differences: a remedy much worse than the disease[z]. It must be owned that a *comprehension* or *coalition* of religious parties is a thing very desirable in itself; and so far

[y] Quidam toto theologiæ systemate, ac notorie fundamentalibus articulis dissentiunt.——Ad (quam) classem referimus Socinianos, et qui hisce proxime accedunt; tum plerasque Anabaptistarum familias, Tremulos, seu Quackeros, et qui Fanaticorum nomen merentur: qui articulos quos Protestantes *palmarios* habent, negant, aut detorquent, et velut evacuant; ut amoto nucleo, inania tantum putamina remaneant. Sic ut theologiæ systema ab istis formatum a nostro plane abeat, et *vix* circa alia *inter eos conveniat* quam quæ ex ipso *naturalis rationis lumine* cognita sunt. ——Circa quos, quamdiu hypothesibus suis innituntur, nobiscum *conciliandos* satagere, *vesaniæ proximum*, ac plane *inutile* duco &c.—

Ex quo et illud consequitur, rationem istos valde fugisse, qui *conciliationem* harum quoque sectarum quas tetigimus, cum Protestantibus moliti sunt, eoque fine vel *symbolum Apostolicum*, vel aliam *laxissimam formulam* proposuerunt.——Nam si formula concordiæ ita *laxe* concipiatur, ut *eadem quibusvis sectariis ad palatum sit*, theologia emerget oppido quam *jejuna* ac *mutila*, et quam parum e solido Christianismo retineat. *Puffendorf, Jus feciale Divin.* sect. xvi. p. 82.

[z] Præstat *salutiferam* veritatem vel inter *pugnas* et *contradictiones* retinere, quam *mendacio*, altam inter quietem, *indormire*. Sed nec ejusmodi concordiæ ratio est ineunda quæ vel *Christianæ religionis indoli* repugnet, vel *plures calamitates* generet quam illæ ipsæ dissensiones, non lacessitæ et irritatæ, prodicebant. *Puffendorf, ibid.* sect. iii.

as it can be effected by throwing out *circumstantials* and retaining only *essentials*, it is well worthy of every good man's thoughts and care: but to attempt the doing it by relaxing the *rule* for *essentials*, or leaving us no rule at all, or what is next to none, is a wild undertaking. If it may be called *uniting*, it is uniting in nothing but a *cold indifference* towards the *weighty* concerns of God and a world to come, which of course will be accompanied with so much the *warmer* pursuit of *secular* emoluments; for, in the same proportion as *religious* fervours abate, *secular* will succeed in their room. I forbear to be more particular in answer to this so popular pretence, because the learned Spanheim is beforehand with me, and has in a manner exhausted the argument under nine several articles [a]. To recite what he says, at length, would be trespassing too far upon your patience, and to abridge what is so close and so well written would be doing it an injury, and much impairing its force. So I pass on to another head.

IX. There is another pretence, which proceeds upon a like bottom with what I last mentioned, but is looser still, and much more extravagant. For as that pitched upon the *universal agreement* of *Christians* so called, for its mark or rule to steer by, so this still fetching a wider compass, pitches upon the *universal agreement* of the whole race of *mankind* (or of the soberer part at least) in all ages, for its measure of *fundamentals*. Throw out all that has been *disputed*, not only between Christian and Christian, but between *Christians* and *Pagans*, or between *Christians* and *Jews*, or *Mahometans*, and make a short creed of the remainder, and there is your list of *fundamentals*, your *terms* of *communion*, reducible to *five* articles of *natural* religion [b], as is pretended. 1. The *existence* of a *Deity*. 2. Some kind of *worship* to be paid him. 3. The practice of *moral virtue*. 4. *Repentance*

[a] Frid. Spanheim. tom. iii. 1332, 1333, 1334. Compare Hoornbeeck, Socin. Confut. p. 193, 206, &c. Buddæus, Miscellan. Sacr. tom. i. p. 320, &c. Turretin. de Fundam. p. 13.

[b] Herbert de Religione Gentilium, c. i. sect. 15. de Veritate, p. 268, &c. de Causis Errorum, p. 31.

Longe processit E. Herbertus, vir illustris, in suis de *veritate*, et *causis errorum* scriptis: in quibus e *necessariorum* censu *fidem Christianam* dispunxit, eaque solummodo capita quæ prudentiores Gentilium admiserunt, in *fundamentalibus* habuit, qualia videlicet, 1. Esse Deum. 2. Colendum eundem. 3. Virtuti operam dandam. 4. A peccatis resipiscendum. 5. Denique præmia et pœnas post hanc vitam expectandas. *Frid. Spanheim.* vol. iii. p. 1294. Conf. Kortholt de Trib. Impost. magn. p. 11.

for sins past. 5. Belief of a *future* state of rewards and punishments.

I shall not here waste your time in confuting a notion which confutes itself, and which ought rather to be *exploded* at once with abhorrence, than seriously answered. If *infidelity* in the worst sense, carried up to *apostasy*[c], is not a *fatal* delusion, or if *Christianity* itself is not a *necessary* term of communion, it is in vain to attempt to prove any thing, or to say any thing upon the subject of *fundamentals*. But from hence we may observe what mazes of error the minds of men (and sometimes men of excellent sense otherwise) are exposed to, when once they recede from true and sound principles, and are set afloat to follow their own wanderings. The effect is natural, as error is infinite, and knows no bounds: and when vain presumption once gets the ascendant, and makes men full of themselves, God leaves them to themselves, and to their own inventions.

X. There is one pretence more which I have reserved for the last place, being as loose as any, and yet carrying so fair a face with it, that it may be most apt to deceive. It is to throw off all concern for a *right faith*, as insignificant, and to comprise all *fundamentals* in the single article of a *good life*, as they call it; to which some are pleased to add *faith* in the *Divine promises*[d]. Well: but can we say any thing too much, or too high, in commendation of a *good life*, the flower and perfection of all religion, and the brightest ornament of every rational mind? I do not say that we can ever think or speak too highly of it, provided only that it be *rightly understood*: but the more valuable a thing it is, the greater care should be taken to *understand* what it means,

[c] *Infidelitatis* species quatuor.

1. *Gentilismus*, materialiter maxima infidelitas, sed *formaliter* levior quam Judaismus.

2. *Judaismus* est gravior infidelitas, quia acceperunt figuram evangelii, quæ erat quasi aurora respectu diei evangelicæ.

3. *Hæresis*, gravissima infidelitas, quæ renititur fidei claræ.

4. *Apostasia* est *fastigium hæreseos*; scilicet *generalis* defectio a fide. *Rog. Boyle, Summ. Theolog. Christian.* p. 204.

[d] Nonnulli eo usque restringunt *fundamenta* religionis, ut dicant, præter *obedientiam* mandatis divinis, et positam in promissis evangelicis *fiduciam*, fundamentale nihil esse. *Turretin.* p. 13, 14. Conf. Hoornbeeck, tom. i. p. 176.

Minus recte assertum aliis hoc criterium fieret; ea sola censeri debere *necessaria*, vel *fundamentalia*, quæ *practica*, quæ ad *vitam* et *mores* faciunt, quæ accommodata ad *studium pietatis* excitandum. Unde quosdam, nostra ætate, *fiducia* promissionum, et præceptorum *obedientia* totum Christianismum circumscripsisse constat. *Frid. Spanh.* tom. iii. p. 1334.

and not to repose ourselves on an *empty name*, instead of a *real* thing. There is not a more equivocal or ambiguous phrase than this of a *good life:* every different sect almost has its own peculiar *idea* of it: and though they may perhaps agree in some *few generals*, yet none of them agree in all the *particulars* that should go in to make up the one collective notion or definition of it. *Jews, Turks, Pagans,* and *Infidels*, as well as *Christians*, all talk of a *good life*, and each in their *own* sense: and the several denominations of Christians, as *Papists* and *Protestants*, *believers* and *half believers*, the soberest *churchmen* and the wildest *sectaries*, all equally claim a title to what they call a *good life*[e]. But do they all mean the same thing by it? No certainly: and there lies the fallacy. To be a little more particular, it is observable, that the infamous Apelles, of the Marcionite tribe, in the second century, (a man that discarded the *prophecies* of the Old Testament, and who denied the *real* humanity, or incarnation, of our blessed Lord, yet) pleaded this for a *salvo*, or cover for all his execrable doctrines, that a *good life*, together with a reliance upon *Christ crucified*, was *sufficient* for every thing[f]. It is certain that he left out of his idea of a *good life* one essential ingredient of it, viz. a *sincere* love of *truth*, accompanied with an *humble submission* of his own conceits to the plain and salutary doctrine of the Gospel. So again, professed Deists have put in their claims, along with others, to the title of a *good life*, and have valued themselves upon it[g], under a total contempt of all *revealed* religion. It is manifest, they must have left out of their idea of a *good life*, the best ingredient of it; namely, the *obedience of faith*. No doubt but *moral probity* is in itself an excellent quality, and I should be apt to value even a *Turk*, a *Jew*, or a *Pagan*, who enjoys it in any competent degree, more than the most orthodox *Christian* who is a stranger to it: but still it is but a *part* (though

[e] "Salmeron, Costerus, Acosta, are "so ingenuous as to confess expressly, "that a *life* apparently good and "*honest* is not proper to any one sect, "but common to Jews, Turks, and "Heretics: and St. Chrysostom is as "plain and large to my purpose as "any of them. It is too plain, that "arguing from the pretended *holiness* "of men's lives to the goodness of "their cause or opinion, is a paralogism "which hath advanced *Arianism, Pelagianism*, and other *heresies* of old, "*Mahometanism, Familism*, and *Anabaptism* of late; and, unless God of "his infinite mercy prevent, may ruin "Christendom now." *Thomas Smith, Preface to his Translation of Daillé's Apology*, p. 31.

[f] Euseb. Eccl. Histor. v. c. 13. p. 226.

[g] Haud crucient animum quæ circa relligionem vexantur lites; sit modo *vita proba. Baro. Herbert. apud Kortholt.* p. 20.

an essential part) of a *good life*, in the proper *Christian* sense; for nothing comes up to the true and full notion of a *good life*, but *universal righteousness* both in *faith* and manners[h]. A *right belief* (in *fundamentals* at least) is implied and included in *true obedience*, as *believing* is submitting to Divine authority, and is *obeying* the commands of God[i]. It is a vain thing therefore to speak of a *good life*, as separate from *saving* belief or knowledge, where such knowledge may be had[k]. The pretence to it carries this twofold *absurdity* along with it: it supposes the *end* already attained without the previous *necessary* means, and makes the *whole* to subsist without the *essential* parts. In short, there is no judging of a *good life*, but by considering first what it contains, and whether it answers its *true idea* or *definition*, or means only a *partial obedience*. A belief of *fundamentals* ought to make *part* of the *idea*, ordinarily at least: which therefore must be determined before we can form a just estimate of a *good life*. To deny or disbelieve the *fundamental* articles of Christianity, is a contradiction to the very nature and notion of true *Christian obedience*, and will always be a stronger argument against the supposition of a *good life*, than any other circumstances can be for it[l]. Or if we may sometimes charitably hope or believe that such and such persons, erring fundamentally, and propagating their errors, are yet strictly *honest* men, and accepted by the great Searcher of hearts, as holding what is *sufficient* for *them*, and as doing the best *they can*; yet this can be no rule for the Church to proceed by, which must judge by the nature and tendency of the doctrines, what is *fundamental* in an *abstract* view to the Christian *fabric*, as before intimated. As to what is so in a *relative* view to particular persons, God only is judge, and not we; and therefore to him we should leave it.

Having thus, my Reverend Brethren, recited, and competently examined the several *improper* or *erroneous* rules suggested by

[h] See Importance &c. vol. iii. p. 478, &c. 566.

[i] Ibid. p. 433, &c.

[k] A late ingenious writer well expresses this matter as follows: "It is "in vain to pretend to real *purity* of "*heart* or *life*, without a *belief* of the "*truth*.—— How is it possible that "the man can be really *good*, who is "constantly offering the *highest affronts* to his *Maker*, and by a disbelief of the *plain* and *important* "articles of faith, is loudly proclaiming him a liar? *He that believeth* "*not God, hath made him a liar, because he believeth not the record* "*that God gave of his Son*. 1 John v. "10." *Dunlop's Preface to Westminster Confession*, p. 168.

[l] See more in reference to this head in Frid. Spanheim, tom. iii. 1336. Velthuysius, 698, 703, 742. Turretin, p. 14. Hoornbeeck, p. 177—187.

some learned writers for determining *fundamentals*, and having pointed out (in as clear a manner, and in as short a compass as I well could) their principal *defects;* I may now return with the greater advantage to the rule before laid down, and there abide. Whatever verities are found to be plainly and directly *essential* to the doctrine of the *Gospel covenant*, they are *fundamental verities:* and whatever errors are plainly and directly *subversive* of it, they are *fundamental errors*. By this rule, as I humbly conceive, we may with sufficient *certainty* fix the *terms of communion* with the several denominations of Christians. As to the precise *terms of salvation*, they may admit of greater variety and latitude, on account of particular circumstances of diverse kinds: and there is no necessity of absolutely excluding all from *uncovenanted* or even *covenanted* mercies[m], whom we may be obliged to exclude from *brotherly communion*. *God* will have regard in judgment to *invincible* ignorance, incapacity, infirmity: but *men* ought to have no regard to them, in settling the *terms* of *communion;* because they ought never to look upon any ignorance &c. as *invincible*, while it is in their power to apply any *probable* or *possible* remedies; and among the possible or probable remedies, *Church censures* may be justly reckoned, as carrying both *instruction* and *admonition* along with them. Whether the errors be *vincible* or *invincible*, whether the parties erring be *curable* or *incurable*, in many cases, God alone can know; Church governors do not, and cannot; and therefore they are to proceed in the same way, and to make use of the same expedients, (under direction of Scripture,) as if they were *certain* that the error is *conquerable*, and the party *capable* of *cure*.

But besides the consideration of the *offending* party, there are several more things of moment to be looked to in this business, viz. the preserving *others* from going astray, and the keeping ourselves *pure* and *undefiled*, and the maintaining *truth* and *godliness* in the face of the world, every man according to his abilities, and

[m] Persons *unbaptized* and without the pale of the Church, doing all that humanly speaking could be expected in their circumstances, we exclude not from *uncovenanted* mercies.

Persons admitted into *covenant* by *Baptism*, and erring *fundamentally*, but with an *honest* mind, and under some *unavoidable* infirmity or incapacity, we exclude not even from *covenanted* mercies: for they that are unavoidably, unaffectedly *blind*, are not chargeable with *sin* so far; and a man shall be accepted (as I observed above, p. 78.) according to what he *hath* or *might have*, not according to what he *hath not* and could not have. This rule is a *Gospel rule*, and so makes a part of the *Christian covenant*.

according to the station wherein God has placed him: for "since "the conservation of such things as are *united* is the end of "*union*, it is evident that we are not to entertain any *union* but "only with them who may help it forward. If therefore there be "any, who, under colour of the blessed name of Christ, *subvert* "his *doctrine*, *annihilate* his *authority* and our *salvation*; it is so "far from being our duty to *unite* ourselves to them, that, on the "contrary, we are obliged to *part* with them: because, to *unite* "with them, were in effect to *disunite* from *Christ*, and from his "*body*; and instead of coming to *salvation*, to fall into *eternal* "*ruin*.—Both the *discipline* of *Jesus Christ*, and the laws of *civil* "*societies*, and even those of *nature* itself, permit us to *avoid* the "*communion* of such as, under any pretence, name, or colour "whatever, go about to *destroy* and *ruin* Christianity[n]."

[n] Daillé, Apology for the Reformed Churches, p. 4, 5.

THE DOCTRINAL USE

OF THE

CHRISTIAN SACRAMENTS

CONSIDERED:

IN

A CHARGE

DELIVERED TO THE

MIDDLESEX CLERGY,

May 12*th*, 1736.

A CHARGE

DELIVERED TO THE

MIDDLESEX CLERGY, &c.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

AS it hath been customary, upon these occasions, to recommend some important point of Christianity; so I take the liberty to offer to your thoughts, at this juncture, the consideration of the *Christian Sacraments*. Not that I can have room, in a short discourse, to enter into the heart of the subject: but the time perhaps may permit me to single out some collateral article, of moderate compass, and to throw in a few incidental reflections, tending to illustrate the value and dignity of those Divine ordinances, and to preserve in our minds a just regard and veneration for them.

When we duly consider the many excellent ends and purposes for which these holy Sacraments were ordained, or have been found in fact to serve, through a long succession of ages, we shall see great reason to adore the Divine wisdom and goodness in the appointment of them. They are of admirable use many ways; either for confirming our *faith* in the *Christian religion* at large, and the *prime articles* of it; or for promoting *Christian practice* in this world; or for procuring *eternal happiness* in a world to come.

I shall confine my present views to the first particular, the subserviency of the Sacraments to *true* and *sound* faith: which, though it may be looked upon as a bye-point, and for that reason hath not been so commonly insisted upon; may yet be of weight sufficient to deserve some consideration at this time.

I. Give me leave then to take notice, in the first place, that the *Sacraments* of the Church have all along been, and are to this day, standing monuments of the *truth* of Christianity against Atheists, Deists, Jews, Turks, Pagans, and all kinds of infidels. They bear date as early as the Gospel itself; and have continued, without interruption, from the days of their Founder. They proclaim to the world, that there once was such a person as Christ Jesus; that he *lived*, and *died*, and was *buried*, and *rose again;* and that he erected a Church, and drew the world after him, maugre all opposition; (which could never have been effected without many and great *miracles;*) and that he appointed these ordinances for the preserving and perpetuating the same Church, till his coming again. The two *Sacraments*, in this view, are abiding *memorials* of Christ and of his religion, and are of impregnable force against *unbelievers*, who presume either to call in question such plain *facts*, or to charge our most holy religion, as an invention of men.

II. But besides this *general* use of the Sacraments against *unbelievers*, they have been further of great service all along, for the supporting of *particular* doctrines of prime value, against *misbelievers* of various kinds; as may appear by an historical deduction all the way down from the earliest ages of the Church to the present times.

No sooner did some misbelieving Christians[a] of the apostolical age endeavour to deprave the true Gospel doctrine of *God* made *man*, rejecting our Lord's *humanity*, but the Sacrament of the *Eucharist*, carrying in it so indisputable a reference to our Lord's *real* flesh and blood, bore testimony against them with a force irresistible. They were so sensible of it, that within a while they forbore coming either to the *holy Communion*, or to the *prayers* that belonged to it[b], merely for the sake of avoiding a

[a] The Docetæ, or Phantasiastæ, whom in English we may call Visionaries; men that would not admit that our Lord assumed *real* flesh and blood, but in *appearance* only; considering him as a walking *phantom* or *apparition*, in order to take off the *scandal* of the *cross*, or for other as weak reasons. Some short account of them may be seen in my Importance, vol. iii. p. 402, 547. or a larger and more distinct one in Buddæus's Eccles. Apostol. p. 550—570.

[b] Εὐχαριστίας καὶ προσευχῆς ἀπέχονται, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν τὴν εὐχαριστίαν σάρκα εἶναι τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, &c. *Ignat. ad Smyrn.* c. vii. p. 4. Le Clerc well comments upon this passage: Quod quidem convenienter ceteræ suæ doctrinæ faciebant: cum enim *Eucharistia* sit instituta ad celebrandum memoriam *corporis* Christi pro nobis *fracti*, et *sanguinis effusi*, non poterat celebrari, ex instituto Christi, ab hominibus qui *mortuum* non esse *Christum* putabant, nisi sibi ipsi contradicerent. *Eccl. Hist.* p. 568, 569.

practice *contradictory* to their principles. However, this was sufficient intimation to every honest Christian, of the meanest capacity, that their *principles* must be false, which obliged them in consequence to vilify and reject the plain and certain *institutions* of Christ. There was no need of entering into the *subtilties* of argument; for the thing declared itself, and left no room for dispute. Such was the valuable use of this Sacrament, at that time, for supporting *truth* and detecting *error*, for the confirming the *faithful* in the right way, and for confounding *seducers*.

III. In the century next following, the Valentinian Gnostics corrupted the faith of Christ more ways than one, but particularly in pretending that this *lower* or *visible* world was not made by *God most high*, but by some inferior *power* or *æon*. Here again the Sacrament of the *Eucharist* was of signal service for the confuting such wild doctrine, and for the guarding sincere Christians against the smooth insinuations of artful disputers. It was very plain, that the bread and wine in that Sacrament were presented before God, as *his creatures* and *his gifts;* which amounted, in just construction, to a recognising him as their *true* Creator: and it was absurd to imagine that God should *accept of*, and *sanctify* to heavenly purposes, creatures *not his own*[c]. Besides, our Lord had chosen these creatures of the *lower world* to represent his own *body* and *blood*, and called them his *body* and *blood*, as being indeed such in Divine *construction* and *beneficial effect* to all *worthy* receivers: a plain argument that he looked upon them as his *own* and his Father's creatures, and not belonging to any *strange* creator, with whom neither he nor his Father had any thing to do.

These arguments, drawn from the holy *Eucharist*, were triumphantly urged against those false teachers, by an eminent Father of that time[d]: who, no doubt, made choice of them as the most affecting and sensible of any; being more entertaining than dry criticisms upon texts, or abstracted reasonings, and

[c] Tertullian afterwards makes use of the same argument, against the same error, as espoused by the Marcionites: and he strengthens it further, by taking in the other *Sacrament* also. Sed ille quidem (*Deus noster*) usque nunc nec *aquam* reprobavit *Creatoris*, qua suos abluit—— nec *panem* quo ipsum corpus suum repræsentat. *Contra Marcion.* lib. i. cap. 14.

[d] Nostra autem consonans est sententia *Eucharistiæ*, et *Eucharistia* rursus confirmat sententiam nostram: *offerimus* enim ei quæ *sunt ejus. Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 18. p. 251. edit. Bened. Conf. cap. xxxiii. p. 270. Conf. Tertull. contra Marcion. lib. i. cap. 14.

more likely to leave strong and lively impressions upon the minds of common Christians. At the same time they served to expose the adversaries to public shame, as *appearing* along with others at the *holy Communion*, while they taught things directly contrary to the known language of that Sacrament.

IV. The same *deceivers*, upon some specious pretences, (but such as no cause can want, that does not want artful pleaders,) took upon them to reject the doctrine of the *resurrection* of the *body;* conceiving that the unbodied *soul* only had any concern in a life to come[e]. Here again, the Sacrament of the *Eucharist* was a kind of armour of proof against the seducers. For as the consecrated bread and wine were the authentic symbols of Christ's body and blood, and were, in *construction* and certain *effect*, (though not in *substance*,) the same with what they stood for, to all worthy receivers; it was manifest, that *bodies* so *incorporated* with the *body* of Christ must of course be partners with it in a glorious *resurrection*. Thus was the *Eucharist* considered as a sure and certain *pledge* to all good men, of the future resurrection of their *bodies*, symbolically fed with the *body* of Christ. For like as the *branches* partake of the *vine*, and the *members* of the *head*, so the bodies of the faithful, being by the Eucharist incorporate with Christ's *glorified* body, must of consequence appertain to it, and be *glorified* with it. This is the argument which the Christian Fathers[f] of those times insisted upon, and with this they prevailed; as it was an argument easily understood[g] and sensibly felt, (by as many as had any tender regard

[e] Basilides, probably of the first century, taught this doctrine. *Iren.* lib. i. cap. 24. p. 102. Afterwards, Cerdo also, and Marcion, lib. i. cap. 27. p. 106. The Valentinian Gnostics also taught the same, lib. v. cap. 1. p. 292.

[f] Ignat. Epist. ad Ephes. cap. xx. p. 19. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 18. p. 251. lib. v. cap. 2. p. 294. Tertull. de Resurr. Carnis, cap. viii. p. 330. Rigalt. Conf. Athanas. Epist. iv. ad Serap. p. 710. edit. Bened.

[g] Notwithstanding the plainness of the argument, a very learned and ingenious Lutheran declares, that he does not understand it, can make no *sense* or *consequence* of it. (Pfaff. Notæ in Iren. Fragm. 84, 85.) I suppose the reason is, because it agrees not with the Lutheran notion of the *presence:* for indeed, as such *corporal* or *local* presence supposes Christ's *body* and *blood* to be received by *all* communicants, both *good* and *bad*, Irenæus's arguments will by no means favour that *hypothesis*, nor consist with it. His reasoning will extend only to *good* men, *real* members of Christ's body, men whose *bodies*, by the Eucharist *worthily* received, (perseverance supposed,) are made *abiding members of Christ's body, flesh*, and *bones*. The argument, so stated, proves the *resurrection* of such persons; and it is all that it directly proves: which however was sufficient against those who admitted no resurrection of the *body*, but denied all.—N. B. The argument is of as little force on the hypothesis of *transubstantiation;* as is plain from what has been hinted of the other.

for the *Sacraments* of the Church,) and as it expressed to the life the *inconsistent* conduct of the *new* teachers, proclaiming them to be *self-condemned.* Wherefore they were put in mind over and over, to correct either their *practice* or their *principles;* and either to come no more to the *holy Communion*, or to espouse no more such doctrines as were contrary to it[h].

V. In the same century, or beginning of the next, when the Marcionites revived the old pretences of the Visionaries, rejecting our Lord's *humanity;* the *Eucharist* still served, as before, to confound the adversaries: for it was impossible to invent any just reply to this plain argument, that our Lord's appointing a memorial to be observed, of his *body broken* and of his *blood shed,* must imply, that he *really* took part of *flesh* and *blood,* and was in *substance* and in *truth* what the Sacrament sets forth in *symbols* and *figures*[i].

VI. When the Encratitæ, or Continents, of the second century, (so called from their overscrupulous abstemiousness,) had contracted odd prejudices against the use of *wine,* as absolutely unlawful; the Sacrament of the *Eucharist* was justly pleaded, as alone sufficient to correct their groundless surmises[k]: but rather than part with a favourite principle, they chose to celebrate the Communion in *water* only, rejecting *wine;* and were from thence styled Aquarians[l]. Which practice of theirs served however to detect their *hypocrisy,* and to take off the *sheep's clothing:* for nobody could now make it any question, whether those so seemingly *conscientious* and *self-denying* teachers were really *deceivers,* when they were found to make no scruple of violating a holy Sacrament, and running directly counter to the express commands and known practice of Christ their Lord.

VII. When the Praxeans, Noetians, and Sabellians, of the second and third centuries, presumed to innovate in the doctrine

[h] Ἡ τὴν γνώμην ἀλλαξάτωσαν, ἢ τὸ προσφέρειν τὰ εἰρημένα παραιτείσθωσαν. ἡμῶν δὲ σύμφωνος ἡ γνώμη τῇ εὐχαριστίᾳ, καὶ ἡ εὐχαριστία .... βεβαιοῖ τὴν γνώμην. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 18. p. 251.

[i] Acceptum panem, et distributum discipulis, *corpus* illum *suum* fecit, *Hoc est corpus meum,* dicendo; id est *figura* corporis mei. *Figura* autem non fuisset, nisi *veritatis* esset corpus: ceterum *vacua res,* quod est phantasma, *figuram* capere non posset. *Tertull. adv. Marc.* lib. iv. c. 40. p. 458. Conf. Pseud. Origen. Dialog. contr. Marcion. lib. iv. p. 853. edit. Bened.

[k] Vid. Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. ii. cap. 2. pag. 186. Strom. lib. i. pag. 359.

[l] Epiphan. Hæres. xlvii. 3. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. i. cap. 21. Philastrius Hær. lxxvii. p. 146. Augustinus Hær. cap. lxiv.

of the *Trinity*, by reducing the *three* Persons of the Godhead to *one;* then the Sacrament of *Baptism* remarkably manifested its *doctrinal* force, to the confusion of those *misbelievers*. There was no resisting the pointed language of the sacramental *form*, which ran distinctly in the name of the *Father*, and of the *Son*, and of the *Holy Ghost*[m]. It seems, that those men being conscious of it, did therefore change our Lord's *form*, and baptized in a *new* one of their own[n]; not considering, that that was plunging deeper than before, and adding iniquitous practice to ungodly principles. But the case was desperate, and they had no other way left to make themselves appear *consistent* men. In the mean while, their carrying matters to such lengths could not but make their *false* doctrine the more *notorious* to all men, and prevent its stealing upon honest and well disposed Christians, by ignorance or surprise. Such was the seasonable use of the Sacrament of *Baptism* in that instance; detecting *error*, and obstructing its progress, and strongly supporting the *true faith*.

VIII. When the Arians, of the fourth century, took upon them to deprave the doctrine of the *Trinity* in an opposite extreme, by rejecting the *Deity* of our Saviour Christ, "who is "over all, God blessed for ever[o];" then again the same Sacrament of *Baptism* reclaimed against *novelty*, and convicted the *misbelievers* in the face of the world. It was obvious to every impartial and considering man, that the *form* of *Baptism* ran equally in the name of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, and that it could never be intended to initiate Christ's disciples in the belief and worship of *God* and *two creatures*[p]. The new teachers however, in prudence, thought proper to continue the old form of baptizing, till the Eunomians, their successors, being plainer men, or being weary of a practice contradictory to their principles, resolved at length to set aside the Scripture form, and to substitute others more agreeable to their sentiments[q]. This was intimation sufficient to every well disposed Christian, to be

[m] Vid. Tertull. adv. Prax. cap. 26, 27. Hippol. contra Noet. cap. xiv. p. 16.

[n] Vid. Bevereg. Vindic. Can. lib. ii. cap. 6. p. 252. Bingham, Eccles. Antiq. lib. xi. cap. 3. p. 7.

[o] Rom. ix. 5.

[p] A full account of this argument may be seen in Bishop Stillingfleet on the Trinity, ch. ix. or in my eighth sermon per tot. vol. ii. or in Athanasius, p. 510, 633. edit. Bened.

[q] Epiphan. Hær. lxxvi. Greg. Nyssen. contr. Eunom. lib. x. p. 278. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. iv. cap. 3. Socrates, Eccl. Hist. lib. v. cap. 24. Theodorus, Lect. lib. xi. p. 576. edit. Cant.

upon his guard against the new doctrines, which were found to drive men to such desperate extremities. For now no man of ordinary discernment, who had any remains of godliness left in him, could make it matter of dispute, whether he ought to follow Eunomius or Christ.

There was a further use made of both Sacraments, by way of argument, in the Arian controversy. For when the Arians pleaded, that the words *I and my Father are one,* meant no more than an *unity* of *will* or *consent*, inasmuch as all the faithful were said to be *one* with Christ and with *each other*, on account of such *unity* of *consent;* the argument was retorted upon them in this manner: that as Christ had made himself really *one with us*, by taking our *flesh* and *blood* upon him in the incarnation; so again he had reciprocally made us really *one with himself* by the *two Sacraments.* For in Baptism we *put on* Christ, and in the Eucharist we are made partakers of his *flesh* and *blood:* and therefore the *union* of Christ's disciples with the *Head*, and with *each other*, (though far short of the essential *union* between Father and Son,) was more than a bare *unity* of *will* or *consent;* being a *real*, and *vital*, and *substantial* union, though withal *mystical* and *spiritual.* Thus Hilary of Poictiers (an eminent Father of that time) retorted the argument of the adversaries; throwing off their refined subtilties, by one plain and affecting consideration, drawn from the known doctrine of the Christian *Sacraments*[r].

IX. About the year 360 rose up the sect of Macedonians, otherwise called Pneumatomachi, impugners of the *Divinity* of the *Holy Ghost.* They were a kind of Semi-Arians, admitting the *Divinity* of the *second* Person, but rejecting the *Divinity* of the *third*, and in broader terms than the Arians before them had done. However, the *Sacrament* of *Baptism* stood full in their way, being a lasting monument of the true Divinity of the *third* Person as well as of the *second:* and by that chiefly were the generality of Christians confirmed in the ancient faith, and preserved from falling into the snares of seducers[s].

X. About the year 370, or a little sooner, the sect of Apollinarians began to spread new doctrines, and to make some noise in the world. Among sundry other wrong tenets, they had this

[r] Hilarius de Trinit. lib. viii. p. 951, &c. Conf. Cyrill. Alexandr. de Trin. Dial. i. p. 407.

[s] See St. Basil on this argument, De Spiritu Sancto, cap. 10, 12, 27, 29.

conceit, that the *manhood* of our Saviour Christ was converted into or absorbed in his *Godhead.* For they imagined, that by thus resolving *two* distinct *natures* into *one*, they should the more easily account for the *one Person* of Christ; not considering that the whole economy of man's redemption was founded in the plain Scripture doctrine of a Saviour both *God* and *man.* In opposition to those dangerous tenets, the learned and eloquent Chrysostom (A. D. 405. circ.) made use of an argument drawn from the Sacrament of the *Eucharist*, to this effect; that the *representative* body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist (sanctified by *Divine grace*, but not converted into *Divine substance*) plainly implied, that the *natural* body of Christ, though joined with the *Godhead*, was not *converted* into Godhead: for like as the consecrated bread, though called Christ's body on account of its sanctification, did not cease to be *bread;* so the *human nature* of Christ, though dignified with the *Divine*, did not cease to be the same *human* nature which it always was[t]. We may call this either an argument or an illustration; for indeed it is both under different views. Considered as a *similitude*, it is an *illustration* of a case: but at the same time is an argument to shew, that the Apollinarians were widely mistaken in imagining that a change of *qualities*, *circumstances*, or *names*, inferred a change of *nature* and *substance.* Bread was still bread, though for good reasons dignified with the name of the *Lord's body:* and the man Christ was still *man*, though for good reasons (that is, on account of a *personal* union) dignified with the title of *God.* Thus the Sacrament of the Eucharist, being a *memorial* of the *incarnation*, and a kind of *emblem* of it[u], was made use of to ex-

[t] Sicut enim, antequam sanctificetur panis, *panem* nominamus, *Divina* autem sanctificante *gratia*, mediante sacerdote, liberatus est quidem appellatione *panis*, dignus autem habitus est *Dominici corporis* appellatione, etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit; et non duo corpora, sed unum corpus Filii prædicatur: sic et hic Divina ἐνιδρυσάσης, id est, inundante corpori *natura*, *unum Filium*, *unam Personam*, utraque hæc fecerunt; agnoscendum tamen inconfusam et indivisibilem rationem, non in *una* solum *natura*, sed in *duabus* perfectis. *Chrysost. Epist. ad Cæsar. Monach.* p. 7, 8. edit. Harduin.

As to what concerns this Epistle, and our debates with the Romanists upon it, the reader may consult, if he pleases, besides Harduin, Frid. Spanheim. Opp. tom. i. p. 844. Le Moyne, Varia Sacra, tom. i. p. 530. Wake's Defence ag. M. de Meaux, printed 1686. Fabricii Bibl. Græc. tom. i. p. 433. Le Quien, Dissert. Damascen. p. 48. et in Notis, p. 270. Zornii Opusc. Sacr. tom. i. p. 727.

[u] Vid. Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 290. Apol. i. p. 96. edit. Thirlby.

N. B. The Eucharist was anciently considered as a kind of *emblem* of the *incarnation*, but in a loose general way: for like as there is an *heavenly* part and an *earthly* part here, so it is also there; and like as *Divine grace*

plain it, and to confirm the faithful in the ancient belief of that important article. But I proceed.

XI. About the year 410, Pelagius opened the prejudices which he had for some time privately entertained against the Church's Doctrine of *original* sin: but the Sacrament of *Baptism* looked him full in the face, and proved one of the most considerable obstacles to his progress. The prevailing practice had all along been to baptize *infants:* and the Church had understood it to be baptizing them for *remission of sin*. The inference was clear and certain, and level to the capacity of every common Christian. Wherefore this single argument had weight sufficient to bear down all the abstracted subtilties and laboured refinements of Pelagius and his associates, and proved one of the strongest securities to the Christian faith so far, during that momentous controversy[x].

XII. About the year 430 appeared the Nestorian heresy: which, dividing the *manhood* of our Lord from the *Godhead*, made in effect *two Persons*, or *two Christs*. Here the Sacrament of the *Eucharist* was again called in, to compose the difference, and to settle the point in question. For since the *virtue* and *efficacy* of the *representative* body was principally founded in the supposed *personal* union of the *real* body with the *Divine* nature of our Lord, it would be frustrating or evacuating all the *efficacy* of the *Eucharist*, to divide the *manhood*, in such a sense, from the *Godhead*[y]. The argument was just and weighty, and could not fail of its due effect among as many as had any tender regard for so divine and comfortable a Sacrament.

XIII. Within twenty years after, came up the Eutychian heresy; which, in the contrary extreme, so blended the *Godhead* and *manhood* together, as to make but *one nature* of both, after the example of the Apollinarians, whom I before mentioned.

together with the *elements* make the Eucharist, so the *Divine Logos* with the *manhood* make *God incarnate*. But then the analogy or resemblance ought not to be strained beyond the intention of it: for there is this observable *difference* in the two cases; that in one case there is barely a *conjunction* or *concomitance* of the two natures, and that to the *worthy* receivers only: in the other, there is an *absolute*, *permanent*, and *personal* union. So then the Eucharist is but a faint, imperfect *emblem* of the other.

[x] A full and distinct account of this whole matter may be seen either in Vossius, Hist. Pelagian. lib. ii. par. 1. Thess. v. Opp. tom. vi. p. 603, &c. or in Dr. Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part i. ch. 19.

[y] Vid. Cyrill. Alex. Epist. ad Nestor. p. 1290. Anathem. xi. p. 1294. cum Cyrill. Explan. apud Harduin. Concil. Conf. Albertin. de Eucharist. p. 754.

The Sacrament of the Eucharist was of eminent service in this cause also: for if the bread and wine in that Sacrament are what they have been called, (and as constantly believed to be,) *symbols* and *figures* of Christ's *body* and *blood*, then it is certain that our Lord really put on *flesh* and *blood*, and that his *human* nature was and is distinct from his *Divine*. To say, that "the "Word was made flesh," or that the *flesh* was *converted* into the *Word*, in such a sense as to leave no distinct *humanity*, was as much as to say, that the *Sacraments* now make us not "members "of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones[z];" and that the *Eucharist* in particular is an *insignificant* show, or *worse*, either not representing the *truth* of things, or representing a *falsehood*. Such was the argument made use of in the Eutychian controversy[a]: a plainer or stronger there could not be; nor any wherein the generality of Christians could think themselves more deeply concerned.

XIV. Long after this, in the eighth century, endeavours were employed by many to bring in the *worship*, or at least the *use*, of *images* into churches. In this case also, the Sacrament of the Eucharist was seasonably pleaded, for the giving some check to the growing corruption. The good Fathers of Constantinople, in the year 754, meeting in council to the number of 338, argued against *images* to this effect: that as our Lord had appointed no visible *image* of himself, his incarnation, or passion, but the *eucharistical* one, and probably intended that for a most effectual bar, to preclude all appearances of idolatry; it would be high presumption in men, without *warrant*, without *occasion*, and against the very *design* of our Lord in that Sacrament, to introduce any other kind of *images* of their own devising[b]. The opposite party, some time after, (A. D. 787,) in the second Council of Nice, eluded this plain reasoning, by pretending, falsely, that the sacred symbols are not the *image* of Christ's body and blood, but the *very* body and blood[c]: and thus they

[z] Ephes. v. 30.

[a] The reader may see the ancient testimonies collected and commented upon in Albertinus, p. 802, 835, 836, 867, 868, 874, 886.

[b] Vid. Acta Concil. Nicæn. secundi, tom. iii. vers. finem.

[c] N. B. They might justly have said, that the sacred symbols are *more* than a mere *image*, *more* than mere *signs* and *figures*: but they should not have denied their being *images* at all. And they might justly have said, that the sacred symbols are, in *construction* and *beneficial effect*, to worthy receivers, the very body and blood: but they ought not to have asserted what they did, in that *absolute* manner, or in such *crude* terms, left without the proper qualifying explanations.

laid the seeds of that error, which grew up at length by degrees into the monstrous doctrine of *transubstantiation.* For the true notion of the Eucharist lying cross to their darling schemes, they chose rather to deprave the *Sacrament* itself, than to stand corrected by it. However, all this tends to confirm the main point, which I have been insisting upon, that the Sacraments, among other very valuable uses, have for many ages upwards been the standing *barriers* against corruptions: though there are no fences so strong, nor any ramparts so high, but daring and desultorious wits may either break through them or leap over them.

XV. I shall add but one example more; and it shall be of Faustus Socinus, of the sixteenth century: a person of pregnant wit and teeming invention; of moderate learning, but a very large share of sufficiency. His great ambition was, to strike out a new system of religion from his own conceits; though he happened only to revive (and perhaps very ignorantly) the ancient Sabellianism, Photinianism, and Pelagianism, with other exploded heresies. He began with subverting (as far as in him lay) the true and ancient doctrine of the *Trinity*, rejecting the *Deity* of the second Person, and even the *being* of the third. After a thousand subtilties brought to elude plain Scripture, and after infinite pains taken in so unnatural a war against Heaven, he was yet sensible, that he should prevail nothing, unless, together with the doctrine of the Trinity, he could discard the *two Sacraments* also, or render them *contemptible.* Baptism was a standing monument of the *personality* and *equal* Divinity of *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost:* and the other Sacrament was an abiding memorial of the *merits* (though no *creature* can *merit*) of our Lord's obedience and sufferings: and both together were lasting attestations, all the way down from the very infancy of the Church, of the *secret* workings, the heavenly *graces* and influences of the *Holy Spirit* upon the faithful receivers. Therefore to let the *Sacraments* stand, as aforetime, was leaving the ancient faith to grow up again in the Christian world, much faster than Socinus, with all his subtile explications of Scripture texts, could bear it down. Being well aware how this matter was, he fell next upon the *Sacraments;* discarding one of them, in a manner, under pretence that it was *needless;* and castrating the other, with respect to what was most valuable in it, to render it *despicable.*

It was thought somewhat odd, by some of his own friends[d], that he should labour to throw off *Baptism*, and at the same time retain the *Eucharist*, which appeared to be *comparatively* of slighter moment, and less insisted upon in Scripture. But he well knew what he did; for the *form* of *Baptism* stood most directly in his way. As to the *Eucharist*, if he could but reduce it to a bare *commemoration* of an absent friend, there would be nothing left in it to create him much trouble; but it might look sincere and ingenuous, in that instance at least, to abide by the *letter* of the text, and to plead for the *perpetuity* of an ancient and venerable (now by him made a *nominal*) Sacrament. This appears to be the most natural account of his conduct in the whole affair. For otherwise it is a very plain case, that a lively imagination like his might have invented as fair or fairer pretexts for laying aside the *Eucharist*[e], than for discarding *Baptism;* and it might have been easier to elude some *few* places of Scripture than *many*. But I return.

From the induction of particulars here drawn together, and laid before you, may be understood, by the way, the true and right notion of the Christian *Eucharist*, such as obtained from the beginning, and continued till the dark ages came on, and longer: but the point which I aimed at was, to illustrate the use of both the Sacraments considered as *fences* or *barriers*, ordained by Christ, to secure the *true faith*, and to preclude *false doctrines*. Few have ever attempted to corrupt Christianity in any of its considerable branches, but, first or last, they have found themselves embarrassed by one or both Sacraments; and have been thereby obliged either to desist presently, or to expose themselves further, by quarrelling with those sacred institutions, which all wise and good men have ever most highly revered.

I have taken notice, how the most essential articles of the Christian religion have, in their several turns, (as they happened to be attacked,) been supported and strengthened by these auxiliary means. The doctrine of the *visible creation* by God most high: the doctrine of our *redemption* by Christ, both *God* and *man:* the doctrine of sanctifying *grace* by the *Holy Spirit* of God, a *real* Person, and also *Divine:* the doctrines of *original*

[d] Vid. Ruari Epistolæ, vol. ii. p. 251.

[e] Indeed, the same pretences, some of them, equally affect both Sacraments, and tend to the discarding of *both*, or *neither;* as Vossius justly remarks, De Baptismo.

sin, and of our Lord's *meritorious* sacrifice, and of a *future resurrection* of the body: these, and as many others as are contained in *these*, have all been eminently preserved and held up by the Christian Sacraments. The Sacraments therefore are full of excellent instruction and admonition: they carry *creeds* and *commandments*, as it were, in the bowels of them: they speak even to the *eyes* in silent *imagery*, and often teach more in *dumb show*, with less expense of time and much greater efficacy, than any the most eloquent discourses could do. The Romanists have sometimes boasted, that *images* are the *laymen's books*, wherein the unlearned may read what it concerns them to know, without knowing *letters*. And indeed, if images had been *authorized*, or had they not been *prohibited* books, they might have been admitted with a better grace. But our *Sacraments* are the true books, (or serving as books,) both to learned and unlearned; full of lively imagery and instructive emblem; drawn by Christ himself, and left as his legacies, for the use of all the churches.

Let us then, my Reverend Brethren, be careful to preserve these *sacred deposits* with all due reverence and watchfulness; inasmuch as they contain treasures of infinite value; and Christianity itself appears to be so entirely wrapped up in them, that, humanly speaking, it must unavoidably stand or fall with them.

THE CHRISTIAN SACRIFICE EXPLAINED,

IN

A CHARGE

DELIVERED IN PART TO

THE MIDDLESEX CLERGY

AT

ST. CLEMENT-DANES,

April the 20th, 1738.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

AN APPENDIX.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

THE Sacrament of the *Eucharist* has for some time been the subject of debate amongst us, and appears to be so still, in some measure; particularly with regard to the *sacrificial* part of it. As it is a *federal* rite between God and man, so it must be supposed to carry in it something that *God gives to us*, and something also that *we give*, or present, *to God*. These are, as it were, the two *integral* parts of that holy ceremony: the former may properly be called the *sacramental* part, and the latter, the *sacrificial*. Any great mistake concerning either may be of very ill consequence to the main thing: for if we either mistake the nature of God's *engagements* towards us, or the nature of our *engagements* towards God, in that sacred solemnity, we so far defeat the great ends and uses of it, and prejudice ourselves in so doing.

A question was unhappily raised amongst us, about an hundred years ago, whether the *material elements* of the Eucharist were properly the *Christian sacrifice*. From thence arose some debate; which however lasted not long, nor spread very far. But at the beginning of this present century, the same question was again brought up, and the debate revived, with some warmth; and it is not altogether extinct even at this day.

Those who shall look narrowly into the heart of that dispute may see reason to judge, that a great part of it was owing to some *confusion* of ideas, or *ambiguity* of terms; more particularly, from the want of settling the *definitions* of *sacrifice* by certain rules, such as might satisfy reasonable men on both sides.

How that *confusion* at first arose may perhaps be learned by looking back as far as to Bellarmine, about 1590, or however as far as to the Council of Trent, about thirty years higher. Before that time things were much clearer, so far as concerned this article. Nobody almost doubted but that the old *definitions* of *sacrifice* were right, and that *spiritual* sacrifice was *true* and *proper* sacrifice, yea the *most proper* of any.

Spiritual sacrifice is St. Peter's phrase[a]: and it agrees with

[a] 1 Pet. ii. 5.

St. Paul's phrase of *reasonable service*[b]: and both of them fall in with our Lord's own phrase, of *worshipping* God in *spirit* and in *truth*[c]. It is serving God in *newness* of *spirit*, not in the *oldness* of the *letter*[d]. It is offering him *true* sacrifice and *direct* homage, as opposed to *legal* and *typical*, in order to come at *true* and *direct* expiation, without the previous covers or shadows of *legal* and *typical* expiations, which reached only to the *purifying* of the *flesh*, not to the *purging* of the *conscience*[e]. This kind of sacrifice called *spiritual* does not mean *mental* service only, but takes in *mental*, *vocal*, and *manual*, the service of the *heart*, *mouth*, and *hand*; all *true* and *direct* service, *bodily*[f] service as well as any other, since we ought to serve God with our *bodies* as well as our *souls*. Such is the nature and quality of what *Scripture* and the *ancients* call *spiritual* sacrifice, as opposed to the outward *letter*. Such services have obtained the name of *sacrifice* ever since David's time[g], warranted by God himself, under the *Old* Testament and *New*. The Jews, before Christ and since[h], have frequently used the name of *sacrifice* in the same *spiritual* sense. The very Pagans were proud to borrow the same way of speaking[i] from Jews and Christians: so that *custom* of *language* has not run altogether on the side of *material* sacrifice. It may rather be said, that the custom of *Christian language*, not only in the *New* Testament, but also in the Church writers, has run on the side of *spiritual* sacrifice, without giving the least hint that it was not *true* sacrifice, or not sacrifice *properly so called*.

St. Austin's definition of true and Christian *sacrifice*[k] is well known, and need not here be repeated. He spoke the sense of the churches before him: and the Schools, after him, followed

[b] Rom. xii. 1.

[c] John iv. 23. See Dodwell on Instrum. Music, p. 31. Stillingfleet, Serm. xxxix. p. 602. Scot, vol. iv. Serm. iv.

[d] Rom. vii. 6.

[e] Heb. ix. 9, 13, 14.

[f] Rom. xii 1. 1 Cor. vi. 20.

[g] They are emphatically styled *sacrifices of God*, (Psalm li. 17.) as being the fittest *presents* or *gifts* to him, the most acceptable *offerings*.

[h] Vid. Vitringa de vet. Synag. in Proleg. p. 40, 41. Philo passim. Justin. Mart. Dial. p. 387.

[i] Porphyrius de Abstin. lib. ii. sect. 34. Conf. Euseb. Præp. Evangel. lib. iv. cap. 9—14. xiii. cap. 13. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 686. edit. Ox. Even Plato, long before Christianity, had defined *sacrifice* to mean a *present* to the Divine Majesty; not confining it, so far as appears, to *material*, but leaving it *at large*, so as to comprehend either *material* or *spiritual*. See my Review, vol. iv. p. 729.

[k] Verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate inhæreamus Deo, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veraciter beati esse possimus. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 6. p. 242. tom. 7. ed. Bened. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 728.

him in the same. Aquinas, at the head of the Schoolmen, may here speak for the rest: he determines, that a sacrifice, *properly*, is any thing performed for God's sole and due honour, in order to *appease* him[l]. He plainly makes it a *work*, or *service*, not a *material thing:* and by that very rule he determined, that the *sacrifice of the cross* was a *true sacrifice;* which expression implies both *proper* and *acceptable*. This notion of sacrifice prevailed in that century, and in the centuries following, and was admitted by the early Reformers[m]; and even by Romanists also, as low as the year 1556, or yet lower. Alphonsus a Castro, of that time, a zealous Romanist, in a famous book (which between 1534 and 1556 had gone through ten or more editions) declared his full agreement with Calvin, so far as concerned the definition of *true sacrifice*, conformable to St. Austin's[n]. Even Bellarmine acknowledged, above thirty years after, that some noted Doctor of the Roman Church still adhered to the same definition[o]. So that *spiritual* sacrifice was not yet entirely excluded as *improper*, *metaphorical*, and *nominal*, among the Romanists themselves; neither was it hitherto a *ruled* point amongst them, that *material thing* was essential to the nature, notion, or definition of *true* and *proper sacrifice*. How that came about afterwards, we shall see presently.

The Romanists, wanting arguments to support their *mass sacrifice*, thought of this pretence, among others, that either their *mass* must be the *sacrifice of the Church*, or the Church had really *none:* and so if the Protestants resolved to throw off the *mass*, they would be left without a *sacrifice*, without an *altar*, without a *priesthood*, and be no longer a *church*[p]. The Protestants had *two* very just answers to make, which were much

[l] Dicendum, quod sacrificium *proprie* dicitur: *aliquid factum in honorem proprie Deo debitum ad eum placandum*. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, *verum sacrificium est*, &c. Christus autem, ut ibidem subditur, seipsum obtulit in passione pro nobis. Et *hoc ipsum opus*, quod voluntarie passionem sustinuit, Deo maxime acceptum fuit, utpote ex *charitate* maxime proveniens: unde manifestum est, quod *passio Christi fuerit verum sacrificium*. *Aquin. Summ.* par. iii. q. 48.

[m] Vid. Melancthon. de Missa, p. 195. In Malachi, p. 545. tom. ii. Chemnit. Examen. part. ii. p. 137.

[n] After reciting Austin's definition, he proceeds; Hæc Augustinus, ex quibus verbis aperte colligitur *omne opus bonum* quod Deo offertur, esse *verum sacrificium*, et hanc definitionem ipsemet Calvinus admittit—— ex cujus verbis constat, inter nos et illum de *veri sacrificii* definitione convenire. *Alphons. a Castro, adv. Hæres.* lib. x. p. 75. edit. 1565.

[o] Bellarmin. de Miss. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 710.

[p] Alphons. a Castro, lib. x. p. 74. Conf. Bellarmin. de Missa, lib. i. cap. 20.

the same with what the *primitive Christians* had before made to the Pagans, when the like had been objected to them. The first was, that *Christ himself* was the *Church's sacrifice*[q], considered in a *passive sense*, as commemorated, applied, and participated in the Eucharist. The second was, that they had sacrifices besides, in the *active* sense, sacrifices of their *own* to *offer*, visibly, publicly, and by sacerdotal hands, in the Eucharist: which sacrifices were their *prayers*, and *praises*, and *commemorations*[r]; *eucharistic* sacrifices, properly, though *propitiatory* also in a qualified sense. The Council of Trent, in 1562, endeavoured to obviate both those answers[s]: and Bellarmine afterwards undertook formally to confute them. The Romanists had no way left but to affirm stoutly, and to endeavour weakly to prove, that the *two* things which the Protestants insisted upon did neither singly, nor both together, amount to *true* and *proper* sacrifice. Here began all the subtilties and thorny perplexities which have darkened the subject ever since; and which must, I conceive, be thrown off, (together with the *new* and *false* definitions, which came in with them,) if ever we hope to *clear* the subject effectually, and to set it upon its true and ancient basis.

I shall pass over Bellarmine's trifling exceptions to the Protestant *sacrifice*, (meaning the *grand sacrifice*,) considered in the *passive* sense. It is self-evident, that while we have *Christ*, we want neither *sacrifice*, *altar*, nor *priest*; for in him we have all: and if he is the *head*, and we the *body*, there is *the Church*. Had we no *active* sacrifice at all, yet so long as we are empowered, by Divine commission, to convey the *blessings*[t] of the *great sacrifice*

[q] Vid. Clem. Alex. p. 688, 836. ed. Ox. Euseb. Demonstr. Evan. p. 38. Augustin. tom. iv. p. 1462. ed. Bened. Gregorius M. tom. ii. p. 472. ed. Bened. Cyrill. Alex. contr. Jul. lib. ix.

[r] Justin Martyr, p. 14, 19, 387, 389. ed. Thirlb. Clem. Alex. 686, 836, 848, 849, 850, 860. edit. Ox. Origen. tom. ii. p. 210, 311, 191, 205, 243, 363, 418, 563. ed. Bened. Euseb. Dem. Evang. p. 20, 21, 23. Tertullian, p. 69, 188, 330. Rigalt. Cyprian. Ep. lxxvii. p. 159. ed. Bened. Hilarius, Pictav. p. 154, 228, 535. Basil. tom. iii. p. 52. ed. Bened. Chrysost. tom. v. p. 231, 316, 503. ed. Bened. Hieronym. tom. ii. p. 186, 250, 254. tom. iii. p. 15, 1122, 1420. ed. Bened. Augustin. tom. ii. p. 439. iv. p. 14, 473, 455, 527, 498, 1026, 1113. vii. p. 240. ed. Bened. and compare my Review, vol. iv. cap. 12.

[s] Si quis dixerit in missa non offerri Deo *verum et proprium* sacrificium, aut quod *offerri* non sit aliud quam nobis *Christum ad manducandum dari*, anathema sit.——Si quis dixerit missæ sacrificium tantum esse *laudis* et *gratiarum actionis*, aut nudam *commemorationem* sacrificii in cruce peracti, non autem *propitiatorium*, anathema sit. *Concil. Trid.* sess. xxii. can. 1, 3.

[t] *Blessing* was a considerable part of the sacerdotal office in the Aaronical priesthood. Numb. vi. 23—27. Deut. x. 8. xxi. 5.

to as many as are *worthy*, we therein exercise an honourable *priesthood*[u], and may be said to *magnify our office*. But waving that consideration at present, for the sake of brevity, I shall proceed to examine what Bellarmine has objected to our *sacrifices* considered in the *active* sense, and to inquire by what kind of logic he attempted to discard all *spiritual* sacrifices, under the notion of *improper*, *metaphorical*, *nominal* sacrifices, or, in short, *no sacrifices*.

1. He pleads, that Scripture *opposes* good works to sacrifice; as particularly in Hosea vi. 6, "I will have mercy, and not "sacrifice:" therefore *good works* are not sacrifice properly so called[x]. But St. Austin long before had sufficiently obviated that pretence, by observing, that Scripture, in such instances, had only *opposed* one kind of sacrifice to another kind, *symbolical* to *real*, *typical* to *true*, *shadow* to *substance*[y]. God rejected the *sign*, which had almost engrossed the *name*, and pointed out the *thing signified*; which more justly deserved to be called *sacrifice*. So it was not opposing *sacrifice* to *no sacrifice*, but *legal* sacrifice to *evangelical*. Such was St. Austin's solution of the objected difficulty: and it appears to be very just and solid, sufficiently confirmed both by the Old Testament and New.

2. Bellarmine's next pretence is, that in every sacrifice, *properly* so called, there must be some *sensible thing* offered; because St. Paul has intimated, that a priest must have *somewhat* to offer. Heb. viii. 3[z]. But St. Paul says *somewhat*, not some *sensible thing*. And certainly, if a man offers prayers, lauds, good works, &c. he offers *somewhat*, yea and somewhat *sensible* too: for *public* prayers, especially, are open to the *sense* of hearing, and *public* performances to more *senses* than one. Therefore the *service*

[u] Some of the elder Romanists acknowledged this to be *sufficient*. Satis est, ut *vere* et *proprie* sit sacrificium, quod mors *Christi* ita nunc ad peccati remissionem applicetur, ac si nunc ipse Christus moreretur. *Canus, Loc. Theol.* lib. xii. cap. 12.

[x] Bellarmin. de Missa, lib. i. cap. 2. p. 710.

[y] Per hoc ubi scriptum est, *Misericordiam volo quam sacrificium*, nihil aliud quam *sacrificio sacrificium* prælatum oportet intelligi: quoniam illud quod ab omnibus appellatur sacrificium *signum* est *veri sacrificii*. Porro autem *misericordia* est *verum* sacrificium. *Augustin. de Civ. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 5.

N. B. In explication of what Austin says, *quod ab omnibus*, &c. it may be noted, that he did not take the *vulgar language* for the *best*, or the *only* rule of *propriety*: he observes elsewhere (de Verb. Dom. Serm. liii.) that almost all call the *Sacrament*, (that is, *sign* of the body,) the *body*. *Pæne quidem sacramentum omnes corpus ejus dicunt*. And yet he did not think that the *sign* was more *properly* the body, than the *body* itself, but quite otherwise.

[z] Bellarmin. ibid. p. 711.

may be the sacrifice, not the *material things:* and such service being *evangelical,* (not *legal* or *typical,*) is *spiritual* sacrifice.

3. The Cardinal has a third argument about *elicit acts*; which being highly metaphysical and fanciful, I choose rather to pass it off without further answer, than to offend your ears with it.

4. A fourth pretence is, that the sacrifice of the Church being but *one,* the *spiritual* sacrifices, which are *many,* cannot be that *one* sacrifice. Here he quotes Austin, Pope Leo, and Chrysostom, to prove that the Church's sacrifice is but *one,* and *that one* the Eucharist[a]. He might have spared the labour, because the same Fathers assert the sacrifice of the Eucharist to be both *one* and *many,* diversly considered: one *complicated sacrifice,* taking in the *whole* action; *many* sacrifices, if distinctly viewed under the several particulars. And though the Eucharist might by common use come to be called emphatically, *the sacrifice,* as being most *observable,* or most *excellent,* or as comprehending *more* sacrifices in one than any other service did, yet it does not from thence follow that the other less observable or less considerable sacrifices were not properly sacrifices. For has not the same Eucharist, in vulgar speech, and by custom, come to be *emphatically* called, *the Sacrament,* as if there were no other Sacrament? And yet certain it is, that Baptism is as *properly* a Sacrament as the other. *Emphatical* appellations therefore are rather marks of the *excellency* or *notoriety* of a thing, than of strict *propriety* of speech. But I return to Bellarmine.

5. A fifth pretence is, that *spiritual* sacrifices, being common both to clergy and laity, require no *proper priesthood,* and therefore cannot be justly esteemed *proper* sacrifices; for *proper* sacrifice and *proper* priesthood, being relatives, must stand or fall together[b]. To which it may be answered, that even *lay Christians,* considered as *offering* spiritual sacrifices, are so far *priests,* according to the doctrine of the New Testament, confirmed by Catholic antiquity[c]. But waving that nicety, (as some may call it,) yet certainly when spiritual sacrifices are offered up by *priests,* divinely commissioned, and in the face of a Christian congregation, they are then as *proper* sacrifices as any other are, or can be: and this is sufficient to our purpose. Let the *Eucharist* therefore, duly administered by *sacerdotal* officers, be admitted as a sacrifice *properly* so called, but of the *spiritual*

[a] Bellarm. ibid. p. 712. [b] Ibid. [c] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 763.

kind, and we desire nothing further. If a *sacerdotal* oblation of the people's *loaf* and *wine* can be thought sufficient to convert them into proper *sacrifices*, though they had nothing at all of a *sacrificial* nature in them before such oblation; surely the like sacerdotal oblation may much more convert the people's *prayers*, *praises*, and devout *services* (which previously had something of a *sacrificial* nature in them) into *real* and *proper* sacrifices, yea the *properest* of any[d]. Why then must our *spiritual* offerings be set aside as of no account in respect of *proper* sacrifice, only to take in other things of much *lower* account than they? Why should we take in those *meaner* things at all, as *sacrifices*, into our *pure offerings*, which are much better without them, and can only be defiled by such an heterogeneous mixture of *legal* and *evangelical*? Let the elements be *signs* (as they really are) of the sacrifice which we *offer*, as they are also *signs* of the sacrifice whereof we *participate*: that appears to be the *end* and *use* of them, (and *great* use it is,) and seems to be all the honour which God ever intended them. To be plainer, we ourselves are the *sacrifice offered* by those[e] symbols; and the victim of the cross is the *sacrifice participated* by the same symbols. But I proceed.

6. It is further argued against *spiritual* sacrifices, that they require no *proper* altar, as all *proper* sacrifices do: therefore they are not *proper* sacrifices[f]. This argument is faulty, more ways than one. For, 1. It can never be proved, that *sacrifices*, and *altars* are such inseparable *relatives*, that one may not subsist without the other. An *altar* seems to be rather a *circumstance* of convenience, or decency, than *essential* to sacrifice. It was accidental to the Jewish sacrifices, that they needed *altars*: and the reason was not because *all sacrifices* must have *altars*, but because sacrifices of *such a kind* could not be performed

[d] This matter is briefly and accurately expressed by our very learned and judicious Bp. Montague.

In lege Christi sunt *sacerdotes*, non tantum illa *laxa* significatione, qua quotquot Jesu Christi sumus ἐπώνυμοι, (*Christiani nominati*,) sumus etiam et dicimur *sacerdotes*, sed et illa magis *stricta*, qua qui populo acquisitionis *præsunt* ἐν νόμῳ Θεοῦ, καὶ εἰς Θεὸν, Dei sunt et populi μεσίται.—— Habemus autem et *altare*, ad quod *offerimus* oblationes et sacrificia *commemorationis*, *laudationis*, *orationis*, *nos*, *nostra* Deo, per sacerdotem. *Montacut. Orig.* tom. ii. p. 313.

[e] The sacrifice of the cross, or Christ himself, may also be said to be *offered* in the Eucharist. But then it means only offered *to view*, or offered to *Divine consideration*: that is, *represented* before God, angels, and men, and *pleaded* before God as what we claim to; not offered again in *sacrifice*. See Field on the Church, p. 204, 205. and my Review, vol. iv. p. 758.

[f] Bellarmin. ibid. p. 712, 713.

without them; otherwise, an *altar* appears no more necessary to a *sacrifice*, considered at large, than a case or a plate, a pix or a patin, is to a *gift*, or *present*. 2. Besides, how will it be made appear that the *table* on which our Lord consecrated the Eucharist, or the *cross* on which he suffered, was *properly* and *previously* an altar? The Cardinal's argument proves too much to prove any thing: for it does not only strike at the *spiritual* sacrifices, but at the *mass sacrifice* too, and even at the *sacrifice of the cross*, which had no *proper* altars. But if it be said, that both the *table* and the *cross* were proper *altars*, as being the *seats* of proper *sacrifices*, then whatever is the *seat* of a spiritual sacrifice (which we now suppose to be proper) will, by parity of reason, be a spiritual *altar* also, and *proper* in its kind: so then, take the thing either way, the argument is frivolous, and concludes nothing[h]. I have now run through the Cardinal's subtilties on this head; excepting that some notice remains to be taken of his artful contrivance to elude St. Austin's definition of sacrifice, and therewith all the old definitions which had obtained in the Church for fifteen hundred years before.

7. He pretends, that that Father defined only *true sacrifice*, not *proper sacrifice*; and that therefore his definition comes not up to the point in hand: *good works* may be true *sacrifices*, in St. Austin's sense, but they will be *improper*, *metaphorical*, or *nominal* only, notwithstanding[i]. This is the substance of the pretext, laid down in its full force, and it will require a clear and distinct answer. First, I may take notice, that it is very odd, in this case especially, to make a distinction between *true* and *proper*, and to *oppose* one to the other. St. Austin, most un-

[g] Some make the *cross* itself the *altar*, which has been the current way of speaking from Origen of the third century. Others say, the *Divine nature* of our Lord was the *altar*, grounding it upon Hebr. ix. 14. Others take in *both*, in different respects: but neither of them seems to have been an *altar* in strict *propriety* of speech, but rather in the way of *analogy*, or *resemblance*. This article has been minutely discussed by Cloppenburg. Opp. vol. i. p. 82, &c. Witsius, Miscellan. tom. i. p. 509. In Symb. Apostol. p. 146. Vitringa, Obs. Sacr. lib. ii. cap. 13. lib. iv. cap. 15. Deylingius, Obs. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 393. Miscellan. 559, 567.

[h] The Lord's table is by the ancients frequently called an *altar*, as being the *seat* of the elements, and so an *altar* in the same *metonymical* meaning, as the elements were *body* and *blood*, or the *grand sacrifice* itself. The Lord's table might also more *properly* be called an *altar*, as being that from which, or at which, prayers and praises and commemorations (*spiritual sacrifices*) were offered. See my Review, vol. iv. p 749.

[i] Bellarmin. ibid. p. 713. conf. Vasquez, tom. iii. p. 507. Suarez. tom. iii. p. 886. Bapt. Scortia, p. 18.

doubtedly, intended, under the word *true*, to take in all *Christian*, all *evangelical*, all *salutary* or *acceptable*, yea all *allowable* sacrifices: and what can it signify to talk of any *proper* sacrifice (Jewish, suppose, or Pagan) as opposed to *true*, so long as such *proper* sacrifice is no sacrifice at all in Christian account, but a *sacrilege* rather, or a *profanation*? But I answer further, that there is no reason to imagine that St. Austin did not intend to include *proper* under the word *true*. It would not have been sufficient to his purpose to have said *proper* sacrifice, because Jewish and Pagan sacrifices might come under the same appellation: but he chose the word *true*, as carrying in it more than *proper*, and as expressing *proper* and *salutary*, or *authorized*, both in one. As *true religion* implies both *proper* and *authorized* religion, and as *true worship* implies the like; so *true sacrifice* implies both *propriety* as to the *name*, and *truth* as to the thing[k].

The point may be further argued from hence, that the ancient Fathers did not only call spiritual sacrifices *real* and *true*[l], but they looked upon them as the *best*, the *noblest*, the most *perfect* sacrifices, the most *suitable* and *proper* gifts or presents that could be offered to the Divine Majesty[m]: and they never dropped any hints of their being either *improper* or *metaphorical*. The Romanists knew this very well; and it may be useful to observe their exquisite subtilty in this argument. For after they have exploded, with a kind of popular clamour, all that the Fathers ever called *true* sacrifice, under the opprobrious name of *improper* and *metaphorical*[n], and have raised an odium against Protestants for admitting no other, then, (as if they had forgot all that they had been before doing,) they fetch a round, and come upon

[k] In this sense St. Austin called our Lord's Sacrifice *true*. Contr. Faust. lib. xx. cap. 18. xxii. 17. Contr. advers. Leg. &c. lib. i. cap. 18.

[l] Justin. Dial. p. 389. ed. Thirlb. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 17. p. 248. ed. Bened. Origen. tom. ii. p. 362. ed. Bened. Clem. Alex. p. 686. ed. Ox. Lactant. Epit. 169, 204, 205. edit. Dav. Philastrius, Hær. cap. cix. p. 221. ed. Fabr. Hieronym. in Amos, cap. v. p. 1420. ed. Bened. Augustin. tom. x. p. 94, 242, 243, 256. ed. Bened. Gregor. Magn. Dial. lib. iv. cap. 59. p. 472. ed. Bened.

[m] Justin. Dial. p. 387. Athenagoras, p. 48, 49. ed. Ox. Clem. Alex. p. 836, 848, 849, 860. Tertullian, Apol. cap. xxx. De Orat. cap. 27, 28. Minuc. Felix, sect. xxxii. p. 183. Cyprian, Ep. lxxvii. p. 159. ed. Bened. Lactantius, Epit. cap. lviii. de vero Cultu, lib. vi. cap. 24, 25. Eusebius, Demonstr. p. 40. Hilarius, Pictav. p. 154. ed. Bened. Basil, tom. iii. p. 207. ed. Bened. Nazianzen. tom. i. p. 38, 484. Chrysostom. tom. v. p. 20, 231, 316, 503. vii. 216. ed. Bened. Augustin. tom. v. p. 268. de Civit. Dei, lib. x. cap. 20. lib. xix. cap. 23. Isidorus Pelus. lib. iii. Ep. 75.

[n] Vide Suarez, tom. iii. p. 886, 891, 892, 893, 896.

us with the *high* and *emphatical* expressions of the *Fathers*, asking, how we can be so dull as to understand them of *metaphorical*, *nominal* sacrifices[o]? Yet we are very certain, that all those *high* expressions of the *Fathers* belonged only to *spiritual* sacrifices; the very same that Bellarmine and the rest discard as *improper* and *metaphorical*.

But they here play fast and loose with us: first, pretending that the *true* and *noble* sacrifices of the ancients did not mean *proper* ones, in order to discard the *old* definitions; and then again, (to serve another turn,) pretending that those very sacrifices must have been *proper*, (not *metaphorical*,) because the Fathers so highly esteemed them, and spake so honourably of them. In short, the whole artifice terminates in this, that the self-same sacrifices as admitted by Protestants shall be called *metaphorical*, in order to disgrace the Protestant cause, but shall be called *proper* and *true* as admitted by the *Fathers*, in order to keep up some show of agreement in this article with *antiquity*. But I return to the Cardinal, whom I left disabling all the *old* definitions, in order to introduce a *new* one of his own, a very strange one[p]; fitted indeed to throw out *spiritual sacrifice* most effectually, (which was what he chiefly aimed at,) but at the same time also overthrowing, undesignedly, both the *sacrifice of the mass* and the *sacrifice of the cross*.

1. As to the *sacrifice* of the *mass*, the subject of it is supposed to be our Lord's *natural* body, *invisible* in the Eucharist; and yet, by the *definition*, the sacrifice should be *res sensibilis*[q], something *visible*, obvious to one or more of the *senses*. Again, our Lord's body is not liable any more to *destruction*; and yet, by the *definition*, the sacrifice should be *destroyed*. But I shall insist no longer upon the Cardinal's inconsistencies in that article, because he has often been called to account for them by learned Protestants[r].

[o] Vide Petavius, Eccl. Dogm. tom. iii. p. 130.

[p] A definition of *one kind* of sacrifice, (*Jewish*, as it seems,) rather than of *sacrifice* in general, or of *Christian* in particular. It is giving us a *species* for the *genus*, like the making a definition of *man*, and then calling it a definition of *animal*.

[q] Sacrificium est oblatio *externa*, facta soli Deo, qua ad agnitionem humanæ infirmitatis, et professionem Divinæ majestatis, a legitimo ministro *res aliqua sensibilis et permanens*, in ritu mystico, *consecratur*, et *transmutatur*, ita ut plane *destruatur*. *Bellarm.* p. 715, 717.

[r] Johann. Forbesius, p. 615. Montacutius, Orig. tom. ii. p. 302, 357. Bishop Morton, b. vi. cap. 6. p. 467, 468, &c. Hakewill, p. 8. Brevint. Depth and Mystery, &c. p. 133, 144. Payne on the Sacrifice of the Mass, p. 70. Bishop Kidder, p. 316, 415.

2. The second article, relating to the *sacrifice of the cross*, has been less taken notice of: but it is certain, that Bellarmine's definition is no more friendly to that than to the other.

If our Lord's *soul* was any part of his *offering*, (as Scripture seems to intimate[s], and as the *Fathers* plainly teach[t], and the reason of the thing persuades,) or if his *life* was an offering, which Scripture plainly, and more than once testifies[u]; then *res aliqua sensibilis*, some *sensible thing* is not the true notion of *proper* sacrifice, neither is it essential to the *definition* of it; unless the *life* which our Lord gave upon the cross was no *proper* sacrifice. Perhaps, in strictness of notion, his "obedience unto "death[v]," his amazing act of *philanthropy*, (so highly extolled in the New Testament,) was properly the acceptable *sacrifice*. So Aquinas states that matter, as I before noted: and Bellarmine was aware of it, in another chapter, wherein he undertakes to prove, that our Lord's death was a *proper* sacrifice[w]. There he was obliged to say, though he says it coldly, that acts of charity are *quoddam sacrificium*, a kind of sacrifice. But the question was about *proper* sacrifice, and about our Lord's *philanthropy*: was that only *quoddam sacrificium*, or was it not *proper*? Here the Cardinal was nonplused, and had no way to extricate himself, but by admitting (faintly however and tacitly, as conscious of self-contradiction) that *spiritual* sacrifice may be *proper* sacrifice, and is not always *metaphorical*: otherwise, the very brightest part of our Lord's own sacrifice, the very flower and perfection of it, his most stupendous work of *philanthropy*, must have been thrown off, under the low and disparaging names of *metaphorical*, *improper*, *nominal* sacrifice.

Having seen how the ablest champion of the Romish cause failed in his attempts against *spiritual* sacrifices, failed in *not proving* his point, failed also in *over proving*, we may now with the greater assurance maintain, that the *old definitions*, which took in *spiritual* sacrifice, were true and just, and that the *new* ones, arbitrarily introduced, in the decline of the sixteenth century, are false and wrong; such as one would expect from

[s] Isa. liii. 10, 11, 12. Psalm xvi. 10. Luke xxiii. 46.

[t] Clem. Roman. cap. xlix. Irenæus, p. 292. ed. Bened. Hieronym. tom. ii. part. 2. p. 167, 173. ed. Bened. Fulgentius ad Thrasimund. lib. iii. Compare Bishop Bilson, Full Redemption, &c. p. 83, &c.

[u] Matt. xx. 28. Mark x. 45. John x. 11, 15, 17. xv. 13. 1 John iii. 16.

[v] Phil. ii. 8. Hebr. v. 8.

[w] Bellarm. de Missa, lib. i. cap. 3. p. 718.

men *zealous* for a *party cause*, and disposed to support manifest *errors* and *absurdities*, at any rate whatsoever.

After pointing out the *rise* of the *new* definitions, I am next to observe what their *progress* was, and what the result or issue of them. It must, I am afraid, be owned, that our Romish adversaries were but too successful in spreading mists and darkness all over the subject, in opening a new and wide field of dispute, thereby drawing the Protestants, more or less, out of their safe intrenchments; dividing them also, if not as to their main *sentiments*, yet at least as to their *modes* of *expression* and their *methods* of *defence*.

How this affair had been fixed amongst us, but a few years before, may be collected from Archbishop Sandys's judicious *definition* of *sacrifice*[x], published in 1585, and contrived to take in sacrifices both of the *material* and *spiritual* kind. Dr. Bilson also (afterwards Bishop) published his book of Christian Subjection, the same year; wherein he took occasion to assert, that the Eucharist is a *sacrifice*, yea, and a *true* sacrifice; but understanding it to be of the *spiritual* kind[y]. This kind of language (the uniform language of *antiquity*, and of the *whole reformation*[z] for sixty or seventy years,) began to vary in some measure, from Bellarmine's time, and more and more so, both here and abroad Some indeed stood by the *old definitions* and *ancient language* concerning the Eucharist: more went off from it; and so

x "Sacrificing is a voluntary action "whereby we worship God, offering "him *somewhat*, in token that we "acknowledge him to be the Lord, "and ourselves his servants." *Sandys*, Serm. xxi. p. 185.

y "Malachi speaketh of the *true* "sacrifice, which, from the beginning, "and so to the end, was and shall be "more acceptable to God, than the "bloody and external sacrifices of the "Jews." *Bilson*, p. 696.

"Neither they nor I ever denied "the Eucharist to be a *sacrifice*. The "very name enforceth it to be the "sacrifice of *praise* and *thanksgiving*; "which is the *true* and *lively* sacrifice "of the New Testament. The Lord's "table, in respect of his *graces* and "*mercies* there proposed to us, is an "heavenly banquet, which we must "*eat*, and not sacrifice: but the *duties* "which he requireth at our hands, "when we approach his table, are "*sacrifices*, not *sacraments*. As "namely, to *offer* him *thanks* and "*praises*, *faith* and *obedience*, yea "our *bodies* and *souls*, to be living, "holy, and acceptable *sacrifices* unto "him, which is our *reasonable* ser-"vice." *Bilson*, p. 699.

z Beza's account (in 1577) may serve for a *specimen*.

Cœna Domini *sacrificii rationem habet*, idque triplici respectu. 1. Quatenus in ea *aliquid Deo offerimus*, solennem videlicet *gratiarum actionem*, ex illo Christi præcepto. 1 Cor. xi. 26.

2. Deinde, quod in ea conferrentur *eleemosynæ*, ex instituto fortassis Apostoli, 1 Cor. xvi. 2. Quæ eleemosynæ vocantur προσφοραὶ, ex illo Christi sermone. Matt. xxv. 40.

3. Quod mortis Domini *sacrificium*, ob *oculos* quodammodo in illis mysteriis *positum*, veluti renovetur. *Beza, Quæst. et Respons.* p. 105.

Protestants became divided, in *sounds* at least, while they differed not much in *sense*. Many finding that they were sufficiently able to maintain their ground against the Romanists, even upon the foot of the *Romish definitions*, never troubled themselves further to examine how *just* they were: it was enough, they thought, that the Romanists could not prove the Eucharist a *true* and *proper* Sacrifice, in their own way of defining; and the rest seemed to be only contending about *words* and *names*. Nevertheless the more thoughtful and considerate men saw what advantage the adversaries might make by aspersing the Protestants as having *no sacrifice, properly so called*, nor pretending to *any:* besides that the *dignity* of a venerable Sacrament would probably suffer much by it; and the ancient Fathers, who were very wise men, had never consented (though as much provoked to it by the Pagan objectors) to lessen the dignity of their *true* and *real* sacrifices by the low and diminutive names of *improper* or *metaphorical*. They always stood to it, that they had *sacrifices*, yea and *true* sacrifices, (of the spiritual[a] kind,) the *noblest* and *divinest* that could be offered; while all other pretended sacrifices, all *material* sacrifices[b], were *mean, poor, contemptible* things, in comparison. Such, I humbly conceive, ought to have been our constant, standing reply to the

[a] See the testimonies in my Review, vol. iv. ch. 12. To which abundance more may be added. And note, that though the epithet *spiritual*, joined, suppose, with *meat*, or *drink*, or the like, may denote some *material thing* bearing a *mystical* signification, yet it has not been shewn, neither can it be shewn, that the phrase *spiritual sacrifice* anciently denoted a *material substance* offered as a sacrifice. A sacred regard was had to St. Peter's use of that phrase, to denote *evangelical services:* besides that the Fathers constantly *explained* what they meant by *spiritual sacrifices*, and so *specified* the particulars, as to leave no room for scruple or evasion, among persons of any reasonable discernment. So that the putting a *new* construction upon the phrase, in order to make some show of agreement with antiquity, is a transparent fallacy. It is keeping their terms, but eluding their meaning. It is teaching *novel* doctrine under *ancient* phrases.

[b] Express testimonies against *material* sacrifice may be seen in Justin Martyr, Apol. p. 14. Tertullian, p. 188. Rigalt. Origen. in Psalm. p. 563, 722. ed. Bened. Lactantius, Epit. cap. lviii. p. 169. Eusebius, Præp. Evang. lib. iv. cap. 10. p. 148, 149. Eusebius, Demonstr. Evang. p. 39, 222, 223. Basil. tom. ii. p. 402, 403. ed. Bened. Chrysostom, tom. i. p. 664. ed. Bened. Cyrill. Alex. contr. Jul. lib. x. p. 345. Procopius in Isa. p. 22, 493.

N. B. It is not *possible* to reconcile those testimonies to the *material* scheme: but it is very easy to make the Fathers *consistent* throughout, with themselves, and with each other, on the *spiritual* foot, as making the *work*, or *service*, the sacrifice. The single question then is, whether the Fathers ought to be so interpreted as to make them *consistent* upon the *whole;* or whether some *detached* passages, capable of a *consistent* meaning, ought to be understood in a sense *repugnant* to the uniform tenor of their writings. The *passive* sense is the true key to those passages.

Romanists, with respect to this article: for we have certainly as just a plea for it in our case, as the ancient Fathers had in theirs. However, as I before hinted, Protestant Divines varied in their *language* on this head, some abiding by the *old definitions*, upon good consideration, others too unwarily departing from them. So now we are to consider them as divided into *two* sorts: and in process of time, as shall be related, sprang up a *third* sort, growing, as it were, out of the other two. I shall say something of each in their order and place, for the further clearing of the subject.

1. Among those that adhered to the *old language*, and still continued to call the Eucharist a *true* or a *proper* sacrifice, but of the spiritual kind, I may first mention Amandus Polanus[c], a learned Calvinist, who died in 1610. Our very judicious Dean Field, (who finished his book of the Church in 1610, and died in 1616,) he also adhered to the *old language*, disregarding the *new* definitions. He asserted the Eucharist to be, with regard to the sacrifices of our *selves*, our *praises*, &c. a *true* but *spiritual* sacrifice[d].

Scharpius, a learned Calvinist, who published his Cursus Theologicus in 1617, scrupled not to reckon the Eucharist among the sacrifices *strictly and properly so called*, but still of the *eucharistical* and *spiritual* kind. He had seen Bellarmine's affected subtilties on that head, despised them, and in part confuted them[e].

Bishop Andrews appears to have been a Divine of the same *ancient* stamp, in this article. In the year 1592, he discovered some uneasiness, that many would not allow the Eucharist to be a *sacrifice* at all, but a mere *sacrament*[f]. Afterwards, in 1610, he asserted the Lord's Supper to be a *sacrifice*, of the *eucharistical* kind[g]. In 1612, he went so far as to say, that the Apostle (1 Cor. x.) *matcheth* the Eucharist with the *sacrifice of the Jews*, and that, by the "rule of comparisons, they must be

[c] Cœna Domini est *sacrificium*, tum eucharisticum, tum propitiatorium: eucharisticum quidem *proprium*, quatenus in ejus usu *gratias* Deo agimus quod nos ex servitute, &c.——propitiatorium vero *aliquo modo*, quatenus unici illius sacrificii *vere* propitiatorii memoriam in eo serio frequentare jubemur. *Amand. Polan. Symphon. Cathol.* cap. xvii. p. 275. Conf. p. 855.

[d] Field, of the Church, p. 210, 220.

[e] Scharpius, Curs. Theolog. p. 1522, 1525, 1539. edit. 2. Genevæ.

[f] Bp. Andrews's Sermons, part ii. p. 35.

[g] Andrews ad Bellarmin. Apolog. Respons. p. 184.

"*ejusdem generis*[h]." By which he did not mean, as some have widely mistaken him, that both must be the *same kind* of *sacrifice*, but that both must be of the *sacrificial kind*, agreeing in the same *common genus* of sacrifice: for he said it in opposition to those who pretended that the Eucharist was an ordinance merely of the *sacramental kind*, and not at all of the *sacrificial*[i].

Dr. Buckeridge wrote in 1614. His notion of the eucharistic sacrifice seems to resolve into a *real* and *proper* sacrifice of Christ's *mystical body*, the Church, and a *metonymical, improper* offering of Christ himself; offering him in *some sort*, or in the way of *representation*, like as is done in *Baptism*[k]. He does not indeed use the word *proper*, following the style of the *ancients* before ever that word came in: but he apparently *means* it, where he speaks of the sacrifice of Christ's *mystical body*, that is, of *self-sacrifice*.

Archbishop Laud speaks of three sacrifices: 1. Christ's own sacrifice, *commemorated* before God, by the *priest alone*, in his *breaking* the bread, and *pouring out* the wine. 2. The sacrifice made by priest and people *jointly*, the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. 3. *Self-sacrifice* by every communicant[l]. I will not defend all those distinctions. I think all the *three* sacrifices are properly the sacrifices of the *Church*, or of all the *worthy* communicants, recommended or offered up by their *priests* in

[h] Bp. Andrews's Sermons, p. 453. Compare his Posthumous Answer to Card. Perron, p. 6, 7.

[i] Besides the argument here drawn from the consideration of what principles he was then *opposing*, (which is a good rule of construction,) it may further be considered that the approved Divines of his time, Mason and Spalatensis, rejected with indignation the thought of any *material* sacrifice, (vid. Mason de Ministerio Anglican. p. 575, 599, 618, 551, 595. Spalatensis, lib. v. p. 149, 265, 267.) condemned it as *absurdity*, *madness*, and *impiety*. So also Bp. Morton, (b. vi. cap. 5. p. 438, 439.) approving what the wiser Romanists had said, condemning the notion in the like strong terms.

[k] De sacrificio *cordis contriti*—— de sacrificiis item *corporis* Christi *mystici* (non *naturalis*) in quo *nosmetipsos* Deo offerimus, satis convenit. ——De sacrificio item *commemorativo*, sive *repræsentativo*, quo *Christus* ipse, qui in cruce pro nobis immolatus est, per viam *repræsentationis* et *commemorationis* a nobis etiam *quodammodo offerri* dicitur, lis non magna est: in *Baptismo* enim offertur sacrificium Christi, uti Augustinus, &c. Buckeridge de Potest. Papæ in præfat.

[l] In the Eucharist we offer up to God three sacrifices: "*One*, by the "*priest only*, that is, the *commemo-* "*rative* sacrifice of Christ's death, "represented in bread *broken* and "wine *poured out*: another, by the "priest and people *jointly*; and that "is the sacrifice of *praise* and *thanks-* "*giving* for all the benefits and graces "we receive by the precious death of "Christ: the *third*, by every *par-* "*ticular man* for *himself only*, and "that is the sacrifice of every man's "*body* and *soul*, to serve him in both "all the rest of his life, for this bless- "ing thus bestowed upon him." *Laud's Conference*, sect. xxxv. p. 305, 306.

that holy solemnity: the priest is their *mouth* in doing it, their conductor, or principal, authorized by God so to be. This great man said nothing of *proper* or *improper:* all the three sacrifices may be understood to be *proper*, but *spiritual.* What he believed, as to each, is not easy to say. If we explain his *commemorative* sacrifice by Bishop Buckeridge's account of the same thing, it could be no more than figurative, in that *relative* view; for we cannot *properly* sacrifice *Christ* himself: but the *commemorative service*, being of the same nature with hymns and praises, may be considered in the *absolute* view, as a *proper* sacrifice of *ours*, of the *eucharistical* and *spiritual* kind; and that perhaps was what that great Prelate might have in his thoughts.

It is certain that Bishop Montague, of that time, understood the whole *action*, or *memorial service*, to be a *true* and *real* sacrifice of praise[m]. And as he was a great admirer of *antiquity*, he had no regard to the *new* definitions, but referred the novelists to St. Austin for correction and better instruction[n]. The very learned Dr. Hammond was, undoubtedly, in the same way of thinking: the *whole eucharistical action* both of *priest* and *people*, the *memorial service* jointly performed, that was *the sacrifice* in his account[o]. Bishop Taylor[p], Archbishop Bramhall[q], Hamon l'Estrange[r], appear to have been in the like sentiments. Dr. Patrick, who wrote in 1659, more plainly followed the ancient way of thinking and speaking, such as had been in use before the *new* definitions came in. *Duties* and *services* were his sacrifice, a *spiritual* sacrifice[s]. He pleads, that such services justly deserve the *name*[t]; that even the Pagan Platonists (as well as Scripture and Fathers) had so used the name of *sacrifice;* and that the appellation was very *proper*[u], taking in not only *mental*, or *vocal* praises, but *manual* also; that is, as he expresses it,

[m] Montacut. Origin. tom. ii. p. 301—304. Compare his Antidiatribe, p. 143, 144. where he takes in our *self-sacrifice*, calling it the sacrifice of Christ's *mystical body*.

[n] Montacut. ibid. p. 358.

[o] Hammond, Practical Catechism, lib. vi. sect. 4. vol. i. p. 174. Compare View of New Direct. p. 154. and vol. ii. Dispatch. p. 164. vol. iii. p. 769. The notion of the *whole action* being the sacrifice, was not *new:* it appears in the *Fathers* of old; and Mr. Perkins, who died in 1602, had taught the same. Problem, p. 137, or English Works, vol. ii. p. 550.

[p] Taylor, Holy Living, &c. ch. iv. sect. 10. Worthy Commun. p. 54.

[q] Bramhall's Works, p. 35, 36, 996.

[r] L'Estrange's Alliance, &c. p. 187, 221.

[s] Patrick's Mens. Mystica, p. 16, 18, 19. ed. 4.

[t] Ibid. p. 35.

[u] Ibid. p. 35, 36.

the *eucharistical actions*[w]. Upon these principles, he tells the Papists, that "we are sacrificers as well as they[x]:" which was the right turn, copied from what the ancient *Fathers* had said in answer to the like charge of having *no sacrifice*, and as justly pleaded by Protestants now, as by Christians then, against their injurious accusers.

Bishop Lany, after the Restoration, (A. D. 1663,) a very learned Divine, and of great acumen, scrupled not to call the whole eucharistical service *true* and *proper* sacrifice, proper without a *metaphor*, as being the fittest *gift* or *present* that could be offered to the Divine Majesty[y]. So little did he regard the frivolous *distinctions* of the Trent Council, or the *new definitions* invented to support them.

Nine years after appeared Dr. Brevint[z]. He was well read in the *eucharistic* sacrifice: no man understood it better; which may appear sufficiently from *two tracts* of his upon the subject, small ones both, but extremely fine. He stood upon the *ancient* ground, looked upon evangelical *duties* as the *true* oblations and *sacrifices*[a], resolved the *sacrifice* of the Eucharist, *actively* considered, solely into them[b]; and he explained the *practical* uses of that doctrine in so *clear*, so *lively*, and so *affecting* a way, that one shall scarce meet with any thing on the subject that can be justly thought to exceed it, or even to come up to it[c]. So that I could heartily join my wishes with a late learned writer, that that "excellent little book, entitled, The Christian Sacrament "and Sacrifice, might be reprinted, for the honour of God, and "the benefit of the Church[d]." It is worth the noting, how

[w] Patrick's Mens. Mystica, p. 36. ed. 4. compare p. 19.

[x] Ibid. p. 37. compare p. 38, 40. N.B. I have omitted Mr. Thorndike, because his notion plainly resolves into the *passive* sense, viz. into the *grand sacrifice* itself, as contained in the Eucharist, because *represented*, *applied*, and *participated* in it. The Lutherans, generally, resolve it the same way, only differing as to the point of *real* or *local* presence. Vide Brochmand, tom. iii. p. 2072, 3052.

[y] Bishop Lany's Sermon on Hebr. xiii. 15. p. 16, 32. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 735, 736.

[z] In 1672, Dr. Brevint wrote the Depth and Mystery of the Roman Mass: reprinted 1673. In 1673, he published the Christian Sacrament and Sacrifice. He was made Dean of Lincoln in 1681, and died in 1695.

[a] Brevint, Depth and Myst. p. 16.

[b] "Sincere Christians must have "their hands full, at the receiving "the holy Communion, with *four* "distinct sorts of sacrifices. 1. The "*sacramental* and commemorative "*sacrifice* of Christ. 2. The *real* "and *actual* sacrifice of themselves. "3. The *free-will offering* of their "goods. 4. The *peace-offering* of "their praises." *Brevint, Christian Sacrifice*, 110, 111.

[c] Brevint, Sacram. and Sacrif. sect. vi. vii. viii. p. 74—134.

[d] Dr. Hickes's Christian Priesthood, vol. i. Prefat. Disc. p. 39, 40.

acutely Dr. Brevint distinguished between the *sacramental* sacrifice of *Christ*, and the *real* or *actual* sacrifice of *ourselves*. We cannot *properly* sacrifice *Christ:* we can only do it in *signs* and *figures*, that is, *improperly*, or *commemoratively:* but we may *properly* offer up *ourselves* to God; and that is, in strict propriety of speech, our *sacrifice*, our *spiritual* sacrifice. Dr. Brevint rejected, with disdain, any thought of a *material* sacrifice, a *bread offering*, or a *wine offering;* tartly ridiculing the pretences commonly made for it[c]. But I have dwelt long enough upon the Divines of the *first* class; who standing upon the *old* principles, and disregarding the *new* definitions, continued to call the Eucharist a *true* sacrifice, or a *proper* sacrifice, (meaning *eucharistical* and *spiritual*,) or forbore, at least, to call it *improper*, or *metaphorical*.

2. I may now look back to other Divines, who used a different *language* in this article.

At the head of them[f] stands the celebrated Mr. Hooker, who wrote in 1597, and who feared not to say, that "sacrifice is now "no part of the Church ministry," and that we have, "properly, "now no sacrifice[g]." I presume he meant by *proper* sacrifice, *propitiatory*, according to the *sense* of the Trent Council, or of the *new* definitions. In such a *sense* as that, he might justly say, that *sacrifice* is no part of the *Church ministry*, or that the Christian Church has *no sacrifice*. But I commend not the use of such *new language*, be the meaning ever so right: the *Fathers* never used it[h].

Dr. Francis White, in the year 1617, (he was afterwards

[c] "Now among these magnificent "wonders of Christ's law, *bread* and "*wine* can be reputed but of *little* "*importance;* which you may find "as well or better among the *oblations* of Aaron, and thus far be-"longing better to his *order;* because "he is often commanded to *offer* "*bread*, which Priest Melchizedek is "not. Therefore, if *offering bread* "and *wine* makes an *order*, Aaron "will be more certainly a priest *after* "*the order of Melchizedek*, than was "either *Melchizedek* or *Christ* him-"self." *Brevint, Depth and Mystery*, p. 116. See p. 117.

[f] Dr. Rainoldes, in 1584, had in the way of arguing *ad hominem* shewn, that the Fathers were no friends to the *mass-sacrifice*, considered as *true* and *proper*, inasmuch as they allowed only of *spiritual* sacrifices, which, in the Romish account, were not *true* or *proper* sacrifices. See Rainoldes against Harte, p. 472, 535, 536, 539. That kind of arguing first led the way to such sort of language as Mr. Hooker made use of; but was not precisely the same with it, not running in the like *absolute* terms.

[g] Hooker, Eccl. Polity, book v. ch. 78. sect. 2. Oxf. edit.

[h] Once Clemens Alexandrinus, (Str. vii. p. 836.) and once Arnobius, (lib. vii.) has said, that the Christians had *no sacrifices;* meaning such as the Pagans had boasted of: but that did not amount to saying, that the Church had no *proper* sacrifices, or *properly no sacrifice*.

Bishop of Ely,) observed, that the *name* of sacrifice doth not in a *proper* and *univocal* sense belong to the Eucharist, but in a *large acceptation* of the word, and in a *figurative* meaning; because it is a *representation* of the *real* sacrifice of Christ once offered upon the cross[i]. He was so far right, in making a *representation* of Christ's sacrifice to be but figuratively *that* sacrifice: but he forgot, that the *Eucharist* contains many *spiritual* services, which are truly *sacrifices* in the Scripture language, and that even the *memorial service*, though it is but *metonymically Christ's* sacrifice, is yet *really our* sacrifice, our *spiritual* sacrifice. From hence, however, may be seen how and by what degrees Protestant Divines came to leave off calling the Eucharist a *sacrifice*, or called it so with the epithet of *improper* or *figurative*. It was chiefly owing to a *partial* conception of it: they considered it barely in its *representative* or *relative* view, and too hastily concluded, that since it was not the *sacrifice represented*, (as the Romanists pretended it was,) it was *no sacrifice* at all in propriety of speech.

Spalatensis, of that time, made no scruple of saying, over and over, that the Eucharist is "not a true sacrifice[k]." In a certain place, he expressed himself in such a manner as might be apt to surprise a man at the first reading: he says, that the name of *true sacrifice* was never given to the Eucharist, never thought on, before the very *latest* and the most *corrupt* ages[l]. But he meant it, I suppose, according to that *sense* of *true sacrifice*, which the Trent Council and the Popish writers had lately affixed to the name.

The Divinity chairs in both universities, about that time, concurred in denying the Eucharist to be a *true*, *real*, or *proper* sacrifice: which appears from Dr. Abbot[m], afterwards Bishop of Sarum; and from Dr. Davenant[n], afterwards Bishop of the

[i] White, Orthodox Faith and Way, p. 339.

[k] Antonius de Dominis, lib. v. c. 6. p. 82, 265, 269, 271, 278.

[l] Esse *verum sacrificium*, nunquam ad postrema corrupta sæcula invenio, aut *dictum*, aut *cogitatum*, aut *traditum*, aut *practicatum* in Ecclesia. *Antonius de Dominis, ibid.* p. 281.

[m] "The *passion* of Christ is the "sacrifice which we offer: and because the *passion* of Christ is not "now really acted, therefore the sacrifice which we offer is no *true* "and *real* sacrifice." *Abbot, Counterproof against Dr. Bishop*, ch. xiv. p. 364. N. B. Here was the like *partial* conception of the thing as I before noted in Dr. White.

[n] Nos asserimus, in *missa* nihil posse nominari aut ostendi quod sit *sacrificabile*, aut quod *rationem* et *essentiam* habeat realis, externi et *proprie dicti* sacrificii: quamvis quæ adhiberi in eadem solent *preces*, *eleemosynæ*, *gratiarum* actiones, *spiritualium* sacrificiorum *nomen* sortiantur; quamvis etiam *ipsa repræsentatio*

same see. Both of them seemed to take their estimate of *true* and *proper* sacrifice from the *new* definitions; allowing them for argument sake, and joining issue with the Romanists upon their own terms. The like may be said of Mr. Mason, who frequently allows, or declares, that the Eucharist is not a sacrifice *properly so called*[o]. But Dr. Crakanthorp (about A. D. 1624) may serve for a good comment upon all the rest: for when he denied the Eucharist to be either a *true* sacrifice, or a sacrifice *properly so called*, he cautiously guarded what he had said, by restraining it to *such a sense* as the Trent Council and Romish divines had affixed to the phrases of *true sacrifice*, and *sacrifice properly so called*[p]. That restriction, or salvo, was often forgot, and came, by degrees, to be more and more omitted; and so the most prevailing doctrine ran in absolute terms, that the Eucharist is *no true sacrifice*, or *no proper sacrifice*, or in short, *no sacrifice*. Bishop Morton, being sensible how much it tended to disparage the holy Eucharist, and how contradictory it was to *ancient* language, to say that the Eucharist is not a *true* or not a *proper* sacrifice, endeavoured to help the matter by a distinction between *truth of excellency* and *truth of propriety*[q]; allowing the Eucharist to be *true* sacrifice, as to *excellency* of nature, but not as to *propriety* of speech: as if the new definitions were a better rule of *propriety*, than all that had prevailed for fifteen hundred years before. His distinction was a good one, in the main, but was not justly applied in this particular, where truth of *excellency* and truth of *propriety* are really *coincident*, and resolve both into one. However, so the vogue ran, as I have before said, and

fracti corporis Christi et fusi sanguinis, *figurate* sacrificium a veteribus sæpenumero vocetur. *Davenant. Determinat.* q. 13.

[o] Mason. de Minist. Anglic. p. 549, 550, 551, 555, 627, 628.

[p] Sacrificium missæ non est *vere* sacrificium *propitiatorium*, ut *concilium Tridentinum* definit, *vestrique* docent; sed *Eucharisticum* tantummodo et *commemorativum*.—Sed nec omnino *verum et proprie dictum* sacrificium in missa ullum est; non *quale* Tridentinum concilium definivit, et vestri uno ore profitentur. *Crakanthorp. contr. Spalatens.* c. lxxiv. p. 574.

[q] Morton's Institut. of the Sacram. book vi. chap. 3. p. 415. chap. 7. sect. i. p. 470.

How much the *old notion* of sacrifice was now *wearing* out may be judged from Dr. George Hakewill, who wrote in 1641, and was otherwise a learned and judicious writer, particularly as to this very argument. He says, "Commemoration being "an *action*, cannot, in *propriety* of "speech, be the *thing sacrificed*, "which must of necessity be a *sub*-"*stance*," &c. *Hakewill, Dissertat.* p. 25.

He rejects Austin's definition, p. 4. And it is too plain from several places of his work, that the *mists* first raised by Bellarmine, and other Romish divines, hung before his eyes.

so has it been transmitted, through many hands, down to this day[r].

3. Such being the case, there is the less reason to wonder that a *third* set of Divines, in process of time, sprang up, as it were, out of the two former. For some serious men perceiving how much the *ancient* and *modern* language differed in this article, and that by means of the now prevailing *definitions* they were likely to *lose* their *sacrifice*; they thought of reconciling the *eucharistic sacrifice* with the *new* definitions, by making it a *material* sacrifice. Our excellent Mr. Mede, in the year 1635, was *chief* in this scheme. The aim was good, to retrieve the *Christian sacrifice*, which seemed to be almost sinking; but the measures were ill laid: for the only right way, as I conceive, of compassing what he intended, would have been to have restored the *old definitions* of sacrifice, and so to have set the Eucharist upon its *true*, and *ancient*, that is, *spiritual* foundation. The endeavouring to fix it on a *material* foot, and to make the *elements* themselves a *sacrifice*, was no more than what had been attempted, about fourscore years before, by the Romanists[s], and, after mature deliberation, had been justly exploded by the *shrewder* men[t], as *Jewish*, or *meaner* than Jewish, and altogether repugnant to *Christian* principles. Neither could Mr. Mede escape the censures of many of that time for what he was doing; as appears by a letter of Dr. Twisse, written in 1636,

[r] The Lutheran way of speaking, in this matter, may be seen in Deylingius. Observat. Miscellan. p. 291. and in Zeltner. Breviar. Controvers. cum Eccl. Græc. p. 231, 251.

The Calvinistical way, in Dallæus, de Cult. Religiosis, p. 1122, 1126. L'Arroque, Hist. of the Eucharist, 275, &c. Basnage, Annal. tom. i. p. 373. all declare it, absolutely, *no true* sacrifice: which, though well meant, is too *unguarded*, and is different *language* from that of the *Fathers* of the *Reformation*.

One of our *late* Divines (a person of great learning) speaks thus:

"We deny that there is *any reason* "why the Eucharist should be called "a *true sacrifice*, and *properly so* "*called*, or ought to be so: for when "we call any thing a *true sacrifice*, "we have regard to the *formal reason* "of a sacrifice, and not to the *final*." *Nichols's Additional Notes*, p. 51. printed A. D. 1710.

But what did he make the *formal reason* of a sacrifice? Did he take it from the *new* definitions? Where there is *properly* a *gift* to God, by way of *worship*, to *honour*, or to *please* him, there is the *formal reason* of a sacrifice. *Gratulatory* sacrifice is as properly *sacrifice*, as the *propitiatory*, or *expiatory*: they are different *species* under the same genus.

[s] Ruardus Tapper. contr. Luther. art. 18. Gaspar. Casalius. De Sacrif. lib. i. c. 20. Jansenius, Concord. Evang. p. 905. Gordon. Huntlæus, lib. ix. c. 3. n. 1.

[t] Salmeron. tom. ix. tract. 29. p. 224. Maldonate, de Sacr. tom. i. par. 3. p. 334. Bellarmine, p. 788, 792, 793. Vasquez, tom. iii. p. 527. Suarez, tom. iii. p. 886, 905, 906, 910. Gregor. de Valentia, tom. iv. p. 1274. Baptista Scortia. de Missa, 34, 36, 38. Arcudius, p. 187, 189.

and since printed in Mede's Works[u]. Mr. Mede forbore however to print his Christian Sacrifice; though he published the appendage to it, concerning the *altar*, which might give least offence: the rest appeared not till ten years after his decease, in the year 1648. There are many good things in it, for which reason it has generally been mentioned with respect by our best Divines: but in the point of a *material* sacrifice, (a sacrifice of the *elements*,) he had not many followers. Dr. Heylin, who in 1636 and 1637 had some scheme or schemes of his own[w], seems to have taken into Mr. Mede's in or before 1654, when he published his exposition of the Apostles' Creed[x].

There are two fundamental flaws in Mr. Mede's system: 1. One in his endeavouring to fix the notion or definition of a *Christian sacrifice* by the rules of the *Levitical*; as if *typical* and *true* were the same thing. 2. The other, in not being able to make out the *sacrifice* he aimed at, by the very *rules* which himself had fixed for it. He observed very justly, that in the Levitical peace offerings, God had, as it were, his *part*, *portion*, or *mess*, assigned in the *sacrifice*[y], or *feast*: (for God was considered in those feasts, not merely as *Convivator*, but as *Conviva* also; a necessary circumstance to complete the *federal* oblation and *federal* feast.) But when he came to make out the *analogy* between the *Jewish* and *Christian* feast, he could find no *part* or *portion* for God in the Eucharist; where we take all to ourselves[z]. There the parallel failed; the rule would not answer: therefore the rule was wrong. It would be trifling here to reply, that a *Christian sacrifice* is no *Jewish* one, and is therefore not

[u] "I perceive, the main thing you "reached after, was a certain *mystery* "concerning a *sacrifice*; which the "Papists have miserably transformed; "but, in *your sense*, is nowadays be-"come a *mystery* to all the Christian "world." *Twisse*, Ep. 70. Compare Mede's Answer, Ep. 71.

[w] In his Coal from the Altar, and in his Antidotum.

[x] Heylin on the Creed, p. 240, &c.

[y] Mede's Christian Sacrifice, book ii. c. 7. p. 370, 371.

[z] Luther first took notice of the *self-contradiction* contained in the making the *elements* a proper *sacrifice* to God in the Eucharist.

Totum ergo cur nos panem, et vinum *totum* comedimus et bibimus, *nihil* relinquentes Deo?—Dum corpora nostra et laudes sacrificamus, nihil nobis, sed omnia Deo soli exhibemus, ut stet ratio sacrificii etiam *spiritualis*. Totum nos *voramus*, et totum *offerimus*: hoc est tantum dicere; neque *voramus* si *offerimus*, neque *offerimus* si *voramus*: et ita dum *utrumque* facimus, *neutrum* facimus. Quis audivit unquam talia? Omnia sibi pugnantissime contradicunt, et invicem sese consumunt: aut necessario et infallibiliter concludunt Eucharistiam *sacrificium* esse non posse. Diluant hæc, rogo, Lovanienses et Parisienses. *Luth. de abrogand. Missa privata*, tom. ii. par. 2. fol. 255. Several answers have been thought on, to elude this argument, by *Romanists* and *others*: but it is impossible to invent any that will *bear*.

to be measured by *Jewish rules:* for why then should a *Christian* sacrifice be made *material* by *Jewish rules*? or why is the *definition* of sacrifice measured by the same? Either uniformly hold to the rule assigned, or else give it up as *no rule;* and then the *Christian sacrifice* may be a *true* and *proper* sacrifice, (though *spiritual* only,) being of a different kind from the *Jewish* ones. If, indeed, the Eucharist could be proved to be a *material* sacrifice by any *clear* text of Old Testament or New, then there would remain no further room for dispute: but since the point is chiefly argued from its supposed *analogy* to other *material* sacrifices, (*Jewish* or *Pagan*,) and that *analogy* does not answer, but fails in the *main thing* belonging to all *material sacrifices*, and which alone should make them appear *gifts to God;* it is plain that the argument has an *essential* flaw in it, which no art can cure.

One thing may be pertinently observed of Mr. Mede, that he confined the sacrifice to the *ante-oblation*. His was a sacrifice of the *unconsecrated* bread and wine[a], not of the *consecrated;* not of the *body* and *blood*. He supposed no new *sacrificing act* in the post-oblation, but the *representation* only of Christ's sacrifice, made by what had been *sacrificed* before. So that some late notions of the *eucharistic sacrifice* can claim but very little countenance from Mr. Mede. What we call *offering* the elements for *consecration*, (like as we *offer* the *waters* of Baptism,) he called *sacrificing;* which was indeed calling it by a *wrong name*, and upon wrong principles: but, in other things, his notion of the Eucharist was much the same with the common one; and he went not those strange lengths, those unwarrantable excesses, which, I am sorry to say, some late schemes manifestly abound with. But I proceed.

The doctrine of a *material* sacrifice, first brought hither about 1635, barely subsisted till the Restoration, and afterwards slept, as it were, for thirty or forty years. But in 1697, two queries being sent to a learned man[b], in these terms, "Whether there "ought to be a true and real sacrifice in the Church; and

[a] "Thus was there, as it were, a "mutual commerce between God and "the people; the people *giving* unto "God, and God again unto his people: "the people giving a *small thanks-"giving*, but receiving a *great bless-"ing;* offering *bread*, but receiving "the *body;* offering *wine*, but receiv-"ing the *mystical blood* of Christ "Jesus." *Mede's Disc.* li. p. 293. Comp. Christian Sacrif. chap. viii.

[b] Dr. Hickes, in Two Discourses, p. 51, &c. 61. printed 1732.

"Whether there is any such thing in the Church of England," (both which might very safely have been answered in the *affirmative*, keeping to the *terms* wherein they were stated,) that learned person chose to alter the terms, *true and real*, into *material*, and still answered in the *affirmative*: which was going too far. Nevertheless, in his answer to the queries, he admitted of some *spiritual sacrifices*, as being *true*, and *real*, and *proper* sacrifices; which makes it the more surprising that he should think of any other sacrifice. For since it is self-evident that *truth of excellency* goes along with the *spiritual* sacrifices, and since he himself had allowed *truth of propriety* to go along with the same, or with some of them at least; to what purpose could it be to seek out for another sacrifice, not *more proper*, but certainly *less excellent*, than what we had before? It is an uncontestable maxim, that the *value* of a *sacrifice* can never rise higher than the value of the *sacrificers*[d]; and therefore if they sacrifice *themselves*, it is not possible that they should do *more*, because in the *giving* themselves, they *give* all that they have to *give*. What *dignity* then, or *value*, could it add to an *evangelical* priesthood, or sacrifice, to present the Divine Majesty with a loaf of bread, or a chalice of wine? or what *practical* ends or uses could be served by it? I shall only observe further, that the same learned writer, afterwards, took *material thing* into the very *definition* of sacrifice[e]: but upon the latest correction, he struck it out again, putting *gift* instead of it[f]; thereby leaving room for *spiritual* sacrifice (which undoubtedly is a *gift*) to be as *proper* a sacrifice as any. So that his *first* and his *last* thoughts upon the subject appear to have been conformable so far, in a *critical* point, upon which much depends.

Another learned writer (a zealous *materialist*, if ever there was one) laid it down for his groundwork, that nothing can properly be called a sacrifice except some *material thing*: but to

[d] Vid. Peter Martyr. Loc. Commun. p. 753, 895. Field on the Church, p. 209. Cornel. a Lapide, in Heb. vii. 7, seems to allow this maxim, when he says, *In omni sacrificio sacerdos major est sua victima* quam offert.

[e] Hickes's Christian Priesthood, p. 74. ed. 2. A. D. 1707. "A sacrifice "is a *material thing* solemnly brought, "or presented, and offered to any "God, according to the rites of any "religion," &c.

[f] Hickes's Christian Priesthood, vol. i. p. 159. A. D. 1711. "A sacrifice is a *gift* brought, and solemnly "offered by a *priest*, ordinary or extraordinary, according to the rites "and observances of any religion, in, "before, at, or upon any place, unto "any God, to honour and worship "him, and thereby to acknowledge "him to be God and Lord."

save himself the trouble of *proving* it, he was pleased to aver, that it was *given for granted*[g]. It might reasonably be asked, when *given*, or by whom? Not by the penmen of the *Old* or *New* Testament; not by the Christian Fathers, or Pagan Platonists, in their times: not by the Schoolmen down to the Reformation, nor by the Papists themselves, generally, before the Council of Trent: not by any considerable number of Protestants, till fifty years after, or more; never by the *Divines* of our Church, without contradiction and opposition from other Divines as wise and as learned as any we have had: not *given* for *granted*, even by Dr. Hickes, of the *material* side, in 1697[h]; no, nor in 1711, as hath been already hinted. To be short then, that important point was rather *taken* than *given* for granted, by one writer who wanted a *foundation* to build a *new* system upon: and as the *foundation* itself was weak, the *superstructure*, of course, must fall, however curiously wrought, or aptly compacted, had it really been so.

But it is time for me now, my Reverend Brethren, to relieve your patience, by drawing to a conclusion. I have pointed out (so far as I have been able to judge, upon very serious and diligent inquiry) the original ground and source of all the *confusion* which has arisen in this argument. The changing the *old* definitions for *new* ones has perplexed us: and now again, the changing the *new* ones for the *old* may set us right. Return we but to the *ancient* ideas of *spiritual* sacrifice, and then all will be *clear*, *just*, and *uniform*. We need not then be vainly searching for a *sacrifice* (as the Romanists have been before us) among *texts* that speak nothing of one, from Melchizedek in Genesis down to Hebrews the thirteenth. Our proofs will be found to lie where the *spiritual* services lie, and where they are called *sacrifices*. The *Eucharist* contains *many* of them, and must therefore be a *proper*

[g] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 5. edit. 1714, or p. 6. edit. 1724.

[h] His words are: "*Vocal* sacrifices "are commonly called *spiritual*.— "These are *true*, *real* sacrifices—— "and therefore our Saviour is said to "have *offered* them up, Heb. v. 7. "and they are expressly called *sacrifices*, Heb. xiii. 15. and 1 Pet. ii. 5." Two Disc. p. 53. "The sacrifice of "*praises* and *prayers* unto God—— "is a *proper*, but *spiritual* sacrifice," p. 61.

N. B. It appears to me, that Dr. Hickes's original scheme of the *Christian sacrifice* (though he called it *material*) really meant no more than an *oblation* of the material elements for *consecration*, (which certainly is no *sacrifice*,) and a *commemorative service* performed by the *material* elements, an *external*, *manual* service, as opposed to mere *mental* or *vocal*: both which points might have been granted him, as not amounting to the *sacrifice* of any *material substance*, the point in question.

sacrifice, in the strength of those texts, and cannot be otherwise. Here the primitive *Fathers* rested that matter; and here may we rest it, as upon firm ground. Let us not presume to offer the Almighty any *dead sacrifice* in the Eucharist; he does not offer us *empty signs:* but as he conveys to us the *choicest* of his *blessings* by those *signs*, so by the same *signs* (not *sacrifices*) ought we to convey our *choicest gifts*, the *Gospel services*, the *true sacrifices*, which he has commanded. So will the *federal* league of amity be mutually kept up and perfected. Our *sacrifices* will then be magnificent, and our *priesthood* glorious; our *altar* high and heavenly, and our *Eucharist* a constant *lesson* of *good life;* every way fitted to draw down from above those inestimable blessings which we so justly expect from it. Let but the *work* or *service* be esteemed the sacrifice, rather than the *material elements*, and then there will be no pretence or colour left for absurdly supposing, that any sacrifice of ours can be *expiatory*, or more valuable than *ourselves;* or that our hopes of pardon, grace, and salvation can depend upon any sacrifice *extrinsic*, save only the *all-sufficient* sacrifice of Christ. When once those foreign fictions, or fancies, of other *extrinsic* sin offerings or expiations are removed, there will be no error in asserting a proper *eucharistic sacrifice;* but many good *practical* uses will be served by it.

Under the legal economy, *bulls* and *goats*, *sheep* and *turtle-doves*, *bread offerings* and *wine-offerings* were really *sacrifices:* they had *legal* expiations (shadows of *true*) annexed to them; to intimate, that *true expiation* then, and always, must depend *solely* on the *true* sacrifice of atonement, the sacrifice of the cross. The *shadows* have since disappeared; and now it is our great *Gospel privilege*, to have *immediate* access to the *true sacrifice*, and to the *true* expiations, without the intervention of any *legal* expiation or *legal* sacrifice. To imagine any expiatory sacrifice now to stand between us and the great sacrifice, is to keep us still *at a distance*, when we are allowed to *draw near:* it is dishonouring the *grace* of the Gospel; and, in short, is a flat contradiction to both Testaments. For the rule of *both* is, and the very nature of things shews that so it must be, that all *true expiation* must resolve solely, directly, and *immediately*, into the one true sacrifice of expiation, namely, the *grand sacrifice*. If, indeed, we had now any *legal* or *typical* offences to expiate, then might *bread* and *wine* be to us an expiatory typical sacrifice, as before to the Jews; and that would be all. If we look for any thing *higher*,

they have it not in them, neither by their own virtue, nor by any they can borrow: for it is no more possible that the blood of the grape, representing Christ's blood, should *purge the conscience*, and *take away sins* now, than that the blood of bulls or of goats, representing the same blood of Christ, could do it aforetime. The utmost that any *material sacrifices*, by *virtue* of the grand *sacrifice*, could ever do, was only to make some *legal* or *temporal* atonement: they cannot do so much now, because the *legal* economy is out of doors, and all things are become *new*. In a word, our *expiations* now are either *spiritual* or *none*: and therefore such of course must our *sacrifices* also be, either *spiritual* or *none at all*.

THE APPENDIX.

AS I have hinted something above[a] of the *strange lengths* which have been run, and of the *unwarrantable excesses* which some late systems of the eucharistic sacrifice *manifestly abound with*; it may reasonably be expected that I should here give some account of what I there intimated. I must own, it is the most unwelcome part of my employ, and what I least wished to be concerned in. It can never be any pleasure to a good mind to be *exposing* failings, even when there is a necessity for it; but it is rather an *abatement* of the *solid satisfaction* arising from the *maintaining* of the *truth*, that it cannot ordinarily be done without some kind of rebuke, open or tacit, upon every *gainsayer*. When I first engaged in the subject of the Eucharist, I saw what *necessity* there was for throwing off the *material hypothesis*, (being *unscriptural*, and *uncatholic*, and many ways *unreasonable*,) lest it should hang like a millstone upon the neck of the main cause. Nevertheless, I endeavoured to remove that *weight* with all imaginable tenderness towards persons, living or dead; designing only to rectify mistakes, in a manner the most respectful, so as not to *betray* the *cause* of *truth*. What I could not approve of, in a late learned *writer*, I expressed my dislike of, where necessary, in the *softest* terms; scarce noting the *deformities* of his system in any *explicit* way, but wrapping them up in *generals*, and throwing the kindest shade over them. But by what has appeared since, I find, that every degree of tenderness and every token of respect must be looked upon as nothing, unless I could have commended the same writer, as a person of *sound judgment*[b], in the very things wherein he certainly judged amiss, and much to the prejudice of those *important truths* which I had undertaken to defend. A very particular stress is laid upon that gentleman's *solid learning* and *judgment* in this very question: he

[a] Page 145.

[b] See Dr. Brett's Remarks on Review, p. 97. and compare p. 1, 121, 123, 156.

was, it seems, *visibly superior in learning and argument* to all opposers[c]; insomuch that a *most eminent* person, in 1716, *had not the courage* to contradict him, however disposed to it, in the article of the *sacrifice*[d]. I have no inclination to detract from that gentleman's *talents:* though the proper glory of a man lies not in the *possession*, but in the *right use* of them. *Admiration* of *persons* has often been found a *false* guide in our searches after *truth*. Very *great men* have frequently been observed to run into *great excesses:* and I doubt not but to make it appear that *he did so* in the article now before us. *Men* must, at last, be tried by *truth*, (which is above every thing,) and not truth by *men*, or by *names*[e]. That I may observe some method, I shall point out the *excesses* which that learned writer appears to have run into, under the heads here following:

1. In depreciating *spiritual* sacrifices beyond what was decent or just.
2. In overvaluing *material* sacrifices.
3. In overstraining many things relating to our Lord's *supposed* sacrifice in the Eucharist.
4. In overturning or undermining the *sacrifice of the cross*.
5. In the wrong stating *our sacrifice* in the Eucharist.
6. In giving erroneous accounts of the *Evangelical* or *Christian* priesthood.

These several heads may furnish out so many distinct chapters: I shall take them in the order as they lie, and shall proceed as far in them as necessity may seem to require, or my present leisure may permit; reserving the rest for any future occasion, according as circumstances may appear.

[c] "Mr. Johnson's books had given "*great offence* to many in the highest "stations in this Church. Dr. Hancock, Dr. Wise, and Dr. Turner, "and *some others* were encouraged "to answer him; but they were all "found to be too weak to be *any* of "them, or *all together*, a match for a "man of his *solid learning and judgment:* he was visibly their *superior* "in *learning* and *argument*, and their "faint essays served but to raise his "reputation." *Brett, ibid.* p. 122.

[d] "This eminent person, whoever "he was, (for Mr. Johnson does not "name him,) and who was least expected to favour the doctrine of the "sacrifice, had not the courage to "deny it to be one." *Brett, ibid.*

The design, I suppose, of that *eminent person*, was not to enter into the debate at all, but only to suggest an healing thought, viz. that since every thing of *moment* was perfectly *secure* without the *material hypothesis*, there could be no good reason left for the *warmth* that was shewn in it. A wise reflection: which ought to have been thankfully received, and seriously attended to.

[e] See my Importance &c. vol. iii. p. 667.

CHAP. I.

Shewing some Excesses of the new Scheme, in depreciating spiritual Sacrifices.

I. I MADE mention before of Mr. Johnson's *taking it for granted*, that *spiritual* sacrifice cannot be sacrifice *properly so called*[f]: which was throwing off a very important question too negligently, and forbidding it a fair hearing.

II. Elsewhere he maintains, that "it is impossible in the "nature of things, that prayer and praise without sacrifice" (he meant *material* sacrifice) "can be better than with it[g]." I pass by the pretence offered in support of this paradox; because it is an old one, borrowed from the Romanists: and it was solidly confuted long ago, by our very learned and judicious Mr. Mason[h]. I shall only note further, that the author might as justly have said, that it is impossible for *uncircumcision* to be better than *circumcision*, because he who receives circumcision *as he ought* must of course have the true *circumcision of the heart*, and *both* must needs be better than one.

III. Another the like paradox is, that "prayer and praise are "absurdly preferred to material sacrifices[i]." Much might be said in confutation of this assertion, both from *Scripture* and *antiquity*: but I consult *brevity*; besides that the bare mentioning such things is sufficient to expose them. I shall only ask, how came *material* incense to be laid aside, and *naked* prayer to be *preferred* before it, as proper to the *saints*, under the Gospel[k]? Incense was *symbolical* prayer; prayer is the *evangelical* incense, and as much preferable to the other, as *truth* is to *shadow*, or *thing signified* to the *sign* or *figure* of it.

IV. To disparage *spiritual* sacrifice yet further, he says, "A "*contrite spirit* is called a sacrifice by David, though it be no "more than a disposition of mind fitting us for devotion and

[f] See above, p. 146. I forgot to take Grotius into my list above; who says, Eleemosynæ et jejunia et res similes sunt *sacræ actiones, et* quidem *externæ*; ideoque cum fiunt ex fide in Christum, sunt *sacrificia novi fœderis*, etiam talia per quæ Deus nobis redditur propitius. *Grot. Vot. pro Pace*, p. 670. Conf. 715.

[g] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 123.

[h] Mason de Minister. Anglic. p. 585.

[i] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 127.

[k] Revel. v. 8. Conf. Irenæus, lib. iv. c. 17. p. 249.

"humiliation, and may prevail with God *when no real* [viz. ma-
"terial] *sacrifice is to be had*[l]." An unseemly reflection upon what are emphatically called *the sacrifices of God*, in that very place[m], as vastly preferable to *material* sacrifices. The Psalmist did not mean, when material sacrifice *was not to be had:* for in the verse immediately preceding he says, "Thou desirest not sacrifice, "else would I give it: thou delightest not in burnt offering[n]." What could be said plainer, to shew the *preference* of the *spiritual* sacrifices above all other?

V. The author goes on in the same strain: "Whatever is now "said of prayer without sacrifice, it is certain, that it is but "mere synagogue worship[o]." It is certain that such prayer is the worship of the *saints*, under the Gospel, as I before noted. But, I presume, this ingenious turn was thought on to anticipate or to retort the charge of *Judaism;* which may justly be objected to *material* sacrifices, and frequently has been. It is odd to speak of public prayer *without sacrifice*, when such prayer is itself a *Christian sacrifice:* but he meant prayer without a *material* sacrifice; that, in his account, is mere *synagogue worship*. He forgot, that it runs in *Christ's* name.

VI. Another position is, that "a sacrifice of righteousness "signifies a noble or rich sacrifice, such as it was proper for "King David to offer[p]." But learned men have well shewn, that it signifies *true* and *spiritual* sacrifice[q], as opposed to *material, typical, symbolical:* and such *spiritual* sacrifice is really *richer* and *nobler* than an *hecatomb*. I am aware that something may be speciously pleaded from Psalm li. 19: and Mr. Johnson makes his use of it[r]. But the learned Vitringa seems to me to have given a just account of that whole matter[s].

VII. To disparage *spiritual* sacrifices yet more, and to give the reader as *low* and *contemptible* an idea of them as possible, they are compared with the *wood offerings*[t] mentioned in Nehemiah[u]; the *fuel* brought for the use of the sacrifices: and it is

[l] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 128.

[m] Psalm li. 17.

[n] The pretences made for changing the *translation*, in order to elude the sense, (p. 131,) appear so forced and unnatural, as not to deserve a serious confutation.

[o] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 128.

[p] Johnson, ibid. p. 130.

[q] See Vitringa, de Vet. Synagog. p. 65. Observat. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 499. in Isa. tom. ii. p. 56, 733, 829.

[r] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 130.

[s] Vitringa in Isa. tom. ii. p. 733.

[t] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 225.

[u] Nehem. x. 34. xiii. 31.

thereupon observed, that "the Jews of old hoped, as well as "other people, by their *sweet-scented cane* and *wood*, to render "their sacrifice a more agreeable service[w]." A coarse comparison! Had not the author otherwise bore the character of a grave and serious writer, one could not have taken this extraordinary thought to proceed from any reverent regard towards *spiritual* sacrifices, the *sacrifices of God*. However, we may perceive from hence, that as often as any one should have objected the *meanness* of a *loaf offering*, or a *wine offering*, he was provided with an answer, and prepared to retort.

VIII. I shall take notice but of one article more, under this head. It was a famous topic among the *Christian Fathers*, when arguing for *spiritual* sacrifices, that spiritual offerings were most agreeable to *spiritual beings*[x], such as *God*, and the *souls* of men: the same argument has been as justly urged by learned moderns. But in order to break the force of it, it is observed, that Porphyry of old, and the Quakers of late days, have carried those reasonings too far, in the *spiritualizing* way[y]. Be it so: may not wise men know where to stop? Has not *external* religion been oftener and more grievously perverted, and carried into extremes? We know what *superstitions* and *dangerous* deceits arose from the use of *material incense* in the Eucharist[z], by the making it an *offering for sin*[a]: neither have we reason to expect any thing better from the bringing in a *material mincha*, for the like purposes, into the Christian Church.

However, this way of depreciating *internal* religion and *spiritual* sacrifice is not the way to promote the *prime* uses, the *practical* ends and purposes of the holy Communion. It is indeed said on the other hand, in the way of apology, that they "do not at all lessen the value of any internal grace, or the "necessity of a pious life," but the contrary[b]. They do not *mean* it, I easily believe: but in *fact* they do it. For every cool,

[w] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 225.

[x] Tertullian. de Orat. c. xxvii. xxviii. See Review, vol. iv. p. 747. Lactantii Epit. c. lviii. p. 169. De ver. Cult. lib. vi. c. 24, 25.

[y] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 127.

[z] Vid. Renaudotius, Collect. Liturg. tom. i. 201.

[a] Jacob. Liturg. p. 38, 53. ed. Fabric. Marci Liturg. 261, 273. Ordo Commun. Renaud. tom. ii. p. 4, 6, 18, 19. Mozarab. Miss. in Martene, tom. i. p. 470, 498. Dionys. Missal. ibid. p. 519. Prudent. Pontif. ibid. 528. Maysacens. Missal. ibid. 538. conf. 591, 601.

[b] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 283. alias p. 288. Brett's Remarks on Review, p. 139.

considering man must see, that those *low* notions of *spiritual* sacrifice (very different from the elevated *ideas* which *Scripture* and Catholic *antiquity* every where inculcate) can have no good aspect upon *practical* religion. As to the pretence of "raising "the dignity of the Sacrament[c]," by a *material* sacrifice, it is marvellous that any man of moderate discernment can entertain such a thought: for the *reverse* is the certain truth. The *dignity* of the holy Sacrament must infallibly *suffer*, if so *mean*, so *unprimitive* a sacrifice should ever be admitted into it. The *ancients* constantly preserved the *dignity* of the Eucharist, by supporting the *dignity* of *spiritual* sacrifices: if *moderns* will submit to learn of them, they will use the same *effectual* methods, often proved and tried.

CHAP. II.

Shewing the EXCESSES *of the new Scheme, in* OVERVALUING *material Sacrifices.*

I. It is alleged, that "there is more *intrinsic* value in a *loaf* "*of bread* and a *flagon of wine*, than in all the *gold and silver in* "*the Indies;* because the former will for some time *support* our "*lives*, the other cannot do it of itself, but only as by the *consent* "of men, it has a *value* set upon it[d]." Upon which I observe, 1. That the argument proves too much: for, by the same argument, a flask of *air* would have more *intrinsic* value than all the rest put together; since *air* is absolutely *necessary* to support *life*, which none of the rest are. 2. The author observes elsewhere, that bloody sacrifices, *in themselves*, are of the *nobler sort*[e]; that is, have more *intrinsic* value: and yet David (a very wise and good man) disdained to offer *even such* to God, if they were to *cost him nothing*[f]. He measured the *value* of the *sacrifice* by the *self-denial*, the *respect*, and the *affection* of the *offerer*, shewn in part by the *costliness* of the offering. And indeed, when God did require *material* sacrifices at all, he required *costly* ones, of as many as could afford it. But what do our bread and wine cost a *whole* congregation? What the *communicants*, who, perhaps, are not one half of the whole? What does the *quota* of any single communicant amount to? Besides that, in reality, we *give* God nothing: we take all to *ourselves*, though not all of it

[c] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 283.
[d] Ibid. part ii. p. 62.
[e] Johnson, Propit. Oblat. p. 10.
[f] 2 Sam. xxiv. 24.

provided at our own proper cost or charge. Was there ever such a *sacrifice* known or thought on, either among Jews or Gentiles, since the world stood? Or were the *primitive* Christians ever charged with any thing of this kind?

II. It is pretended further, that this material oblation is of "greater value than ourselves[g]." Impossible, if we ourselves are the *offerers*[h]: for it is a clear and uncontestable maxim, (as I have hinted above,) that the value of a *sacrifice* can never rise higher than the value of the *sacrificers*. Upon the strength of which maxim our very learned and judicious Dean Field did not scruple to intimate, that if a man could be supposed to sacrifice even *Christ* our Lord, it would not be so valuable as the sacrifice of *himself*[i]. The same principle is confirmed by the united voices of the *ancients*, who always looked upon *self-sacrifice* as the most *valuable* of any[k]. They had good reason to think so, if either our Lord's *example*, or St. Paul's authority[l], or the nature of the thing itself can be of any weight.

III. It is pretended, that the bread and wine are the most *excellent* and *valuable* sacrifice, because "they are in mystery "and inward power, though not in substance, the body and "blood of Christ, and therefore the most sublime and divine "sacrifice that men or angels can offer[m]:" they are *enriched*, *replenished*, *overshadowed* by the Holy Spirit, and by such *Divine influence* rendered the *body* and *blood* in *efficacy* and *virtue*, receiving by the Spirit a *life-giving* power[n].

[g] Johnson, Propit. Oblat. p. 107.

[h] That *we* are the *offerers* (and not *Christ*, as the Romanists absurdly pretend) is allowed by Dr. Hickes, who says, "As the *congregation* offer-"ed, so it *consecrated* and *performed* "the whole eucharistical service, by "the *ministration* of the *priest*; who "therefore always administered in the "*plural* number—*προσφέρομέν σοι*, "*we offer*," &c. *Christian Priesth.* vol. i. pref. Account, p. 22, 23.

The Romanists themselves allowed it, a few years before the Council of Trent; as appears from Alphonsus a Castro. Hæres. lib. x. fol. 214. edit. A. D. 1549.

Sacerdos, *in persona Ecclesiæ*, præsentat Deo Patri oblationem factam per Filium in ara crucis. Compare Field, p. 210. and Spalatensis, lib. v. c. 6. p. 282.

[i] Field on the Church, p. 209.

[k] Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 836, 848, 849, 860. Origen, tom. ii. p. 364. ed. Bened. Cyprian, Ep. 76. p. 232. alias Ep. 77. p. 159. Euseb. Demonst. p. 40. Basil, tom. iii. p. 207. ed. Bened. Nazianzen, tom. i. p. 38. Hilarius, p. 154. ed. Bened. Chrysost. tom. v. p. 20, 231, 316, 503. tom. vii. p. 216. ed. Bened. Augustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. xix. c. 23. lib. x. c. 20. ed. Bened. Procopius, in Isa. p. 22. Gregor. M. Dial. iv. c. 59.

[l] Rom. xii. 1. Phil. ii. 17. 2 Tim. iv. 6.

[m] Johnson, Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 60. compare 67, 141.

[n] Johnson, ibid. p. 171. Note, That *overshadowing* is peculiar to *Baptism*: for because it is said, that a man must be *born of water and of the Spirit*, the Fathers sometimes fol-

To which I answer, 1. That it is certainly a valuable *Sacrament:* and what the author here enumerates may shew the value of what *God gives to us*, not the value of what *we give to him* in it. The *Spirit,* which is supposed to make all the *value*, is what *God gives* to us in the Eucharist, not what *we give* to God: for it cannot be supposed that we *sacrifice* the *Holy Spirit.* So that all that the author has here said, however pertinent to the *sacramental* part of the Eucharist, is foreign to the *sacrificial,* and can add little to the *value* of it. It is but consecrated *bread* and *wine* still that we are supposed to *sacrifice;* unless we take in Christ's *natural body* to enrich the sacrifice, which would be *Popery;* or else the *Divine Spirit,* which is worse. 2. Besides, it is certain, that the baptismal *waters* are as much *enriched, replenished, overshadowed* by the Holy Spirit, and have the same (if not greater) *life-giving* power, and yet they are no *sacrifice* at all. 3. I have before hinted, that no sacrifice which *we* can *offer* can be more *valuable* than *ourselves:* and therefore all this pompous train of words must come to nothing. 4. The notion of the *Spirit's* coming upon the elements, to make them *absolutely* the body, is a *gross* notion; arising only from a *popular* form of speech[o], and not consistent with the *true* and *ancient* doctrine, that the *unworthy* eat not the *body* nor drink the *blood* of Christ in the Eucharist[p]: neither have they the communion or fellowship of the *Holy Spirit.* It is not sufficient here to say, that they *do receive* the Spirit, but receive *no benefit*, because they *resist* or *quench* the Spirit: for being "guilty of the body and "blood of the Lord," in the very act, (1 Cor. xi. 27,) there is no room to suppose that in that very act they receive *motions of grace:* and if they receive none, there are none to be *quenched.* Or if, on the contrary, they were certain to receive the *kindly motions* of the Spirit in the very act, who should forbid the *unworthy* coming to receive *motions of grace?* This *evasion* therefore will not answer the purpose. The Spirit *deserts* ill men in

lowed the *figure,* in describing the *new birth.* The Spirit is *quasi maritus;* the water is *marita,* and *fœcundata,* and therefore styled *unda genitalis.* The Holy Ghost *overshadows;* the water *brings forth;* and the *holy thing* born is the *new Christian.* How to adapt the same *figure* to the Eucharist, I see not; nor how to apply it to the purpose of *sacrifice.*

[o] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 530, 601, 609, 680, 682, 688.

[p] Review, vol. iv. p. 579. Ostensum est Dominum *recedere* cum negatur, nec immerentibus ad salutem prodesse quod sumitur, quando gratia salutaris in cinerem, *sanctitate fugiente,* mutetur. *Cyprian. de Laps.* p. 214. ed. Bened.

their *sinful* acts: therefore the *unworthy* do not receive the *Spirit*, but the *elements* only: therefore again, they receive not the *body;* because without the *Spirit*, the elements, *ex hypothesi*, are not the *body* and *blood*, but bare elements, having a *relative* holiness, because before *consecrated*, and that is all. 5. If the bread and wine once *consecrated* were *absolutely* the *body* and *blood*, by means of the *Spirit*, there is no reason why the baptismal waters should not be thought Christ's blood *absolutely*, by means of the same *Spirit*. It is certain, from the nature of the thing, and it is confirmed by the concurring verdict of antiquity [q], that we are as properly *dipped* in the *blood* of Christ in Baptism, as we *eat* the *body* and *blood* of Christ in the Eucharist. Therefore the baptismal *water* is as *valuable* as the eucharistical *wine*, and as fit to make a *sacrifice* of; and it is also *commemorative* of the *death* and *passion:* consequently the *elements* in either Sacrament, being blessed with like *privileges*, and having the like *dignity*, have all of them, in that view, the same title, and ought *all of them* to be *sacrifices*, as much as *any*.

IV. It is further pretended, that the consecrated bread and wine are *changed*, if not in their substance, yet in their *inward qualities* [r]: which appears to be *sound* only, without *meaning;* or *words* without *ideas*. When *water* is said to have been miraculously *changed* into *wine*, the words carry some idea of an *internal* change of qualities: but when *wine* remains *wine* still, not changed as to *colour*, or *taste*, or *smell*, or any other *perceivable* quality, it is hard to say what that *inward* change means, or what *idea* it carries with it. *Outward* relations, *adventitious* uses or offices, are easily understood; and *relative* holiness carries some sense in it [s]: but the *inward* change, the *inhering*, *intrinsic* holiness, supposed in this case, will not comport either with true *philosophy* or sound *theology*. Whatever it means, or whatever it is conceived to be, certain it is, that it belongs as much to the *consecrated* waters of *Baptism* [t] as to the *consecrated* elements of the Eucharist: and so let it pass.

V. The most important paradox of all, relating to this head, is, that the consecrated elements are the *substitutes* of the body

[q] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 694. and to the references in the margin add, Salmasius contr. Grot. p. 186, 191, 394. and Patrick's Full View of the Eucharist, p. 82.

[r] Grabe, Defens. Eccl. p. 75, 87, 20, 85, 91. Johnson. Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 254, 255. alias p. 258, 259, 163, 181, 183, 244. first edit.

[s] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 528.

[t] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 693, 694.

and blood; are *sacrificed* first, and afterwards *taken* by the communicants *in lieu* of the *natural* body and blood, or of the *sacrifice of the cross*[u]. "The eucharistical bread and wine are made "the most perfect and consummate *representatives* of the body "and blood.—They are not only *substituted*, but they are, by the "*power* of the *Spirit* which is communicated *to them*,—made the "*lively, efficacious* Sacrament of his body and blood.—The *visible* "material *substitutes*—are the bread and wine: and when the "Holy Spirit, which is his *invisible representative*, communicates "its *power* and *presence* to the symbols, which are his *visible* "*representatives*, they do thereby become as full and *authentic* "*substitutes*, as it is possible for them to be[x]. The sacramental "body and blood of Christ are *substituted* instead of the natural, "and are therefore first to be *presented* to the most worthy "party in the covenant, the infinite *grantor* of all mercies, and "then, in the next place, to the least worthy persons, or the "*grantees*, the whole body of Christian people[y]." How to make any clear sense or consistency of these or the like *positions*, I know not; but they seem to be embarrassed with insuperable perplexities. 1. The notion of *substitute*, as here applied, appears unaccountable. The *sacramental* body is supposed to be *substituted* for the *natural*, so as to be exclusively an *equivalent* for it, made such consummate *proxy*, *substitute*, *representative*, by the *power* and *presence* of the Holy Spirit *with it* and *in it*. This is the notion, if I can understand it. And if this be the notion, it is very different from the *old notion* of *instruments* of *investiture*, or *deeds* of *conveyance*, supposed to convey instrumentally some other thing[z], but not to be so given *in lieu* of it, as to *exclude* it, or *supersede* it, or to supply the *want* of it[a]. The rights, privileges, honours, offices, so conveyed, are supposed to go *with* the

[u] Johnson, Propit. Oblat. p. 29, 30, 44, 76.

[x] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 183. alias p. 186. Compare p. 344. alias 349. and p. 176. alias 179.

[y] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part i. Pref. to second edit.

[z] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 571, 572, 573.

[a] For were it so, then the *inward part*, or *thing signified*, would not be our *Lord's body*, but a *fictitious body* given in its room: and if made such body *absolutely*, by an *union* with the Spirit, it would be more properly the *body* of the *Spirit*, than our *Lord's body*, from which it is supposed distinct: and in this way, the *very* idea of our *mystical union* with Christ's *glorified body* would be obscured or lost, and we should be but as *aliens* from his *proper body*; unless *two bodies* of Christ (not *sign* and *thing*, but *absolutely* two bodies, for the *sacramental* is said to be *absolutely* the body) were given at once in the Eucharist.

pledges, and not to be made up to the grantee by an *equivalent*. The *pledges* (a *ring*, suppose, or *book*, or *parchment*, or *staff*) are worthless things *in themselves*, and are valuable only for what *accompanies* them, not for what they really *inclose* or *contain*. In a word, such pledges are not *exclusively* given *in lieu* of the *things* which they are pledges of, (for then the party would be no richer for them than the bare *pledges* amount to,) but such a *manner* of delivery is made *in lieu* of another *manner;* and the *pledge* and *thing* go together[b]. In the Eucharist, for example, Christ's crucified body and blood shed (that is, his *atonement* and *sacrifice*) are spiritually *eaten* and *drank*, under the *pledges* of corporal refreshment: and even the *glorified* body is *received* into real, but *mystical* union, under the same symbols. Those symbols, with what they contain, are not *substitutes*, in the sense of *equivalents* for the things, to *supersede* them; but they are *instruments* to *convey* them, and to bring them in effect to us. 2. It is not easy to explain how the supposed *substitutes* can be any *sacrifice* at all to God. The elements are not conceived *substitutes* of the *body* and *blood*, any otherwise than by the *power* and *presence* of the Spirit. The elements, *with* the Spirit, (not *separate* from the *Spirit*, which alone renders them so *valuable*,) are supposed the *substitutes*. Is the *Spirit* then *sacrificed* along with the elements? That is *absurd*. But if the *Spirit* makes no part of the thing sacrificed, the *value* departs from it, yea, and the *essence* of the substitutes; for the *body* and *blood*, that is, the *substitutes*, are not sacrificed, but the *elements* only. If it be said, that *grace* or *virtue* accompanies the elements, in the *presenting* them to *God*, like as in the presenting the same elements to *man;* this again is perfectly *unintelligible*. We can understand that *pardon* and *sanctification* are presented to the communicants

[b] See Review, vol. iv. p. 572. N. B. A thing may be said to be given *in lieu*, or *instead* of another thing, two ways: 1. In a sense *exclusive;* as when a *stone*, suppose, is given instead of *bread*, or a *serpent* instead of *fish:* where neither the *fish* nor the *bread* are supposed to be given, nor any thing *equivalent*. To the same *exclusive* sense belongs the giving *value* for *kind;* as *money*, suppose, instead of *house* or *land:* where again neither the *house* nor the *land* is supposed to be given, but an *equivalent* in *money*. 2. But one thing is also said to be given in *lieu* of another thing, in an *inclusive* or *accumulative* sense; as when *deeds* are delivered *instead* of an *estate*, which is given *with* them and *by* them. Here, in strictness, the deeds are not *substitutes* or *equivalents* for the *estate:* but one *form of delivery*, which is practicable and easy, is substituted and accepted, instead of *another form*, which the principal thing given is not capable of. In this *latter inclusive* sense, the symbols of the Eucharist may be called *substitutes*, but not in the *former*.

along with the symbols: but how *pardon* and *sanctification* should be presented, in the way of *sacrifice*, to God, is not easy to explain. 3. I must here also observe, that whatever those *substitutes* mean, the baptismal *waters* have as clear a claim, in that case, as the eucharistical *elements* can have: they are as certainly *substituted* in the sense of *pledges*, and in a *sacramental* way, as the other can be supposed to be. But it never was the intention of either *Sacrament*, that we should, in a *sacrificial* way, present to God *as much* or *the same* that God gives to us[c]. I see not the *sense* or the *modesty* of pretending to it. *Spirit, pardon, grace*, we may be glad to *receive;* but we have no right, no pretence, no power to *offer* the same in sacrifice. It is neither practicable nor conceivable; it is mere confusion: which confusion arises, partly, from the want of distinguishing between what is *in* the elements, from what comes *with* them; and partly, from the not distinguishing between the *sacramental* view of the Eucharist and the *sacrificial;* or between the *gifts of God* to man, and the *gifts of man* to God. The elements are in effect the body *to us*, because God gives us the body *by* and *with* the elements: but they are not in effect the body *to God;* because we do not give to God the *fruits* of the body *crucified*, or the *privileges* of the body *glorified*. A man must have very *confused* sentiments, who can argue from what we *receive*, in this case, to what we *give* as a *sacrifice*.

CHAP. III.

Pointing out some Excesses *in relation to our Lord's supposed Sacrifice in the Eucharist.*

I. IT is pretended, that our blessed Lord offered up his *sacramental body*, that is, the *consecrated elements*, as a material sacrifice in the Eucharist[d]. Now, in the first place, I find no *Scripture proof* of this position. The Romanists, in support of the *general* point of a *material* or *sensible* sacrifice, have often taken their tour from Melchizedek in Genesis down to Hebrews the xiiith and 10th. And they have as often been pursued, in

[c] Some such *confuse* notion appears more than once in the Propitiatory Oblation, p. 27, 43. Comp. Preface to second edit. of Unbloody Sacrifice, and Advertisement, p. 498. Brevint takes notice of the like *confusion* in the conception of some Romanists upon this article. Depth and Myst. p. 20.

[d] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrifice, part i. p. 85, 90, 92, edit. 2nd, part ii. p. 1, 3, 6, 7, 178, 246, 242, et passim.

like order, by the best-learned Protestants[e], and forced out of all their entrenchments.

The plea from *hoc facite*, when first set up, was abundantly answered by a very learned Romanist: I mean the excellent Picherell[f], who wrote about 1562, and died in 1590. Protestants also[g] have often confuted it; and the Papists themselves, several of them, have long ago given it up. The other boasted plea, drawn from the use of the *present tense*, in the words of the institution, has been so often refuted and exposed[h], that I cannot think it needful to call that matter over again, in an age of so much light and learning. The fairest pretences from *antiquity* have likewise been again and again fully answered, mostly by the same hands. Wherefore, let that be my apology for not taking distinct notice of every particular advanced by the late learned Mr. Johnson; who has but little of *moment*, which had not been completely *obviated* on one side (as it had been *anticipated* on the other side) long before he wrote in this cause. He was indeed a stranger to what had been done; because he had resolved and determined from the first so to be, and held to his resolution all along; as he frankly declared in 1714, and again in 1724[i]. I commend not his *rule* nor his *conduct* in that particular. *Wise* men will be always glad to see what *wise* men have said before them, in any point of controversy, and will not think themselves so *perfectly secure* against mistaking the sense either of *Scripture* or *Fathers*, as to need no *counsellors* to assist them, nor any *eyes* but their *own*[k]. It was not right to imagine, that in 200 years time, or nearly, (in a question very frequently

[e] Chemnitius, Rainoldes, Bilson, Hospinian, Duplessis, Mason, Spalatensis, Montague, Morton, Albertinus, Johan. Forbesius, Brevint, Towerson, Kidder, Payne.

[f] Picherellus, p. 63, 136.

[g] Johan. Forbesius, p. 616. Mornæus, p. 212. Salmasius contr. Grot. p. 444. Albertinus, p. 498, 509. Morton, b. vi. ch. 1. p. 390. Towerson, p. 276. Brevint, Depth and Myst. p. 128. Payne, p. 9, &c. Pfaffius, p. 186, 220, 259, 269.

[h] Picherellus, p. 62, 138. Spalatensis, p. 278. Mason, p. 614. Morton, b. vi. ch. 1. p. 394. Albertinus, p. 74, 76, 78, 119. Johan. Forbesius, p. 617. Brevint, p. 128. Kidder and Payne. Pfaffius, p. 232, 233.

[i] "It was my resolution from the "beginning, to take my measures and "information from *antiquity* only, and "therefore not to look into any of "those books that had been written, "either by those of the Church of "Rome for their corrupted sacrifice, "or by the Protestants against it: "and I can truly say, I have most "firmly and religiously observed this "rule, which I at first proposed to "myself." *Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif.* pref. epist. p. 39. first and second edit.

[k] Of the use and necessity of consulting *moderns*, (as well as ancients,) see Review, vol. iv. p. 463—465. To neglect *moderns*, in such cases, is really nothing else but preferring *one modern* to all the rest, and claiming to be

canvassed by the best-learned men,) nothing had been thought on, nothing done, towards *clearing* the point; more than what a single writer might do at once, with a *Bible* only and some *Fathers* before him. I should not wonder if the strongest genius, walking by such a *rule*, should commit abundance of mistakes in the management of a controversy of any considerable *compass* or *delicacy*, such as this is. But I pass on.

It is certainly of some moment, that so learned and judicious a man as Picherellus (critically skilled in *Scripture* and *Fathers*, and under no bias, except it were to the Romish Church, in which he lived and died,) should so expressly and fully declare against our Lord's offering any *expiatory* sacrifice in the Eucharist[l]. It is also of some moment, that the *current* opinion before the Council of Trent was against the *first* Eucharist's being an *expiatory* sacrifice; and that the Divines of Trent were almost *equally* divided upon that question; and that it was chiefly *fear* of the *consequences*, obvious to Protestants, which obliged the Council to controvert the then *current* persuasion[m]. It is not without its weight, that Jansenius, Bishop of Ghent, who died fourteen years after, was content to take in *spiritual* sacrifice, in order to make out some *sacrifice* in the *first* Eucharist[n]: as to which he judged very right; for undoubtedly our Lord so *sacrificed* in the Eucharist, and we do it now. But no proof has been given, nor ever can be given, of our Lord's *sacrificing the elements*. He might, yea, and did *offer* the elements for *consecration*, (which is very different from *sacrificing*, being done also in *Baptism*,) or he might present them as *signs* and *figures* of a *real* sacrifice, being also signs and figures of *real* body and blood: but as they were not the *real* body and blood which they represented, so neither were they the *real* sacrifice: neither can it be made appear that they were *any* sacrifice at all.

heard as an *interpreter* of Scripture and Fathers, at the same time *refusing* the favour of an *hearing* to every interpreter besides.

[l] Picherell, p. 134.

[m] See Jurieu, Hist. of the Council of Trent, p. 380.

[n] Dicendum est, quod, Christum in Cœna et Eucharistiæ institutione *sacrificium obtulisse*, primum quidem satis est significatum, cum dicitur *gratias egisse*. Gratiarum actio enim est *quoddam sacrificium*: a qua Christi actione Sacramentum corporis et sanguinis Domini habuit nomen illud ab initio Ecclesiæ, ut diceretur *Eucharistia*. Igitur cum gratiarum actio est *sacrificium*, et Sacramentum hoc dicatur et sit *Eucharistia*, (quod est *gratiarum actio*,) consequitur ex Christi *actione*, et *nomine* a Christi actione imposito, Sacramentum hoc esse *sacrificium*. Unde in canone dicitur *sacrificium laudis*: de quo Psalmista, *immola sacrificium laudis*, &c. *Jansenius, Comm. in Concord. Evang.* p. 904.

As the point now in question has not been *proved*, there is the less occasion to *disprove* it. *Want* of proof is sufficient reason for *rejecting* a position, according to the old rule, that the proof lies upon him that *affirms*. However, I may, *ex abundanti*, throw in one reason against it, which may be as good as a thousand, because it is *decisive*. If the elements were a *sacrifice* in the *first* Eucharist, as upon the principles lately advanced, then they were *given for remission of sins;* consequently were a *sin offering* and an *expiatory* sacrifice: which is directly repugnant to the whole tenor of the New Testament, every where ascribing *true* expiation solely to the death of Christ. It is in vain to plead, that this other sacrifice expiated *in virtue* of what it represented. The *blood* of *bulls* and of *goats* represented Christ's sacrifice, and expiated, so far as they did expiate, *in virtue* of it: yet St. Paul plainly teaches, that it was *not possible*, in the very nature of the thing, for those *secondary* sacrifices to "take away sins[o]," that is, to make *true* and *spiritual* expiation. They might *atone* (and that *in virtue* of the grand atonement) for *legal* offences, or *typical* sins, and might sanctify to the "purifying of the flesh[p]," procuring some *temporal* blessings, which were figures and shadows of *eternal:* but more than that they could not do. *True* expiation always rested *immediately* and *solely* in the *prime* sacrifice. And the *secondary* sacrifices could avail no further, by any *virtue* whatever, than to *secondary*, that is, *typical* and *temporal* expiation. Now, as we have no *typical expiation* at all under the Gospel, nor look for any remission but what is *spiritual*, and "pertaining to the conscience[q];" it is exceeding plain, that the remission of the Eucharist resolves *immediately* and *entirely* into the *prime* and *grand* sacrifice, and not into any supposed *elemental* sin offering. Neither indeed is there any such thing under the Gospel; it being one of the great Gospel privileges to have *immediate* access to the *true* expiation, and not to be kept, as it were, at a *distance* from it, by the intervention of secondary sacrifices, or secondary expiations[r].

Such most certainly is the doctrine of *Scripture* and of all *antiquity:* and our own excellent Liturgy was altogether formed upon it. Accordingly we never ask remission on account of any expiatory sacrifice but *Christ's* alone; never conclude our prayers (no, not even in the *Communion service*) *through the sin offering of the Eucharist*, but *through Jesus Christ our Lord:* that

[o] Heb. x. 4. [p] Heb. ix. 13. [q] Heb. ix. 9. [r] See above, p. 148, 149.

is, through his *merits*, solely and immediately, and his *sacrifice*, not through any sacrifice of our *own*: which would be both *superstitious* and *profane*.

If the reader would see the sense of the *ancients*, with respect to the words of institution, "body given and blood shed for "remission of sins," he may turn to Albertinus[s], who produces a long list of ancients[t], (besides a multitude of moderns, Schoolmen and Romanists[u],) all interpreting the words, not of the *sacramental* body and blood given in the Eucharist, but of the *real* body and blood which were to be given upon the *cross*. I may add one more, older than any of them, namely, Tertullian; who does not only so interpret the words, but occasionally mentions it as a very great *absurdity*, to interpret the "body given "for you," of the "bread given:" inasmuch as it would amount to saying, that the *bread* was to be *crucified* for us[x]. These things considered, we may take leave to conclude, that the notion of Christ's offering the *consecrated* elements as a *sacrifice*, may justly be numbered among the unwarrantable *excesses* of some few moderns, who did not well consider what they were doing.

II. It is pretended further, that such sacrifice of the *consecrated* elements, or *sacramental* body and blood, was our Lord's *most solemn act of his Melchizedekian priesthood*. Indeed, to make out this Melchizedekian offering, sometimes our Lord's sacrificing *himself* along with the symbols is taken in[y]: but I wave the consideration of that *additional* part at present, designing to treat of it separately in the next article. The sacrifice of the *consecrated* symbols by itself, must, upon the foot of the *new* scheme, be reckoned Melchizedekian; as well because *our* eucharistical sacrifice (which is not of the *natural* body, but of the

[s] Albertinus, p. 78. Compare 74, 119. And Bishop Morton, b. i. part 3. p. 112. b. vi. ch. i. p. 394, &c. ch. viii. p. 475, &c.

[t] Origen, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Jerome, Pelagius, Theodorit, Fulgentius, Ferrandus, Primasius, Pseud-Ambrose, Hesychius, Remigius, Sedulius, Bede, Isidorus, Claudius Taurinensis, Haymo, Euthymius, Theophylactus, Anselm.

[u] Aquinas, Hugo Cardinalis, Carthusianus, Titelmannus, Valentia, Salmeron, Sà, Jansenius, Cajetan, Vasquez, Maldonate, Barradas, Suarez, &c.

[x] Si propterea panem *corpus* sibi finxit, quia corporis carebat veritate; ergo *panem* debuit tradere *pro nobis*: faciebat ad vanitatem Marcionis, ut *panis crucifigeretur*. *Tertull. contr. Marc.* lib. iv. cap. 40. p. 571.

[y] "The Spirit by which they wrote "directed them——to represent our "Saviour, as now performing the "most solemn act of his Melchizedekian priesthood, and therefore as "offering *his body and blood* to God, "under the *symbols* of bread and "wine." *Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif.* part i. p. 83. alias 86.

sacramental only) is reputed Melchizedekian[z], as also because it is self-evident, that Melchizedek did not sacrifice the *natural* body of Christ, which was not then in being, but the *sacramental* only, if either. If therefore our Lord's sacrifice of *himself* in the *first* Eucharist be taken in to complete the *most solemn act*, then it must be said, that he offered *two* sacrifices in the Eucharist, and both of them Melchizedekian; of which I shall say more below, in the place proper for it. Our present concern is only with the sacrifice of the *consecrated* elements, considered as a Melchizedekian sacrifice, by itself.

I apprehend that it *has not*, and that it *cannot* be proved, that Melchizedek (so far as his priesthood, or the acts of it are recorded in Scripture) made any *expiatory*, or any *material* sacrifice at all. His *sacerdotal* function was described but *in part*, to make it the fitter type of *part* of our Lord's priesthood. Other parts of our Lord's priesthood were sufficiently *typified* by the Aaronical priesthood: but some further *type* was still wanting, to *typify* what Aaron's priesthood could not do. Aaron's typified the *transient* part, the *atoning* part; which was to be performed *once for all* by our Lord: but the *abiding* or *everlasting* part (viz. the distributing the *subsequent* or *permanent* benefits of that atonement) was not provided for in Aaron's priesthood, considered as *typical* of our Lord's, but was to be *typified* another way; namely, by the priesthood of Melchizedek, represented no further in Scripture than the reason of such type required. Melchizedek therefore was introduced, not as offering any *sacrifice of atonement*, (that was to be considered as *previously* executed,) but as conveying or applying, instrumentally, the subsequent *blessings* of that atonement. This was part of the *sacerdotal* office: and in respect of this part only, Melchizedek was introduced as a *priest*; to *typify*, as I said, the *permanent* part of our Lord's priesthood. *Types*, at the best, are but imperfect resemblances of their *antitypes* or *archetypes*: and therefore it is no wonder, if our Lord's priesthood (a complicated office) could not sufficiently be represented, whole and entire, by any single *type*, but might require *several*, and of different kinds, to represent it *distinctly*, as branched out into its *several* distinct particulars.

Whoever well considers in what manner Melchizedek is introduced in Genesis[a], and what is further said of him by the

[z] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 317. alias 322. [a] Gen. xiv. 18.

Psalmist[b] and by St. Paul[c], will easily perceive the truth of what I say. Melchizedek, therefore, so far as he is brought in for a *type*, did not *sacrifice* at all, (except it were in the *spiritual* way of *lauds*,) but he instrumentally conveyed to Abraham the *blessings* of the *grand sacrifice*; like as Christian ministers now do to the children of Abraham, that is, to all the *faithful*.

The ancient *Fathers*, who have often been wrongfully appealed to in this matter, by Papists in general, and by some Protestants, meant no more than what I have here said: though it would be tedious to enter into a detail of them[d]. They meant, that Melchizedek, by a *divine* instinct[e], foreseeing the *sacrifice of the cross*, offered to God, by way of *thanksgiving*, a mental, vocal, manual *representation* or *figuration* of it, by the *symbols* of bread and wine; and by the same *symbols*, instrumentally, conveyed to Abraham the spiritual *blessings* of it. This I observe of those Fathers who make the most of what Melchizedek did: but the Fathers of the first two centuries and a half say nothing expressly of his *offering to God* any thing, (whether in a *spiritual* way or otherwise,) but only of his *feasting* Abraham and his family. As to the *later* Fathers, some of them speak with the same reserve as the more *ancient* Fathers did; others are more explicit: but none of them, I conceive, went further than what I have mentioned. Upon the whole therefore, their testimonies are altogether foreign to the point of *sacrificing* the *elements*, being that they were not considered as *sacrifices*, but as *figures* of a sacrifice, and *instruments* of a thanksgiving service.

What Mr. Johnson has pleaded in favour of his notion had been sufficiently *obviated* by Picherell[f], among the Romanists, long before; and by many judicious Protestants[g] after him. The same has been confuted by the learned Pfaffius[h] since; as also by

[b] Psalm cx. 4.

[c] Heb. v. 6, 10, 11. vi. 20. vii. 1—24.

[d] The ancients referred to on this article are, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, Eusebius, Julius Firmicus, Epiphanius, Philastrius, Ambrosius, Chrysostom, Jerome, Pelagius, Austin, Isidorus Pelusiota, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodorit, Leo Magnus, Arnobius junior, Cæsarius of Arles, Cassiodorus, Primasius, Isidorus Hispalensis, Damascene, Pseud-Athanasius, Pseudo-Cyprianus, Pseud-Ambrosius, Paschasius Radbertus, Œcumenius, Theophylact, Euthymius, Potho Prumiensis; and perhaps more.

[e] Vid. Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. v. cap. 3. p. 243.

[f] Picherell, p. 116, 135, 333, &c.

[g] Jewel, Answ. to Harding, p. 425. Peter Martyr, Loc. Comm. p. 895. Bilson, p. 702. Spalatensis, p. 272. Mason, p. 557. Gul. Forbesius, p. 672. second edit. Jackson, vol. ii. p. 955. vol. iii. p. 305. Morton, b. vi. Brevint, Depth and Myst. p. 107, &c. 135. Outram, p. 228. Kidder and Payne. Albertinus, p. 199, 200.

[h] Pfaffius, p. 196, 278, 321, 323.

the reverend and learned Mr. Lewis, in a small tract[i], containing much in a little; close, clear, and judicious, published in 1714.

The sum then is, that if our Lord's performances in the *first* Eucharist were such as Melchizedek performed, (by the accounts which *Scripture* and *antiquity* give of them,) they amounted only to a *spiritual* sacrifice of *lauds*, a *representation* of the sacrifice to be made *upon the cross*, and a *distribution* of the *benefits* and *blessings* of that sacrifice to his disciples.

III. It is pretended, that our Lord did not only sacrifice his *sacramental* body in the Eucharist, but his *natural* body besides, sacrificed *both* in the same act[k]. This refinement of the *material* scheme was not thought on (so far as appears) before 1714, and then hardly submitted to, after much reluctance, by the learned Dr. Hickes; and not well relished by *others* on the material side, whom Mr. Johnson complained of in 1720[l]. However, the "strength of the cause" was now made to "depend in a great "measure," upon that "matter of fact," (as it is called[m],) advanced without *proof*, or so much as *appearance* of proof; excepting the precarious argument drawn from the *present tense*, mentioned above; and except another as slight an argument drawn from John xvii. 20. taken with some obscure testimonies of Fathers; which at most prove only that our Lord *devoted* himself in the Eucharist or elsewhere, *before* his passion, to be an *expiatory sacrifice* on the cross: not that he *sacrificed himself*, in the expiatory sense, before. A person's *devoting* himself in order to be such a sacrifice, is not *performing* the sacrifice, any more than *engaging* to do a thing is *actually* doing it[n]. So slender are the proofs of this *new* notion. But let us see what *self-contradictions* and other *absurdities* it contains in it, or carries with it.

1. It is supposed to be the most solemn act of the Melchizedekian priesthood; though it is certain that Melchizedek neither so sacrificed *himself*, nor our Lord's *natural* body or blood, not then existing.

[i] Lewis, Answ. to Unbl. Sacrif. p. 18—23.

[k] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 49, 83, 118. first edit. alias 51, 86, 122. second edit. part ii. p. 6—10.

[l] Johnson, Saxon Laws, pref. p. 56.

[m] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part ii. p. 272.

[n] Of this see Dr. Turner's Christian Eucharist no proper Sacrifice, p. 19, &c. Field's words in the like case are very applicable here: "This "proveth not a *real* sacrifice of Christ. "—For his blood is not *poured* out, "neither is he *slain indeed*. As in "the time of the old Law, if the priest "reaching forth his hand to slay the "beast that was brought to be sacri-"ficed, had been so hindered by some-"thing interposing itself, that he "could not *slay* the same, he had "*offered no sacrifice*, but *endeavoured* "only so to do, so is it here." *Field*, p. 207.

Put *engaged* for *endeavoured*, and the argument is much the same.

2. It supposes *two* expiatory sacrifices made by our Lord in the Eucharist; one of the *sacramental* body, and the other of the *real:* this the author seems to own, thinking he has some colour for it in Hebrews ix. 23. where St. Paul (he says) calls the offering made by Christ *sacrifices*, in the *plural* number[o]. As to the construction of that text, I am content to refer to *commentators*, not suspecting that so forced and strange a sense is at all likely to gain many followers: the *hypothesis* itself must be better supported, before any such odd meaning of that text can be admitted. But what shall we do with those *two* sacrifices of our Lord's in the Eucharist? They agree not with the words of institution, "This is my body:" which should rather have run, This is my *two bodies*, my *sacramental* one, and my *natural:* and so likewise the words, "This is my blood." Then again, those *two* sacrifices, being both *expiatory*, both given for the "life "of the world," there would be two *propitiations*, two *expiations;* and we shall want to know what was the precise *value* of this, and what of *that*, and whether they differed in value as *finite* and *infinite;* or whether they were of *equal* worth.

It is pleaded, that they were both but *one oblation:* which is resembled to a *deed of gift*, where, by delivery of a *parchment*, lands or houses are conveyed; and it is further likened to a man's *presenting* to God *houses*, &c. by a piece of *money*, or a pair of *gloves*[p]. But this account will not tally. 1. Because the *sacramental* body is supposed to be a complete *substitute*[q], made so by the *Holy Spirit;* which therefore must be a great deal more than a *pledge* or *earnest* of the *natural*, being itself absolutely *Christ's body*, and invested with the like *power* and *efficacy*. So here were *two* sacrifices of *like* power and efficacy, and therefore of *like value*, as it seems: there were *principal* and *proxy*, the *thing* itself and the *equivalent*, both together, though they mutually *superseded* each other[r]. The first of them seems to be advanced, in order to make our Lord's two sacrifices look like *one sacrifice;* and the second, to the end that *ours*, which is but *one* of the *two*, and *infinitely* slighter, may yet look as considerable to us now, as *both* his then were to his disciples[s]. But

[o] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part ii. pref. p. 5.

[p] Johnson, Saxon Laws, Pref. 57.

[q] See above, p. 159.

[r] Ibid.

[s] N. B. As there are two *inconsistent* accounts here tacked together, in order to serve two *different* purposes, so it is observable, that *different* reasons, in different places, have been

if the *elemental* sacrifice be considered only as *gloves* or *parchment* in comparison, notwithstanding all its *inherent* virtues and *enrichings* of the Spirit, then it is not a *substitute* in the sense contended for, nor of any considerable *value;* so that instead of calling it a *substitute* or a *sacrifice*, we may better call it a *sign* or *figure* of our Lord's sacrifice, or at most a *pledge, earnest*, or *token* of our *own*. I here take it for granted, that our Lord's *elemental* sacrifice was at least as good as *ours* can be supposed to be: and if even *his* was but as *gloves* or *parchment*, (comparatively speaking,) *ours*, at this day, can be no more; and if so, it does not appear worth the contending for, while we have an *infinitely better* sacrifice to trust to, and to rest our *expiation* upon.

3. There is no more proof made that our Lord in the Eucharist *consigned* his *natural* body to be *broken*, and his *natural* blood to be *shed*, than that he consigned the same to be *then* and *there* eaten and drank. It is allowed, that *what was given for them* in the Eucharist, *was* also *given to them;* and *what was given to them*, that *they received*[t]. If therefore our Lord *then* and *there* gave his *natural* body and blood for them, they *then* and *there* received the same *natural* body and blood: but if he *gave* them not, no *transfer*, no *sacrifice* was yet made of them. It is argued, "if the "bread and wine were" [in the Eucharist] "given to God, so "were Christ's natural body and blood too[u]:" by the same way of reasoning, if the bread and wine were in the Eucharist given to the disciples, so were Christ's natural body and blood too.

I know it is *denied* that Christ gave his *natural* body, in such a sense, to the Disciples, because of the glaring absurdity; and it is pleaded in that case, that our Saviour, in the institution, "said not one word of his natural body[x]." But why then is it

assigned for calling the elements the *body:* for when they are to be made *substitutes*, then the reason given for the *name* of body is, that they are in *power* and *effect*, by the *Spirit*, the *same* with the *archetypes*, the very *body* and *blood* which they represent. Part i. p. 177—212. But when it is to be proved, that Christ offered his *natural* body besides, then the reason why the elements are called *his body*, is quite another reason, viz. because he offered his *natural* body a sacrifice by and under the elements, as *symbols* or *pledges*. See part ii. pref. p. 2. I may note, that if the *last* reason were a true one, we could have no pretence now for calling the elements his *body;* because it is not our intention to *offer*, under the *symbols*, our Lord's *natural* body as a sacrifice for the sins of men: we cannot *sacrifice* Christ our Lord.

[t] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. p. 87. alias 91. part ii. p. 11.

[u] Johnson, Saxon Laws, pref. 57.

[x] See Brett's Discourse on the Eucharist, pref. p. 16. Answer to Plain Account, p. 41. Johnson, Propit. Oblat. p. 33.

pretended, from the same *institution*, that he *consigned* his *natural* body to God as a *sacrifice*[y]? If our Lord's *silence*, as to his *natural* body, is an argument that it was not then *given to* the Disciples, the same *silence* is as good an argument to prove that it was not then *given for them* to God: or if any words of the institution prove that the *natural* body was then *given for them*, the same words will equally prove, that it was also then *given to them* and *received* by them; and *orally* too, according to the *hypothesis* which I am here examining. To be short, upon the principles advanced to support the *material* sacrifice, it most evidently follows, either that the *natural* body was not *given to God* in the *first* Eucharist; or if it was, that it was *literally* given to the Disciples also, and *orally* received by them.

IV. Another paradox relating to this head is, "that our Sa-"viour *laid down his life*, when, by a free act of his will, he did "give his body and blood to God, in the Eucharist[z]." It might as *justly* and with as much *propriety* be said, that he was *crucified* at the table, or *died* at his last Supper. But the author, I presume, being sensible, that where our Lord "laid down his "life," there he *sacrificed himself*, and having conceived that the *sacrifice of himself* should be performed in the *Eucharist*, and there only; he was under a kind of necessity of maintaining, (pursuant to his other principles,) that our Lord "laid down his "life" in the Eucharist. The love of Christ towards us is sometimes expressed by his "laying down his life" for us[a]; and oftener by his "dying[b]" for us: which (besides the *general* use of the phrase of *laying down one's life*) is a more special argument with respect to this case, that the phrases are here *equivalent*. Let it be said then, that Christ was *crucified*, *slain*, *gave up the ghost*, or *resigned his spirit* in the Eucharist: indeed, they may any of them be as reasonably asserted, as that he literally *sacrificed himself* in the Eucharist.

Another learned writer, on the same side, chooses rather to say, that our Lord "laid down his life," when he *surrendered* himself to the band of soldiers[c]; which was after his last Supper: but if any person would undertake to justify such *new* construction of the phrase, he should produce some example to shew,

[y] See Johnson, part i. p. 64, 83. part ii. p. 4, 6, 7, 9, 272, 273.

[z] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part ii. p. 69.

[a] John x. 15, 17, 18. 1 John iii. 16.

[b] Rom. v. 6, 8. xiv. 9. 1 Cor. viii. 11. xv. 3. 2 Cor. v. 15. 1 Thess. v. 10.

[c] Brett's Answ. to Plain Account, p. 62, 75.

that any one has ever been said to have "laid down his life" without *dying*, or *before* he *died*. And yet if any such example could be produced, it would not fully come up to this particular case, because our blessed Lord, at the very last moment, when he resigned his soul, had it in his power to rescue himself from death, as well as he had power to *raise the dead*. His life *no man* could *wrest from him* at any time: neither was it taken till the very instant when he "laid it down of himself[d]," condescending to suspend his *Divine* power, or the exercise of it. But I shall have another occasion to say more of this matter under the following chapter.

CHAP. IV.

Pointing out some Excesses *in relation to the* Sacrifice of the Cross.

THE *sacrifice of the cross* is so momentous an article of the Christian religion, that we have great reason to be jealous of any attempt either to overturn it, or to undermine it. No such thing was ever formally attempted, that I know of, by any Divines of our Church, before 1718, when the *second* part of Unbloody Sacrifice appeared. The author himself, in his *first part*, had owned the *sacrifice* of the cross more than once[e], in *words* at least; though he then seems to have *scrupled*, in some measure, the use of the *phrase*, and to have been looking out for some *evasive* construction to put upon it. Afterwards, in some places, he ordered *mactation* to be read for *sacrifice*[f], or for *oblation*: and *mactation* at length became his usual expression for what we call the *sacrifice* of the cross. Let us examine his reasons or motives for this so important a *change* in Christian theology.

1. His first scruple seems to have been what he had hinted in the *first* edition of his *first* part, where he says, "By *sacrificed* "*on the cross*, we must then mean, that he was *slain* as an expi-"atory victim, and not that he *offered* himself as a Melchizede-"kian *priest*; for he declares that he did this in the *Eucharist*.

[d] John x. 18.

[e] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 12, 66, 68, 95. first edit. Propit. Oblat. p. 106.

N. B. Dr. Hickes all along owned the *sacrifice of the cross*. (Christ. Priesth. vol. i. p. 165.) So likewise Mr. Leslie, and Mr. Scandret, p. 4, 8, 157. Dr. Brett also, as late as 1713, which appears by his Sermon on the Christian Altar, &c. p. 18, 19. Though he adopted Mr. Johnson's new notions in or before 1720. Discourse, &c. p. 39.

[f] See Johnson, second part, p. 267.

"For *this*, says he, is *my body given* to God for you[g]." He adds afterwards, "It cannot be proved," that the Melchizedek in Genesis did offer *bloody* sacrifice[h]. This pretence is very slight; because it cannot be proved, by any thing said in Genesis, or any other part of Scripture, or by *antiquity, universality*, and *consent*, that Melchizedek *sacrificed* bread at all, or that he did any thing more (so far as he is brought in for a *type*) than what amounted to the *prefiguration* of the grand sacrifice, and an instrumental *conveyance* of the *blessings* of it[i]. However, as it is certain from *Scripture*, confirmed by *antiquity, universality*, and *consent*, that our Lord did offer himself a sacrifice *on the cross*, and that our Lord was not a priest of any *other* order but the order of Melchizedek, it most evidently follows, that such his sacrifice was so far Melchizedekian, was an act of that *priesthood* which was altogether Melchizedekian, and not Aaronical[k]. In the *strictest* sense, no *material* sacrifice, bloody or unbloody, no *active* sacrifice at all, (excepting the sacrifice of *lauds*,) can be Melchizedekian; for Melchizedek, as a *type*, *offered* nothing but *lauds* to God, and *blessings* to Abraham under visible *signs*: but as our Lord's priesthood was entirely Melchizedekian, and contained the *atoning* as well as *benedictory* part, it is manifest, that even the *atonement*, so considered, was Melchizedekian, as opposed to Aaronical. In short then, it must not be said that our Lord's sacrifice was *bloody*, and therefore not Melchizedekian; but it was Melchizedekian, though *bloody*[l], because it was our Lord's, who was of no other priestly order but the order of Melchizedek. It is a poor thought of the Romanists, and it is well exposed by Dean Brevint[m], that *bread* and *wine* are necessary to every act or exercise of the Melchizedekian priesthood: for as the notion is founded in *error*, so it terminates in *absurdity*. Our Lord had no *bread* to offer on the cross: neither has he any *bread* or *wine* to offer in heaven, where he *intercedes* as a priest in virtue of his sacrifice once offered, and *blesses* as a priest, and "abideth a "priest continually[n]." But I proceed.

2. The first and main scruple against the sacrifice of the cross

[g] Johnson, second part, p. 95.

[h] Ibid. p. 472.

[i] See above, p. 166, &c.

[k] Heb. vii. 11, 13, 14, 16, 17.

[l] N. B. It cannot be reasonably doubted but that Melchizedek offered *bloody* sacrifices, after the way of the ancient Patriarchs: only, that *part* of his *priesthood* was not mentioned; as there was no need to mention it, since the *benedictory* part of his priesthood was all that the type intended was concerned in, as I before intimated.

[m] Brevint, Depth and Mystery, &c. p. 116, 117, 118.

[n] Hebr. vii. 3.

being thus considered and confuted, there will be less difficulty with the rest, which are slighter, and which appear to have been invented purely to wait upon the other. A second scruple is, that our Lord could not, while alive, offer (unless it were under symbols) his body and blood, as *substantially separated;* because it appears not that *any blood* flowed from him till the *soldier* pierced him; but it is probable, that the "nails so filled the orifices," that "no blood could issue thence[o]." I shall venture to leave this ingenious speculation with the reader.

3. Against the *sacrifice of the cross*, it is pleaded, that to suppose it, "is to render the sacrifice of Christ a *bloody* one indeed; "so bloody, as that it cannot be reconciled to *purity* of any sort, "till *killing one's self* be esteemed a *virtue*[p]." The same argument, as lately revived by another gentleman, runs thus: "He "could not *offer himself a sacrifice* in any other manner than by "*symbols* or *representatives:* for had he in any manner *put him-*"*self to death,* he might have been too justly accused of *self-*"*murder*[q]." Sorry I am, that any thing of this kind, though only in the way of argument, should drop from serious and religious persons: and I was in some doubt with myself, whether I could *prudently* or *reverently* repeat it, though in order only to *confute* it. But who can any longer bear to have that *most precious sacrifice*, upon which all our hopes and all our comforts depend, treated in a manner far from becoming it? Why must Christ's laying *down his life* be so invidiously, so injuriously called *putting himself to death?* To *resign his life*, or voluntarily *to submit to death*, is one thing: to *put himself to death* is quite another, differing as *active* disobedience from *passive* obedience. But though he was *passively* obedient, in submitting to *suffer*, *bleed*, and *die* for us, it does not therefore follow, that he exercised no *act* of *offering*, or that he made no *active* sacrifice on the cross. It was his *own choice* to submit to the will of his enemies, and his *choosing* so to *suffer*, so to be *passive*, for the honour of God and the salvation of men, was the *divinest* act and exercise of true *piety* and *philanthropy*. It was *active* virtue, as all *choice*

[o] Johnson, Unbl. Sac. pref. p. 4, 5.

[p] Ibid. part ii. p. 70.

[q] Brett's Answ. to plain Acc. p. 66. One might here make use of Tertullian's argument against Marcion, (cited above, p. 165,) with a very little change. "If our Lord made for "himself a *body of bread*, to be sacri-"ficed, because he could not offer "himself in any other manner than "by *symbols*, then was bread *given* "*for the life of the world*, and bread "should have been *crucified* for us."

(whether to do or to suffer) is equally *active*, an *act* of the will, and a *work*[r]. He thus *actively* offered on the cross his *body*, his *blood*, his *soul*, his *life* to God; choosing not to *kill*, but to be *killed*; not to *slay*, but to be *slain*: and by such *act* of submission and resignation to the will of God, he made himself a voluntary *sacrifice*, in his death, for the sins of mankind. This is the plain doctrine of the Gospel, which every one that runs may read: and it is confirmed by as *early*, as *universal*, and as *constant* a tradition for fifteen centuries or more, as any point of Christian doctrine whatsoever; from Barnabas, Clemens, and Ignatius[s], down even to Socinus of the sixteenth century. It would be tedious to enter into the detail of *authorities*; neither can it, I presume, be necessary. I shall only hint further, that from the third century and downwards, *altar of the cross*[t] has been the current language: one certain argument, among many, that the *sacrifice* was supposed to be made *upon the cross*. And such also is the language of the Greek and Oriental liturgies[u].

It is very wrong to suggest that our Lord was merely *passive* in laying down his life, because *nature was spent*, and because he had been *half dead before*, and the like[x]; as if any *violence* of death could have *wrested* his soul from *him*, the Lord of life, as it may *ours*. Our *older* and *better* divinity may be seen in the learned and judicious Bp. Bilson, who confirmed the same both by *Scripture* and *Fathers*. It ran thus: "The conjunction of the *human* "nature with the *Divine*, in the person of Christ, was so fast "and sure, that neither *sin*, *death*, nor *hell*, assaulting our Sa-"viour, could make any *separation*, no not of his *body*: but he "himself, of his *own accord*, must put off his earthly tabernacle,

[r] Aquinas understood *active* and *passive* as well as most can pretend to: and he scrupled not to call our Lord's passive obedience, *a work*: *Hoc ipsum opus, quod voluntarie passionem sustinuit*, &c. See above, p. 152. The argument from the word *patient*, or *passive*, in this case, is only playing upon an *equivocal* name, and committing a *fallacy*.

[s] Barnabas, Ep. ch. vii. p. 21. Coteler. Clem. Rom. Epist. i. c. 49. Ignatius ad Ephes. c. ii.

[t] Origen, tom. ii. p. 220. conf. 187, 83, 362. Bened. edit. Eusebius de Laud. Constant. 765. ed. Cant. Hieronym. tom. ii. part. 2. 167. tom. iii. 384. Bened. Ambrosius, tom. i. 995, 1002. tom. ii. 1054. ed. Bened. Chrysostom, tom. ii. 403, 404. Bened. edit. in Heb. 839. Augustinus, tom. iv. 211, 1565. tom. v. Append. 273. tom. viii. 820. Leo Magn. tom. i. 251, 261, 264, 267, 276, 293. Quen. Venant. Fortunat. Hymn. de Pass. Christi, p. 695.

[u] Jacob. Liturg. p. 35. Fabric. Basil. Liturg. Copt. p. 24. Renaud. Gregorii Liturg. Copt. 36. 37. conf. 46. Basilii Liturg. Alex. p. 83. Gregorii Liturg. p. 120, 121, 123. Ordo Commun. Syr. Jacob. p. 22.

[x] Johnson, part ii. p. 69, 70.

"that dying for a season, he might conquer death for ever. "And so the *laying down his life* was no imposed punishment, "nor *forcible* invasion of death upon him, but a *voluntary sacri-* "*fice* for *sin*, rendered unto God for our sakes[y]." This doctrine Bishop Bilson defended against some rigid Calvinists of his time, who maintained the *contrary*[z] for the support of some other *false* principles. But I return.

The author of Unbloody Sacrifice, though he had argued before, several ways, against the *sacrifice of the cross*, yet retreated at length to this: "I do not, nor ever did *deny*, that Christ "*offered himself on the cross*; but I declare, I cannot prove it "from Scripture; so that if it be true, I leave it to be proved "by *tradition*[a]." How hard of belief in this high article, when it is *undeniable* that Scripture (taken in the sense of the *Fathers* of the *first*, *second*, and *following* centuries) *does prove* it; and when, in other cases, he conceived, that "that man ought to "suspect his own judgment and orthodoxy, whose opinions sink "below the standard of the second age after Christ[b]." But we need not *Fathers* in this point, nor indeed any thing but *Scripture texts*, and *unprejudiced* reason.

The prophet Isaiah represents our Lord as "wounded for our "transgressions," and "bruised for our iniquities," and making "his soul an offering for sin[c]." Where but ón the cross? Not at his last supper, where he was neither *wounded* nor *bruised*, except it were *in effigy*, nor offered his *soul*, so much as *in effigy*, whether we interpret it of *soul* or of *life*. His "pouring out his "soul unto death," (not his *pouring* out *wine*, or *pouring* out *promises* or *engagements*,) is by the same prophet made the one thing considerable[d].

Where our Lord *bare our sins*, (a *sacrificial* phrase,) there most certainly he made his *sacrifice*: now St. Peter expressly tells us, that "he bare our sins in his own body on the tree[e];" not in his *sacramental* body, or at the *Communion table*. Besides that it is manifest from the same text, that he had not made the *expiatory sacrifice* in the Eucharist: for if he had, he could have had none of our sins to *bear* in his body on the cross; neither indeed would his *death* have been *necessary* to our redemp-

[y] Bishop Bilson, Full Redemption, &c. p. 8.

[z] Ibid. p. 229.

[a] Johnson, Sax. Laws, vol. i. pref. p. 58.

[b] Johnson, Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 212. alias 215.

[c] Isa. liii. 5, 10.

[d] Isa. liii. 12.

[e] 1 Pet. ii. 24. Compare Isa. liii. 4, 6, 11, 12.

tion, being *superseded* by the eucharistical *remission*, and by the *atonement* then made.

Where *peace* was purchased, where *redemption* and *reconciliation* were perfected, there may we look for the *sacrifice* of peace, redemption, and reconcilement. Now St. Paul says plainly, that he "made peace through the blood of his cross," (not through the blood of his *holy table*, whether sacramental or natural,) "to "reconcile all things[f]," &c. Again, "we were reconciled to God "by the death of his Son[g]," and reconciled "unto God by the "cross[h]:" not by the *Eucharist* of his Son, not by the *Communion table*. We were "redeemed by his blood[i];" and "made "nigh by the blood of Christ[k]," and "sanctified also by his "blood[l]:" not in the Eucharist, where no blood was *shed*, except it were in *effigy*; neither will such *sacramental* shedding answer St. Paul's meaning, where he says, that "without "shedding of blood there is no remission[m]." Again, it is said, Christ "appeared to put away sin by the SACRIFICE of HIMSELF: "and as it is appointed unto men ONCE TO DIE—so Christ was "ONCE OFFERED to bear the sins of many[n]," &c. Where it is plain, that he was to put away sin by *sacrificing himself*, and that, *by dying*; as appears by the similitude immediately following; "As it is appointed unto men once to die, *so Christ* was once "offered," viz. in his *death*: otherwise the parallel will not answer. It is in vain to say, that the *offering* was *previous* to his *bearing* our sins: for the prophet Isaiah expounds his "making "his soul an offering for sin," by his "pouring out his soul "unto death[o]." So that his being *offered to bear*, must mean, that he was offered *on the cross*, where he was to pour out his soul, that upon the *same cross* he might *bear* our sins, &c.

More might be added, but I forbear to proceed further in so plain a point, so firmly grounded on Scripture, and so fully established by *antiquity*, *universality*, and *consent*; consent of the Christian churches from the beginning down to this day.

4. It was going great lengths, to say, "I must humbly declare "my opinion, that it is impossible to establish the doctrine of "Christ's body and blood being a *real sacrifice*, by any *other* "arguments but those by which we prove the *Eucharist* to have "been instituted a *sacrifice* by our blessed Saviour[p]." What-

[f] Coloss. i. 20. [g] Rom. v. 10. [m] Heb. ix. 22. [n] Heb. ix. 27, 28.
[h] Eph. ii. 16. [i] Revel. v. 9. [o] Isa. liii. 10, 12.
[k] Eph. ii. 13. [p] Johnson, Sax. Laws, pref. p. 54.
[l] Heb. xiii. 12. x. 29. ix. 12, 13, 14. Unbl. Sacrif. part ii. pref. p. 1, 2.

ever might be the fate of this *particular*, much *disputed* notion of the eucharistic sacrifice, one thing is certain, and will be readily allowed by every considerate man, that the *general* and *unquestionable* doctrine of the *real sacrifice* ought never to be put upon a level with it: neither ought it to have been so much as suggested, that there is any ground for so strange a comparison. It was obliging Socinians too far, to raise any doubt or question about the certainty of the *sacrifice of the cross:* but to throw out broad innuendos besides, that it stands upon *no better*, or *no other* foundation, than the *material* sacrifice, the material and *expiatory* sacrifice of the Eucharist; what is it but betraying the Christian cause into the hands of the adversaries? For if they may reasonably urge, (or cannot reasonably be confuted, if they do urge,) that such *material* and *expiatory* sacrifice is a *novelty* of yesterday, scarce thought on before the *dark* ages of superstition, which made use of *material* incense for like purposes; scarce ever seriously maintained by any of the West before the sixteenth century, and then only by the Romanists; never admitted, in either part, by Protestants before the seventeenth century, nor then by many of them; never taught (as now taught) before the eighteenth century, and then by a single writer only, for some time: I say, if the Socinians may reasonably urge the *premises*, the conclusion which they aim at is *given* them into their hands: and so at length this indiscreet zeal for an *imaginary* sacrifice of the Eucharist (not capable of *support*) can serve only to perplex, darken, or destroy, the *real* one of the cross[q].

I thought to go on to *two chapters* further, pointing out more *excesses* and *inconsistencies* of the new scheme. There is one which particularly deserved to be mentioned; the precarious consequence drawn from our Lord's supposed sacrifice in the *first* Eucharist, to *our* sacrifice in the rest, built only upon this, that *we are to do what Christ did*[r]*:* an argument, which, if it proves any thing, proves that we are to do *all that Christ is supposed to have done* by way of sacrifice; that is, to sacrifice

[q] The chief advocate for the *new* system says, "It is no small *satisfaction* to me, that the sacrifice of "the *Eucharist*, and the *personal* "sacrifice of Christ, do rest upon the "same foundation, and stand or fall "together." *Johnson's Unbl. Sacr.* part ii. pref. p. 1, 2. To which it is sufficient to say, *God forbid!* The *personal* sacrifice of Christ stands upon the *rock* of *ages:* the other (in his sense of it) is built upon the *sand.*

[r] Johnson's Unbl. Sacr. part i. p. 50, 91, alias 51, 94. Johnson, part ii. p. 10.

his *sacramental* body and his *natural* also, (which is *absurd*,) or else to sacrifice *ourselves* under symbols, as our Lord sacrificed *himself*, which will not serve the purpose of the *material* scheme. One way the argument proves *too much*, and the other way *too little;* and so neither way will it answer the end designed. I am aware, that some will tell us what the argument *shall prove*, and what it *shall not prove*[s]. But who will give a disputant leave to draw consequences *arbitrarily*, not regulated by the *premises*, but by an *hypothesis*, which itself wants to be regulated by *reason* and *truth?*

I have not here room to enter further into this matter: these papers are already drawn out into a length beyond what I at first suspected. I hope my readers will excuse my stopping short in this fourth chapter, and saving both myself and them the trouble (perhaps *unnecessary* trouble) of two more. It is of use in any controverted points, to observe what *exit* they are found to have, when pursued to the utmost. There were sufficient reasons before against a *material* sacrifice, considered in its best light, as purely *gratulatory*, or *eucharistical:* and there were more and stronger against the same considered as *expiatory*, or *propitiatory;* reasons, I mean, from *Scripture* and *antiquity*, and from the *nature of things:* but the managers for the *material* cause have now lately furnished us with a *new* argument against it, by shewing us, that, after all that can be done for it, it has really *no exit*, or such as is *worse* than *none;* while it terminates in various *inconsistencies* and *incongruities;* and not only so, but is contradictory also to *sound doctrine*, particularly to the *momentous* doctrine of the *sacrifice* of the *cross*.

[s] Johnson, part i. p. 96, 122. alias 99, 126.

Dr. Brett on Liturgies, p. 135. N. B. The sum of what is pleaded on that side, when carefully examined, will be found to amount only to this: we are to *do what Christ did*, so far as *serves* the *new system:* but we are *not to do what Christ did*, so far as *disserves* it. *Do this*, shall be *an argument*, when and where it makes for it: *do this*, shall be *no argument*, when or where it makes against it. It is observable, that the words, *this do*, in the institution, come after the words, *take, eat, this is my body*, and therefore manifestly relate, not merely to the *sacerdotal* ministration, but to the *whole action* or *actions* both of priest and people. The *blessing*, the *breaking*, the *pouring out*, the *distributing*, the *receiving*, the *eating*, and the *drinking*, are all comprehended in the words, *this do*. All those actions are *shewing forth the Lord's death*, (1 Cor. xi. 26,) for a *remembrance* or *memorial* of him.

A brief Analysis of Mr. Johnson's System, shewing what it is, and by what Steps he might be led into it.

1. THE first thing in *intention*, last in *execution*, was to prove, that the Gospel ministers are *proper priests*.

2. *Proper priests* must have a *proper* sacrifice: therefore some *medium* was to be thought on, to prove a *proper* sacrifice, particularly in the *Eucharist*.

3. A prevailing notion, or vulgar prejudice, had spread among many, for a century or more, that no sacrifice could be *proper*, but a *material* one: therefore pains were to be taken to prove the Eucharist a *material* sacrifice.

4. But as material sacrifice carried no appearance of *dignity* in it, looking too *low* and *mean* for an *evangelical* priesthood to stand upon; therefore ways and means were to be used to raise some esteem of it: *spiritual* sacrifice was to be *depreciated*, and *material* to be *magnified*. Hence, as it seems, arose the thought of enriching the *elements* with the *Spirit*; borrowing from the *sacramental* part of the Eucharist, to augment and advance the *sacrificial*. And now the scheme appeared with a better face.

5. Nevertheless, if our Lord in the *original* Eucharist did not sacrifice the *elements*, it could not reasonably be supposed that we do it now, and so things would not tally: therefore it was found necessary to assert, that he also *sacrificed* the *elements*, as his *sacramental body*; and thereupon *reasons* and *authorities* were to be searched out for that purpose.

6. Still there was a weighty objection remaining, viz. that Scripture speaks often of Christ's offering *himself*, but never once of his offering in sacrifice the *symbols*: to remove which difficulty, it was thought best to say, that he offered *himself* in the Eucharist, but by and with the symbols. An after-thought, and not well comporting with former parts of the scheme.

7. But there was still another difficulty, a very great one; namely, that our Lord, according to the accounts of the New Testament, sacrificed himself but *once*[a]: therefore, either he did it not *in the Eucharist*, or not *upon the cross*. To remove this difficulty, it seems to have been resolved to give up the *sacrifice of the cross*, and to retain only the sacrifice *of the Eucharist*: and so the scheme was complete.

[a] Propit. Oblat. p. 97.

Having thus given a sketch of the system in the *analytical* way, it may now be easy to throw it into the *synthetic*, thus:

1. Christ our Lord made a *personal* sacrifice of himself *once;* either in the Eucharist or on the cross.

2. It cannot be proved to have been *on the cross*, but there are divers reasons against the supposition; therefore it must have been *in the Eucharist*.

3. He sacrificed himself in the Eucharist, under *symbols*, sacrificing the *symbols* together with *himself:* otherwise we could have no pretence now for sacrificing the same symbols.

4. The Christian Church, after his example, sacrifices the *symbols*, but not *him*.

5. Therefore the Church has a *material* sacrifice.

6. Therefore the Church offers a *proper* sacrifice.

7. Therefore the Gospel ministers are *proper* priests, *sacrificing* priests: which was to be proved.

Now my humble opinion upon the whole is, that if the learned author had taken *spiritual* sacrifice for his *medium*, instead of *material*, he might not only have avoided many perplexities, and no small number of mistakes, but might also have come at his *main point* justly and regularly, in conformity with *Scripture* and *antiquity*. He might have proved that Christian ministers are *priests* in as high and as proper a sense as any before them have been, (*Christ* only excepted,) authorized to stand and *minister between God and his people*, and to *bless in God's name*, and to execute all other *sacerdotal* functions, but in a more *spiritual* and *heavenly* way than other priests had done: which detracts not at all from the *propriety* of the Christian priesthood, but adds very much to its *value* and excellency, and shews it to be of *superior* dignity to any real or pretended priesthood, either of Jews or Pagans.

A distinct summary View of the several Oblations *in the Eucharist, previous to* Consecration *or subsequent.*

What is *previous*, goes under the name of *Ante-oblation:* what is *subsequent*, falls under the name of *Post-oblation.*

I. Of the *Ante-oblation.*

THE *ante-oblation* has three parts, or three views, as here follows:

1. There is a presenting to God *alms* for the poor, and *oblations* for the use of the Church. The *material* things are gifts *to men:* the benevolent *act*, or *work*, is a *gift*, or *sacrifice* unto God. St. Paul points out this distinction where he teaches, "To do good and to communicate" are "such sacrifices" as "God is well pleased with[a]." The benevolent *services* are the sacrifice; not the *material* money, or goods. This distinction is further confirmed by the common *custom of speech;* which shews what the common *ideas* are. *Alms* (that is, alms-deeds) *make an atonement for sin:* a true and a proper expression, understanding *atonement* in a qualified sense. But who would say, that *money* makes an atonement? *By bounty and charity God is appeased:* the proposition is *true*, and the expression *proper*. But can we say, that by *silver* and *gold* God is appeased? No, certainly. And why cannot we? Because it would be *confounding* ideas: for, even in common language, expressive of the common ideas, the *service* is the gift to God, not the *material* thing.

2. There is in the Eucharist a presenting to God (*virtually* at least) an *acknowledgment* of God's being *Creator* and *Giver* of all good things; as Irenæus intimates[b]. Tertullian extends it to *both* Sacraments[c]: inasmuch as the religious use of *water* in Baptism carries in it a *tacit* acknowledgment that water is a *creature* of God.

3. There is also a presenting of the elements to God for *consecration:* which is common to *both* Sacraments. For in *Baptism*

[a] Hebr. xiii. 16. The like distinction is clearly laid down in Justin Martyr. Apol. ii. p. 60. ed. Paris. 1636. Τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνου εἰς διατροφὴν γενόμενα, οὐ πυρὶ δαπανᾷν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις προσφέρειν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ εὐχαρίστους ὄντας, διὰ λόγου πομπὰς καὶ ὕμνους πέμπειν.

[b] Iren. lib. iv. cap. 18. p. 251.

[c] Tertull. contr. Marc. lib. i. cap. 14, 23.

the waters are so *presented*, and for the same or like *spiritual* purposes.

II. Of the *Post-oblation.*

The *post-oblation*, otherwise called *commemoration*, may likewise be considered under *three views*, or as containing *three parts.*

1. The first is, the *offering to view*, viz. of God, angels, and men, under certain *symbols*, the *death*, *passion*, or *sacrifice* of Christ. We do the *like* (not precisely the *same*) in Baptism also: for there we *represent* and *commemorate* mentally, vocally, and manually, (in *mind*, and by *mouth*, and by significant *actions*,) the death and burial of Christ our Lord.

2. The second is, the *offering*, as it were, to *Divine consideration*, with our *praises* and *thanksgivings*, Christ and his sacrifice, pleading the *merit* of it, in behalf of ourselves and others. We do something near akin to this in *Baptism* likewise, pleading the same *sacrifice* of atonement, with the *merits* thereof, in behalf of the persons baptized; offering the same to *Divine* consideration.

3. The third is, the offering up Christ's *mystical body*, the Church, or *ourselves* a part of it[d], as an holy, lively, reasonable *sacrifice* unto God: a sacrifice represented by the outward *signs*, and conveyed, as it were, under the *symbols* of bread and wine.

This third article of the *post-oblation* is seen also in *Baptism:* for we are therein supposed to be *dedicated*, *consecrated*, *devoted*,

[d] Fulgentius's doctrine on this head is well worth the noting, as making the *Church* to be the *sacrifice* offered, and likewise as interpreting the *illapse* of the *Spirit*, conformably, of the Spirit's sanctifying that *mystical body*, viz. the *Church*. He flourished about 510, and is of greater antiquity and authority than most of the Greek, Latin, or Oriental *liturgies* now extant.

Cum ergo sancti *Spiritus* ad sanctificandum totius Ecclesiæ *sacrificium* postulatur *adventus*, nihil aliud postulari mihi videtur, nisi ut per gratiam salutarem in *corpore Christi* (quod est *Ecclesia*) caritatis unitas jugiter indisrupta servetur.——Dum itaque Ecclesia *Spiritum* sanctum *sibi* cælitus postulat *mitti*, donum sibi caritatis et unanimitatis postulat a Deo conferri. Quando autem congruentius quam ad consecrandum sacrificium *corporis Christi* sancta Ecclesia (quæ *corpus* est *Christi*) Spiritus sancti deposcat adventum? quæ ipsum *caput suum* secundum carnem de Spiritu sancto noverit natum.——Hoc ergo factum est caritate divina, ut ex ipso Spiritu *corpus illius* capitis esset renatum, de quo *ipsum caput* est natum.——Hæc itaque spiritalis ædificatio *corporis Christi*, quæ fit in caritate, (cum scilicet secundum B. Petri sermonem, *lapides vivi ædificantur* in domum spiritalem, in sacerdotium sanctum, offerentes *spiritales hostias*, acceptabiles Deo per Jesum Christum) nunquam opportunius petitur, quam cum ab ipso *Christi corpore* (quod est *Ecclesia*) in *sacramento* panis et calicis ipsum *Christi corpus et sanguis* offertur. *Calix enim quem bibimus*, &c. 1 Cor. x. 16, 17. *Fulgent. ad Monim.* lib. ii. p. 34—37. ed. Paris. Conf. Fragment. p. 641.

through Christ, to God. On which account Baptism has been looked upon as a kind of *sacrifice* among the ancients[c].

Nevertheless, the Sacrament of the Eucharist has more particularly obtained the name of *sacrifice:* partly, on account of the *offerings* to church and poor in the *ante-oblation*, which are *peculiar* to that Sacrament; and partly, on account of the commemorated *sacrifice* in the *post-oblation*. For though Baptism commemorates the *death* and *burial*, and indirectly the *grand sacrifice;* yet it does not so precisely, formally, and directly represent or commemorate the *sacrifice of the cross*, as the Eucharist does.

[c] Cum venis ad gratiam Baptismi, vitulum obtulisti, quia in mortem Christi baptizaris. *Origen. in Levit.* Hom. ii. p. 191. ed. Bened.

Holocausto dominicæ passionis, quod eo tempore offert quisque pro peccatis suis, quo ejusdem passionis fide *dedicatur*, et Christianorum fidelium nomine *baptizatus* imbuitur. *Augustin. ad Rom. Expos.* cap. xix. p. 937. ed. Bened.

Ipse homo, Dei nomini consecratus, et Deo devotus, in quantum mundo moritur ut Deo vivat, *sacrificium* est. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 6. p. 242.

THE SACRAMENTAL PART OF THE EUCHARIST EXPLAINED, IN A CHARGE DELIVERED IN PART TO THE CLERGY OF MIDDLESEX

At the Easter Visitation, 1739.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

IN a former discourse[a], upon the like occasion, I endeavoured to explain the *sacrificial* part of the Eucharist more minutely than I had before done, for the removing of scruples and the obviating mistakes. I would now do something of like kind with respect to the *sacramental* part of the same, so far as it appears to be affected by the *sacrificial;* that so both parts may aptly suit with each other, and hang naturally together. As truth is uniform, so just notions of one part will of course tend to preserve just ideas of the other part also: and as error is apt to lead to error, so any erroneous tenets there, will naturally bring in erroneous positions here.

It is matter of fact, that for the sake of advancing a *new* kind of sacrifice, *new* doctrines have been offered, time after time, with regard even to the *sacramental* part of the Eucharist: which in truth is as much *superior* to the *sacrificial*, as *God's* part in that holy rite is superior to *man's;* and which therefore calls for our more especial caution and circumspection.

Great stress has, by some amongst us since 1702, been laid upon the *invocation* and *illapse* of the *Holy Ghost* upon the elements: not barely to make them *sacred* signs and pledges, or *exhibitive* symbols of Christ's body and blood to every *faithful* communicant, (which might reasonably be admitted,) but even to make them the *very body*, or *verily* the *body* of Christ: not the *natural* body, but another true body, called a *spiritual body*, consisting, as is presumed, of elements changed in their *inward* qualities, and *replenished* either with the Holy Spirit himself,

[a] The Christian Sacrifice explained, in the preceding Charge.

or with the *graces*, or *virtues*, or *energies* of the Spirit[b]; supposed to be *intrinsic* to them, *inherent* in them, permanent with them, and *received* both by *worthy* and *unworthy* communicants. It is said, that the "Holy Spirit being invited and called down by the "prayer of the priest, (according to the ancients,) descended upon "the bread and wine on the altar, and *enriched* them with all "the *virtues* and *graces* with which the *personal* body and blood "of Christ did abound, and so made them in this, and perhaps "in a yet more mysterious and incomprehensible manner, to be "*verily the body and blood* of Christ; as the Holy Ghost did "formerly come upon the blessed Virgin, and *formed* in her "womb the *personal* body and blood of Christ[c]. That the "consecrated symbols are sanctified, and *altered*, if not in their "*substance*, yet in their *internal* qualities,—and that the eucha-"ristical symbols *themselves* are *verily* made, in a mysterious "manner, the *body* and *blood* of our crucified Saviour[d]. That "this sacramental flesh and blood of Christ is taken by a *corpo-"real* eating and drinking of the *unworthy*, as well as *worthy* "communicants: of these, namely, to their justification and "eternal salvation both of flesh and spirit; but of *those* to their "condemnation and destruction of soul and body[e]."

Whoever looks into *Scripture*, or genuine *antiquity*, will there find but very little ground or colour for these or the like specu-

[b] Spiritu Sancto, qui ad invocationem sacerdotis descendens, panem sanctificat, et omni *divina* ac *vivifica virtute* corporis et sanguinis Christi eundem replet.——Ita ut Eucharistia duabus constet rebus, *terrena*, quæ est materia panis, et *cœlesti*, quæ est *gratia* ac *virtus* Spiritus Sancti *pani indita*.——Divina illius virtus et gratia *pani communicata* ac *inhærens*, uti jam paucis probabo. *Grabe. Ad Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 34. p. 327, 328.

In the same year, Dr. Allix, who saw deeper, condemned those notions, in very plain terms, while speaking of the modern Greeks, whose tenets those are.

Ad tales autem *miraculosos* effectus, quos jactant tam Græci quam Latini, credendos, aliquid nobis videtur deesse, *scil.* Christi promissio, aut mandatum. De his miraculis fama orta videtur ex *absurda* quadam *credulitate*, Spiritum Sanctum in elementorum naturam, *supernaturalem* quandam *vim* infundere. *Allix. in notis ad Nectarium*, p. 429. N.B. The question of *inherent virtues* had been thoroughly discussed by the best-learned Protestants, and the notion generally exploded, here and abroad, long before Dr. Grabe undertook (inadvertently, perhaps, or however unadviseedly) to revive it.

[c] Grabe's Defence of the Greek Church, p. 88.

[d] Grabe, ibid. p. 75, 87. Conf. p. 20, 35, 90, 91.

[e] Grabe, ibid. p. 87.

N.B. The Leipsic Acts, in their censure upon that posthumous piece, first published in 1721, have left this note:

Ex his vero patet, quod licet in articulo de cœna, alienam a pontificiorum *transubstantiatione* sententiam habuerit Grabius, tamen in eodem ab Anglicana etiam——*Ecclesia* haud parum discrepaverit. *Act. Lips.* p. 281. A.D. 1722.

lations; which appear rather to have been borrowed from Damascen of the eighth century, or from the more *modern* Greeks, or the Pseudo-primitive liturgies. There was indeed, as early as the *second* century, some mention made of the *descent* of the *Holy Ghost* in Baptism[f]: and there was also a prevailing notion of some *concurrence* of the Holy Spirit with *water*, to the *conception* and *birth* of a Christian; which *concurrence*, by way of illustration, or to render the idea of it more lively and affecting, was sometimes compared to a *conjugal union*[g]. But it was never understood, that such *similitudes* were to be scanned with a scrupulous exactness; or that every affecting or popular expression should be strained with the utmost rigour: for that would be using the ancient writers in much such a way as the Anthropomorphites and others have interpreted Scripture, contrary to the true meaning and intent of it. The *Fathers* very well knew how to distinguish between a power *adsistant* to, or *concurrent* with the element[h], and a power *infused* into it, or *lodged* in it: and they were well aware of the difference between the *virtue* of *Baptism* (meaning the *whole* solemnity, in which *God* bears a part[i]) and the *inherent* virtue of the consecrated *water*, which means quite another thing, and is a late invention of dark and ignorant ages[k].

As to the *Eucharist*, for the three first centuries, and part of the fourth, nothing at all was said, so far as appears, of any *descent* of the *third Person* upon the elements[l]; nothing of his *forming* them into Christ's body; no, nor of his *forming* the *natural* body in the womb: but the ancients interpreted Luke i. 35, of our Lord's *own* Divine Spirit, namely, of the *Logos*, and supposed that the same *Logos* formed for himself a body in the

[f] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 676, 685.

[g] Tertullian. de Baptismo. Chrysostom. in Ephes. Hom. xx. p. 147. Leo I. Serm. 23, 24. p. 155, 160. Quesnell. Pseud-Ambros. de Myst. cap. lix. p. 243. See more testimonies in Vossius, Opp. tom. vi. p. 233, 274. Compare Albertinus, p. 465, 466, and my Appendix, p. 156, 157.

[h] Διττὴ καὶ ἡ κάθαρσις, δι' ὕδατός τε, φημὶ, καὶ πνεύματος· τοῦ μὲν θεορητῶς καὶ σωματικῶς λαμβανομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀθεωρήτως συντρέχοντος. *Nazianz. Orat.* xl. p. 641. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 682, 683, 684.

[i] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 468, &c.

[k] Sacramenta *continere* gratiam, nunquam olim dictum: itaque Thomas, parte tertia quæstionis sexagesimæ secundæ, articulo tertio, non potuit altius arcessere quam ab Hugone de Sancto Victore. *Chamier. Panstrat.* tom. iv. p. 52. N. B. Hugo flourished about A. D. 1120.

[l] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 685, &c.

womb[m]. So little foundation is there, within the three *first* and *purest* ages, for the pretended *similitude* between the *Holy Ghost's* forming the *natural body* in the womb, and his forming the *spiritual body* in the Eucharist. The similitude made use of anciently with respect to the Eucharist, was that of the *incarnation*[n], intended only in a confuse, general way, and not for any rigorous exactness. For like as our Lord, in his incarnation, made and fitted for himself a *natural body* to dwell in; so, in regard to the Eucharist, he has appointed and fitted for himself a *symbolical body* to *concur* with, in the distributing his graces and blessings to the *faithful* receivers. As to the *third* Person, his more immediate *presence* and *energy* was by the ancients assigned to *Baptism*, correspondently to the figure of the *conjugal union*, as before hinted: while to the *Eucharist* was assigned the more immediate presence and energy of the *Logos*, as the figure of the *incarnation*, made use of in that case, justly required. It would be a kind of *solecism* in ancient language, to speak of the Holy Ghost in this matter, as some *late* writers have done; because it would be confounding the *analogy* which the truly *ancient* Doctors went upon in their doctrine of the two Sacraments. The very learned and judicious Bishop Bull gives a reasonable account of what was taught concerning the *Eucharist* in the early days of Justin and Irenæus:

"By or upon the sacerdotal benediction, the *Spirit* of *Christ*, "or a Divine *virtue* from Christ, descends upon the elements, "and *accompanies* them to all *worthy* communicants: and there-"fore they are said to be, and are, the *body* and *blood* of Christ, "the same *Divinity* which is *hypostatically* united to the body "of Christ in heaven, being *virtually* united to the elements of "bread and wine[o]." Here it is observable, that by *Spirit* of Christ, Bishop Bull could not mean the *third* Person, but the

[m] Hermas, lib. iii. Simil. 5. Justin. Apol. i. p. 54. Dial. 354. Irenæus, lib. v. cap. 1. p. 293. Clem. Alex. p. 654. Tertullian, contr. Prax. cap. xxvi. de Carn. Christi, p. 18. Hippolytus, contr. Noet. cap. iv. p. 9. cap. xvii. p. 18. Novatian, cap. xix. Cyprian, de Idol. Vanit. p. 228. Lactant. lib. iv. cap. 12. Hilarius, de Trin. 1011, 1044, 1047. Gregorius Bœticus, apud Ambros. tom. ii. p. 354, 356.

[n] Justin. Apol. xcvi. Dial. p. 290. Compare my Doctrinal Use, &c. p. 114, and Review, vol. iv. p. 583, and Albertinus, p. 296, 664.

[o] Bull's Answer to the Bishop of Meaux, p. 21, 22. How different Bishop Bull's account is from Dr. Grabe's, in his notes on Irenæus, will be obvious to every one who will be at the pains to compare them: though at the same time Bishop Bull very respectfully refers to Dr. Grabe (p. 23.) for clearing the point against the Romanists.

Logos[p], which only is *hypostatically* united to the *humanity* of Christ; and that that *Spirit* is not said to *reside* in the elements, but to *accompany* them, and to the *worthy* only: so that the *virtual union* can amount only to an union of *concurrence*, (not of *infusion* or *inherence*,) whereby Christ is conceived to *concur* with the elements, in the *due use* of them to produce the effects in *persons* fitly disposed. All which is true and ancient doctrine.

In the fourth century, some *illapse* of the *third* Person upon the elements was commonly taught, and that justly, provided it be but as justly understood. Not so as to make the sacramental body a *compound* of element and spirit, after the way of the modern Greeks; nor so as to make the *third* Person the proper *food* of the Eucharist, or the *res Sacramenti*, for the *Logos* was always considered as the *food* there spiritually given and received[q]: yea it was the *incarnate Logos*[r], and therein stands our *mystical union* with Christ as improved and strengthened in that Sacrament. But the work of the Holy Ghost upon the elements was to translate or change them from *common* to *sacred*, from *elements* to *sacraments*, from their *natural* state and condition to *supernatural* ends and uses, that they might become holy signs, certain pledges, or exhibitive symbols of our Lord's own natural body and blood in a mystical and spiritual way. Not that any change was presumed, either as to the *substance* or the *inward qualities* of the elements, but only as to their *outward* state, condition, uses, or offices. For like as when a *commoner* is advanced into a *peer*, or a *subject* into a *prince*, or an *house* into a *church*, or a *laic* into a *priest* or *prelate*, there is a change of *outward* state, condition, circumstances, and there are *new* uses and offices, *new* prerogatives, *new* glories, but no change of *substance*, no, nor of *inward* qualities implied: such also is the case (only in a more eminent degree) with respect to the elements of the Eucharist; when they are *consecrated* by the priest, when they are *sanctified*

[p] How common and familiar such use of the name *Spirit*, or *Holy Spirit*, anciently was, may be understood from the interpretation of Luke i. 35, as before mentioned, and from the testimonies collected to that purpose by learned men. Grotius in Marc. ii. 8. Bull. Defens. Fid. Nic. cap. ii. sect. 5. Constant. in Hilar. præfat. p. 19.

[q] Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 38. p. 284. Clemens Alex. 123, 125, 126, 177, 178. Tertullian. de Orat. cap. 6. De Resurr. Carn. cap. 38. Origen. in Levit. Hom. xvi. p. 266. in Matt. p. 254. Novat. cap. 14, 16. Hilarius de Trin. lib. viii. p. 954. Nazianzen, Orat. iii. p. 70.

[r] Tertullian. de Resurr. Carn. cap. 37. Origen. in Matt. p. 254. Augustin. in Psal. xxxiii. p. 211. cxx. p. 1381. Compare Jewel's Answer to Hard. art. viii. p. 293, and Albertinus, p. 341, 758.

by the Holy Ghost, when they are rendered *relatively holy*, when they are transferred from *common* to sacred[s], when they are exalted from mean and low uses, in comparison, to the *highest* and *holiest* purposes that such poor things could ever be advanced to. Such a *change*, or *transmutation*, as I have now mentioned, frequently occurs in the primitive writers: more than this (I am competently assured) will not be found in any certain and undoubted monuments of Catholic writers, within the first six conturies[t].

So long as *symbolical* language was well remembered and rightly understood, and men knew how to distinguish between figure and verity, between signs and things: while due care and judgment was made use of, to interpret the *literal* expressions of Scripture and Fathers *literally*, and *figurative* expressions according to the *figure:* I say, while these things were so, there could be no room for imagining any *change* in the elements, either as to *substance* or *internal* qualities, nor for supposing that our Lord's words, "This is my body," were to be otherwise interpreted than those parallel words of the Apostle, "that rock was "Christ[u]." For as the word *Christ*, which is the *predicate* in one proposition, is to be *literally* understood, and the *trope* lies in the verb *was*, put for *signify*, or *exhibitively* signifies; so the word *body*, which is the *predicate* in the other proposition, is to be literally interpreted of the *natural* or *personal* body of Christ, and the *trope* lies in the verb *is*[w], put for *represents*, or exhibitively signifies. And as it would not be right to say that the *rock* was literally a *spiritual Christ*, distinct from the *real Christ*,

[s] Accedat verbum ad elementum, et fit Sacramentum. *Augustin. in Johann.* Tract. 80.

[t] Compare Jewel's Def. of Apol. part ii. p. 243, 244. Albertinus, p. 425, 509. Cosin. Histor. Transubst. p. 109, 113, 124. Covel. Account of Gr. Church, p. 47, 53, &c. 67, 68, 72.

[u] 1 Cor. x. 4. Solet autem res quæ *significat*, ejus rei nomine quam significat nuncupari.——Hinc est quod dictum est, *petra erat Christus*. Non enim dixit, petra *significat*, sed tanquam hoc *esset;* quod utique per *substantiam* hoc non erat, sed per *significationem*. Sic et *sanguis*, quoniam animam significat in Sacramentis, *anima* dictus est. *Augustin. in Levit.* q. lvii. p. 516. tom. 3. Conf. Epist. xcviii. ad Bonifac. p. 268. tom. 2. and my Review, vol. iv. chap. 7. p. 571—586.

Sacramentorum enim natura et *usitata* loquendi *ratio* postulare videtur, ut *symbolis* non solum *nomina*, sed et eorum *proprietates*, imo *effecta* tribuantur. *Cosin. Histor. Transubst.* p. 3.

[w] See this proved at large in Chamier's Panstrat. tom. iv. p. 528, 529, &c. Albertinus, p. 525, 526, 686. Jewel's Def. of Apol. p. 209. Answ. to Hard. p. 238, 239, 255, 267. Spalatensis, lib. v. cap. 6. n. 73. 169. Cosin. Histor. Transubstant. p. 10, 24, 30, 41, 43, 44. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 549, 550, 589, 590, 600.

making *two Christs*; so neither can it be right to say or conceive that the *bread* in the Eucharist is a *spiritual body* of Christ, making *two true bodies* of Christ. But as the rock was a *symbol* of the one true Christ, so is the sacramental bread a *symbol* exhibitive of the one true body of Christ, viz. the *natural* or *personal* body, given and received in the Eucharist: I say, given and received *spiritually*, but *truly* and *really*; and the more *truly*, because *spiritually*, as the *spiritual* sense, and not the *literal*, is the *true* sense[x].

The *ancient* notion of this matter might easily be cleared from *Father* to *Father*, through the earlier centuries; and, I presume, I have competently done it elsewhere[y]. Therefore I shall here content myself with a single passage of Macarius, of the fourth century, which very briefly, but fully expresses what all the rest mean. He observes, "that bread and wine are offered in the "Church as *symbols* (or *antitypes*) of our Lord's *body* and *blood*, "and that they who partake of the *visible* bread, do *spiritually* "eat the flesh of our Lord[z]." He is to be understood of *worthy* partaking; as Albertinus has shewn[a], and as reason requires. And when he speaks of the Lord's *flesh*, he cannot be understood of any *spiritual flesh* locally present in the Eucharist, but of the *natural* body and blood *spiritually* given and received, whereof the sacramental body and blood are the *symbols*, or *antitypes*, in his account. Such was the doctrine prevailing in his time, and three centuries, at least, longer.

But in the declension of the seventh century, some began to speak very oddly of the elements, as being literally made, by consecration, the *very body* and *blood* of Christ, not *images* or *antitypes* at all[b], as used to be taught aforetime. From thence we may reasonably date all the confusion and perplexity which has since so clouded and embarrassed the theory of this Sacrament.

When *learning*, *language*, and *taste* fell to decay, and men

[x] Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 606, 696. Jewel's Answer to Hard. p. 238, 241, 251, 256, 292. Bilson's Christian Subject, p. 631.

[y] Review, vol. iv. chap. 6, and 7.

[z] Ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ προσφέρεται ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος ἀντίτυπον τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἵματος, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μεταλαμβάνοντες ἐκ τοῦ φαινομένου ἄρτου, πνευματικῶς τὴν σάρκα τοῦ Κυρίου ἐσθίουσι. *Macar. Homil.* xxvii. p. 168. Conf. Albertin. p. 437, 438, 439.

[a] Albertinus, p. 440.

[b] Yet it has been thought, that while they rejected the names of *figure*, *type*, and *image*, they or their followers admitted of the names of *symbol* and *representation*. See Claude, book iv. chap. 10. p. 341, 344. Which, if true, shews only how *confused* those men were, both in language and notion.

became as much strangers to the *sublime* of their forefathers, as to the symbolical *majesty* of the sacred style, then came up a lean, dry, sapless kind of *theology*, mightily degenerated from the just and elevated sentiments of former ages[c]. There was a branch of the Eutychians, who in consequence of their main principle of a *confusion* of the *two natures* of Christ, (making the *human* and *divine* nature *one*,) thought themselves obliged to maintain, that the *body* of Christ was, from the very moment of his conception, altogether *incorruptible*. From this error of theirs they had the Greek name of *aphthartodocetæ*[d], and the Latin one of *incorrupticolæ*, and from one Gaianus, a chief leader amongst them, they had some of them the name of Gaianites. Against those Gaianites, one Anastasius (a monk of Mount Sinai about the year 680[e]) happened to engage: and amongst other topics of argumentation, he made choice of one drawn from the *Eucharist*. He had learned, or might have learned from Catholic teachers, that by the operation of the Holy Spirit the elements are *changed* into the *body* of Christ, meaning the *symbolical body*; that is, changed into *sacraments*, or *holy signs*: and he had learned also, that the worthy communicants do partake of the *natural* body of Christ, the *thing signified*; that is, *spiritually*, *mystically*, *symbolically*, partake of it. These two propositions he *confusely* remembered, or rather ignorantly *misunderstood*, and so he blended them both into this one; that the elements themselves upon consecration become, not in signification, but in reality, the *natural* body of Christ: which amounted to saying, that, instead of exhibitive *signs*, they become the very *things signified*. Under such confusion of thought, he formed his argument against the Gaianites in this manner: "The consecrated elements are no *types* or *figures*, but they are the *very body* "and *blood* of our Lord; and they are *corruptible*, as will appear "upon experiment: therefore our Lord's body, before his resurrection, was also *corruptible*[f]," which was to be proved.

[c] Literam sequi, et *signa* pro *rebus* accipere, *servilis* infirmitatis est. *Augustin. de Doctrin. Christian.* lib. iii. c. 9. p. 49.

[d] Ἀφθαρτοδοκῆται. Vide Damascen. Hæres. lxxxiv. p. 107.

[e] Between 677 and 686. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. ix. p. 313.

[f] Ὁ ὀρθόδοξος. Εἰπέ μοι, παρακαλῶ ——αὐτὴ ἡ κοινωνία καὶ θυσία τοῦ παναγίου σώματος καὶ αἵματος Χριστοῦ ἣν προσφέρεις καὶ μεταλαμβάνεις, σῶμα καὶ αἷμα ἀληθινόν ἐστι Χριστοῦ, τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ ψιλὸς ἄρτος ὡς ὁ πιπρασκόμενος κατ' οἶκον, καὶ ἀντίτυπος τοῦ σώματος Χριστοῦ, ὡς ἡ θυσία τοῦ τράγου ἣν Ἰουδαῖοι προσάγουσιν;

Ὁ Γαιανίτης· μὴ γένοιτο ἡμᾶς εἰπεῖν ἀντίτυπον τοῦ σώματος Χριστοῦ τὴν ἁγίαν κοινωνίαν, ἢ ψιλὸν ἄρτον, ἀλλ'

To confirm his notion that the elements are no *types* or *figures*, but the *very body*, he pleaded, that our Lord, in the institution, said not, This is the *figure* [*antitype*] of my body, but "This is "my body[g]." An argument by which he might as easily have proved, that the rock in the wilderness was the *very Christ*: for St. Paul said not that the rock *signified* Christ, or was a *symbol* of Christ; but he declared in express words, that "that rock "was Christ[h]." It is hard to say what precise ideas that author had of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, or what he really meant; if indeed he went further than the sound of words. Albertinus conjectures, from his occasionally mentioning the *descent* of the *Holy Spirit*, that he conceived the consecrated elements to become the *very body*, because the *same Spirit* was imparted to them as to the *natural* body of our Lord; a notion not falling in with *transubstantiation* or *consubstantiation*, but amounting to some kind of *impanation*[i]. If so, he may be looked upon, according to what appears, as the first *inventor* of the spiritual *bread-body*, or first *founder* of that system. But I much question whether that notion can claim so early a date. Whatever conception the author had of the elements, as made the *very body* and *blood* of *Christ*, yet (so far as we may judge from some passages of another work of the same author, first published by Dr. Allix in 1682[k],) he did not conceive that the elements were *enriched*, either with the *Spirit* himself, or with the *graces* of the Spirit: for he distinguished between the *bread from heaven*, viz. the *Logos*, given to the *worthy* only, and carrying

αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἷμα ἀληθῶς Χριστοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ μεταλαμβάνομεν, τοῦ σαρκωθέντος καὶ γεννηθέντος ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας θεοτόκου καὶ ἀειπαρθένου Μαρίας.

g 'Ο *ὀρθόδοξος. οὕτω πιστεύομεν, καὶ οὕτως ὁμολογοῦμεν, κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ Χριστοῦ——τοῦτό μου ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα.——οὐκ εἶπε, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀντίτυπον σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματός μου. Anastas. Hodeg.* c. xxiii. p. 349, 350.

N. B. That weak way of reasoning has been since fathered upon several *older* writers; as Origen, Magnes, Theodorus Heracleotes, Theodorus Mopsuestenus, Cyrillus Alexandrinus, and others: but those and the like passages appear to be all *fictitious*, imposed upon those earlier writers by some *later* Greeks. See Albertinus, p. 367, 420, 769, 770, &c. 893.

h 1 Cor. x. 4.

i Mens ipsius videtur esse, panem et vinum eatenus esse *verum* Christi *corpus* et *sanguinem*, quatenus *idem Spiritus* qui proprio Domini *corpori* et sanguini inest, se pani et vino similiter communicat: qui certe monachi hujus conceptus nihil habet commune cum *transubstantiatione*, aut *consubstantiatione*, sed *impanationis* cujusdam, ab aliis post clarius expositæ, speciem quandam habet. *Albertin.* p. 906. Conf. Claude, lib. iv. c. 9. p. 331—336.

k S. Anastasii Sinaitæ Anagogicarum contemplationum in Hexaemeron, liber xii. hactenus desideratus. Lond. 1682. Conf. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. vol. ix. p. 328.

eternal life with it, and the *earth-born flesh* of Christ, viz. the consecrated elements, common both to *worthy* and *unworthy*, and having no such promise of *eternal life* annexed to it[l], in John vi. 51. I will not answer for the *acuteness*, much less for the *soundness* of his distinction. He found himself entangled presently, only by reading a *few* verses further in the same chapter, where *eternal life* is annexed to the eating of the *flesh* and drinking the *blood*, as well as before to the manducation of the *bread from heaven*, which he had interpreted of the *Divine nature* of Christ. Here he was in straits, and retired in confusion, leaving his readers in the dark; but referring them for instruction to men more knowing, and more equal to the difficulty than he pretended to be: only he seemed to aim at some blind distinction between the *earth-born visible flesh*[m] which the *unworthy* partake of, and the *mystical flesh*[n] which belonged to the *worthy* only, and which it was very difficult to make any sense or consistency of, upon his principles. He had discarded *signs* as such, and had resolved all into the *things* signified, viz. the *real* flesh and blood of Christ: and now he wanted a distinction, in order to explain *what* was received by the *unworthy*, and what by the *worthy*, but found none; except it were this, that the unworthy received the corruptible *flesh* and *blood* of Christ, separate from his *Divinity*, while the *worthy* received *both* together. This is all the sense I can make of his notion: and I pretend not to be *certain* even of this[o]. Neither would I

[l] Ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβὰς, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος· καὶ ἐάν τις φάγῃ ἐκ τοῦ ἄρτου τούτου, ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.——ἀκούεις περὶ διαφορᾶς βρώσεως· ἐκ τοῦ ἄρτου τοῦ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταβαίνοντος τοὺς ἐσθίοντες εἶπεν ἔχειν ζωὴν αἰώνιον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς, οὐ τέθηκε τοῦτο.——διττῶς μετέχομεν τῶν μυστηρίων. Οἱ μὲν ἄξιοι ἐκείνων ἀπολάβουσι τοῦ ἄρτου τοῦ καταβαίνοντος ἀεὶ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τοῦτ' ἔστι τῆς ἐνοικήσεως καὶ ἐκλάμψεως τοῦ παναγίου πατρὸς τῆς θεότητος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὡς τὰ θεῖα καὶ οὐράνια φρονοῦντες· οἱ δὴ γήινοι καὶ τὰ γήινα φρονοῦντες, τῆς γηγενοῦς καὶ μόνης σαρκὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ μεταλαμβάνουσιν τολμηρῶς καὶ ἀναξίως. *Anastas. Hexaem.* lib. xii. p. 18.

[m] Οὐ περὶ τῆς ὁρωμένης αὐτῷ [fort. αὐτοῦ] σαρκὸς καὶ αἵματος λέγει· μετέλαβε γὰρ καὶ Ἰούδας, καὶ Σίμων ὁ Μάγος τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τῆς εὐχαριστίας, τοῦ ἄρτου καὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου. *Anastas. ibid.* p. 19.

[n] Τίς δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀληθὴς βρῶσις τῆς μυστικῆς σαρκὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ τί τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ κρυπτόμενον ἀπόρρητον αἷμα αὐτοῦ, καταλιμπάνομεν τοῖς ἱκανωτέροις καὶ γνωστικωτέροις, οἷς χρὴ μεταδιδοῦσιν; P. 19.

[o] As *errors* commonly are the *corruption* of *truth*, and retain some of the *original* features; so one may see in Anastasius's notion some resemblances of the *ancient* doctrines, miserably perverted or misunderstood.

1. He had learned that the Spirit makes the *body* of Christ: he interpreted it of the *natural* body, instead of *symbolical*, viz. the *sacrament* of the *true* body.

2. He had learned that the natural body is *given* and *received*: he inter-

have dwelt so long upon so obscure and unintelligible a writer, had he not been the *first*, or among the *first*, that threw off the old distinctions between the *symbolical* and *true* body, thereby destroying, in a great measure, the very idea of a *Sacrament*. Hitherto the *new* notion of the elements being made the *real* body, as opposed to *image* or *figure*, had been used only for the support of *true* doctrine as to other points. But it is always wrong policy (to say no worse) to endeavour to support *sound* doctrine by any thing *unsound*, or to defend *truth* by any thing but *truth*. Error, first or last, will infallibly turn on the side of error, and cannot naturally serve for any other purpose. So it proved in this case: for the next time that this *new* doctrine appeared upon the stage was in the service of *image-worship*, then creeping into the Church. They who opposed that *innovation*, kept up the ancient principle with regard to the *elements* of the Eucharist, as *symbols*, *figures*, *images*; pleading that our Lord had left no visible image of himself, his incarnation, passion, sacrifice, &c. but that of the *Eucharist*. In reply to that plea, the *innovators* remonstrated against the *symbolical* nature of the Eucharist, contending that the consecrated elements were no *images*, *types*, or *figures*, but the *very* body and blood of Christ, literally so.

Damascen, surnamed Mansur, the father of the modern Greeks, and their great oracle, was in this sentiment; a very considerable man otherwise, and worthy of better times[p]. He had read the *Fathers*, who were pointed against him; which however signified little to a person already embarked in a wrong cause: for it is certain, and might be proved by many instances, that men who have any *affection* stronger than their *love* of *truth*, will never want *evasions* against any evidence whatever. He pretended that the ancients had called the elements *types*, or

preted it *literally*, instead of *mystically*, or *spiritually*.

3. He had learned that the *natural* body given, is considered as *corruptible*, *crucified* and *dead*, and not as *glorified*: that he retained, and justly.

4. He had learned, that *the flesh profiteth not*, and that the *unworthy* partake not either of the *Logos*, or *Holy Ghost*, but that the *worthy* partake of both: and those also he appears to have retained.

Upon the whole, he blundered only in *two* of the propositions: but those two mistakes, like the *flies* in the *ointment*, marred the composition, and corrupted his whole system of the Eucharist.

[p] Damascen flourished about A. D. 740. Died about A. D. 756. Vid. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. tom. viii. p. 774.

figures, only *before* consecration, never *after*[q]. A plea notoriously false in fact, as all learned men know[r]: and had he said just the reverse, viz. that the Fathers had *never* so called them *before* consecration, but *always after*, he had come much nearer to the truth. The elements, before they are consecrated, are *common* things: and it is their *consecration* only that renders them *figures, signs, symbols, sacraments.* To pretend therefore that they are signs or symbols *before* consecration, is making them *sacraments* before they are *sacraments*, and carries a contradiction in the very terms. If the *Fathers* have ever so called them, which is questioned, it could amount only to some chance expression, contrary to their customary language, and to be accounted for by the *figure* called a *prolepsis*, as done by way of *anticipation.*

However, Damascen persisted in his error, that the consecrated elements are no *type* or *figure*, but the very "deified "body of our Lord[s]." If you ask, who makes them so? he sometimes tells you, the *second* Person does it, like as he *formed* for himself a personal body in the womb[t]: and sometimes he says, that the *third* Person does it, like as he also, overshadowing the Virgin, *formed* the same body in the womb[u]. Thus he drew together the two constructions of Luke i. 35, one prevailing principally before the fourth century[w], and the other after[x]: and he reconciled the two positions handsomely enough, by observing, that the *second* Person operates by the *third.*

But still he was well aware, that whatever person should be supposed to make the *body* in the womb, yet nothing could make that body properly our *Lord's body*, but our Lord's *assuming* it into an union with himself: the forming an *human* and a *sanctified* body would not be *making* that body *Christ's*

[q] Damascen. de Rect. Fid. lib. iv. c. 13. p. 271, 273. edit. Lequ.

[r] See Albertinus, p. 904, 907, 911, 912, 915. Jewel's Answ. to Hard. art. xii. p. 335. Def. of Apol. p. 243. Bilson's Christian Subject, p. 594, 595. L'Arroque's Hist. of the Euch. part ii. p. 213, &c. 368, &c.

[s] Οὐκ ἔστι τύπος ὁ ἄρτος καὶ ὁ οἶνος τοῦ σώματος καὶ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Κυρίου τεθεωμένον. *Damascen. de Rect. Fid.* lib. iv. c. 13. p. 271.

[t] Damascen, ibid. p. 268.

[u] Damascen, ibid. p. 269. Epist. ad Zachar. Epum Duarorum, p. 656.

[w] See above, p. 189.

[x] It may be noted, that when πνεῦμα ἅγιον, in that verse, came at length to be interpreted of the *third* Person, yet δύναμις ὑψίστου continued to be interpreted of the *second*, namely of the Λόγος. Athanasius, Orat. iv. p. 642, 695. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. v. p. 318. Ambros. de Sp. Sancto, lib. ii. c. 5. Ruffin. in Symb. p. 20. ed. Oxon. Philastrius, cap. cl. p. 345. Augustin. contr. Maxim. lib. iii. c. 15. Leo I. Serm. xxi. p. 147. Damascen, p. 204, 658. Theophylact in loc.

body: and, for the like reason, the Holy Ghost's so *forming* and so *sanctifying* the elements would not be *converting* them into, or *making* them, the *body* and *blood of Christ*, but merely a *sanctified* body. Therefore Damascen proceeded further to [y] affirm, that our Lord *makes* the elements *his* body and blood, by *joining* his *Divinity* with them: and it is observable, that while he thought the *grace* of the *Spirit* sufficient for the elements of *oil* and *water*, in Chrism and Baptism, yet he judged that nothing less than Christ's own *Divinity* could make the elements of the Eucharist *Christ's body and blood.* Had he thought of this in time, he might have spared his two previous considerations, about the *second* and the *third* Person's *forming* or *changing* the elements into *Christ's body*, so improperly brought in; for it is now plain, by his own account, that the elements are not *made* Christ's body, but by Christ's *assuming* them into some kind of *union* with his *Divinity;* and all that was supposed *previous* could amount only to preparing them, fitting them, sanctifying them, in order to *be made* the body and blood of Christ. It could not amount to so much as *forming* them, like the body in the womb, though he had pretended that it did: for the bread and wine want no forming, (like the body in the womb,) having been *formed* before, and all along keeping their original forms. So that at length that pretended previous *change* could resolve only into a previous *sanctification* by the *Spirit*, upon his own principles: the *Logos* was to do the rest, by assuming those *sanctified* elements, and *making* them the body and blood of Christ. So confused and incoherent was this great man.

But what was worse still, after all these lengths of fancy, there was yet a difficulty remaining, which was altogether insuperable. The elements were to be made the very *deified body* of Christ, like as the *personal* body, in the womb, had been made. How could this be, without the like *personal* union of the elements with the *Divinity?* Here Damascen was plunged, and attempted not to get out, at that time, or in that work. But in another work, in the way of a private letter, he did endeavour to surmount the difficulty, by suggesting a new piece of subtilty, that like as a man's body takes in daily *additional* matter, and all becomes one and the same body; so our Lord's *personal*

[y] Συνίζευξε τῷ ἐλαίῳ καὶ ὕδατι τὴν χάριν τοῦ πνεύματος—— ἐπειδὴ ἔθος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄρτον ἐσθίειν, ὕδωρ τε καὶ οἶνον πίνειν, συνέζευξεν αὐτοῖς τὴν αὐτοῦ θεότητα, καὶ πεποίηκεν αὐτὰ σῶμα καὶ αἷμα αὐτοῦ. *Damasc.* p. 269.

body takes in all the *new-made* bodies of the Eucharist; and thus, by a kind of *growth*, or *augmentation*, all become one and the same *personal* body of Christ[z]. A marvellous thought! But he was *wedded* to a *new* scheme, and was in no disposition to return to the *old* principles, which might have eased him of all perplexities. The *heart* will commonly govern the *head:* and it is certain, that any strong passion, set the wrong way, will soon infatuate even the *wisest* of men: therefore the first part of wisdom is to watch the *affections*. But I pass on.

I am aware that the late learned editor of Damascen has disputed the genuineness of that epistle[a]. But the *external* evidences for it appear to me to outweigh the slight suspicions drawn from the *internal* characters. And I am much mistaken, if any unprejudiced examiner will find that the learned editor has *proved* any thing more than a strong desire to fetch off his author from some palpable absurdities, lest they should too much impair his credit as to other points. But, however that be, it is certain that Damascen's system wanted some such additional succour as that epistle endeavoured to supply: and whether he did the kind office himself, or some other did it for him, is of no great moment with respect to the main cause. One thing we may observe from the whole, that whosoever once embraces any great *absurdity*, and resolves to abide by it, must, if he will be consistent and uniform, proceed to *more:* and though to go on is a kind of *madness*, yet to stop short betrays more *weakness* and *self-condemnation*.

No *transubstantiation* (such as the Romanists hold) was yet invented. Damascen's doctrine was far enough from that[b]; excepting that it might accidentally and gradually lead to it, as indeed it did, by sapping those *ancient* principles which other-

[z] Damascen. Epist. ad Zachar. p. 655—659. N. B. There is something of a like thought appearing in a work ascribed to Gregory Nyssen, Orat. Catechet. magn. c. xxxvii. p. 537. But there are strong suspicions that that work has been *interpolated*. It is certain, that there is, in the close, an *addition* from Theodorus Raithu, who flourished about A. D. 646. So that there is no depending upon the *whole* work as genuine; but there may be, and probably are *interpolations* in it, perhaps of the seventh or eighth century, or later. See Albertinus, p. 487. Fabricius, Bibl. Græc. tom. viii. p. 153. But if Nyssen really held any such notions, or used any such expressions, they were *affected* and *singular*, and ought to bear no weight against the *known* sentiments and *common* style of the *Fathers* in general.

[a] In Admonitione Prævia, p. 652.

[b] Vid. Albertinus, p. 912, 913. L'Arroque's Hist. of Euch. p. 366, &c. Claude against Arnaud, part i. book 4. chap. 9. p. 338.

wise were sure barriers against it, and by setting men's minds afloat after new devices.

From Damascen we may pass on to the famous Council of Constantinople, which consisted of three hundred and thirty-eight bishops, who assembled under Constantine the Sixth, surnamed Copronymus, A. D. 754. They, detesting all *image-worship*, reestablished the ancient doctrine of the *elements* being commemorative and exhibitive *types*, *figures*, *symbols*, or *images* of the natural body and blood of Christ; alleging that the Eucharist was the only image of Christ's *incarnation* which Christ had authorized in his Church[c]. They speak magnificently of the *consecration*, and the *effects* of it; the elements thereby becoming an *holy image*, and *deified*, as it were, by *grace*[d]: by which they appear to mean no more than *divinely sanctified*, according to the ordinary use of such *phrases*, at that time, and before[e]: and they themselves explain it by its being *made holy*, when before it was *common*[f]. And though they speak of the elements being *replenished*, that is, *sanctified* by the Holy Ghost, yet they reserve the *enlivening* or *life-giving* virtue to the *true* and *proper* body and blood of Christ[g]; not to the elements, the *image* of them. They distinguish between the *real*, *natural* body, and the *relative* body, or body by *institution* and *appointment*[h]. The meaning of the latter must be determined by *what* it is *appointed* to; which the Council itself sufficiently explains: it is appointed to be a *true image*, and a most clear *memorial* of the

[c] The whole passage may be seen in the Acts of the second Nicene Council, Act. vi. p. 368, 369. Harduin, tom. iv. Compare Dr. Covel's translation of it, and remarks upon it; Account of Gr. Church, p. 150, 151; and Albertinus, p. 914; and Claude, book iv. chap. 10. p. 347—355.

[d] *Εἰκῶν αὐτοῦ ἁγία, ὡς διά τινος ἁγιασμοῦ, χάριτι θεουμένη.* P. 368.

[e] Vid. Suicer's Thesaur. tom. i. 444, 1363, 1392, 1398. Jewel's Answ. to Hard. p. 247. Albertinus, p. 886. and compare Damascen. lib. iii. c. 17. p. 239.

[f] *Τῆς εὐχαριστίας ἄρτον, ὡς ἀψευδῆ εἰκόνα τῆς φυσικῆς, σαρκὸς διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐπιφοιτήσεως ἁγιαζόμενον, θεῖον σῶμα εὐδόκησε γίνεσθαι, μεσιτεύοντος τοῦ ἐν μετενέξει ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἅγιον, τὴν ἀναφορὰν ποιημένου ἱερέως.* P. 368.

[g] *Ζωοποιῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ——εἰκὼν τοῦ ζωοποιοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ——σὺν τῷ ποτηρίῳ τοῦ ζωοφόρου αἵματος τῆς πλευρᾶς αὐτοῦ.* Note, that Mr. Johnson, inadvertently, rendered the last words, *life-giving cup of the blood which* [flowed] *out of his side*, (Unbl. Sacrifice, p. 195:) he should have rendered, as Dr. Covel has done, *the cup of the enlivening blood of his side:* which is different, and gives quite another idea to the main thing. Conf. Theodoret. Dial. ii. p. 85.

[h] *Ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ Χριστοῦ σῶμα ἅγιον, ὡς θεωθέν· οὕτως δῆλον καὶ τὸ θέσει*——p. 368. For the phrase, *εἰκὼν κατὰ θέσιν*, vid. Damascen. tom. i. p. 354.

natural body[i]: a *true image*, as opposed to *bare representation*, as in a *picture*, not exhibitive of, or accompanied with *true* and *spiritual* benefits: a very *clear memorial*, as opposed to the *faint* shadows and *dark* intimations of the *legal* types or figurations. Some further light perhaps may be given to the true meaning of those Constantinopolitan Fathers, by a short passage of the Emperor Copronymus, preserved by Nicephorus, who was Patriarch of Constantinople from 800 to 815. The passage runs thus:

"He commanded his holy disciples and apostles to deliver, by "what thing he pleased, a *symbol* [type] for *his body*: that "through the sacerdotal ministration we might receive *really* "and *truly*, though it be by participation and designation, *his* "*very body*[k]." The meaning, as I apprehend, is, that we partake of the *natural* body itself, in a *true* and *reasonable* sense, (that is, *symbolically* or *spiritually*,) by receiving what God has *instituted* as a *symbol* and *instrument* to convey it. Copronymus does not say, that the elements are really and truly *that body*: no, that was the very position of the adverse party. But he affirms that we truly and really *receive* that very body, though symbolically, or by an *appointed* medium and pledge of it: which I understand to be exactly the same doctrine that our Church teaches, viz. that the body and blood of Christ are "verily "and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's "Supper[l]." This doctrine did not happen to please the Nicene Fathers, who sat thirty-three years after, in the year 787. It was not sufficient to say, that by or with the elements we do verily and indeed *receive* Christ's body and blood, but the *elements* themselves must *literally* be the *very body* and the *very blood* of Christ, and not types or pledges only of it[m]. Not indeed in the sense of Papal *transubstantiation*, (which was not then

[i] Ἀληθῆ τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰκόνα——ἣν αὐτὸς ὁ ἱεροτελεστὴς καὶ Θεὸς——εἰς τύπον καὶ ἀνάμνησιν ἐναργεστάτην τοῖς αὐτοῦ μύσταις παραδέδωκε. P. 368.

[k] Ἐκέλευσεν τοῖς ἁγίοις αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς καὶ ἀποστόλοις, παραδοῦναι δι' οὗ ἠράσθη πράγματος τύπον εἰς σῶμα αὐτοῦ. Ἵνα διὰ τῆς ἱερατικῆς ἀναγωγῆς, κἂν εἰ ἐκ μετοχῆς καὶ θέσει γίνηται, λάβωμεν αὐτό, ὡς κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς, σῶμα αὐτοῦ. *Constantin. Copronym. in Notis ad Damascen.* tom. i. p. 354. As to the ecclesiastical *use* and *sense* of the word κυρίως, see Albertinus, p. 461. Claude, part ii. p. 76.

[l] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 606, 696.

[m] Οὔτε ὁ Κύριος, οὔτε οἱ Ἀπόστολοι, ἢ πατέρες εἰκόνα εἶπον—ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ αἷμα.——μετὰ δὲ τὸν ἁγιασμὸν σῶμα κυρίως καὶ αἷμα Χριστοῦ λέγονται, καὶ εἰσὶ, καὶ πιστεύονται. *Concil. Nicen.* ii. Act. vi. p. 370, 371. Harduin, tom. iv.

thought on[n],) but in some such sense as Anastasius or Damascen had before recommended.

Seven years after (viz. A. D. 794.) appeared the Caroline books, moderating in the dispute between the Councils of Constantinople and Nice. The author or authors of them determine that the Sacrament of our Lord's body and blood goes much beyond a *picture* of man's device, in many respects; which they handsomely enumerate[o]: and of that no man can doubt. They determine further, that the elements are not *types* of things *future*, nor faint *shadows*, like those under the *law*, but that they are *truth* and *substance*[p]; a sacrament and mystery, commemorative of a thing *performed*, and not prefigurative of a thing *hoped* for only, or *promised:* a sacrament directly and plainly signifying and exhibiting the *true expiation*, and not merely under the *dark* covers or *remote* innuendos of *legal* expiations. In short, the eucharistical symbols are not *prefigurations* of things expected, but *evidences* of things done, and *memorials* of mercies and blessings in hand, not in prospect only. Their whole meaning seems to be, that though the consecrated elements are really *signs* and *symbols*, (for so much they intimate in the words *sacrament*, *mystery*, and *true image*,) and therefore not the *very body and blood*, as many then taught; yet they are more than *types*, or *prefigurations*, or *adumbrations*, or even *bare* memorials, because they *exhibit* the things signified, and that not *darkly* or *indirectly*, (which even the Jewish sacraments did[q],) but *directly* and *plainly*, under the strongest light, and to greatest advantage.

[n] Ibid. Albertinus, p. 915. Covel, p. 151, 152.

[o] Distat *Sacramentum* Dominici corporis et sanguinis ab *imaginibus* pictorum arte depictis, &c. *Carol. Magn.* lib. ii. p. 278.

[p] Nec nobis legis transeuntibus umbris imaginarium quoddam indicium, sed sui sanguinis et corporis contulit Sacramentum. Non enim sanguinis et corporis Dominici mysterium *imago* jam nunc dicendum est, sed *veritas;* non *umbra*, sed *corpus;* non exemplar *futurorum*, sed id quod exemplaribus præfigurabatur.—Jam verus Melchizedech, Christus videlicet, rex justus, rex pacis, non *pecudum* victimas, sed *sui* nobis corporis et sanguinis contulit Sacramentum. Nec ait, Hæc est *imago* corporis et sanguinis mei, sed Hoc est *corpus meum* ——Cum ergo, ut præfati sumus, nec *artificum opus*, vera Christi possit imago dici, nec corporis et sanguinis ejus mysterium, quod *in veritate* gestum esse constat, non *in figura*, merito, &c. *Carol. Magn. de Imagin.* lib. iv. p. 520. Conf. Albertin. p. 916, 917. Jewel's Answer to Hard. art. xii. p. 344, 345. Bilson's Christian Subject, p. 593. Claude, part i. book v. chap. 9. p. 96, 97. L'Arroque, p. 380, &c.

[q] Idem itaque in mysterio cibus et potus illorum qui noster, sed *significatione* idem, non *specie:* quia idem ipse Christus illis in petra *figuratus*, nobis in carne *manifestatus*. *Augustin. in Psal.* lxxvii. p. 816.

This doctrine is sound and good, and well guarded, in the main, against both extremes. Only, it might have been wished, that they had been less scrupulous about the use of the name *figure*, or *image*, (so common and familiar in elder times,) and that they had given less countenance to the novel and affected phrases then coming into vogue: for, generally speaking, *ancient doctrine* is best kept up by adhering strictly to *ancient language;* and *new phrases* at any time, taken up without necessity, have been observed to lead the way to a *new faith.*

Hitherto, however, the *western* parts appear to have retained just ideas of the holy Eucharist. But before the end of the ninth century, the *eastern* innovations, introduced by Anastasius and Damascen, and established by the Nicene Council, spread wide and far, both among Greeks and Latins. When it was once resolved that the consecrated elements should be no longer *signs* or *figures* at all, but the *very* body and blood of Christ, the *symbolical* language of Scripture and Fathers became *neglected*, and in a while *forgotten;* and the old notion of a *sacrament*, as importing a *sign* and a *thing signified,* wore off apace: and now all the care was, how to make out that *very body and blood,* by some subtile evasions or newly devised theories. Many are the wanderings of human invention, after men have once departed from the right way; as sufficiently appeared from the great variety of systems soon set up, instead of the only *ancient* and *true* system: and they were all but as so many different *modifications* of one and the same error, committed in sinking the idea of *symbolical* grants, and thereupon confounding *figure* and *verity,* exalting *signs* into *things signified.* But let us inquire more particularly what ways were taken, or could be taken, to make it competently appear, that the elements once consecrated are *no signs*, but the *very body and blood* of Christ. They are reducible perhaps to *five*, as follows: 1. Either the elements must literally *become* the same *personal* body. 2. Or they must literally *contain* or inclose the same *personal* body. 3. Or they must literally become *another* personal body. 4. Or they must literally contain *another* personal body. 5. Or they must literally be or contain a *true* and *proper* body of Christ, distinct and different from a *personal* body.

1. As to the first, it was undoubtedly the thing aimed at by the first *innovators;* namely, by Anastasius, and Damascen, and the Nicene Fathers. And they endeavoured to make it out in the way of *augmentation,* as has been related, joining the new-

made body here to the *personal* body above, so as to make one personal body of both. Another shorter way of coming at the point was that of *transubstantiation*, which crept in later, and which the Latins generally fell into; for *relief*, as it seems, to wearied minds, fluctuating in uncertainties, and not knowing how or where to rest.

2. As to the second way, which has been called *consubstantiation*, some think that Paschasius Radbert (about A. D. 831.) took into it[r]: others conceive that it came in later[s].

3. As to the third way, some have imagined that our Lord's *Divinity* becomes personally united with the *elements*, as well as with his own *natural* body, having in that sense *two* personal bodies. This conceit has sometimes gone under the name of *assumption*[t], as it imports the Deity's *assuming* the elements into a *personal union;* and sometimes it has ben called *impanation*, a name following the analogy of the word *incarnation*. Rupertus Tuitiensis (about A. D. 1111.) has been believed to espouse this notion[u]; and Odo Cameracensis[w], who lived about the same time. It is much the same notion that St. Austin supposes *ignorant* children might be apt to conceive, in their simplicity, at the first hearing of what is said of the elements, and before they come to *know better*[x]. So simple were even famous Divines grown in the late and dark ages.

4. As to the fourth way, those who have supposed some *spiritual* and *personal* body from above, distinct from the *natural*, to come upon the elements, and to abide in them and with them, have had some colour for it from two very *ancient* passages, one

[r] Cosin. Histor. Transubstant. p. 86. Conf. Albertinus, p. 922. But others interpret him of *transubstantiation*. See Claude, part ii. p. 198, &c.

[s] Hospinian. Histor. Rei Sacram. p. 6.

[t] N. B. *Assumption* has been also a common name for Damascen's hypothesis, wherein it is supposed that the Divinity *assumes* the elements into a *personal* union, but by the *medium* of the natural and personal body. Vid. Pfaffius de Consecrat. p. 450. Buddæus, Miscell. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 80.

[u] Vid. Hospinian. p. 7. Albertinus, p. 959, 960. Pfaffius de Consecrat. Euch. p. 449, 450. Buddæus, Miscellan. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 80.

[w] Fac ergo Domine, nostram oblationem adscriptam, ut pretiosum corpus Christi fiat, *Verbo Dei* adunata, et in *unitate personæ* conjuncta. *Odo. Cameracens. in Sacr. Can. Exposit. Bibl. PP.* tom. vi. p. 360.

[x] Infantes——si nunquam discant experimento, vel suo vel aliorum, et nunquam illam speciem rerum videant, nisi inter celebrationes sacramentorum, cum offertur et datur, dicaturque illis authoritate gravissima, cujus corpus et sanguis sit, nihil aliud credent, nisi omnino in illa specie *Dominum* oculis apparuisse mortalium, et de latere tali percusso liquorem illum omnino fluxisse. *Augustin. de Trin.* lib. iii. c. 10. p. 803. Conf. Albertin. p. 648, 649.

of Clemens Alexandrinus, and another of Jerome[y]. But it hath been abundantly shewn, time after time, by learned and able men, that that ancient distinction ought not to be understood of two personal bodies of Christ, but of two distinct *views* or *considerations* of one and the same natural and personal body[z]. The celebrated Bertram, (that is, Ratramn,) of the ninth century, has been by some supposed to be of the number of those who made *two* such *bodies* of Christ. There is some appearance of it, but, I think, *appearance* only: for upon carefully weighing and considering his real sentiments, it will be found, that he supposed only a sacramental body received *orally*, and the natural body received *spiritually* in the *Eucharist*[a].

5. There is yet a fifth way, which prevailed with many, as high as the ninth century; which was to imagine some kind of union of our Lord's *Divinity* with the consecrated elements, short of *personal*, but yet presumed sufficient to denominate them in a *true* and *proper* sense (as opposed to *symbolical*) the *Lord's body and blood*. Remigius[b], who flourished about the year 890, conceived, that our Lord's *Divinity* filling the *natural* body and the *mystical*, viz. the Church, and the *consecrated elements*, made all the three to become *one body* of Christ. It is observable, that

[y] Διττὸν δὲ τὸ αἷμα Κυρίου· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ σαρκικὸν, ᾧ τῆς φθόρας λελυτρώμεθα· τὸ δὲ πνευματικὸν, τουτέστιν ᾧ κεχρίσμεθα: *Clem. Alex. Pædag.* lib. ii. c. 2. p. 177. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 587.

Dupliciter vero sanguis Christi, et caro intelligitur: vel spiritualis illa et divina, de qua ipse dixit *caro mea vere est cibus;* vel caro et sanguis, quæ crucifixa est, et qui militis effusus est lancea. *Hieron. in Ephes.* p. 327. Opp. tom. iv. edit. Bened.

[z] Beza de Cœna Domini, p. 93. Jewel's Answer to Harding, art. v. p. 248, 249. Albertinus, p. 315, 395. Rivet in Consult. de Relig. p. 26. Chamier, tom. iv. p. 695. Spalatensis, lib. v. c. 6. p. 103.

[a] Bertram de Corpore et Sanguine Domini, p. 16, 24, 36, 40, 96, 100, 114, 116. edit. Anglo-Latin. Lond. A. D. 1686.

[b] *Caro* quam *Verbum* Dei Patris assumpsit in utero Virginali, in unitate suæ personæ, et *panis* qui consecratur in Ecclesia, *unum corpus* Christi sunt. Sicut enim *illa caro* corpus Christi est, ita *iste panis* transit in corpus Christi; nec sunt *duo* corpora, sed *unum* corpus. Divinitatis enim plenitudo quæ fuit in illa, *replet* et istum panem, &c.——et sicut ille panis et sanguis in corpus Christi transeunt, ita omnes qui in Ecclesia *digne* comedunt illud, *unum* Christi *corpus* sunt.——Tamen illa *caro* quam assumpsit, et iste *panis*, omnisque *Ecclesia* non faciunt *tria* corpora Christi, sed *unum* corpus. *Remig. Antissiodorensis* (alias Haymo) *in* 1 *Cor.* x. p. 132.

Sicut *caro* Christi quam assumpsit in utero Virginali, *verum* corpus ejus est, et pro nostra salute occisum, ita *panis* quem Christus tradidit discipulis suis——et quem quotidie consecrant sacerdotes in Ecclesia, cum virtute *Divinitatis* quæ illum *replet* panem, *verum* corpus Christi est; nec sunt *duo corpora* illa caro quam assumpsit, et iste panis, sed unum *verum corpus* faciunt Christi. *Id. in* 1 *Cor.* xi. p. 137. Conf. Albertin. p. 938.

he admits of but one of the three to be Christ's body in the *personal* sense: but having a *confuse* notion of some *remote* union of each with the *Logos*, which was *common* to them all, he therefore called each of them singly a *true* body of Christ, and all conjunctly *one true* body. The like account may be seen in the book de Divinis Officiis[c], falsely ascribed to Alcuinus of the eighth century, written probably in the eleventh century or later. The sum is, that because one of the three is truly Christ's body in a *symbolical* sense, and the other truly his body in a *mystical* sense, and the third in a *true* and *proper sense;* therefore all the three are severally a *true* body of Christ, and together *one true* body. Such were the rovings of men bewildered in their ways, after they had deserted the old paths. It is however worth the observing, that this author was very solicitous to avoid the suspicion of making two *true bodies* of Christ, which Christian ears could not bear: and further, that he retained so much of the *ancient* principles, under clouds of confusion, as to suppose the *Logos* to be the heavenly *food* of the Eucharist, and he resolves the *formal* reason of the name of *Lord's body* into some *immediate* relation to the *person* of Christ. I do not find that the *third* Person's filling the elements with *himself*, or with his *graces*, was hitherto supposed the *immediate ground* or *formal reason* of their having the name of *Christ's body:* or had it so been, the *element* of Baptism, upon the *analogy* observed by the *ancients*, would most certainly have had a better title to the name. For the Holy Ghost was supposed more immediately to preside, as it were, in that Sacrament, under the *figure* of a *conjugal union*, as before mentioned: and even as low as Damascen, we find, that while the *grace of the Spirit* was said to be joined with the *oil* and the *water*, the very *Divinity* of the second Person was supposed to be joined with the *elements* of the Eucharist[d].

I am sensible that a great show of authorities has been produced, in order to persuade us, that, according to the *ancients*, the *third* Person was presumed to *make* the elements the *body* and *blood* of Christ[e]. But out of twenty-two authorities, seventeen, as I conceive, either *must* or *may* be understood of the *second* Person[f], the Λόγος, often called *Spirit:* and the *five*

[c] Pseudo-Alcuinus de Divin. Off. cap. 40.

[d] See above, p. 198, 199.

[e] Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 187—195.

[f] 1. Ignatius. 2. Justin Martyr. 3. Irenæus. 4. Clemens Alexandrinus. 5. Origen. 6. Cyprian. 7. Athanasius. 8. Julius Firmicus. 9. Nazianzen. 10. Epiphanius. 11. Gregory Nyssen.

remaining authorities prove only, that the *Holy Ghost*[5] makes the elements *sacraments*, or *sanctified* symbols, or an *holy body*, fitting them for the uses intended, and *preparing* the communicants at the same time. The Holy Ghost prepares both the *symbols* and the *guests:* but still it is the *Logos*, the *incarnate Logos*, who is properly the *spiritual food* or *feast*, according to Scripture and all Catholic antiquity; and that not as *residing*, by his Divinity, in the *elements*, but as *adsistant* only, or *concomitant;* and that to the *worthy* only. But I pass on.

I have been observing something of the various wanderings and mazes which thoughtful men fell into, after the *change* of doctrine introduced in the seventh century. For from thence came *augmentation, assumption, impanation, composition, consubstantiation, transubstantiation, local presence*, and *oral* manducation of the *res sacramenti, inherent* virtues, *bread-sacrifice, bread-worship*, and the like; all issuing from the same source, all springing from the same root; namely, from that *servilis infirmitas*, which St. Austin speaks of, the mistaking *signs* for *things*, and *figure* for *verity*.

The *Reformation*, as is well known, commenced in the sixteenth century, and then this high subject came to be reconsidered, and to be set in a proper light, upon the foundation of *Scripture* and *antiquity*. But disputes arose even among *Protestants*. For though the *later* and *grosser* corruptions of the Latin Church were soon thrown off, with general consent, yet some of the *older* and more *refined* depravations of the Greeks were not easily distinguished (in those infant days of criticism) from what was truly ancient, but had made too deep an impression upon the minds of many serious persons. The nature of *symbolical* grants and *constructional* conveyances was not so well considered as might have been wished. Many understood not what *eating* could mean, unless it were conceived to be *oral* and *literal:* neither could they suddenly bring their minds to comprehend how a thing could be said to be given and received at the supper, without being literally, locally *present* in the supper, in the very *tokens* or *pledges* of the heavenly things there made over to every faithful communicant. As if *liery* and *seisin*

12. Ephræm. Syrus. Vid. Albertin. 453. 13. Gaudentius. 14. Cyrill. Alex. See Albertin. 454. 15. Gelasius. 16. Theodorite. 17. Pseud-Ambrose.

[5] Cyril. Hierosol., Optatus, Chrysostom, Austin, and Council of Constantinople.

might not be given and taken by proper instruments: or as if a *ring*, a *book*, a *crosier*, or other tokens of investiture, might not convey lands, honours, dignities, without being inwardly *enriched* with[h], or outwardly *converted into* the very things themselves which they so convey. For as any person becomes legally vested in an estate by the delivering and receiving of *deeds*, though he does not literally take the lands and tenements in his hands, nor grasp them in his arms; so may a person, in construction of *Divine law*, be vested in or possessed of the Lord's *body and blood*, and whatever depends thereupon, without literally receiving the same into his mouth. The notion is a very plain and easy notion, that one might justly wonder how it came to pass, that even Divines of good note should not hit upon it at first; or if they did, should slight it[i].

Our Divines, as Cranmer, Jewel, Hooker, &c. (to do them justice,) understood this matter perfectly well. Neither do I know of any considerable person amongst our *early Reformers* who missed the right thought: unless perhaps we may except the great Bishop Poynet, in his exile at Strasburg, where he died A. D. 1556. He drew up his Diallacticon abroad, with a truly pious and pacific design, hoping to contribute something towards healing the then reigning differences between Lutherans and Calvinists, upon the subject of the Eucharist. The treatise was not published till after his death[k]: a short preface was

[h] See Review, vol. iv. p. 571, 572. Sicut sigillum principis vere est non otiosum, sed *efficax*, nulla tamen sibi *indita virtute*, sed *authoritate* duntaxat principis quasi *comitante*: sic Sacramenta, quæ in *signis* et *signaculis* esse negare nullus potest,——etsi nulla in rebus externis *vi indita* agant in animas hominum, aut in gratiam quæ in iis quæritur, tamen non desinunt esse instrumenta *efficacia*, tanquam σημεῖα καὶ σφραγῖδες. *Chemier*, tom. iv. p. 57.

[i] It is marvellous to observe, how from the time of Paschasius Radbert, of the ninth century, down to the sixteenth, almost the whole Latin Church were imposed upon themselves, or imposed upon others, by *confounding* two very distinct propositions with each other, as if they were the *same*. They saw plainly, both in Scripture and Fathers, that *the natural body of Christ is the thing signified, and received by the faithful in the Eucharist*: that is to say, received *with* the elements, *spiritually* received. Had they rested there, all had been right. But by slipping a *false* consequence, or false comment, upon *true* premises, they inadvertently changed that *sound* proposition into this very *unsound* one: that *the elements are that very natural body, locally present, and orally received by every communicant*. They had lost the idea of a *symbolical* and *constructional* reception; which requires neither *local* presence nor *corporal* contact.

[k] Diallacticon viri boni et literati, de veritate, natura, atque substantia corporis et sanguinis Christi in Eucharistia. 1557. First edition. Strasburg. 1573. Second edition. Geneva. At the end of Beza's Opuscula. 1576. Third edition. At the end of Harchius. 1688. Fourth edition. London. By Dr. Pelling.

prefixed to it by the editor, supposed to be Sturmius[l]. I shall give a brief account of the author's main principles, using the octavo edition of 1576.

He was a religious admirer of the *ancient* Fathers: but as their works were not at that time critically distinguished, he was often misled, even in the main lines of his *hypothesis*, by *spurious* pieces or passages; quoting several material things under the admired names of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Austin, which belonged not to them, but were some of them as late as the twelfth century. Many passages of Austin and others stand only on the credit of Gratian, an author of the eleventh or twelfth century. And it is known that the piece De Cœna, ascribed to Cyprian, belongs to Arnoldus, who wrote about A. D. 1140. Under these disadvantages, it is the less to be wondered at, if the excellent author did not every where hit that ancient truth which he sincerely sought for.

1. In the first place, he appears to carry the notion of *inherent* virtues or graces, as lodged in the *elements* themselves, much too far[m]. And he seems to make the conjunction of grace and element *absolute* and *physical*[n]. By which means, he found himself at length involved in insuperable perplexities upon the point of *adoration* of the elements[o], and the communion of the *unworthy*[p]: though he endeavoured to get off from both, as handsomely as the thing would bear. Our other more cautious Divines of that time, as Cranmer and Jewel, had no concern with those *perplexities*, any more than the ancient *Fathers* had: for they avoided the main principle from which those difficulties arose; yea, and flatly contradicted it[q].

[l] See the French Supplement to Bayle's Dictionary, in the article *Poinet*.

[m] Vim vitæ signis externis inditam, p. 53. Virtutem [veri corporis] vitalem conjunctam habet, p. 79. Virtus ipsius corporis efficax et vivifica—cum pane et vino conjungitur, p. 83. Intus abditam et latentem naturalem ejusdem corporis proprietatem, hoc est, vivificam virtutem, secum trahat, p. 83. Virtutem veri corporis spiritualem habet, p. 88. Virtus autem interna, quæ vi Divini Verbi accedit, p. 118. Virtute benedictionis mysticæ vim insitam, p. 119.

[n] Si gratiam et virtutem veri corporis *cum pane et vino conjungi* credamus, nimium *elementis* tribuere videbimur, p. 107. Divina virtus abesse a signo non potest, qua Sacramentum est, p. 112. Sacramenta quam diu Sacramenta sint, suam retinere virtutem, nec ab ea posse separari, p. 114.

[o] P. 107, &c. [p] P. 112.

[q] See Cranmer's Preface, cited in Review, vol. iv. p. 601, and compare Review, p. 530, 680. Bishop Jewel writes thus: "We are taught, not to "seek that *grace* in the *sign*, but to "assure ourselves by receiving the "sign, that it is given us by the *thing* "*signified*.——It is not the creature "of *bread* or *water*, but the *soul* of

2. The very worthy author appears not to have guarded sufficiently against the notion of *two* true bodies of Christ, *natural* above, and *spiritual* below, in the Eucharist: which is what the mild and moderate Cassander, very tenderly, charged him with; intimating, that he had put the *distinction* wrong between *body* and *body*, (as if there were two *true* bodies,) instead of distinguishing between the *different manner* of exhibiting or receiving one and the same *natural* body[r]. And so far Cassander judged very rightly, and conformably to the ancients: only as he chose to distinguish between a *visible* and *invisible* manner, he should rather have expressed it in the terms of *literal* and *spiritual;* which is the true distinction.

Bishop Cosin[s], speaking of Bishop Poynet, represents him (if there be not some error of the press) as making that very distinction which Cassander wished he had made, or which he suggested, by way of correction, as preferable to Poynet's. I say, Bishop Cosin represents Poynet as doing the very thing which Cassander required, and mostly in Cassander's own words, without naming him. Yet it is plain enough, that that distinction which Cosin ascribes to Poynet was not his, but Cassander's: wherefore I suspect some error of the *press* or of the *editor*, (as might easily happen in a *posthumous* piece,) and

" man that *receiveth* the *grace* of God. " These corruptible creatures need it " not: we have need of God's grace. " But this is a phrase of speech. For " the *power* of God, the *grace* of " God, the *presence* of the Trinity, " the *Holy Ghost*, the *gift* of God, are " not in the *water*, but in *us:* and we " were not made because of the Sa- " craments; but the Sacraments were " made for our sake." *Jewel's Treatise of the Sacraments*, p. 263. fol. ed. Compare Def. of Apol. p. 208, 238.

[r] Quæ de *duplici* Christi corpore (Bertramum secutus) erudite disserit, facile aliquos offendat, quibus ex verbis Christi persuasum est, et quidem *vere*, non aliud corpus in Sacramento fidelibus dari, quam quod a Christo pro fidelium salute in mortem traditum fuit. Quamvis autem hic distinctione aliqua opus sit, malim tamen illam ad *modum* præsentiæ et exhibitionis quam ad *ipsam rem subjectam*, hoc est, *corpus Christi*, adhiberi. Commodius itaque, et ad docendum accommodatius, et Christi instituto convenientius, et ad conciliationem aptius dici videtur, ipsum Christi corpus pro nobis traditum, etiam in Eucharistia fidelibus tradi; adhibita Augustini distinctione: " Ipsum quidem, " et non ipsum; ipsum invisibiliter, " et non ipsum visibiliter, &c." *Cassander, Epist.* p. 1084. Conf. Rivet. Animadv. ad Consult. p. 30. Apologet. p. 102. Grotii Opp. tom. iii. 621, 643, 660, 668.

[s] Licet discrimen ipse cum Patribus agnoscat inter *corpus Christi* formam humani corporis *naturalem* habens, et quod in Sacramento est *corpus* mysticum, *maluit* tamen discrimen illud *ad modum præsentiæ et exhibitionis, quàm ad ipsam rem subjectam, hoc est, Christi corpus* verum, accommodari; quum certissimum sit, *non aliud corpus in Sacramento fidelibus dari nisi quod a Christo pro fidelium salute in mortem traditum fuit. Cosin. Hist. Transubst.* p. 10.

that Cosin really wrote *malim*, not *maluit*, making Cassander's censure his *own*. But of this let the considerate readers of both judge, as they see cause. Certain however it is, that Bishop Cosin (with all our other learned and judicious Divines) was zealous against the notion of two *true* bodies of Christ, and very strongly asserted, yea, and often inculcated, in that small treatise, where he had not much room to spare, that the *natural* body is the *thing signified*, the thing spiritually *given* and *received* by the *faithful* in the Eucharist. He was well aware, how much depended upon that *momentous* principle; as well because it was the *safe*, the *only* clue to lead serious Christians through all the labyrinths of contending parties, as also because it was fixing the economy of man's salvation upon its true and firm *basis*, which is this: that in the Sacraments we are made and continued *members* of Christ's *body, of his flesh, and of his bones*[t]. Our *union* with the *Deity* rests entirely in our *mystical* union with our Lord's *humanity*, which is *personally* united with his *Divine nature*, which is *essentially* united with God the *Father*, the head and fountain of all. So stands the economy; which shews the high *importance* of the principle before mentioned. And it is well that Romanists, and Lutherans, and Greeks also, even the whole East and West, have preserved it, and yet preserve it: though some of them have miserably corrupted it by the *wood, hay*, and *stubble*, which they have *built* upon it; namely, by a *local* presence, a *literal* exhibition, and an *oral* manducation, with other the like *novel* additions or defalcations. But I return.

Twenty years after Poynet, a very learned physician, a German, building upon the same principles, and being much more sanguine and self-confident, pursued it to far greater lengths in two several treatises[u], bearing different running titles[x]. His name

[t] Ephes. v. 30.

[u] De *Eucharistiæ* Mysterio, Dignitate, et Usu: ex unanimi primitivæ Ecclesiæ Consensu, ad omnium eorum qui Christi Nomen profitentur, sedandas Controversias. Libri tres. 4to. Jodoco Harchio, Montense Medico, autore. Wormatiæ. 1573.

Orthodoxorum Patrum——Fides de *Eucharistia* et *Sacrificio* universali Ecclesiæ: ad Pontificiorum et Evangelicorum cognoscendas, dirimendasque Controversias, pro Christi Gloria, et Ecclesiarum Pace. Per Jodocum Harchium, Montensem Medicum. A. D. 1576. 8vo.

[x] The running title of the first: Concordia de Cœna.

The running title of the second: Patrum Consensus de Eucharistia.

N. B. Hospinian says, this last was printed A. D. 1577. Hospin. Histor. Sacram. part ii. p. 354. Which may be true: for I take the date 1576, not from the title-page, (which has no date,) but from the end of the preface, written in 1576.

was Harchius. It was a vast undertaking for that time. He set himself at once to oppose Romanists, Lutherans, and Calvinists, (*three sects*, as he called them[y],) condemning them all as guilty of great errors in the article of the *Eucharist*, and proposing a *fourth* system, wherein they should all unite. He boasted highly of the *Fathers*, as full and clear on his side[z]: he filled his two books with quotations of that kind: some *genuine* and some *spurious*, some *ancient* and some *middle-aged*, some *Greek* and some *Latin;* many of them *misconstrued*, more *misapplied*, but all made to serve the *system*[a] which he had before formed in his mind. As the attempt was considerable in its way, and commendable for its good meaning; and as it may be of use to know what the *system* was, and how *received*, and how *confuted*, (for *confuted* it was by a very able hand,) I shall here take the pains to draw out the chief lines of it, and next to exhibit a brief summary of the *answer* then made to it.

1. He pleads much for an *invocation* of the *Holy Ghost* in the Communion Offices[b]; and he speaks often of some *illapse* either of the *second* or *third* Person upon the *elements*, or else of some *virtue* of *life*, some *spiritual* and *eternal* gift, sent down from above, upon the consecrated bread and wine[c].

2. He asserts a spiritual and marvellous *change* thereby made in the *elements*, but not destroying either their *substance* or their *figure:* a change of *qualities*, and a *melioration*, as it were, of the *substance* itself, by the powerful operation of the *Holy Ghost* and the supervening of the *Logos*[d]: on account of which change, he talks frequently of the elements as *passing into* the *virtue* of Christ's body and blood[e]. Sometimes he calls it *passing* into the

[y] Harch. Patr. Consens. p. 183, 230.

[z] Ibid. idem, p. 77, 127, 129, 270, 278.

[a] A brief summary of his *system*, in his own words, is as here follows: Panis Eucharistiæ est corpus quoddam *sanctum*, consecratione sacerdotum factum *divinum;* existens veluti *imago, repræsentatio*, seu *sacramentum* proprii et animati corporis Christi quod in cœlo est; *impletum* a Christo *Spiritu Sancto* et *Verbo:* ut *offeratur* (mystice) Deo Patri, per ministerium *sacerdotum;* deinde ut *sumatur* ab omnibus fidelibus, &c.——in fide et charitate, *ore* et *corde*, ad remissionem peccatorum——in spem resurrectionis et vitæ æternæ, simul et ad memoriam passionis Christi, &c. Hæc definitio vera est et catholica, et a nobis in hoc libro probanda. *Harch. Patr. Consens.* p. 93. Conf. p. 68, 79.

[b] Harch. Patr. Consens. p. 25, 96, 98, 100. Concord. p. 146.

[c] Ibid. Concord. p. 14, 45, 49, 79, 92. Patr. Consens. p. 56, 115, 151, 157, 168.

[d] Ibid. idem, p. 30, &c. 75, 82, 83, 86, 146. Patr. Consens. p. 54, 69, 100, 157, 185.

[e] Ibid. idem, p. 32, 35, 39, 45, 47, 53, 74, 79, 105.

flesh of Christ, or *substance* of his body: but then he interprets it to mean, not the *personal* body or substance, but *another* very like it, or near akin to it in virtue; which he denominates a *spiritual* body, to distinguish it from the *natural* and *personal* body[f].

3. He makes this pretended *spiritual* body sometimes the body of the *Divine Spirit*, meaning Christ's own *Divine Hypostasis*[g]; sometimes, the body of the *Word* and *Spirit* together[h]; and sometimes of the *Divine essence*, or whole *Trinity*[i].

4. But as he could not admit of a *personal* union between the Deity and the bread-body, without calling it *Christ*, and *Lord*, and *God*, he was content to call it a *creature*, but a *most noble* creature[k]; an *image* of the natural body, but not full and adequate; extremely like it in power and energy, but not perfectly equal[l]: a *true*, and *holy*, and *Divine*, but *inanimate* figure, while full of the *Word*, and of the *Spirit*, and of *grace*, and of *life*[m].

5. He supposed two *true* bodies of *Christ*; one in heaven above, another in the Eucharist below: one *natural*, and eaten by *contemplation* and *faith* at all times; the other *spiritual*, and eaten in the Eucharist both with *mind* and with *mouth*[n]. He conceived them to be so *nearly* the same thing, that they might be reckoned as *one flesh*, but yet considering that there was some *inequality*, he rather chose to make them *two*[o].

6. He maintained an *infusion* of the *Divine essence*[p], or of Christ[q], or of some *virtue* of Christ's flesh[r], into the elements: an *inhabitation*[s] also, and *union*[t], and *mixture*[u] with the same.

7. He once supposed, that the spiritual body in the Eucharist is not so fully or perfectly Christ's body as every good Christian is[x]; but he appears to have changed his mind afterwards, upon

[f] Harch. Concord. p. 33, 35, 39, 45, 53, 74, 105. Patr. Consens. p. 69.
[g] Ibid. idem, p. 15, 16. Patr. Consens. p. 28, 42, 47, 69.
[h] Ibid. Patr. Consens. p. 29, 42, 46, 48, 53, 69, 98, 114, 128, 180.
[i] Ibid. Concord. p. 31, 48, 70, 74. Patr. Consens. p. 91, 167, 172, 182, 183.
[k] Ibid. idem, p. 36, 37, 38, 75, 76, 82, 83.
[l] Ibid. idem, p. 36, 38, 53, 54, 65, 94, 95. Patr. Consens. p. 68, 79, 91, 117, 250.
[m] Ibid. Patr. Consens. p. 68, 76, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 112, 131, 147.
[n] Ibid. Concord. p. 27, 55, 70, 81.
[o] Ibid. Patr. Consens. p. 215, 216.
[p] Ibid. Concord. p. 31, 48, 70, 74. Patr. Consens. p. 74, 76.
[q] Ibid. Concord. p. 28, 31, 39, 48. Patr. Consens. p. 74, 77, 225.
[r] Ibid. Patr. Consens. p. 128, 182, 209, 215.
[s] Ibid. Concord. p. 56, 57, 63. 68, 74. Patr. Consens. p. 50, 91.
[t] Ibid. idem, p. 15, 57, 71. Patr. Consens. p. 46, 48, 50, 58, 68, 70, 71, 91, 121.
[u] Ibid. Patr. Consens. p. 28, 126, 131, 134, 181, 193, 204.
[x] Ibid Concord. p. 25, 48, 60, 64.

a supposal that the *fulness* of the *Godhead* resides in the elements, and not ordinarily in *good* men[y].

8. He supposed the *spiritual* body to be the vicarious *substitute* of the *natural;* not *equal* in power or virtue, but approximate[z].

9. The spiritual body, not being *hypostatically* united with the *Divinity*[a], has no title in his scheme (as he supposed) to formal *adoration;* but must be *reverenced* only, or highly *venerated*[b].

10. He supposed the elements to *contain* within them the *grace* of Christ's body, the nature of the *Word* and *Spirit*, and the *essential* powers of Christ's body in a *permanent* way, abiding as long as the elements may serve for food[c].

11. He imagined *brutes*, upon devouring the elements, to devour *them* only: but *unworthy* communicants are supposed to *receive* the *Deity* besides, but as a *judge* and an *avenger;* as a *burning coal*, or a *consuming fire*, not to save, but to destroy them[d].

12. He maintained an *oral* manducation (as of course he must) of the eternal *Word*, of the *Divine* substance, and of essential grace[e].

13. As to the *sacrifice*, he was reasonably modest and cautious in his first piece. He lashed the Romanists on that head, all the way, and blamed some Protestants, but with tenderness[f], not denying them or others their just commendations[g]. He speaks handsomely of the first English Liturgy, as coming very near to the *primitive*, and particularly admires their *form* of *consecration*, beseeching God to sanctify the gifts with his *Holy Spirit* and *Word*[h]. He insisted much upon *self-sacrifice*, and the sacrifice of *alms*, and the *memorial* of our Lord's passion[i].

[y] Harch. Patr. Consens. p. 91, 154.

[z] Ibid. idem, p. 85, 112, 173, 174, 176.

[a] Ibid. Concord. p. 37, 63, 68, 86, 87, 105. Patr. Consens. p. 54, 91. 126, 173.

[b] Ibid. idem, p. 59, 60, 106. Patr. Consens. p. 52, 53, 54, 65, 130, 213, 217, 262.

[c] Ibid. idem, p. 89. Patr. Consens. p. 64, 83, 102, 175, 209, 213, 228.

[d] Ibid. idem, p. 41, 56, 71, 72, 87, 88. Patr. Consens. p. 61, 139. 140, 141, 175, 212.

[e] Ibid. idem, p. 15. Patr. Consens. p. 82, 93, 138, 151, 154; 174, 201, 212.

[f] Ne quis putet in posterum in Cœna Domini *nullum* esse *sacrificium:* quod ab Evangelicis *aliquot* doleo nimis impudenter *negatum*, aut *omissum*, neque in catechismis explicatum. *Harch. Concord.* p. 132.

[g] Legite, O pontificii, Liturgiam Justini, et putabitis institutam fuisse a Calvino. Legite et eam quæ fertur Jacobi, et quid, precor, differt ab ea quam instituit Lutherus? *Ibid.* p. 132.

[h] Harch. Concord. p. 145, 146.

[i] Ibid. idem, p. 52, 120, 131, 132, 133, 138, 139, 143, 147, 148, 158, 161, 167, 168, 171, 176.

He expressed some contempt of a *bread-sacrifice*, a sacrifice of signs and shadows[k]. Had he said, *signs and shadows of a sacrifice*, rather than *sacrifice of signs*, he had said better. However, he observed, that a sacrifice of *bread* and *wine* is never mentioned in *Scripture*, no, nor in the *Fathers;* except in such a qualified sense as Irenæus speaks of[l]. He had a particular fancy, that the elements should first be made food of, and then sacrificed from *within:* for so he hoped to avoid all *extrinsic* sacrifice, (condemned by Scripture,) and to account the better for the *order* of the words of *institution*[m]. Besides, it would suit the more aptly with another fancy of his, viz. that though the elements were the *body* of the *Logos* before manducation, yet they were not the body of Christ, *God-man*, till *eaten* and converted into *human flesh*[n].

14. In his second treatise he altered his notion of the *sacrifice* more ways than one: whether *disgusted* with the Protestants for slighting his kind offices, or whether further *instructed*, it is certain, that he came much nearer to the Popish sacrifice, and brought severer charges than before, both against Lutherans and Calvinists, as casting off the *visible* sacrifice of the Church[o]. He forgot his former speculations about the sacrifice *following* the manducation; for now he made it go *before*[p]. And whereas formerly he had disowned any *propitiatory* sacrifice[q], content with *gratulatory*, after the Protestant way, he now made it *properly* propitiatory, inventing a colour for it, viz. that *Christ* himself consecrates by the minister, *fills* the elements with the *Logos* and *Spirit*, is *present* with them, and offered by himself in them and with them[r].

15. As to our Lord's own sacrifice in the *original* Eucharist, he supposed him to have offered up that *spiritual body* there

[k] Harch. Concord. p. 120, 139, 143, 147, 155, 157, 158.

[l] De panis et vini hostia nusquam leges in *Scripturis*, imo neque in *Patribus;* nisi ea ratione offeramus panem et ejusmodi visibilia, quæ Irenæus vocat *creaturas*, ut non appareamus in conspectu Dei aut vacui aut ingrati. *Harch. Concord.* p. 171.

[m] Harch. Concord. p. 171, 174, 175.

[n] Etiamsi panis Eucharistiæ sit *virtute* caro Christi, et *realiter corpus Verbi* ante manducationem, tamen ut fiat *actu* vera caro, debet prius manducari, et nutritionis lege in *carnis* formam converti. *Harch. Concord.* p. 80.

[o] Harch. Patr. Consens. p. 38, 39, 40, 234, 270, &c. 281, 282, 285.

[p] Ibid. idem, p. 79, 274, 275.

[q] Ibid. Concord. p. 132, 143, 161.

[r] Ibid. idem, p. 240, 263. In hoc pane *præsens* et *oblatus*, p. 264. Hostia offertur, et grata est Patri, et simul *propitiatoria:* non ex se, sed oblata *per Christum*, p. 300.

made, that compound body of spirit and element: or else perhaps he offered up his own *natural body* to the Father, as it were *in effigy*, under the *symbols* of bread and wine[s].

16. His construction of the words of *institution* may be worth the noting as a particularity. He interprets the words, "This "is *my* body given for you," as if our Lord had said, "This is "my *spiritual body, given me* by my *Father*, for your consolation "and conservation[t]." A construction scarce tolerable, if there had not been worse invented for the same words, to serve the like purposes.

I beg pardon, if I have been tedious in recounting the rovings of that learned gentleman; which may have their use, and which were not so much owing to the weakness of the *writer*, (for I much question whether any one else could have performed better in that way,) as to the weakness of the *principle* which he had the misfortune to set out with. Whoever else should take in hand to *enrich* the elements, either with what belongs *to us*, or with what belongs to *God only*, could not reasonably expect to succeed any better than that ingenious writer did. He is to be commended however for adhering to the *sacrifice of the cross*[u], and for allowing, that the faithful partake of Christ's body *extra cœnam*[x], and that the ancient Patriarchs feasted upon the same *spiritual food* that we do now[y]. In other points where he judged ill, he appears to have intended well: for he certainly had a warm zeal for God, loved religion, (or what he esteemed such,) and had firmness enough to submit to a kind of voluntary *exile* for it; as he has left upon record[z].

What the Protestants, in general, thought of his *first* per-

[s] Christus in pane et vino accipiens, ut homo, a Patre corpus et sanguinem, *Verbi* scilicet æterni et *Spiritus*, obtulit illa eadem Deo Patri ad gratiarum actionem, agnoscens beneficium: vel in pane et vino obtulit, tanquam in *symbolis*, corpus suum proprium, sequenti die crucifigendum. *Harch. Patr. Consens.* p. 273, 274.

[t] Accipite hoc meum corpus, *Divini* mei *Spiritus*, quod *mihi* datur pro vobis *a Patre meo*, ad vestram consolationem, justificationem, vivificationem, conservationem. *Harch. Patr. Consens.* p. 28. conf. p. 29.

[u] Harch. Concord. p. 133.

[x] Ibid. idem, p. 31, 80, 82, 91. Patr. Consens. p. 142, 228, 229.

[y] Ibid. Patr. Consens. p. 200, 201, 202.

[z] Harch. Concord. in dedicatione. Mention also is made of a piece of his, printed in 1573, with this title: De Causis Hæresis, proque ejus Exilio, et Concordia Controversiarum in Religione, Hæreticorum, Pontificiorum, et Pœnitentium, Oratio ad Deum Patrem. Gesner, Epit. p. 515. This I have at second hand from Mr. Bayle, in the French Supplement to his Dictionary, in the article *Harchius*.

formance, and how coldly they received his *reconciling* scheme[a], he has himself declared in his preface to the *second*. They were offended, it seems, with him, for mistaking his talents, and meddling out of his sphere; they approved not of his interposing, without judgment, in theological debates, and admonished him to return to the business of his own profession. The Romanists were either silent, or more favourable in their censures, so far as appears: and he was suspected, by some of the Lutheran way, to incline more to the Popish than to the Protestant interests[b]. He was very impatient for some *answer*, thinking it a tribute of respect due to himself or to the subject: but he lived not to see any. Beza was preparing one[c], which appeared at length in the year 1580, some time after Harchius's decease. Beza had been dilatory in that matter, under a serious persuasion that such remote and fanciful speculations might best be left to die of themselves. But being at last overruled by friends, he submitted to undertake the work; as he tells us himself[d]. He complains frequently of the author's laboured *obscurity*, and of the difficulty of ascertaining his true and full meaning[e]. But to prevent any suspicion of unfairness, and to enable the readers to judge for themselves, he collected a competent number of passages out of Harchius's first treatise, and prefixed them to his own, filling more than forty pages with them.

After these preliminaries, he fell directly upon the *leading error* of the whole system: which was the making the elements *receptacles* either of the eternal *Word* or *Spirit*, or of some Divine *power* or *grace*, supposed to be *infused* into them, *inherent* in

[a] Conabar dissentientes inter se Evangelicos appellatos, (Lutheranos inquam,) et Calvinistas, sive Zuinglianos, conciliare.——Sed tantum abest ut ex meis laboribus ullam reportarem gratiam, ut ambobus in sua opinione licet dissimillima hærentibus, ambo me veluti risui et contemptui habentes, ad *medicæ* meæ professionis harenam indignabundi relegarint. *Harch. Patr. Consens.* in præfat.

[b] Quomodo *pontificii* me exceperint, vix possum conjecturis assequi, contra quos tamen potissimum omnia argumentorum meorum tela dirigebantur.—Verum quomodocunque in ea re mecum sentiant aut dissentiant *pontificii*, relatione tamen postmodum accepi, me potius *pontificium* quam *Evangelicum*, ab Evangelicis aliquot esse judicatum. *Harch. ibid.*

[c] De Cœna Domini, adversus Jodoci Harchii Montensis Dogmata, Theodori Bezæ Responsio. Genevæ. 1580. pages 8vo. 160. Reprinted in folio, among the Tractatus Theologici, (two volumes,) A. D. 1582. Genevæ. From p. 148. to p. 186.

[d] Beza contr. Harch. p. 4. 8vo. ed. alias p. 148. fol. edit.

[e] Ibid. p. 5, 49, 60, 147, 148. edit. prima.

them, *intrinsic* to them, and *permanent* with them. He calls it a most grievous error, full of *impiety*[f]: a notion altogether *unscriptural* and *absurd*[g]; yea, and *wilder* than either *consubstantiation* or *transubstantiation*, which it aimed to correct[h]. He proceeds to confute it at large, in a strong, masterly way, worthy of his great abilities. I shall endeavour to give you a *taste* of his performance, in a few particulars; though it must be a great disadvantage to it, to appear as it were in *miniature*, when the whole is so *close* and *concise*: but it is necessary, in a manner, to give some kind of summary view of it.

1. He observes, that the system proposed, under colour of magnifying the *signs* one way, really lessened and depreciated them another way, as making them *bare memorials* of what they ought spiritually to *exhibit*, namely, of the *natural* body, being in that respect made mere *signs*, (as any *picture* might be[i],) rather than *exhibitive* signs. And though he endeavoured, another way, to give more honour to the *signs* than really belonged to them, yet he destroyed the very nature of *signs* by doing it, and made quite another thing of them, viz. *receptacles* of the *Divinity*, not exhibitive *signs* or *symbols* of the *humanity*[k]: which, in effect, was excluding the *thing signified* out of the Sacrament, and seeking salvation independently on Christ's *humanity*[l]; thereby subverting the economy of man's redemption, which stands in our *mystical* union with the *human nature* of Christ[m].

[f] Teterrimum, et plane cum manifesta *impietate* conjunctum errorem, p. 52. Nego igitur et pernego *Deitatem*, aut *vim* ullam *Divinam* in ipsa signa *infundi*: et *impium* esse hoc dogma rursum dico, eo sensu quo loquitur et scribit Harchius; non quo locuti sunt *Patres*, quorum sententiam penitus depravat. *Beza*, p. 71.

[g] Beza, p. 66.

[h] Harchius magis etiam *ineptam* sententiam tuetur: qui ut corporis naturalis *localem* præsentiam excludat, *Deitatem* ipsius *Verbi*, ex carne assumpta in panem *illapsam*, velit *intra* ipsum panem habitare, adeoque ipsi re ipsa *uniri* et *permisceri*, p. 66, 67.

[i] Docemus Sacramentorum significationem, divinitus institutam, neque *nudam* esse, qualis est *pictarum* imaginum et aliorum ejusmodi vulgarium signorum, sed cum ipsa rerum significatarum *præbitione* conjunctam. *Beza*, p. 50.

Nimium profecto, parce et jejune de isto signorum genere loquitur, cum ea *μνημόσυνα* tantum vocat, quod etiam *pictis* imaginibus convenit. *Beza*, p. 51.

[k] Quamvis enim postea plus etiam illis quam nos tribuere videatur, nedum ut illa extenuet: si quis tamen rem totam propius inspiciat, comperiet omnem *signorum* rationem ab ipso aboleri: ut qui panem illum et vinum illud, non *corporis* illius pro nobis traditi, et *sanguinis* illius pro nobis effusi *signa*, sed ipsius *essentialis* æterni Filii Dei *conceptacula* esse contendat. *Beza*, p. 51.

[l] Neque enim nunc quærimus, plus an minus in his vel illis detur, sed an *idem* detur, id est, illa ipsa Christi *humanitas*. Si hoc negatis, ergo *extra* Christi humanitatem salutem quæritis. *Beza*, p. 95.

[m] Vid. Beza, p. 96, 97, 123, &c.

2. Beza observes further, at large, that it is manifestly wrong to interpret *body given for you*, and *blood shed*, of any thing but the *natural* body and blood *signified* in the Eucharist, and therein also mystically or spiritually *given* and *received*[n].

3. Against *inherent* graces, virtues, powers, &c. he pleads, that to suppose *pardon-giving*, *grace-giving*, *life-giving* powers to be *lodged* in the elements, is transferring *Divine* powers from their *proper seat*, where only they can *reside*, to things altogether incapable of sustaining them or receiving them: in short, it is communicating to inanimate creatures the *incommunicable* attributes, properties, or powers of God[o].

4. He enforces his plea by observing, that it is attributing more to the *signs*, than to the *Word of God* which *makes* them signs, and of which as high things are predicated in Scripture, but without any supposal of an *inherent* or *intrinsic* power infused into, or lodged in the sounds or syllables[p].

5. He enforces it still further by observing, that it is attributing more to the *inanimate* elements than could be justly ascribed to the Apostles or others who wrought *miracles;* not by any *inherent* or *intrinsic* powers *infused* into them, but by the *sole* power of God *extrinsic* to them[q].

6. He adds, that it is ascribing more to the bread and wine, the *sacramental body*, than could be justly ascribed even to our Lord's own *natural* body considered in itself, or abstracted from his *Divinity*, the only proper *seat* or *subject* of such powers[r]. He dwells upon this topic, as well to guard it from cavil and misconstruction, as to imprint it the deeper on the minds of his readers, being indeed singly sufficient and unanswerable, when rightly understood. For if even a *personal* union makes not the *humanity* of Christ life-giving in itself, or so as to become the *proper seat* or *subject* of such powers[s], much less can any supposed union of the *Logos* or of the *Spirit* with the elements make

[n] Beza, p. 67, 68, 69, 70, 89, 90.

[o] Spiritualia ac divina (cujusmodi incorporatio in Christum, et in eodem collatum *justificationis*, *sanctificationis*, et tandem *glorificationis*, seu *vitæ æternæ donum*) per alium, ut ullo modo *efficientem* causam, si quis nobis tribui existimet; aut rerum Divinarum prorsus est imperitus, aut plane impius: ut qui quod *unius Dei* est incommunicabiliter, tam *proprium* quam *ipsa Deitas*, ad panem et vinum, res inanimatas, transferat, aut certe cum illis communicet. *Beza*, p. 70, 71. conf. 114, 115, 130—136.

[p] Beza, p. 133, 134, 135.

[q] Ibid. p. 75, 76, 77, 132, 133, 134.

[r] Ibid. p. 77, 78, 79, 134.

[s] Διὰ τὴν ἡνωμένην αὐτῇ ζωὴν, αὐτὴ [σὰρξ] ζωοποιός. *Theod. Dial.* p. 184. Caro Christi *per se* vivifica non est, sed vivificandi vim a *Spiritu* cui juncta est, id est, a *Divinitate* mutuatur. *Albertinus*, p. 341. conf. 758.

them the subject or seat of *life-giving* powers[t]. If it should be pleaded, that a *healing virtue* went out of Christ's *body*[u], even that would not reach the case, were it really fact; since *healing* virtues and *grace-giving* powers are widely different. But the texts say not that virtue went out of *his body*, but out of *him*, or *from* him: neither is it said, that he *felt* in *his body*, but that he *knew in himself*; knew that a *miraculous* operation [δύναμις] had gone forth from him; which was said, to intimate that a miraculous virtue or power really *resided* in him, as *God-man*, but in no man else[w].

I return to Beza.

7. He takes occasion to expose the doctrine of an *oral* manducation of *Christ*, or of the *Spirit*, as palpably absurd[x].

8. He more particularly exposes the notion of the *unworthy's* receiving the *res Sacramenti*, the grace of the Sacrament, and not with any *benefit*, but to certain *destruction*. A contradiction to all the Scripture phrases in that article, phrases of a kind and gracious import, words of favour, and blessing, and comfort; and such as will no more admit of a *destructive* meaning, than light, or life, or health, or peace, or immortality can admit of it[y]. Indeed, Christ is *offered* both to worthy and unworthy in the holy Communion: and to the former, who *receive* him, he is a life-giver and preserver, while to the latter, who reject him, he is a judge and avenger. Still Christ *received* is always health, and life, and blessing to the receiver[z]: and it is Christ *rejected*,

[t] N. B. The *man* Christ (according to the rule of *communicatio idiomatum*, and after the *personal* way of speaking) may be said to be *God*, *Life-giver*, &c. But as the *human nature* cannot be said to be the *Divine nature*, so neither can it be said to be efficiently or properly *life-giving*. Much less can it be said of the *elements*, which are not so much as *hypostatically* united, nor can claim any benefit from the rule of *communicatio idiomatum*, or from the use of *personal* phrases.

[u] See Mark v. 30. Luke vi. 19. viii. 46.

[w] Cognoscens divinum opus a se patratum. Vid. Olearius in Matt. p. 275, 276. Wolfius, Cur. Crit. in loc.

[x] Beza, p. 86, &c. 100.

[y] Ibid. p. 99, 100, 101, 102, 103.

[z] Omnes quidem manum et os afferentes *symbola* recipiunt, mens vero vera fide non prædita *rem* Sacramenti *repudiat*: ac proinde reus non fit talis quispiam indigne *sumpti* corporis et sanguinis Domini, (nisi per *corpus* et *sanguinem* ipsa illorum *symbola* metonymia sacramentali intelligas,) sed corporis et sanguinis Domini *contempti*, et per incredulitatem *repudiati*. ——Usque adeo conjuncta sunt et connexa *vita* et *caro* Christi, quoniam caro Filii Dei est, ut neque vitæ particeps esse quisquam extra illius carnis, unici vinculi nostræ cum vita colligationis, participationem possit, neque quisquam illius esse *particeps*, sive in Verbo, sive in Sacramentis, qui ex ea non *vivificetur*: et qui contrarium statuunt, Christum *dividant*: de quibus quid statuendum sit, docet Spiritus Sanctus, 1 John iv. 3. *Beza*, ibid. p. 103. Conf. Beza contr. Pappum de Unione hypostatica, p. 138, 139, 140.

not Christ *received*, who becomes to every unworthy communicant both a *judge* and a *revenger*[a]. This reasoning appears to be just and solid: and it is worth observing, that, after the latest refinements in this article, by the help of a distinction between *external* and *internal* eating of the same *enriched* body[b], yet the difficulty remains as before, and cannot be evaded. For unless the unworthy (who are the *external eaters*) are supposed externally and orally to eat both the *bread* and the *grace*, they cannot be said to eat the *body*, which is supposed to mean and to consist of *both*, and is not the *enriched body*, if either be wanting. All that can be made out, in that way, is, that the *unworthy* eat one *part* of the pretended *spiritual body*, and not the *other part*; they eat the *gross* part, viz. the *bread*, not the *finer*, viz. the *grace*: which, in other words, is saying, that they eat not the *body*; and therefore the distinction so applied destroys itself. The plain truth is, that nothing but the *sign* is *externally* eaten, and nothing but the *thing signified* is eaten *internally*: therefore to imagine an *external* or an *internal* eating both of *sign* and *thing*, confounded in *one*, and called a *spiritual body*, is joining together incompatible ideas. But I pass on.

9. Beza takes notice how Harchius's system might lay a foundation for *bread-worship*, stronger and firmer than even the Popish one does, because of the *union* or *mixture* of essential Divinity with the elements, which it introduces and rests upon[c]. He adds, that it would go near to destroy the *sursum corda*, the *lifting* up of the *heart*, so much, and so justly celebrated by the ancients. For if the elements really *contain* such immense *treasures*, what need have we to *look up* to the *natural* body above? Or what have we to do but to *look down* to those *impanated* riches, to the elements *ennobled* with all *graces* and *virtues*, and *replenished* with that very *Divinity* which makes the *humanity* so considerable[d]?

10. When Beza came to answer on the head of *sacrifice*, he appeared to be much concerned at Harchius's unfair and ungenerous dealing, in reviving stale accusations against Protestants, without so much as taking notice of the strong and repeated replies[e]. He avers solemnly, that the *reformed* had

[a] Christus igitur ipse, tum in Verbo, tum in Sacramentis, eos quidem a quibus *sumitur*, id est, fideles, *vivificat*: incredulos autem non *receptus*, sed *repudiatus* judicat. *Beza contr. Papp.* p. 140.

[b] See Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 208, 351—356.

[c] Beza, p. 146, 147.

[d] Ibid. p. 147.

[e] Ibid. p. 152.

been so far from discarding the *eucharistical sacrifice*, that they *only* had most strictly preserved it, or rather *retrieved* it, fixing it upon its true and ancient *basis*. Therefore he resented Harchius's misreport, in this article, as a grievous *calumny*[f] upon the Protestant name, since the Protestants had not rejected *all sacrifice*, no nor so much as a *visible* sacrifice in the Eucharist[g].

This was the turn that Beza gave to that matter; and it was the right turn, made use of before by Bucer in 1546. For Bucer was so far from submitting to the injurious charge of discarding *the sacrifice*, that he retorted that very charge, and justly, upon the accusers themselves: not merely pleading, in behalf of the Protestants against the Romanists, that we have a sacrifice as well as they, but that we *only* had kept it, and that they had *lost* it, or however had so lamentably depraved or smothered it, that what remained of it was next to none[h]. This he said, and this he proved, beyond all reasonable contradiction. They must be very little acquainted with those two excellent men, Bucer and Beza, who can suspect that they admitted of no sacrifice but *mental* or *vocal* only: for they were firm and constant friends to the *Christian sacrifice*, rightly understood; to *external* sacrifice[i],

[f] Cum totidem illa constet a nobis diligenter fieri, *calumniator* in eo deprehendetur, quod *sacrificium* a nobis sublatum esse dicat. *Beza*, p. 153.

[g] Quo sensu veteres Cœnam Domini *sacrificium* vocarint, apertissime liquet. Ostendat autem Harchius ecquid tandem istorum in nostris ecclesiis prætermittatur; et tunc a nobis *visibile* sacrificium abolitum esse clamitet. *Beza*, p. 155.

[h] Demonstrabo hæc ipsa veteris Ecclesiæ, et S. Patrum *sacrificia* nos *vere offerre* et *sacrificare:* vestros vero sacrificulos *illa cuncta* a missis suis omnique sua administratione aut *prorsus removisse*, aut certe *pervertisse*, ut autoritatibus omnibus S. Patrum extremæ impietatis convincantur et condemnentur. *Bucer contr. Latom.* lib. ii. p. 146.

Planum faciam in nostris ecclesiis restituta esse cum genera omnia *sacrificiorum* et *oblationum* quæ offerre vetus Ecclesia solita est——deinde ostendam Ecclesiæ veteris sacrificia et oblationes per vestros sacrificos aut esse *omnino sublata*, aut *penitus perversa*. *Bucer, ibid.* p. 246. Conf. p. 144, 261.

[i] *External* sacrifice has been owned, not only by Bucer and Beza, but by Hoper, Jewel, Bilson, Fulke, Zanchius, Chrastovius, Mornæus, Scharpius, Field, Spalatensis, Montague, Lany, Patrick, and many more, who yet admitted none but *spiritual* sacrifice: neither do I know that any of the old Protestant Divines ever rejected *external* sacrifice, but in the sense of *extrinsic*, in which both Scripture and Fathers reject it.

N. B. *Extrinsic* sacrifice means something *ab extra*, as a *goat*, a *lamb*, a *loaf*, all *extrinsic* to us: *intrinsic* is what proceeds *ab intus*, from *within* ourselves; as all our true *services* do, whether internal and invisible, or *external* and *visible:* and therefore if all *true services* are properly *sacrifices*, there must of consequence be some *visible*, *external* sacrifices. But we ought carefully to note, how the ancient writers used *words* or *phrases*. If I mistake not, Lactantius and Austin rejected all *visible* sacrifice,

and that principally in the Eucharist, as all the *Fathers* were. Had but the Protestant Divines, as many as came after them, been as careful and accurate as they were in the stating the main question, and as constant in abiding by it, many intricate disputes which have since risen might have been happily prevented. For, indeed, the great question between the Romanists and us, is not whether the Eucharist be a *proper*, or a *visible*, or an *external* sacrifice, but whether it be an *extrinsic* sacrifice or no; and whether *their* Eucharist or *ours* is that *Gospel sacrifice* which our Lord instituted, and which all antiquity acknowledged. It will be found, upon just inquiry, that our eucharistical sacrifice is the true one, and that their *bread-sacrifice* (for it is really no better, *fiction* set aside) is as much a corruption, though not altogether so *novel* or so *dangerous* a corruption, as their *bread-worship*. But I return.

From the time of Beza's answer, Harchius and his system have been very little mentioned: both seem to have been almost buried in oblivion for a hundred and twenty years or more. Only Mr. Bale takes notice[k] of some slight mention made of Harchius, by Rivet, in some letters to Militiere, alias Brachet, in the last century. Indeed the Romanists, since that time, have sometimes invidiously and insidiously charged the Protestants as interpreting the words of institution to such a sense as either to make two *personal* bodies of Christ, or to imagine some other *fictitious* body, substituted as the *res sacramenti*, instead of the *natural*. The Protestants rejected the *injurious* aspersion with disdain, resenting it as a great *reproach*, to be so much as suspected of any such thing[l]; but insisting upon it, in the strongest manner, that the words, *this is my body*, and *this is my blood*, could not reasonably be interpreted of any thing else but the *natural* body and blood, represented, and sacramentally exhibited in the holy Communion[m].

admitting none but *invisible*, under the Gospel: but then they meant by *invisible*, the same with *intrinsic*; and they call it *invisible* with respect to its invisible source, as it comes from *within*.

[k] In the Supplement to Bayle's Dictionary, or in the last French edition, in the article *Harchius*.

[l] Vid. Chamier, Panstrat. tom. iv. p. 528, 529.

[m] Quæritur ergo, quid sit *corpus meum, sanguis meus*. Nos candide, et libere, ac libenter respondemus, κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν interpretandum, cum Hesychio in Levitici xxii.——est igitur *corpus illud*; id est, solida substantia *humanæ naturæ*, quam assumptam in utero Virginis circuntulit in hypostasi sua *Verbum*; quam cruci affixam, et in sepulchro depositam suscitavit a mortuis——quam denique

From the accounts now laid before you, my Reverend Brethren, I take the liberty to observe, that some late notions of the Eucharist appear to be little else but the remains of that *confusion* which first began in the decline of the seventh century: and the fundamental error of all lies in the want of a right notion of *symbolical* language, as before hinted. Hence it is that *signs* have been supposed either literally *to be*, or literally *to inclose*, the very things *signified*, viz. the *Divine* body, or the *Divine* graces, virtues, or powers. Beza cleared up what concerned the latter with great acumen and force: and the whole question has been more minutely discussed since by several able hands[n]; but more especially by the very acute and learned Chamier, who has in reality exhausted the question, both historically and argumentatively, in his disputes against the Romanists[o].

I may note by the way, that the Romanists, from the time of the Trent Council[p], have commonly maintained some kind of *physical* efficiency in the *outward* sacraments, together with *inherent* graces as infused into the elements: though some of their ablest Divines have scarce known what to make of the Trent doctrine on that head, but have in a manner given up the *thing*, contending merely for *words* or *names*. Cardinal Allen, one of the shrewdest of them, saw the absurdity of the notion, and exposed it: being aware how ridiculous it would be, to imagine any *inherent* or *intrinsic* powers to have been infused into *clay* and *spittle*, into *handkerchiefs* and *aprons*, or into St. Peter's *shadow*[q]: neither durst Bellarmine afterwards be at all positive

transtulit in cœlos, inde reddendam terris postremo adventu. *Chamier, Panstrat.* tom. iv. p. 528.

[n] Hooker, book v. chap. 57, 60, 67. Gasp. Laurentius, Defens. Sadeelis, p. 382, &c. Rivet. Cathol. — Orth. tom. ii. p. 5, &c. Vossius de Sacram. Vi et Efficacia. Le Blanc, Thes. p. 253. Preservative against Popery, vol. ii. tit. 7. p. 32. Albertinus, p. 503.

[o] Chamier, Panstrat. tom. iv. p. 51—96.

[p] Si quis dixerit Sacramenta novæ legis non *continere gratiam* quam significant, —— anathema sit. *Concil. Trident.* sess. vii. can. 6.

[q] Noli putare id Patres dicere, quasi sit aliqua *permanens* qualitas a Deo *infusa* Sacramento, aut ejus materiæ, cum ea qualitas neque *spiritualis*, neque *corporalis* esse possit. Nam si *corporalis* esset, nihil adjuvaret ad *spiritualem* effectum magis quam ipsa natura aquæ: et *spiritualis* qualitas non potest inesse in *corpore* tanquam in *subjecto*. Sed id volunt, hanc esse virtutem Sacramentorum, *ordinari*, *moveri*, *applicari*, *elevari* a Deo ad effectum spiritualem. —— Christus accipiendo *lutum* aut *salivam*, non *impressit* illis, multo minus *umbræ* Petri, aliquam *qualitatem* medicam; sed utendo, ac applicando, elevavit eas, &c. *Alanus de Euchar.* p. 130. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 698, 699.

on that head[r]. But yet both of them were minded to contrive some *verbal* evasion, whereby to make a show of maintaining what in reality they had yielded up. They pretended I know not what *Divine movement*, raising or enabling the elements to produce the effect: which was somewhat like the subtilty of those who not knowing how to ascribe *thought* to *matter*, as such, either added *motion* to matter, or had recourse to *Divine* omnipotence, to salve the *hypothesis*. Only there is this difference between the two cases, that *thought* is a *communicable* attribute, which a *creature* may have; but a *grace-giving* power is *incommunicable*, and can reside only in a *Divine* Being. Gerard Vossius has well observed[s], that the *evasion* before mentioned was a *mere* evasion: and indeed it amounts only to so many *unmeaning* words, artfully thrown together as a fine-spun covering, to hide the flaws of a false *hypothesis*. Be the *Divine movement* what it will, it can never shake God's *attributes* from his *essence*, or his incommunicable powers from his nature, so as to transfer or impart them to a foreign subject. God may *cooperate* with the elements, so as to affect the *soul*, while they affect the *body*: but his operations and powers, though *assistant* or *concurrent*, are not *inherent* or *intermingled*, but are entirely *distinct*; and are as truly *extrinsic* to the elements, as the *Deity* is to the *creature*. When and where the elements are duly administered and received, God does *then* and *there* work the effect, pursuant to his promise and covenant[t]. The elements are the *occasional* causes, as it were, and he the *efficient*: this is the whole of that matter.

If what hath been said may be thought sufficient to vindicate

[r] Non esse controversiam de *modo* quo Sacramenta sunt causæ, an *physice*, &c.——et rursum si physice, an per aliquam qualitatem *inhærentem*, an per solam Dei *motionem*. *Bellarm.* lib. ii. cap. 1. p. 30.

[s] Commentum hoc de effectu ab *actionis* vi orto, nec tamen a *vi interna* ejus, cujus actio est, profecto merum κρησφύγετον est, eademque facilitate, qua citra probationem ullam affertur, etiam rejici debet. *Vossius de Sacram. Vi et Efficacia*, p. 253.

[t] Effectum non attingunt *proprie*, sed *operari* dicuntur, quia *ubi sunt*, Deus juxta promissionem suam *operatur*, et *concurrit* ad productionem effectus supernaturalis. *Albertinus*, p. 503.

Res ipsa quæ unitur *nobiscum* in conjunctione spirituali, nequaquam cum illis *signis* unitur: alioqui *sacramentalis* etiam hæc unio [unio pacti] esset dicenda *spiritualis*; quæ ipsa quoque *signa vivificaret*; et signa ipsa sacramentalia non amplius essent *instrumenta*, sed ipsa forent causa *efficiens* et *formalis*: quod est ἀθεόλογον, et naturæ Sacramentorum, atque Spiritus Sancti energiæ, fideique proprietati omnino repugnans. *Gasp. Laurent. Index. Error. Greg. de Valent. in Opp. Sadeel.* p. 380.

the received doctrine of this Sacrament, as a *sacrament*, then the other notion of it, together with the *bread-sacrifice* built upon it, must fall of course: and we may reasonably rest contented with what our excellent Church has all along taught us, both of the *sacrament* and *sacrifice*: which in truth is no other doctrine but what the New Testament, and the Fathers of the Church from the beginning, and downwards for six whole centuries, have delivered: here fix we, and abide. And that the reasonableness of our so abiding may yet more clearly and more succinctly appear, I beg leave here to throw in a few pertinent considerations, for a kind of recapitulation of what I have before said.

1. Let it be considered what pains have been taken some way or other to *enrich* and *ennoble* a bread-sacrifice, in order to make it bear, or to suit it to a Gospel state, and yet none of the ways will answer upon a strict trial; unless we could be content to rest in *words* which have no *consistent* or no *determined* ideas. Shall we fill the elements with *Divinity*, like as our Lord's *personal* body is filled[u]? A vain thought! But supposing it were fact, yet shall we *sacrifice* the Divine essence, or any of the Divine persons? God forbid. Yet Harchius, in his way, was forced to admit of that absurdity, in order to make out his *pure* and *unbloody*, and *propitiatory* sacrifice[x]: and so must all they who build upon the same *general* principles, if they mean to be *consistent* with themselves.

Or shall we, to avoid the former absurdity, endeavour only to enrich the elements with *grace-giving* or *life-giving* powers? That would be sacrificing the *Divine attributes*, as before, only with the additional absurdity of abstracting them from the *essence*, and placing them in a creature, an *inanimate* creature.

Or shall we call it only the sacrificing of *grace* and *pardon*, first lodged in the elements, and next transferred from them to us? But how shall we make *sense* of it[y]: and if we could, how

[u] The *similitudes* made use of for magnifying the consecrated elements, (chiefly since the seventh century,) are these five:

1. As the Λόγος deified, in a manner, the natural body; so, &c.

2. As the *fulness of the Godhead* dwelt in Christ's body; so, &c.

3. As the *Holy Ghost* formed the body in the womb; so, &c.

4. As the *Holy Ghost* inhabited the man Jesus; so, &c.

5. As the burning bush was a *shechinah* of God; so, &c.

All of them *novel*, and *foreign*; and betraying great forgetfulness of *symbolical* language, or *sacramental* phrases.

[x] Harchius, Patr. Consens. p. 240, 263, 273, 275, 280, 299, 300.

[y] N. B. Whatever the *Fathers* may be conceived to have, looking at all that way, is either to be understood of what is *concurrent* with the elements,

would it answer the purposes intended by it? It is very certain, that good Christians are endowed with *infused* and *inherent* graces. Now, supposing that the elements have the same, (which however is a wild supposition,) yet that could only make the elements, *so far*, equal to every good Christian. But still the *good Christian*, though *equal* only in that view, will be as much a *nobler* sacrifice than the *elements*, as *man*, the *living* image of God, is better than a *dead loaf*. Why then so much earnestness for a *dead* sacrifice, (were it really any,) in preference to so many better *living* ones? Or what sense or consistency can there be in proclaiming, that such *dead* sacrifice, and offered by *man*, is the most *sublime* and *Divine* sacrifice that men or *angels* can offer[z]; especially considering, that the value of the *sacrifice* can never rise higher than the value of the *sacrificer*[a]?

Shall we at length say (which appears to be the last refuge) that the sacred elements are the *most perfect and consummate representatives* of the *natural* body and blood, answering to the *originals* as completely, as exemplified copies do to *charters*, or to *letters patents*? Such *words* are easily thrown out: but what *sense* do they bear, or what *Scripture* or *Fathers* have ever used them[b]? Or to what purpose can it be, to make use of swelling and magnificent phrases, without any *coherent* or *determinate* ideas? Besides that even the *original* body and blood do not operate *efficiently*, as the elements are supposed to do, but *meri-*

not *inhering* in them; or else, it is to be interpreted of the *whole* sacramental solemnity, in which God bears his part: and then it is no more than saying, that God is in the Sacraments, as he really is, and operates in *both*, as he really does. It may be justly said, that the *abiding virtue* of Baptism, (not the *inherent virtue* of *water*, which is none,) operates as long as a man lives. See Review, vol. iv. p. 646. That is, God applies and continues the graces and privileges of that seal, and his work is sure and lasting. And if God operated with the *consecrated* elements reserved in the Church, or in private houses, for many days or weeks after; it was not because the elements retained any *inherent* virtues, but because God is true and constant to his own covenants or ordinances.

[z] Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 60, 67, 141. Compare my Appendix to Christian Sacrifice explained, p. 156, 157 of this volume.

[a] See my Christian Sacrifice explained, p. 146. Pet. Martyr. Comment. ad 1 Cor. p. 48, 65. Zanchius, tom. vi. p. 212, 215. alias ad Ephes. p. 424. Benedict. Aretius, Loc. Comm. p. 394. Pet. du Moulin, Buckler of Faith, p. 416. Anatome Missæ, p. 168. Rivet. Summ. Controv. tom. ii. p. 108. Animadv. ad Cassand. p. 28.

[b] Cardinal Perron made use of that vaunting plea, that affected and foreign similitude, and was thus answered:

Stupenda prorsus est hominis audacia, *veteribus* tribuentis id de quo ne per somnium quidem cogitarunt. Quis enim illorum unquam observavit, aut tantillum subinnuit, eucharistiam hoc sensu *antitypum* appellari? Nullus, nemo. *Albertin.* p. 277. Conf. p. 437, 443, 471.

toriously[c], and that by means of the *Divinity* which *personally* resided and resides in them: therefore, unless the elements have the same Divinity *personally* united with them, they can be no such *consummate proxy* as hath been pretended. Upon the whole, this account must either at length resolve into a *personal* union of the elements with the *Logos*, or amount to nothing. I have endeavoured to turn and try this matter every way, in order to guard the more strongly against a common failing, viz. the resting in a string of *unmeaning* words, which really carry in them no *certain* or no *consistent* ideas. For so it is, that *false* systems generally have been kept up by such as intend not to deceive others, but are really deceived themselves: and it is difficult to persuade them to call over their *ideas*, or to examine their *terms* with due care.

2. To what has been said, I shall only add, that it is worth considering, that many true and sound principles of our own Church, and of the ancient churches also, (as may be understood from what has been hinted,) must be given up, before we could admit the *bread-sacrifice*; and that when it is brought in, it can never find rest, till it thrusts out the *sacrifice of the cross*, as I have shewn elsewhere[d]. Some perhaps might *modestly* resolve to stop in the midway; but they would be the less *consistent* in doing it: for the natural, necessary, unavoidable consequence of the other principle, regularly pursued, must at length terminate in rejecting the *cross-sacrifice*. If our Eucharist is a sacrifice of the *elements*, so was our Lord's also; or else ours and his will not tally: and he must have sacrificed *himself* at the same time; or else other accounts will not answer[e]. And if such was the case, the sacrifice of the cross was effectually *precluded*, since our Lord was to make a sacrifice of *himself* but *once*[f]. The sacrifice of the cross cannot, in this way, be considered as a *continuation* of the sacrifice of the *original* Eucharist, for these reasons: 1. The *subject-matter* could not be the *same*: for neither *bread* nor *wine* could have any place in the oblation of the cross. 2. The *number* could not be *one*; for in the original Eucharist are supposed *two* sacrifices, the *elemental* and *personal*, whereas upon the cross there could be no more than

[c] Agnoscimus *carnem* vere *vivificare*, quatenus oblata fuit Deo—— tanquam causa *meritoria*, sed non vivificare corporibus nostris receptam. *Rivet.* tom. ii. p. 138.

[d] Appendix, chap. iv. p. 172, &c.

[e] Ibid. p. 180.

[f] Ibid. p. 177, 180.

the *personal.* 3. The *form* of the sacrifice could not be the *same*, but different as *bloody* and *unbloody*. 4. The *priesthood* (which is most material) could not be the *same:* for it is denied that Christ offered at the cross a Melchizedekian sacrifice, or offered as a Melchizedekian priest[g]. 5. Lastly, the *value* could not be the *same:* for *two* must be supposed better than *one*, if *each* of them has its respective value; or if not, why was not one of them spared? And a Melchizedekian sacrifice must be supposed the most *honourable* and the most *valuable* of any, and so of course must *supersede* all other. In short, the cross-sacrifice, in this way, must either be *excluded*, or else grievously *disparaged*, by being brought in as *second*, and *inferior* to the *higher* sacrifice before made in the Eucharist. Some learned persons, ancient and modern, have reasonably conceived *three* several parts or views of *one continued oblation* of Christ our Lord[h]: but then they have conceived it in quite another sense, and upon very different principles, nothing at all akin to the notion of the *bread-sacrifice.* They might, in their way, *consistently* maintain one continued *oblation;* which others cannot, for the reasons just mentioned. Therefore, though it is a very great error to reject the *sacrifice of the cross*, yet since it is but the necessary consequence of the principle before mentioned, and is no more than arguing *right* from *wrong* premises; it seems that the *first* or *greatest* fault lies in *retaining* the *principle,* after it is clearly seen what company it must go with, and what precipices it leads to. I forbear to press these matters further, and should have been glad to have had no occasion for pressing them so far. May God give a blessing to what is sincerely intended for the service of *truth* and *godliness:* and may that Divine Spirit which *accompanies* the word and sacraments, and *dwells* in all the faithful, grant us a sound judgment and a right understanding in all things.

[g] See Appendix, above, p. 166, &c. 173. [h] See Review, vol. iv. p. 752.

DISTINCTIONS OF SACRIFICE:

SET FORTH IN

A CHARGE

DELIVERED IN PART TO

THE CLERGY OF MIDDLESEX,

At the Easter Visitation, 1740.

Nos panem et vinum, in usu sacræ Cœnæ, *sanctificari* concedimus: *sacrificari* nunquam dabimus. *Mason. de Minister. Anglican.* p. 575.

REVEREND BRETHREN,

THOUGH I have dwelt some time upon the *Christian sacrifice*, perhaps even to a degree of tediousness; yet considering the great importance of the subject, I am not willing to dismiss it, while I see room left for throwing in any further light upon it. This may be done, as I conceive, by a more minute consideration of the several *distinctions*, or *names* of distinction, which *sacrifice*, of one kind or other, has passed under, in Church writers; those especially of the earlier times, not neglecting others of later date.

My design therefore, at present, is to bring together into one summary view the most noted distinctions, or names of distinction; and to explain them one by one, taking in the authorities proper to illustrate their meaning, or to signify their use.

I.

The first and most comprehensive division, or distinction of *sacrifice*, is into four several kinds, denominated from so many several kinds of religion; *Patriarchal*, *Pagan*, *Mosaic*, and *Christian*.

1. The *Patriarchal* sacrifices commenced, very probably, soon after the fall, and consisted of *slain beasts*[a], prefiguring Christ to be slain, pursuant to some Divine appointment[b]. Certain it is, that Cain and Abel offered sacrifices, and that very early[c]; one, of the *fruits* of the earth; and the other, of *cattle*[d]. Such were the *patriarchal* sacrifices strictly so called, of the material and

[a] This hath been probably collected from Gen. iii. 21. See Patrick and other commentators.

[b] See my first Charge of 1731. p. 20, above. Conf. Eusebius, Demonstr. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10. p. 35.

[c] A. M. 130. Bedford's Script. Chronol. p. 126.

[d] Gen. iv. 3, 4.

they consider the grand sacrifice as *dispensed* or *communicated*[q] in the Eucharist, by and through the symbols, to as many as are worthy.

But while *Scripture* and *Fathers* thus speak of Christ himself, or of his *body* and *blood*, as the *sacrifice* whereof Christians *partake*, that is, of sacrifice in the *passive* sense, or *passive* view, with respect to us the *receivers* of it; yet the same Scripture and Fathers do as plainly and as frequently speak of other *sacrifices* belonging to Christians, such as they *actively* offer up to God, and present as *their own* sacrifices, the best they have to *give;* and those are their *spiritual* sacrifices, of which I shall say more under a distinct head, in its place. Enough, I hope, hath been said for the explaining both the meaning and the use of the distinction between *active* and *passive* sacrifice, between *performing* a sacrifice, and *participating* of what has been sacrificed. Our religious duties or services are our *only sacrifices* in the *active* view; and Christ once offered is our *only sacrifice* in the *passive* or *receptive* view; as was formerly well distinguished by a moderate Roman Catholic[r], who met with hard usage for so freely speaking the truth. But I pass on.

III.

Another very noted and necessary distinction is between sacrifice *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*. Christians have no *extrinsic* sacrifice but *Christ;* and that with regard to *participation* only, as before hinted: all their other *sacrifices*, wherein they themselves are the *sacrificers*, are of the *intrinsic* kind, are *ab intus*, from *within* the persons themselves; being either good thoughts,

[q] Memoriam sui ad altare tuum, Deus, fieri desideravit [*Monica*] cui nullius diei intermissione servierat, unde sciret *dispensari victimam sacram*, qua deletum est *chirographum* quod erat contrarium nobis. *Augustin. Confess.* lib. ix. cap. 13. p. 170. tom. i. edit. Bened.

Ut jam de cruce commendaretur nobis *caro* et *sanguis* Domini, novum sacrificium. *Augustin. in Psal.* xxxiii. p. 211. tom. iv.

Quod addidit, *manducare panem*, etiam ipsum *sacrificii* genus eleganter expressit, de quo dicit *sacerdos ipse*, panis quem ego dedero, *caro mea* pro seculi vita. Ipsum est *sacrificium*, non secundum Aaron, sed secundum Melchizedech. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. xviii. cap. 5. p. 466. tom. vii.

[r] Rite in missa dicitur a sanctis Patribus offerri et sacrificari *corpus* Christi. 1. Eo sensu quo asserunt Ecclesiam offerre in missa *semetipsam* et preces. 2. Quia in missa *repræsentatur* et *commemoratur* sacrificium crucis et passionis Christi, nuncupatur *sacrificium commemorativum*. 3. Capiendo sacrificium *passive*, pro *sacrificato*, noviter *applicato* nobis, asseritur rite sacrificium missæ; quia in ea *continetur* corpus Christi quod fuit vere *sacrificatum* in unico illo sacrificio crucis. *Joan. Barnes. Catholico Roman. Pacific. in Brown Fascic.* tom. ii. p. 849.

good words, or good ways, all of them issues of the *heart*[s]. This is ancient and catholic doctrine: for thus did the primitive Fathers distinguish the *Christian* sacrifices from the sacrifices of *Jews* and *Pagans;* which were of the *extrinsic* kind, were *extraneous* to the man, such as *sheep*, *goats*, *beeves*, *fruits*, *cakes*, or the like. What Barnabas says of God's now requiring an *human oblation*, instead of the old *legal* sacrifices[t], may best be interpreted by this key: it is the *man* that God requires as his *sacrifice;* and he is to give to God, not things *extrinsic*, but his whole self, his soul and body, his mind and heart[u].

Origen expresses the distinction in plain and broad terms, observing that every good man has his sacrifice in *himself*[w]: that he sends it up to God from within, from his own self: that *sons*, or *daughters*, or *farms*, or *cattle*, are all of them *extraneous*, or *extrinsic*, to the man: that *self-sacrifice* is beyond all other, as it is copying after the example of Christ[x]. Origen was not singular in thus commending *self-sacrifice*, as the *best* of any, and the sum total of all: other ancient Fathers of the Church have done the like[y]. It is a maxim of truth, and of common sense, that *self-sacrifice* is always the *best* that any *person* or *persons* can offer, because it comprehends *them* and all *theirs*. An *angel's* self-sacrifice is the most that such angel can offer, and our *Lord's* self-sacrifice was the most that he could offer, and every *man's* self-sacrifice is the most that such *man* can offer. There is a seeming objection to this truth, drawn from the consideration of an authorized *minister's* offering up to God his own *people;* who, collectively at least, must be owned to be *better* than he. But then it is to be remembered, that such authorized

[s] Prov. iv. 23.

[t] Hæc ergo [sacrificia] vacua fecit, ut nova lex Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quæ sine jugo necessitatis est, *humanam* habeat *oblationem*.—— Nobis enim dicit, *sacrificium Deo* cor tribulatum, &c. *Barnab. Epist.* c. ii. p. 55. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 732.

[u] Deus non *pecudis* sanguine, sed *hominis* pietate placatur. *Lactant. Epist.* p. 204.

Non vult ergo sacrificium trucidati *pecoris*, sed vult sacrificium contriti *cordis*. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 5. p. 241. tom. vii.

[w] Unusquisque nostrûm habet *in se* holocaustum suum, et holocausti sui ipse succendit altare, ut semper ardeat. *Origen. in Levit.* Hom. ix. p. 243.

[x] Vota autem Domino offerre nemo potest, nisi qui habet aliquid *in semetipso*, et in *substantia sua*, quod offerat Deo.——Filium offerre, vel filiam, aut pecus, aut prædium, hoc totum *extra nos* est. *Semetipsum* Deo offerre, et non *alieno* labore, sed *proprio* placere, hoc est perfectius et eminentius omnibus votis: quod qui facit, imitator est Christi. *Origen. in Num.* Hom. xxiv. p. 364. ed. Bened.

[y] See references to them in Christian Sacrifice explained. Append. p. 156, above.

minister therein acts in *persona ecclesiæ*, in a public capacity, as an officer of the *church*[z]; and so it is the *whole church* which offers what is offered in and through him. But I return.

To Origen I may subjoin Lactantius, who rejects all *extrinsic* sacrifice, every thing *extraneous* to the man; alleging that God requires only what comes from *within*; from the *heart*, not from the *chest*; offered up by the *mind*, not by the *hand*[a]. This is not excluding good services, whether external or internal, whether mental, vocal, or manual: for they are *intrinsic* to the person, are as the *man himself*, amounting to, or resolving into *self-sacrifice*. What our Lord says of *evil* thoughts, words, and deeds, that they *come from within*, and out of the *heart*[b], must be equally true of all *good* services; for the reason is the same in both. This I hint, lest any one should interpret *intrinsic* sacrifice of *mental* service only, exclusive of *vocal* or *manual*, confounding *intrinsic* sacrifice with *internal*, which is of different consideration, and belongs to another head of division, as will be seen in the sequel. But I proceed to other authorities.

Chrysostom understood the distinction between *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* sacrifice, rejecting the one as *Jewish*, and recommending the other as proper to the *Gospel:* those he says were *from without*, these from *within*[c]. His disciple Isidore fell in with the like sentiments, in his reflections on Rom. xii. 1. "Present "your bodies a living sacrifice[d]", &c. St. Austin is very clear and expressive on the same head: for after rejecting all *extrinsic* sacrifice, (*actively* considered,) he then asks the question, "What? have we therefore nothing to offer? Shall we so come

[z] See Christian Sacrifice explained, Append. p. 156, above.

Object. 1. May not the value of an *offering*, by Divine *institution*, be made to rise higher than the value of the *man?* No: for if it is made the man's *property*, (and otherwise he cannot *give* or *sacrifice* it,) the *proprietor* is still more valuable than the *property*, as containing it. Object. 2. Is not the *offering Christ* to view, more valuable than offering *ourselves?* No: because it is *service* only, and no *service* is more valuable than the *servant* himself: besides, such *offering to view* is not *sacrificing Christ:* so the objection runs *wide* of the point.

[a] Quid igitur ab homine desiderat Deus, nisi cultum *mentis*, qui est purus et sanctus? Nam illa quæ aut digitis fiunt, aut *extra hominem* sunt, inepta, fragilia, ingrata sunt. Hoc est sacrificium *verum*, non quod ex *arca*, sed quod ex *corde* profertur; non quod *manu*, sed quod *mente* libatur. Hæc acceptabilis victima, quam *de seipso* animus immolaverit. *Lactant. Epist.* cap. lviii. p. 172. Conf. Zen. Veron. in Psal. xlix.

[b] Matt. xv. 18, 19. Mark vii. 15, 23.

[c] Ἐκεῖναι μὲν γὰρ πλούτου καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων εἰσὶν, αὗται δὲ ἀρετῆς. Ἐκεῖναι ἔξωθεν, αὗται ἔνδοθεν. *Chrysost. in Hebr.* cap. vi. Hom. 11. p. 115. tom. xii. Bened. ed.

[d] Isidor. Pelusiot. lib. iii. Epist. 75. p. 284.

"before God? So hope to appease him?" He answers: "By "all means *offer:* you have *within you* what you are to offer. "Look not *abroad* for *frankincense*, but say, In me are thy "*sacrifices* of *praise*, O God, which I am to render thee. Seek "not *abroad* for *cattle* to slay; you have *within* yourself what "you should slay. *The sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit*[e]." I may hereupon remark, that St. Austin would not say in this case, *Offer Christ:* for though Christ is our sacrifice to *commemorate*, or to *feast upon*, he is not our sacrifice *to offer up* in a proper sacrificial sense. Much less would he say, Sacrifice *bread* and *wine;* for they are things *extrinsic*, as much as *cattle*, or *frankincense*, and cannot be the subject-matter of a Gospel sacrifice, any more than the other. What then was the only sacrifice left for a Christian *actively* and *properly* to offer? The *man* himself, (or *his services*, which amount to the same thing,) that was still left: and there St. Austin very justly and very consistently fixed the *Christian sacrifice*, (actively considered,) as he always does.

IV.

I pass on to another ancient and useful distinction of sacrifice, into *visible* and *invisible*. A distinction near akin to the former, or rather resolving into it. *Pagan* and *Jewish* sacrifices were *visible;* but the Christian sacrifices were deemed *invisible;* not every way, but in respect of their invisible source, as arising from *within*, from the *heart* or *mind*, which is *seen* to God only. Lactantius argues, that our sacrifices ought to be *invisible*, that so they may suit the better with an *invisible* Deity[f]. St. Austin has the same distinction between *visible* and *invisible* sacrifices, meaning by the *visible* the noted sacrifices of *Jews* and *Pagans*, and by the *invisible*, the sacrifices made by good Christians only, the Gospel sacrifices. In one place, he observes, that the *Jewish* sacrifices, which God's people now read of only, and do not use, were *signs* of the evangelical; and thereupon he says, that "a visible sacrifice is a Sacrament, or holy sign, of an invisible "sacrifice[g]." In another place, arguing, *ex hypothesi*, against

[e] Nihil ergo offeremus? Sic veniemus ad Deum? Et unde illum placabimus? Offer sane: *in te* habes quod offeras. Noli *extrinsecus* thura comparare, sed dic, *In me* sunt, Deus, vota tua, quæ reddam laudis tibi. Noli *extrinsecus* pecus quod mactes inquirere: habes *in te* quod occidas. Sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus, &c. *Augustin. in Psal.* l. p. 473. tom. iv. Conf. p. 14, 364, 527, 528, 529.

[f] Si enim Deus *non videtur*, ergo his rebus coli debet quæ *non videntur*. *Lactant. de ver. Cult.* lib. vi. cap. 25.

[g] Nec quod ab antiquis Patribus

Porphyrius, and other Pagans, (whose principle it was, to offer what they called *invisible sacrifices* to God supreme, and what they called *visible*, to inferior deities,) he pleads, that both the *visible* and *invisible* ought to go to the *supreme* only; those being *signs* of these, and requiring the same direction, to the same Deity: and hereupon he observes, that the persons themselves are, or ought to be, that *invisible sacrifice*, whereof the *visible* are the *signs*[h]. St. Austin here builds upon this Christian maxim, that what some call *visible sacrifice*, is really no better than the *sign*, *shell*, *shadow*, of true sacrifice; and that it is no more *true sacrifice*, than articulate *sounds* are *sense*, or *words* are *ideas*. Nothing with him is *true sacrifice*, or *acceptable* sacrifice, or *evangelical* sacrifice, (for those are so many phrases reciprocal and tantamount,) but the *invisible sacrifice*, the sacrifice of the *heart*, of the *mind*, of the *man*, for the mind is the man.

One may justly wonder what some Divines, among the Romanists, have meant, who, in order to maintain an *extrinsic* sacrifice in the Eucharist, have laid hold of Austin's account of a *visible sacrifice*, (that is, of a *sign*, *shell*, *shadow*,) as amounting to a *definition* of *true* or *proper* sacrifice. They could not have contrived a shorter or surer way to depreciate the eucharistical sacrifice. For since it is manifest, that St. Austin rejected those called *visible sacrifices*, as what never were *true sacrifices*, (in his sense of *true*,) even when *required* under the law, and are not *required* at all, under the notion of *sacrifice*, by the Gospel[k], the advancing of *signs* now into proper *sacrifices* is but a kind of

talia *sacrificia* facta sunt in victimis pecorum (quæ nunc Dei populus *legit*, non *facit*) aliud intelligendum est, nisi rebus illis eas res fuisse *significatas* quæ *aguntur* in nobis, ad hoc ut inhæreamus Deo, et ad eundem finem proximo consulamus. *Sacrificium* ergo *visibile invisibilis sacrificii Sacramentum*, id est, *sacrum signum* est. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 5. p. 241. tom. vii.

[h] Qui autem putant hæc *visibilia* sacrificia *Diis aliis* congruere, *illi* vero tanquam invisibili *invisibilia*, et majori majora, meliorique meliora, qualia sunt puræ mentis, et bonæ voluntatis officia; profecto nesciunt hæc ita esse *signa* eorum, sicut *verba* sonantia *signa* sunt *rerum*. Quocirca, sicut orantes atque laudantes, ad eum *dirigimus* significantes voces, cui *res ipsas in corde*, quas significamus, *offerimus*, ita sacrificantes non alteri *visibile sacrificium* offerendum esse noverimus, quam illi cujus in *cordibus* nostris *invisibile sacrificium* nos ipsi esse debemus. *Augustin. ibid.* lib. x. cap. 19. p. 255.

[i] Sacrificium, *proprie* dictum, est sacrum signum. *Sylvius*, tom. iv. p. 624. Sacrificium est invisibilis sacrificii visibile Sacramentum. *Bayus*, lib. iii. cap. 2. p. 210.

[k] In hujus prophetæ verbis utrumque distinctum est, satisque declaratum, illa sacrificia per seipsa non requirere Deum, quibus *significantur* hæc sacrificia quæ requirit Deus. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 5. p. 242.

will-worship, or *sacrilegious* usurpation. The *sacramental* elements are not that *true sacrifice* which St. Austin so often speaks of, but the *signs* of it[l]; not that *true* eucharistical *sacrifice* which that Father so magnificently sets forth, but the *shadows* of it[m]. And what can give a man a meaner idea of the *eucharistical oblation*, aud *sacerdotal sacrifice*, than the placing it in the *signs* of *true* sacrifice, and thereby setting it much *lower* than the *private*, but *true* sacrifice of every single *laic* of the Church? In short, St. Austin's true sacrifice was really *self-sacrifice*[n], the same with his *invisible sacrifice:* and his *eucharistical sacrifice* was the offering up the collective body of Christians, the whole *Church*, or *city* of God[o]. But of this I may say more in a proper place. All that I shall observe further here is, that St. Austin never once gives (so far as appears) the name of *visible sacrifice* to any thing which he esteemed *true sacrifice*, or Gospel sacrifice, justly so called. What he said of *visible sacrifice*, in the two passages before cited, related purely to the *Jewish* and *Pagan* sacrifices, which he opposed to the *invisible*, that is, to the *Christian* sacrifices. He does indeed sometimes speak of the Christian sacrifices, as *appearing*[p], or being *seen;* that is, in such a sense as things *invisible* may be said to be seen by their *signs*, or reasonably collected and inferred from what appears outwardly. Good works are *seen* by men, and they are *sacrifices:* but they are not seen as *good*, or as *sacrifices*, except to God only, who alone sees the *heart*. Good Christians are a *sacrifice* to God in St. Austin's account, and they are *visible*, as *men:*

[l] Quod ab omnibus *appellatur* sacrificium, *signum* est *veri* sacrificii. *Ibid.*

[m] Nazianzen expressly teaches the same thing, where he declares that the *outward oblation* is but as *shadow* to *truth*, in respect of the true and spiritual sacrifices.

Οἶδα καὶ ἄλλο θυσιαστήριον, οὗ τύπος τὰ νῦν ὁρῶμενα——τούτῳ παραστήσομαι, τούτῳ θύσω δεκτὰ, θυσίαν, καὶ προσφορὰν, καὶ ὁλοκαυτώματα, κρείττονα τῶν νῦν προσαγομένων, ὅσῳ κρεῖττον σκιᾶς ἡ ἀλήθεια. Nazianz. Orat. xxviii. p. 484. See my Review, vol. iv. p. 757—759.

Gregorius affirmat oblationem illam quæ fit in Eucharistia, esse *umbram* ac *imaginem* oblationum nostrarum *spiritualium*, ac iis longe inferiorem. *Albertinus*, p. 474. The reader may compare Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 32. if disposed to observe what may be *said*, where no just *answer* can be given. Albertinus had foreclosed all *evasions:* and yet no notice was taken of him.

[n] Augustin. tom. v. p. 268. tom. vii. p. 242, 243, 244, 256, 260, 569, 609, 674. tom. viii. p. 349, 568. tom. x. p. 94. ed. Bened.

[o] Vid. tom. vii. p. 243, 244, 256, 260, 569, 674.

[p] Ibi quippe primum *apparuit* sacrificium quod nunc a Christianis offertur Deo, toto orbe terrarum, &c. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. xvi. cap. 22. p. 435. tom. vii.

Cum *videt* sacrificium Christianorum toto orbe terrarum, &c. *Ibid.* l. xvii. cap. 5. p. 465.

nevertheless, he calls them an *invisible sacrifice*, because in their *sacrificial* capacity they are seen to God only, the searcher of *hearts*. He would not allow that *Satan* himself could *see* what Job did, when he *sacrificed* unto God: Job was *visible*, but his *sacrifice* was *invisible;* because it was *true sacrifice*, arising from the *heart*[q]. From what hath been noted under this article, it may sufficiently appear, that the Gospel sacrifices are of the *invisible* kind, as contradistinguished from the *visible* sacrifices of Jews and Pagans; and that they have had the name of *invisible*, on the same account as they had the name of *intrinsic;* and so both the names resolve into one and the same notion. By these accounts, the *bread* and *wine* of the Eucharist could not be considered as *Gospel sacrifices*, being that they are *ab extra*, and *open* to *view;* and as they are not *intrinsic*, so neither are they *invisible*, either in *themselves* or in their *source*.

V.

Another, more ancient and more famed distinction of sacrifice, was into *material* and *immaterial*, or *corporeal* and *incorporeal:* the Christian sacrifices were of the *immaterial* and *incorporeal* kind, and as such distinguished from the Jewish and Pagan sacrifices, which were *material* and *corporeal*. This distinction is as old as Justin Martyr, who rejected the sacrifices of Jews or Pagans, as *material* sacrifices. Such *material* things, he says, God has *no need* to receive of us, but that he accepts only of the men themselves, while copying after the Divine perfections, *purity*, *righteousness*, *philanthropy*, and the like[r]. This was pleaded in answer to the Pagan charge of *impiety*, thrown upon Christians for *not using* material sacrifices. Justin tacitly admits the charge as to *fact*, that the Christians did not use such sacrifices; but in vindication of their conduct in that article, he pleads that God had *no need* of material sacrifices: which in his phraseology, as circumstances shew, amounted to saying, that God *did*

[q] Ablatis omnibus, *solus* remansit Job: sed in illo erant *vota laudis* quæ redderet Deo. *In illo* plane erant: arcam pectoris sui fur *diabolus* non invaserat. Plenus erat unde *sacrificaret*. Deus *videbat* in corde servi sui cultum suum gratuitum: placebat illud *cor* in *conspectu Domini*, in luce viventium. Diabolum *latebat*, quia in tenebris erat. *August. in Psal.* lvi. p. 528, 529. tom. iv.

[r] Ἀλλ' οὐ δέεσθαι τῆς παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ὑλικῆς προσφορᾶς προσειλήφαμεν τὸν Θεὸν, αὐτὸν παρέχοντα πάντα ὁρῶντες· ἐκείνους δὲ προσδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν μόνον δεδιδάγμεθα καὶ πεπείσμεθα, καὶ πιστεύομεν τοὺς τὰ πράσσοντα αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ μιμουμένους, σωφροσύνην, καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν, καὶ ὅσα οἰκεῖα Θεῷ ἐστι. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. p. 14. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 734.

not require them, but indeed *rejected* them. This appears very plainly by his use of the like phrase soon after, with respect to *blood*, *libations*, and *incense*, which, without all question, Justin understood to have been absolutely *rejected:* yet Justin, even in that case also, pleaded that God had *no need* of them[s]. He chose, very probably, that form of speaking, by way of oblique reproof to the Pagans, for their gross sentiments, in conceiving that the Deity *had need* of such offerings. Other Fathers, in the same cause, made use of the phrase of *no need*, exactly in the same way; so as not barely to teach that God is *all-sufficient*, but intimating withal, that God had really *rejected* what he is there said to have *no need* of[t]: otherwise their arguments on that head would have been of no force to justify the conduct of Christians, in their not admitting such or such sacrifices. It is observable, that in both the places where Justin speaks of the sacrifices which God has *no need* of, he uses the phrase in direct *opposition* to such sacrifices as God *accepts* of; which makes it still plainer, that that phrase, as it there stands, is used as equivalent to *disallowing*, or *rejecting*. But to clear the matter up yet further, so as to cut off all evasive pretences or reserves, (as if Justin had left room for a *material* sacrifice in some shape or other,) it is worth noting, that he distinctly points out what is to be offered to *man*, and what to *God*, in the Eucharist: all the material part, all that God gives for *nutriment*, is to be *offered to ourselves and to the needy*, and to God are to be sent up *hymns* and *praises*[u]. Justin could never have expressed himself in that manner, had he thought that any part of that material *nutriment* was to be a *sacrifice* unto God. The words are very emphatical.

[s] Ἀνενδεῆ αἱμάτων, καὶ σπονδῶν, καὶ θυμιαμάτων. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. p. 19. See Review, vol. iv. p. 735. and Dodwell of Incense, p. 46.

[t] Athenagoras, p. 48, 49. Clem. Alex. p. 836, 848. Tertullian ad Scap. c. ii. p. 69. Arnobius, lib. vi. p. 190, 191. Lactantius, Epit. c. lviii. p. 171, 172.

[u] Τὸ τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνου εἰς διατροφὴν γινόμενα, οὐ πυρὶ δαπανᾶν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις προσφέρειν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ εὐχαρίστους ὄντας διὰ λόγου πομπὰς καὶ ὕμνους πέμπειν. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. p. 19.

Literally thus:

"Not to consume by fire the creatures made for nutriment, but to "*offer* them to ourselves, and to the "needy; and thankfully to send up "to him [God] by speech, praises, "and hymns."

N. B. Mr. Reeves has diluted the meaning of this passage by a translation too paraphrastical. It cannot be supposed that Justin meant only, that such things should not be offered to God by *wasting, burning;* for he declares plainly *what* things are to be *presented* to *God*, and *what* to *man:* besides that the taking from such offerings the very *essential characteristics* of all material *presents* to God, is the same with forbidding them to be *used* as *presents*, or *considered* as *presents* to the Divine Majesty.

We are not to *burn it*, as the Pagans did: well, what then are we to do with it? May we not προσφέρειν, *offer* it up as a sacrifice? No; but we must offer it, in a lower sense, to man. What then is to be offered up to God? Nothing? Yes, *thanks, praises, hymns*, and the like: that is God's tribute, that is a sacrifice fit for him, and worthy of him. I have dwelt the longer upon this Father, because of his great antiquity and authority, and because his sentiments on this head have been sometimes widely mistaken by contending parties.

I pass on to Lactantius[v], who has the same distinction with Justin, but under the names of *corporeal* and *incorporeal*, instead of *material* and *immaterial:* he argues, that since God is *incorporeal*, he ought to have a *sacrifice* suitable, that is, *incorporeal*. Nay, he argues further, that no other kind of sacrifice ought to be offered him, and that he requires no other[w]. It is observable, that his *incorporeal* sacrifices take in mental, vocal, and manual services; all *good works*[x], external or internal, coming from a *good* mind. *Bodily* service is performed indeed by the *body*, as the instrument: but that *service* is not a *bodily substance*, not a *material thing;* as a *sheep*, a *bullock*, a *cake*, a *loaf*, or a vessel of *wine* is. Lactantius's notion of sacrifice includes all acts of obedience, all *true* services of the man[y]; but it excludes every thing *extraneous* to the man, from being the subject matter of his sacrifice: so that this distinction of *corporeal* and *incorporeal*, or of *material* and *immaterial*, differs only (if it at all differs) in a mode of conception from the distinction of *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*, before explained.

Eusebius recommends the Christian sacrifices as incorporeal, in opposition to the *corporeal* sacrifices of Jews and Pagans[z].

[v] Sicut corporalibus *corporalia*, sic utique incorporali *incorporale* sacrificium necessarium est. *Lactant. Epit.* c. lxviii. p. 171. Duo sunt quæ offerri debeant, *donum* et *sacrificium*. ——Deo utrumque *incorporale* offerendum est, quo utitur. *Donum* est integritas animi, *sacrificium*, laus et hymnus. *Lactant. Instit.* lib. vi. c. 24. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 754, 755.

[w] Quid igitur ab homine *desiderat* Deus, nisi cultum mentis, qui est purus et sanctus? See above, p. 238.

[x] Hic cultor est veri Dei, cujus *sacrificia* sunt mansuetudo animi, et *vita* innocens et *actus* boni. *Lactant. Instit.* lib. vi. c. 24.

[y] Hæc sunt *opera*, hæc *officia* misericordiæ; quæ si quis obierit, verum et acceptum *sacrificium* Deo immolabit. *Lactant. Epit.* p. 204. Conf. Minuc. Fel. sect. 32. p. 183. in Review, vol. iv. p. 748.

[z] Ταύτας δὲ πάλιν τὰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ νοερὰς θυσίας τὰ προφητικὰ κηρύττει λόγια. *Euseb. Demonstr.* lib. i. c. 10. p. 39. conf. 35, 36. Origen. in Psalm. p. 563, 722. edit. Bened. and my Review, vol. iv. p. 754.

Basil in like manner observes, that God rejects *corporeal* sacrifices[a]. Chrysostom also bears his testimony to the same thing, and in words of like import, where he speaks of the converted Jews as relinquishing their *corporeal* services, upon their embracing Christianity[b]. Cyril, after observing that *beeves, sheep, turtles, pigeons, fruits, fine flour, cakes, incenses*, are all discarded under the Gospel, as too gross to be offered for sacrifice; and that Christians are commanded to offer up something more *fine* and more *abstracted*, more *intellectual* and *spiritual*, namely, *meekness, faith, hope, charity, righteousness, temperance, obedience, dutifulness, praises*, and all kinds of virtues, (not a word of *bread* or of *wine* in all this long list,) adds, "For this sacrifice, as being purest "from *matter*, is most worthy of the Deity, who is by nature "*uncompounded* and *immaterial*[c]." To the same purpose writes Procopius, of the next succeeding century; observing that *corporeal* sacrifice is abolished, and *spiritual* established[d].

Could such writers, after all, believe *bread* or *wine* to be the *sacrifice* which God accepts? Are they finer than *fine flour?* Are they *purer* than *cakes?* Or say that they are: yet are they *immaterial*, or *incorporeal?* Or if even that were allowed, (which never can be allowed,) yet are they *faith*, or *hope*, or *charity*, or good *mind*, or good *life?* Every way they stand excluded. But still, colours have been invented, to evade the authorities here cited: sometimes it is said, that *immaterial*, or *incorporeal*, may not mean *perfectly* immaterial, but only less *gross*, or less *feculent*[e]. That is not very likely, if we consider, that the *immateri-*

[a] Παρατεῖται τὰς σωματικὰς θυσίας. *Basil. Comm. in Isa.* tom. i. p. 398. edit. Bened.

N. B. In Review, vol. iv. p. 759, I took notice, that the editor had rejected that piece as of *doubtful* authority, in his preface, tom. i. p. 48. But I have since observed, that in a later tome he altered his mind, and admitted it as *genuine*, giving his reasons, tom. iii. in Vita Basilii, c. 42. p. 179, &c.

[b] Τὴν διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν σωματικῶν ἀφέντες θεραπείαν. *Chrysost. adv. Judæos*, Hom. vii. p. 664. tom. i. ed. Bened. Conf. ad Roman. Hom. xx. p. 658. tom. x.

[c] Ἀϋλοτάτη γὰρ αὕτη θυσία τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἁπλῷ καὶ ἀΰλῳ πρέπουσα Θεῷ. *Cyrill. Alex. contr. Julian.* lib. x. p. 345. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 759. Dodwell on Incense, p. 89.

[d] Οὐκοῦν εὔδηλον ὡς τὸ σωματικὸν ἐκβαλὼν, τὸ πνευματικὸν πληροῦν ἐπαγγέλλεται. *Procop. Gaz. in Isa.* p. 22, 23. conf. p. 493.

[e] "When I call the eucharistic sacri-" fice *material*, I must here declare, "that I mean nothing by it but that "it has such a real *corporeal* exten-" sion, as natural *bread* and *wine*, as "all other bodies are allowed to have; "and that I do not intend it as a "word of the same adequate import "with the Greek ὑλικός. For I ap-" prehend that some of the ancients "may have asserted, that the eucha-" ristic sacrifice is ἀΰλος, as well as "ἀσώματος; but then they did not

ality or *incorporeity* of the sacrifice spoken of, is understood to be analogous to God's *immateriality* or *incorporeity*, to which it is compared. But that is not all: for it is further to be considered, that the *immaterial* quality of the *Christian* sacrifices was commended by the Fathers, in opposition to the *Jewish* and *Pagan* sacrifices. Now had they really meant no more than that they were *less gross*, or *less dreggy*, such an argument could not have failed to introduce a very *doubtful* debate between them and their adversaries, viz. whether the Jewish and Pagan *fine flour*, and *cakes*, were not as free from dregs as the Christians' *bread;* and whether their libations were not of wine as *pure*, and as free from *feculency*, as any that the Christians could pretend to. Yet we find nothing recorded, no not so much as a hint of any such debate: wherefore it is much more reasonable, as well as more natural to suppose, that those plain Fathers, who were both wise and honest men, understood *immaterial* and *incorporeal* in the usual and obvious sense of those words. And indeed the instances which they give to exemplify what they meant, such as *hope, faith, virtue*, all *immaterial*, (and those were their *sacrifices*,) demonstrate that they did so. I take no notice of some slighter *evasions* which have been offered, for fear of being tedious, or of giving offence to persons of true discernment.

VI.

I pass on to the famous distinction of *bloody* and *unbloody* sacrifice: a distinction, probably, borrowed from the Pythagorean philosophers[g] by the Christian Fathers, of a philosophic turn, who, by some easy and proper refinements of the idea, adapted it to *Christian* purposes. Justin Martyr here seems to have led the way; who to the Pagan sacrifices of *blood*, and to their *libations*, opposes the *true spiritual* praises and thanksgivings offered up by Christians[h]. He did not say, unbloody, or spiritual *bread* and *wine*, but spiritual *praises* and *thanksgivings*. Athenagoras, of the same age, says, that it is meet to offer an *unbloody sacrifice*, and to bring a *rational service*[i]. Had he in-

"mean *perfectly immaterial*, or *without* "*out bodily substance*, but *not gross* "or *dreggy*." *Unbloody Sacrifice*, part i. p. 27.

[g] Vid. Clem. Alex. p. 848, 849. ed. Ox.

[h] Οὐ *ἐν τῇ πάλιν παρουσίᾳ, μὴ δόξητε λέγειν* Ἠσαΐαν, *ἢ τοὺς ἄλλους προφήτας θυσίας ἀφ' αἱμάτων ἢ σπονδῶν ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον ἀναφέρεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀληθινοὺς καὶ πνευματικοὺς ὕμνους καὶ εὐχαριστίας. Just. Mart. Dial.* p. 389. ed. Lond.

[i] Προσφέρειν *δέον ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν, καὶ τὴν λογικὴν προσάγειν λατρείαν. Athenag. Legat.* p. 49.

tended *bread* and *wine* by the *unbloody sacrifice*, this would have been the place wherein to have mentioned them: but he has not one word of them. All that he opposes to the sacrifices of *blood*, are the *knowledge of God's works and ways*, the *lifting up holy hands*, and the like; which, according to him, are θυσία μεγίστη, the *noblest sacrifice;* and therefore, undoubtedly, the same that he recommends under the names of *unbloody sacrifice* and *rational service*[k]. He had said before, God needs no *blood*, nor *fat*, nor *scents*, nor *incense;* that is, he does not now *accept* them. What then does he *accept* instead of *blood*, &c.? Did he say bread or wine? No: but he tells us of that *greatest sacrifice*, describing it as consisting of religious *faith*, and *prayers*, and *services:* those God accepts in opposition to *blood*, &c. wherefore those are what this Father recommended as *unbloody sacrifice* in the place now cited. The case is plain in the author himself, and will, besides, be abundantly confirmed by other similar passages in the *Fathers* that followed, whose testimonies I shall take in their order of time.

Tertullian, to the *bloody sacrifices*, opposes *pure prayer*[l]: not a word of pure *bread* and *wine*, as a Christian sacrifice in opposition to the other. But in another place, where he again recommended prayer sent up from a chaste body, an innocent soul, and a sanctified spirit, he adds, not worthless grains of *frankincense*, the tears of an Arabian tree, nor *two drops of wine*[m]. He must have been very imprudent, not to say worse, in touching upon so tender an article as the *two drops of wine*, had he conceived that such in part was the real *sacrifice* of every Christian communicant at the holy altar.

Origen[n], Lactantius[o], Eusebius[p], Austin[q], all state the *oppo-*

[k] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 739, 740. and compare Jewel's Answer to Harding, p. 427, 428.

[l] Sacrificamus—sed quomodo Deus præcepit *pura prece:* non enim eget Deus, conditor universitatis, *odoris*, aut *sanguinis* alicujus. *Tertull. ad Scap.* c. ii. p. 69. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 745, 746.

[m] Offero ei opimam et majorem *hostiam;* quam ipse mandavit: *orationem* de carne pudica, de anima innocenti, de Spiritu Sancto profectam: non grana thuris unius assis, Arabicæ arboris lachrymas, nec duas *meri* guttas, &c. *Tertull. Apol.* c. xxx. p. 277. Conf. Arnob. lib. vi. p. 190. edit. Lugd. Bat.

[n] Decet enim Deo immolari victimam *cordis*, et *hostiam* contribulati spiritûs, non *carnis* et *sanguinis* jugulari. *Origen. in Num.* Hom. xxiv. p. 363.

[o] Deus non pecudis *sanguine*, sed hominis *pietate* placatur. *Lactant.* Epit. 204.

[p] Οὐ δι' αἱμάτων, ἀλλὰ δι' ἔργων εὐσεβῶν καθαρὰν ὠνομασμένην θυσίαν τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀναφέρειν Θεῷ. *Euseb. Demonstr. Evang.* c. vi. p. 19. conf. p. 20, 21, 23, 39. in Psal. p. 212.

[q] Non vult ergo sacrificium truci-

sition in the same way; not between *bloody animals* and *bloodless bread* or *wine*, (as they should have done upon the *material* scheme,) but between *bloody sacrifices* and sacrifices of the *spiritual* kind, such as prayers, praises, and good works. More particularly, Eusebius joins *rational* with unbloody, and calls it unbloody *service*, not unbloody *elements*, *symbols*, and the like[r]. Eusebius further teaches, that the *unbloody sacrifices* will obtain in heaven[s]. From whence it is manifest, that he meant not the *elements* by that phrase, but religious *services*. Neither has there been produced so much as a single passage from his writings, where that phrase *must* mean the material elements, or where it may not reasonably mean religious *acts*, *services*, *performances*[t]. Attempts have been made upon a place or two[u], to warp them to another meaning, but so slight, and so easily seen through at once, that I shall not here trouble you with any particular confutation of them. The error lies in confounding the *material things* with the *religious work*; and the sacrificial *instruments* with the *sacrificial service*; that is, with the *sacrifice* itself. But I proceed.

The Emperor Constantine, in a letter to King Saporis, says, that Christians are content with *unbloody prayers* only, in supplicating God; and that *prayer, free from blood and filth*, together with the *sign* of the *cross*, was sufficient for victory[w]. Here we have the epithet *unbloody* directly applied to religious *services*, (not to *material* things;) so that there is no arguing from the

dati pecoris, sed vult sacrificium *contriti* cordis. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. c. 5. p. 241.

[r] Θυσιαστήριον ἀναίμων καὶ λογικῶν θυσιῶν. *Euseb. Demonstr. Evang.* lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. Πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, ἄναιμον καὶ καθαρὰν ἀποδιδοὺς αὐτῷ λατρείαν. *Euseb. ibid.* p. 21.

[s] See the passage in my Review, vol. iv. p. 756. How *sacrifices* shall be offered in heaven, or *what* sacrifices, see Origen in Num. Hom. xviii. p. 359. ed. Bened. Lactantius, Instit. lib. vi. c. 24. Augustin. tom. iv. p. 474. tom. vii. p. 610. Gregor. Magn. tom. iii. p. 509. ed. Bened.

[t] Θυσίαις ἀναίμοις καὶ μυστικαῖς ἱερουργίαις τὸ θεῖον ἱλάσκοντο. *Euseb. de Vit. Constant.* lib. iv. c. 45. p. 651. Ἀναίμους καὶ λογικὰς θυσίας, τὰς δι' εὐχῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτου θεολογίας, τοῖς αὐτοῦ θιασώταις τίς ἐπιτελεῖν παρέδωκεν ἄλλος, ἢ μόνος ὁ ἡμέτερος σωτήρ. *Euseb. de Laud. Constant.* p. 768. ed. Cant. Conf. Demonstr. lib. i. c. 6, 10.

[u] See Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 21. N. B. Eusebius asks, "Who "but our Saviour ever taught his "votaries to offer by prayer and an "ineffable theology, these unbloody "and rational sacrifices?" That is, *memorial services*; which is Eusebius's constant notion of the *eucharistic sacrifices*. *Demonstr. Evang.* p. 27, 38, 39, 40. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 487.

[w] Μόναις εὐχαῖς ἀναιμάκταις πρὸς ἱκεσίαν Θεοῦ ἀρχοῦνται——ἀποχρῆσαι αὐτῷ εἰς νίκην τὸ τοῦ σταυροῦ σύμβολον —καὶ εὐχὴν καθαρὰν αἱμάτων καὶ ῥύπου. *Constantin. apud Sozom.* lib. ii. c. 15. p. 63.

Pagan application of that epithet to the *Christian*, which was widely different, as their *sacrifices* were different. It is in vain to plead, that the difference lay only in this, that the Jews and Pagans used *animal sacrifices*, and the Christians *bloodless* bread and wine: for then, why did not the Fathers mention *unbloody bread* and *wine*, rather than *unbloody prayers?* And why should they so industriously smother the *true* state of the *competition*, (if it were *true*,) and run off so *wide*, that nobody, by their way of speaking, could suspect any other, than that the *opposition* entirely lay between *bloody victims* and *unbloody services* of lauds, prayers, and good works? For those are what they directly call *sacrifices*, and what they expressly point to, as often as they specify or explain their *unbloody sacrifices*.

Cyril of Jerusalem in plain terms characterizes the *spiritual sacrifice* by *unbloody service*[x]. Now, as sure as that a *service*[y] is not a *substance*, and a *spiritual sacrifice* is not a *corporeal host*, so sure is it, that the epithet of *unbloody* belongs not to the *elements* in that passage of Cyril. There may be some doubt of what Cyril meant by the *sacrifice* of *propitiation*, in the same paragraph: but a wise interpreter will not therefore depart from what is *clear* and *certain*. What I apprehend is, that Cyril, by *spiritual sacrifice* and *unbloody service*, meant the *consecratory service*, whereby the elements became *symbols* of the *real* body and blood, symbols of the *grand sacrifice*. When the elements were once so constituted *exhibitive* symbols of the grand sacrifice, which is the true *sacrifice* of *propitiation*, Cyril scrupled not to give them the *name* of what they represented and exhibited, by an usual metonymy of *sign* for *thing*: for, in the very same way, he there also gave them the *name* of *Christ slain*[z], and of the *most tremendous sacrifice*[a]. The symbols therefore,

[x] Μετὰ τὸ ἀπαρτισθῆναι τὴν πνευματικὴν θυσίαν, τὴν ἀναίμακτον λατρείαν, ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐκείνης τοῦ ἱλασμοῦ παρακαλοῦμεν τὸν Θεὸν ὑπὲρ κοινῆς τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν εἰρήνης. *Cyril. Mystag.* v. sect. 8. p. 327. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 651, 652.

"After that the *spiritual sacrifice*, "the *unbloody service*, is finished, "upon that sacrifice of propitiation "we beseech God in behalf of the "common peace of the churches."

[y] It has been sometimes pleaded, (Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 24.) that *service* may import a *material thing*; and Exod. xii. 26, 27. is appealed to, as affording an example of it. But the whole context shews, that *service* there really means *service*, the celebration of the paschal sacrifice, the keeping that feast.

[z] Χριστὸν ἐσφαγιασμένον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων προσφέρομεν, ἐξιλεούμενοι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἡμῶν τὸν φιλάνθρωπον Θεόν. *Cyril. Mystag.* p. 328.

[a] Τῆς ἁγίας καὶ φρικωδεστάτης προκειμένης θυσίας. *Cyril. ibid.* p. 327. Conf. Ephræm. Syr. de Sacerdot. p. 2, 3. Chrysostom, tom. i. p. 382, 383,

in a *figure*, are there called the *sacrifice* of *propitiation;* but the *spiritual sacrifice* and *unbloody service*, spoken of just before, express that *service* of ours, that *sacrifice* which we *actively* offer up, in order to the consecrating the *elements* into *holy symbols*, exhibitive of the *grand sacrifice* to every faithful receiver[b]. So that the phrases of *spiritual sacrifice* and *unbloody service* do here retain their usual meaning; and Cyril has neatly contrived to insinuate to his readers a just notion of the *two sacrifices* of the Eucharist; the one actively *offered*, and the other passively *received* or *participated*[c].

I pass on to Zeno of Verona, who lived about the same time with Cyril. He makes use of the same distinction of *bloody* and *unbloody*, while recommending the sacrifices of *Christians* as preferable to the animal sacrifices of Jews and Pagans[d]. By *unbloody* sacrifices, he understood *clean thoughts* and *pure manners*, intimating nothing of clean *bread* or pure *wine*, as set in competition with the *bloody* sacrifices. A strange omission, had he been at all aware that the *elements* were the proper Christian sacrifice.

Nazianzen speaks of his purifying the people at the *mystical table*, that is, in the Eucharist, with *unbloody* and perfect *ordinances*[e]. From whence it is plain, that he thought not the

424. tom. vii. p. 272, 310. tom. ix. p. 176. tom. xi. p. 217, 218. Nazianz. Orat. xvii. p. 273.

[b] Cyril's whole context will set this matter clear.

Παρακαλοῦμεν τὸν φιλάνθρωπον Θεὸν, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐξαποστεῖλαι ἐπὶ τὰ προκείμενα, ἵνα ποιήσῃ τὸν μὲν ἄρτον σῶμα Χριστοῦ, τὸν δὲ οἶνον αἷμα Χριστοῦ· πάντως γὰρ οὗ ἂν ἐφάψαιτο τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τοῦτο ἡγίασται, καὶ μεταβέβληται. Εἶτα, μετὰ τὸ ἀπαρτισθῆναι τὴν πνευματικὴν θυσίαν, τὴν ἀναίμακτον λατρείαν, ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐκείνης τοῦ ἱλασμοῦ παρακαλοῦμεν. κ. τ. λ.

Here I understand ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐκείνης to refer to σῶμα and αἷμα Χριστοῦ, before mentioned. They are *that sacrifice of propitiation* into which the elements are supposed to be *symbolically* changed, by the *spiritual sacrifice* and *unbloody service;* that is, by the *consecratory* prayers and lauds, *instrumentally*, as by the Spirit *efficiently*. In a word, ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ἐκείνης means the same, as if it had been said ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνου καὶ αἵματος. And indeed, if θυσίας had referred to πνευματικὴν θυσίαν next preceding, Cyril, probably, would have said, ἐπὶ τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, not ἐκείνης.

[c] See above, p. 234, &c.

[d] *Spiritali* Deo sacrificium est necessarium *spiritale*, quod non ex sacculo, sed ex corde profertur: quod non bromosis pecudibus, sed suavissimis *moribus* comparatur; quod non *cruentis* manibus, sed sensibus *mundis* offertur; quod non jugulatur ut pereat, sed, sicut Isaac, immolatur ut vivat. *Zeno Veron. in Psal.* xlix. This I take from Dodwell on Incense, p. 97, 98.

[e] Ἐγὼ τραπέζης μυστικῆς παραστάτης,
Ἐγὼ καθαίρω λαὸν, ὃν σοι προσφέρω,
Ἐν τοῖς ἀναίμοις καὶ τελείοις δόγμασι.
Nazianz. Iamb. vol. ii. p. 182.

epithet *unbloody* to be appropriated to *material* substance. And this may help to explain another passage of his, relating to Julian, whom he represents as *desecrating* his hands by *profane blood*, thereby wiping out the consecration he had received in *Baptism*, and washing his hands of the *unbloody sacrifice*[f]; that is, of the *consecration* received in the eucharistical solemnities. Had this plain sense of the place been thought on, there would have been no room left for the speculations which some have raised upon that passage[g].

There is another noted place of the same Father, where he speaks, I think, of the Pagans, set on by Arians, and defiling the *unbloody sacrifices* with the blood of men and of victims[h]. I see no reason for interpreting *unbloody sacrifices*, in this passage, at all differently from the common usage of that phrase in Church writers of those ancient times. Both the thought and the expression seem to be near akin to what Optatus uses, upon a like occasion, in relation to the rudeness and profaneness of some Donatists; who had overturned, as he terms it, the *vows* and *desires* of the people, together with the *altars*[i]. I suppose, Gregory might as properly and as reasonably say, that the *devotions* of the people were *polluted* in one case, as Optatus might say, that they were *overturned* in the other case: the expressions are alike rhetorical.

Asterius Amasenus, in a work ascribed to Gregory Nyssen, speaks expressly of *incorporeal repentance* and *unbloody supplication*, as obtaining in the Church, in the room of animal sacrifices[k]. So that the epithet *unbloody*, for the first four centuries, at least, appears not to have been so much as *applied* to the eucharistical *elements*, much less *appropriated*.

Some pieces have been quoted on this head[l], under the admired names of Athanasius and Chrysostom, which might have been worth examining, were they not now known to be

[f] Καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἀφαγνίζεται, τῆς ἀναιμάκτου θυσίας ἀποκαθαίρων, δι' ἧς ἡμεῖς Χριστῷ κοινωνοῦμεν, καὶ τῶν παθημάτων, καὶ τῆς θεότητος. *Nazianz. Orat.* i. p. 70.

[g] See Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 20.

[h] Θυσιαστηρίων κατορχούμενοι, καὶ τὰς ἀναιμάκτους θυσίας, ἀνθρώπων καὶ θυσιῶν αἵμασι χραίνοντες. *Nazianz. Orat.* xx. p. 348.

[i] *Vota* et *desideria* hominum, cum ipsis *altaribus*, evertistis. Illac ad aures Dei ascendere solebat oratio. *Optat. contr. Parmen.* lib. vi. p. 289.

[k] Ὅπερ δὲ ἦν τότε ὁ ἔνσαρκος μόσχος, τοῦτο νῦν ἐστὶ ἡ ἀσώματος μετάμελεια, καὶ ἀναίματος δεήσις. *Greg. Nyssen. de Pœnit.* p. 170. That work belongs to Asterius Amasenus of the fourth or fifth century. Vid. Fabricius, Bibl. Græc. tom. viii. p. 160.

[l] Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 20.

spurious[m]. But Chrysostom, in his *undoubted* writings, abundantly discovers how he understood the distinction which we are now upon, by his opposing the *bloody* antiquated *sacrifices*, not to clean *elements*, but to Christian *virtues*, lauds, prayers, and good works[n]. Isidore Pelusiot uses the phrase of *unbloody sacrifice*[o], but without explication; so that his sense of it must be determined, either by his general doctrine elsewhere, or by the constant usage of contemporary writers.

St. Austin opposes to the antiquated *bloody victims*, the *sacrifices* of *praise*[p]. Cyril of Alexandria says, that the angels of heaven offer *unbloody sacrifices*[q]. A very clear passage, by which we may reasonably interpret his meaning in other passages[r] not so clear, or left doubtful and undeterminate. I shall here take notice but of one, which runs thus: "The table bearing the "*shewbread* (proposition of loaves) signifies the *unbloody sacrifice*, "by which we are blessed, while we eat the *bread* from heaven, "that is, *Christ*[s]." Here the phrase of *unbloody sacrifice* undoubtedly refers to the sacrament of the *Eucharist*, in and by which we are *blessed, sanctified*, &c. It may be a name for some part of the *service*, or for the *whole solemnity*, (as the whole is often denominated for some eminent part,) but cannot reasonably be construed as a name for the *elements*, considered as a *material* sacrifice. The *bread* from *heaven*, the *thing signified*, rather than the *signs*, would, by Cyril's account, have the better title to that

[m] That ascribed to Athanasius is among the *spuria* of the Benedictine edition, tom. ii. p. 241.

The other ascribed to Chrysostom is among the *spuria* of the Benedictine edition, tom. v. p. 630.

[n] Chrysostom. contra Jud. Hom. vi. p. 648. Hom. vii. p. 617, 664. tom. i. In Psal. iv. p. 20. In Psal. xlix. p. 231. In Johann. Hom. lxxiv. p. 437. tom. viii. In Hebr. Hom. xi. p. 115, 116. tom. xii.

[o] Isidor. Pelusiot. lib. iii. Ep. 75. p. 284.

[p] Augustin. ad Honorat. Epist. cxi. p. 439. tom. ii.

[q] Cyrill. Alex. de Rect. Fide, p. 160. See my Review, vol. iv. p. 756, 759.

[r] Cyrill. Alex. explicat. Anathem. xi. p. 156. De Adorat. in Spiritu, lib. xiii. p. 457. Epist. ad Nestor. p. 72. In Malach. p. 830.

[s] Σημαίνει μὲν ἡ τράπεζα τὴν προθέσιν ἔχουσα τῶν ἄρτων, τὴν ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν δι' ἧς εὐλογούμεθα, τὸν ἄρτον ἐσθίοντες τὸν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, τουτέστι Χριστόν. *Cyrill. Alex. de Adorat. in Spirit.* lib. xiii. p. 457.

N. B. This passage, or part of it, [in Unbloody Sacrif. p. 20.] is strangely rendered thus: "The table "which had the shewbread denotes "the unbloody sacrifice of the bread, "or loaves." Here τῶν ἄρτων, which belong to πρόθεσιν going before, (for πρόθεσιν τῶν ἄρτων amounts to the same with τοὺς ἄρτους τῆς προθέσεως,) are separated from πρόθεσιν, and πρόθεσιν alone is rendered *shewbread*, very oddly, that so τῶν ἄρτων may be thrown to ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν, to make an unbloody sacrifice *of loaves* in the Eucharist: not considering, that ἄρτος, in the apodosis of the comparison, follows after, and means, not the *elements*, but the *bread from heaven*, that is, *Christ*, as Cyril himself interprets.

name. But I apprehend, that the phrase of *unbloody sacrifice* in that place, denotes not the *heavenly bread* itself, nor the *signs*, but the *memorial service* performed by those signs, which is the usual signification of the phrase. Upon the whole, I may presume to say, that no clear testimony hitherto, within the six first centuries, has been produced, whereby to prove that *unbloody sacrifice* was ever made a name for the *elements* of the Eucharist. If the *Fathers* had entertained such a notion, no doubt but they could have expressed it, in words as clear and as full as the Church writers of the eighth[t] and following centuries expressed it; for they wanted no command of language: but since they never did so express it, but those later writers are (so far as appears) the first that did so; it is reasonable to conclude that such an use of that phrase came in about the time that *transubstantiation* (or something very like it) was creeping in. And it is no great wonder if the *signs* then came to be looked upon as the *unbloody sacrifice*, when they were believed to be or to contain the very *things signified*, the real *body* and *blood* that was once *sacrificed* upon the cross[u]. I would not be understood, by my tracing the use of the phrase of *unbloody sacrifice* in so particular a manner, as if I thought that much depended upon it: for had the Fathers really denominated the *elements* by that name, it would amount only to this, that as the elements, by a *metonymy*, have been sometimes called *tremendous sacrifice*, often *body* and *blood*, or *Christ slain*, and the like; so, by the same metonymy, they have been likewise called *unbloody sacrifice*. But as the fact has not been proved, that the elements were ever so named by the ancient *Fathers*, I thought it proper first to consider the fact, and to give what light I could to it, because it may be of some use to know how the ancients understood and applied their *terms* or *phrases*.

[t] The Second Council of Nice (A.D. 787.) speaks plainly enough: *οὔτε ὁ Κύριος οὔτε οἱ ἀπόστολοι, ἢ πατέρες, εἰκόνα εἶπον τὴν διὰ τοῦ Ἱερέως προσφερομένην ἀναίμακτον θυσίαν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ αἷμα. Concil. Nicæn.* ii. Act. vi. p. 370, 371. So also had Damascen before, tom. i. p. 272. So likewise Ambrosiaster, of the same century, [vid. Oudin. tom. i. p. 1858.] in these words:

Offerimus tibi hanc immaculatam hostiam, rationabilem hostiam, *incruentam hostiam*, hunc *panem* sanctum, et *calicem* vitæ æternæ. *Pseud-Ambros.* serm. v. In Oudin. tom. i. 1904. So the interpolated Sacramentary of Greg. I., and so other *late* liturgies.

[u] See Sacramental Part of the Eucharist explained, in the preceding Charge, p. 194—208.

VII.

There was another ancient distinction similar to the former, though of somewhat less note; and that was the distinction of *smoky* and *unsmoky* sacrifice. The Jewish and Pagan sacrifices were of the *smoky*, *fiery* kind; but the Gospel sacrifices were free from *fumes* and *vapours*, and inflamed only with the *fire* of the Holy *Spirit*. It will be of use, carefully to examine this distinction, on two accounts: first, in order to observe whether the Fathers *opposed* to the *smoky* sacrifices, which they rejected, clean *bread* and *wine*, or *clean life*; and, next, to see whether that *fire* of the *Spirit*, which they supposed to fall upon the *Christian sacrifice*, was conceived to come upon the eucharistical *elements* or upon the *communicants*. By these two marks, we may as easily and as certainly discern what was or what was not the *Christian sacrifice*, in their estimation, as a *tree* is known by its fruits, or a *face* by its lines and features.

1. Let us see then, first, how the Fathers expressed the distinction, and what it was that they *opposed* to the *smoky* sacrifices of Jews and Pagans.

Justin, according to his way of stating the *Christian sacrifice*, in opposition to *incensings*, among other articles, opposes only the *sacrifice* of *praise*[t]. Athenagoras does the like[u]. Irenæus opposes a contrite heart, and *prayers*[w], upon the strength of St. John's authority in the Revelations[x]. Clemens of Alexandria opposes to *incensings*, &c. a sacrifice of the *heart*, and of *speech* exhaled from *holy souls*, and the like[y]. Tertullian opposes *clean prayers*[z]. So does Origen[a]. Lactantius opposes to *blood*, *fumes*, and *libations*, a *good mind*, a *clean breast*, and *innocent* life[b]. Hitherto no one thought of opposing *clean bread* or *pure wine* to the *smoky* sacrifices.

Eusebius, speaking of Constantine, says; "*To God*, the King

[t] Just. Mart. Apol. i. p. 19. See above, p. 243. and Review, vol. iv. p. 734, &c.

[u] Athenag. p. 48, 49. See above, p. 247. Review, vol. iv. p. 739.

[w] Irenæus, lib. iv. c. 17. p. 248, 249. ed. Bened. See Review, vol. iv. p. 734, &c.

[x] Revel. v. 8.

[y] Clem. Alex. Pædag. lib. iii. c. 12. p. 306. Strom. ii. p. 369, 370. Strom. vii. p. 848. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 744.

[z] Tertull. Apol. c. xxx. p. 277. Ad Scap. c. ii. p. 69. See above, p. 247. and Review, vol. iv. p. 745, 746.

[a] Origen. contr. Cels. p. 755. See Review, vol. iv. p. 748.

[b] Illic nihil exigitur aliud quam *sanguis* pecudum, et *fumus*, et inepta *libatio*: hic *bona mens*, *purum pectus*, *innocens vita*. *Lactant. Instit.* lib. v. c. 19. p. 279.

"of all, he sent up gratulatory prayers, being a kind of *unfiery* "and *unsmoky* sacrifices[c]." Elsewhere, to *blood*, *smoke*, and *nidor*, he opposes purity of thought, sincerity of affection, soundness of principles, and the like[d]. The author of some commentaries under the name of Ambrose, who is supposed to have collected much from Chrysostom, opposes *faith* and *prayers* to the *smoky* sacrifices[e]. Now, if the eucharistical *elements* had been the *Christian sacrifice*, how easy and how natural must it have been for the *Fathers* to flourish upon that topic; the cleanness, the pureness, the usefulness of *bread* and *wine*, or the *intrinsic value* of it, (as some have done since[f],) beyond all the *gold and silver of the Indies*. Indeed, how could they miss of it? Or how could they forbear to employ their finest strokes of oratory upon it? Yet they were totally silent on that head. Say, that their *disciplina arcani*, in some measure, restrained them from exposing their *mysteries* to strangers and aliens: yet that *disciplina* scarcely commenced so soon as some of these *authorities*[g]. Besides that, their mysteries were not unknown to Julian, for instance, (who had been a Christian reader,) nor to several other adversaries: and they would not have been *silent*, whatever the *Christians* themselves were. Yet Julian charged not the Christians with *bread sacrifice*, but with *no sacrifice*[h], (excepting *Christ's*,) and so the general charge used to run[i]. I know but one instance, and that as late as the fifth century, which looks at all like a charge of *bread-sacrifice* upon Christians: and perhaps by that time there might be more colour for it (though *colour* only hitherto) than there had formerly been. It is the

[c] Τῷ πάντων Βασιλεῖ Θεῷ εὐχαρίστους εὐχὰς, ὥσπέρ τινας ἀπύρους καὶ ἀκάπνους θυσίας ἀνεπέμπετο. *Euseb. de Vit. Constant.* lib. i. c. 48. p. 526.

[d] Euseb. Demonstr. Evang. lib. i. c. 6. p. 23. c. 8. p. 29. c. 10. p. 40. See Review, vol. iv. p. 755.

[e] Nonne altare est cœleste *fides* nostra, in quo offerimus quotidie *orationes* nostras, nihil habens carnalis sacrificii quod in *cineres* resolvatur, nec in *fumos* extenuetur, nec in *vaporationes* diffundatur. *Pseud-Ambros. in Hebr.* viii.

[f] See Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. p. 62. Compare my Appendix above, p. 155.

[g] Vid. Tentzelii Exercitationes: contr. Schelstrat. part. ii. p. 32, &c. Deylingius, Observat. Miscellan. p. 407, 408. Dallæus De Cult. Relig. p. 1085, 1113. Calvoer de Rit. p. 639.

[h] Vid. Cyrill. Alex. contr. Jul. lib. ix. p. 307, 308. lib. x. p. 345. edit. Spanhem.

[i] Justin. p. 14, 19, 387. ed. Lond. Athenag. p. 48, 49. Clem. Alex. p. 306, 369, 370, 688, 836, 848, 860. Minuc. Fel. sect. 32. p. 183. Tertull. Apol. 277. Ad Scap. c. ii. p. 69. Origen. contr. Cels. lib. viii. p. 755. ed. Bened. Arnobius, lib. vi. p. 189. Lactantius, Instit. lib. v. c. 19. Epit. p. 169, 204. Eusebius, Demonstr. Evang. lib. x.

instance of Benjamin the Jew, mentioned in Isidore, who objected, that the Church's *oblation* appeared *new* and *strange*, with respect to *bread's* receiving a *sanctification*, considering that the *law* had prescribed *bloody* sacrifices. Isidore makes a very obscure reply, telling the Jew, that the *law* had prescribed *blood* and *nidors*, in the court of the temple *without*, but that *within* there was a *table* of *bread*, (meaning the *shewbread*,) which was not exposed to the *view* of the ancient people[k]. It does not appear from this passage, either that Isidore admitted the bread for a *sacrifice*, or that Benjamin the Jew (who speaks only of bread's being a sanctified offering) charged him with it. But suppose it related to the name of *sacrifice*, as sometimes given to the elements in the *passive* view, (metonymically called *sacrifice*, as representing and exhibiting the grand sacrifice *received* or *participated* in the Eucharist,) it would not concern the question about the *active* sacrifices performed in the Eucharist, but the sacrifice *received* in it, *symbolically* received; and so the instance would be foreign to the point now in hand[l]. I shall have occasion to say more of the *elements*, as denominated a sacrifice, in the *receptive* way, and in a *metonymical* sense, as I go on, and therefore may pass it over now.

2. Having observed what kind of Christian sacrifices were constantly *opposed* to the *smoky* and *fiery* sacrifices of Jews and Pagans, (not pure and clean bread or wine, but pure heart and life,) I am next to take notice what kind of *fire* the Christians acknowledged in their sacrifice, and how they interpreted it. As *Pagans* boasted of their *culinary* fires, which consumed their

[k] *Καινὴν καὶ ξένην τὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἕφης προσφορὰν ἐπινενοῆσθαι, ἐπειδὰν ἄρτος τὸν ἁγιασμὸν ἐνεπιστεύθη, τοῦ νόμου αἵμασι τὰς θυσίας ὁρίζοντος. Πῶς δὲ οὐ συνορᾶς——ὅτι τὰ αἵματα καὶ τὰς κνίσσας ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ, καὶ τοῖς προσκηνίοις τοῦ ἁγιάσματος νόμος ἐκήλευσε γίνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἄρτους ἡ ἔσω ἐνδέχετο τράπεζα, ἡ τῷ παλαίῳ ἀθέατος λαῷ· ὧν εἷς ὑπάρχει αὐτὸς, ὁ τὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ κρυπτομένην καὶ νῦν δεδηλωμένην ἀλήθειαν μὴ γνούς. Isidor. Pelus.* lib. i. Ep. 401. p. 104. alias 92.

[l] I may just take notice of another instance, sometimes pretended out of Origen; as if he had *opposed* an *offering* to God of *bread*, to the *sacrifices* which Pagans offered to dæmons. See the passage in Review, vol. iv. p. 532. The strength of the objection lies only in a *false* rendering of that passage in Origen: the material words, justly rendered, run thus: "We eat "the loaves *brought*, with thanks-"giving and prayer over the things "*given*." Bellarmine would translate *προσαγομένους ἄρτους*, *loaves offered*, understanding them as offered *to God*: whereupon Albertine makes this reflection:

Quod Bellarminus ambigue vertit *oblatos*, et de oblatione *Deo* facto intelligit, id partim ex linguæ Græcæ ignorantia, partim ex præjudicio inepte supponit. *Albertin.* p. 362.

sacrifices, Christians, in their turn, spake as highly of the *fire* of the *Spirit:* let us now see in what manner they managed that topic.

Clemens of Alexandria, opposing the *fire* of the *Spirit* to the gross culinary fires, observes, that that spiritual fire does not sanctify the *flesh* (of animals), but *sinful souls*[m]. The *souls* were the sacrifice in his account. Upon the *material* scheme, had it been his, he must have said, that the *fire* does not sanctify *animal flesh*, but *bread* and *wine*.

Origen supposes every man to have his *burnt sacrifice* in himself, offered from the *altar* of his heart, which *altar* he himself *fires*, and keeps always *burning*[n]: that is to say, by the fire of the Spirit *within*, not by any fire from *without*, as in the case of the Jewish and Pagan *burnt offerings*.

Jerome represents the *man*, his *thoughts*, *words*, and *works* sublimated, in a manner, by the *fire* of the *Spirit*, and, as it were, *spiritualized* into an heavenly composition, so as to become a most acceptable *sacrifice* unto God[o]. The persons themselves, by his account, are the *sacrifice;* and upon them the *fire* of the *Spirit* falls: whereas, had the *elements* been supposed the *sacrifice*, the *fire* must have fallen there, and the whole turn of the comparison must have been differently contrived. Austin's accounts are much the same with Jerome's, while he supposes the *old man* to become in a manner *extinct*, and the *sacrifice* of the *new man* to be lighted up by the *fire* of the *Spirit*[p].

[m] *Φαμὲν δ' ἡμεῖς ἁγιάζειν τὸ πῦρ, οὐ τὰ κρέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτωλοὺς ψυχάς. Πῦρ οὐ παμφάγον καὶ βάναυσον, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρόνιμον λέγοντες, τὸ διϊκνούμενον διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς διερχομένης* [f. *δεχομένης*] *τὸ πῦρ. Clem. Alex.* Strom. vii. p. 851.

[n] Unusquisque nostrûm habet in se *holocaustum* suum, et holocausti ipse *succendit* altare, ut semper *ardeat*. *Origen. in Levit.* Hom. ix. p. 243.

[o] Ut corpus pinguis literæ, quod significatur in lege, et prophetæ nubilum *igne* Domini, hoc est, *Spiritu Sancto* (de quo dicit Paulus, *Spiritu ferventes*) in *spiritualem* et tenuem *substantiam* convertantur.—Ut per *ignem Spiritus Sancti* omnia quæ cogitamus, loquimur, et facimus, in *spiritualem substantiam* convertantur, et hujuscemodi Dominus delectatus *sacrificiis* placabilis fiat. *Hieronym. in Ezech.* xliv. p. 1021, 1022.

[p] Extincto vel infirmato per pœnitentiam *vetere* homine, *sacrificium justitiæ*, secundum regenerationem *novi* hominis, offeratur Deo; cum se offert ipsa *anima* jam abluta, et imponit in *altare fidei*, divino *igne*, id est, Spiritu Sancto, comprehendenda. *Augustin. in Psal.* iv. p. 14. tom. iv. Conf. tom. v. p. 973, 976. and Gaudentius Brix. de Exod. ii. p. 807.

Totos nos *divinus ignis* absumat, et *fervor* ille totos arripiat. Quis fervor? De quo dicit Apostolus, *Spiritu ferventes*. Non tantum *anima* nostra absumatur ab illo *divino igne* sapientiæ, sed et *corpus* nostrum, ut mereatur ibi immortalitatem. Sic levetur *holocaustum* ut absorbeatur mors in victoriam. *Augustin. in Psal.* l. p. 474.

The most eloquent Chrysostom frequently flourishes upon the same topic. In one place, elegantly describing the nature and excellency of *self-sacrifice,* he proceeds to speak of the *fire* which comes upon it, as being of a very new and uncommon kind, such as subsists not upon *wood*, or material *fuel*, but is *self-subsisting, lives* of itself, and *gives life* to the *sacrifice*, instead of consuming it[q]. Most certainly he thought not of the *material* elements: for he excludes all such gross *fuel;* neither were the elements capable of receiving *life* by the *fire* of the *Spirit.* Cyril of Alexandria reasons on this head exactly the same way, mysticizing the *fire*, and appropriating it to the *persons* considered as the *sacrifice*[r]. What the Fathers aimed at in all was, to point out something in the *Christian sacrifices* correspondent or analogous to the ordinary sacrificial *fires* of the Pagans, and to the *holy fire* of the Jews, but yet far *exceeding* both, in purity, dignity, and energy.

But perhaps it may be here asked, Do not the same Fathers often speak of the *Holy Spirit's* coming upon the eucharistical *elements*, as well as upon the *persons* of the communicants? It is very certain that they do; for they supposed the Holy Ghost to *consecrate*, or *sanctify*, the elements into *holy signs*, or *sacred symbols*, representative and exhibitive of the *body* and *blood* of Christ: not to make *holocausts* or *sacrifices* of them, but *sacraments* only[s]; *signs* of the *grand sacrifice*, spiritually given and received in and through them. Therefore the *Fathers* do not speak of the *fire* of the *Spirit*, as inflaming or warming the *elements;* neither could they with any propriety or aptness do it: if there be any chance expression seeming to look that way[t], it

[q] Καινὸς γὰρ οὗτος τῆς θυσίας ὁ νόμος· διὸ καὶ παράδοξος τοῦ πυρὸς ὁ τρόπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ξύλων δεῖται καὶ ὕλης ὑποκειμένης, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ζῇ τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἡμέτερον, καὶ οὐδὲ κατακαίει τὸ ἱερεῖον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ζωοποιεῖ. *Chrysostom. in Rom.* Hom. xx. p. 657. tom. ix. Conf. de Sacerdot. lib. iii. p. 383. tom. i. Item de Pœnitent. Hom. ix. p. 349. tom. ii. Item de Beat. Philogon. Hom. vi. p. 500. tom. i. et in Hebr. Hom. xi. p. 115, 116. tom. xii. Item, tom. i. p. 648, 671.

[r] Cyrill. Alex. cont. Jul. lib. x. p. 345. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 759.

[s] See Sacramental Part of the Eucharist explained in the preceding Charge, p. 190, &c.

[t] There is a passage of Ephræm Syrus, which has been thought to contain some such meaning: Christus Salvator noster *ignem* et *spiritum* manducandum atque bibendum præstitit nobis carne vestitis, *corpus* videlicet et *sanguinem* suum. *Ephr. Syrus, de Natura Dei incomprehensibili*, p. 682. But *ignis* there seems to mean the *Logos*, received with the *Spirit;* received, not by the *elements*, but by the *persons* upon their partaking of the elements. Vid. Albertin. p. 453, 454. The same is received in *Baptism* also.

can be understood only of the gift of the Spirit *accompanying* the elements to every worthy communicant. Upon the whole, it is manifest, that when the Fathers opposed their *sacrificial fire* (viz. the fire of the Spirit) to the *sacrificial fires* of Jews and Pagans, they supposed it to enlighten, inflame, and spiritualize, not the *elements*, but the *persons*: therefore the persons were the true and acceptable sacrifices, *living sacrifices*, burning and shining *holocausts*.

VIII.

There was another ancient, but less noted distinction of sacrifice, into *false* and *true*; or into *untrue* and *true*, which amounts to the same.

Philastrius, speaking of the Jewish sacrifices, observes, that they were not perpetual, nor *true*, nor salutary[u]. That is to say, that though they had truth of *propriety*, and were, properly speaking, *sacrifices*, yet they had not truth of *excellency*, as the Christian sacrifices have. Justin Martyr, long before, had hinted the same thought[w]. And so also had Lactantius in opposing the *true* sacrifices of Christians to the *false* ones (though he does not expressly so call them) of Jews and Pagans[x]. St. Austin expresses the distinction of *false* and *true* in plain terms; opposing the *true* Christian sacrifice, performed in the Eucharist, to all the *false* sacrifices of the aliens[y]. The context may perhaps make it somewhat *doubtful*, whether *true sacrifice* in that place refers to the *grand sacrifice*, or to the *eucharistical sacrifice*, since they are both of them mentioned in the same chapter. But I choose to refer the words to the *nearer*, rather than to the more *remote* antecedent, as most natural, and therefore most *probable*: and the commendation there given to the *true sacrifice*, by way of preference, runs no higher than what he elsewhere says of the *sacrifice of the Church*, offered in the Eucharist. [z] That sacrifice Austin prefers, under the name of *true*, before the *false* sacrifices both of Jews and Pagans.

[u] Necessitate indocilitatis cogente, sacrificia temporalia, non *perpetua*, nec *vera* fuerunt indicta Judæis, nec salutaria. *Philastr.* Hær. cix. p. 221.

[w] Just. Mart. Dial. p. 389.

[x] Lactant. Epit. p. 169, 204, 205.

[y] Huic summo *veroque* sacrificio cuncta sacrificia *falsa* cesserunt. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. c. 20. p. 256. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 760.

[z] Hujus autem *præclarissimum* atque *optimum* sacrificium *nos ipsi* sumus: hoc est civitas ejus; cujus rei mysterium celebramus oblationibus nostris. Cessaturas enim victimas, quas in *umbra* futuri offerebant Judæi: et *unum sacrificium* Gentes a solis ortu usque ad occasum, sicut jam fieri cernimus oblaturas, per Prophetas oracula increpuere divina. *Au-*

I may just note by the way, that there is another sense of *false* sacrifice to be met with in Cyprian, which belongs not to this place; for he understood *schismatical* sacrifices; which he calls *false* and *sacrilegious* sacrifices, as offered in opposition to the *true* pastors[a]. The Jewish and Pagan sacrifices were denominated *false*, in such a sense as we speak of a *false* diamond, or *false* money, meaning *counterfeit, figure, imitation:* schismatical sacrifices are called *false* in such a sense as we say a *false* title, a *false* patent, or the like. But enough of this.

IX.

Hitherto I have been considering such names of distinction as served to discriminate the *Christian* sacrifices from the sacrifices both of *Jews* and *Pagans*. I proceed next to some other distinctions which respected only the *Jewish* sacrifices as opposed to the sacrifices of the *Gospel*. Hereto belongs the distinction between *old* and *new;* which we meet with first in Irenæus of the second century[b]: who appears to understand the *new oblation* of the offices of piety and benevolence performed at the Christian altar[c]. The sum of his doctrine is, that the *old* sacrifices which the *law* required, and which even then had the *second* place only, have now under the Gospel *no place* at all; and that the *true* sacrifices which then had the *first* place, have now the *sole* place under a *new* form, with many *new* and *great* improvements. The *service,* not the *elements,* are with him the *new oblation*[d].

Cyprian, after Irenæus, has the same distinction, under the terms of *old* and *new;* observing, that by the accounts given in

gustin. de Civit. Dei, lib. xix. cap. 23. tom. vii.

Unde et in ipso *verissimo* et *singulari* sacrificio, Domino Deo nostro agere gratias admonemur. *Augustin. de Spir. et Lit.* c. 11. p. 94. tom. x. Conf. de Civit. Dei, lib. x. c. 6. p. 243. tom. vii. Et contr. Advers. Leg. lib. i. c. 18. p. 568. tom. viii.

[a] Dominicæ hostiæ *veritatem* per *falsa* sacrificia profanare. *Cyprian. de Unit. Eccles.* Sacrilega contra *verum* sacerdotem sacrificia offerre. *Cyprian.* Ep. 69.

[b] Novi Testamenti *novam* docuit oblationem, quam Ecclesia ab Apostolis accipiens, in universo mundo *offert Deo,* ei qui alimenta nobis præstat, *primitias* suorum munerum in *Novo* Testamento. *Iren.* lib. iv. c. 17. p. 249. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 741, 743.

[c] The following words of Origen are a good comment upon what is said by Irenæus:

Si quis vel *egentibus* distribuat, vel faciat aliquid *boni operis* pro mandato, *munus* obtulit Deo. *Origen. in Num.* Hom. xi. p. 311. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 741, 742.

[d] Irenæus hath plainly said, *Deus in se assumit bonas operationes nostras. Iren.* lib. iv. c. 18. p. 251. But where hath he said, Deus in se assumit *panem nostrum* et *vinum nostrum,* or *pecuniam nostram?* Nowhere.

the Old Testament, the *old sacrifice* was to be abolished to make way for the *new*[e]. He refers to Psalm l. 13, 23. Isaiah i. 11. iv. 6. Mal. i. 10. Not that every text there cited directly asserted so much; for at the same time that the prophets spake slightly of the *old* sacrifices, in comparison, yet God required a religious observance of them: but since those sacrifices were so slightly spoken of, even while their use and obligation remained, that single consideration was sufficient to intimate, that they were to *cease* entirely under a more *perfect* dispensation. So the Fathers understood that matter; and therefore those texts out of the Psalms, and out of the Prophet Isaiah, with others of like kind, were not *foreign*, but were conclusive and pertinent, with respect to the purpose for which they were cited. They did not only prove that the *new* were then comparatively *better* than the *old*, but that a *new* and *better* dispensation should admit of *no other*[f] but the *best*. This I hint, to prevent any one's imagining, because *material* sacrifices obtained along with *spiritual* then, though the spiritual were *preferred*, that therefore so it may be now, under the *last* and most *perfect* economy, where the circumstances are widely different. But I return.

Cyprian, among the *new* sacrifices, reckons the sacrifice of *praise*, the sacrifice of *righteousness*, spiritual incense, that is, *prayers*, and the *pure offering*, whatever it means[g].

Eusebius mentions the *new mysteries* of the *New* Testament, contained in the *unbloody* and *rational* sacrifices[h]. From whence appears the vanity of arguing, (as some have done[i],) that the

[e] Quod sacrificium *vetus* evacuaretur, et *novum* celebraretur. *Cyprian. Testim.* lib. i. c. 16.

[f] "*Prayer* and *sacrifice*, strictly so "called, were both acts of worship; "but prayer more *excellent* than *sa-* "*crifice*, because *sacrifice* was a *rite* "of prayer, and a rite which God "required *no longer* than till that "*most precious sacrifice* of the Son of "God was offered for us: the *merit* "of which alone it is, that made the "prayers of good men in all ages "acceptable." *Claget on the Worship of the Blessed Virgin*, vol. ii. p. 189. fol. edit.

[g] See the meaning of the *pure offering*, mentioned in Malachi, explained by Tertullian and Eusebius, cited in Review, vol. iv. p. 746, 754.

[h] Ἐνὶ δὲ τῷ Κυρίῳ μόνῳ θυσιαστήριον ἀναίμων καὶ λογικῶν θυσιῶν κατὰ καινὰ μυστήρια τῆς νεᾶς καὶ καινῆς διαθήκης. *Euseb. Demonstr. Evang.* lib. i. c. 6. p. 20. Θύομεν καινῶς, κατὰ τὴν καινὴν διαθήκην. *Ibid.* cap. 10. He explains the meaning of *new*, lib. i. c. 6. p. 16.

[i] Bellarmin. de Eucharist. p. 749, 751. Conf. Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 268, 269.

That pretence has been often answered by learned Protestants. Pet. Martyr contr. Gardin. p. 54. Jewel against Hard. p. 421. Bilson, p. 696. Hospinian, p. 568. Chrastovius de Missa, lib. i. p. 57. Mason, 585. Du Moulin. Buckl. 432. Rivet. Cathol. 106. Buddæus, Miscel. Sacr. tom. i. p. 54. Deylingius, Miscell. Sacr. p. 98, 99.

new sacrifice, spoken of by the Fathers, could not mean *spiritual* sacrifice, which had obtained long before: for it is *certain* fact, that the *Fathers* did so understand and so apply the name of *new sacrifice;* and therefore it is reasoning against *fact*, or disputing against the *Fathers* themselves, to argue in that way. Besides that the argument may very easily be retorted, since neither *material* sacrifice, nor *bread sacrifice*, nor *wine sacrifice*, could be reckoned altogether *new:* for they obtained under the *old*, that is, under the *Jewish* economy[k]. In one sense, indeed, they are *new*, (which is no commendation of them,) they are *new Christianity*, having been *unknown* in the Church for six whole centuries or more, and not brought in before the late and dark ages; probably, about the time when *material incense* came in, under the notion of a *Christian* sacrifice[l]. But of this I may say more in another article below. I shall only add here, that St. Austin called the *cross-sacrifice*, Christ's *body* and *blood*, as participated, the *new* sacrifice[m].

X.

I proceed to another distinction, as considerable as any before mentioned; and that is of *legal* or *literal*, and *spiritual* or *evangelical*. Indeed, the word *spiritual* may, and sometimes has been *opposed* to *material* or *corporeal;* and so far the distinction would resolve into article the fifth, before considered under the names of *material* and *immaterial:* but here I consider the name of *spiritual* under another conception, as opposed to *literal* and *legal*. The New Testament itself often distinguishes between the *letter* and the *spirit*[n], that is, between the *Law*, which is the outward *shell*, and the *Gospel*, the inward *kernel*. This distinction may be otherwise expressed by the words *carnal* and *spiritual:* for the word *flesh* is frequently a Scripture name for the external and legal economy[o], as opposed to the *spirit*, which is the name for the Gospel, as before hinted. *Earthly* and *spiritual* mean

[k] Exod. xxix. 40. v. 11, 12, 13. Levit. ii. 4, &c. Numb. xxvii. 13, 14. Compare Brevint on the Mass, p. 116, 121. Kidder, p. 93. new edit. fol.

[l] See Christian Sacrifice explained, Appendix, p. 185. Compare Dodwell on Incensing, p. 222. Claget on the Worship of the Blessed Virgin, p. 188. vol. ii. in fol.

[m] Ut jam *de cruce* commendaretur nobis *caro* et *sanguis* Domini, *novum* sacrificium. *Augustin. in Psalm.* xxxiii. p. 211. tom. iv. ed. Bened.

[n] Rom. ii. 29. vii. 6. viii. 2. 2 Cor. iii. 6. Compare Christian Sacrifice explained, p. 124. and Glassius's Philolog. Sacr. p. 1427.

[o] Rom. iv. 1. 2 Cor. v. 16. Gal. iii. 3. iv. 23, 29. Philipp. iii. 4. Hebr. vii. 16. Tertullian expresses the distinction by the words *carnalia* et *spiritalia*. *Adv. Jud.* cap. v. p. 188. So also Jerome on Malachi; and probably some others.

the same with the other[p]. *Typical* and *true* is but another way of wording the same distinction[q] between legal and evangelical, as the *Law* was a *type* or *prefiguration* of Gospel-blessings, and as *figure* is opposed to *truth*.

Symbolical and *true* differs from the other, only as a *type* differs from a *symbol*, or as a particular from a general: for a *type*, strictly, is a figure of things *future*, as before noted; whereas a *symbol* is a figure of things *past*, *present*, or *to come*. So that both are *figures*, and as such are opposed to *truth*, like as *shadows* to *substance*. In short, the Jewish sacrifices were comparatively *literal*, *carnal*, *terrene*, *typical*, *symbolical*; and the Christian sacrifices are *spiritual* and *true*: such is the import of the present *distinction*, variously expressed in Scripture or in Church writers.

St. Peter uses the name of *spiritual sacrifice*[r], in such a sense as *spirit* and *truth* are opposed to *type*, *figure*, *shadow*, *symbol*, or *emblem*: for he understood it in the same way as he understood the Church to be a *spiritual house*, and the Jewish *temple* to have been an *emblem* or *figure* of it. So much appears from St. Peter's context. The Fathers took their hints from the Apostle: and their notion of *spiritual sacrifice* appears conformable thereto, as being regulated by it, and copied from it; only taking in St. Paul's account of *reasonable service*[s], and our Lord's own rule of worship "in spirit and in truth[t]," and the several other descriptions given in the New Testament of evangelical sacrifice. There were two things pointed to by the *legal* sacrifices; our *Lord's* sacrifice, and *ours*; his propitiating *merits*, our qualifying *duties* or *services*. The truth of this matter may best appear by a distinct enumeration of particulars, as follows:

1. The legal *incense* pointed to the *perfume* of Christ's mediation[u], and at the same time to the *prayers* of the saints[w]. In these it centered, in these it terminated: and thus the *material* incense is now spiritualized into the evangelical sacrifice of prayer.

[p] Tertullian uses the distinction of *terrene* and *spiritual*.

[q] Irenæus particularly uses the distinction of *typical* and *true*, lib. iv. cap. 17. Note, that the *truth* of a thing, in Scripture phrase, means the *true interpretation* of it. Dan. vii. 16.

[r] 1 Pet. ii. 5.

[s] Rom. xii. 1.

[t] John iv. 24.

[u] Revel. viii. 3, 4. Vid. Vitringa in loc. Wolfius in loc. Lightfoot, vol. ii. p. 1260. Outram, p. 359.

[w] Revel. v. 8. Vid. Vitringa in loc. Dodwell on Incensing, p. 36, &c. Outram, p. 357.

2. The *blood* of the ancient sacrifices *typically* referred to the blood of Christ; which none can dispute: but it seems withal, that it *symbolically* referred to the *blood* of *martyrs*, who *sacrifice* their lives unto God[x].

3. The *mincha* of the Old Testament had a *typical* aspect to Christ, as all the *sacrifices* had: but it seems likewise to have had a *symbolical* aspect to the oblation of Christ's *mystical body*, the *Church*[y].

4. The *daily sacrifice* looked principally to our Lord's *continual* intercession: but it appears to have been likewise a kind of emblem or symbol of Christian *faith* and *service*[z].

5. The Levitical *memorial* typified the *sweet odour*[a] of Christ: but in symbolical construction it seems also to have pointed to *prayers* and *benevolent* works[b].

6. Sacrifices in general, typically looking to Christ, are symbolically interpreted of *almsdeeds*[c].

7. The animal sacrifices of the old law, pointing to the *grand sacrifice*, appear to have had a secondary, symbolical aspect to the *calves* of the *lips*[d].

8. *Libations* of *wine*, typifying the blood of Christ, are represented as emblems of pouring forth one's blood in martyrdom[e].

9. Lastly, the *mactation* of animals for sacrifice is interpreted of *mortifying* our lusts and passions[f].

Thus has the New Testament itself unfolded the *mystical* intendment of the *Law*; giving us the *spirit* instead of the *letter*, *truth* for *figure*, and, in the room of the antiquated *signs*, the *things* themselves *signified* by them. Upon this principle, the *Fathers* of the Church constantly believed and taught, that the *legal* sacrifices were not barely typical of the sacrifice of the cross, but were *signs* also and *symbols* of the *evangelical* sacrifices offered up by Christians[g]; and were to be considered as sem-

[x] Revel. vi. 9. Vid. Vitringa in loc. Zornius, Opusc. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 536—561. Biblioth. Antiq. tom. i. p. 505. Outram, p. 181.

[y] Rom. xv. 16. Vid. Vitringa in Isa. lxvi. 20. p. 950.

[z] Philipp. ii. 7. Vid. Vitringa de v.t. Synagog. l. i. c. 6. p. 70, 71. Wolfius in loc. Conf. Rom. xii. 1.

[a] Ephes. v. 2. Conf. Deylingius's Observ. Sacr. tom. i. p. 315.

[b] Acts x. 4. Phil. iv. 18. Heb. xiii. 16. Vid. Wolfius in loc.

[c] Hosea xiv. 2. Hebr. xiii. 15.

[d] Phil. ii. 17. 2 Tim. iv. 6. Conf. Deyling. Observat. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 547, &c. Zornius, Opusc. Sacr. tom. ii. p. 48, &c.

[e] Rom. vi. 6. Coloss. iii. 5. See Dodwell on Incense, p. 34. and Cranmer against Gardiner, p. 109. alias p. 422, 423.

[f] Irenæus, lib. iv. c. 7. ed. Bened. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 849. ed. Ox. Origen in Levit. Hom. ii. p. 191. edit. Bened. Nazianz. Orat.

blages to realities, or as shadows to substance, or as flesh to spirit. It remains only, that we inquire what they understood the *spiritual sacrifice* to be; for as to the *legal sacrifices*, every one knows what they were, being so particularly set forth, and so minutely described in the Old Testament, and referred to also in the New.

Now as to the *spiritual sacrifices*, besides what is said of them in both Testaments[h], the *Fathers* have so plainly deciphered them, and so distinctly enumerated them, that there can be no reasonable question made as to what sacrifices they intended by that name. I have elsewhere traced this matter from *Father* to *Father*, through the first *four* centuries[i], and I need not repeat here: only I may add two or three authorities to the *many* before cited, for confirmation.

Origen is very full and express in his accounts of *spiritual sacrifice*[k]. Chrysostom is so minute and particular in specifying what the *spiritual sacrifices* are, that nothing can be more so[l]. He does it by giving in a *catalogue* of *Christian virtues* or *graces*: those are the *spiritual* sacrifices, in his estimation. When he says, they need no *instruments*, nor are confined to *place*, he is to be understood of the virtuous *habits* resting in the mind, and which, if all *opportunities* of outward exercise were wanting, would still be *spiritual sacrifices*; so that they do not *absolutely* need *instrument* or *place*, as *material* sacrifices do. And when they do need both, as to the *outward* exercise of those *virtues* or religious *habits*, still it is the *inward heart*, rather than the *outward work*, which is properly the acceptable sacrifice. Such is Chrysostom's account of this matter, and such the concurring sentiments of all *antiquity*. Great pains have been taken[m] to

xxxviii. p. 484. Chrysostom. in Hebr. Hom. xi. p. 807, 808. Augustin, tom. vii. p. 241, 242, 255. viii. 345, 586. x. 94. Pseud-Ambros. in Hebr. viii. p. 447.

[h] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 730, 731.

[i] Ibid. p. 732—795.

[k] Immolatio *spiritalis* est illa quam legimus, *immola Deo sacrificium laudis, et redde Altissimo vota tua. Psal.* l. 14. Laudare ergo Deum, et vota *orationis* offerre, *immolare* est Deo. *Origen. in Num.* Hom. xi. p. 311. tom. ii. ed. Bened. conf. p. 191, 205, 248, 363, 418, 563.

[l] Τί δέ ἐστιν ἡ λογικὴ λατρεία; τὰ διὰ ψυχῆς, τὰ διὰ πνεύματος. *Joh.* iv. 24. Ὅσα μὴ δεῖται σώματος, ὅσα μὴ δεῖται ὀργάνων, μὴ τόπων. Τὰ δέ ἐστιν ἐπιείκεια, σωφροσύνη, ἐλεημοσύνη, ἀνεξικακία, μακροθυμία, ταπεινοφροσύνη. *Chrysostom. in Hebr.* Hom. xi. p. 115. tom. xii.

Τί δέ ἐστι λογικὴ λατρεία; ἡ πνευματικὴ διακονία, ἡ πολιτεία ἡ κατὰ Χριστὸν —— ταῦτα γὰρ ποιῶν, ἀναφέρεις λογικὴν λατρείαν. Τουτέστιν, οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν. *Chrysost. in Rom.* Hom. xx. p. 658. tom. ix.

[m] See Unbl. Sacrifice, part i. p. 22—27, 61.

find, if it were possible, some ancient voucher for a different account of *spiritual sacrifice*, or for some different application of that *name:* but not a single instance has been found, nor, I suppose, ever will be.

Bellarmine pretended[n] that Tertullian understood Abel's sacrifice of a *sheep* to have been a *spiritual sacrifice*. All invention and misconstruction. Tertullian did not, could not suppose so wild a thing; which would have been a flat contradiction to his known, certain, settled principles every where else in his works[o], and in that very work also which Bellarmine referred to. Tertullian does not say that Abel's sacrifice was a *spiritual* sacrifice, but that Cain, the elder brother, was a type or prefiguration of the elder people Israel, and Abel a type or prefiguration of the younger people, the Christian Church; and that as their sacrifices were *different*, (one being of the fruits of the ground, the other of the flock,) so a *difference* in the sacrifices of the two different people was thereby intimated[p]. Not precisely *the same* difference, but a *difference:* and as to the kind of difference, Tertullian sufficiently explains it afterwards, when, to the *terrene* sacrifices of the elder people, the *Jews*, he opposes the *spiritual* sacrifices of the younger people, the *Christians*, and specifies what they are; namely, the sacrifices of *lauds*, and of a *contrite heart*[q]. But some may ask, how then did Tertullian make out what he pretended? He made it out thus: that the *Jewish* and *Christian* sacrifices would be *different*, like as Cain's and Abel's were, and that one should be *rejected*, and the other *accepted* by God: so far the analogy or similitude holds, and no further. For if we were to strain it with the utmost rigour, the Jewish sacrifices ought *all* to have been of the *fruits* of the *ground*, which

[n] Bellarmin. de Eucharist. p. 751. Compare Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 25.

[o] See some of the passages collected in Review, vol. iv. p. 745—748.

[p] Sic et sacrificia *terrenarum* oblationum et *spiritualium* sacrificiorum prædicata ostendimus. Et quidem a primordio majoris filii, id est, Israel terrena fuisse in Cain præostensa, et minoris filii Abel, id est, populi nostri, sacrificia *diversa* demonstrata. Namque major natu Cain de fructu *terræ* obtulit munera Deo, minor vero filius Abel de fructu *ovium* suarum. Respexit Deus in Abel et in munera ejus, in Cain autem et in munera ejus non respexit. —— Ex hoc igitur *duplicia* duorum populorum *sacrificia* præostensa jam tunc in primordio animadvertimus. *Tertull. adv. Jud.* cap. v. p. 187.

[q] Quod non *terrenis* sacrificiis, sed *spiritalibus* Deo litandum sit, ita legimus ut scriptum est; *Cor contribulatum et humiliatum hostia Deo est:* et alibi, *Sacrifica Deo sacrificium laudis, et redde Altissimo vota tua.* Sic igitur sacrificia *spiritalia laudis* designantur, et *cor contribulatum* acceptabile sacrificium Deo demonstratur. *Tertull. ibid.* cap. v. p. 188.

is false in fact; and the *Christian* sacrifices ought to be *animal sacrifices*, which is manifestly absurd. In short, as Tertullian has not said, nor could consistently say, that Abel's sacrifice was a *spiritual* sacrifice; so neither can it, by any clear or just consequence, be concluded that he meant it, or had any thought of it. But it is further pleaded, that *material* things have sometimes the epithet of *spiritual* or *rational* superadded; and why then may not a *material* sacrifice be a *spiritual* or *rational* sacrifice in a just sense of the word? I answer: the question is not, whether the epithet *spiritual* may not in a just sense be applied to a *material* subject; for it is certain that it may, and St. Paul[r] himself more than once so applies it: the question is not, how the single word *spiritual* may be applied, but what the phrase of *spiritual sacrifice*, according to Scripture usage, and according to Church usage, signifies. It has not been shewn, that either the New Testament or the ancient Fathers ever gave the name of *spiritual sacrifice*, either to the *elements* of the Eucharist, or to any *material* offerings. *Spiritual sacrifice* is a *phrase* of a *determined* meaning in the New Testament and ancient Church writers; and it is but a vain attempt to look for any real countenance from them, by retaining the *phrase*, unless the *ideas* which they affixed to it be retained also: for the *doctrine* will be *different*, though the *words* or *phrases* should still continue the *same*.

If it should be suggested, after all, that the *carnal*, *earthly*, *legal* sacrifices meant only such sacrifices as wanted the *inward* service of the *heart*, and that *spiritual sacrifices* meant sacrifices offered from and with the *spiritual service* of the heart; it is obvious to reply, that then the *distinction* which we are now upon could not have served the purpose for which it was brought, could not have shewn the *absolute* preference due to the *Christian*

[r] 1 Cor. x. 3, 4. xv. 44.

N. B. The word *spiritual* sometimes means the same with *mystical*, and may be applied to any *material* thing considered as a *sign* of something *spiritual*. In such a sense, St. Paul speaks of *spiritual* (that is, *mystical*) *meat*, *drink*, *rock*. In the like sense, we may, among the Fathers, meet with the phrases of *mystical* (or *spiritual*) *oil*, or *waters*, or *bread*, or *cup*, or *supper*, or *table*, meaning a *material* sign or symbol of something *spiritual*. Cyprian seems to denote the elements by the name of *spiritual and heavenly Sacrament*. *Epist.* lxiii. p. 108. But still the phrase of *spiritual sacrifice* is not applied to them (so far as appears) among Church writers truly *ancient*: for in that phrase *spiritual* denotes not the *sign* of something else, but the very *thing signified*, like as in the phrase of *spiritual house*, parallel to it in the same verse of St. Peter. (1 Pet. ii. 5.)

sacrifices above the *Jewish*. The *Jews*, as many as were really good men, joined the sacrifice of the *heart* with the *material* offerings: and if that had been all the meaning which the *Fathers* went upon in their disputes with the *Jews*, the *Jews* might have retorted, irresistibly, that their sacrifices were as truly *spiritual* as the Christian sacrifices could be, and *more valuable*, as having *all* that *spirituality* which the *Christians* pretended to, and a rich offering besides, of *bullocks*, suppose, or *rams*. The *Fathers* were wiser than to lay themselves open, and to expose the Christian cause, by any such meaning: besides that, their own repeated explications of the phrase of *spiritual sacrifice* are a flat contradiction to it.

XI.

I pass on to another celebrated distinction of sacrifice, into *Aaronical* and *Melchizedekian;* which served also to distinguish the *Christian* sacrifices from the *Jewish* ones, but in a view somewhat different from that of the distinction immediately preceding. For as the distinction of *literal* and *spiritual* was intended chiefly to set forth the superior excellency of what Christians *actively* offered by way of sacrifice, so the present distinction of *Aaronical* and *Melchizedekian* was intended chiefly to set forth the superior excellency of what Christians *passively* receive, participate, or feast upon, under the name and notion of a sacrifice.

Christians have an *altar*, whereof they partake[s]. And that altar is *Christ* our Lord[t], who is *altar*, *priest*, and *sacrifice*, all in one. Under the law, those were different things, because any one of the legal *figures* alone could not represent Christ in all the three several capacities: but in him they are all united. He performed his sacrifice in the *active* and *transient* sense, once for all, upon the cross: he distributes it daily in the *passive* and *abiding* sense of it, to all his true servants, to every faithful

[s] Hebr. xiii. 10. See my Review, vol. iv. p. 540, &c. And compare Dallæus de Cult. Lat. Relig. lib. viii. cap. 24. p. 1117. Patrick, Mens. Myst. p. 85. Spanheim. Dub. Evang. tom. ii. p. 843. Mason de Minister. Anglic. p. 625.

[t] Revel. viii. 3, 5. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 741. and Vitringa in loc. with Dodwell on Incensing, p. 29—44. and Dallæus de Cult. Lat. Relig. p. 1117.

Est ergo *altare* in cœlis (illuc enim preces nostræ et oblationes diriguntur) et *templum;* quemadmodum Johannes in Apocalypsi ait, et apertum est templum Dei. *Irenæus*, lib. iv. cap. 17. p. 249. Conf. Clem. Alex. p. 209. Origen. in Levit. Hom. i. p. 186. In Josh. Hom. xvii. p. 438. and others referred to in Review, vol. iv. p. 741.

communicant. His table here below is a secondary *altar* in two views: first, on the score of *our own* sacrifices of *prayers*, *praises*, *souls*, and *bodies*, which we offer up from thence[u]; secondly, as it is the *seat* of the consecrated *elements*, that is, of the *holy* and *blood* of Christ[w], that is, of the *grand sacrifice*, symbolically represented and exhibited, and spiritually there *received*; received by and with the *signs* bearing the name of the *things*.

These things premised, we may now find our way opened towards a right conception of the *Melchizedekian* sacrifice, whereof we *partake* in the Eucharist, and which is infinitely preferable to all the sacrifices of Aaron, considered barely as *sacrifices*: for as to their *sacramental* capacity, that is of distinct consideration. For the first two centuries and a half, Melchizedek was considered as giving *holy food* to Abraham, a symbol of the *true food* from heaven, and a prelude to what our Lord himself should afterwards do in the *institution* of the *Eucharist*[x].

About the middle of the third century, Cyprian, considering our Lord's *passion* as the *sacrifice* commemorated and participated in the Eucharist, (which is a right notion rightly understood,) expressed that commemorative act by the word *offer*[y]: by which he could mean only the *presenting* to *view*, or *representing*; as is very evident, since our Lord's *passion* could be no otherwise *offered*, neither could the *cross-sacrifice* be reiterated. Christ cannot again be *sacrificed*, no, not by himself; much less by any one else. From hence it may be perceived in how lax a sense Cyprian used the word *offer*. Therefore no certain conclusion

[u] "It is called a *table* with reference to the *Lord's Supper*, and "an *altar* on the score of the *sacrifice* of *praise* and *thanksgiving* there "offered to God Almighty." *King Edward's Letter*, A. D. 1550. in Collier's Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 304. See Reasons against Altars in 1559. Ibid. p. 433. and compare my Christian Sacrif. expl. p. 130. Dow's Answer to Burton, p. 116.

[w] Quid enim est *altare*, nisi *sedes* corporis et sanguinis Christi? Quid vos offenderat Christus, cujus illic per certa momenta *corpus* et *sanguis* habitabat——fregistis etiam calices, *sanguinis Christi* portatores. *Optat. adv. Parmen.* lib. vi. p. 289.

In the other sense or view of an *altar*, the same author says, *Altaria* Dei, et quibus *vota* populi, in *membra* Christi portata sunt.——Illac ad aures Dei ascendere solebat oratio. *Optat. ibid.*

[x] Μελχισεδὲκ, βασιλεὺς Σαλὴμ, ὁ Ἱερεὺς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑψίστου, ὁ τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὸν ἄρτον, τὴν ἁγιασμένην διδοὺς τροφὴν, εἰς τύπον εὐχαριστίας. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* iv. p. 632. Conf. Tertullian. adv. Judæos, cap. iii. p. 185. Contr. Marc. lib. v. p. 472.

[y] Passionis ejus mentionem in *sacrificiis* omnibus facimus: *passio* est enim Domini *sacrificium* quod *offerimus*. Calicem in *commemorationem* Domini et passionis ejus *offerimus*. *Cyprian, Ep.* lxiii. p. 109. Calix qui in *commemorationem* ejus offertur, p. 104.

can be drawn from it, in favour of the strict *sacrificial* sense of the word, whether he speaks of *offering* bread and wine[z], or of offering Christ's *passion*, unless some other circumstances determine the meaning. Cyprian cannot be understood of our Lord's sacrificing *himself* in the Eucharist, because that would be too *high* for *us* to aim at; nor of his sacrificing the *elements*, because that would have been too *low* a sacrifice for *him*, at least, to offer. When he speaks of offering a *true and full sacrifice*[a], (meaning *bread* and *wine* jointly, and not either singly,) he understands that bread and wine (which he calls *sacrifice*, by the same figure as he often calls them *body* and *blood*) to be a *true* and *full* representation or *image* of the sacrifice of the cross. So Cyprian himself explains it, viz. by *offering* (that is, *presenting*) an *image* of Christ's sacrifice in *bread* and *wine*[b]. The sum of his doctrine is, that the *typical* Melchizedek blessed Abraham in and by *bread* and *wine*, considered as *symbols*, *images*, *figurations* of our Lord's passion and sacrifice; and that the true Melchizedek so blessed his own disciples in delivering to them the *benefits* contained in his *passion*, by the like symbols. We may go on to Eusebius, who explains this matter more clearly, and who, besides, more distinctly expresses the difference between Aaronical and Melchizedekian sacrifices, in these words:

"As he (Melchizedek) being a priest of the Gentiles, no "where appears to have used *corporeal* sacrifices, but *blessed* "Abraham with wine only and bread; just in the same manner, "first our Lord and Saviour himself, and then all priests from

[z] Quod Melchizedech sacerdos Dei summi fuit, quod *panem* et *vinum* obtulit, quod Abraham benedixit.—Dominus noster Jesus Christus, qui sacrificium Deo Patri *obtulit*, et *obtulit hoc idem* quod Melchizedech obtulerat, id est, *panem* et *vinum*, suum scilicet *corpus* et *sanguinem*, p. 105.

Compare St. Austin on the same head:

Ipse est etiam sacerdos noster in æternum, secundum ordinem Melchizedech, qui seipsum obtulit holocaustum pro peccatis nostris, et ejus sacrificii *similitudinem* celebrandam in suæ passionis memoriam commendavit; ut illud quod Melchizedech obtulit, Deo jam per totum terrarum orbem in Christi Ecclesia videamus offerri. *Augustin. de divers. Quæst.* q. 61. p. 34. tom. vi.

[a] Ille sacerdos vice Christi vere fungitur, qui id quod Christus fecit imitatur; et sacrificium *verum* et *plenum* tunc *offert* in Ecclesia Deo Patri, si sic incipiat *offerre* secundum quod ipsum Christum videat obtulisse. Ep. lxiii. Compare my Review, vol. iv. p. 751.

[b] Ut ergo in Genesi per Melchizedech sacerdotem benedictio circa Abraham possit rite celebrari, præcedit ante *imago* sacrificii Christi, in *pane* et *vino* scilicet constituta. Quam rem perficiens et adimplens Dominus, panem et calicem mixtum vino *obtulit*, et qui est plenitudo veritatis, veritatem præfiguratæ *imaginis* adimplevit. P. 105.

" him, among all nations, consummating the *spiritual hierourgy*, " according to the laws of the Church, do represent the mys- " teries of his *body* and of his salutary *blood*, in *bread* and *wine*. " Melchizedek foresaw these (mysteries) by a *divine* spirit, and " previously made use of those *images* of things to come[c]." Whereupon we may observe, 1. That Melchizedek, by this account, used no *corporeal* sacrifices: therefore he did not sacrifice *bread* and *wine*, which undoubtedly are both *corporeal*. It is in vain to contend that he meant *bloody*, as opposed to *unbloody*. His word is *corporeal*, not *bloody*; and he had used the same word just before, speaking of *corporeal* oil, in the common sense of *corporeal*[d]. 2. That the Melchizedekian priests, after our Lord, exercise a *spiritual hierourgy*, as opposed to *corporeal* sacrifices before mentioned: therefore their sacrifices are *spiritual*; and therefore, again, they sacrifice not *bread* or *wine*, but they represent or signify the *mysteries* of the passion in *bread* and *wine*[e]; they perform a *memorial service* by those symbols, a direct memorial of the *grand sacrifice*. 3. That Melchizedek, by a *divine* spirit, foresaw the *mysteries* of the same *grand sacrifice*, and made a *figuration* of it in bread and wine, and by those symbols conveyed a *blessing* to Abraham[f], the blessing of the great atonement. Herein lay the superior excellency of *Melchizedek's sacrifice*, (that is, *figuration* of the grand sacrifice,) that it directly pointed to and exhibited *true* expiation, while Aaron's directly conveyed *temporal* blessings only, and a *temporal* atonement[g]. It must indeed be owned, that *true*

[c] Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος Ἱερεὺς ἐθνῶν τυγχανῶν, οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται θυσίαις σωματικαῖς κεχρημένος, οἴνῳ δὲ μόνῳ καὶ ἄρτῳ τὸν Ἀβραὰμ εὐλογῶν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον πρῶτος μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ Σωτὴρ καὶ Κύριος ἡμῶν, ἔπειτα οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἱερεῖς ἀνὰ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὴν πνευματικὴν ἐπιτελοῦντες, κατὰ τοὺς ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς θεσμοὺς, ἱερουργίαν, οἴνῳ καὶ ἄρτῳ, τοῦτε σώματος αὐτοῦ καὶ σωτηρίου αἵματος αἰνίττονται τὰ μυστήρια, τοῦ Μελχισεδὲκ ταῦτα πνεύματι θείῳ προτεθεωρηκότος, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ταῖς εἰκόσι προκεχρημένου. *Euseb. Demonstrat. Evang.* lib. v. cap. 3. p. 223. Conf. Theodorit. in Psal. cx. p. 852.

[d] Οὐδὲ διὰ σκευαστοῦ καὶ σωματικοῦ ἐλαίου κέχριστο, οὐδὲ τέλος ἕξειν ἔμελλε τῆς ἱεροσύνης. *Euseb. ibid.* p. 223.

[e] So Epiphanius on this article. Ὁ Μελχισεδὲκ αὐτῷ [Ἀβραὰμ] ἀπήντα, καὶ ἐξέβαλεν αὐτῷ ἄρτον καὶ οἶνον, προτυπῶν τῶν μυστηρίων τὰ αἰνίγματα, ἀντίτυπα τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν, λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι ἄρτος ὁ ζῶν, καὶ ἀντίτυπα τοῦ αἵματος, τοῦ ἐκ τῆς πλευρᾶς αὐτοῦ νυχθέντος καὶ ῥεύσαντος εἰς κάθαρσιν τῶν κεκοινωμένων καὶ ῥαντισμὸν, καὶ σωτηρίαν τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν. *Epiphan. Panar.* Hær. lv. n. 6. p. 472.

[f] So Julius Firmicus of that time: Melchizedech, rex Salem, et sacerdos summi Dei, revertenti Abrahæ, cum pane et vino, *benedictionis* obtulit gratiam. *Bibl. P. P.* tom. iv. p. 114. ed. 1618.

[g] This matter is clearly expressed by an author of the twelfth century, under the name of Cyprian:

expiation was conveyed under the *legal veils* to persons fitly qualified: but those legal sacrifices, in their *sacrificial* capacity, did nothing of that kind. What they did of a *saving* kind was in their *sacramental* capacity: for, that they were *sacraments*, as well as sacrifices, is an allowed principle among knowing Divines of all principles or persuasions[h]. Where then was the difference between the Aaronical sacrifice and Melchizedekian, if both were *sacramental* conveyances of the same blessings, and if neither of them availed any thing in their *sacrificial* capacity, properly speaking? The difference lay here, that Melchizedek was considered as conveying the *true* expiation *directly* and *plainly*, by the symbols of bread and wine, and not under the *dark* covers of a *legal* expiation, which but *remotely* and *obscurely* pointed to it. He feasted himself and Abraham directly upon the *grand sacrifice* itself, as Christian priests do now: Aaron feasted himself and his people directly upon nothing but the *legal* sacrifices, and the *legal, temporal* expiations. But this distinction will yet be better understood, by some other passages of the *Fathers*, which I am going to subjoin in their order.

St. Jerome, more than once, mentions the distinction between the Aaronical and Melchizedekian sacrifices. He declares, in one place, that Melchizedek did not (like Aaron) sacrifice *irrational* victims, but *offered* bread and wine, that is, the *body* and *blood* of the Lord[i]. He does not say, *sacrificed* bread and wine, but *offered*, (a word of some latitude,) and he presently after interprets them by the *body* and *blood*. So that Melchizedek, according to him, offered no sacrifice but the *grand sacrifice*: and he could not properly *sacrifice* that *body* and *blood*, which were not then in being, but he *figured* it by *symbols*[k], and there-

Hoc maxime discernere debet Christiana religio, quod sanguis *animalium* a sanguine *Christi* per omnia differens, *temporalis* tantum habeat vivificationis effectum, et vita eorum *finem* habeat, et sine ulla revocatione terminum constitutum, ideoque ad obtinendam æternitatem non potest proficere——Bibimus autem de sanguine Christi, ipso jubente, vitæ *æternæ* cum ipso et per ipsum participes. *Pseudo-Cyprian. de Cœna*, p. 113. edit. Bened.

[h] Cudworth on the Sacram. chap. ii. p. 23, &c. Gerhard, tom. iv. p. 292, 297. Alanus de Eucharist. p. 502. Chamier, tom. iv. p. 14, 15. Vossius de Idololatr. lib. i. cap. 41. p. 151, 152. Cloppenburg, Schol. Sacrific. p. 9, &c. Buddæus, Instit. Theolog. p. 687.

[i] Quod autem ait, *Tu es sacerdos in æternum, secundum ordinem Melchisedech*, mysterium nostrum in verbo *ordinis* significatur, nequaquam per Aaron irrationalibus victimis immolandis, sed oblato *pane* et *vino*, id est *corpore* et *sanguine* Domini. *Hieron. Quæst. Hebraic.* p. 520. tom. ii. ed. Bened.

[k] Postquam *typicum* Pascha fuerat completum, et agni *carnes* cum Apo-

with conveyed the *blessings* of it; feasting Abraham, not with legal victims, but with *Christ* himself. This appears to be his sense of that matter; which will be further confirmed by other passages of the same Father. He gives a kind of summary of the sentiments of Hippolytus, Irenæus, two Eusebius's, Apollinaris, and Eustathius, in relation to Melchizedek; importing, "that he sacrificed no victims of flesh and blood, took not the "blood of the brute animals upon his right hand; but he dedi-"cated a *Sacrament* in bread and wine, in the simple and pure "sacrifice of Christ[l]." So I point and translate the sentence; altering the common punctuation, only as to the placing of a single comma, to make out the sense. As to what he says of not receiving blood on the *right hand*, (or *right thumb*,) I suppose it alludes to the Levitical rites of consecration to the priesthood[m], which Melchizedek had nothing to do with. He received his *priesthood* in some other way, and he exercised it in a different manner; not by *sacrificing* animals, but by *dedicating* or consecrating a *Sacrament*[n], in or with *bread* and *wine*: that is to say, with the *simple* and *pure* sacrifice of *Christ* alone, represented and exhibited by and under those symbols. This appears to be St. Jerome's sense, and his full sense. For like as he had, in a passage before cited, interpreted bread and wine by what they

stolis comederat, assumit *panem* qui confortat cor hominis, et ad *verum* Paschæ transgreditur *Sacramentum*: ut quomodo in *prefiguratione* ejus Melchizedech, summi Dei sacerdos, panem et vinum *offerens* fecerat, ipse quoque veritatem sui corporis et sanguinis *representaret*. *Hieron. Comment. in Matt.* xxvi. p. 128. tom. iv. part. 1.

[l] Neque carnis et sanguinis victimas immolaverit, et brutorum sanguinem animalium dextra susceperit, sed pane et vino, simplici puroque sacrificio Christi, dedicaverit Sacramentum. *Hieron. Epist. ad Evangel.* p. 571. tom. ii.

[m] Exod. xxix. 20.

[n] Recurre ad Genesim, et Melchizedech regem Salem hujus principem invenies civitatis: qui jam tum in *typo Christi* panem et vinum *obtulit*, et *mysterium* Christianum in Salvatoris *sanguine* et *corpore* dedicavit. *Hieron. ad Marcell.* p. 547. tom. iv. part. 2.

N. B. Jerome considered Christ's *body* and *blood* as *symbolically* contained in the exhibitive signs: and no wonder, when in the same Epistle he could write thus: Sepulchrum Domini quotiescunque ingredimur, toties *jacere in syndone cernimus Salvatorem*, &c.

I interpret the dedicating a *Sacrament* in or with Christ's *body* and *blood*, in such a sense as St. Austin says, *Mare rubrum——passione et sanguine Domini consecratum*. [In Psalm. lxxx.] And, *Unde rubet Baptismus*, nisi Christi sanguine consecratus? In Johan. Tract. xi. That is to say, the *Sacrament* of Baptism is made an *exhibitive sign* of Christ's *blood*: which is, its *consecration*, or *sanctification*, or *dedication*, to high and holy purposes. The blood *signified*, and spiritually exhibited, by *water* in one Sacrament, by *wine* in the other, gives the *holy sanction* to both Sacraments: for without that, they would be no *Sacraments* at all.

are *signs* of, namely, by *body* and *blood* of the *Lord*, so here he interprets them by the same thing, under the equivalent expression of the *simple and pure sacrifice of Christ*. And as he had in a second passage, before cited, interpreted the *offering* bread and wine, of a *figuration* and *representation* of the *true* body and blood, so he may reasonably be presumed to *mean* the same thing here. He calls the *sacrifice of Christ*, thus represented, thus exhibited, *simple* and *pure*, as not blended with any *typical sacrifices* or legal *expiations*, but standing perfectly clear of them, and nakedly viewed in its own *simplicity*, free from such legal incumbrances: *represented*, indeed, by *symbols*, but yet so represented as that the *things signified*, the *body* and *blood*, and the *true expiation*, are as plainly, as directly offered to every man's *faith* and *understanding*, as the *signs* are to the outward *senses*, and both are alike spoken of in *plain* and *clear* terms. If it was not altogether so in Melchizedek's sacrament, or figurative sacrifice of Christ's body and blood, yet certainly it is in *ours*: and this consideration renders it vastly preferable to the *legal* sacrifices; though they also darkly were *sacraments* of the same things, and were much more valuable in that their *sacramental* capacity than in any other.

St. Austin often speaks of this matter. He understood the Melchizedekian sacrifice, (as opposed to Aaron's,) of sacrifice *passively* considered; not as *offered* to God, in a proper sense, but as exhibited to, and *received*, or participated by men[o]. The want of observing the difference between a *sacrifice* considered as *actively* offered, and as *passively* received, has made strange confusion in what concerns the Melchizedekian *sacrifice*, spoken of by the Fathers[p]. Yet this matter was clearly understood, as low as the times of Charles the Great[q], and much lower: and

[o] Quod ergo addidit, *manducare panem*, etiam ipsum *sacrificii* genus eleganter expressit.——Ipsum est sacrificium, non secundum ordinem Aaron, sed secundum ordinem Melchisedech: qui legit intelligat.——Quia enim dixerat superius, dedisse se domui Aaron cibos de victimis Veteris Testamenti, ubi ait, *Dedi domui patris tui omnia quæ sunt ignis, filiorum Israel in escam.* Hæc quippe fuerunt sacrificia Judæorum: ideo hic dixit *manducare panem;* quod est in Novo Testamento *sacrificium* Christianorum. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. xvii. cap. 5. p. 466, 467. tom. vii. Conf. Ep. 177. p. 626. tom. ii. Et in Psal. xxxiii. p. 210, 211. tom. iv. In Psal. cvi. p. 1211. In Psal. cix. p. 1241. tom. iv. De Quæst. Octogint. q. lxi. p. 34. tom. vi. De Civit. Dei, lib. xvii. p. 435, 480. Contr. Advers. Leg. p. 570, 571. tom. viii.

[p] See my Appendix, above, p. 165—168, 172.

[q] Jam verus Melchisedech, Christus videlicet, rex justus, rex pacis, non *pecudum victimas*, sed sui nobis corporis et sanguinis *contulit* Sacramentum. *Carol. Magn. Capit. prolix.*

even Thomas Aquinas, of the thirteenth century, has given a just account of it; rightly distinguishing between the *oblation* of a sacrifice and a *participation*[r]. To be short, as the sacrifices of Aaron, in their *oblatory* view, were no way comparable to the *spiritual* Gospel sacrifices, in their intrinsic value, or in regard to the *Divine* acceptance; so neither were the blessings, or the sacrificial *feasts* of Aaron and his *altars*, worthy to be named in comparison to the spiritual blessings, or spiritual banquet, given to believers, whether by the *typical* or the true Melchizedek. If we interpret what the *Fathers* say in relation to the Melchizedekian sacrifices, as opposed to the Aaronical, by this key, every thing, I presume, will be easy and clear: but without it all is confusion. I know but of one objection to this account, and that not weighty; namely, that the *Fathers* sometimes speak of Melchizedek as *offering* something to *God*, and not barely as *distributing* to Abraham and his company. But then let it be remembered, that the word *offer* is a word of a *large* and *lax* meaning, importing any kind of *presenting*, either *to view*, (as when Hezekiah spread a *letter* before *the Lord*[s],) or *for consecration*, or the like. And it is further to be noted, that the *Fathers*[t], some of them at least, (as Ambrose, Philastrius, Chrysostom, Austin, and perhaps Eusebius,) understood Mel-

lib. iv. cap. 14. p. 520. Conf. Haymo Halberst. In Psal. cix. p. 597. Theodulf. de Ordinat. Baptismi, cap. 18. Anselm [sive Herveus Dolensis] in Hebr. v. p. 416. et in Hebr. vii. p. 423. Walafrid. Strab. de Reb. Eccl. cap. xvi. p. 674.

[r] In sacerdotio Christi duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsa *oblatio* Christi, et *participatio* ejus. Quantum ad ipsam *oblationem*, expressius figurabat sacerdotium Christi sacrificium legale per sanguinis effusionem, quam sacerdotium Melchisedech, in quo sanguis non effundebatur. Sed quantum ad *participationem* hujus sacrificii et ejus *effectum*, expressius præfigurabatur per sacerdotium Melchisedech, qui *offerebat* panem et vinum, significantia, ut Augustinus dicit, ecclesiasticam *unitatem*, quam constituit *participatio* Christi: unde etiam, in nova lege, *verum* Christi sacrificium *communicatur* fidelibus sub specie panis et vini. *Aquin.* part. iii. q. 22. art. 6. p. 61.

[s] 2 Kings xix. 14. Isa. xxxviii. 14.

[t] Ambrosius, tom. i. p. 714. edit. Bened. Philastr. Hær. cix. p. 221. Hær. cxliv. p. 314, 316. Chrysost. adv. Jud. Hom. vii. p. 671. tom. i. in Hebr. p. 128, 129. tom. xii. Augustin. contr. Advers. Leg. p. 570, 571. tom. vii. Eusebius, Demonstr. Evang. lib. v. cap. 3. p. 223.

Ambrosiaster well expresses that notion. Quantum est inter Aaron et Christum, tantum est quodammodo inter Judæos et Christianos; superiora etiam et *sacrificia*. Talia videlicet offeramus sacrificia, quæ in illud sanctuarium cœleste offerri possunt: non jam pecudem et bovem, non sanguinem et adipem; omnia hæc soluta sunt, et pro eis introductum est *rationabile obsequium*. Quid est *rationabile* obsequium? Quod per *animam*, quod per *spiritum* offertur.——Quid est Deum *in spiritu* adorare, nisi in *charitate* et *fide* perfecta, et *spe* indubia, et sanctis animæ *virtutibus*? *Pseud-Ambros. in Hebr.* vi. p. 443.

chizedek to have *offered* a sacrifice of *lauds* to God, besides his *conveying* the *grand sacrifice*, that is, the blessings and benefits of it to Abraham.

XII.

Having thus far observed, by what names of distinction Christian sacrifices were discriminated from Jewish and Pagan, jointly or singly considered, I may pass on to some other notes of distinction, by which Christian sacrifices, differently circumstantiated, were distinguished one from another. Here may come in the distinction between *external* and *internal* sacrifice, which is of very different consideration from a distinction before mentioned, between *extrinsic* and *intrinsic*.

Origen, mysticizing the two *altars* which belonged to the *temple*, the *inner* and the *outer* altar, makes *mental* prayer or service to answer to the incense on the one, and *vocal* prayer to answer the burnt offerings on the other. Such was his notion of *internal* and *external* sacrifice under the Gospel[u]. Neither is it amiss, provided we take in *manual service*, or *good works*[w], into the notion of *external sacrifice*, to render that branch of the division complete. But here it is to be noted, that though *mental* service *alone* may make *internal* sacrifice, yet *vocal* or *manual* alone, without *mental*, will not make *external* sacrifice. *Outward* service is but the *shell* and *carcase* of sacrifice, without the sacrifice of the *heart*[x]. How both the *internal* and *external* sacrifice are performed in the Eucharist, see particularly noted and explained in Dean Field[y].

XIII.

Christian sacrifices may be divided into *private* and *public*: which is a distinction somewhat *like* to, but not altogether the *same* with the former. For though *internal* sacrifice, as such, is

[u] Altaria vero duo, id est *interius* et *exterius*, quoniam altare orationis indicium est, illud puto significare quod dicit Apostolus, Orabo *spiritu*, orabo et *mente*. Cum enim *corde* oravero, ad altare *interius* ingredior ——Cum autem quis *clara voce*, et verbis cum *sono* prolatis, quasi ut ædificet audientes, orationem fundit ad Deum, hic *spiritu* orat, et offerre videtur hostiam in altari quod *foris* est ad holocaustomata populi constitutum. *Origen. in Num.* Hom. x. p. 303.

[w] *Good works* were always eminently reckoned among the *Christian sacrifices*, as may be seen in Justin, p. 14. Clemens of Alexandria, p. 836, 848. Chrysostom, tom. v. p. 231, 503. and indeed in all the Fathers. How that is to be understood, see in Review, vol. iv. p. 735.

[x] Vid. Chrysostom. in Rom. Hom. xx. p. 657. tom. ix. Origen. tom. ii. p. 363. ed. Bened. Nazianz. Orat. i. p. 38. Gregor. M. Dial. iv. cap. 59.

[y] Field on the Church, p. 204.

always *secret*, yet it may be performed *in company* with others, as well as when we are *alone:* and though *external* sacrifice, as to the *outward* part, is open to view, may be *seen* or *heard*, yet it may be performed *in private* as well as *in company*. Therefore both external and internal sacrifices may be subdivided into *private* and *public*, accordingly as they are respectively offered up to God, either from the *private closet* in retirement, or from among our brethren met together in the public *assemblies* for the same purpose. Private prayer is *private sacrifice*, and public prayer is *public sacrifice*. Good works likewise are *sacrifices*, if really and strictly *good*, if *referred* to *God* and his *glory:* therefore when they are done in private, they are *private sacrifices;* but if so done as to "shine before men," for an example to them, then they become *public sacrifices*.

XIV.

Christian sacrifices may be distinguished likewise into *lay-sacrifice* and *clerical*. In a large sense, all good Christians are *sacrificers*, and, so far, *priests* unto God[z]. St. Austin, in few words, well sets forth both the *agreement* and the *difference;* observing that all Christians are *priests*, as they are *members* of Christ, members of one and the same *High Priest;* but that *Bishops* and *Presbyters* are in a more *peculiar* or *emphatical* manner entitled to the name of *priests*[a]. So I interpret *proprie*[b]; not to exclude Christian laics from being, *properly speaking*, sacrificers, but so only as to exclude them from being *emphatically* and *eminently* such as the *clergy* are: for though they are all equally *sacrificers*, they are not equally *administrators* of sacrifice, in a public, and solemn, and authorized way.

The Protestant doctrine, commonly, has run, that clergy and

[z] Exod. xix. 5, 6. 1 Pet. ii. 9. Revel. xx. 6. Just. Mart. Dial. p. 386. Irenæus, lib. iv. cap. 8. p. 237. Tertullian. de Monogam. cap. vii. p. 529. Origen in Levit. Hom. ix. p. 236, 238. Cyrill. Hierosol. Catech. xviii. c. 33. p. 301. Ambros. in Luc. vi. Hieron. contr. Lucif. p. 290. tom. iv. Augustin. tom. viii. p. 477, 478, 588. Leo Magn. Serm. iii. p. 107. Isidor. Pelus. lib. iii. Ep. lxxv. p. 284. And compare Review, vol. iv. p. 763, 764. Christian Sacrifice Explained, above, p. 128, 137.

[a] Erunt sacerdotes Dei et Christi, et regnabunt cum illo mille annis, Apoc. xx. 6. Non utique de *solis episcopis* et *presbyteris* dictum est, qui *proprie* jam vocantur in ecclesia *sacerdotes:* sed sicut omnes Christianos dicimus, propter *mysticum chrisma*, sic omnes *sacerdotes*, quoniam *membra* sunt *unius* sacerdotis. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. xx. cap. 10. p. 588. tom. vii.

[b] Compare Whitaker upon that place of St. Austin. Answer to Reynolds, p. 77. Chrastovius de Opific. Missæ, lib. i. cap. 11. p. 104. Fulke's Defence of Translations, p. 62.

laity are equally *priests:* not equally *Bishops*, *Presbyters*, or *Deacons*, but equally *priests*, (in the sense of ἱερεῖς,) that is, equally *sacrificers*[c]. For like as when a senate presents a petition, by their *speaker*, to the crown, every member of that senate is equally a *petitioner*, though there is but one authorized *officer*, one *speaker* commissioned to prefer the petition in the name of the whole senate; so in this other case, the whole body of Christian people are equally *sacrificers*, though the *clergy* only are commissioned to *preside* and *officiate* in a public character[d]. The *sacrifice* is the *common* sacrifice of the whole body, and so the name of *sacrificer* is also common: but the *leading* part, the *administration* of the sacrifice, is *appropriate* to the *commissioned* officers; and so also are the names of *Bishops*, *Presbyters*, and *Deacons*. This is all that any sober Protestants have meant; though their expressions have been sometimes liable to misconstruction, by reason of the latent ambiguity of words and names. The word *priest* is equivocal, as denoting either a *presbyter* or a *sacrificer:* and the word *sacrificer* is still further equivocal, as meaning either one who barely *sacrifices*, or one that *administers* a sacrifice in a *public* capacity, as the *head* or *mouth* of an assembly.

Perhaps, after all, some shorter and clearer way might be thought on, for compromising the debates concerning *lay-priesthood*. If "steward of the mysteries of God[e]," may be thought a good general definition of *sacerdos*, or a title equivalent to *priest*[f], then the disputes about the precise meaning of ἱερεὺς, *sacrificer*, and how far that name is common to *clergy* and *laity*, may be superseded, and the name of *priest* may be *appropriated* in the sense of *ambassadors* of God, or *stewards* of Divine mysteries, to the *Bishops* only in the *first* degree, and to *Presbyters* in the second[g], or in a *third* degree to *Deacons*

[c] Cranmer against Gardiner, p. 424, 440. Jewel's Answer to Harding, Art. xvii. p. 429. Defence of Apol. p. 576. Pet. Mart. Loc. Comm. p. 788. Hospinian. Histor. Sacram. part. i. p. 584, 590.

[d] Utut omnes *offerant* preces, laudes, eleemosynas, et hujusmodi *sacrificia*, non tamen *eodem modo* omnes hæc *offerunt:* nec debent homines *privati* pastorum *munus* et officium usurpare. *Sutliff. contr. Bellarmin.* p. 294.

[e] 1 Cor. iv. 1.

[f] Æquipollent ista *dispensator mysteriorum Dei*, et *sacerdos:* mysteria namque Dei *sancta* sunt, et *sacerdos* dictus est a *sacris* dandis. *Chrastovius, Polan.* p. 197.

[g] Nazianz. Carmin. tom. ii. p. 6. Eusebius, Demonstr. lib. x. cap. 6. Hieron. in Epitaph. Paulæ. Optatus, lib. i. p. 15. Leo I. de Quadrig. Serm. x. Sidonius, Ep. xxv. Facundus, lib. xii. cap. 3. Conf. Basnag. Annal. tom. ii. p. 652. Hickes's Christian Priesthood, vol. i. p. 36.

also[h], as some of the ancients have estimated, perhaps not amiss.

There is yet another way of compromising this matter, viz. by passing over the Greek ἱερεὺς, *sacrificer*, and running higher up to the Hebrew word *cohen*[i], as of the elder house, and primarily signifying a person of *nearest access to God*, or a commissioned *agent between God and man*. Let but that, or something of like kind, be the proper notation of *priest*, and then it will be a clear case that God's peculiar ambassadors *in ordinary*[k], solemnly set apart for that office, are more *properly* priests than any other persons can be justly presumed to be.

It has been thought that the *Aaronical* priests were as *agents for men* with God, and that the *evangelical* priests are as *agents for God* with men[l]. There may be something in that distinction: but considering that the *evangelical* priests do offer up both the *spiritual* sacrifices and sacrificers *to God*[m], as well as bring God's messages and God's blessings *to men*, it seems that their *agency* looks both ways, and perhaps equally; and they appear to be indifferently and reciprocally *agents* from God *to man*, and from man *to God*.

Some have made it a difficulty to conceive how a priest, being ignorant of what passes in the *heart*, can be said to present to God the *intrinsic* and *internal* sacrifices of his people. The truth is, that which the priests offer, they offer in the name or in the person of the Church, as before noted[n]: and therefore what they therein do, is to be considered as the *act* and *deed* of the whole Church, independent of the *knowledge*, or *attention*, or *intention*, or *personal* virtues of the officiating ministers. Their *ministration* is the *outward mean* appointed by God, and by that appointment made the *ordinary* condition of God's acceptance. As God accepts not the devotions of the people, however other-

[h] Optatus, lib. i. p. 15. See Hickes's Christian Priesthood, vol. i. p. 36, 37.

[i] Vox כהן genuina sua significatione notat *familiarioris accessûs amicum*. *Vitringa, Observat. Sacr.* lib. ii. cap. 2. p. 272. Conf. in Isa. vol. ii. p. 830, 885, 950, 951.

[k] *In ordinary*, to distinguish them from *prophets* as such, who were ambassadors or legates *extraordinary*.

[l] *Prophetarum* et Apostolorum erat *res Dei* apud homines agere, *sacerdotum* autem *res hominum* apud Deum. Illi *Dei legati* apud homines, hi *hominum patroni* apud Deum.——Ministerium *Evangelicum* a sacerdotio *Aaronico* multum differt, idque in eo præcipue cernitur, quod illud *pro Deo* apud homines præcipue constitutum sit, hoc *pro hominibus* apud Deum. *Outram de Sacrif.* lib. i. cap. 19. p. 220, 222.

[m] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 731, 763, 764. and compare Vitringa in Isa. lxvi. 20. p. 951.

[n] See above, p. 238.

wise sincere or fervent, without the outward *Sacraments*, (which are the *ordinary* instruments of conveyance, both with respect to *our* sacrifices and *God's* graces,) so he accepts not, ordinarily, of what Christians presume to *offer* in a solemn public way, without the external ministration of the *proper* officers. And why should not they be supposed as proper instruments to convey the *invisible sacrifices* of men to God, as to convey the *invisible graces* of God to men? To suppose otherwise, would be strangely depreciating the *sacerdotal function*, as if that were concerned only in the *external* part, the *shell* and *carcase* of a *sacrifice*, and the *internal* and *invisible* part (which, strictly, is the sacrifice) were really presented by *none* but the *devout* worshippers themselves. In this way, the *devout laity* (supposing the *priests* to be unattentive) would be the only *sacrificers*, and the *priests*, as such, would not be *sacrificers* at all. But it is certain that the *priests*, in this case, are and ought to be considered, as conveying and recommending all the *invisible* sacrifices, and therefore are properly *sacrificers* in their *sacerdotal* capacity, yea, and more than sacrificers, because *leaders, conductors*, commissioned *officers* in the *public sacrifice*, which must be accepted *through them*, even when they themselves (*if unworthy*) shall not be accepted[o]. But enough of this.

XV.

I pass on to another very celebrated distinction of Christian sacrifices, into *gratulatory* and *propitiatory:* though we have really none of the latter sort but *one*, and that not properly *ours*, but our *Lord's*, performed once upon the cross, but in *virtue* always abiding[p].

[o] To enforce this consideration, I may add, that the *priesthood* below will thus correspond the more aptly to the *high priesthood* above, if Dr. Lightfoot judged righly in the words here following:

"Christ is a *Priest for ever*, still "offering *sacrifice* to God; but no "more *himself*, but his *people's* sa-"crifice. And that offering is two-"fold, viz. offering the *persons* of "his people to God, as an *acceptable* "*living* sacrifice, (Isa. viii. 18,) and "offering their *services* as an accept-"able *spiritual* sacrifice to God, Rev. "vii. 3." *Lightfoot*, tom. ii. p. 1261.

[p] Singuli Christiani habent *duplex* sacrificium, *propitiatorium* et *eucharisticum:* sed alterum habent *alienum*, alterum *proprium*. Alienum est propitiatorium a *Christo* oblatum.

Singuli *sacerdotes* habent *duplex* sacrificium; *propitiatorium* et *eucharisticum*.——Non habent *proprium* sacrificium *propitiatorium*, nec placant *suo* sacrificio, sed *alieno*. Quod tamen neque ipsi *offerunt*, sed tantum *accipiunt* fide *fructum* alieni sacrificii. *Melancth. Opp.* tom. iv. p. 514. Unicum est autem re ipsa *propitiatorium*, videlicet *obedientia* Filii Dei, quæ est λύτρον pro nobis, et *meretur* nobis reconciliationem. *Ibid.* p. 603. Conf. Cranmer, Opp. Posth. p. 139

The word *propitiatory* is equivocal, capable of a *larger* or a *stricter* sense. In a *lax* and *less proper* acceptation, every service *well pleasing* to God is *propitiatory*. In this view, *Baptism* and all our *spiritual* sacrifices are *propitiatory:* particularly *almsgiving* is said to *propitiate* in this qualified sense of the word [q]. And the Fathers frequently so apply the word, with respect to any *good works* [r]. Tertullian sometimes, and Cyprian often, speaks of making *satisfaction* to God by *repentance*, &c. Nevertheless, in the strict and proper sense of *propitiation*, *expiation*, or *satisfaction*, no service, no sacrifice, nor any thing else, ever did or ever could make it, excepting only the all-prevailing sacrifice of the cross. The sacrifice of Christ from *without* is the *meritorious* cause of *propitiation:* our own *qualifying* sacrifices from *within* are the *conditional:* and the two *Sacraments*, ordinarily, are the *instrumental*. As to the *material* elements, in either Sacrament, they are neither an *extrinsic* expiation nor an *intrinsic* qualification, and therefore cannot, with any propriety, be called an *expiatory* or a *propitiatory* sacrifice, no not in the lowest sense of *propitiatory*. Indeed, the *religious use* of them is *propitiatory*, in such a sense as *Christian services* are so [s]: therefore our so *using them*, that is, our *service*, is the *sacrifice*, and not they; and it is an *intrinsic* and *qualifying* sacrifice, not *extrinsic* or *expiatory*. Nothing *ab intus* can properly *expiate*, as is justly observed by a learned writer [t]: *propitiate* it may, but still in such a secondary, subordinate sense as has been mentioned. The extrinsic legal expiations reached only to *temporals:* the *intrinsic*, under Christ's *extrinsic* sacrifice, were even then the *saving* sacrifices, and must for ever be so. *Sacraments*, as

—150. Pet. Mart. Loc. Comm. p. 704. Zanchius's Tractat. Posth. p. 421.

[q] Philipp. iv. 18. Hebr. xiii. 16. Ecclus. iii. 30. xxxv. 2.

[r] Verum sacrificium insinuans, quod offerentes *propitiabuntur* Deum. *Iren.* lib. iv. cap. 17. p. 248.

Qui fraudibus abstinet, *propitiat* Deum. *Minuc. Fel.* sect. xxxii. p. 183. Conf. Origen. in Levit. Hom. xiii. p. 255. cited in Review, vol. iv. p. 651.

[s] In this sense, *propitiatory* sacrifices are allowed by Protestant Divines: Cranmer against Gardiner, p. 437, 438. Gulielm. Forbes. Consider. Modest. p. 694. Johann. Forbes. Opp. tom. i. p. 619. Spalatens. p. 283. Thorndike's Epil. b. iii. p. 42, 46. Payne on the Sacrif. of the Mass, p. 77. Jackson, vol. iii. p. 299. Morton on the Eucharist, b. vi. p. 60, 72. cum multis aliis.

[t] Johnson's Unbl. Sacrif. part i. p. 299, 300. The use which the learned author intended by that principle, (that nothing *ab intus* can expiate,) was to introduce another *extrinsic*, *expiatory* sacrifice, after Christ's. A very wrong thought; but which shews, however, that he aimed at a very different kind of *propitiation* and *expiation* than what Divines allow to *intrinsic* and *spiritual* sacrifices.

such, (not *sacrifices*,) are the *rites* of *application*, the *means* and *instruments* of conveyance and reception, with respect to the *benefits* of the *great atonement*. The Jewish sacrifices, considered as *Sacraments*, and not otherwise, were such *rites*. The *Eucharist* is eminently so now; and *Baptism*, perhaps, yet more eminently, as it was anciently reckoned the *grand absolution*, and as *life* is before *nutriment*[w].

XVI.

There is another distinction of Christian sacrifice, not so commonly observed, but worth the noting; and that is, between sacrifice in a *large, general* sense, and sacrifice in a more *restrained, eminent*, or *emphatical* meaning[x]. Our Lord's sacrifice, for instance, is eminently *the sacrifice*, infinitely superior to all other: not that it is more *properly* a sacrifice than others which equally fall within the same *general* definition, but it is a more *excellent* sacrifice: in scholastic terms, *non magis sacrificium, sed majus:* not *more* a sacrifice, but a *greater* sacrifice.

The like may be observed of our *spiritual sacrifices*, compared one with another. All religious duties, all Christian services, are *sacrifices* properly so called: but some are more *emphatically* or more *eminently* called by that name, because of some *eminent* circumstances attending them, which give them the greater value and dignity. St. Austin makes every religious act, work, or service, a sacrifice[y]. Nevertheless, he supposed the work of the *Eucharist*, the sacrifice there offered, to be emphatically and eminently *the sacrifice* of the Church: the *singular sacrifice*[z], as

[u] How absurd the notion is of *applying* one expiatory sacrifice by *another* expiatory sacrifice, as such, has been often shewn: particularly by Morton, b. vi. cap. 11. and Sutliff. [adv. Bellarmin. p. 233, 249, 308.] and others; but by none better than by Dean Brevint's Depth and Mystery of the Rom. Mass, p. 31—34.

[w] See my Review, vol. iv. p. 650, 659—661. and Salmasius (alias Simplicius Verinus) contr. Grot. p. 402.

[x] N. B. Most of Bellarmine's arguments to prove that *spiritual* sacrifices are not *proper* sacrifices, resolve into an *equivocation* in the word *proper;* not distinguishing between *proper*, (that is, *special*,) as opposed to *large*, and *proper* as opposed to *metaphorical* or *figurative*. From thence appears the use of the present *distinction*.

[y] Verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut sancta societate inhæremus Deo, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni, quo veraciter beati esse possimus. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 6. p. 242. See Review, vol. iv. p. 728. and Christian Sacrif. explained, above, p. 124, 125.

[z] Hæc quippe Ecclesia est *Israel secundum spiritum*, a quo distinguitur ille *Israel secundum carnem*, qui serviebat in umbris sacrificiorum, quibus significabatur *singulare sacrificium*, quod nunc offert Israel secundum spiritum. *Augustin. contr. Adversar. Leg. et Prophet.* lib. i. cap. 20. p. 570. tom. viii.

Unde et in ipso verissimo et *singulari*

being, comparatively, of *singular value;* and also the *universal sacrifice*[a], as comprehending many sacrifices of the spiritual kind, and taking in the whole *redeemed city*, the whole *city of God.*

Baptism, in St. Austin's account, was a sacrifice of a *single* person, or of *a few* in comparison[b]: the several single *good works* of every Christian were so many *sacrifices* in his estimation, *true* sacrifices, not *nominal* or *metaphorical:* but still the sacrifice offered in the *Eucharist* was emphatically *the sacrifice* of Christians, being a *complicated* sacrifice, the *joint-worship* of all, and containing *many* circumstances which gave it a more eminent right and title to the name of *the sacrifice of the Church*[c]. The Eucharist therefore was *emphatically* or *peculiarly* the sacrifice[d]: that is to say, in a peculiar *manner*, or with peculiar *circumstances*, but not in a peculiar or different *sense* of the name *sacrifice;* for those things ought to be distinguished, though they have been often confounded. All the *confusion*, in this matter, lies in the *equivocalness* of terms, and particularly of the word *proprie, properly*, which is variously used, and is subject to various meanings[e]. It may mean *proper*, as opposed to *improper* and *metaphorical:* or it may mean *proper*, as opposed to *large* or *general;* which is the same with *peculiar* as to *manner* and *circumstances* only, not as to propriety of *phrase* or *diction.* All *spiritual* sacrifices are sacrifices *properly* so called, falling under the same *general* reason and definition of sacrifice[f]: nevertheless, the Eucharist is a sacrifice in a more *eminent* way; not *more* a

sacrificio, Domino Deo nostro agere gratias admonemur. *Augustin. de Spirit. et Lit.* cap. xi. p. 94. tom. x.

[a] Ut tota ipsa redempta civitas, hoc est, congregatio societasque sanctorum, *universale sacrificium* offeratur Deo, per sacerdotem magnum, &c. Hoc est sacrificium Christianorum, *multi unum corpus in Christo:* quod etiam *sacramento altaris*, fidelibus noto, frequentat Ecclesia; ubi ei demonstratur, quod in ea re quam offert, *ipsa* offeratur. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 6. p. 243. tom. vii.

[b] See Appendix, above, p. 184. and compare Ambros. tom. i. p. 214, 215. Origen, tom. ii. p. 405. ed. Bened. Chrysost. in Hebr. x. Hom. 20. p. 186. tom. xii. ed. Bened. Bede, Homil. tom. vii. p. 59.

[c] Quomodo autem Spiritui Sancto *in pane* et *vino* sacrificium *Ecclesiæ* non offertur, quando *ipsam Ecclesiam*, et templum et sacrificium ipse Spiritus habere cognoscitur. *Fulgentius inter Fragment.* p. 641.

[d] See Review, vol. iv. p. 730, 731, Christian Sacrif. expl. above, p. 128. Appendix, above, p. 184.

[e] The various meanings are these:

1. *Proper*, as opposed to *aliene:* in Latin, *proprium* et *alienum.*

2. *Proper*, as opposed to *common:* *proprium* et *commune.*

3. *Proper*, as opposed to *allusive* or *metaphorical:* in Latin, *proprie dictum*, et *improprie* dictum.

4. *Proper* or *peculiar*, as opposed to *large* or *general:* *proprie*, et *lato modo*, or *largo modo.*

[f] See Review, vol. iv. p. 729. Christian Sacrif. expl. above, p. 124, 125. N. B. The old Protestant Divines, for the most part, maintained

sacrifice, but a more *excellent* sacrifice, as I before distinguished in another case. I thought it necessary to be thus minute and explicit in this article, for the removing vulgar prejudices, and for the preventing common mistakes.

XVII.

I shall mention but one distinction more, (if it may be called a distinction,) and that is, between sacrifice *real* and *nominal*, between sacrifice *truly* such, and sacrifice in *name* only. It may sound oddly, to distinguish sacrifice into *sacrifice* and *no sacrifice*, which is really the case here: but it is necessary, for the preventing *confusion*, and for the obviating mistakes which frequently arise from a figurative or catachrestical use of *names*. This distinction of *nominal* and *real* is of large extent, comprehending under it several subdivisions; as *instrumental* and *real*, *symbolical* and *real*, *verbal* and *real*, and lastly, *commemorative* and *real:* of which in their order, as follows:

1. The first I call *instrumental* and *real;* as when the *instrument* of a sacrifice (whether for brevity or for any other reason) bears the name of *sacrifice* or *oblation*. Thus, for instance, jewels of *gold*, *chains*, *bracelets*, *rings*, *earrings*, and *tablets*, were called an *oblation* for the Lord, to make an *atonement* for *souls*, before the *Lord* [g], as if they had really been *sacrifices:* but it is certain, that those offerings were no more than *instruments* subservient to sacrifices; and that appears to have been the ground and foundation of the way of speaking [h].

this point against the Romanists, (who first denied it,) that *spiritual* sacrifices are *proper* sacrifices, that is, *properly* so called; which might be particularly proved from their standing *definitions*. See Christian Sacrif. expl. above, p. 124. I shall only add here the testimony of an adversary, who, speaking of the Protestants, says,

Putant actum contritionis, laudationis, gratiarum actionis pertinere ad sacrificia *proprie dicta*, ex Davide, Psal. l. et ex illo D. Augustini, lib. x. cap. 6. Cæterum toto cœlo errant, &c. *Johan. Puteanus*, q. lxxxiii. Dub. 2. p. 299. A. D. 1624. He goes on to argue the point: a bye-point, which Allen, in 1576, and Bellarmine, about twelve or twenty years after, had insisted upon, for the sake of perplexing a cause, and for the turning a reader off from the main point in dispute. For whatever becomes of the question about *proper* and *improper* sacrifice, (a strife about a *name* only,) one thing is certain, that *spiritual* services are the only *true* and *acceptable* services under the Gospel; and that *material* sacrifices, however *proper*, in respect of *diction*, or use of *language*, are now out of date, and are rejected of God, and are therefore so far from being properly *worship*, that they are more properly *sacrilege* and *profanation*. See my Christian Sacrif. expl. above, p. 123—127, 130. The Romish sacrifice is neither *true* nor *proper;* but they apply that epithet to a mere *fiction* and *idol* of their own.

[g] Numb. xxxi. 50.

[h] *Aurum* offerri dicitur ad *expiationem* pro animabus. At qui tandem

By the like *figure* of speech, by a metonymy of *instrument* for *principal*, we sometimes find the Fathers giving the name of *sacrifice* to the *altar-offerings*, to the *bread* and *wine;* which were the *instruments* of the *benevolent acts*, as also of the *memorial services*, that is, of the *real* sacrifices. Cyprian[i], certainly, so uses the word *sacrifice;* and probably Tertullian before him[k]; and others after[l]. Such expressions were very innocent in *ancient* times, while Christians were too wise and too well instructed to make any such gross mistakes as the ignorance of later times introduced. The *Fathers* could not then suspect, that such *figures* of speech should ever come to be interpreted with rigour, and up to the *letter*, while sufficiently guarded by the well known standing doctrine of *spiritual* sacrifices. 2. By a like *figure* of speech, the *sign* or *symbol* of a sacrifice often bore the *name* of *sacrifice;* that is to say, by a metonymy of the *sign* for the *thing signified*[m]. Our blessed Lord had used the like *figure* in the very *institution* of the *Eucharist*, as it were, giving the names of *body* and *blood* to the elemental *signs* and *symbols* of them. And what wonder is it, if the *Fathers*, considering that the real *body* and *blood* were a *sacrifice* upon the cross, should sometimes call the elements by the name of *sacrifice;* which was but following the like *figure*, and saying the same thing that our Lord had said, only in *equivalent* terms[n]? If any one should doubt of this

auro aut *fiat* aut *figuretur* expiatio, nisi *mediate* et *instrumenti* modo? Dum scilicet suffimentis sacris, et ignitis *subservit* oblationibus: adeo ut nihil sit aliud ad *expiationem offerri*, quam ad usum eorum quæ expiando. *Mede, Dissertat. Triga*, p. 28.

[i] Locuples et dives es, et Dominicum celebrare te credis, quæ *corban* omnino non respicis, quæ in Dominicum sine *sacrificio* venis, quæ partem de *sacrificio* quod pauper *obtulit*, sumis? *Cyprian. de Opere et Eleemos.* p. 242. ed. Bened.

[k] De stationum diebus non putant plerique *sacrificiorum* orationibus interveniendum, &c.——Accepto corpore Domini et conservato, utrumque salvum est, participatio *sacrificii*, et executio officii. *Tertull. de Orat.* cap. xiv. p. 135, 136.

[l] Dum sacris altaribus nullam admovent *hostiam*. Propterea decernimus, ut omnibus Dominicis diebus, altaris *oblatio* ab omnibus *viris* et *mulieribus* offeratur tam *panis* quam *vini;* ut per has *immolationes*, et peccatorum fascibus careant, et cum Abel vel cæteris juste *offerentibus* promereantur esse consortes. *Concil. Matiscons.* ii. Can. 4. Conf. Bona. Rer. Liturg. p. 436. A. D. 585. Apostol. Constit. lib. ii. cap. 27.

Ille bonus Christianus est, qui—— *oblationem* quæ offeratur Deo, in *altari* exhibet. *Eligius Noviomens. apud Bonam, ibid.* p. 436. A. D. 640.

[m] How usual a *figure* this is, in Scripture itself, with relation especially to *exhibitive* signs, see proved at large, in Review, vol. iv. chap. 7. p. 571—580. And compare St. Austin, Epist xcviii. p. 286. tom. ii. In Levit. q. lvii. p. 516. tom. iii.

[n] Ad summam, regula hæc tenenda est, *Patres quo sensu* intellexerunt *corpus* et *sanguinem* Christi adesse in cœna, *panemque* esse ipsum *corpus* Christi, *eodem* etiam senserunt in cœna *offerri* Christum, cœnamque

solution, with respect to the name of *sacrifice*, sometimes (though rarely in comparison) given to the *elements*; let him say, what other solution can be justly given for their being much more frequently called by the name of *body* and *blood*[o], yea and of *Christ slain*, or simply *Christ*, or *Lord*, or *God*, or the like. Instances out of antiquity might be here given in great numbers: but I shall content myself with a single passage of St. Ambrose, wherein the *elements* appear to be denominated *Christ*, and *Christ's body*, and *sacrifice*, all in the compass of a few lines[p], and all by the same *metonymy* of *sign* for *thing* signified, exhibited, participated. He uses the word *offer* in a lax sense, for *commemorating*, or presenting to Divine consideration: for it cannot be supposed that he thought of literally *sacrificing* Christ, either *above* or *below*. Indeed, he explains his sense of that matter elsewhere[q], by Christ's *presenting* himself as *intercessor above*, in virtue of his *blood* shed, and by our representing the same thing *below*, in a kind of *imagery*, made of the symbols of bread and wine. Christ's *offering* himself above, is rather *commemorating* a sacrifice, than *sacrificing*[r]: and our doing the like below, is but an *imitation* even of that[s]; so far is it from *sacrificing* either the *signs* or the *things*. But as the *bread* and *wine* represent the *real* body and blood, which were a *real* sacrifice, so they have the names of *body*, and *blood*, and *sacrifices*: and there is no more room for arguing, barely from the *name* of sacrifice, to *real*

ipsam esse *sacrificium* hilasticum, sed incruentum; nempe in *mysterio*, in *figura*, et *imagine*. *Zanchius, ad Ephes.* v. p. 422.

[o] Pene quidem Sacramentum *omnes* corpus ejus dicunt. *Augustin.* Serm. cccliv. p. 1375. tom. v.

[p] Etsi nunc Christus non videtur *offerre*, tamen ipse *offertur* in terris, quando Christi *corpus* offertur: imo ipse *offerre* manifestatur in nobis, cujus sermo sanctificat *sacrificium* quod offertur. *Ambros. in Psal.* xxxviii. p. 853. ed. Bened.

[q] *Umbra* in lege, *imago* in Evangelio, *veritas* in cœlestibus. Ante *agnus* offerebatur, offerebatur *vitulus*; nunc *Christus* offertur.——Et offert se ipse quasi sacerdos, ut peccata nostra dimittat. Hic in *imagine*, ibi in *veritate*, ubi apud Patrem pro nobis quasi advocatus intervenit. *Ambros. de Offic.* lib. ii. cap. 48.

[r] Vid. Grotius de Satisfact. in fine. Compare Review, vol. iv. p. 516.

[s] "As Christ is a *Priest* in heaven "for ever, and yet does not *sacrifice* "himself afresh, (nor yet without *sacrifice* could he be a *Priest*,) but by "a daily *ministration* and *intercession* "represents his *sacrifice* to God, and "*offers* himself as *sacrificed*; so he "does upon earth, by the *ministry* of "his servants. He is *offered* to God: "that is, he is, by prayers and the "Sacrament, *represented* or *offered* "*up* to God as *sacrificed*; which, in "effect, is a celebration of his death, "by a *ministry* like to his in heaven." *Taylor, Great Exempl.* p. 407. Conf. Grotius, Opp. tom. iv. p. 620, 643, 660. Field, p. 204, 205. Hospinian. Histor. Sacram. p. 580, &c. Bucer. contr. Latom. p. 147, 175, 249. Brevint on the Mass, p. 74.

sacrifice in the one case, than there is for arguing, barely from the names of *body* and *blood*, to *real* body and blood, (that is to say, to *transubstantiation*,) in the other case. The argument proves too much to prove any thing.

It may be said perhaps, that the ancients, while they call the elements *body* and *blood*, do yet by some *additional words* give us to understand, that they meant not the *real* body and *blood*; but where do they give us to understand, that when they called the elements a *sacrifice*, they did not believe them to be a *real* sacrifice[t]? I answer, they do it in hundreds of places: by what they say of *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* sacrifice: by what they say of *visible* and *invisible*: by what they say of *material* and *immaterial*: by what they teach of *bloody* and *unbloody*, of *smoky* and *unsmoky*, of *false* and *true*, of *old* and *new*, of *literal and spiritual*; and in short, by the whole tenor of their doctrine concerning *spiritual sacrifices*, for six whole centuries together. Could we suppose, that they made the *elements* themselves a proper *sacrifice*, they would be all over *perplexity*, *confusion*, and *self-contradiction*: but allow only, that they made use of the same easy and common *figure* when they called them *sacrifice*, as when they called them *body* and *blood*, and *Christ slain*, or the like[u], and then their whole doctrine is *consistent*, *uniform*, and *clear*, all the way through, and without embarrassments. But I proceed.

3. To the head of *nominal* and *real*, I refer *verbal* and *real*. The Latin name *sacrificium*, through the unskilfulness of declining ages, came to be used as equivalent to the word *sacramentum*: so that when the Church writers of those times called the elements a *sacrifice*, they really meant no more than a *sacrament*, that is, *sign* of a sacrifice. The *idea* remained the same as before; but there was a change in the *terms*, a confusion in *words*

[t] See Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 455.

[u] It may be noted that Vasquez (who admits not the elements to be a *sacrifice*) assigns *three* reasons why the *Fathers* might so call them: the *first* of the three is adapted to the Romish principles: but the *second* and *third* are good.

1. Quia sunt *materia*, quæ *transit* in id quod in *sacrificium* offertur.

2. Quia ipsum Christi *corpus* vocatur panis, et *sanguis* vinum.

3. Quia proponuntur Deo *consecranda*: latius autem patet *oblatio* quam *sacrificium*. *Vasquez, Opp.* tom. iii. p. 414.

Alia ratione dici potest panis et vinum *Deo offerri*, si non addatur *in sacrificium*: quia hoc ipso quod *proponitur* coram Deo *consecrandum*, Deo *offertur*; latius enim patet *oblatio* quam *sacrificium*: et hoc modo explicari possent aliquæ *orationes Ecclesiæ* in officio missæ, in quibus dicitur panis et vinum *offerri*, vel illorum *propositio* dicitur *oblatio*. *Vasquez, ibid.*

or *names*. This is plain from the odd *definition* of *sacrifice* given by the famous Isidore of Seville, about the close of the sixth century, or beginning of the seventh. He defines *sacrifice* by a *thing made sacred*[x]; which is rather the definition of a *sacrament*, as denoting *an holy sign*, or a thing, before common, *consecrated into an holy symbol:* and it will serve as aptly for the *waters* of Baptism as for the *elements* of the *Eucharist*. It would be ridiculous to claim Isidore, as making the *elements* a *sacrifice*, in the old or true sense of that name: his sacrifice was *verbal* only, not *real;* a verbal *sacrifice*, a real *sacrament*. However, in process of time, this change of language, this misapplication of a *name*, might, very probably, become a snare to many; and might, with several other concurring circumstances, during the *dark* ages, help to bring in *bread-sacrifice*. When *transubstantiation*, or something like it, was creeping in, one argument pleaded for it ran thus: either the elements must be the *real* and *natural* body and blood, or else the *Christian sacrifices* will be *meaner* than the *Jewish* sacrifices were[y]. Which shews, that the *bread-sacrifice*, or *elemental* sacrifice, was then made a *principle* whereon to build, and therefore had gained some footing in the Church before that time. Then, that very consideration which should have made them look back, to correct their *first error*, served only, in the days of ignorance, to lead them on to *more* and *greater*. If an *elemental* sacrifice is *meaner* (as it really is) than a *Jewish* one, and they were sensible of it, they should have corrected that *false principle* by returning to *spiritual* sacrifice, and then all had been right: they should have considered the elements as symbols of Christ's body, *natural* and *mystical*, and as *instruments* of a *memorial-service*, and so all had been well.

[x] *Sacrificium* est —— omne quod Deo *datur*, aut *dedicatur*, aut *consecratur*. *Sacrificium* dictum, quasi *sacrum factum:* quia prece mystica *consecratur* in memoriam pro nobis Dominicæ passionis: unde hoc, eo jubente, *corpus* et *sanguinem* dicimus. Quod dum fit ex fructibus terræ, *sanctificatur* et fit *Sacramentum*, operante invisibiliter Spiritu Dei. *Isidor. Hispalens. Orig.* lib. vi. cap. 19. p. 142, 143.

This description, or definition, seems to have prevailed among the Irish Divines of the seventh and eighth centuries. See Usher's Relig. of ancient Irish, chap. iv.

Cangius, under the word *sacrificium*, in his Glossary, has brought no higher authorities for such use of the *name* than the seventh century; excepting Patricius, whose pretended writings are of *suspected* credit.

Rabanus of the ninth century, (De Instit. Cleric. lib. i. cap. 32.) Honorius of the twelfth, (Gemm. Anim. cap. 93.) and Alensis of the thirteenth, (tom. iv. p. 192,) seem to follow Isidore. As also do several of the elder Romanists of the sixteenth century: such as Fisher, Tonstall, &c.

[y] Paschas. Radbert de Corp. et Sangu. cap. ii. Opp. p. 1559. Algerus, p. 268.

If it should here be objected, that in this way of distinguishing between the *material* symbol and *spiritual* service, even the *Jewish* sacrifices might all be distinguished off into *services*, and no room left for *material* sacrifices under the *Law*, any more than under the *Gospel:* I say, if this should be objected, it is obvious to reply, that the two cases are exceeding *wide*, and the circumstances extremely *different:* for,

1. Material things are frequently called sacrifices under the *Law*, and *accepted* as sweet odour; but the *elements* are never so called under the Gospel, nor accepted of, as *sweet odours*.

2. Under the *Law*, God considered the *fat* and the *blood* as his *portion*, to be separated from man's use; and he *accepted* them as entirely his[x]: no such thing is appointed with respect to the *elements* under the Gospel; neither does God *accept* them, or any *part* of them as *his*, or as exempt from man's use.

3. Legal and typical *expiations* (sure marks of a proper legal *sacrifice*) were annexed to the *Jewish* oblations: but no such *typical* and *temporal* expiations, distinct from the *true* expiation, is annexed to the oblation of the *elements*, to shew them to be a *sacrifice* in themselves[y].

4. Under the *Law*, there was need of *extrinsic* sacrifices, and *extrinsic* expiations, to signify, by such *shadows*, that men must be saved by an *extrinsic* sacrifice, to appear in due time; namely, the grand sacrifice[z]: but under the Gospel, the true sacrifice is come, and so that great truth is no longer *shadowed*, or *darkly* insinuated, but *openly* and *fully* declared. And we have now direct immediate *access* to the *true* sacrifice, and to the *true* expiations: not kept *at a distance*, as before, by the intervention of *typical* sacrifices, or *typical* expiations: such is our Gospel privilege[a].

5. All sacrifices, properly *expiatory*, must be something *ex-*

[x] See Review, vol. iv. p. 575. and compare Mede's Christian Sacrifice, p. 471. Cudworth on the Sacrament, chap. v. p. 89, 90. Johnson's Unbloody Sacrifice, part i. p. 238. part ii. p. 77, &c.

[y] Eusebius well observes, that God accepted of *animal sacrifices*, while as yet no *better* sacrifice of expiation could be had; that is, while the sacrifice of Christ, signified by the other, was yet *future:* but afterwards the case was altered, and all such sacrifices were superseded by the sacrifice of Christ. Vid. Euseb. Dem. Evang. lib. i. c. 10. p. 36.

[z] Spiritualis effectus est *solutio* a reatu *interno*, &c. quam sacrificia *adumbrant*, non *præstant*. —— Sed si sacrificia adumbrant ac significant ablationem reatus æterni, necesse est ut *substernatur* effectus *temporalis*, per quem *spiritualis* ille effectus *repræsentetur:* is vero est ablatio *reatus*, ratione pœnæ *temporalis*. *Vossius ad Judic. Ravensp.* p. 86. conf. p. 98.

[a] See Christian Sacrifice explained, above, p. 148, 149. App. p. 164, 165.

trinsic, for nothing *ab intus* can expiate, as before noted[b]. The *extrinsic* thing, in such a case, is demanded by way of *price*, or *compensation*, for the forfeited *life* of the *man*, or in *lieu* of it[c]. Therefore as the *Jewish* sacrifices were properly *expiatory*, (though in a *legal* and *temporal* way[d],) they must of course be *extrinsic* to the *persons*, and they were so: but *Christians* owning no expiation at all, save only the true and heavenly *expiation* made upon the cross, cannot have any *expiatory* or *atoning* sacrifice besides that. They may have, and they have, *intrinsic, gratulatory*, and *qualifying* sacrifices; and those are their *religious duties* and *services*, and nothing else. Therefore the reason is plain, why the *Jewish* sacrifices cannot be distinguished off, or advanced into *spiritual services*, nor *the Christian* sacrifices sunk into *material* and *extrinsic* oblations. But I return.

4. To the same head, of *nominal* and *real*, belongs the distinction of *commemorative* and *real:* which is an old distinction. Chrysostom observes, that we do not offer, as the Jews formerly did, *one lamb* one day, and the next day *another*, and so on; but that we every day offer the *same Lamb*, which Lamb is Christ, and consequently the *same sacrifice; or rather*, as he adds, correcting the *expression*, a *commemoration of a sacrifice*[e]. Thus he distinguishes a *commemorative* sacrifice from a *real* one, or a *commemoration* of a sacrifice from the *sacrifice* itself. That he here understood an *expiatory* sacrifice is plain, because he interprets it of *Christ himself*, our *only* sacrifice of propitiation. It may be suggested, that a *commemoration* of a sacrifice, though it is not *that sacrifice*, may yet be a *sacrifice*, or *another* sacrifice notwithstanding: and it may be said, that a *symbol* of a sacrifice may itself also be a *distinct* sacrifice. Both parts are true: for a

[b] See above, p. 281.

[c] Vid. Euseb. Dem. Evang. lib. i. c. 10. p. 35.

[d] Hence arises another irresistible argument against the notion of the *elements* being expiatory *sacrifices:* for, if they were so, they should have a *real* and *distinct* expiation of their own, to *adumbrate* the true sacrifice as *future* still: which would amount to declaring that Christ is *not come*, and so would be a flat contradiction to Christianity.

[e] Τί οὖν; ἡμεῖς καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν οὐ προσφέρομεν; προσφέρομεν μέν, ἀλλ' ἀνάμνησιν ποιούμενοι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ.——τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ προσφέρομεν, οὐ νῦν μὲν ἕτερον πρόβατον, αὔριον δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε μία ἐστὶν ἡ θυσία.—— εἷς πανταχοῦ ὁ Χριστὸς——πολλαχοῦ προσφερόμενος, ἓν σῶμά ἐστι, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ σώματα, οὕτω καὶ μία θυσία.——οὐκ ἄλλην θυσίαν καθάπερ ὁ Ἀρχιερεὺς τότε, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ποιοῦμεν· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἐργαζόμεθα θυσίας. *Chrysost. in Hebr.* x. Hom. xvii. p. 168, 169. tom. xii. edit. Bened. Other authorities to the same purpose are referred to in Review, vol. iv. p. 487. and more might be added.

memorial service is a *sacrifice*[f], while it is also a *commemoration* of the *grand sacrifice;* and the *Jewish* sacrifices were *sacrifices* in themselves, while *types* of Christ's sacrifice, and *symbols* also of *ours.* But then, let it be observed, that when Chrysostom here speaks of the real *sacrifice* in the Eucharist, he does not mean the *signs*, but the *thing signified* by them, namely, *Christ himself*, the *one sacrifice*, as he expressly mentions: besides, had he intended the *elements*, he could not have said, that we have *one sacrifice*, or *always the same sacrifice;* for he very well knew, that we offer one day *one loaf*, and another day *another loaf*, and so that would have amounted to the same with one day *one sheep*, and another day *another;* and the very objection which he was there answering would have returned upon him with all its force.

But will not the same objection lie against offering any *sacrifices* at all, even *spiritual* sacrifices, so many distinct *acts*, and therefore one day *one sacrifice*, and another day *another*, and so on? No: for Chrysostom was there speaking only of *expiatory* sacrifices, or *sin offerings;* as the chapter, which he was commenting upon, led him to do: and there is really no *sin offering*, or *expiatory* sacrifice, under the Gospel, but *Christ* alone; who is not properly *offered* in a *sacrificial* way, but *commemorated* only, in the Eucharist. There may be in the Eucharist *gratulatory* sacrifices, consistently with what is here said by Chrysostom: but whether the *elements* or the *service*, properly, are such *gratulatory* sacrifices, he has not determined in this place, not

[f] Eusebius observes, that our Lord has ordered us a *memorial, instead of a sacrifice;* *μνήμην καὶ ἡμῖν παραδοὺς, ἀντὶ θυσίας, τῷ Θεῷ διηνεκῶς προσφέρειν.* *Demonstr.* lib. i. c. 10. p. 38. One would think by this, that he had excluded a *memorial* from being a sacrifice. But he does not: for he presently after explains what he means by, *instead of a sacrifice*, adding *ἀντὶ τῶν πάλαι θυσιῶν καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων, instead of the ancient sacrifices and burnt offerings. Ibid.* p. 38. But as to the *memorial services*, he does as plainly call them *sacrifices*, in the next page, as words can do it.

Τὰ *σεμνὰ τῆς Χριστοῦ τραπέζης θύματα, δι' ὧν καλλιεροῦντες, τὰς ἀναίμους καὶ λογικὰς, αὐτῷ τε προσηνεῖς θυσίας προσφέρειν Θεῷ*, &c. p. 39. Where I understand by *σεμνὰ θύματα* the *symbols*, metonymically called *victims*, as *body* and *blood:* and Eusebius takes notice, that *by them* (that is, by them as *symbols* and *instruments*) we *offer*, we perform our *unbloody* and *rational* sacrifices. He had said before, Τούτου *δῆτα θύματος τὴν μνήμην ἐπὶ τραπέζης ἐκτελεῖν διὰ συμβόλων*, &c. That is, the *memorial* of the *victim*, Christ crucified, is performed by those *symbols;* by consecrating, by breaking, distributing, pouring, eating, and drinking them with devout hearts, prayers, praises, &c.

entering into that question: though he has sufficiently determined it elsewhere, by what he constantly teaches with respect to *self-sacrifice*, *intrinsic* sacrifice, and all *spiritual services*; which he called *sacrifices* without any scruple, and without any self-correction[g].

Some have thought, that the very *phrase* of *commemorative sacrifice*, as applied to the *Eucharist*, imports, that the Eucharist is a *sacrifice*: but that is a very great mistake. It neither *implies* it nor *contradicts* it, but *abstracts* from it, expressing no more than this, that the Eucharist is a *commemoration* of a *sacrifice*, namely, of the *grand sacrifice*. It is a contracted, compendious form of speech, which, drawn out at full length, expresses *a sacrament commemorative of a sacrifice*; as appears from Aquinas[h], who may be allowed to be a good interpreter of a *scholastic* phrase. That sense passed current, and was not only admitted by Calvin and other Protestants, but contended for, when the Romanists began to give a *new* sense and *new* turn to it. Cardinal Allen was not pleased with the Schools for speaking the plain truth[i], nor with the Protestants for following them in that just sense of the *phrase*: so he endeavoured to warp it to a new and foreign meaning[k]. He pleaded that a

[g] It has been observed by some, that the *spiritual sacrifices*, among the Fathers, often go under *metaphorical* names, such as *odour of suavity*, and the like: and it has been urged, as of moment, that if a sacrifice of the heart is not an *odour* of *suavity* in a *proper* sense, why must it be thought a *sacrifice* in a *proper* sense? The argument is wrong, because it proves too much. Our Lord, as a *sacrifice*, is called our *Passover*, and the *Lamb* of God, and likewise an *odour* of *suavity*, Ephes. v. 2. Might it not therefore as well be pleaded against his *sacrifice*, that since he is not a *lamb*, nor a *passover*, nor an *odour*, in a *proper* sense, why must he be a *sacrifice* in a proper sense? The truth is, proper sacrifices may often have *metaphorical* names: but they are *proper* sacrifices notwithstanding, if they fall within the *general* reason and definition of *sacrifice*. The sacrifices called *zebachim*, for instance, in Hebrew, or θυσίαι in Greek, or *hostiæ* in Latin, or *victimæ*, were not therefore sacrifices merely because *so called*, or because they were of such a particular *kind*, but because they were considered as *presents* to God, and as expressions of *worship* and *homage* offered to the Divine Majesty.

[h] *Sacramentum* hoc est *commemorativum* Dominicæ passionis, quæ fuit *verum* sacrificium, et sic *nominatur* sacrificium. *Aquin. Summ.* part. iii. qu. 73. art. 4.

Successit autem ei [paschati] in Novo Testamento Eucharistia, *sacramentum* quod est *rememorativum* præteritæ passionis, sicut et illud erat *præfigurativum* futuræ. *Aquin. ibid.* art. 5. Conf. Lombard. lib. iv. distinct. 12. lit. G.

[i] Alanus de Eucharistia, p. 551.

[k] Majores certe nostri cum Eucharistiæ confectionem appellarunt nonnunquam *commemorativum* sacrificium ——non ita dicebant, quod judicarent hæc vocabula *non consistere* cum sacrificio *vero*, ut propterea non esset

commemorative sacrifice may consistently be *proper* also: which was no part of the question. The question was, whether any certain conclusion could be drawn from the *name* of sacrifice, sometimes given to the *elements* by the ancients, when those very ancients declared their own meaning in such instances to be, that the Eucharist, so considered, was a *commemoration* of a *sacrifice*, rather than a *sacrifice*. But I pass on. The phrase of *commemorative sacrifice*, in such a sense as Aquinas used it in, and as signifying *a sacrament commemorative* of a *sacrifice*, has been admitted by the best learned Protestants[1] all along, without any scruple. The sum is, that a *commemorative sacrifice*, in the *relative* sense of the phrase, is the same as a *nominal* sacrifice, opposed to a *real* one; a *sign* opposed to the *thing signified;* a *memorial* of a sacrifice, not *that sacrifice*. Such was the *original*, such has been the *customary* use of the phrase, from the time it first came in: and the question is not, whether a *commemorative* sacrifice may not also, in an *absolute* view, be a distinct *sacrifice;* but whether that *phrase* ordinarily had *expressed both?* It is certain, that it had not; but, among the Schoolmen formerly, and among the best learned Protestants since, it *expressed* no more commonly than a *sacramental* commemoration or memorial of a *sacrifice*, namely of the *grand sacrifice*. In this sense, our present most learned Metropolitan admits of it. His words are: "In the *Christian* Church, there is only *one proper* sacrifice, "which our Lord offered upon the cross; and consequently "*Christians* cannot *partake* of any sacrifice in a *literal* and *strict* "sense, without allowing *transubstantiation*," page 262. The Lord's Supper is "a *commemorative sacrifice*, or the *memorial* of "our Lord offered upon the cross; which is first dedicated to "God by prayer and thanksgiving, and afterwards *eaten* by the "faithful," &c. p. 267. When it is said, that *Christians* cannot partake of *any* sacrifice in a *literal* sense, and that there is but *one proper* sacrifice for *Christians* to *partake* of; the meaning, I

proprie dictum sacrificium, quia esset *commemorativum*. *Alanus de Eucharistia*, p. 547.

[1] Cranmer against Gardiner, book v. p. 435. R. Jacobi Epist. ad Perron. p. 52. Andrews, Resp. ad Bellarm. p. 184. Spalatensis, lib. v. p. 82, 83, 149, 204, 882, 911. Buckeridge, p. 4. See my Christian Sacrifice, above, p. 137. Morton, book v. p. 440. alias 35, 38. Field, p. 205. Laud, Conf. p. 305, 306. Towerson on the Sacraments, p. 169. Payne on the Sacrifice of the Mass, p. 49, 51, 53, 75. Patrick, Mens. Myst. p. 15, 16. Brevint on the Mass, p. 23.

presume, of those *few, chosen* words is this: we may indeed partake of *Christ's* sacrifice, a *proper* sacrifice, but not in a *literal* sense; for the participation is *spiritual:* we may *literally* partake of the elements; but then they are not a *proper* sacrifice, but *symbolical,* and *commemorative* [m], being that they are *memorial signs* of the sacrifice, not the sacrifice itself. Therefore, upon the whole, we have no sacrifice to partake of in a *literal* sense; for either the sacrifice we partake of is not *literal* and *proper,* or else the *participation,* at least, is not *literal* and *proper:* so stands the case. And what is this but very plainly declaring, that the elements are not a *proper* sacrifice? Well, but is it not as plainly declaring, that *spiritual* sacrifices are no *proper* sacrifices, since we have but *one* proper sacrifice? No, it is not declaring any such thing: for, observe the words, Christians cannot *partake* of any sacrifice; it is not said, cannot *offer,* but the thought entirely runs upon a sacrifice of *participation* [n]. So there is room left to say, that we *offer* proper sacrifices, namely, *spiritual* sacrifices. But will there not also be room left for saying, that we *offer* the elements as a *proper* sacrifice? No: for if they are not a *proper* sacrifice when *participated,* they could not be such when *offered* [o]: if the feeding barely upon *them* amounts not to a *feast* upon a *proper* sacrifice, they never were a *proper* sacrifice at all. The words are so exactly *chosen,* as plainly to exclude the *elements* from being a *proper* sacrifice, and at the same time not to exclude our *religious services* from really being so. This, I presume to say, (without *his Grace's* leave or

[m] "The elements are made the "*symbols* of his *body* and *blood,* the "*partaking* whereof is *all one* to the "receivers, and does as much assure "them of the favour of God, as if they "should eat and drink the *real* body "and blood of Christ offered upon "the cross," p. 263. "To eat of "the Lord's Supper, is to *partake* of "the *sacrifice* of *Christ,* which is "there *commemorated* and *repre-*"*sented.*" *Abp. Potter on Church Government,* p. 264.

[n] Accordingly, these words are added: "Hence it is manifest, that "to eat of the Lord's Supper is to "*partake* of the *sacrifice* of Christ, "which is there *commemorated* and "*represented.*" *Ibid.* p. 264.

Sacrifice is here taken in the *passive* view, as *participated,* according to Dr. Cudworth's notion of a *symbolical* feast upon a sacrifice. See my Review, vol. iv. p. 712, &c.

[o] *Offered* here means offered for *consecration:* "To consecrate the "Lord's Supper is so constantly "called προσφέρειν in Greek, and "*offerre* in Latin, that it is needless "to cite any testimonies for them." *Ibid.*

N. B. The offering for consecration, means no more than presenting them to God, in order to have them consecrated into *memorial signs,* or *symbols* of Christ's sacrifice, that is, into a *commemorative,* not *real* sacrifice.

knowledge,) appears to be his sense, and his whole sense; no way favouring the *material hypothesis*, but the contrary; however some may have misconstrued his words, for want of considering them with due *attention*.

As to the name *memorial*, it may be noted, that it is capable of a twofold meaning, according as it may be applied. Apply it to the elements, and so it means a *memorial sign*, no sacrifice at all: apply it to the *prayers*, *praises*, and eucharistical actions[p], and then it means a *memorial service*, and is a *sacrifice*, a *spiritual sacrifice*. But it is time to take leave.

I have now run through the most considerable *distinctions* of sacrifice, which have fallen within the compass of my observation; and I am willing to hope, that the explications here given may be of use, as spreading some further light upon the subject. Had the difference lain in *words* only[q], (*ideas* remaining the *same*,) it would not have deserved one moment's care or thought: but as this question had been lately managed, it is too plain, that the true *idea* both of the *sacrament* and *sacrifice* had been *changed* into quite another thing; and that such a *change* could not be supported, without making *other* very considerable *changes* in the whole system of *theology*, and in points of high consequence both to *truth* and *godliness*. Wherefore it appeared as necessary to endeavour, with all *Christian* mildness, to set these matters right, as it was to "contend earnestly for the faith once "delivered unto the saints."

[p] Recordatio ergo, seu commemoratio, ponitur——in rebus sensibilibus. Omnia enim *memorialia*, seu *monumenta*, sunt sensibilia et patentia sensui: ac propterea *benedictio* illa sensibilis, *fractio*, *distributio*, *comestio* panis sacramentalis, nobis est *memoriale* passionis Christi, &c. *Spalatens.* p. 83.

[q] Pfaffius, in the view he took it, and with respect to one learned writer, looked upon the *dispute* as a kind of *logomachy*, p. 53, 344. and pref. p. 7. which I noted in Review, vol. iv. p. 727. adding, that *there* was a *good deal of truth* in what Pfaffius had said, and that *a great part* of the debate was chiefly about *names*. I have since noted, that the *original scheme* of a *principal* writer in that cause appeared to me to be little more. Christian Sacrifice explained, above, p. 147. But I was well aware, that some writers had carried matters a great deal further. Where a road first *divides*, two travellers may almost shake hands: but if one goes on here, and another there, as far as the *diverging* roads will lead them, they may at length be found at a very wide distance from each other: so it is here. An *equivocal* word, perhaps, or phrase, in which both parties agree, first strikes out *two* very different *ideas*; and those two *ideas*, having their different *trains* or *connections*, do at length carry the two parties off, wide and far from each other, into very opposite systems.

Faxit Deus omnipotens, ut *uni* Christi *sacrificio* vere innitamur, ac illi rursum rependamus *sacrificia* nostra *gratiarum* actionis, *laudis, confessionis* nominis sui, veræ *resipiscentiæ, pœnitentiæ, beneficentiæ* erga proximos, aliorumque omnium *pietatis officiorum:* talibus enim *sacrificiis,* exhibebimus nos nec Deo ingratos, nec Christi sacrificio indignos[r].

[r] Cranmer in Collier's Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. Collection of Records, p. 84.

SIX OCCASIONAL SERMONS.

The Duty of doing Good,

A SERMON

PREACHED BEFORE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

AT

ST. MARY'S CHURCH,

ON COMMEMORATION SUNDAY,

November 2, 1712.

GALATIANS vi. 10.

As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith.

THESE words having relation to what went before, it may be convenient to look back to the sixth verse of this chapter, where the Apostle begins his exhortation to acts of charity and kindness towards the ministers of the Gospel. "Let him," saith he, "that is taught in the word communicate to him that teach-"eth in all good things," that is, in all good offices; particularly those of beneficence and liberality for their support and maintenance. He proceeds in the two next verses to press the duty further, from the consideration of God's strict and impartial justice in punishing any omission or neglect of it. "Be not "deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, "that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his flesh shall "of the flesh reap corruption; but" then for their encouragement, he adds, that "he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the

"Spirit reap life everlasting." And, to obviate any mistrust about it, he exhorts them "not to be weary in well doing," from the certainty of the reward attending it, "in due season "we shall reap, if we faint not." Then follows, "As we have "therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men, especially "unto them who are of the household of faith." This is the connection of the words with those foregoing, which may be sufficient to let us into the general drift and design of them at present; their more particular explanation shall come in due time and place, according to the order and method in which I mean to treat of them, as follows:

I. I shall consider in general the duty of doing good to all men; the reasonableness, necessity, and excellency of it: "Let "us do good unto all men."

II. The limitations of this duty to some particular seasons; "as we have opportunity:" and to particular persons; "espe-"cially unto them who are of the household of faith."

I shall beg leave to detain you a while upon these points; and then endeavour briefly to apply the whole to the present occasion.

I. I am to consider in general the duty of doing good to all men; the reasonableness, necessity, and excellency of it.

It hath pleased Almighty God so to order the affairs of the world, that the welfare and happiness of mankind both present and future shall in a great measure depend upon their mutual kindness, their amicable and friendly offices towards one another. Not only our food and raiment, the necessaries and conveniences of life, come in to us this way, but even our spiritual food and sustenance, our instruction and improvement in piety and virtue, are in a great measure owing to the same; we are beholden to each other for them. God is pleased to convey his mercies and blessings, spiritual and temporal, by the mediation and service of men, making us the dispensers and stewards of the bounties of Heaven. He feeds and clothes us, while tender and helpless, by the assistance of kind parents; instructs us, as we grow up, by masters and teachers; calls us to our duty by his ministers; and provides for us, all along through our manifold wants and necessities, by our friends. Our *obligations* therefore to do good, to be kind and serviceable to each other in our respective capacities, are laid deep in our nature, are the necessary result of *our state and condition* here, are what we are all born to, and

mainly designed for, and that no doubt for very wise and good reasons.

It would be easy for Almighty God to make every man independent upon any but himself, to send us bread from heaven, or to make every thing we have occasion for spring up ready to our hands; or he might administer to our necessities a thousand other ways, which we know not of, without the least assistance or service of our neighbours. But not to mention other things, where would there be that lovely harmony of society consisting of mutual offices? What charms of conversation would be left us, which is rendered so agreeable by our contributing to each other's happiness? What exercise of love and amity, which endears us to one another, and so unites us together? In fine, what foundation would there be for the many social virtues to which we are trained up here, in order to prepare us for much nobler and diviner exercises of love hereafter? Love and amity are the delight of heaven, and make up the blessedness of saints and angels. We are therefore taught the practice of those virtues now, which in greater perfection are to be our chief employment, our joy and bliss for ever. And hence perhaps it is, that we are made in a manner to depend upon one another from the first moment we breathe till our last; and that we have all some means or other of being useful and beneficial to our kind put into our hands, that by the exercise of love and amity in this life we may be duly qualified for a better.

As God has thus taken care, by the very state and condition of our being, to oblige us to this duty of doing good, so to enforce it yet further, it comes recommended to us by our own *natural instinct* and *passions*, by the best and brightest *examples*, the most frequent and solemn *exhortations*, and the most engaging *motives*.

There is no man, who has not very much debauched his nature, but finds in himself a very strong propensity to acts of mercy and pity upon some special occasions; and feels a sensible pleasure and satisfaction within arising from them. To relieve the needy, to assist the helpless, to raise the drooping soul, and to bring comfort to the afflicted and heavy laden, these are very delightful and pleasurable duties. And it is hard to determine whether the pleasure of bestowing a favour in this manner does not equal or even exceed the joy of the receiver. Thus by the very bent and inclinations of our nature are we incited to do

good; we find pain and trouble in resisting these inward motions of our own breasts, and are never better pleased than when we indulge and gratify them. These soft and tender impressions are the dictates of nature to us, the silent notices of Heaven, and, as it were, the still voice of God unto our souls; and so far as we yield ourselves up and are conformable to them, we resemble in some measure the Divine love, and copy after the pattern which God himself hath set us. To delight in doing good is to imitate him in the noblest and most charming of his excellencies. His wisdom and power are infinite, but his goodness is the flower and the perfection of both. This is his darling attribute, which he seems most to delight and triumph in, and which renders him so Divine and so adorable a Being. His happiness is infinite, too great and too secure to be either heightened or impaired. All that he hath in view, if we may so speak, is to communicate some degrees and measures of it; to shed abroad his love, and scatter his rich bounties through the compass of the wide world. This is the design of the creation, and the end of all things. There are as many instances of his goodness, as there are creatures of his making; the heavens and the earth are full of the goodness of the Lord. He is kind even to the brutal part of the creation, in giving them being, and preserving it when given. "He giveth fodder unto the cattle, "and feedeth the young ravens that call upon him; and even "the lions roaring after their prey do seek their meat from "God," as the Psalmist very elegantly observes. But his kindness to man is the most remarkable; since it is for his sake that both the animate and inanimate part of this lower world were created and are preserved. He provideth for the necessities of all men, as seemeth good to his wisdom, in a surprising manner, "filling their hearts with joy and gladness." Above all, his marvellous loving-kindness is seen in the provision made for our eternal happiness, in his sending his own Son to suffer, bleed, and die to save us. And when this Divine Saviour was pleased to take upon him our nature, to converse with sinful men, all his endeavours were to do them good; and every action of his life and circumstance of his death was a fresh instance of it. He healed diseases, cast out devils, fed thousands by miracle, at once contributing both to the happiness of this life and of that which is to come. He laid hold on all opportunities of being kind and serviceable, and industriously sought out more; in fine, his cha-

racter is summed up in this, that "he went about doing good." The like may be observed of the whole host of heaven, the blessed company of saints and angels, who have been always engaged in the same friendly designs, constantly employed in doing good. After so many, and so great and glorious examples, need we any precept, any persuasion, to incite us to this duty? Yet to secure our compliance in this point, to imprint and rivet it into our hearts and minds, every page almost of the Old and New Testament inculcates this lesson to us, and presses it most earnestly upon us. There we find God declaring, that he prefers the works of charity and mercy to his own more immediate service, in as much as he does not stand in need of our services, but our brethren do, and may be benefited by them. He therefore rejects all our prayers and praises in comparison, looking upon them as nothing, if brought into competition with relieving the widow and fatherless in their affliction, or doing good to the bodies or the souls of men. There also we find our blessed Saviour acquainting us with the particulars of the inquiry to be made at the last day; whether we have fed the hungry, or clothed the naked; given drink to the thirsty, or visited the sick and afflicted, to speak comfort to them. And there we see that the unprofitable and wicked servant are the same in God's account of them; that it is in vain for any man who does no good, to pretend he has done no harm: he must answer for his neglects and omissions of this kind. The not doing good, when we might and ought to have done it, is a high crime, and will be enough to condemn us at the great day. So strong, so indispensable are our obligations to this duty. Indeed it is the very life and soul of Christianity, the sum and substance of all religion; and love is the fulfilling both of the Law and the Gospel. All other duties either yield to it, or else are implied in it; and that we may not pretend to want objects of compassion and charity, or to grow straitened and narrow in our affections, all mankind have an interest and concern in them. No distance of place or time can limit the extent of this duty: for our good wishes and prayers at least may reach unto the ends of the earth, and be serviceable where we cannot know it; and the fruits of our present services may spring up and grow to all succeeding generations. No difference in opinions or opposition of parties can make void our obligations; for all are in a Christian sense neighbours; and we are to "love our neighbours

"as ourselves." No affronts or injuries, no injustice, violence, or oppression, ought to stifle our sense of this duty; for we are to "love our enemies, to do good to them that hate us, and to "pray for them that despitefully use us and persecute us. If "our enemy hunger, we must feed him" never the less for being such; and "if he thirst, we must give him drink; that by so "doing," if possible, we may melt him into love and gratitude, "heaping," as it were, "coals of fire upon his head." And this indeed is as great an instance of pity and compassion, as curing either the blind or lame; nay, a much greater, thus to heal the rage of a distempered mind, and to bring a man back again to his right senses. "As we have therefore opportunity, let us do "good unto all men," whether friends or enemies, whether brethren or aliens, to all who can stand in need of, and may be any thing the better for us.

Having thus considered the duty in general, the reasonableness, necessity, and excellency of it in its largest extent, I proceed, in the second place,

II. To consider the limitation of it to particular times and seasons, "as we have opportunity;" and to particular persons, "especially unto them who are of the household of faith."

The words ὡς καιρὸν ἔχομεν are sometimes rendered, *while we have time;* that is, while by the mercy of Almighty God our frail and uncertain lives are continued to us. And this is evident, that we ought always to be "doing the work of him that sent "us, while *our* day lasts, and before *our* night cometh, when no "man can work." And so our season for doing good, taken at large, is the whole time of our sojourning here in this world. But then as to some particular acts and kinds of it, there are some special seasons and opportunities proper for them; the well-observing of which will be the best means to direct us as well what good to do, as in what manner, so as to answer the ends and designs of it. And in this sense it is, that I would here understand the words of my text, "as we have "opportunity."

Now these proper seasons or opportunities of doing good may be conceived to respect either the persons who are to do a kindness, or those it should be done to. In regard to the former, every advantage which accrues to them, every increase of their substance, power, or ability in any kind, affords a fresh occasion; and is, as it were, a new opportunity given them for doing good.

Does any man abound in wealth, and riches flow in upon him? This is the season, the opportunity which God hath put into his hands, that he may do good by his liberality and bounty towards his poorer brethren. Is he withal advanced to great honours, power, and authority? This must be looked upon as an opportunity given him of doing good, by protecting and encouraging virtue and piety, by discountenancing and restraining vice and immorality. Hath any man, by the blessing of God and his own industry, attained to a good degree of learning, or by years, thought, and experience, to more than ordinary measures of wisdom? This then is the season and opportunity for his doing good, by instructing the ignorant and unlearned, or by advising and admonishing the unwise and unthinking. Or is he by God's grace, prayer, and endeavour, arrived to a better sense of religion, and a more exalted piety, than his neighbours? This likewise is another opportunity of doing good, that "being himself converted he may *then* strengthen his brethren." And, that it may not be thought, that only the rich, great, wise, learned, or eminently good, are blessed with opportunities, it must be observed, that all others, in different proportions, or in different ways, have their opportunities too, and are obliged in their respective capacities to do what they can. The offices of humanity, civility, and courtesy lie open and common to all; and the very meanest and lowest may do good by their honest industry in time of health, and at all times by humility, modesty, and peaceable carriage, by good advice, by prayer, or by example. Hitherto I have considered how a man may be said to have opportunity with respect to his own power and abilities of doing good.

Next we may observe the like with respect to the wants and occasions of others whom we ought to do good to. These indeed are innumerable, and we can never want opportunities in this sense of any sort or kind. "The poor we have always with us, "and when we will we may do them good." There will be always ignorance, weakness, folly, sin, and misery enough in the world, to furnish us with matter for our compassion and charity, and to exhaust all our services. But because our time is short, our talents few, and our abilities at the highest finite and limited; our business must be, out of so great variety to choose such instances of doing good as we are best qualified for; and of those such as are most wanted, or by some peculiar circumstances

come more particularly recommended to us. Some special times and occasions may require our service more than others; and some opportunities may be offered, which, if not presently laid hold on, may be lost for ever. On this account the offices of love and charity may reasonably be distinguished into two sorts, constant and occasional, from the matter or the objects of them. We are constantly obliged to be doing good, of some kind or other, in proportion to our abilities; and the ordinary standing necessities of mankind afford constant matter for it. But besides this, we are also occasionally obliged to exert ourselves with greater zeal, vigour, and activity upon some special emergencies, and very urgent and pressing engagements. As if a church and nation be in present danger of sinking into heresy and schism, profaneness, irreligion, or atheism; this is a special opportunity, calling for as special assistance; and at such a time all, who are capable of doing any good service, are obliged forthwith to employ their wits, tongues, pens, interest, and authority for the prevention and cure of such a threatening mischief. In cases of inferior and private concern, for instance, if any person or persons are nearly reduced to extremities, labouring under some heavy and severe pressures, and not being able to subsist, if not speedily relieved by kind neighbours; such opportunities as these are what no good Christian, who has any bowels of compassion, no good heathen, would let slip from him. In this sense therefore, "as we have opportunity" offered, "let us do "good unto all men," after the example of the good Samaritan, laid down for a rule of practice by our blessed Saviour in all cases of this nature.

There is another limitation of this duty, taken notice of in my text, and that is, to particular *persons*, as well as to times. Not that any persons, whom it may be in our power to serve, are to be excluded from our charity; only it may admit of different degrees, and is principally to be applied to some more than others: we may be allowed both in our constant and occasional charities to make a difference in regard to the quality and circumstances of the persons, and when all cannot be equally served, to prefer the most deserving. We are to "do good unto "all men, but especially unto the household of faith;" that is, to Christ's church or family, and those particularly whose labours and services most eminently deserve and require it; to them especially, in whose support and welfare the interest of religion,

the honour of God, and the good of souls is so deeply concerned. Where other circumstances are equal, or but nearly equal, the value and character of the person, or the relation to us, ought to give them the preference in our charitable offices, and to entitle them to our first and best services. Indeed a stranger, or even an enemy in extremities, is to be relieved before a friend or a brother who is in no such want of us; for the offices of humanity seem equally due to them as men, and a bare convenience of one may reasonably be postponed, and give way to the extremities of the other. But where this is not the case, or where both seem to lie under almost equal necessities, there certainly a man may be allowed and even obliged more especially to assist his friends before his enemies, brethren before aliens, Christians before heathens, kindred before acquaintance, good and well deserving before those who have less pretensions; and though we may be willing to assist all or any of them as we are able, and as we see proper occasions, yet towards some more especially we may give a loose to our affections, and be enlarged in our bowels of compassion; may open both our hearts and hands to receive and embrace them, and even overflow in our kindness and bounty towards them. To feed the hungry, and clothe the naked, is kind and Christian, though the persons so relieved be strangers and aliens, and even useless or ill-deserving. But if such offices be done to Christians, and good Christians, and such as have deserved well by their pious and painful endeavours, then the charity is the greater, as the design of it is nobler, and the good effect of it more diffusive, lasting, and beneficial than the other. The rule then which the voice of nature and reason, as well as the laws of God, have marked out for our charities, is this, that if at any time we can serve the honour of God and the interests of the public more by one sort of charity than another, or by relieving some persons before others, and in one particular manner beyond any else, we are always to choose that which may probably do most good, may spread the widest and last the longest. Thus to relieve any persons in necessity is an act of humanity and Christian charity; but more so, if they are persons of uncommon merit, or undeserved sufferings; and relieving them in such a way as shall promote the welfare of their souls, makes it yet more excellent than if it concerned only their bodily wants; and if it be at the same time useful and beneficial to many more besides, it is then

better than if it were confined to them only; and if the influence of it may reach to after ages, it is a nobler height of charity than if it should conclude with the present.

Having thus shewn the nature and measures of the duty, and what sort of management is requisite to make it the most excellent and valuable in the sight of God and man, it may now be proper to come to the application of all to the particular instance of it now before us, which calls for our returns of gratitude, our joyful praises and thanksgivings at this day.

III. Of all the methods and contrivances of doing good, there is none more excellent and praiseworthy than that of founding schools and universities for the propagation of religion and sound learning. This seems to imply and contain under it all other instances of doing good, is a large and complicated charity, reaching both to the bodies and souls of men; to private persons and the public weal, to present and to future ages.

The first, but least thing to be considered in it, is the provision thereby made for a set number of persons successively to live creditably and comfortably in their generation. This is in itself a nobler height of Christian charity than dealing our bread to the hungry, or clothes to the naked. For the provision herein made is large and generous; it is a remedy not only against present but future wants; and hinders such evils from being ever felt, as the other only are designed to remove; and is therefore as much better, as it would be to have prevented a stroke while it is threatened only at a distance, than afterwards, to heal the wound.

Besides this, the persons thus provided for as to bodily necessities, are at the same time put into the most happy circumstances that can be with regard to their souls. Many perhaps thus brought up might in some other method of life, in trade or in merchandise, have enriched themselves more; but they could never have been placed in a better way for eternity, nor set out with a fairer or a more promising prospect. For besides the advantage of good books, and, what is more, of good men, as well for instruction as example; besides the benefits of regularity and discipline, and the daily, stated exercises of devotion; the freedom and disincumbrance from cares and business, the leisure and liberty they enjoy in such places, give the greatest encouragement to the study of piety and virtue, and make way for the highest and noblest improvement of the mind. "He

"that hath little business shall become wise," saith the son of Sirach, and we may say, *good too*, for the same reason; for leisure is a foundation for both. While secular care and multiplicity of engagements disturb and even distract a great part of mankind, here our very business, which for the pleasure of it is but diversion, tends also to regulate and compose the soul; and we have little else to do, if we rightly consider it, but to be advancing and improving daily in all wisdom and virtue, and to be laying up a good foundation for the time to come, that we may "lay "hold on eternal life." How blessed then are the fruits of such public charities, to which so many may in a great measure owe not only their comfortable subsistence here, but their eternal happiness hereafter!

Yet this is not all, nor a thousandth part of the benefits arising from them: they are not confined to those persons only who are immediately concerned in them, but are of universal influence, are spread wide and far, and can neither be numbered nor measured for greatness. From these fountains come wise and able men for the service of Church and State, for the ornament and defence of both: by these, a nation is made happy, and religion grows and prospers: by these, wise counsels are framed, and under God the course of the world steered: by these, justice and fidelity are kept up, the peace and harmony of society maintained, order and government preserved. In a word, by these, multitudes are trained up to all the virtues of the civil and social life, and at the same time qualified to become citizens of heaven.

I shall but just observe further of these public charities, that as the happy effects of them are almost unlimited as to place, so are they in a manner as to time too. Late posterity may enjoy the blessed fruits of them as well as we, who live behind many others; and the children which are yet unborn may praise the Lord for them. As time drives on, and one age succeeds another, these unexhausted mines are daily productive of new blessings to enlighten and enrich mankind. From these fruitful stores may yet arise lights and ornaments to the Church; patriots and counsellors to support the State; wise, great, and good men to supply the necessities of this world, and to fill the mansions of the other.

It might be easy to enlarge upon this head, and may be difficult to contain; but I know not whether I could be excused

for having said so much on matters so well known and understood by all here, were it not that the occasion is as proper as the subject is inviting; and besides, the clamours of some against these venerable societies, and the institution of them, have made it the more necessary to speak out, and to open our most just pretensions, as well for the honour of our pious founders as our own vindication. It has been the humour of some persons, with what reason or justice let the world judge, to defame and decry these nurseries of religion, sometimes as useless, at other times hurtful to the public; and to discourage as much as possible the youth of the nation from resorting to them. The learning there taught, because perhaps above their capacities, passes with them for pedantry; their principles, because loyal, are principles of slavery; and their methods of instruction, because different from the schemes of some modern projectors, are reckoned old and superannuated. Now if what these men pretend be true, we should appear, methinks, with no very good grace upon this occasion, and should be but ill employed in reciting the names of our benefactors, only to publish their shame for having misplaced their charities, and thereby done such mischief to the world. But our comfort is, that the pretences of these men are so easily seen through, as not to bear refuting. Had they singled out some particular persons, and there placed their censure, their modesty perhaps had been commendable, and their attempts feasible: but when they presume to strike at whole bodies, and throw their scandal at large, this treatment is too coarse, and the management too gross, to go down even with the unthinking vulgar.

Enough has been said already to shew (and it is visible to all the world) how much the public has been indebted, and ever will be, to the founders of such religious societies, and the worthy members of them. But no wonder, if, when empirics profess the art of medicine, the sounder and abler physicians be decried. While ignorance or lusts, pride or faction, are predominant with some, what wonder is it, if these learned bodies, which are so directly opposite to them, and I hope will ever be so, fall under their censure? Such enemies we shall ever have, and it is our glory to have such. These places were designed to combat ignorance and vice, and to stand in direct opposition to them. The world would not be so sensible of the great need they have of them, were it not for such men, as make it their business to

oppose them. The louder they exclaim against them, the more do they publish and proclaim to all wise judges the great usefulness and necessity of them. When they grow impatient of the curb, and are so fretted with it, they do but shew how much they wanted it, and how much more unruly and unmanageable they had been without it.

But leaving these gentlemen to be better handled by those who shall think it worth their while to do it in a more public way, I shall beg leave to close all with a few short advices suitable to the present occasion.

How ought we in the first place to bless the memory of our pious founders and benefactors, who under God have been the authors and contrivers of so much good to mankind; who have thereto contributed so largely and generously, and yet contribute, and will continue to do so, in effect, to the end of the world! If "they who turn many to righteousness shall shine as the stars for "ever and ever," how great must be their glory, how ample their rewards, who have been so remarkably instrumental in reforming the world, not only encouraging true piety and goodness while they lived, by counsel, by command, and by example, but perpetuating these great designs to all after ages, taking care that there never may be wanting a supply of such persons, whose business it should be to instruct the ignorant, to convert the wicked, to multiply the number of God's saints on earth, and to enlarge the company of the blessed in heaven!

And how ought we to return our humblest thanks and praises to Almighty God, for putting into their hearts such good and great designs; for bringing them to perfection, giving success to them, and showering down his mercies and blessings upon them!

Let us from hence learn to have a just sense of the honour and happiness we enjoy, that we may the better answer the ends of it. Let us often reflect that we are trained up here in order to be qualified in some measure to enlighten and reform the world; that a great deal depends upon our making a right use of the present season; that by improving ourselves we shall be enabled also to improve others, and contribute singly to make thousands both wiser and better, and to bring them on to heaven with us. Let us therefore pursue our studies with industry and care, having always our eye fixed upon the great end and design of them; the glory of God, and the good of mankind. This may

serve to regulate our searches after knowledge, and fix their due bounds and measures better than all the rules of philosophy or logic. It is easy for a man to know, who knows any thing of himself, in what sort of study he may improve most, and be most useful to the world; and the same consideration will be a safe rule to direct him how far it may be proper to pursue it; so far certainly, and no further than as it may turn to a good use, and may not prevent some greater good, which he might and ought to have been doing in the mean time. To our searches after knowledge we are more especially to be careful to join the practice of true piety, and to begin with reforming ourselves, if ever we hope to reform others. This will go further towards improving and bettering mankind than the most refined and elevated knowledge, or the greatest compass of learning; and without this, it is to be feared, we can do but little good to others, and yet less to ourselves. The present age, to say the least of it, is bad enough; and if all, who are thus religiously educated, were as good as they should be, and were to join their best endeavours, they would yet find it work enough to improve and reform it. But if some of these also should run in with the crowd, and by their bad example or counsel turn seducers and corrupters, like the libertines of the times; if they spread the poison which it should be their business to draw out, and heighten the distemper which they ought to heal; then the case would be yet more justly deplorable, and "woe to those persons by whom the offence cometh," strict and severe will be their condemnation.

But I shall not go on in any such melancholy reflections, which I hope can concern very few here. Nor shall I venture beyond these few hints to be further tedious in this assembly, where are present so many whose own better thoughts will be a safe direction to themselves, and their examples the most persuasive sermons to others. May Almighty God bless the endeavours of all such, reward their services, and increase their numbers, and grant us all to be like-minded, striving in nothing but how we may best promote the glory of God, the good of mankind, and the salvation of our own souls.

A SERMON

PREACHED BEFORE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

On Thursday the 7th of June, 1716.

Being the Day of Public THANKSGIVING to Almighty God for suppressing the late unnatural REBELLION.

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2 SAMUEL XX. 1, 2.

And there happened to be there a man of Belial, whose name was Sheba, the son of Bichri, a Benjamite: and he blew a trumpet, and said, We have no part in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse: every man to his tents, O Israel.

So every man of Israel went up from after David, and followed Sheba the son of Bichri: but the men of Judah clave unto their king, from Jordan even to Jerusalem.

THIS and the foregoing chapter give us the history of the rise, progress, and conclusion of an unnatural rebellion raised against good King David: one that appeared formidable, and might have been of unhappy consequence to him and his kingdoms, had not his timely care and vigilance (with the blessing of God thereupon) seasonably suppressed it. The narrative of the matter is this.

King David[a] had been some time absent from his royal city, having "fled out of the land for Absalom." But as soon as the death of Absalom had removed all difficulties, "the people

[a] 2 Sam. xix. 9.

"were at strife throughout all the tribes of Israel," about bringing the King back to Jerusalem, to reinstate him in his throne.

The King, hearing of the zeal and concern which his subjects of Israel had for him, thought proper to intimate it to the *elders of Judah*[b], inviting them, as being nearest akin to him, of the same tribe with himself, his *brethren*, his *bones*, and his *flesh*[c], as himself expresseth it, to come to him with all convenient speed, that they might not be "the last to bring back the King."

By this affectionate and endearing message, "he bowed the "heart of all the men of Judah, even as the heart of one man, "so that they sent this word unto the King, Return thou, "and all thy servants[d]." And soon after they went in person to meet him, and to conduct him over Jordan[e], in his way to Jerusalem.

While the *men of Judah* were thus paying their early offices of duty and respect to their royal master, *the men of Israel*, thinking themselves neglected and postponed, in a matter which concerned their honour and their interest, began to be full of anger and resentment against their brethren of Judah; and accordingly came to the King with remonstrances and complaints against them: "Why have our brethren, the men of Judah, "stolen thee away, and have brought the King and his house-"hold, and all David's men with him, over Jordan[f]?" To which the men of Judah replied very justly, that the reason was, because the King was *near of kin*[g] to them; intimating withal, that what they did was not so much with an eye to their own advantage, (not having "eaten at all of the King's cost,") as out of their particular duty and affection to their sovereign, to whom they were so nearly related.

This did not satisfy: but still the Israelites insisted, that they had "ten parts in the King[h]," according to the number of their tribes, and therefore "more right in David" than the other: and "why then," say they, "did ye despise us, that our "advice should not be first had in bringing back our King?" The men of Judah being hereby warmed and irritated, gave them rough language in return; "and their words were fiercer "than the words of the men of Israel."

And now matters began to look towards a rupture. Which

[b] 2 Sam. xix. 11. [c] Ver. 12. [d] Ver. 14. [e] Ver. 15. [f] Ver. 41. [g] Ver. 42. [h] Ver. 43.

yet, very probably, might have been prevented, but that " there " happened to be there a man of Belial," a factious, turbulent man, (one who probably had had an inveterate hatred to the house of David;) " whose name was Sheba, the son of Bichri, a " Benjamite," perhaps of the house and lineage of Saul, as was Shimei: he knowing how to take advantage of a popular discontent, and wanting not the will to do it, presently " blew a " trumpet, and said, We have no part in David, neither have we " inheritance in the son of Jesse: every man to his tents, O " Israel." As much as to say, " We, of the tribes of Israel, " are dismissed from King David; and have no further interest " or concern with him. He has discarded us, to take our " brethren in; and has no regard but to the house of Judah. " To your tents, O Iarael: and look ye out for another king." This was putting the most invidious and malicious construction upon what had been done that could be; and was turning the rage of the discontented people upon the King himself, who had no way affronted them, except it was by his inviting and admitting the men of Judah, which he had so great reason to do.

But when men's minds are sore, and fretted with contention, they are very apt to run into extremes, and to take every thing by the worst handle; and " so every man of Israel went up " from after David," (deserted and revolted from him,) " and " followed Sheba the son of Bichri." It was presently made a *party concern*, and accordingly all that were there joined in it. Some, we may suppose, out of resentment and ill will; and others out of fear or shame; lest they should seem unconcerned for, or regardless of, what was, or what was pretended to be, the common cause of their brethren.

By " every man of Israel," in the text, we are not to understand all the ten tribes; but that part only who were there present; all that came to conduct the King over Jordan; probably a small number in comparison to the whole.

" The men of Judah" however, as well out of affection and bounden duty, as because they had been the unhappy occasion of the others' revolt, " clave unto their King from Jordan even " to Jerusalem," conducting him all the way to his royal seat, placing him in his throne, and steadily adhering to his interest, against all opposers.

No sooner had the King despatched his necessary affairs, but

he "assembled the men of Judah[i]" together, thinking it high time to look after the growing rebellion. For Sheba was so vigilant, that "he went through all the tribes of Israel[k]," poisoning the minds of the King's loyal subjects, and drawing many after him. King David was sufficiently apprehensive of it; and therefore suddenly gave orders to his forces to pursue him. "[l]David said to Abishai, Now shall Sheba the son of Bichri do "us more harm than did Absalom: take thou thy lord's "servants, and pursue after him, lest he get him fenced cities, "and escape us.

"And there went out after him Joab's men, and the Chere-"thites, and the Pelethites, and all the mighty men: and they "went out of Jerusalem to pursue after" him with all expedition, to stop his progress, and thereby to prevent a general defection of the tribes. This so seasonable and prudent despatch of the King's forces had, by the blessing of God, its desired effect.

Sheba was in a little time besieged and blocked up, at the place of his rendezvous, which was Abel of Bethmaachah[m]; and the people of the town, either out of a sense of loyalty, or out of tenderness for themselves, finding they had no other remedy, were glad to capitulate, and to buy their peace at the price of the traitor's head. Upon this they dispersed, and the rebellion ended. This is a brief but full account of the matter of fact. These things, no doubt, "were written for our admonition," and may be useful to us when carefully considered. My design is,

1. To draw such reflections and observations as naturally occur to us from the contents of the foregoing history.

2. To make some brief application of them, so far as is suitable, to the occasion of this day's solemnity.

3. To conclude the whole with a few practical advices proper to the place and audience.

I. I am to draw such reflections and observations as may naturally occur to us from the contents of the foregoing history.

1. And the first is, how men's passions, beginning often from some very slight and inconsiderable occasions, swell, by degrees, to an amazing height; and carry them further than they at first intended, or so much as suspected; even to things which themselves, when cool and sedate, would have heartily abhorred

How small and trifling a circumstance was it, (if rightly con-

[i] 2 Sam. xx. 3, 4. [k] Ver. 14. [l] Ver. 6, 7. [m] Ver. 15.

sidered,) that the men of Judah happened to come *first* to the King; and were beforehand with their brethren of Israel, in paying their dutiful addresses to him. Might it not have contented the men of Israel, that their own hearts were loyal, that they meant the same thing with the other, had done their best to signify it, and only failed in a small circumstance of time, and that not through any neglect or fault of theirs, but by being prevented by their brethren? Was it worth contending so eagerly, who should be there *first* to conduct the King over Jordan, so long as both were agreed in the principal matter, that he ought to be conducted; and that it was for the common interest that he should return, and be set at the head of his people? Admitting that the men of Judah had the advantage by ingratiating themselves first with the King: yet was this any thing more than what was very natural for men to take, when they had so fair an opportunity for it; or than the men of Israel themselves would gladly have taken in the like circumstances, and have approved very well, when it had been their own? Could one ever have imagined, that this should be thought reason sufficient to justify a revolt, and the taking up arms against their sovereign? Had it been told the Israelites beforehand, what monstrous extravagances they should run into; that they should engage in a rebellion against the Lord's anointed, and enter into measures equally destructive to their country and themselves; that they should run the risk of sacrificing the lives of many innocent subjects; of bringing destruction and desolation on many well deserving families; of filling their country with cries and tears, laying cities waste, or burying them in blood and ashes: had these or the like scenes of barbarity and cruelty (the certain attendants of a civil war of any long continuance) been represented to them in their blackest colours beforehand; which of them might not have said, as Hazael to the prophet, "What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this great "thing[n]?"

But when once men give way to their unruly passions, they are no longer masters of their own thoughts or designs; but are hurried on by an impetuous force. Consideration leaves them, and they advance by imperceptible steps so far, that they know not how to retreat. "The beginning of strife is," (as the Wise

[n] 2 Kings viii. 13.

Man observes, "as when one letteth out water[o]." It rages and swells more and more, till it makes an inundation, and overflows a country.

The contest between the men of Judah and the Israelites was at first little more than a strong passion for the King's interest and their country's good; joined with some impatience, that any should rival or go beyond them in it. Thus far it was laudable and generous; and had it stopped here, all had been well. But they proceeded to quarrel with each other, until both were inflamed to the utmost. A rupture ensues, a secession follows, and the next step is rebellion.

2. You may please to observe further, that the contest, however sharp and fierce before, had never come to that height it did, had not there happened to be a Sheba amongst them, to *blow the trumpet* to sedition and rebellion. Artful representations, and studied disguises; invidious constructions, and malicious aggravations; these were what fired their passions to the utmost, and turned them into fury. Then they were prepared to go any lengths with their leader. Then they flew off in rage from that very King, whom, but a little while before, they beheld with the greatest respect and veneration.

And here I cannot but reflect a little upon the nature of *incendiaries*, the leaders and promoters of tumults and seditions; how mischievous a sort of men they are; how dangerous to any state or kingdom. Generally speaking, the bulk or body of any people are disposed to be peaceable and quiet. They love to mind their own proper business; and would of themselves be easy almost under any government. They would never think of rebelling, till loaded with oppressions; such, as it were better to die, than to bear any longer. Reason, or the love of peace, or the public good, or their own private interest, would incline them to lie still, and bind them down to submission and order. There is no pleasure or safety in seditions and riots, which should make men fond of being active in them. They are first drawn in by artificial insinuations and crafty pretences: such as they have neither skill, nor inclination, nor leisure to inquire into, but, as Scripture observes of some that followed Absalom, "they go in "their simplicity, and they know not any thing[p]." The consequence however is the same, when once their passions are wound

[o] Prov. xvii. 14. [p] 2 Sam. xv. 11.

up to a pitch, whatever were the motives, real or imaginary, which raised them. This their designing leaders know; and they understand too well what use to make of it. But,

3. We are next to take notice, what absurd and inconsistent things men are hurried into, by a predominant humour or passion; heightening and increasing those very evils, seeming or real, which they seek to redress.

The apprehension of being second only in the King's favour was what much afflicted the men of Israel. What course do they take to remedy this grievance? Not the true and only pious or prudent method, that of patience and meekness, of dutiful and loyal behaviour, of zeal for the King's service, and for the honour and interest of their country; which must have gained them the favour and affection of their sovereign, and the love and esteem of all wise and good men: but the direct contrary. They rebel against that sovereign whose favour they so much desired, and slight the happiness which they courted. And how were they now to better their circumstances, or to redress the grievance complained of? Could they hope for a milder, gentler, or better prince than King David? Or could any of them be secure that, under a new government, they might not as soon break out into factions and parties, and as soon supplant or ruin one another? Besides, how could they expect that God should give success to a design so ill formed, and laid in perfidiousness and treason? Or if he should, that the success itself might not prove a snare and a curse to them; as it is the usual method of Divine Providence to make the prosperity of wicked men, first or last, an inlet to their greater misery? We find this eminently verified in those very Israelites, within a reign or two after. They were displeased at some rough usage they had met with from their king Rehoboam; and they "rebelled against the house of David[q]" from that day. This God was pleased to permit, partly in consequence of what he had denounced against Solomon[r]; and partly by way of penalty to the Israelites themselves; who had been partakers in his sins. The issue of this was, that, as they revolted from their lawful sovereign, so they revolted from their religion too, and went out of rebellion into idolatry. When principles of morality once sit loose upon men, it is not to be

[q] 1 Kings xii. 19. [r] 1 Kings xi. 12, 33.

expected that principles of religion will stay long. But to proceed.

Another grievance which lay heavy upon the minds of the Israelites was the appearing slight and contempt thrown upon them by the men of Judah. But is sedition the way to take off contempt? Or is rebellion the ready road to honour? Would not a manly and generous behaviour, a steady loyalty to their lawful sovereign, a noble ardour for the true good of their country, not to be shaken by any private resentment or impotent passion; would not this have abundantly retrieved their honour, and have set them above contempt and obloquy? Would not this have been infinitely better than to betray a weak mind or a corrupt heart; the surest way to render any person contemptible, as the contrary is to create reverence and respect? Besides that if such designs fail of success, (as they commonly do,) the contempt is so far from being removed, that it returns upon them with double and triple weight. Thus it proved in the case before us. God was pleased to defeat their wicked purposes. Their leader suffered, and the rest were content to bear much greater ignominy than what they first complained of.

Another thing, which we may reasonably suppose afflicted the Israelites, was, that they knew not how otherwise to be revenged on the men of Judah. But it should have been considered, that all such desire of revenge is both foolish and hurtful: hurtful to the world, and most of all generally to the enraged persons themselves, both as to the inward torment it carries with it, and the ill effects and consequences of it. The mischief which they intended for others, (as is usual in such cases,) fell chiefly upon themselves. And the unhappy men found, to their sorrow, that it would have been infinitely better to have borne a slight grievance, than to have ventured upon unwarrantable methods of redressing it.

4. You may please to observe further, how strong and invincible the prevalence of some passions is for the time, maugre all the remonstrances of religion, or even common humanity. As to religion, could not the men of Israel have reflected what a great and crying sin they were running into? That they were to lift up their hands against the Lord's anointed; the man whom they knew to be chosen of God, "to feed his people Israel," and to be "a captain over Israel;" whom they had solemnly sworn to,

or "made a league with, in Hebron before the Lord," and "anointed king over Israel[s]." Notwithstanding all which, upon slight pretences, they rebel against him. So little does a sense of religion avail, when men are under the power of strong resentments, and so true is it, (however melancholy a truth it be,) that nature, corrupt nature, will, for the most part, prevail over duty and principle. And hence it is, that the strength of any government, generally, lies more in the *affections* than in the *consciences* of the people. This is the less to be wondered at, since even the common principles of humanity, strong as they are in most persons, yet bend and yield to unruly passions. Had the rebel Israelites had any pity or compassion left either for enemies or friends; any tenderness for their native country, which they were endeavouring to lay waste; any bowels for their brethren, whose blood they had a mind to spill; any consideration for the cries or tears, the frights or agonies, of such as they were blindly hasting on to ravage, plunder, murder, and destroy; they could never have entered, upon so slight motives, into so rash and desperate an undertaking. But I proceed,

5. To observe, what is of more comfortable consideration to us, that such violent and impetuous passions, as make men deaf to the remonstrances of religion and humanity, seldom last long.

No sooner was Sheba, the promoter of the mischief, removed, but the people whom he had seduced, cooled into duty and order, grew calm and easy. As it was a sudden passion which hurried them on, fed by mistakes and misconstructions; so it died upon the first check and disappointment. They returned to their allegiance, and the King lived peaceably ever after.

A state of anger and resentment, fierceness and bitterness, is not the natural state of man's mind. It requires some outward force and violence, as to raise it at first, so to keep it up afterwards. Afflictions will bow it down, or reflections calm it, or time will wear it out, if no new fuel be administered to revive it. Thus it happened in the instance which I have been considering: and thus, I hope, it hath happened also in the nearer instance which I am next to consider; and which gave occasion to this day's joyful thanksgiving.

But when I say *joyful*, mistake me not, as if I thought it all matter of joy and triumph, without a proper mixture of con-

[s] 2 Sam. v. 2, 3.

passion, shame, and sorrow. This is not like the triumph over a foreign enemy; nor does it become us to shew our rejoicings in the same manner, or with the same unbounded freedoms. For though the blessing of Heaven be as great, or greater, and the Divine goodness as remarkable, in putting an end to a rebellion, and preventing a civil war *at home*, as in repeated victories *abroad:* yet there is a tenderness due to the misfortunes of our fellow subjects; and not of those only who spent their loyal blood in the service of their king and country, but of them likewise who were unwarily drawn in and enticed the other way, and have either fallen in battle, or have died ingloriously by the hands of justice: or of such as still survive; but are too much filled with shame or grief, to rejoice with us; and such also as have their minds so unhappily divided, between private affections and the public good, that they are not yet able to have a full and perfect sense of the blessings of Heaven, or to relish the happiness of their country. These and the like considerations must cast a damp upon our joy, on this occasion; and render it something like to what a man feels within himself, when by the loss of his limbs he has had the good fortune to preserve his body. This shall make me the more tender of speaking to the case in hand; and it were well if we could draw a veil over what can hardly be remembered without a silent shame and sorrow for it. I shall however proceed to my second general head, namely,

II. To make some brief application of the foregoing reflections to the occasion of this day's solemnity.

I shall not minutely consider (nor indeed do I pretend to know) the birth and rise, or the particular springs and motives of the late rebellion.

1. Only I shall beg leave to observe in general, what is open and visible to all, that passion and resentment had the greatest hand in it; as it is the best excuse for it: I mean in those who were professed Protestants; and such of them especially, as had no scruple about the *settlement* in the late reign, nor in the beginning of this, nor since, if we may be allowed to think (as certainly we may) that a man is not influenced by any principles of conscience, who at the same time swears, and acts against it.

Title indeed was here pretended, as is usual in such cases. But whoever considers that the pretended title had been, in a manner, universally disowned and disclaimed in the two preced-

ing reigns, and frequently rejected by the whole legislature, and abjured by men almost of all ranks, orders, or denominations amongst us, both then and since, will easily allow that title was the pretence only, and disgusts and discontents the true motives. Which reminds me of an observation made by a great statesman and a polite writer of our own[t]; "that upon the disputes of "right and title to the crown, between the two roses, or races, "of York and Lancaster, the popular discontents at the present "reign made way for the succession of a new pretender, more "than any regards of right or justice in their title; which served "only to cover the bent and humour of the people to such a "change." Men may pretend conscience for their humours, their passions, their follies, their vices; and it is frequent enough so to do; and not easy to discover whether they are sincere or no, while they act consistently with themselves. But it must be a strange sort of conscience, that cannot be brought to comply with a government, and yet can be brought to swear to it: which is full of scruples about so uncertain a thing as the pretended title, and yet has no scruple about so plain and clear a thing as the obligation of an oath: which dares not give up some supposed right of another, on any consideration whatever, for fear of damnation; and yet is not afraid to give up the very bonds and links of human society, and the most sacred ties of all governments; in a word, to make God's name cheap, his authority contemptible, and his vengeance despicable in the eye of the world. But to proceed,

2. I crave leave to observe next, that it may reasonably be presumed, that matters had never proceeded so far as to an open rebellion, had they not been industriously and artfully managed by the Shebas of our land, the emissaries of the Church of Rome; I mean the professed Papists: men of the most inveterate hatred to our religion, laws, and establishment, and to whatever tends to the prosperity and honour of the English Church or the English nation; who have been contriving all imaginable ways to blast and ruin our happy Reformation from the first commencing of it; have been concerned almost in every commotion of State, and active in every rebellion; feeding upon our factions, and rejoicing daily in our unhappy divisions. These, as is well known, were the chief promoters of the late disturb-

[t] Temple, Miscell. part iii. p. 46.

ances; actuated with revenge against our king, our country, our laws, and constitution; and with a zeal for that Church, which scruples not to allow, and even to bless and sanctify, any fraud or deceit, any treachery or perfidiousness, any rage or violence, in order to extirpate what they call heresy, and to carry on the cause of their own superstition and idolatry. How would they rejoice and insult over us, to find us doing with our own hands what they have been labouring unsuccessfully for above a century and a half together! As to our heats and animosities amongst ourselves, they may subsidé and fall by degrees; and every thing may revert into right order, so long as we keep out the common enemy. But if once we open a door to Papal tyranny and usurpation, and submit ourselves to that yoke of bondage, all will be lost, and past recovery. It is worth remarking, that, amidst our many distractions and confusions, during the grand rebellion and usurpation, there was so much of the English spirit still left, that they preserved themselves against any attempt of foreign powers. The nation was still honoured and revered abroad, though dismally divided and distracted at home. In a while their heats abated, and they settled into order and regularity: still retaining their own sovereignty and independency, and their religious and civil rights whole and entire. These reflections have carried me a little out of method: but I return.

I should here go on to pursue the parallel between the case of the revolting Israelites and that of the persons concerned in the late rebellion, in many particulars; as the strange absurdity and inconsistency of the design, how improbable a method to redress any imaginary or real grievances, without involving the whole nation in infinitely more and greater; how repugnant to the principles of religion and to common humanity; how unlikely to prosper, and how destructive in its consequences if it had. The last I shall speak to presently; the rest I pass over: the thing speaks itself, or may be easily understood from what hath been observed above; and we may spare ourselves the trouble of an ungrateful remembrance. It is sufficient that the good hand of Providence has defeated and blasted the designs of our enemies; that our country is not made a scene of war, or a field of blood; that neighbours and brethren are not, at this present, destroying and murdering one another; that our goods and possessions are not violently torn from us, our houses rifled, our

temples defaced, villages burned up, or cities consumed, and turned into ruinous heaps; that "Judah and Israel may dwell "safely, every man under his vine and under his fig tree[n]:" in a word, that we have the comfort and happiness to meet together this day, to bless and praise Almighty God for the preservation of our King and our country, our religion, laws, and liberties, and all we hold dear, from impending ruin. What the consequences of a successful rebellion (after a severe struggle, and wading through a sea of blood) might have been, we do not certainly know; and it is happy for us that we do not. But in all human views, and according to the probable issues of things, (without a miracle to prevent them,) the least we could expect was, to have had the noblest and happiest island in the world ravaged and defaced by foreign invaders; the bravest people, who have been used to give the law or the balance to Europe, made the scorn and the derision of those that hate them; and, to finish our misery, the purest and best constituted Church in the Christian world, which was founded in the blood of martyrs, and has been preserved hitherto by marvellous providences, given up for a prey to seducers, and overrun with bigotry, superstition, and idolatry.

But some perhaps may think, might not God's good providence have prevented all this, even under a succession of Popish princes? Yes certainly, it might. For what might not an omnipotent God do for us, under the most deplorable and desperate circumstances? But who shall assure us that he will do it, if we suffer ourselves to fall into such circumstances by our own supineness, or, what is worse, perverseness? Let any man tell us why Providence has not prevented the like in other countries; or how it comes to pass that a succession of Popish princes hath ever proved fatal to the Protestant religion. The Roman Conclave understand this well enough, and have been labouring this point with indefatigable zeal and pains; never doubting, but that by the gaining of this only, they may soon have what they please.

It is frankly said by a late writer of the order of the Jesuits, speaking of the consequence of a Popish successor to these kingdoms, that "it must perpetuate it (the Romish religion) "upon the throne, and in time bring it to prevail among the

[n] 1 Kings iv. 25.

"people[x]." The remark is true and just, founded on history and observation, and the plain reason of things. We humbly trust that God's good providence will prevent this, and will support that blessed Reformation which his own right hand hath planted in these kingdoms: but not by miracles, nor out of the ordinary way, but by means proper to it; that is, by perpetuating to us a succession of Protestant princes; the way by which he has been pleased hitherto to support it, and to preserve it down to this day. And we have reason to think and hope that he will still so preserve and continue it, so long at least as till the sins of the nation are full grown, till we have filled up the "measure of our iniquities," and are become *ripe* for vengeance. God grant the ingratitude of many for mercies received, their unreasonable murmurs and complaints, their discontentedness with a well settled government, which they have frequently owned and solemnly sworn to, their heats and animosities, and party rage, may not hasten the approaches of the day of vengeance, and too soon eclipse the blessed light of the Reformation amongst us.

But these are too melancholy presages upon a day of thanksgiving, which lets us into a more comfortable scene, and gives us a pleasing prospect of better things. I shall pass on to the last part of my design;

III. To draw a few practical advices proper to the place and audience.

1. And the first is, to beware of the approaches of passion, and to guard against any temptation or provocation thereto. The studious life may be an advantage to us in this respect, by affording us a more thorough insight into the affections and workings of human nature; acquainting us with the distempers of the mind, and the causes of them, and the methods proper to heal them; teaching us to think and reflect, and to turn our eyes inward upon ourselves. This must render us less liable to be ensnared by passion, and better able to discern what use we are to make of any trials or provocations we may meet with from the world.

We have complained sometimes, and indeed with reason, of the general reflections thrown upon the Universities and Clergy: such treatment was as injurious as it was rude and uncivil. To

[x] F. I. D'Orleans Hist. Stuarts, p. 298.

throw scandal at large, and to condemn whole bodies for the faults of a few, is an uncharitable and unwarrantable procedure. And this might have been enough to exasperate some men. But such as consider that this was chiefly owing to the petulance of a few writers, and those the least considerable; and how unavoidable such things are, and how little they deserve the notice of understanding men, and how easily they are wiped off by a prudent and exemplary conduct: I say, such as consider thus, will think such censures proper only to provoke their pity, or to exercise their virtues, or to put them upon the practice of the Apostle's rule, "not rendering evil for evil, or railing for "railing: but contrariwise blessing; knowing that they are "thereunto called, that they should inherit a blessing[y]."

2. A second useful caution is, to be upon our guard against any popular pretences or vulgar delusions. It should seem the privilege and happiness of such as are trained up to think justly, and to reflect coolly, to be above any thing of that kind; to be able to distinguish between persons and principles, between men and things. It is natural for many to run in implicitly with whatever happens to be espoused by any particular set of men, with whom they have been engaged in some common interests. The reputation of constancy, the fear of disobliging, and the shame of deserting, are very powerful prejudices and strong temptations. But the best philosophy, as well as religion, teaches us to arm against this delusion; acquainting us, that it is the part of a wise and good man to be constant to none, further than they are constant to themselves, and to their duty; and that the truest constancy is, to sit loose to men, and to keep fixed to sound and good principles. Men are uncertain, fickle, various: principles are settled things, and change not. These are what will hold, and what we may safely trust to, while men's humours are afloat, and their passions toss them to and fro: and these are what, after they have been weary of a vain pursuit, they will at length return to, when they grow cool, and reflect.

When a nation is unhappily divided, and animosities run high, it is easy to imagine there may be danger of extremes either way. A good man has no security in such cases, nor any firm ground to rest himself upon, but by examining carefully what is true, right, and just in itself, separate from common vogue or popular opinion. And this is so necessary a part of Christian

[y] 1 Pet. iii. 9.

conduct, that, amidst the variety of cases and incidents which may happen, there is no other way of preserving a good conscience, and keeping up to one certain rule and tenor of life and conversation. And he that wants either the courage or the will to do this, knows not yet what it is to be a good Christian, or a good man. But,

3rdly and lastly, It should be our especial care not only to forbear any thing tending to promote divisions, but to use our best endeavours to heal and reconcile them.

As there are none more sensible of these things than ourselves, or more likely to suffer by them; so I beg leave to intimate how becoming and proper a part of our profession and business it is, to do what in us lies to prevent the growth and increase of them. While animosities prevail, arts and sciences will gradually decay and lose ground; not only as wanting suitable encouragement, but also as being deprived of that freedom, quiet, and repose, which are necessary to raise and cherish them. As divisions increase, Christian charity will decline daily, till it becomes an empty name, or an *idea* only. Discipline will of course slacken and hang loose; and the consequence of that must be a general dissoluteness and corruption of manners. Nor will the enemy be wanting to sow tares to corrupt our faith, as well as practice; and to introduce a general latitude of opinions. *Arianism, Deism, Atheism*, will insensibly steal upon us, while our heads and hearts run after politics and parties.

It were a happy thing, if any remedy could be found out for these *grievances;* if all odious names of distinction could be forgotten and laid aside, and moderate counsels might take place; if men would learn humility and contentedness, meekness and charity; and consider that the "wrath of man worketh not "the righteousness of God;" and that all envy and malice and party rage are directly opposite to the mild and gentle spirit of the Gospel.

Permit me to observe, that the great warmth and eagerness, which is shewn by many, is not about heaven and happiness, and the blessedness of the life to come. It is not so much as pretended that the glory of God, or the salvation of men, is what engages their thoughts and concern, or what they so eagerly contend for. It is all for the fading and perishing things of this life; power, honour, and riches. These are the things which divide and distract us. Were it possible to restore a true spirit

of heavenly-mindedness, these eager contests would soon fall of themselves, as having no longer any sufficient foundation.

We profess to believe a God, and a future judgment; a state of eternal happiness, and a state of eternal misery. We have been taught that we are as[z] *strangers* and *pilgrims* here on earth; that we are to seek for a *better country*, and are to look upon ourselves as citizens of heaven; of that blessed place, from whence all envy and ill-will, all wrath and bitterness, all rancour and malice, all fury and violence, must be for ever shut out; and nothing but love, peace, gentleness, harmony, and goodness, abound for evermore. These things, I presume, are not told us, in Scripture, as matters of theory and speculation only, or as subjects to talk on; but are designed to influence our practice, and to make us good men.

It is a moving and a solemn reflection, made by[a] a great Prelate of our Church on another occasion,

"That a good man would be loath to be taken out of the "world reeking hot from a sharp contention with a perverse "adversary, and not a little out of countenance to find himself "in this temper translated into the calm and peaceful *regions* of "the *blessed*, where nothing but perfect *charity* and *good-will* "reign for ever." This was meant of controversial disputes; but may be applied with equal or greater force to our party contests, which are neither so innocent nor so useful, nor carried on so coolly as the other.

But this I leave to your serious and pious meditation. And shall conclude with a word or two of advice to the youth of the University, whose want of years and sedateness may render them most liable to intemperate sallies.

As the privilege of their education raises them above the *vulgar crowd*, and is apt to inspire larger thoughts and views in *them*, as well as to create expectation in *others*; so it concerns them highly, to demean themselves suitably thereto, and to act up to their *character*.

To behave themselves soberly, peaceably, and discreetly; to let party disputes alone, which can hardly be managed with temper even by men of years and gravity.

Not to provoke or to exasperate one another by any opprobrious words or invidious names, invented only to sow discord and to propagate mischief in the world. In fine, to use no insulting,

[z] Hebr. xi. 13. 1 Pet. ii. 11. [a] Tillotson, vol. i. p. 583.

no rudeness, no misbecoming behaviour, on this day of thanksgiving, or on any day after: but to curb their passions, to observe rules and orders, to submit to their proper governors, and to pursue their respective studies; such as may hereafter render them the supports and ornaments of our most holy Church, and so many blessings and comforts of the age and place they shall live in.

In the mean while, to set a shining example of sobriety, modesty, regularity, and all other graces and virtues that may tend to promote the glory of Almighty God, the security and satisfaction of our most gracious, and, to us particularly, most indulgent Sovereign, and the peace of his kingdoms; together with the honour and prosperity of the *University* whereunto they belong; and their own comfort, welfare, and happiness, both now and for ever.

A SERMON

PREACHED BEFORE

THE SONS OF THE CLERGY,

AT THEIR

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

IN THE

CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF ST. PAUL,

December 14, 1721.

MATTHEW v. 16.

Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.

THESE words of our blessed Lord have relation to what went before; being a continuation of the same thought, and a kind of practical conclusion drawn from it. In the thirteenth verse of this chapter, he tells his disciples that they "are the salt of the earth;" thereby intimating their character and office, to *season* the world with their instruction, to *purify* it by their example, and by both to spread such a *sweet savour of life* to all around them, as should preserve them from corruption, and render their persons acceptable unto God. To enforce this further, and to imprint it deeper, he carries on the same thought in the verses following, but under another metaphor, lively and elegant as the former; "Ye are the light of the "world," says he, verse 14, to the same disciples; signifying thereby their qualifications and endowments, together with the duties arising from them: they were to hold out the *light* of their

instruction, persuasion, and example, to an ignorant and immoral world; that is, in the words of the text, "to let *their* light "shine before men, that they *might* see *their* good works, and "glorify *their* Father which is in heaven."

Which is as much as to say, "Be ye *shining* professors, and "*bright* examples of religion and virtue in a dark, misguided "age; but not so much for your own honour or reputation, as "for the glory of God: let strangers see and admire your *work* "*of faith, and labour of love, and patience of hope,* that they may "be converted and edified thereby: but let the praise and glory "of all be returned up to the author and fountain of all, to *your* "*Father which is in heaven.*"

Having shewn the connection of the words with the words preceding, and briefly intimated the general meaning and design of them, I may now proceed to consider them more distinctly and largely, in the method here following:

I. To shew what is implied in the duty of "letting our light "shine before men."

II. To lay down some considerations, proper to enforce the practice of it.

III. To observe how far those considerations may affect Christians in *general*, or some in *particular:* concluding with a suitable *application* of the whole to the present occasion.

I. I shall endeavour to shew what is implied in the duty of "letting our light shine before men."

The duty taken in its full latitude, with all it contains and comprehends, is not so properly a distinct duty in itself, as the sum total, or completion of all. It is not only to be religious, but to be eminently so; not only to be good and virtuous, but to be exact and exemplary in it; not only to be truly pious, but to be remarkable and conspicuous in the face of the world for it. We may however distinguish between the foundation and the superstructure, between goodness in the general and a supereminent degree of it; and so the text may be considered as containing a duty distinct by itself, namely, the duty of being open and exemplary in our virtues; not concealing or smothering our good principles or practices, but producing them and drawing them forth in the face of the world. But I shall not affect to be very nice and critical, in distinguishing the foundation from the superstructure, choosing rather to take both in; only insisting more particularly on the latter, as most agreeable

to the design of the text. A point of this nature, if treated of in any measure suitable to its dignity and importance, may, I presume, deserve the attention of any Christian auditory, and of this especially; where are many present whose education and circumstances give them a more peculiar concern in it, and are such as will bear in the application. Now, to come to the business in hand; the advice of the text, to "let our light shine "before men," may be conceived to imply two things:

1. That we give sufficient outward proofs of being ourselves moved and actuated by a true spirit of godliness.

2. That we make it our endeavour, by all practicable and prudent methods, to implant and propagate the same in others.

1. As to the first part, our giving sufficient outward proofs of our being actuated by a true spirit of religion, or godliness; this is to be done partly by the *constant tenor* of our lives and conversations, and partly by our *occasional* joining in any public services tending to the honour of God and the happiness of mankind.

Pious and good men may give sufficient proof of what they are, by the *constant tenor* of their lives and conversations. Indeed, a man cannot be throughly religious, but the world must see a great deal of it; and every fair and impartial judge will readily understand it. Humility, temperance, modesty, friendliness, affability, and other the like social virtues, will of course appear; and it will not be difficult for bystanders, of any reasonable discernment, to distinguish between real unaffected goodness and any false appearances of it, especially if it be accompanied with a religious observance of such *public* duties as cannot be hid from the world. Of this kind are these; a careful attendance upon the solemn and public worship, a reverent regard to God's holy word and sacraments, a conscientious performance of charitable exercises, such as visiting the sick, feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and relieving the oppressed: to all which may be added, any *occasional* promoting and encouraging *public* designs set on foot for the glory of God and the benefit of men. Such instances of duty, if done at all, must be done in public, and cannot be concealed. The world is the proper stage for them: it is scarce possible for a man to be, as it were, a common friend or benefactor, but men must see it and take notice of it. And it is very agreeable to the precept of the text, for a man to desire even to be *seen of men*, while he sets them such good

example: provided only that he disclaim the *glory* of it, rendering it up entire to Almighty God, to whom alone all *glory* does of right belong.

It may perhaps be objected to what hath been said, that our blessed Saviour, in the next chapter, cautions us very strictly against *fasting*, *praying*, or giving *alms*, with any design to be *seen of men*. And that he means a great deal more than the forbidding us to make that the *only motive* for what we do, is very plain from the strict *secrecy* which he enjoins in the performance of those duties: we must industriously hide and conceal them from the view of the world, to prevent the very suspicion of our being so employed. How is this reconcilable with the advice of the text, to "let our light shine before men;" and for this very end and purpose, "that they may see it?"

This seeming difficulty will admit of a very plain and obvious answer, if we distinguish between *private* and *public* duties; which have their several ends and uses, and are therefore to be conducted by different rules and measures. To clear this point, let us take into consideration the three duties before specified, *prayer*, *fasting*, and *almsgiving*. There is a *private* kind of *prayer*, proper for the closet; a secret intercourse to be religiously kept up between God and our own souls. For this kind of prayer, *enter* your *closet*, and *shut the door*, and pray only in *secret*.

But then there is also a *public* kind of prayer, in the *family*, or in the *Christian assemblies*; the very end and design of which is to implore *public* blessings, and to keep up an open show, an outward face of religion in the world: here "let your light "shine before men," by your constant attendance thereunto, and by all the outward becoming tokens of a serious and fervent devotion.

The like may be said for *fasting*. Good men will, for many private reasons proper to themselves, undertake sometimes voluntary *fasts*, such as the world need not, ought not to be acquainted with. Here let the rule be, to "anoint the head, "and wash the face, that you appear not unto men to fast." But besides these private *fasts*, there are also public *standing* fasts of the Church, and *occasional* ones of the State: here "let "your light shine before men:" fast as you are commanded to do, and let others know that you do so, for the sake of the benefit they may receive from your good example.

The third instance is *almsgiving*. A pious and good man will often do alms in *secret*, for reasons proper and private to himself. In such cases as these, "let not your left hand know "what your right hand doeth:" be as secret and reserved as possible. But there are also many *public* occasions for the exercise of the duty of *almsgiving:* here "let your light shine "before men, that they may see it:" be charitable and generous in the face of the world, that men may observe it, bless God for it, and take example by it.

Thus are the *private* and *public* duties admirably contrived and tempered together, so as mutually to support and strengthen each other. Were they all of a *public* kind, religion might become matter of form, and degenerate into hypocrisy and vain-glory: or were they all to be done in *secret*, the benefit of example would he lost, and religion would of course decline daily, for want of public countenance and encouragement. *Private* duties are, as it were, the life and spirit of religion; without which it would be a kind of dead ceremony and lifeless form: while the *public* serve to give the greater gloss, grace, and strength to the other; and most of all contribute to the continuance and propagation of religion in the world.

Having shewn how we are to "let our light shine" by the proofs we give of our own righteousness, I come now,

2. To consider the other way of "letting our light shine," by our endeavours to implant and propagate the same spirit in others. *Example* is of greatest force in this matter: and so far this article will coincide with the former. Only, there I considered it as a proof of what the man is in himself; here I am to consider it under another view, in respect of its happy influence upon other persons. Any duty or virtue may be sooner learnt by *example* than by *rule*. This shews at once what many words would but imperfectly describe. It is a lesson suited to all capacities; such as a child may apprehend, and yet the oldest and wisest may improve by. It is learnt without trouble, and steals upon us almost without thought. It comes in by the eyes and ears, and slips insensibly into the heart, and so into the outward practice; by a kind of secret charm transforming men's minds and manners into its own likeness. When I speak of *example*, I suppose it to consist in *words* as well as in *actions*. A good man's *discourse*, in the way of pattern and example, may be as edifying as his life. His ordinary conversation, tempered

with prudence, sweetness, and modesty, may be very instructive in the main; and, even without the formality of grave admonitions, may be a kind of lecture of morality to all around him. There will be something peculiar and distinguishing in his manner, something savouring of the pious frame and disposition of his heart. His candour in judging, his modesty in censuring, his caution and reserve in believing or reporting ill of any man, his charity in excusing, or giving every thing the kindest turn that it can bear; these and many other graces may appear, even when he seems least to design it; and may be highly useful and edifying to as many as observe it. The due *government* of the *tongue*, which is the glory of a man, as well as the perfection of a Christian, can be no other way so easily and so handsomely taught as in the way of example.

But though *example* be the standing and the most effectual method of diffusing our *light*, yet there are many other occasional means, proper at some seasons, to enforce and strengthen it. Among which, in the first place, may be mentioned *exhortation*; which, as it is more direct and plain, so it may sometimes awaken and rouse those whom no example could move. The office of *exhorting* more especially becomes persons of superiority and eminence, in profession, age, dignity, or abilities; as magistrates, ministers, parents, masters, &c. It may indeed be exercised toward *equals* or *superiors*: only then it requires a different manner, a more cautious treatment, and a more ceremonious address. "To exhort one another daily" seems to be the duty of Christians at large, the duty of all towards all; provided only it be done pertinently, discreetly, and seasonably; with due regard to time, place, person, and other circumstances. It is however a duty very much grown into disuse, since we have fallen from the primitive simplicity: nor is it easy to revive it in these times; there being few fit to discharge it as they ought, and fewer that would bear it. Yet those who are really good men themselves, and endowed with the gift of prudence, may often engage in it with success, and thereby diffuse their *light* further than they can by *example* alone.

Another method, near akin to the former, is that of *reproof*. It is the duty of persons in authority to rebuke and reprove offenders, in such a way and at such seasons as are the fittest and most proper for answering the ends of it; viz. the reclaim-

ing of the sinners themselves, and putting a stop to the contagion of their example. Great tenderness and caution are required in a point of this extreme nicety; though the same general rules may, for the most part, serve either for *exhortation* or *reproof*, and I need not repeat them.

To conclude this head, whatever endowments, stations, or abilities a man is possessed of, affording him means for the promoting of piety or the suppression of vice; these are all so many ways pointed out for diffusing his *light* abroad, and making it *shine* out with lustre, and to advantage. The world has been much obliged to the several *religious societies*, happily set on foot in this kingdom, for the many and various means they have devised of spreading a sense of religion and piety far and near; by forming of *schools* of *charity*, by taking care of the *execution* of good *laws* against *profaneness* and *immorality*, by dispersing *religious books*, by improving and augmenting *parochial libraries*, by sending out *missionaries* into foreign parts to *propagate* the *Gospel*, and by sundry other commendable services too long to be mentioned. In a word, whatever ways and means can be thought on for instructing, converting, or improving present or future generations; all are referred to this head, and fall under the precept of the text, to "let our light shine before men." Having thus stated and cleared the duty, I now proceed to my second general head,

II. To lay down some considerations proper to enforce the practice of it.

And these are three: the glory of God, the public good, and our own particular interest in a life to come.

1. Let the first consideration be the *glory of God*, which is the motive hinted in the text; "that they may see your good works, "and glorify your Father which is in heaven." It must be a public and exemplary profession or practice, that must bring the greatest honour to Almighty God, and make his name famous to all the ends of the earth. A private, retired virtue, however safe and easy to a man's self, does but little, in comparison, to promote God's honour in the world. It is well known how very shy and reserved many otherwise pious and good men are with respect to any outward show or appearance of religion. They are apt to seek corners and privacies on purpose to conceal it; as if they had a mind to go to heaven in disguise, and to steal through the crowd into a better world. And though the saving

of our souls be the great business of life, and what, it is to be hoped, we have most of us a real and hearty concern for in our secret retirements; yet it must, I am afraid, be owned, that there is too little mention made of it, even when it might be proper, and too general a silence and reserve about it. This so close and wary carriage in our religious concernments is more than need be or should be; and is attended with some ill effects. For while bad example is open and daring, and solicitations to vice public and common; if there be not some exemplary instances of true piety and godliness to confront them, God's honour must of course suffer, and the cause of religion decline daily. If impious wretches form their clubs and cabals, (and such we have been lately told of as cannot be mentioned without horror, nor paralleled in any history;) I say, if they gather together to carry on the interests of the kingdom of darkness, to keep lewdness in countenance, and to stamp some credit even upon the most execrable blasphemies; it concerns every good man, on the other hand, to be zealous for God's honour in the face of the world, in order to give the greater life and vigour to religion, and to make the adversary, at length, sink down in utter shame and confusion. There is ordinarily that force in truth, and in a just and righteous cause, that while men stand up for it with resolution and constancy, they are in a manner secure of triumphing over all its opposers. But,

2. As the *glory of God* requires this exemplary conduct, so also does the good of man. This is not so properly a different topic from the former, as the same under a different view. For whatever tends to make men wiser and better, does in the same degree tend to the furtherance of God's glory; which is then at the highest when the greatest numbers join in celebrating his name. Now that the exemplary lives and services of good men are of great force and efficacy to convince and convert others, is too plain a thing to need many words; and it has been already hinted. Let those therefore who have learnt the true art of living, come abroad, and practise in the view of the world. However highly some may speak of the *contemplative* and *devotional* life, it seems to be the perfection of those only who either have no call to, or are too weak and unfurnished for, the *active*. Such as live like anchorets in a cell or a cloister, may do well in some particular circumstances, when their service is not wanted, or would be fruitless: but these are not the men to whom the

world must be indebted for the example of holy living. They are too private to be seen, and too singular in their way for the generality of men to take their rules and measures from. Men must be taught to be religious and virtuous after another method, or not at all; there being few, in comparison, whose circumstances will admit of such abstraction and retirement. They must be taught how to be much in company, and to be religious all the while; how to converse daily with the world, without being corrupted thereby; how to despatch business, and manage the affairs of life, still preserving their integrity, and keeping up a real and hearty sense of true godliness and piety. Examples of this kind are highly necessary, and of all the most useful. From such the foolish may learn wisdom, and the wicked be wrought over to virtuous and godly living; from them the intemperate may learn sobriety; the unclean, chastity; the proud, and high-minded, modesty and humility; the dissolute and profane, recollection and gravity. These things must be learnt, not from *recluses*, but from men of *public* life and character, that mingle with the crowd, and act their parts upon the stage of the world. Thus lived Christ and his Apostles; thus also John the Baptist, for the latter part of his life, to shew that his former had not been spent in vain. For though it be necessary to retire sometimes, for the sake of improvement; yet the design of such improvement is, in a great measure, lost, if it does not prepare and qualify us for a more public life, or public services, whenever we shall be called to them; that so the world may have the benefit of our improvements, and take their pattern and direction from us.

3. To this I must add, thirdly, a further consideration, drawn from our own particular interest in a life to come. Such as "turn many to righteousness," saith the Prophet, "shall shine "as the stars for ever and ever[a]." And our blessed Lord hath said; "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I also "confess before my Father which is in heaven[b]." And in another place, "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall "the Son of man also confess before the angels of God[c]." There is some uncommon happiness in reserve, some *exceeding*, as well as *eternal*, weight *of glory* laid up for those who make it their more especial care to stand up against a deluge of iniquity, heresy, or profaneness; and, by their exemplary labours and

[a] Dan. xii. 3. [b] Matth. x. 32. [c] Luke xii. 8.

endeavours, do their best to confront and shame a wicked world. Troubles and difficulties there are, great and many, in doing it, (as in all glorious enterprises,) and they enhance its value, and heighten the reward. And let this suffice by way of motive to the duty laid down in the text. I proceed,

III. Thirdly, to observe how far these considerations may affect Christians in *general*, or some in *particular*; where I shall conclude with a suitable application of the whole to the present occasion.

The duty here recommended, more or less, concerns all Christians. For there is no one so mean or low but may set a good example, and in some measure promote the interests of religion, suitably to the station, whatever it be, wherein God has placed him. But more particularly does the precept of the text concern those who are *set upon a hill;* persons of quality and high station, who move in a larger sphere, and are able to do much by their countenance, interest, and authority. Nothing can sooner or more effectually recommend virtue and piety than illustrious and great examples. This is the way to bring religion into vogue, and to render it genteel and fashionable; which is a considerable advantage to it. Vice, in itself vile and odious, will by this means become more and more despicable. Many will grow perfectly ashamed of it, while they see none but the inferior rank giving in to it. They will put on the outward garb of sanctity (at least) as a part of good breeding, and a gentlemanly accomplishment. And though it should sometimes rise no higher than a refined *hypocrisy*, yet even that may have its use, and be of much better consequence, in respect of example, than *open profaneness*. But we may reasonably hope that good and great examples would strike much deeper into the hearts of many; and by degrees spread a real and hearty sense of religion and piety through the kingdom.

After persons of high station and authority, in Church or State, the *Clergy* in general may be mentioned, as men particularly concerned in the advice of the text. They are in a special manner set up for "lights of the world," for ensamples and patterns to others. It is their profession and business to promote virtue, and rebuke vice; to maintain God's honour, and to keep up a sense and face of religion in the world. It cannot be thought pretending in them, however it might in others, to stand up for God and religion. A more than ordinary zeal for God's

glory, a devout earnestness in prayer, a religious gravity, and even great appearances of sanctity, at proper seasons, such as might look like ostentation in others, may be becoming and graceful in them, when joined with a good life. Indeed, it is no more than what their high office and sacred character demand of them, suitable to that peculiar relation they bear to God, and to the work which they are sent to do, that of reforming the world.

From the *Clergy* I descend, with pleasure, to the *Clergy's Sons*, here met together; and making a becoming and venerable appearance upon this our solemn festival. Surely they also are raised up for "lights of the world." God hath this day called us to his holy sanctuary, singled us out from city and country, from remote and distant retirements, to appear in one collective body, and in the view of the world. Now is the time to "let our "light shine before men," while their eyes are upon us, and they are expecting to "see our good works," that they may "glorify "*our* Father which is in heaven." You are an *holy seed*, sanctified from your *birth*, and eminently consecrated to the service and glory of God. Your *education* is a further privilege; you have been bred up within the verge of the tabernacle, amidst holy offices, under the nurture and admonition, the example and the benediction of the sacred calling. Let it be seen by our lives and conversations, under whose roofs we have some time dwelt, by whose instructions we have profited, and by whose examples we have been formed. Let our *manners* declare our extraction, and every *line* of our behaviour shew the work of some *masterly* hand. I cannot here run through the whole circle of divine graces and virtues, wherein we ought to be exemplary, after the pattern set us by our pious progenitors. Your own better thoughts will suggest to you more than I can find words to express. *Three* things only I will take leave to mention, whereby we may make our "light shine" to very excellent purposes.

1. By a becoming zeal for the *primitive faith* and *doctrine*.

2. By our promoting *works* of *charity*.

3. For the sake of both the other, by our expressing, on all proper occasions, a religious concern for the *Establishment* in Church and State.

1. Let us, in the first place, manifest a becoming zeal for the *primitive faith* and *doctrine:* that faith which was taught us by our fathers, and which they received and professed as handed

down to them, by a long series and succession of bishops and martyrs, from Christ and his Apostles. We are now called to a more than common zeal for the *faith*, while *Atheism* and *Deism* make daily advances; and *Arianism*, paving the way to both, appears open and barefaced. It has been the glory of our Clergy, our immediate and our remote progenitors, that they ever held in veneration the mysterious doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity. When *Socinianism*, some years ago, made large steps and loud triumphs, very little impression could be made upon the *Clergy*; who, conformable to their *subscriptions*, still adhered to the true faith, almost without exception. They knew how ancient that faith was, and what value had been set upon it by all the primitive churches. Let it then be one principal part of our care and concern, to copy after those bright examples, by our constant and unshaken zeal for the *ancient faith*: so may we approve ourselves as true sons of this Church, by inheriting those principles which our fathers preserved as a sacred *depositum*, to be handed down to their children, and to children's children, and to all succeeding generations. To desert this faith, or even to be cold and indifferent towards it, is to sully our extraction, cancel our sonship, and to strike ourselves at once out of privilege and character.

2. A second method of making our light shine is by promoting *works* of *charity*. This subject hath been often and excellently handled in this place, and upon the same occasion. The usefulness and necessity of public charities in general, and of this in particular, have been set forth in the strongest colours; and are, no doubt, so deeply imprinted in the hearts and minds of the audience, that they can never be erased or blotted out. Your light has shone abroad from hence to distant quarters, even to the darkest corners of the land: and both *widows* and *orphans*, with as many as wish well to them, have often "seen your good "works, and glorified your Father which is in heaven," for them.

Widows and *orphans* have been ever looked upon as very proper objects of compassion and charity. Their helpless condition and afflicted circumstances plead strongly in their behalf: and lest they should ever want a friend to *prefer* their *petitions*, God himself has condescended to recommend their case, and in moving terms to intercede, and almost entreat for them. Now, if *widows* and *orphans*, in general, have so just a claim to our

charity, much more those of our own household and family; whose husbands, whose fathers have served at the altar; and some of them by their integrity, or generous disdain of mean compliances, others by their suffering for conscience sake, many for want of provision suitable to their merit, have entailed poverty and distress upon their unhappy families. But these and the like considerations are so well known, and have been so often repeated, that I forbear. It may be a comfortable thought to us, that, amidst our sorrowings for the ravages made by *avarice* at home, and our consternation at the advances of a *pestilence* abroad, there are yet many great and excellent designs on foot, many commendable *charities* going on, promoted and encouraged by some of all ranks and orders of men, through the whole nation. These, we hope, may in some measure atone for a deluge of iniquity, and be sufficient to draw down still more and more blessings and mercies upon this Church and kingdom. Happy they that join hands and hearts in these good works; they shall not be afraid in the *evil day*, but *shall stand in the gap*, before the Lord, for *this land*, that it may not be destroyed when God comes to visit us.

Thirdly and lastly, to our zeal for the *true faith* and for *works* of *charity*, let us add, for the sake of both the other, a religious concern for the *Establishment* in Church and State. This will be securing the *outworks*, and preserving the necessary *fences:* which if we neglect to do, our *faith* will be broke in upon and trampled down; and all our promising foundations for *public charities* will be razed and tore up. I need not remind you how much these depend upon the *Protestant settlement* in the State. This in particular, which we are now met to solemnize, is perfectly wrapped up in it; and must either stand or fall with it. An anniversary festival of the *Sons of the Clergy*, what is it but a triumph over *Popery*, an insult upon their doctrine of the Clergy's *celibacy*, and an affront to their policy and practice? Who sees not that our ground is entirely *Protestant*, that our *charter* subsists by the present *settlement*, and must dissolve with it?

As our zeal for the *settlement* in *State* is thus highly becoming our place and character, so likewise is our hearty concern for the *Establishment* of the *Church*. This is the band of union which keeps us in, and shuts heresy, Popery, enthusiasm, and every wild disorder, out. Take away this, and what are we but a broken, disconcerted multitude, without order or discipline,

exposed to every rude assault, and unable to make head against foreign or domestic enemies! If therefore we value our religion, we must look well to the *Establishment* of the Church, the only outward *human* means of preserving our faith and doctrine, and handing them down safe to our posterity.

Let us therefore, my brethren, be hearty and constant friends to our present Establishment in Church and State. I put both together; neither can they subsist asunder: none can be really friends or enemies to *either*, without being such to *both*. They that strike immediately at the *Church*, pave the way, at a distance, to the ruin of the *State*: as, on the other hand, they that aim directly at the overthrow of the *settlement*, indirectly and remotely lay a train for the destruction of the *Church* also. *Church* and *State* are vitally linked together, united in their interests, and inseparable from each other. This was well understood by our pious and wise forefathers; who, as they have, many ways, preserved the *Church*, by their close attachment to the *constitution* in State; so have they as effectually secured the *State*, by their resolute adherence to, and unanswerable defences of, the doctrines of the *Church*. Let us, their progeny, take pattern from their examples; discountenancing, on the one hand, every wild conceit of a *State's* subsisting without an *Established* Church; and on the other, all vain and delusive hopes of a *Reformed* Church's subsisting under a *Popish* settlement.

To conclude; may every one of us here descended of the *sacred line* take the instructions of Solomon for the advice of a father; "My son, fear thou the Lord and the King: and "meddle not with them that are given to change[d]."

[d] Prov. xxiv. 21.

A FAMILIAR DISCOURSE

UPON THE

DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY,

AND THE

USE AND IMPORTANCE OF IT:

IN

A SERMON

PREACHED UPON

TRINITY SUNDAY,

AT THE

PARISH CHURCH OF ST. AUSTIN.

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2 CORINTHIANS xiii. 14.

The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all. Amen.

THIS solemn form of blessing, or benediction, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, laid down by St. Paul, and from him derived into the common liturgies, may be a proper subject for our meditation upon the festival of the Holy Trinity, which we this day celebrate. It is a festival of long standing in the Church; though not so ancient as those of Christmas, Easter, Ascension-Day, or Whitsuntide.

Every Lord's day, formerly, was looked upon as the feast of the Holy Trinity, being in memory of the *creation*, and of Christ's *resurrection;* in both which the three Divine Persons, Father,

Son, and Holy Ghost, were all jointly concerned. Besides that in every festival, of old time, it had been customary to celebrate the praises of the Holy Trinity, in the common doxology, ("Glory "be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost,") and in other the like forms, in the daily offices of the Church; so that it appeared the less necessary to set apart any particular day in the year for the commemoration of the Holy Trinity, when the memory thereof was otherwise kept up in the ordinary and standing liturgies all the year round.

However, since the doctrine of the blessed Trinity is in itself of the highest concernment to all Christians, and had met with many opposers, even among Christians themselves, (by reason of its sublimity far surpassing human understanding,) the piety of our ancestors took care to have this momentous article more particularly inculcated; and, for that very purpose, set apart one more especial Sunday in the year, to be called Trinity Sunday, as a standing memorial of it. Which seems to have been first done about nine hundred years ago, or at the least six, in some churches or monasteries; and in process of time became the usual and customary way in all churches throughout the world. The day chosen for it is the Sunday after Whitsunday, the most proper of any. For as the festival of Whitsunday is in memory of the great things done for us by *God the Holy Ghost*, Christmas and Easter, of what hath been done by *God the Son*, and all of them set forth the inestimable love of *God the Father*, by whom the Son was sent, and the Holy Spirit shed abroad; after such particular notice taken of the Divine Persons singly and separately, nothing could be more suitable than to have this festival immediately follow, wherein to celebrate the praises of all *three* together: so that the preceding festivals naturally conclude in this of the present day.

And that I may do some justice to this day's solemnity, I have made choice of a text, which is in effect a prayer put up to the three Divine Persons, imploring their aid, grace, and assistance. It is St. Paul's *prayer*, while we consider him as looking up to the three Divine Persons, imploring a blessing from them; and it is his *benediction*, if you consider him as imploring the same for and upon the Corinthians, to whom he is writing: so that the words have a double aspect; are *petitionary*, with respect to the *Divine Persons*, asking a blessing of them; and *authoritative*, with respect to the Corinthians, upon whom, as

God's minister, by apostolical authority, he conveys the blessing derived from above. "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and "the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be "with you all. Amen."

I must make a few remarks upon the several parts of the text, for the better understanding of it: which when I have done, I shall proceed to the consideration of the matter contained in it.

"The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ." Our common way of expressing it in the liturgy is, "The grace of our Lord Jesus "Christ." And so many of the old Greek copies and versions, and ancient Fathers, read this text of St. Paul: instead of *the* Lord Jesus, *our* Lord Jesus; though the difference is not very material. The next words are, "and the love of God;" that is, of *God the Father*. And so also some Greek copies, one version, and a Greek Father read the place. But the other reading is best warranted, and therefore rightly preserved in our translation. God the Father has particularly and eminently the name of *God* given him, in the Scripture style, because he was first made known to the world, and because God the Son and God the Holy Ghost (though one God with the Father) are yet represented as submitting to *inferior offices*, and to be *sent* by the Father: and one of them is *his Son*, and the other *his Spirit*, referred to him, as being the *first* in the Godhead, and *fountain* of both the other.

The following words, "the communion of the Holy Ghost," in the usual form, is *the fellowship of the Holy Ghost:* in which there is no more difference, than the putting one English word for another. *Fellowship* is the old word, and more properly English, the word *communion* being borrowed from the Latin. Our liturgy being older than the present English translation of the New Testament, keeps the old word *fellowship*, which the people had been used to in the daily service. But *communion* being thought the handsomer expression of the two, after *fellowship* became vulgar, it was chosen rather than the other.

The *Amen* at the end of this text has been thought not to be St. Paul's, but to have been added by the Church of Corinth; it having been customary for them to say *Amen* after the reading of this epistle to them. This conjecture is founded upon the *Amen's* being wanting in some ancient copies: but since a much greater number of copies have it, the conjecture goes upon very

slight grounds. And this is all I thought necessary to be said, in relation to the *words* of the text. I now proceed to the matter. My design is to treat of the *nature*, *distinction*, *union*, and *offices* of the three Divine Persons herein mentioned: not in the dry controversial way, which I think not proper for popular discourses, but in such a way as may be sufficient to give every common hearer a good notion of what I am talking about, and may be useful to him, in respect both of his *faith* and *practice*.

In the text, we find first *grace*, as coming from God the Son; then *love*, as from God the Father; and lastly, *communion*, as being of the *Holy Ghost*.

What these three things mean, I shall shew, when I come to speak of their distinct offices.

The method I intend is this:

I. To treat of the nature, distinction, union, and offices of the three Divine Persons. And,

II. To intimate the use and importance of these great articles of our Christian faith.

I. I am first to treat of the nature, distinction, union, and offices of the three Divine Persons.

1. In the first place, it is proper to say something of the *nature* of each Person, that you may the better conceive what kind of Persons they are.

The first and most general distinction of all things that are, is into two kinds, *created* and *uncreated*. The nature of a *creature* is this, that it comes into being by the order, will, and pleasure of another, and may cease to be whenever the Creator pleases. Of this kind are the sun, moon, stars, men, angels, and archangels: they are all of a frail, changeable nature; they might cease to be, and sink into nothing, as from nothing they came, were they not supported by a superior hand. Only the three *Divine* Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, they can never fail or cease: they always were, and always will be; their property is always to exist from everlasting to everlasting, without the help or support of any thing else whatever, being indeed the stay and support of the whole creation, of the whole bulk and mass of beings. Our thoughts are quite lost, as often as we think of any person's existing before all beginning: yet we are very certain that so it must be, or else nothing could ever begin to be at all. Whether one only, or more Persons might or do exist in this most perfect and incomprehensible

manner, we could never know by our own reason alone, unassisted with Divine revelation. But sacred Writ sufficiently assures us, that three such Persons there are, who have been from all eternity without beginning, and who cannot but be to all eternity; and these are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. I will not stand to prove this to you particularly from holy Scripture, because it would lead me into a large field of inquiry, beyond the compass allowable in discourses of this nature. It is sufficient to say, that this is and has been all along the faith of Christ's Church, founded upon Scripture: and my design now is rather to tell you what the true faith is, and to assist you in conceiving it, than to lay down the particular proofs and arguments on which it rests.

To conceive then rightly of the three Divine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, consider them as being just the reverse of what *creatures* are; not frail, mutable, or depending on any one's pleasure; not as beginning to be, or capable of ever ceasing to be; but as being perfect and unchangeable, all-sufficient, and independent, without beginning, and without possibility of ever coming to an end. Such is the *nature* of these three; and for that reason they are all properly *Divine*.

2. After this brief account of their nature, I may next consider their *distinction*. They are constantly represented in Scripture as *distinct* from each other: the Father is not the Son, nor is the Holy Ghost either of the other two. They are described, as any other distinct persons are, by different characters and offices. This is so plain through every page almost of the New Testament, that it were needless to instance in particulars. The Father is said to *send*, the Son to be *sent*, and the *Holy Ghost* to *proceed*, or *go forth*. The Father is represented as *one witness*, and the Son as *another witness:* the Son as *one comforter*, the *Holy Ghost* as *another* comforter, not both one comforter. The Father is introduced as speaking to the Son, and the Son as speaking to the Father, and the Holy Ghost as delivering commands from both. These and a multitude of other particulars plainly prove their distinction one from another; which being analogous to, and nearly resembling the distinction of persons among men, or angels, or other rational creatures, we therefore presume to call it a *personal* distinction, and to call the three *three Persons*.

3. But as there is a distinction amongst them, there is also an

union, a very close and unexpressible union, among the Divine Three. And though Scripture every where represents these three Persons as *Divine*, and every one singly *God* and *Lord*; yet the same Scriptures do as constantly teach that there is but *one God* and *one Lord*. From whence it evidently follows, that these three are *one God* and *one Lord*. And if such an imperfect union as that of *husband* and *wife* be reason sufficient to make them twain to be *one flesh*; and if the union of a good man to Christ shall suffice to make them in a certain sense *one spirit*[a], how much more shall the incomparably closer and infinitely higher union of the three Divine Persons one with another, be sufficient to denominate them *one God* or *one Lord*! There is no other union like it, or second to it; an union of will, presence, power, glory, and all perfections: an union so inseparable and unalterable, that no one of the Persons ever was or ever could be without the other two; it being as necessary for the three to be, and to act *together*, as to *be at all*; which is the perfection of unity, and the strongest conjunction possible.

Our blessed Lord therefore intimates, that he and the Father *are one*: and they are represented by St. John in his Revelations, as being *one temple*[b], and as having but *one throne*[c], and making but *one light*.

The Holy Ghost likewise is represented as being one with the Father, as much as the *soul* of *man* is *one* with the *man* whose soul it is[d]. And they are all three together said to be *one*; "these three are one[e]," which though a disputed text, is yet not without very many and very considerable appearances of being truly genuine. The doctrine however is certain from many other places of Scripture, whatever becomes of that text; and the *unity* of three Persons in one *Godhead* sufficiently revealed, as well as their distinction. Neither is there any difficulty in admitting that three things may be *three* and *one* in different respects; distinct enough to be *three*, and yet united enough to be *one*; distinct without division, united without confusion. These therefore together are the *one Lord God* of the Christians, whom we worship, and into whom we have been baptized.

I proceed now, after considering what the Divine Persons are in themselves, to observe also what their *offices* are, *relative* to us. We are taught in our common and excellent Church Catechism,

[a] 1 Cor. vi. 17. [b] Rev. xxi. 22. [c] Rev. xxii. 1. [d] 1 Cor. ii. 11.
[e] 1 John v. 7.

taken from Scripture, to believe in God the Father who *made* us, in God the Son who *redeemed* us, and in God the Holy Ghost who hath *sanctified* us. So that the peculiar offices of the three Divine Persons are, to *create*, *redeem*, and *sanctify*. To the Father it peculiarly belongs to *create*, to the Son to *redeem*, to the Holy Ghost to *sanctify*. The Father is God the *Creator*, the Son is God the *Redeemer*, the Holy Ghost is God the *Sanctifier*. Which is not to be so understood, as if neither the Son nor Holy Ghost were concerned in *creating*; nor as if neither the Father nor Holy Ghost were concerned in *redeeming*; nor as if neither Father nor Son were concerned in *sanctifying*. All the three Persons concur in every work; all the three together *create*, *redeem*, and *sanctify*: but each Person is represented, in Scripture, as having his more peculiar part or province in regard to these several offices; on account of which peculiarity, over and above what is common to all, one is more eminently and emphatically *Creator*, another *Redeemer*, and a third *Sanctifier*. So much as is *common* to all, serves to intimate their *union* one with the other: and so much as is *peculiar* to any one, in like manner serves to keep up the notion of their *distinction*. We may observe something of like nature in the words of the text. "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ." God the Father giveth *grace*, and the Holy Spirit likewise giveth *grace*, and is particularly called the *Spirit* of *grace*; and grace is the common gift of the whole *Trinity*: but yet here it is peculiarly attributed to Christ, as his gift and blessing, and denoting the special grace of *redemption*. The next words are, "the love of God," that is, of God the Father. We read of the "love of Christ," and of the "love of the Spirit;" and love is common to the whole Trinity, for "God is love." But here one particular kind of love, the love of the Father in sending his Son to redeem us, the Holy Ghost to sanctify us, is intended.

The last words are, "and the communion of the Holy Ghost." Now there is a *communion* both of the *Father* and the *Son* with every good man; according to what our Lord says, "If any man "love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, "and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him[f]." Every good man is the *temple* of the whole *Trinity*, which has *communion* with him, and abides in him; as is plain from innu-

[f] John xiv. 23.

merable texts of Scripture. But, in this text, one special and peculiar kind of *communion*, appertaining to the Holy Ghost, is signified.

One thing however is observable, that though St. Paul might have indifferently applied *grace*, or *love*, or *communion*, to either Father, or Son, or Holy Ghost, or to all together; yet he chose rather to make the characters *several* and *distinct*, to keep up the more lively sense of the distinction of persons and offices. Having intimated as much as is needful, of the *nature, distinction, union*, and *offices* of the three Divine Persons of the ever blessed Trinity, I now design very briefly,

II. To intimate likewise the importance and use of these great articles of our Christian faith. The importance of those weighty truths may be judged of from the nature of the thing itself, as well as from the concern which God hath shewn to inculcate and fix them upon our hearts and minds.

1. From the nature of the thing itself. If there really be three such Divine Persons as I have described, (and no one can doubt of it, that reads the Scripture without prejudice,) it must have been as necessary to let mankind into some knowledge of them all, as it is that we should have right and just sentiments of any one. For there is no having a right apprehension of any one, without knowing what relation he stands under to the other two. To know or conceive of God as a *single* Person, is to know God very imperfectly, or is rather a *false* conception of God. It is therefore of as great concernment to know that God is three Persons, (supposing it really so,) as it is to conceive truly, rightly, and justly of God. Further, if there really be three *Divine* Persons, it is as necessary that man should be acquainted with it, as it is that he should direct his *worship* where it is due, and to whom it belongs. For if all honour and glory and adoration be due to *every* Person, as much as to *any*; it was highly requisite that a creature made for worship, as man is, should be instructed where and to whom to pay it. To offer it to any *single* Person only, when it is claimable by *three*, is defrauding the other two of their just dues, and is not honouring God perfectly, or in full measure and proportion. Besides, how shall any one Person *justly* claim all our homage and adoration to himself, and not acquaint us that there are two Persons more, who have an equal claim to it, and ought therefore to receive equal acknowledgments?

Add to this, that if a man is to be trained up to a knowledge of God here, in order to be admitted to "see God as he is," in the life that shall be hereafter; it seems highly requisite that he should know at least *how many* and *what* Persons stand in that character, that by his acquaintance with them now, in such measure as is proper to this state, he may attract such love and esteem for them here, as may prepare him for the fuller vision and fruition of the same hereafter. Thus far I have presumed to plead, from the very nature and reason of the thing itself. But to this I must add,

2. That this reasoning is abundantly confirmed, from the concern that God hath shewn to imprint and inculcate this so necessary and saving belief upon us. I shall not here cite the many texts of Scripture bearing testimony to the *Divinity* of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and engaging us to place our hope, trust, and confidence in them all, and to pay our worship to them. This would be too large a task, and is a work more proper for a divinity chair than for the pulpit. But I shall single out two or three considerations appearing to me of great force; leaving you at leisure to consult the Scriptures themselves, for the many and plain testimonies of the Divinity of the three Persons.

You will observe, that as soon as ever our Lord had given his disciples commission to form a church, he instructs them to baptize in the name of the *Father*, the *Son*, and the *Holy Ghost*.

This was the one short and important lesson to be first instilled and inculcated into the new converts through every nation. From whence we may justly infer, that the faith in these three Persons as *Divine*, in opposition to all the *gods* of the Gentiles, was to be the *fundamental* article of Christianity, the *distinguishing character* of the true religion. Such care has been taken to impress the belief of the ever blessed Trinity upon the minds of all Christ's disciples.

Another thing I would observe, not so obvious perhaps as the former, but not less worthy of notice; and that is, how the whole scheme and frame of the Divine dispensations seem purposely calculated to introduce men gradually into the knowledge of these three Persons. This appears all the way down from the *fall* of Adam, to the completion and perfection of all by the descent of the Holy Ghost. One might justly wonder why man, created after God's image, should be so soon suffered to fall; and why, after his fall, such a vast preparation, such a long train

should be laid for his recovery, that there should be no way for it but by means of a *Redeemer* to mediate, to intercede, to suffer for him, to raise and restore him, and at length to judge him. Why might not the thing have been done in a much shorter and easier way? Why might not God the Father (so graciously disposed towards all his creatures) have *singly* had the honour of pardoning, restoring, raising, and judging mankind? Or supposing both the Father and Son joined in the work, why should it be still left, as it were, *unfinished* and *incomplete*, though in the hands of *both*, without the concurrence of the *Holy Ghost?* Can any doubt be made, whether God the Father singly was able or willing to do all that the Holy Ghost has done for us; to work miracles, to shed gifts, to sanctify and purify man's nature, and to qualify him for the enjoyment of God? These things must appear strange and unaccountable, full of darkness and impenetrable mystery. But our wonder ceases as soon as we consider that mankind were to be gradually let into the knowledge of *three Divine Persons*, and not one only; that we were to be equally obliged to every one of them, that so we might be trained up to place our love, our fear, and trust in all, and pay acknowledgments suitable to their high quality and perfections. This is the reason of that long train and vast preparation in man's redemption: and with this view, there appear so many characters of consummate wisdom all the way, that nothing can furnish us with a more charming and august idea of the Divine dispensations from first to last. Consider but a little our Lord's conduct, when he was going to take his leave of his disciples, and what he said to them upon that occasion: "It is expedient," says he, "for you, that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter "will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto "you[g]." And in another place, "I will pray the Father, and "he shall send you another Comforter, that he may abide with "you for ever[h]." What is the meaning of this? Could the disciples want any *other comforter*, when he had told them, in the same chapter, that he himself and the Father should come and *make* their *abode* with them[i]; and when he had determined himself to be with them "alway, even to the end of the world[k]," what occasion could they have for any *other comforter?* Or what *comforter* could do more or greater things than the Father and

[g] John xvi. 7. [h] John xiv. 16. [i] John xiv. 23. [k] Matt. xxviii. 20.

Son could do, by their constant presence with them? But the reason of the whole procedure is very plain and manifest. The *Holy Ghost*, the third Person of the ever blessed Trinity, was to be introduced with advantage, to do as great and signal things for mankind, as either Father or Son had done; that so *he* likewise might partake of the same Divine honours, and share with them in glory: and thus Father, Son, and Holy Ghost might be acknowledged as one God, blessed for ever.

It can never be imagined that an all-wise God, jealous of his honour, and strictly prohibiting all *creature worship*, would ever have laid such a scheme as has been laid to magnify two *creatures*, and to raise them to such a height of honour and dignity, as to be made partakers of that glory and worship which can be due to God only. No, certainly; the Son and the Holy Ghost are no *creatures*, but strictly *Divine*, and of the same true and eternal Godhead with the Father himself. In this faith was the Church founded; in this faith have the renowned martyrs and confessors of old lived and died; in the same faith are all the churches of the Christian world instructed and edified at this day. Let it therefore be the especial care and concern of every one here present, to continue firm, steadfast, and unshaken in this faith; and never to be moved from it by the "disputers of this world;" who are permitted for a while to gainsay and oppose it, for a trial and exercise to others, that "they which are approved may "be made manifest." Persevere in paying all honour, worship, and praise to the three blessed Persons; knowing how great and how Divine they are, and how securely they may be confided in. And let the intimate *union* they have one with another put us in mind of that brotherly love and union which ought to be among Christians; that we may become, as it were, *one heart* and *one soul*, knit together in one faith, in the unity of the Spirit, and the bond of peace. So may the "grace of our Lord Jesus "Christ," and the "love of God the Father," and the "commu-"nion of the Holy Ghost," be with us all evermore.

A SERMON

PREACHED AT THE

CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF ST. PAUL,

BEFORE THE

RIGHT HON. THE LORD MAYOR,

THE

ALDERMEN, AND CITIZENS OF LONDON,

On Wednesday, May 29, 1723.

Being the Anniversary Day of Thanksgiving
for the Restoration.

ECCLESIASTES vii. 14.

In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider: God also hath set the one over against the other, to the end that man should find nothing after him.

THE words which I have here cited are in some measure obscure, and of doubtful meaning; which is no fault of the *translation*, since the *original* itself is here also ambiguous, and fairly capable of more meanings than one.

Our translators have left a latitude in their version of the place, not taking upon them to determine the sense where the *generality* of the expression in the *original* had left it undetermined; lest they should thereby forestall the reader's judgment, and make a comment instead of a translation. A safe and prudent rule in *translations*, to leave a text in the same doubtful state wherein it was found; rather than to fix and determine it

to a *certain* meaning, upon *uncertain* conjectures. It may be left to *commentators*, whose proper business it is, to point out some determinate sense for a reader to fix upon: and if it be not certainly the true sense, yet if it be a good sense, and as probable as any other, it may very well pass for the true one, till a truer can be found.

Now as to the text before us, the first words of it, "In the "day of prosperity be joyful," have no difficulty: the sense is plain and obvious, and thus far interpreters are agreed. The next clause, "but in the day of adversity consider," may well enough bear to be changed into this: *but consider also the day of adversity;* that is, look backwards or forwards to the *day of adversity;* as being that which went before, and may also ensue upon the day of prosperity: *for God hath set the one over against the other;* so I render this clause, (instead of "God also hath "set," &c.) the better to preserve the connection and coherence of one part with another. The last words of the text are the most obscure of any, and capable of divers meanings; "to the "end that man should find nothing after him." I shall not trouble you with a tedious recital of the several constructions put upon them by different interpreters; some referring the words, *after him*, to *man*, the nearest *antecedent;* and others, I think rightly, to *God*, the more remote. Instead of the words, "to the end that man should find nothing after him," I should rather choose another rendering, which the words of the original will very well bear, and which makes the sense more natural and coherent; *in such a way* (order, or method) *that man can find nothing after him:* nothing after *God*, nothing to correct or justly complain of. The whole verse then may, I conceive, be thus rightly paraphrased:

"*In the day of prosperity be joyful*, receiving and enjoying the "blessings of Heaven with thankfulness and cheerfulness; *but* "*consider also the day of adversity*, as what went before, or may "again return: *for God hath set the one over against the other, in* "*such a way;* he hath so mingled and tempered prosperity and "adversity together, and hath so exactly balanced one with the "other, *that no man, after him, can find* any thing to correct or "complain of with any reason; nothing wiser or better can be "contrived or thought on, for the due government of the moral "world, after what unerring wisdom has once fixed and settled."

The text, thus understood, will lead me to discourse upon the

manifold wisdom of Divine Providence, in the various turns and vicissitudes of human affairs; the interchangeable successions of judgments and mercies, whether towards particular men, or whole bodies of men, churches, and kingdoms; the revolutions of states, and fortune of empires, public calamities and public blessings returning in their appointed seasons: a subject useful at all times, and particularly suitable to this day's solemnity. For though (God be thanked) the blessings which we now commemorate may turn our thoughts chiefly to the *brighter* side of Divine Providence; yet both the advice of the text, and the reason of the thing, call upon us to consider the *dark* side also. We shall have no full sense of the mercies we enjoy, till we look back to the calamities which we once lay under: neither shall we be in a right disposition to make the best use of what we have, unless we look forward to the great uncertainty and instability of all things here below; how suddenly adversity may overtake us, and a cloud overshadow us, amidst our rejoicings. We have had our days of *prosperity* and our days of *adversity*, as all other nations also have had theirs: "God hath set the "one over against the other," in the ordinary course of his Providence, to chastise, try, exercise, or improve mankind. His *goodness* is chiefly seen in one, his *justice* in the other; his *wisdom* and his *power* in both. In discoursing further,

I. I shall first observe, in the general, that we ought to look up to God as the *supreme Author* both of *calamities* and *blessings*.

II. I shall apply the general doctrine to the particular case of our late troubles, and our deliverance from them in the happy *Restoration*.

III. I shall point out the proper use and improvement to be made of all.

I. I am, first, to observe, in the general, that we ought always to look up to God, as the *supreme Author* both of *calamities* and *blessings*. His Providence steers and governs all things both in heaven and earth. Every seemingly uncertain chance or wandering casualty is directed to its proper end by his unerring wisdom. Not a *hair* of any man's head perishes, nor so much as a *sparrow* falls, but by his guidance or permission. *Second* causes are entirely in the hands of their *first mover:* even the voluntary counsels and contrivances of moral agents are all conducted by his rule and governance; and are so curiously wrought

in and interwoven with his eternal purposes, as to make up, in the whole, one entire, uniform, and beautiful contexture. He hath the hearts and wills of all men under his sovereign command, winding and turning them by secret and irresistible influences, to bring about his own good and great designs. So that all events, whether calamitous or prosperous, are in the last result to be ascribed to his *directive* or *permissive* Providence: which I may shew a little more particularly, first of *calamities*, and next of *blessings*.

1. As to *calamities*, it is said, "Shall there be evil in a city, "and the Lord hath not done it[a]?" And in another place; "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and "create evil: I the Lord do all these things[b]:" that is, either by direction or permission. Accordingly, David scrupled not to say, that *the Lord* had *bidden Shimei* to *curse him*[c]. And Absalom's wickedness in *rebelling* against his royal father, and going in unto his *father's concubines*[d], were a judgment of God upon David, consequent upon God's avenging sentence pronounced against him in the matter of Uriah. For "thus saith the Lord, "Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, "and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto "thy neighbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of "this sun. For thou didst it secretly: but I will do this thing "before all Israel, and before the sun[e]." When God sees fit to execute vengeance, he unties the hands of wicked men, and lets them loose to commit all uncleanness and iniquity with greediness. He withdraws his protecting arm, for a time, from those whom he has once determined to chastise. And in such a case it is all one to him, whether the fury of wild beasts or that of wilder men be let in upon them to execute his righteous judgments. This is no reflection upon his holiness, or unspotted purity; as if he either stood in need of men's wickedness, or were consenting unto it: but it is a marvellous instance of Divine wisdom in conducting all things to some excellent purpose, that the very worst of all shall not return useless or empty; but the very things which of all others are the most displeasing and hateful to him, shall yet be turned to a good use, and made to serve the ends of his glory; while the wicked actors either design nothing of it, or design the quite contrary. To *them* remains

[a] Amos iii. 6. [b] Isa. xlv. 7. [c] 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11. [d] 2 Sam. xvi. 22. [e] 2 Sam. xii. 11, 12.

shame and confusion of face, for the evil of their doings: to *him* glory and praise, for bringing *good* out of *evil*. Thus the *serpent* was suffered to beguile Eve, and Eve to deceive Adam, which brought on a curse upon *them* and *theirs*: but out of this mischief was made to spring up an everlasting covenant of mercy; and the *curse* was thereby converted into a *blessing*. Joseph was meanly and maliciously sold into Egypt by his inhuman brethren: they did wickedly therein, but God was wise and gracious in permitting it, as fully appeared by what followed after. God suffered Satan to afflict Job in a very grievous measure: but then he made it subservient to Job's happiness and to his own glory. In like manner he suffered Judas to betray, and the Jews to crucify our blessed Saviour: they acted wickedly, exceeding wickedly; but God was very just and kind in permitting them so to do, to bring about the great and glorious purposes of man's redemption.

Such is the wisdom and goodness of Almighty God in conducting all events to his own glory; and making both wicked men and devils undesigning instruments to execute his all-wise and secret counsels.

The ends which God hath to serve, in any great *calamities*, are many and various, and often dark and mysterious; that it may be hard to know on what special errand they come, and whether they be designed more for *trial* and *exercise*, than for *vengeance* or *punishment*. Only in *national* visitations we may reasonably judge, for the most part, that one particular end and design of them is correction and chastisement for national sins. This was manifest all along in the Jewish Church and nation. The calamities they suffered by *sword*, *pestilence*, *famine*, or *captivity*, were all so many judgments upon them, bearing a visible reference and proportion to the nature, number, and aggravations of their sins and impieties. And the reason given by Almighty God, in the case of the Amorites, whom he would not finally cut off before their iniquities were *full*[f], seems to carry in it the force of an argument for the truth of the observation in general; and may give light into the methods of God's vindictive dealings with whole nations or communities. From the consideration of *calamities* let us turn our eyes to a more pleasing prospect, namely, to that of *blessings*.

2. The very name of *blessings* intimates their author and

[f] Gen. xv. 16.

speaks their *Divine* original. The common sentiments of mankind, upon which the custom of speech is formed, seem to agree in this; that prosperous events are the blessings of Providence and the gifts of God. And they ought indeed to be esteemed of as such, being more peculiarly and eminently his works. They are what he particularly delights, and, as it were, triumphs in; and more abundantly displays his power in effecting. They fall in with his primary and original design in creating us; which was no other than to set forth his own goodness, and to promote our welfare and happiness. And though calamities are, in their season, necessary to this very end; yet it is that *necessity* alone which makes them eligible: for God "does not afflict willingly, " nor grieve the children of men."

Besides that afflictions and troubles are, for the most part, owing rather to God's *permissive*, than *directing* Providence; and are often little more than the natural fruits and consequence of men's sins. As when animosities run high, and ambition and avarice, and other vile affections reign; when public spiritedness decays, and religion declines, and charity waxes cold; the natural effect and result hereof can be nothing else but the desolation, the misery, the ruins of a land: so that men may justly blame themselves for the calamities of their own making. But blessings and comforts are more directly and plainly the work of God. No device or art of man could ever be able to procure even the *ordinary* comforts of life, without God's special assistance: and as to *extraordinary* turns and revolutions of State, such as we this day commemorate, his interposal in such cases is often clear and manifest. They are brought about by surprising incidents, and by some marvellous train of providences; to shew that the whole contriving, conducting, and completing them are entirely his. I proceed then,

II. To apply the general doctrine to the particular case of our late troubles, and our deliverance from them in the *happy Restoration*.

We must first take a brief, summary survey of those calamities, under which this Church and nation had for many years groaned. Whoever will be at the pains to peruse the black history of those rebellious times, will there find such amazing circumstances of distraction, horror, and confusion, as are scarce to be paralleled in any Christian annals: such insolencies, oppressions, rapines, murders, treasons, so openly carried on,

without remorse or shame, among *Christians*, *reformed* Christians, neighbours of the same kingdom, and brethren of the same household; and all this with such a glozing show of piety and devotion, with hands and eyes lift up to heaven, *seeking the Lord*, as the phrase then was: such a scene, I believe, as was never before seen or heard of; and when it was, might have made a *generous* mind almost disdain the relation he bears to the *species*, or even to blush for the reproach of being reckoned to the *kind*. Misguided zealots took upon them to set rules to their superiors; to trample on all laws, *sacred* or *civil*; to involve three kingdoms in a dreadful war, wherein we lost above two hundred thousand lives; the bravest blood of the country spilled, the worthiest families stripped, plundered, and undone. Under pretence of espousing *liberty* and *property*, those wretched patriots pulled down all the ancient fences made for the security of both; shewing at length what kind of *liberty* it was that they affected: liberty to imprison, banish, plunder, and destroy all that had either loyalty to provoke their resentments, or revenues to supply their avarice: liberty first to deface, spoil, and crush the *monarch*, and next to accuse and condemn, and in the end to murder the *man*: liberty to tread under foot all authorities, to set up and pull down *parliaments*, or to model them at pleasure; to abolish a whole *House* of *Peers*, and almost to extinguish the *nobility*, raising up the very dregs of the populace to usurp their places: in a word, liberty to turn a kingdom upside down, and to leave it languishing, and well nigh expiring in its miserable distractions and most deplorable confusions. Such was the sad and mournful estate of this unhappy island in its *civil* capacity. But its *religious* one was still worse, and of more melancholy consideration; inasmuch as the concernments of it are higher, and reach further than the other. Our excellent Church was soon vanquished and trodden down, after the King, its *nursing father*, had lost his head in defence of it. When *monarchy* once failed, *episcopacy* could not long survive: that venerable, ancient, *apostolical* order fell a sacrifice to misguided zeal and blind popular fury. Then began conceited ignorance to triumph wide and far over learning and sound knowledge; novelty over antiquity; confusion over order; schism, heresy, and blasphemy, over unity, orthodoxy, and sincere piety. This was *refining* upon the Church of England! these our *reformers!*

It were endless to proceed in the melancholy story of the

Church, and most deplorable state of *religion* in those times; when it seemed all to degenerate into a solemn cant, or into the vilest hypocrisy; was mostly outside, cover, and pretence, to beguile some persons out of their *estates*, and others out of their *lives*.

But I forbear: let us come to the consideration of God's overruling providence in those sad calamities. It may sound harsh to say it, but so it was; the hand of *the Lord* was in all this. Those deplorable distractions were his judgments; the enraged multitudes were the ministers of his vengeance: and what they did wickedly, traitorously, rebelliously, was by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, wisely, righteously, and even graciously permitted. Perhaps for the trial and exercise of good men, to improve their virtues, and to heighten their rewards: perhaps, to teach us, by dear-bought experience, to set the higher price and value upon good order and regularity, and to make us for ever after abhor such principles or such practices as tend to overthrow them. Perhaps for the greater honour of our excellent Church, permitted, for a while, to lie bleeding of the wounds received from her enemies; that as in most other circumstances she had come the nearest to the primitive churches, so she might not be far behind them in sufferings also.

However dark and mysterious the designs of Providence may be, one thing however is evident, that God's avenging *justice* was particularly seen in those times of trouble; justice upon a *sinful* nation, upon all orders and degrees of men, upon all kinds, sects, and parties; as all, more or less, contributed either to the rise, or growth, or continuance of them. Faults there were, many and great, on all sides; and all in their turns suffered for them. The *churchmen* and *royalists*, many of them, for being too full of heat and resentment, for taking unwarrantable steps at the beginning, and making use of unseasonable severities, and some unusual stretches of prerogative; which gave great offence, and first paved the way to our future troubles. And these were the first that felt the weight of the ensuing calamities.

The *disciplinarians* as justly suffered for the lengths they ran in the *rebellion*; for their unreasonable prejudices against the *crown* and the *mitre*; and for the desperate steps they took to introduce their *discipline* and to new model our *religion*. They were remarkably defeated and disappointed in all their fairest hopes and most promising expectations; the Divine justice, at

length, raising up a *new sect* to be a *scourge* for them, as they had been to others.

And even the new sect, or medley of *sectaries*, (as they were then called,) they did not long enjoy the spoils of their iniquity, but were many of them grievously oppressed and harassed by the *tyrannical power* which themselves had set up. Thus was the Divine justice visibly exercised upon all parties one after another: which at length happily ended in disposing all to accept of their true and only cure, the *Restoration*. The *Sovereign* resumed his *throne;* the *nobility* their ancient grandeur, and *seats* in *parliament;* the *Bishops* their *sees;* the loyal *gentry* their estates and privileges; the *commons* their rights and franchises; the whole kingdom their freedom, safety, and tranquillity. The power *military* again became regularly subject to the *civil;* and now law and justice flowed in their ancient channels: mutiny and discord ceased; all things reverted to their primitive order and regularity, calm, quiet, and composed: nothing but joy and gladness seen in every face; some few only excepted, whom their crimes had made desperate, and who were left to repine in corners. "This was the Lord's doing, and it is yet "marvellous in our eyes:" that so many jarring factions, and disunited parties, with so many different views, divided interests and affections, should yet unite together in one common design, should join heads, hearts, and hands in the *Restoration;* though they had most of them again and again entered into solemn resolutions and repeated *oaths*, *covenants*, and *engagements* to the contrary. What could ever have brought about so surprising a revolution, so easily, so suddenly, so irresistibly, but an Almighty arm presiding over kingdoms, and bearing sovereign sway over the very hearts and wills of men? I need not proceed further in describing the happiness of the *Restoration:* I have been doing it in effect, and perhaps in the strongest and most awakening manner, while I have been setting forth the many and dreadful miseries which preceded it, and from which we were delivered by it.

All happiness in this world is but comparative, and is never so clearly seen, or sensibly perceived, as when we duly consider or experimentally know what it was to want it. The blessing of *health* is then best understood after we have felt the pain, the wearisomeness, the anguish of an acute disease or a long sickness. The fruits of *liberty* have the more grateful relish after the

uneasy hours of a close and tedious confinement. How welcome is repose and rest after great toils and fatigues! How comfortable is peace after the doubtful hazards and hardships of a consuming war! And how exceedingly delightful and transporting must *good order* and *government* appear, after recounting the miseries of popular tumults, the distracting scenes of *anarchy* and *confusion!*

Seeing then it hath pleased Almighty God thus miraculously to heal our breaches and to bind up our wounds; what remains, but that we "rejoice in the day which the Lord hath made," and that we endeavour proper and suitable returns of praise and adoration, of obedience and service to him? Which brings me to my last general head, namely,

III. To point out the proper use and improvement to be made of all. And here I need not go further than the advice of the text; "In the day of prosperity be joyful:" but *consider* also that the *day of adversity* may come. Therefore prepare for it, and *guard* against it. And in order thereto, out of many good rules which might be proper to this end, I shall mention *two* only, that I may draw to a conclusion.

1. The first is, *to be watchful over the beginnings*, over the first tendencies to *public broils* or distractions. To what a hideous length did many run in our late troubles, who at first never intended it? But one thing insensibly drew on another; and many unforeseen incidents drove men on, when once entered, beyond their first thoughts and counsels, till they were gradually led up to the very highest pitch of impiety and wickedness. From representing *grievances*, they proceeded to undutiful *petitions*, from petitions to seditious *remonstrances*, from remonstrances to *covenants* and *associations*, then to *riots* and *tumults*, and so on to open *rebellions*. Thus came our miseries rolling on, like the waves of the sea, till they overwhelmed us. A few wise counsels and healing measures, at the *beginning*, might have accommodated the rising differences, and have prevented what followed.

2. A second good rule of prudence and necessary maxim of life is, for men *to know when they are well:* not to be too humoursome and delicate, if things do not exactly answer what they may fondly expect or wish for; nor to affect *changes* at any time without the greatest *necessity*. This one lesson, well studied and practised, might have prevented our twenty years' miseries; and

might have *preserved* to us, for the whole time, all that happiness which in the end we only *regained*. We have felt the mischief of disturbing *settlements*, and throwing *government* off the hinges: let it be a warning to all, not to be fond of *experiments* of that kind, but to prize and value an *establishment* when they have it; particularly to be thankful for the *present* one, which, through many doubtful struggles and weary strifes, has been transmitted to us, from the *Restoration* down to this very day; but withal augmented, improved, and strengthened, as later experiences have brought in more wisdom.

Some, perhaps, led away with the empty *name*, not considering the *thing*, may be *weak* enough to wish for, or even *vain* enough to expect another *restoration*, as they would falsely call it. To such, let the advice be, *to know when they are well. Restorations*, properly so called, such as we this day commemorate, are truly valuable. The *restoring* a king to his just rights, and a people to their religion, liberty, and estates, and all orders and degrees of men to their ancient powers and privileges: such a *restoration* is a blessed thing indeed; it is like restoring *life* to *three kingdoms*. But what is it that wants to be *restored* at this day? Is it the people's liberties? But no nation under the sun enjoys more or greater: or if they did not, yet certainly they can never improve national liberty by the admission of *arbitrary* rule and *Papal* tyranny.

Is it *religion* that wants *restoring*? But though religion is not perhaps altogether in so flourishing a state as its best friends may wish, or its enemies fear; yet (God be thanked) it still retains a good degree of *strength* and *splendour*; both which would be mightily impaired and obscured, and in a while destroyed, by letting in upon us Popish superstition and idolatry.

Does *monarchy*, or *episcopacy*, or *parliamentary* powers, want to be *restored* as formerly? the *nobility* to their seats, the *clergy* to their cures, the *gentry* to their paternal inheritances? No. Nor would the return of *Popery* be a proper means, were there any thing wanting of this kind to restore or to resettle men in their just rights, but rather to unsettle every thing, and to throw us back again into the wildest confusions.

Does the *royal family*, as formerly, still want *restoring*? But who knows not that *his Majesty* now reigning (and long may he reign) is a branch of the same *royal* stock with him whose *restoration* we are now celebrating; and but one remove further

distant, in the course of natural descent, from the same *royal progenitor*.

But *strict lineal succession*, perhaps, is wanting. Be it so: it is a happiness which many or most of our *ancient* and *best* kings, from the conquest downwards, have also wanted. A *happiness*, no doubt, it is to have it, (for *peace* and *tranquillity* sake,) when it can be had; that is, when it falls in with, or is not a bar to a kingdom's *safety*; which is always of nearer concernment than *peace* or *tranquillity*. As bare *conveniences* must ever yield to *necessities*, so must considerations of *peace* to those of *safety* and *preservation*, such as without which a kingdom cannot tolerably subsist.

To be short, *lineal succession* is still kept up, as far as is consistent with the nation's just rights and liberties, or with the fundamental laws and constitution of the kingdom; that is, as far as our *ancestors* (in whose power it was) ever intended any such *strict rule* of succession, or in fact observed it: nor can reason, or good sense, or common justice to a *free people*, and under a *limited monarchy*, demand or admit of more. All parties, in their turns, will make use of such a plea or pretext about *hereditary right*, when it favours their purposes or falls in with their inclinations: but as it never has been, so we may be confident it never will be, a *reason* with any considerable numbers of men, but such as have been before determined by other reasons, *stronger* and *more prevailing*.

Real scruples of *conscience*, as to this particular, remain but with a *few*, and those the most *sedentary* and least *enterprising* of any: and it will always cast a damp upon men of that *religious* frame and *devout* temper of mind, to consider, that what they would call restoring a *king* to his just right, would yet be restoring the *kingdom* to *nothing* but *slavery*, *penury*, or *persecution*, it may be, for the present, and in the end, superstition, darkness, and idolatry. What *good man*, however scrupulous about the *rights* of *princes*, would not even *dread* such a *restoration*; and rather sit down with his *scruples* in retirement, solitude, and repose, than be ever consenting (upon very *uncertain* reasonings, and as *uncertain* prospect of success) to bring *certain* misery upon his fellow subjects?

Upon the whole it appears, (which is what I intend by all I have here said,) that such a *restoration* as some have vainly thought on, or endeavoured, could be nothing akin to that which

we now commemorate; but as unlike it and contrary as possible in all *material* circumstances. And the reasons which once so strongly pleaded *for* the *one*, do now as strongly plead *against* the *other*; since it would not be restoring us to any *happiness* we want, but to such *miseries*, or even to *greater* than those from which we were this day delivered.

Let us then be thankful to Almighty God for the blessings which he hath sent us, and has preserved to this time; for restoring to us our happy constitution and legal establishment in *one* reign, and for watching over it in *another*; for securing and strengthening it in a *third*, and for improving, fixing, and perfecting it in the reigns following. All which gives us grounds to hope, (unless God for our sins shall otherwise determine,) that the *blessings* which we now commemorate may prove as lasting and durable for ages to come, as they are highly valuable for the present. Let but the spirit of contention cease, and brotherly love return: "Depart from evil, and do good; and dwell "for evermore."

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF CHILDREN,

RECOMMENDED IN

A SERMON

PREACHED IN THE

PARISH CHURCH OF ST. SEPULCHRE,

June the 6th, 1723.

BEING

THURSDAY IN WHITSUN-WEEK;

At the Anniversary Meeting of the Children educated in the Charity Schools in and about the Cities of London and Westminster.

PROVERBS xxii. 6.

Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it.

THE meaning and design of these words of king Solomon is plain and obvious at first hearing: from whence we may reap this advantage, that the time which upon more difficult texts would be spent in prefatory explications, may here be more agreeably (and perhaps more usefully too) laid out upon the subject. The pertinency of the text to the present occasion will, I doubt not, be as clear and manifest as the meaning and purport of it: so that your thoughts, very probably, will run quicker upon it than any words can do, and will be beforehand with me in the application. My design from it is to *offer*, or rather to

repeat, some of the most obvious and most approved rules and directions for the training up children; and to intimate of how great moment and importance they are to the *children* themselves, to their *parents* and others having the charge over them, and to the *public* at large.

You will not, I presume, expect any *new* directions from me on this head, (the *older* they are the better,) nor indeed any so exact and accurate as those which have been more maturely weighed, and after long experience, perfected by the united wisdom and joint counsels of those whom God hath raised up to inspect, promote, and conduct this weighty affair through this great city, and other parts of the kingdom. All I shall endeavour is, to collect and lay before you a few useful hints, out of many you will think on; such as may deserve to be treasured up in our memories, and such as, in regard either to their own weight or to our forgetfulness, may very well bear the repeating and frequent inculcating. And now not to detain you with any further preface, I proceed directly to what I intend.

First, To point out some of the principal rules or directions for the religious training up of children.

Secondly, To remind us of some special reasons and motives proper to enforce the use and exercise of them: concluding all with a brief application of the whole to as many as are any way capable of promoting, assisting, or encouraging so good a work.

I. I am, first, to point out some of the principal rules or directions for the religious training up of children. The persons herein chiefly concerned are *fathers* and *mothers*, natural and spiritual, *masters* and *mistresses*, *tutors*, *guardians*, *governors*, and the like. All the branches of this duty belong not equally to all: many of them are indeed common to parents, masters, guardians, &c., but some are special to *parents* only, or to them chiefly, and not to the rest. In the enumeration of particulars, I shall think it sufficient if they belong to any, and if they be of such importance as may make it necessary to mention, and not to omit them.

1. I shall begin with what comes first in order, and which chiefly belongs to *fathers* and *mothers*, *godfathers* and *godmothers*, the bringing children to the font, to be publicly baptized according to the rules and orders of the Church of England, formed exactly upon the *primitive* model; saving only as to the allowing and dispensing with the *pouring* on of water upon the child, in-

stead of *immersion*: which allowance has at length, by custom, took place of the rule, and unhappily excluded it, perhaps beyond recovery; though many good and pious men have hinted their desires, or wishes, for restoring the primitive practice, which had constantly obtained in England, from the first planting of Christianity, till within less than two hundred years ago, and has not been entirely laid aside, above a century and a half at most. But enough of that.

I said *publicly* baptized. For as to the custom of administering Baptism by reading the office for *public Baptism* in private houses, it is of very late date, and is neither so decent nor so regular as the public method which our Church prescribes in her *Rubrics*. It has indeed, with great reluctance, been submitted to, and still is so; and especially in this *city* more than in any other place of the kingdom. *Custom* hath here also prevailed against *rule*; and many have been, in a manner, forced to comply with it, upon prudential reasons; submitting to it as a tolerable inconvenience, to prevent greater. But it were much to be wished that the more public and solemn way were again restored, and universally practised as formerly. To proceed.

When *Baptism* is once over, nothing more remains to be done for the *infant*, in the *religious* way, for some time; except it be *praying* for him. The care of supporting and cherishing the growing infants, while unable to speak, or to learn any thing, falls not under the head of *religious* education: as neither does the method of *nursing*, or *suckling* them; though it may not be improper to throw in a word or two of it, because a *case* of *conscience* has been thought to be nearly concerned in it. Some *Divines* of great note have been very particular and pressing upon the duty of *mothers*, as obliged to nurse and suckle their own children. I cannot stay to examine their reasons for it, which are not all of the same weight, but differing in the degrees of more and less. One thing, however, is certain, that it is no unalterable duty of mothers so to do: in some circumstances they cannot, and in others they need not; there is a latitude left for discretion and prudence in such cases. They are in duty bound to do the best they can for the health of their children, and the right forming their tempers and manners; both which may, in some measure, depend on their first milk, or on the method of nursing. But if both these points may be effectually secured, (as they often may,) as well by a *nurse* as by the proper

mother, then the thing is indifferent, and either way may be taken without scruple. But I pass on to something of much greater moment, and of more necessary and standing obligation

2. As soon as children are grown up to be capable of learning any thing, it is the business of those, under whose care they are, to use all proper precautions to prevent their learning any evil customs or bad habits; and to season them betimes with a just and awful sense of a God and a world to come. They have *souls* to provide for as well as *bodies:* and therefore due care must be taken of the more precious part, which shall survive the other, and endure for ever. When children arrive to little notices of things, (sooner or later, according to their different capacities,) care must be taken to prevent their receiving or retaining any ill impressions. A child of three or four years growth, though he will have but a very faint and imperfect sense of what is good or evil, may yet contract habits of either. He may learn *stubbornness* at that age, which, if it grows up with him, will prove a very ill quality: or he may learn submission, modesty, and obedience, which will, in time, produce excellent fruits in his after life and conversation. A child will, at that age, learn to *curse* or *swear*, if he becomes acquainted with such language: or he may be taught to abhor and detest every thing of that kind, and to form his tongue to quite another accent. Early care must be taken in a matter of so great concernment.

Telling of *lies* is a thing which children will soon learn, and especially if they find benefit in it, or can escape the rod by it. This should be prevented with all possible care, by possessing them very early with the greatest abhorrence and detestation of a *lie*. And instead of letting them escape punishment by any such little and mean artifice, they should be detected in it, and immediately brought to shame, and smart for it. *Sincerity* is the noblest and best of qualities, and ought to be timely instilled and implanted in them. If that be wanting, there will scarce be any thing truly good and valuable remaining. To be deceitful and disingenuous is to be all that is bad: above all things therefore encourage and promote in children an honest heart, a plain and open speech, a frank and ingenuous demeanour.

It is hard to say, precisely, at what age children become capable of knowing what we mean by *Almighty God*, by *heaven*, or by *hell*. Some imperfect notion of these things may certainly be wrought into them very soon; and they will retain and im-

prove their first notices as they grow up. They may be told that God will be *angry* with them when they do amiss; that he will torment them in *hell-fire*, where they shall feel excessive pain, and be more sensible of smart than they are now: and they may be informed, that God will be kind to them and bless them, and give them all the good things their hearts can wish, provided they do well. Such advices as these will at first appear new and strange to them, and will put them upon asking many little childish questions about them; which should, however, be carefully and discreetly answered: and the answers will be well remembered by children as they grow in years, and may have a good effect upon them all their lives long.

It is observable, that many by the hearing of foolish stories of *apparitions*, while they were young, have received so deep and lasting impressions, as not to be able, when grown up to be men and women, to correct this early dread, or even to trust themselves *alone* in the *dark*. This is but a silly and superstitious fear, doing more hurt than good: and it would be a prudent and charitable part in parents or governors, to prevent as much as possible the frightening of children with any idle tales of that kind. But I would observe from it, how strongly those fears work afterwards, which have been implanted in young and tender minds. And therefore, instead of making children afraid where no fear is, let them be taught when, and whom to fear, namely, Almighty God. Let them be informed how dreadful his vengeance is towards those that offend him; how he drowned a whole world at once for sinning against him; how he rained down fire and brimstone out of heaven upon sinful Sodom; how he made the earth open and swallow up Corah and his company, for resisting God's *high priest*, and for being stubborn and rebellious; how he ordered a man to be stoned to death for breaking the holy Sabbath, caused Achan to be as severely punished for *stealing*; and struck Gehazi with leprosy, and Ananias and Sapphira with present death, for *lying*. Let but children have a list of these and the like examples of Divine vengeance lodged in their memories, by frequent inculcating, and by repeated inquiries how they retain or resent them, and it will be to them a standing lesson of religious awe and reverential fear of Almighty God, that they shall not dare to offend him in any known instance. Then, to give them a more present and constant sense of

what *offences* are, and what the contrary, let them have notice of them as often as they occur before their eyes, in bad and in good examples. If they happen, as they often will, to meet with any sad examples of drunkenness, swearing, cursing, and the like, let not such example pass without its just censure and condemnation, that children may be thereby taught what to avoid. And when they see the contrary examples of piety, modesty, sobriety, and the like, let them hear these things commended, that they may be thereby taught to go and do likewise. In such a method as this may the minds of children be formed up to virtue, and steeled against ill impressions; which is the principal end and aim of a religious education.

3. To do this the more effectually, it will be necessary to maintain a just *authority* over them, either correcting or encouraging them, as need may require. If they be first taught to submit to the reason of their governors while they are young, they will be the more easily and certainly conducted by their own reason, when grown up to be men and women. They should be taught the lesson of submission betimes, before ever their passions grow to a head, and become unmanageable. It may be sometimes proper to cross and disappoint them: never comply with a froward temper, nor humour a child even in trifles, if he appears too stubborn and self-willed. One that has been always indulged, though in slight matters, during his childhood, will expect the like indulgence afterwards in matters of much greater consequence. Let them therefore be trained up to submission and modesty; not to murmur or dispute, but to conform quietly and contentedly to rules and orders; to be patient under discipline, and to take it as a favour whenever their desires are gratified, or their inclinations indulged. By such a conduct they will be made gentle and tractable, dutiful and well-disposed; and they will love their parents or their governors the better for it. It is a mistake to imagine that excessive fondness is the way to oblige and gain them. It will rather produce pride and sturdiness for the present: which will at length shew itself in ill manners, contempt, and rudeness towards their best and kindest friends. The foundation of love must be laid in humility and submission: teach them first to stand in awe by seasonable correction; and it will be easy afterwards, a thousand ways, to attract their love and esteem also. "He that spareth his rod

"hateth his son," says Solomon: "but he that loveth him "chasteneth him betimes[a]." And again; "Chasten thy son while "there is hope, and let not thy soul spare for his crying[b]." In another place; "Foolishness is bound up in the heart of a child; "but the rod of correction shall drive it far from him[c]."

But while I am advising a just and seasonable severity, I would not forget to throw in some proper cautions, to prevent any extreme on that hand. At first, let it not be used but when *necessary*, or when *gentler* means fail. If a soft rebuke will be as effectual as a sharp reproof, use it rather. The tempers of children are not all the same, but sometimes widely different; and so requiring a different kind of treatment. If any can be allured and enticed to their duty, it is sufficient, and there will be no need of threats, which, in such a case, will do harm. However, do their duty they must: and it does not become a parent or a governor to use much *entreaty* where he ought to *command*.

Another caution, in the matter of correction, is, that it be done, as much as possible, without anger, passion, or resentment; though always with *authority*. Passion is never a good guide, and least of all in matters which require cool and sober thought. Besides, it sets an ill example to a child, and often tends to alienate his love and affections. And there is no occasion at all for anger or resentment in the affair of correction. The only end it aims at is the good of the child: and it should be considered only as a bitter potion in the hand of a kind physician, who, though he gives his patient some uneasiness, is his friend in doing so, and has no resentment or anger against him.

Another caution in this matter is, to proportion, as near as may be, the penalty to the offence: not to be as severe for every childish neglect as for stubbornness and wilful disobedience, for swearing, or for lying, or other sins against God. Slight indiscretions and weaknesses, which have no ill meaning or evil tendency, may be slightly passed over: while offences of a more heinous nature are to be chastised with proportionable severity. Having intimated what course is proper in order to maintain a just authority over children, I now proceed to another branch of a parent's or a governor's duty; namely,

4. To bring them to *church*, and to instruct them duly in their

[a] Prov. xiii. 24. [b] Prov. xix. 18. [c] Prov. xxii. 15.

catechism and their daily prayers. The design of bringing them so soon to church, even before they can well understand what is doing there, is to inure them to the constant practice of so necessary a duty. If they know little for the present as to what it means, they will however be sensible that it is their duty to attend: and as they grow older, they will both understand what the thing is, and reap the benefit of it.

As to teaching them the Church Catechism, it is a duty so well known, and, I presume, so punctually observed, that it may suffice barely to have mentioned it. I suppose the same of bringing them to be *confirmed*. They are to be taught likewise to say their daily prayers, morning and evening. This is a thing very necessary to be strictly insisted on. Children will soon be apt to grow weary of it: and if they be neglected, they will either not perform it at all, or quickly lay it aside. They must be told, that it is not a task, imposed upon them merely as children, but what must carefully be observed and practised as long as they live. And this must be often inculcated, and earnestly pressed upon them: otherwise they will be much tempted, in the following stages of their lives, through cares, and business, and sundry distractions, to leave off the practice, to the great prejudice of their virtue, and with the manifest hazard of their souls.

5. Another duty of parents and governors, as such, is to *pray* and intercede with God for the children under their care. Means must be used, and prudent methods carefully observed: but it is God alone that can warrant the success of them. Paul has planted, and Apollos watered; but it is God that giveth the increase. A *father* may sow the principles of piety in his children, and a *mother* may improve and cherish them; a *master* or a *mistress* may add to both, and a *minister* may give a helping hand to all: and yet without God's grace and blessing to improve and further it, it will come to nothing. It therefore highly concerns all that have the charge of children, to be often on their knees to implore God's favour and assistance upon their pious and painful endeavours. And they need not doubt, but if they do faithfully and truly perform their parts, God will do his.

6. One thing more I have reserved for the last place, as being most considerable; which is to set good examples before children, and to keep them as much as possible from the sight of

bad ones. It is indeed the bounden duty of all men to lead sober and exemplary lives; but of those especially who are to go in and out before children, and have the daily charge of them. Children are very prone to imitate what they hear and see. If you shew them nothing but what is good, they will assuredly take to nothing ill. A child that never heard an *oath*, will not invent one: and if he never sees an ill thing done, it is more than probable he will never do one. It is bad example commonly which first shews them the wrong way, and a certain depravity of nature, prone to follow, confirms them in it after. And let this suffice just briefly to have intimated the necessity and usefulness of setting good examples before children, and of guarding them, as much as may be, from the sight, or however from the influence of bad ones.

I have now run through the principal articles, such as have to me occurred, relating to the good education of children. If the rules I have laid down happen to fall short of what hath been already practised in many of our *schools* of *charity*, (which I am willing to hope hath often been the case,) then let what hath been said pass only for an imperfect recital of what have been done in times past, for the instruction, imitation, and encouragement of times to come. The very worthy *trustees* of these charities have thought it proper, upon the election of a new *master* or *mistress*, to renew and reinforce these kind of instructions in the strongest manner: and they have had some thoughts of erecting *a superior school, for the training up of schoolmasters and schoolmistresses*, on purpose to carry on and more effectually to secure the same good end. All which shews their judgment of what moment and importance it is, that the office of training up children be punctually executed: and it may well become our place and function, in our discourses from the pulpit, to endeavour to add some further strength and encouragement to so good and great designs. In order hereunto, I proceed now, secondly,

II. To remind us of some special reasons and motives, proper to enforce the duties laid down. And these are such as respect either the children themselves, or those who have the charge over them, or the public in general.

1. In regard to the *children*; the text itself intimates a very important reason, or motive; namely, that if they be trained up, while young, to what is good, they will not, when they come

to be *old, depart from it.* Which is not to be so strictly understood, as if the general rule admitted of no exception. There have been, and there will be again, instances to the contrary: but such instances, we hope, are, in comparison, rare and uncommon. Those who have been well educated from the first, will, for the most part, hold on in the same pious course. It seems to fare with our minds as it does with our bodies, to a great degree of resemblance. They are supple and pliable in their first and early years, easily bowed and turned this way or that: but they grow fixed and stiffened as they ripen in age, then preserving the same shape, figure, and frame, into which they had been first moulded. The very disposition and turn of the mind depends much upon it: and perhaps a great deal of what we are used to call *natural temper*, is little more than that particular frame of heart which was first infused in our education. It is a great advantage to religion to have been timely planted in the tender soil, and to have taken the first possession: and education, though not the only, is yet the principal circumstance, and has the most considerable share in our tempers and manners. Of the few good men there are, most of them may probably, upon reflection, find, that their pious dispositions were at first owing, under God, to the prudent care of some that had the charge of their infancy. Not but that persons, however well trained up in infancy, may afterward fall away in time of temptation: but they do not ordinarily do so; or if they do, their consciences soon recoil, their good principles formerly imbibed still remain; and they will at one time or other exert themselves again with force and vigour. When once the heat is over, and a little cool reflection succeeds, such persons generally will relent, and remember from whence they are fallen, will return and live: and it but rarely, perhaps, is found that they totally and finally miscarry. From hence appears how invaluable a blessing it is to have been set right at first. How easily, I had almost said insensibly, may such arrive to the greatest heights. They run through the difficulties of a religious course without so much as feeling the pain and toil of it. Happy they that have been thus conducted through the paths of virtue, almost insensible of the dangers every way surrounding them; who have never known what it is to have been captive to sin and Satan, never felt the weight of prevailing lusts, corrupt customs, or vicious habits. How easily may they obtain a *crown*, which must

cost others dear, and be but hardly at length gained, (if gained at all,) after many doubtful struggles, many sighs and tears, many bitter pains and agonies of mind! So much for the advantage of good education to the *children* themselves.

2. I may next mention the advantage accruing to *parents*, or others who have the care over them, in respect of their peace and comfort in this life, and their rewards in a life to come. As ever they hope to have any joy or consolation in the children grown up, let them be careful to season them betimes with principles of piety. For if they be not taught to fear God, they will not fear man: if they have no love or reverence for their Creator, they will not love or reverence their other best friends. Where there is little or no sense of religion, all other bonds or ties, such as nearness of blood or kindnesses received, signify nothing. They will be sturdy and stubborn toward those who had the rule over them, will despise their aged parents, and pay no reverence to their grey hairs. And what can we expect better? Would we have *wheat* spring up where nothing hath been sown but *tares?* Or should we look for any thriving fruits from a neglected and barren soil? No: according to what we sow, that we may expect to reap: and if children be rightly educated, then and then only may their parents, guardians, governors, or other friends, find joy, and comfort, and satisfaction in them. But besides the present comfort, there is a much greater in reserve hereafter. The children whom they have well instructed and piously educated shall as certainly accompany them to *heaven*, as they now do to *church;* and shall there, with united melody, tune their *hallelujahs*, here begun, to a more exalted strain of praises and thanksgivings. There shall they return their joyous thanks to their kind preservers, for so happily conducting them to that blessed place: which will be so much the more welcome and delightful to *both*, for the mutual joy and satisfaction they shall have in each other. It remains now only to consider,

3. The advantage hence arising to the *public* in general. If children be well educated, it must of course turn to the public peace and prosperity of a church or kingdom. Every good man, so raised, becomes a blessing to the neighbourhood where he dwells; as, on the other hand, every bad man is a common pest and nuisance. There cannot then be any surer foundation laid, than what we are now mentioning, for the security, peace, and welfare of any state or people. Which is the reason why in

Rome, and Athens, and Sparta, and other well ordered governments of old time, a more especial care was taken about the training up youth. Without this, men would grow wild and savage, and unfit for society. Rebellions, rapines, murders, and other monstrous impieties, are but the natural fruits of depraved nature, uncultivated by education. But if youth be wisely and justly managed, how happy will its influence be upon society, and what blessings will it draw down from heaven upon men! This will be the surest way to make our Church flourish and prosper. If the youth be brought up to understand her doctrines and to practise her rules, they will one day be both supports to it and ornaments of it. They will, we hope, from these good beginnings proceed daily to make greater and greater improvements: they will come better prepared to attend upon God's ministers, and to receive fuller instructions to complete and perfect them in all virtuous and godly living. Religion will hereby daily abound more and more, and gather new life and strength through the whole kingdom. These are some of the advantages proposed by our *schools* of *charity*, happily set on foot, and wonderfully blessed with success, through all parts of our island. The application and inference from all is, that we be every one of us willing and desirous to join our sincere endeavours for the promoting so good a work; contributing our *quota* of money at least, if not of our service, according to our several stations and abilities, toward thus making the world wiser, and the Church larger; towards the improving of mankind here, and the enlarging the number of the blessed hereafter. There is no need to multiply persuasives in so plain a case: the thing speaks itself, and carries all the force of the most moving eloquence or commanding rhetoric along with it. Who that hath any bowels of compassion for his Christian brethren, any love for his native country, any concern for our excellent Church, any regard for God and religion, or any tenderness for the souls of men, can ever turn away his face, or draw back his hand from promoting and encouraging, to the utmost of his power, so desirable and so blessed a work as we are now upon? a work, which if it be as wisely and as carefully pursued, as it is piously intended and laid, will, I doubt not, go on prosperously while the Church stands or the world lasts. If *proper persons* be employed for inspecting and educating the poor children, and a conscientious care be all along taken in *collecting* and *disposing* the charitable

contributions in such a manner as may best answer the purposes intended: if the provision thus raised be ever prudently regulated and portioned out, so as neither to *exceed* nor *come short* of the first and main design; *large enough* to invite the poor parents to send their children to these schools; and *not too large*, so as either to puff the children up, and set them above their proper rank and order, or to make them disdain any the *lowest* kind of work or service, such as they are born to, and wherein they may be most useful: I say, if these, and the like prudent regulations, (such as the worthy *trustees*, the best judges of them, shall find most expedient and practicable,) be from time to time carefully observed, and constantly conveyed down, in succession, to others; I will even venture to foretell, that there will never be wanting hands sufficient to promote and carry on this great design to distant generations. All that are *well-disposed*, and understand their *true happiness*, will be ambitious to bear part in this charitable work of ours; wisely considering, how much they shall thereby serve the interests of the *public*, and their *own* also, both here and hereafter.

SERMONS

ON

SEVERAL IMPORTANT SUBJECTS

OF

RELIGION AND MORALITY:

WITH

A PREFACE BY JOSEPH CLARKE, M.A.

PREFACE

BY

JOSEPH CLARKE, M. A.

THE following Discourses require no other recommendation than what the title-page will give them, by acquainting the world, that they are the works of the late Dr. Daniel Waterland; a person, whose *learning* and *judgment* were equalled by nothing, but his *candour* and *humility*. I shall not attempt to draw a character, which, if there were need of any, would require, and hath accordingly had, a more able hand to do justice to the subject. A very ingenious writer[a] hath already obliged the world with a just and lively description of this great and good man; and amidst all the *beauties of oratory*, hath kept within the strictest bounds of *historical truth*. But Dr. Waterland was *sufficiently known* to his *contemporaries;* and his *works* will deliver him down with honour to *posterity:* he wants neither marbles nor epitaphs to fence against oblivion: by his learned defences of Christianity, he hath raised himself a *perpetual monument;* and hath rendered it needless to have his character drawn by any *other pen*, from the reputation he hath acquired by *his own*. I cannot help just mentioning the public stand he made against *Arianism*, when supported by one, whose great reputation for learning had, both at home and abroad, been justly acknowledged: a cause wherein his adversaries were silenced by the force of his arguments; and that *over-forward gentleman*, who put our Author's Queries to the press without his consent or knowledge, (Queries sent him in *friendly letters*, and by way of *private correspondence only*[b],) soon found reason to repent (I do not say he *did* repent) of his conduct.

[a] Mr. Seed's Sermon on occasion of the death of Dr. Waterland: preached at Twickenham Chapel, January 4, 1740-1. Printed for R. Manby, over-against the Old Bailey, on Ludgate Hill.

[b] Vid. Waterland's Preface to his Vindication of Christ's Divinity, vol. i.

In these, and many other learned tracts upon the most abstruse and difficult points, his notions are so clear, and his expression so happy, that the most abstracted subjects become, in his hands, easy and intelligible; and his ideas are conveyed to the minds of *others* with the same clearness with which he conceived them in *his own*. These will render his name more lasting than the greatest *titles* and *preferments* would have done: those he affected not, nor was solicitous to *have* them; if he had any *ambition*, it was to *deserve* them: and it is a *greater honour* to him, that our most excellent Primate, to whom *merit* is always the *chief recommendation*, thought him *worthy* of them; than it is to others to be, by the *common methods, actually advanced* to them. Nor was he less sensible of the great honour done him by the whole body of the *Convocation*, in choosing him their *Prolocutor;* though, for some reasons, he found it proper to decline it.

But his learning and abilities, though great and admirable, I look upon as the least part of his praise. He had, indeed, an *excellent head;* but he had too, what is infinitely more valuable, an *honest mind*. The character he himself hath described in one of his sermons is so exactly his own, that it seems to be a transcript only of his own heart: "He "was a person of great simplicity and integrity, remarkable for his "honest and upright heart, his frank and open conversation, and for "his plainness and sincerity in all his dealings. He had no sinister or "selfish views, no deceit nor craftiness in him. His designs were "all just, fair, and honourable. His conduct equal, clear, and uni-"form. In a word, his tongue, his hand, and his heart, all went "together."

He hath already approved himself to the learned world as a most able writer in *critical* and *metaphysical* discourses; and in these now published, he will be found to have acquitted himself with equal honour in *practical* ones. The following Sermons are truly such: and what the *Author's* opinion was of such kind of discourses, may be seen in his Preface to the second edition of Mr. Blair's Sermons, vol. iv. p. 419, &c.: "When I say *practical*, let no one be so weak as to take "that for a *diminutive* expression; which is indeed the *highest* and "*brightest commendation* that a *work* can have; whether we look at the "intrinsic *use* and *value* of it, or at the real *difficulties* of performing it "to a degree of exactness, or at the talents requisite for it. A man "bred up in the schools, or conversant only with books, may be able "to write *systems*, or to discuss *points*, in a clear and accurate manner: "but that and more is required in an *able guide*, a complete *practical* "*Divine*, who undertakes to bring down the most important truths to "the level of a *popular audience;* to adapt them properly to *times*, "*persons*, and *circumstances;* to guard them against *latent* prejudices

" and *secret* subterfuges; and lastly, to enforce them with a becoming " earnestness, and with all the prudent ways of insinuation and address. " A person must have some knowledge of *men*, besides that of *books*, " to succeed well here; and must have a kind of *practical sagacity* " (which nothing but the grace of God, joined with recollection and " wise observation, can bring) to be able to represent Christian truths " to the life, or to any considerable degree of advantage." The Author hath here laid down the *necessary qualifications* of a *practical Divine*, and the reader of the following Sermons will find, that he hath given us, in *himself*, a complete *example* of one. If some may have looked upon him as a *mere scholar*, conversant only in the learning of the schools; they will here find they were mistaken, and that he understood *men* as well as he did *books*. It appears, from the following Discourses, that he had a thorough insight into human nature, understood the secret springs and movements of the passions, and the whole *anatomy*, if I may so speak, of the human mind. His way is always, first, to search out the *seat* of the *disease*, and in what *passion* the *latent seeds* of it are situated; and then to apply the remedy *there* with consummate skill and a masterly hand: they will be found full of sound reasoning, just and proper observations, and excellent rules for the conduct of life. As his great design was the *instructing his audience*, he chose rather to *inform the mind* than *amuse the imagination*, and to be *understood* rather than *admired*.

The style is simple and unadorned, but clear and nervous; and such an *unusual plainness* runs through the whole, that perhaps it is a kind of style which never yet appeared; but which wants only *to appear*, in order to be *admired* and *imitated*.

But what gave a *peculiar force* and efficacy to his *instructions*, was a *life answerable to them*; while he stood forth a pattern of what he taught, and was *himself* the *character* he was recommending to *others*.

At the end of this volume there are two tracts; I. A Summary View of the Doctrine of Justification; II. An Inquiry concerning the Antiquity of Infant Communion.

I.

The subject of *Justification* was the occasion of great controversy in the last century. During twenty years' confusion in Church and State, many books were published on this subject by the contending parties; all maintaining their several schemes and hypotheses with equal zeal, and perplexing the plain, natural sense of the inspired writers, with learned sophistry and metaphysical subtleties.

Upon this occasion, in order to restore and settle the peace of the

Church in relation to a point of so great importance, the learned and judicious Mr. Bull, afterwards Bishop of St. David's, composed, about the year 1660, being then about twenty-seven years of age[c], his most incomparable piece, entitled Harmonia Apostolica, &c. well known to the learned, which he published A. D. 1669. In which work, and his Examen Censuræ, &c. and Apologia pro Harmonia, &c. written against the several persons who appeared against him in the cause he had undertaken, he hath, in a manner, exhausted the subject, clearing and settling the true nature of the doctrine, to the satisfaction of every learned and impartial judge. But there hath of late years sprung up among us a sect of men, who are reviving the *solifidian* doctrine; contending that we are *so* justified by *faith alone*, as to *exclude good works* from being *necessary conditions* of *justification*; admitting them to be only necessary *fruits* and *consequences* of it[d]: and Bishop Bull's Works, now mentioned, being wrote in Latin, and so of no service to unlearned readers, from whom this sect of men gather their converts; there seemed to be wanting some treatise in English on this subject[e], which might set that important point of doctrine in a clear light to common Christians: and this seems to have been the occasion of Dr. Waterland's writing the treatise here published; wherein he hath reduced the subject to a very short compass, and, under *five heads*, which take in all that is necessary to be considered for clearing the subject, hath given us a Summary View of the Doctrine of Justification.

He considers, 1. what the *name* imports; 2. what the *thing* contains; 3. how it stands *distinguished* from *renovation* and *regeneration*; 4. what are the *concurring causes* on *God's* part, and on *man's*, to produce it and preserve it; 5. what are the common *extremes* which many have been apt to run into on this head, and how they may be avoided: and the sum is, that we are *justified* by God the *Father*, considered as *principal*; and by God the *Son*, as *meritorious purchaser*; and by God the *Holy Ghost*, as immediate *efficient*; and by *Baptism*, as the ordinary *instrument* of *conveyance*; and by *faith* of such a kind, as the ordinary *instrument* of *reception*; and *lastly*, by *faith* and *holiness*, as the necessary *qualifications* and *conditions*, in adults, both for the first *receiving*, and for the perpetual *preserving* it[f].

These several particulars he hath inquired into, explained, cleared, and settled them with all that accuracy, closeness of reasoning, and perspicuity, which are the characteristics of all his writings.

[c] Harmoniam quidem scripseram circa annum ætatis vicesimum septimum. *Apolog. pro Harm.* sect. viii. §. 5. p. 60. edit. Grabe.

[d] Vid. Whitefield's Answer to the Bishop of London's Pastoral Letter, p. 24, 25.

[e] There is a small Discourse of Saving or Justifying Faith, by Dr. Stebbing: but it is in a different method from our Author's; and both may be useful.

[f] Vid. Summary View, &c. sect. iv. 6.

As *Baptism* hath been too often omitted, or but slightly mentioned. in treatises on the subject of *justification*; our Author gives it a large and distinct consideration[5]. Wherein he shews, that *Baptism*, considered as a *federal rite*, or transaction between God and man, is, in the *New Testament*, and the *ancient Fathers*, either declared or supposed to be the *ordinary*, necessary, outward *mean* or *instrument*, in God's hand, of man's *justification*, the *immediate* and *proximate form* and *rite of conveyance* on *God's* part, and consequently of *reception* on *man's*. This he proves from many clear texts of Scripture; confirming it from the concurring verdict of the *ancients*, down from the *first age*, about A. D. 70. to the end of the fourth century, or later; and from our *Church's forms*; concluding this head with noting, and accounting for a mistake in some eminent moderns, who have taught that the *first* justification in adults is *antecedent* to *Baptism*, and that *Baptism* rather *seals* and *confirms* it, than *conveys* it; for which doctrine he sees no sufficient ground, either in *Scripture* or *antiquity*, or in the *public offices* of our Church; but much the contrary.

Our learned Author observes, that the *phrase* of the *instrumentality of faith*, very eminent men, Hammond, Tillotson, Bull, and Truman (whom he there refers to) have disliked, and rejected the thing. He therefore *distinguishes* upon the question; *rejecting* it according to the *false notion* some had conceived of it, but *contending* for it in the true and proper sense of it. He distinguishes the *instrumentality of faith* to *justification* into an *active* and a *passive* sense; rejecting it in the *former*, and maintaining it in the *latter*. *Faith* cannot be the *instrument* of *conveyance* in the hand of the *efficient* cause; but may be very properly looked on as the *instrument* of *reception* on the part of the *recipient*. It is not the *mean* whereby the grace is *effected* or *conferred*; but may be, and is the *mean* whereby it is *accepted* or *received*.

[5] As our Author hath remarked, that *Baptism* "has been too often omitted, "or but perfunctorily mentioned, in "treatises written on the subject of "*justification*," *Summary View*, *&c.* sect. iv. 4. init. I think it just to Bp. Bull to observe, that that learned and judicious writer hath *not* omitted it in *his* Works; urging, that the *necessity of Baptism* for the *remission of sins*, so often spoken of in holy Scripture and the writings of the ancients, is an argument sufficient alone to overthrow the doctrine of *Solifidianism*, or justification by *faith alone*.

Necessitas Baptismi, eorumque quæ ad Baptismum disponunt, ad remissionem peccatorum consequendum, quæ passim in sacris Scripturis celebratur, atque in scriptis veterum fere utramque facit paginam, argumentum præbet, quod solum sufficiat funditus evertendo Solifidianismo isti, quem multi tum sacris Scripturis, tum Patrum testimoniis astruere conati sunt; uti egredie docuit doctissimus et pientissimus Thorndicius noster ὁ μακαρίτης in scriptis suis passim. Namque hinc apparet, fidem per se non sufficere ad justificationem obtinendum; sed requiri præterea externum Baptismum, ubi haberi potest: omnino vero necessario requiri sponsionem illam novæ vitæ, quæ per Baptismum fieri solet. *Apologia pro Harmonia*, *&c.* sect. iv. §. 9. p. 23. Conf. sect. vii. §. 4. p. 41.

Our Author hath here referred to Bishop Bull as *rejecting* the *instrumentality of faith*. But, upon considering, upon this occasion, with some care, what Bishop Bull hath said, he seems to me, as far as I am capable of judging, *not* to reject the instrumentality of faith *absolutely*, but only in the same sense in which our Author rejects it, and to admit it in the sense our Author admits it. He *rejects faith* from being an *instrument*, if *instrument* be understood strictly to signify an *efficient cause* of justification, or to have a *physical efficiency*: for, since justification is the free *act of God alone*, and produced *extra nos*; neither *faith* nor any action of *ours* can have a *physical efficiency* in producing the effect of justification[h]. But if, by *faith* being an *instrument*, be meant that it is an instrument by which *we accept Christ*, and *embrace the benefit* of justification procured by him; he seems not averse from allowing it an *instrument* in this sense: but urges, that this *act of embracing Christ* is *totally different* from the *act of justification*; since the *former* is *our* act, but *justification* is the act of *God alone*: and that therefore, although it should be granted, that *faith* is the *instrument* of *that act* whereby *we lay hold* on Christ; yet it will not follow, that *faith* is therefore the *instrument* of *justification* also[i]: that is, he denies faith to be the *instrument* of *justification*; because he understands *justification* here in the *active* sense, as the act of *God* alone *conferring* it on man: but considered in the *passive* sense, as that by which *we lay hold* on Christ, and receive the benefit of justification so *conferred*, he seems to have no objection to calling it an *instrument*: and he confesses, in the next sentence, that though, if we will have faith to be an *instrument*, it can be so only when considered as a work *prescribed to us*, and performed by the grace of God; yet he confesses, I say, that *faith*, so considered, may in some sense be called a *mean* or *instrument*, as being that *by* which we *obtain* the thing which is *promised* upon *that condition*[k]: that is, he allows that,

[h] — Si *instrumentum* stricte et proprie sumatur pro *causa efficiente* minus principali, clarum est, *fidem* justificationis *instrumentum* nullo modo dici posse. Nam primo cum *justificatio* sit *actio Dei solius*, eaque tota *extra nos* producta, quomodo vel *fides nostra*, vel quævis nostra actio ad *justificationis* effectum producendum *physicam* ullam *efficientiam* habeat, prorsus ἀκατάληπτον est, &c. *Harmonia Apostol.* dissert. i. cap. 11. sect. 9. p. 11. Conf. dissert. xi. cap. 18. sect. 6. p. 114.

[i] — Hunc *actum amplectendi Christum* a *justificationis actu* δὶς διὰ παντὸς et toto cœlo distare; cum *sit actus noster*, justificatio vero *solius Dei*. Etiamsi igitur *concederemus*, habitum *fidei* esse *instrumentum*, istius actus, *quo Christum amplectimur*; qui tamen inde intulerit, *fidem* esse etiam *justificationis instrumentum*, manifestissimæ certe *inconsequentiæ* reus tenebitur. *Ibid.* diss. i. cap. 11. sect. 9. p. 11.

[k] Ut ergo quod res est dicam; Si *fidem instrumentum* esse velimus, fieri non potest, ut concipiatur alio modo *instrumentum* esse, quam quatenus *opus est ex præscripto*, et per gratiam Dei a nobis præstitum. *Conditio* enim, quatenus præstita est, aliquo modo *medium*, sive *instrumentum dici potest*, quo *consequimur* rem, quæ sub conditione promittitur. *Ibid.*

though *faith* cannot be an *instrument* of *justification* in the *active* sense of justification, an instrument on the part of *God* who *justifies;* yet it may be an *instrument* in the *passive* sense, on the part of *man* who *receives* justification from the hand of God.

I think I have here represented the learned Bishop's sentiments truly: and it appears to me therefore from thence, that he is not to be ranked among those who reject the instrumentality of faith *absolutely*. He seems to me to distinguish upon the case, much as our Author hath done; and though he dislikes the *phrase*, yet he rejects the *thing* as the instrument of *conveyance* only, not as the instrument of *reception;* though he chooses to call it by another name: for,

It may be noted, that there is this *difference* between Bishop Bull and our Author; that the *Bishop* looks upon faith, considered as the *instrument of reception*, to be a *condition* of justification[l]: but Dr. Waterland distinguishes *that faith* which he reckons among the *conditions* of justification, from *that faith* which he makes the *instrument of reception*. *Faith*, as a *condition*, means the *whole complex* of *Christian belief:* but *faith*, considered as *precisely* the *instrument* of *reception*, means only, in his account, the *laying hold* on *grace*, and *resting* in Christ's *merits*, in opposition to our *own deservings*[m].

I have observed, that there hath risen of late among us a sect of *enthusiasts*, who contend, with the old Solifidians, that we are *justified* by *faith alone*, in *such manner*, as to *exclude good works* from being *necessary conditions* of *justification;* admitting them to be nothing more than necessary *fruits*, *signs*, or *consequents* of it. This doctrine hath been lately publicly maintained by one of the chief leaders of that sect; and, in order to support it, he is pleased to claim the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth Articles of our Church, as teaching the *same doctrine* with him[n].

As I did some time since[o] publish a Vindication of the Church of England, in requiring Subscription from the Clergy to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion in general; I think it the more incumbent upon me, to take this opportunity of vindicating those *particular* Articles now mentioned, from teaching any such doctrine as they are here supposed to do: since, if they really could be proved to teach any thing so contrary to the whole tenor of Scripture, I should be so far

[l] — Si hoc sensu *instrumentum* sumatur (nempe pro *conditione* sive instrumento morali) fidem esse unicum justificationis instrumentum omnino negamus: cum (ut jam satis evicimus) etiam pœnitentiæ opera non minus necessaria ad justificationem obtinendam a Spiritu Sancto diserte statuantur. *Ibid.* He makes *faith* considered as an *instrument*, to be as much a *condition* as *repentance*. Conf. the foregoing note [k].

[m] Summary View, &c. sect. iv. 6.

[n] Mr. Whitefield's Answer to the Bishop of London's Pastoral Letter, p. 24, &c.

[o] A. D. 1739.

from *defending* the *requiring subscription* to them, that I should most heartily join, as I have there declared[p], in *pleading against* it. I shall therefore here take the liberty of giving a brief consideration of this matter, as what may properly enough at this time, when such claims are advanced to our Articles, attend upon the treatise of *justification* now published.

Before I enter upon this subject I shall observe, that it is, in general, objected to our Articles, that they are formed upon the plan of *Calvinism*. Now one of the *five points* of *Calvinism* is, that we are *justified* by *faith alone;* and therefore our eleventh Article, which so speaks, may be urged as teaching the *Calvinistical doctrine* concerning *justifying faith:* therefore I beg leave, for a confutation of this pretence, that *our Articles are Calvinistical*, to refer to Dr. Waterland's Supplement to the Case of Arian Subscription, vol. ii. where the reader may receive sufficient satisfaction on that head[q]. I now pass on to the Articles themselves.

Article XI.

Of the Justification of Man.

In this Article it is said, that "we are justified by faith only——and "not for own our works or deservings." And it is insisted upon, by those I am here concerned with, that the Article hereby ascribes our *justification* to *faith only*, in *such sense* as to *exclude good works* from being *necessary conditions* of it[r].

But when the Article teaches, that we are *justified* by *faith alone*, it does not mean that *all other virtues* and *good works* are to be *excluded thereby* from being *necessary conditions* of *justification;* nor, that *faith* does *more* in the business of *justification* than *other* virtues do: but that this proposition, viz. "we are justified by faith alone," is true so far only as the word *faith* signifies such an obedience as is joined with a *trust* in Christ's *merits*, and a *renouncing* all *merit* of *our own*, all *merit* or *deservings* in *our own works*[s]. Such is the *faith* meant in the Article, when it is said, "we are *justified* by *faith only*." Not *such*

[p] Church of England Vindicated, &c. sect. iv. p. 47.

[q] P. 340—353.

[r] Whitefield's Answer, &c. p. 24, 25.

[s] Summam rei paucis complectar: cum veteres Protestantes docuerunt, *sola* nos *fide* justificari, illud non ita intellexerunt, quasi per *eam fidem excludendæ* essent *cæteræ virtutes*, cæteraque *bona opera*, tanquam ad *justificationem* obtinendam nullo modo *necessaria*, aut quasi *fides plus aliquid ageret* in ipso *justificationis negotio*, quam *cæteræ virtutes;* sed *propositionem istam eatenus tantum ut veram recipi voluerunt*, quatenus vox *fidei* denotat talem obedientiam, quæ cum *fiducia* de *meritis Jesu Christi*, ac *meritorum nostrorum* perfecta *abrenuntiatione*, conjuncta est, quæque adeo ea *opera omnia excludit*, quæ cum fiducia et opinione *meriti nostri* fiunt. *Bull. Harmonia Apostolica*, diss. ii. c. 18. sect. 6. p. 114.

faith as *excludes good works* from being *necessary conditions* of *justification:* but a *faith* which excludes only *such* works as are done trusting in our *own merits* and *deservings.* So the Article itself plainly limits it. It does not merely say that we are justified by *faith only;* but explains it, by saying also, in the beginning of the Article, "we are *accounted* "*righteous* before God, *only* for the *merit* of our Lord and Saviour "Jesus Christ by *faith,* and *not for our own works or deservings:*" which plainly shews, that *faith* here means only a *reliance* on Christ's *merits,* in opposition to any *merit* of *our own;* excluding *good works* from the business of *justification* no otherwise, than from being pleaded as *meritorious,* not from being *conditions.* And the reason why *justification* is here *particularly* and *eminently* ascribed to *faith only,* is, because, as it is by *faith only,* of all our virtues, that we *lay hold* on the *Gospel covenant,* by which we are *justified;* therefore our *justification* may not improperly be attributed to *faith alone*[t]; that being *emphatically* the *instrument* whereby we *receive* the grant of *justification:* but *obedience* nevertheless is *equally* a *condition* or *qualification;* though not *that act* of the mind whereby we *embrace* the promises, as *faith* is[u]; which therefore is said, in the Article, *emphatically,* or *eminently,* to *justify.* And for the like reason it is, that Scripture expresses all *evangelical obedience* by the name of *faith*[x].

That what I have been here giving is the true and only sense intended in the Article, we need no other evidence than the Homily of Justification. The Article itself sends us *there* for a more full *explanation* of its meaning: and in the Homily we find it *actually explained* in the sense I have here given of it: which Homily Bishop Bull hath alleged for the same purpose; maintaining and defending this to be the plain sense, both of the Homily and the Article, against his opposers[y].

It is likewise worth observing, that our Articles were compiled, next to Scripture and antiquity, upon the plan of the Augustan Confession, drawn up by Melancthon, as learned men have sufficiently

[t] Bishop Bull, after quoting a passage from the Homily of Justification, proceeds thus: Ex quibus verbis clare elucet, *quid summum illud sit,* quod in *negotio justificationis* ex *Ecclesiæ nostræ* sententia *fidei distincte* tribuendum sit; nempe quod, licet *cæteræ virtutes* non *minus necessariæ* sint ad hominis *justificationem,* quam *ipsa fides,* ac fides proprie nihilo plus agat in isto negotio, quam alia virtus; quia tamen ex omnibus virtutibus *fides una* promissum *amplectitur* Evangelicum, *quo justificamur,* ideo non incommoda locutione *ipsi soli* justificatio nostra tribui possit ac soleat; viz. per metonymiam quandam, qua actus ponitur pro objecto circa quod versatur. *Ibid.* p. 112. Conf. diss. i. c. 6. sect. 1. p. 26.

[u] Vid. Summary View of the Doctrine of Justification, sect. iv. 5. prope fin.

[x] Bull. Harm. Apost. diss. ii. cap. 5. sect. 5. p. 45, 46.

[y] Bulli Harmonia Apostolica, diss. ii. c. 18. sect. 6. p. 110—114. Examen Censuræ. Respons. ad Animadvers. xxiii. p. 103—106. Apologia pro Harmonia, sect. v. p. 28—34. Conf. Harmon. Apostol. diss. i. c. 6. sect. 1. p. 26.

proved[z]. Insomuch that Bishop Bull says, that he who is ignorant of *this Confession*, will scarce be able to understand the sense and meaning of our Articles[a]. The Augustan Confession therefore may be produced as a *comment* upon our Articles. Now in the twentieth article of that Confession, they acknowledge *repentance* to be *necessary* to *justification*; and yet, nevertheless, they assert that we are *justified* by *faith*: and they explain their meaning to be, that, though *repentance* be a *necessary condition* of *justification*, yet we are not justified upon the account of any *merit* in our *repentance*, or other *good works*, but for Christ's *merits* only: but we cannot *lay hold* on this benefit any otherwise than by *faith*; by which we believe that we shall be forgiven, and *justified* for *Christ's sake*[b]. Therefore, the saying that we are *justified by faith*, is plainly here declared to be *consistent* with saying that *repentance* and other *good works* are *necessary conditions* of *justification*. And since this is declared by the Augustan Confession, upon the plan of which our Articles were formed; it is a very fair and equitable conclusion, that *our Articles* therefore meant not, by saying that we are justified by *faith alone*, to *exclude* thereby *good works* from being *necessary conditions* of *justification*[c].

Article XII.

Of Good Works.

In this Article it is said, "that good works are the fruits of faith, "and follow after justification." From whence it is argued, that, according to this Article, *good works* cannot be *previous conditions*, but only *fruits* and *consequents* of *justification*[d].

But a distinction is here to be made between *good works* of faith, *internal* and *external*. The *internal works* are *repentance, hope, charity*, &c. The *external works* are these *virtues* of the mind reduced into *outward acts*. Now that these *latter works* only are the *works* meant in the Article, which are said to *follow after* justification, I prove thus.

[z] Waterland's Supplement to the Case of Arian Subscription, vol. ii. p. 347, 348. Bulli Apolog. pro Harmon. sect. vi. §. 3. p. 35.

[a] Harm. Apostol. diss. ii. c. 18. sect. 6. p. 110.

[b] Quanquam igitur contritio aliqua, seu pœnitentia, necessaria est, tamen sentiendum est, donari nobis remissionem peccatorum, et fieri nos ex injustis justos, id est, reconciliatos seu acceptos, et Filios Dei gratis, propter Christum, non propter dignitatem contritionis aut aliorum operum præcedentium aut sequentium. Sed fide hoc beneficium accipiendum est, qua credere nos oportet, quod propter Christum nobis donentur remissio peccatorum et justificatio. *August. Confess.* art. xx. *De Fide.* Vid. Corpus et Syntagma Confessionum, part. ii. p. 17. Genev. 1654.

[c] Conf. Bulli Harm. Apostol. diss. ii. cap. 18. sect. 6. p. 110.

[d] Vid. Whitefield's Answer to the Bishop of London, p. 25.

The *works* which are said to *follow after* justification, are the *same works* which are said, in the same Article, to be *the fruits of faith*, by which such *faith* is *as evidently known* as a *tree discerned* by the *fruit:* but the *works* which are said to be the *fruits of faith*, by which such *faith* is as *evidently known* as a *tree discerned* by the *fruit*, must be *external works, external signs* of *faith*, as the *fruit* is the *external sign* of the *tree:* therefore the *works* which are said to *follow after* justification are only the *external works*, i. e. the *internal works* of the mind *reduced* into *outward acts.*

That by the *works* which are here said to be *fruits of faith* are meant *external works*, is evident by their being said to be *such* by which a lively faith is as *evidently known* as a *tree discerned* by the *fruit*. *Faith* cannot be *evidently known* by *internal* works or virtues, since *they* cannot be *signs* of it; for *signs* must be *external* and *outward;* otherwise they cannot make our faith *evidently known* to others: but these *internal virtues* are all *secret*, and as remote from the eyes of men as *faith* itself, till it be made known by *external* works. If it be said, that the Church here speaks of our faith being *evidently known*, not to *others*, but to *ourselves;* besides that it is a construction which the words of the Article will not bear; it will still be the same thing: for this would be to shew one thing which is unknown, by another equally unknown; since these *internal virtues* are equally as *unknown* to *ourselves*, as our *faith* is[e].

I conceive therefore, that this Article is sufficiently vindicated from teaching any such doctrine, as that we are *so* justified by *faith only*, as to *exclude good works* from being *previous, necessary conditions* of *justification*. The *works* said in the Article to *follow after* justification are *external* works only; and *such* works we allow *do follow after* it. But nevertheless the *internal* works may, for all that is said in this Article, and do, *precede* and are *necessary conditions* of *justification:* and they are these *internal works* only, which we assert to be such *necessary, previous conditions.*

The truth of the case is, *internal* works are *necessary*, and must be *previous* to what is called the *first justification;* and *external* works, which *follow after* the *first justification*, are *equally necessary* to the *second*, if opportunity permit[f]. *Habitual righteousness*, consisting of

[e] Vid. Bulli Harmon. Apostol. diss. ii. cap. 18. sect. 8. p. 116.

[f] Hæc quæ de absoluta bonorum operum disseruimus, certissima sunt. Nihilominus et hic etiam cautione aliqua lectori Christiano opus erit, ut accurate distinguat inter justificationem *primam* ac *secundam*, adeoque inter *bona opera*, quæ ad *hanc illam*que necessario *requiruntur*. Atque hic statuendum omnino est, ad *primam* justificationem *opera* tantum *interna* fidei, pœnitentiæ, spei, charitatis, &c. esse absolute *necessaria;* cætera vero *externa* opera, quæ in *factis externis*, sive in *actuali* singularum virtutum, quas modo enumeravimus, *exercitio* conspiciuntur, *signa* tantum esse *fructus*que pietatis internæ, et justifica-

the *internal works* of faith, (such as *repentance, hope, charity*, and the like,) is a *necessary condition* of *justification*, and *goes before* it. *Actual righteousness*, consisting of *external acts*, are *necessary* to be done *after* justification, and *follow* it; follow the *first* justification, and are *necessary* to be done in order to the *second*, or to *preserving* the *first*. That is, the *first righteousness* is *necessary* for the *reception* of the grant of *justification*; the *latter righteousness* is *equally necessary* for *preserving* the same grant. And this appears to be the doctrine of the Homily of Justification, to which the compilers of the Articles do, in the foregoing Article, refer for a *more full explication* of their doctrine, on the point of *justification*[g]. Or, perhaps, by *good works following after justification*, in this Article, may be meant good works following after *grace*: for even the *internal* good works, which we say must *precede* justification, as *necessary conditions* of it, do not precede *grace*, as I shall shew under the next Article. And there may be reason to think, that the compilers might not here perhaps accurately express the *distinction* between *grace* and *justification*; because they appear not to have done it in the following Article, by comparing the *title* of it with the *Article itself*; the *title* being, "Of Works done "before *justification*;" and yet the Article speaking only of works done before *grace*; as I shall have occasion to observe under that Article.

Dr. Waterland hath well observed, in the tract now published, that since "all of us, or nearly all, are *baptized* in *infancy*, and therefore "*regenerated* and *justified* of course;—*good works* must, in this case "at least, (which is *our case*,) *follow* after *justification* and *regeneration*, "if they are at all:—and we need not so much as inquire whether "good works *precede* or *follow* justification in the case of *adults*, since

tione *posteriora*, eaque demum lege præstanda, si non desit opportunitas. Hoc dubio procul illud est, quod voluit Ecclesia nostra in *articulo duodecimo*, in quo dicit *opera* esse *fructus fidei*, et veluti *signa* quibus *fides dignoscitur*, quæque *justificationem* hominis consequuntur. Per opera enim hic intelligi omnino debent opera externa, &c.—*Bulli Harmon. Apostol.* diss. ii. cap. 18. sect. 8. p. 115, 116. Conf. sect. ix. x. p. 116—118. Ibid. cap. iii. sect. 2. p. 38. Ibid. cap. xii. sect. 28. p. 90. Apolog. pro Harmon. sect. vi. §. 7. p. 37.

[g] Bishop Bull, after quoting a passage from the Homily, proceeds thus: Author distinguens *habitualem* (ut dici solet) justitiam nostram *virtutibus internis* fidei, spei, pœnitentiæ, charitatis, &c. constantem, ab *actuali* justitia operum bonorum, sive *factorum conspicuorum*. De *priori* docet, quod *necessario requiratur* in omni homine qui *justificatur*; de *posteriori*, quod *postea* (nempe *post justificationem*) necessario *præstanda* sit. Nimirum *prior justitia requiritur* (ut diximus) ad *gratiam* justificationis *accipiendam*; *posterior* ad eandem gratiam *conservandam*. *Apolog. pro Harmon.* sect. v. §. 4. p. 29. conf. §. 5.

The famed maxim of St. Austin, that *good works follow after justification, and do not precede it*, Dr. Waterland interprets of *Baptism*: viz. that men must be *incorporated* in Christ, must be good Christians, before they could practise *Christian works*, strictly so called, *Summary View*, sect. iv. 4. prope fin. i. e. *external* Christian works. Bishop Bull interprets it another way. Harmon. Apostol. diss. ii. cap. 3. sect. 2. p. 38. et Grabii Annot. ibid. p. 39.

"it is not *our* case[h]." But if forward men will raise these unnecessary disputes, "teaching things which they ought not," and thereby "sub-"verting whole houses;" it becomes proper and necessary that their "mouths should be stopped," by declaring and defending the true and sound doctrine.

Article XIII.

Of Works before Justification.

Mr. Whitefield hath printed this Article, together with the other two, at the end of his Answer to the Bishop of London: but I do not find that he draws any argument in particular from this Article. However, the use I suppose to be made of it is, to conclude from it, that since the Article *teaches* that "works done before the grace of Christ, and the in-"spiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they "spring not of faith in Jesus Christ;—yea rather, for that they are not "done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done,—they "have the nature of sin;" therefore the same Article must *teach* that *good works* cannot be done *before* justification.

But I apprehend, that one short answer will suffice to vindicate this Article from teaching any such doctrine.

Though *works* done before the *grace* of Christ are not pleasant to God, but rather, not being done as God hath commanded, have the nature of sin[i]; that is, though such works may be *materially* good, they are *formally* evil; yet, works done before *justification* may be pleasant to God, and not have the nature of sin; may be *good works*, and *previously necessary*, as such, to *justification*. For it is one thing to say, that good works precede *grace;* and another to say, they precede *justification*. The *former* we say not: the *latter* only we maintain. *Grace* and *justification*, which are really *distinct*, should not be *confounded* together. No work *truly good* can precede *grace;* because, without *grace*, no such work can be performed: but *good works* may and do precede *justification;* for *grace is given before* justification, that *good works may be* performed, *by which* we *attain justification*[k].

I am aware that the *title* of the Article is, "Of Works before "*Justification*." But the *Article itself* says not a word of works before *justification;* but only of works before the *grace* of Christ, and the

[h] Summary View, &c. sect. iv. 6. ad fin.

[i] Vid. Vitring. Observ. Sacr. lib. iii. cap. 12. tom. ii. p. 622. Bull. Harm. Apostol. diss. ii. cap. 5. sect. 4. p. 44. Burnet's Exposit. of the Thirty-nine Articles, art. xiii. Sharrock de Fin. et Offic. p. 52. Clarke's Posth. Sermons, Serm. 13. vol. iv. p. 317, &c. Bennet's Directions, p. 78.

[k] Res est, nulla opera vere bona præcedere posse gratiam Dei, cum sine gratia illa ne præstari quidem possint. At possunt opera bona præcedere justificationem, imo et revera præcedunt; quippe datur gratia ante justificationem, ut præstentur ea, quibus ad justificationem perveniatur. *Harmon. Apostol.* dissert. ii. cap. 12. sect. 28. p. 90.

inspiration of his Spirit: and the *title* must be explained by the *Article*, and not the *Article* by the *title*. And therefore the doctrine of the *Article* being only about works done before *grace;* we must conclude, that by *Works before Justification*, in the title, are meant only works before *grace;* as the meaning is explained to be in the Article itself.

I have thus given a brief vindication of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth Articles of our Church, from teaching any such doctrine, as that we are *so justified* by *faith alone*, as to *exclude good works* from being *previous, necessary conditions* of *justification*. And if they who are vending about this *false doctrine*, and claiming *these Articles* as on their side, had *more* of that *letter learning* they despise, and *less* of that *assurance* they are noted for, they would be *wiser men themselves*, and fitter to *teach others*, than they at present appear to be. But *ignorance*, the *greater* it is, is always the *bolder*.

II.

The other tract is on the subject of *Infant Communion*.

The Author, in his Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist, vol. iv. p. 563. observes, that the *Fathers*, both in the Greek and Latin churches, for the first four centuries, or somewhat more, never interpreted John vi. *directly* of the *Eucharist:* but that, by the frequent *applying* the *general doctrine* of *spiritual feeding*, there spoken of, to the *particular case* of the *Eucharist*, many, among the Latins especially, came, about the beginning of the fifth century, to *interpret* it *directly* of the *Eucharist*, and so to think that John vi. 53. was as decisive a text for the *necessity* of the *Eucharist*, as John iii. 5. was for the *necessity* of *Baptism*. Having observed this, he proceeds to say, that "hereupon ensued a "common practice of giving the Communion to mere *infants*. Pope "Innocent I. is believed to have been the first or principal man that "brought up such doctrine of the *necessity* of communicating *infants*." In the margin, after referring to Wall and Bingham, he says, "Compare "Mr. Peirce's Essay on Infant Communion, who carries it much higher "than others, upon suggestions which bear a plausible appearance, and "are worth examining by some person of learning and leisure. But "in the mean while, I acquiesce in Dr. Wall's account, as one that was "well considered, and which, in my opinion, cannot be far from the "truth." And in another marginal note, after referring to Wall and Vossius, for St. Austin's being supposed to have interpreted John vi. 53. of the *necessity* of the *Eucharist* to salvation, he adds, "But Thorndike "disputes it with some show of reason."

From the manner of expressing himself in these passages, it appears, though he followed the *common opinion*, that the doctrine of the *necessity* of *Infant Communion*, founded on John vi. 53. and the

practice consequent thereupon, prevailed in the fifth century; yet, that he was not clear in his judgment about it, but had some scruples in relation thereto. For though he acquiesced in Dr. Wall's account for the present, looking upon him as one who had well considered the matter; and observed, that Mr. Peirce had carried the practice still higher, upon suggestions which bear a plausible appearance; yet he thought those suggestions worth *examining* further into. And though he had said, that St. Austin is supposed to have construed John vi. 53. of the *necessity* of the *Eucharist* to salvation, referring to Wall and Vossius; yet he was not so well satisfied of the truth of such supposition, but to add, that Thorndike *disputes it with some show of reason;* doubtful all the while how this matter might turn out upon further inquiry: and accordingly he himself inquired deeper into it before the book was published, as appears by the following Advertisement prefixed to it.

"ADVERTISEMENT.

" In [p. 563, vol. iv.] I have followed the common opinion of learned " Protestants (Mr. Bingham, Dr. Wall, &c.) in relation to *Infant Com-* " *munion*, as prevailing in the fifth century, under a notion of its strict " *necessity*, built upon John vi. 53. though I had some scruple about " it; as may appear by my manner of expressing myself, and by the " reference to Thorndike in note[k].

" Having since looked somewhat deeper into that question, I think " it now just to my readers to advertise them, that I apprehend that " *common opinion* to be a *mistake;* and that though the practice of " giving Communion to *children* at *ten* or at *seven* years of age (or " somewhat sooner) was *ancient*, and perhaps *general*, yet the practice " of communicating *mere infants*, under a notion of its *necessity*, and " as built upon John vi., came not in before the eighth or ninth century, " never was *general;* or however lasted not long in the West, where it " first began. My reasons for this persuasion are too long to give here: " but I thought this short hint might be proper, to prevent misconcep- " tions as to that Article."

The tract now submitted to the judgment of the learned, is the result of our author's further inquiry into this subject; wherein the reader will find at large the reasons for the opinion delivered in the above Advertisement.

The thing was mentioned incidentally only in his Review, where nothing was built upon it: and though that might be one occasion of his looking further into it, yet he had other motives for so doing, esteeming it a point worth clearing up.

Some have censured the *ancients*, as having *erred* in *teaching* the *necessity* of *Infant Communion*, and *practising* it upon such *erroneous principles;* in order to detract in general from the *authority* of the *ancient Fathers*. Among these is, particularly, Mr. Daillé, in his treatise concerning the Use of the Fathers for determining the Controverted Heads of Religion; who, in lib. ii. cap. 4. *concerning the errors of the Fathers*, having, among the rest, brought in St. Cyprian, as falling in with the *error* of that age, the doctrine of the *necessity* of the *Eucharist* to *baptized infants*[l]; and St. Austin, as *teaching* the *same*[m]; closes the chapter with concluding from thence, that since the *Fathers* were guilty of *so many errors*, their opinions are not of *weight enough* to shew the *truth* of any *controverted point*[n].

Though it be the *immediate* design of Mr. Daillé's treatise to shew (from the *uncertainty* of *determining clearly* what the opinions of the *Fathers* were, and from their not being *infallible* in their opinions, though clearly known) that the *Fathers* cannot be made *judges*, in the *controversies* between Protestants and Papists; yet it plainly appears, that he was willing hereby to decry *their authority* in *general*[o]: which others have made a very bad use of, as it must be obvious they would do, though with little reason: for though it be true, that the *Fathers* were not *infallible*, and may have *erred* in points of *less consequence;* yet it is running into *unjustifiable extremes* to conclude from thence, as some have done, that therefore there is *no credit* to be given to the *verdict of antiquity* at all; that they have *erred* in *fundamentals*, or in delivering down the canonical books of Scripture, and the *fundamental doctrines* therein contained. Though Mr. Daillé himself might have no design of running to such *extremes;* yet he hath given an handle to others for so doing: and though he professes to add the fourth chapter of his book, concerning the errors of the Fathers, *unwillingly*[p]; yet, as a judicious writer observes, he hath made it hard for us to believe it, when we find that he has made

[l] Idem beatus martyr [Cyprianus] in sui seculi errore versabatur, putans omnibus baptizatis, ne pueris quidem exceptis, Eucharistiam esse ad salutem necessariam. *Dallæi de Usu Patrum* lib. ii. cap. 4. p. 263. Latin. edit. Genevæ, 1686.

[m] Statuit etiam Augustinus Eucharistiam pueris necessariam. *Ibid.* pag. 280.

[n] —Videor ex his jam merito posse concludere, cum Patres tot modis erraverint, sive seorsum singuli, sive conjunctim plures, nec privatam singulorum sententiam, nec plerorumque ex iis consensum argumentum esse satis firmum ad eorum capitum quæ hodie controvertuntur certo demonstrandum veritatem. *Ibid.* p. 294.

[o] Quæ duobus superioribus capitibus disseruimus sufficere arbitror, ut quivis moderato ingenio præditus apud se constituat, *non tantam esse in rebus ad religionem pertinentibus, quam vulgus existimat, Patrum auctoritatem. Ibid.* p. 252.

[p] Poterunt ergo, quiqui sint æqui lectores, hoc et sequens caput prætermittere, quod utrumque *pæne invitus* subjicere cogor, ut iis, qui se studiis suis abripi patiuntur, excusationem omnem præcidam ——ægre quidem, et, quod ait poeta, *ἀέκοντι θυμῷ* hanc disputationis partem aggredior. *Ibid.* p. 253.

their errors *more* and *greater* than they really are[q]. Nor does it appear consistent with the great regard he would seem to pay to their characters[r], to have been so diligent in collecting and publishing their *errors*, without *evidence sufficient* against such great and good men; who have received their *vindication*, against the accusations of this writer, from several learned hands[s]; as they have also done against the like objections of Mr. Barbeyrac, by the pen of our learned author in another treatise[t]. Many errors imputed to them have, upon review, been found to be the errors only of those who so imputed them: and the tract now published hath taken away *one error more* from Mr. Daillé's catalogue, by shewing, that the *doctrine* of the *necessity* of *Infant Communion* was really *never taught* by those *ancient Fathers*, whose doctrine it hath commonly been thought to have been.

The *Fathers* were *men*, therefore *fallible*, and not to be acquitted of all *mistakes*, unless we could acquit them too of *human frailties*. But though we should not dissemble the *real errors* of the *Fathers*, yet it becomes us to be *cautious* in our censures, not to lay *more* errors to their charge than they were really guilty of; nor to be *over zealous* in *searching out* every occasion of *carping* at their writings; nor to *aggravate*, beyond reason, those errors which they may be found to have fallen into; lest we thereby give an handle to the enemies of religion to turn it to a bad use, by decrying the *authority of antiquity in general*, and in relation to the weightier matters of our faith. Buddæus, who seems to be a great admirer of Mr. Daillé's book, speaking of Zornius who wrote against it, confesses this[u]: and though he was no very zealous advocate for the *Fathers*, speaks of them in very handsome terms, not running the lengths of those who talk only as their *prejudices* direct them, without knowing any thing of the matter. Buddæus was a man of learning, and knew what he said: and therefore, at the same time that he cannot acquit the *Fathers* of *all errors* and *faults*, (and who ever pretended to do it?) declares them to have

q Wall's History of Infant Baptism, part ii. cap. 9. sect. 15. vol. ii. p. 436.

r Grave enim est, et a pudore nostro alienum, hominum, præsertim sanctorum et merito venerabilium nævos ac labes spectare ac ostentare. *Daillé, ibid.* p. 253.

s Scrivener in Apologia pro Sanctis Ecclesiæ Patribus adv. Dallæum, par. ii. cap. 4. p. 185. Cavei Epistola Apologetica. Zornius Hamburgensis Vindiciæ Patrum, oppositæ Joanni Dallæo, &c. in Opuscul. ejus Sacr. tom. i.

t Importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity, vol. iii. cap. 7. p. 634—648.

u Lubens sane fateor, caute hac in re procedendum, ne vitia et nævos Patrum ultra, quam decet, exaggerando, et curiose nimis, quæ carpamus, in illorum scriptis, conquirendo, ipsam quoque religionem Christianam, doctrinamque sacram, profanorum hominum ludibrio exponamus. Nec tamen ideo omnia in patribus laudanda, aut nævi, vitia, et errores dissimulandi; cum tela, quæ inde forte homines impii, aut dissentientes, contra nos depromunt, alia repellere ratione queamus. *Buddæi Isagog. ad Theolog.* lib. ii. cap. 3. sect. 13. tom. i. p. 542.

been excellent men, judicious, pious, virtuous, and learned for the times they lived in[x]. He takes the middle way, neither ascribing too much nor too little to their authority[y]. He is so far from *despising* them, as they only do who are *ignorant* of them, that he *recommends* the *diligent study* of them, not only as *useful*, but as *absolutely necessary* in order to an exact knowledge in *ecclesiastical antiquity*[z]: and declares, that notwithstanding the errors of this or that *single Father* in some points; yet the *true Catholic doctrine* and *faith of the Church* may be found in them[a]. The reader will excuse this short digression concerning the *Fathers*, which the mention of Mr. Daillé's treatise hath led me into. I chose to be a little particular in representing the sense of Buddæus upon this head; because, being a learned and judicious man, and no great admirer of the *Fathers*, his moderate opinion, and recommendation of them, will carry a double force, and may be of use to procure a more favourable reception for them among those who will not regard what is said of them by others, whom they look upon as more prejudiced in their favour.—I now return.

As Mr. Daillé hath imputed to the *Fathers* the *doctrine* of the *necessity* of *Infant Communion*, in order to destroy their credit in *general*; so there are others who have taken advantage, from this *supposed doctrine* and *practice*, to lessen their credit in respect particularly to *Infant Baptism*. The Antipædobaptists, who say that the custom of giving *infants* the *Communion* was, anciently, as *general* as the *baptizing* them[b], argue thus: the *ancients* taught the *necessity* of *Infant Communion*; and thereupon gave *infants* the *Eucharist*, as well as *Baptism*: but all allow that they were guilty of an *error* in giving the *Eucharist* to *infants*; and therefore there can be no reason to lay

[x] Fuerunt inter eos viri præstantes, pollentes ingenio, et pro istorum temporum ratione eruditi, virtutis quoque sanctitatisque laude florentes; nec tamen nævorum, errorum, vitiorum, humanæque imbecillitatis plane expertes. *Ibid.* p. 540.

[y] De auctoritate illi recte sentiunt, qui, media quadam via incedentes, nec plus, nec minus, quam decet, illis tribuunt. *Ibid.* p. 539.

—— Nec omnis erga veteres istos ecclesiæ doctores, quibus multa debemus, abjicienda veneratio; sed accurate simul, diligenterque dispiciendum, ne, dum modesti videri volumus, in veritatem simus injurii. *Ibid.* p. 543.

[z] Antiquitatis et historiæ ecclesiasticæ notitiam adcuratiorem sine Patrum lectione neminem sibi comparare posse, adeo manifestum est, ut ignorantiam suam proditurus esset, qui secus sentiret.—— Atque hæc cum ita se habent, nos Patres neutiquam contemnere, manifestum est; sed eorum potius lectionem, si recte instituatur, ceu utilem maxime ac salutarem, omnibus commendare. *Ibid.* p. 544.

[a] Hi ipsi autem nævi atque errores Patrum, dum hic in illo, alius in alio capite erravit, non obstant, quo minus, si ex omnibus adsumantur, quæ recte dicta sunt, veræ inde Catholicæque doctrinæ in Ecclesia perpetua conservatio propagatioque intelligi queat. *Ibid.* p. 505.

[b] Vid. Wall's History of Infant Baptism, part ii. cap. 9. sect. 15. vol. ii. p. 435, 436.

any great stress on *their authority*, or to regard *their opinion* or *practice*, in giving them *Baptism*[c].

As these I have hitherto mentioned have pleaded the *antiquity* of the *practice* of *Infant Communion*, as founded on the doctrine of its *strict necessity*, in order to censure the *Fathers* as guilty of *error* therein; so there have been others, on the contrary, who have pleaded the same, in *favour* of such practice, and to recommend the *revival* of it. Bishop Bedell, of the last century, Bishop of Kilmore in Ireland, occasionally mentions it in a letter to Dr. Ward, Master of Sidney College in Cambridge[d]. And Mr. Peirce of Exon, in the year 1728, published an Essay in Favour of the ancient Practice of giving the Eucharist to Children.

These were the motives which excited Dr. Waterland to examine whether the *fact* itself be true, from the *supposal* of which these *several conclusions* are drawn: i. e. whether the *ancient Fathers really practised Infant Communion* under an opinion of its *strict necessity to salvation*. For if they did not, then neither does Mr. Daillé's argument, with respect to this particular point, hold good for *censuring* it as *ancient practice built on erroneous principles*; nor that of the Antipædobaptists, in *derogation* from the *authority* of the *Fathers* for *Infant Baptism*; nor, on the other hand, those of Bishop Bedell and Mr. Peirce, for *reviving* the practice, so far as they plead for it on supposing such to have been the *ancient* doctrine and practice.

As Dr. Waterland hath fallen immediately to the business of his *inquiry* into the *antiquity* of this doctrine and practice, without staying to give any previous particular account of the several sentiments of learned moderns on that head; it may not be improper to note how that matter stands, for the use of common readers; and to be more particular in relation to this tract, it being on a subject not so commonly known.

1. Mr. Wall, author of the History of Infant Baptism, hath given it as his opinion, that in Cyprian's time, about the middle of the third century, the people of the Church of Carthage did oftentimes bring their *children younger than ordinary* to the *Communion*[e]; probably at four or five years of age[f]. This he concludes from a story which Cyprian tells, in his book De Lapsis, concerning a *girl* who,

[c] Conf. Wall, ibid. sect. 17. vol. ii. p. 447.

[d] ——And so did also children baptized in the primitive Church communicate in the Lord's Supper. Which I know not why it should not be so still. Vid. Archbishop Usher's Letters published with his Life by Dr. Parr, 1686. No. clxiii. p. 442.

—— As for diverse ages they did, [i. e. children did receive the Eucharist,] and by the analogy of the Passover they may, perhaps ought, &c. *Ibid.* p. 445.

[e] Wall's History of Infant Baptism, part ii. cap. 9. vol. ii. p. 446. ed. 3.

[f] Ibid. p. 440.

in the *Decian persecution*, was carried by her nurse to the *idol feast*, and *partook of the sacrifices*, and was afterwards brought by her mother to the *Communion* while St. Cyprian was administering. Now as this must have been after Cyprian's return to Carthage, upon the ceasing of the persecution, which was A.D. 251[g]; so high, from this instance, must Mr. Wall suppose this custom to have prevailed in the Church of Carthage.

In Austin's and Pope Innocent the First's time, the beginning of the *fifth century*, he thinks it was given, in the western parts, to *mere infants;* and that this continued, from that time, for about six hundred years[h]; that *these Fathers taught such practice*, upon an opinion of its *necessity* to the *salvation* of *baptized infants*[i]; that Innocent did first bring up such doctrine, and that St. Austin followed him in it[k].

As to the Greek Church, he thinks that some time during the space of the aforementioned six hundred years, when it was low in the world, that Church took this custom from the Latin Church, which was more flourishing[l].

And that the Roman Church, about the year 1000, entertaining the doctrine of *transubstantiation*, let fall the custom of giving the holy elements to *infants;* and that the other western churches, mostly following their example, did the like upon the same account: but that the Greeks, not having the said doctrine, continued, and do still continue, the custom of *communicating infants*[m].

This is the sum of Mr. Wall's account, which may be seen at large in the place referred to in the margin[n]. He carries the *practice* as high as Cyprian's time, A.D. 251. And the same practice as founded on the doctrine of its *necessity* to the *salvation* of *baptized infants*, to the time of Austin and Innocent I. about the beginning of the fifth century.

2. Mr. Bingham, in his Origines Ecclesiasticæ, mentions the giving the *Eucharist* to *infants* as a *known practice* and *custom* of the *ancient Church*, and that *immediately from the time of their Baptism;* citing for it, Cyprian, Austin, Innocentius, and Gennadius, writers from the third to the fifth century[o].

In another place he says, that it is *beyond dispute*, that the Church *immediately* admitted *infants* to a participation of the *Eucharist*, as

g Persecutione sopita anno 251, latebris egressus, et ecclesiæ suæ reditus, &c. *Cavei Hist. Liter.* p. 126. ed. 1740.

h Wall's History of Infant Baptism, ibid. p. 446.

i Ibid. p. 445.

k Ibid. p. 441, 442.

l Ibid. p. 446.

m Ibid. p. 446.

n Ibid. part ii. cap. ix. sect. 15, 16. vol. ii. p. 435—446.

o Bingham's Orig. Eccles. b. xii. cap. 1. sect. 3. vol. i. of his Works, p. 529. fol. ed.

soon as they were *baptized;* quoting Cyprian again for the *practice*, and Austin, with Pope Innocent his contemporary, as *seeming to say* it was *necessary* for infants, in order to obtain *eternal life;* referring to some passages of St. Austin, and Innocent's Epistle to Austin and the Council of Milevis[p].

And it appears to have been Mr. Bingham's own opinion, that the *primitive Church*, Greek and Latin, from St. Cyprian's time, really gave the *Communion* to *infants*, from an opinion of its *necessity*, founded upon a *Divine command*, John vi. 53[q].

He acquaints us, that Maldonate says, the custom continued, even in the Roman Church, for *six centuries:* but that Bona makes it *double the number;* for that, according to him, it was not abrogated in France till the twelfth century; that it continued a little longer in Germany, if Suicerus doth not mistake in the author he quotes for it: that Zuinglius speaks of the custom continuing long among the Helvetians: and that Hospinian mentions, from his own knowledge, the custom in Lorrain and the parts adjacent, of the Priest's dipping his fingers in the cup, and dropping it into the child's mouth *immediately after Baptism*, with these words, "The blood of our Lord "Jesus Christ be of advantage unto thee to eternal life."

That the Greek Church was a little more tenacious of the custom; that Nicephorus of the fourteenth century mentions it, and that Dr. Smith speaks for the *present Greek Church*, that they give the *Eucharist*, in both kinds, to *children* of *one* or *two* years old, and sometimes to *new-born infants* after Baptism, in case of imminent danger of death; grounding their belief of an *absolute necessity* of *this sacrament* upon the words of our Saviour, John vi. 53, and pleading the *practice* of the *primitive Church* in their own justification[r].

To this account which Mr. Bingham gives from Dr. Smith of the *modern Greek Church*, I shall add, that Dr. Covel, in his account of the *present Greek Church*, A. D. 1722, says, that they give the *Eucharist* to *sucking children*, after they are baptized and anointed, or confirmed[s]: and that Mr. Rycaut, in his Account of the Armenian Church, mentions the following odd custom there; viz. that "as soon "as the Priest hath sopped the bread into the wine," (which is the manner of distributing the communion in that church,) "some *boy*, or "*young lad, is presently at hand to lick his fingers;* which he willingly "grants him, esteeming it a kind of initiation, or *pledge* to them of "*receiving the sacrament hereafter*, when they come to *years of under-*

[p] Bingham's Orig. Eccles. b. xv. cap. 4. sect. 7. vol. i. p. 774, 775.
[q] Ibid. p. 776.
[r] Ibid. p. 776, 777.
[s] Ibid. b. ii. c. 1. p. 186.

"*standing:* as the rubbing the lips of the infant with the consecrated "elements, is to children at the time of their admittance to Baptism[t]."

From this account it appears, that the Armenian Church does not profess to give the *Communion* to *children*, till they come to *years of understanding;* and yet the custom here mentioned is certainly *more* than *a kind of initiation, or pledge to them of receiving the sacrament hereafter*, since it is *actually receiving it*. But I return.

Mr. Bingham's opinion seems to differ from Mr. Wall's in this: that, whereas Mr. Wall supposes the doctrine of the *necessity* of the *Eucharist* to the salvation of baptized infants, to be taught no higher than Innocent I, whom he takes to have been the *first* who brought up this doctrine[u]; Mr. Bingham seems to think that this doctrine of its *necessity* was held by the Church *all along* from St. Cyprian's time; though he does not found his opinion upon any *positive testimony*, but only looks upon it as absurd to think, that the Church should *give* the Communion to infants, without imagining any manner of *necessity* from any Divine command to do it[x].

3. Pfaffius reckons it among the *rites* of the third century, that the *Eucharist* was given to *infants;* but has no authority for its having been the custom of any but the African Church, to which he refers, quoting for it St. Cyprian de Lapsis[y]. He mentions it again, as the *custom*, in some places, in the fourth century[z]; and the *same custom*, founded upon the opinion of its *absolute necessity*, as one of the *errors* of the fifth century[a].

4. Mr. Daillé, in his treatise De Usu Patrum, &c. observes, that the Council of Trent decreed, that the *ancients* admitted *infants* to the communion of the *Eucharist*, not as looking upon it to be *necessary* to their salvation, but only as having a *probable reason* for so doing. But, says Mr. Daillé, it seems plain from the *Fathers themselves*, that they thought the communion *necessary* to *baptized infants*[b]: for which he cites several passages from St. Austin[c], Innocent I, his contemporary[d], and Cyprian long before them[e].

Hereby it appears, that Mr. Daillé thought that the Council of

t Rycaut's Account of the Armenian Church, chap. viii.

u Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. c. 9. vol. ii. p. 442.

x Bingham's Orig. Eccles. book xv. chap. 4. sect. 7. vol. i. p. 776.

y Pfaffii Institutiones Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ, secul. iii. cap. 2. sect. 4.

z Ibid. secul. iv. cap. 3. sect. 5.

a Ibid. secul. v. cap. 3. sect. 4. Conf. other eccles. writers.

b Patres Tridentini, *nulla necessitate salutis, sed probabilem tantum ob causam* veteres, parvulos usu rationis carentes ad Eucharistiæ communionem suscepisse decernunt. Atqui non modo magna subest de hac re dubitandi occasio; sed ex ipsis Patrum monumentis certo constare videtur ipsos, quod Tridentinæ Synodi pace dictum sit, parvulorum tinctorum communionem plane censuisse necessariam. *Dallæi de Usu Patrum* &c. lib. i. cap. viii. p. 175.

c Ibid. p. 175. conf. lib. ii. c. 4. p. 280.

d Ibid. p. 175, 176.

e Ibid. p. 176. conf. lib. ii. c. 4. p. 263.

Trent have given a *wrong account* of the *opinion of the ancients* on this head. He looked upon the *necessity* of *Infant Communion* to have been a *doctrine* as high as St. Cyprian: for he not only cites that *Father* for the *custom*, but also for the doctrine of its *necessity*[f]. But this is occasioned by a mistake in the passage quoted from Cyprian, Epist. lix. *Baptizandum et sacrificandum.* So Mr. Daillé cites it[g]. But Mr. Wall has observed, that the edition he cites it from is wrong in that place; that Dr. Hammond, Marshal, the Magdeburgenses, Mr. Walker, and all whom he had seen, do quote it *sanctificandum*, as it is also in the last edition, Oxon. 1682, in which are the various lections of several manuscripts, which had been collated, but no variety in reading this word; and that St. Austin has put the matter beyond question, who, quoting that part of the epistle, (lib. iv. contra duas Epist. Pelag. c. 8.) writes it *sanctificandum*, not *sacrificandum*[h].

Mr. Wall adds, that *sacrificandum*, in that sense, is not Latin[i]. And Mr. Peirce, though he thinks somewhat might be pleaded for such a sense from Cyprian's style, yet, upon the whole, he agrees with Mr. Wall, that Mr. Daillé's edition was faulty herein. But the he contends, that even *sanctificandum* will here signify *receiving the Eucharist.*

He allows, that the word does *commonly* and *usually* signify *Baptism*, as Mr. Wall argues; but then he urges, that the *ancients* speak of the *Lord's Supper* in the *same manner:* and to prove it, he cites some passages from Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyril of Jerusalem, Macarius Archbishop of Antioch, and Cyprian himself, wherein the elements of the *Eucharist* are said ἁγιάζειν[k].

But I take the liberty to answer, that this remark which Mr. Peirce has made by no means comes up to the point, nor is any manner of proof, that *sanctificandum*, in the passage disputed, relates to the *Eucharist.*

The passage is in an epistle of Cyprian, in answer to Fidus, and runs thus: "Quantum vero ad causam infantium pertinet, quos dixisti "intra secundum vel tertium diem, quo nati sunt, constitutos, bap-"tizari non oportere, et considerandum esse legem circumcisionis "antiquæ, ut intra octavum diem eum qui natus est baptizandum et

[f] Extat Innocentii Epistola; ac ut deesset non sinit nos Augustinus ea de re dubitare. *Innocentius* (inquit) *parvulos definivit, nisi manducaverint carnem Filii hominis vitam prorsus habere non posse.* Longo ante tempore Cyprianus in *eundem sensum* ea de re locutus fuerat. *Ibid.* p. 176. Idem beatus martyr (Cyprianus) in sui seculi errore versabatur, putans omnibus baptizatis, ne pueris quidem exceptis, Eucharistiam esse ad *salutem necessariam*, ut apparet ex Epistola lix. &c. *Ibid.* lib. ii. c. 4. p. 263.

[g] De Usu Patrum, lib. ii. c. 4. p. 263.

[h] Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part i. chap. 6. sect. 10. vol. i. p. 85.

[i] Ibid.

[k] Essay in favour of the ancient Practice of giving the Eucharist to Children, part i. sect. 7. p. 46.

"sanctificandum non putares; longe aliud in concilio nostro omnibus "visum est[l]."

The question moved by Fidus, an African Bishop, to which this passage is an answer, was concerning the day on which *infants* ought to be *baptized;* whether, if need required, *as soon as they were born*, or not till the *eighth day*, according to the rule given in the case of *circumcision*[m]. What has any mention of the *Lord's Supper* to do here? Nothing: nor is there any. The whole passage appears plainly to relate to *Baptism only*. The *question* was concerning *Baptism only;* and *Baptism only* is *directly mentioned* in the *answer:* not a word of the *Eucharist;* unless *sanctificandum*, the word in dispute, relates to it; which I can see no reason to believe, nor have the least doubt but that it relates to *Baptism*, the word *immediately preceding*, and to which it is joined. And it seems to be a far-fetched construction, to render *baptizandum et sanctificandum*, by *baptized and sanctified in the Lord's Supper;* when it so plainly means only, *baptized, and sanctified* in *such Baptism*. Mr. Peirce, in relating this matter, says, that "one Fidus a "Bishop had, in a letter to Cyprian, moved a doubt, whether *infants* "should be *baptized* within two or three days after they were born, "or whether they ought not rather to be kept back from Baptism *and* "*the Lord's Supper* till the eighth day,—*as I understand him*," says Mr. Peirce[n]. But I cannot see any reason he could have to *understand* him of the *Lord's Supper*, when the passage so evidently speaks of *Baptism only;* except it were to favour an *hypothesis*, that Cyprian is herein an evidence for the *necessity* of *Infant Communion*.

But Mr. Peirce urges, that, waving all arguments from this passage of Cyprian, there is another place in the *same epistle*, which shews plainly, that Fidus's doubt, and the Synod's determination, related as well to the *Eucharist* as to *Baptism;* and that is, where Cyprian mentions the *kiss of peace* as given to *infants*[o]; which being a ceremony of the *Eucharist*, Mr. Peirce would from thence infer, that Cyprian must be speaking of *Infant Communion*. But he was aware, that Bellarmine, from this epistle of Cyprian, and Cotelerius from Chrysostom, and Mr. Wall, reckon this *kiss of peace* or charity among the ceremonies of *Baptism*[p]: and if it was so, then Cyprian, notwithstanding his mentioning the *kiss of peace*, may still be speaking of *Baptism only*. Mr. Peirce therefore, in order to avoid the force of this, tells us, that the mentioning the *kiss of peace* among the ceremonies of *Baptism*, "is "easy to be accounted for by this one observation; that anciently all

[l] Cypriani Epistola 59. alias 64.

[m] Vide Bingham's Origin. Eccles. book xi. chap. 4. sect. 12. vol. i. p. 482.

[n] Essay in favour of the ancient Practice of giving the Eucharist to Children, part i. sect. 7. p. 45.

[o] Ibid. p. 48.

[p] Ibid. p. 49. Conf. Bingham's Orig. Eccles. book xii. chap. 4. sect. 5. vol. i. p. 542.

"*baptized persons*, whether *infants* or *adults*, used *immediately* to be "admitted to the *Lord's Supper*[q]." But this answer is a kind of *arguing in a circle*. Cyprian, says he, must here speak of *Infant Communion*; because he mentions the *kiss of peace* given to *infants*: and it must be meant that the *kiss of peace* was given to *infants* at their *communion*; because *Infant Communion* was the *ancient practice*. That *Infant Communion* was the *ancient practice*, was the *question in debate*; and Mr. Peirce was to prove it from Cyprian's mentioning the *kiss of peace* given to *infants*. But this, it seems, he cannot prove to be given to *infants* at their *communion*, without the *observation* that *Infant Communion* was the *ancient practice*; that is, without *supposing* the very *point to be proved*.

But there is a sentence, in the passage which Mr. Peirce quotes from Cyprian, concerning the *kiss of peace*, which plainly shews that it *could not* relate to the *Eucharist*. In answer to Fidus, who had pleaded for deferring Baptism till the eighth day, because children, at their birth, were *unclean*, and every one abhorred to kiss them; Cyprian, among other things, replies, "Etsi adhuc infans *a partu novus est*, non "ita est tamen, ut quisquam illum in gratia danda atque in pace "facienda exosculari horrere debeat[r]." Now, as Mr. Peirce is pleased to say, that the *kiss of peace* is here mentioned as given to *infants* at their receiving the *Eucharist*, because they *were admitted to communion* immediately after Baptism, which is nothing more than *petitio principii*; I shall take leave to say, that since, on the contrary, *not one instance* can be produced in the early ages, where an *infant* adhuc a partu novus, *just born*, was ever admitted to the *Communion*; we have more right to conclude, that therefore the *kiss of peace*, here mentioned as given to an *infant* ahhuc a partu novus, *just born*, related not to *Infant Communion*, but to *Infant Baptism* only. To return now to Mr. Daillé.

He says, that "almost all the Doctors of the first ages believed "that the Eucharist was necessary for infants;" and that Maldonate has so observed, who tells us, that this opinion remained in the Church for about six hundred years[s].

By the manner in which he here cites Maldonate, one would think he intended, by his evidence, to carry this doctrine, not only as high as St. Cyprian's time, but even to the *very beginning* of the *Christian Church*. Yet the learned have observed, that Maldonate's words

q Essay, &c. part i. sect. 7. p. 49.

r Cypr. Epist. 59. alias 64. ad Fidum.

s Non est prætermittendum præter Cyprianum, Augustinum, Innocentium Papam I. Quorum testimonia supra retulimus, pene omnes doctores priorum seculorum credidisse Eucharistiam necessariam esse infantibus, idque observasse Maldonatum scribentem hanc sententiam sexcentos circiter annos viguisse in Ecclesia. *Dallæi de Usu Patrum*, &c. lib. ii. cap. iv. p. 293.

require no such meaning. The passage of Maldonate runs thus: "Missam facio Augustini et Innocentii Primi sententiam quæ sex-"centos circiter annos viguit in Ecclesia, Eucharistiam etiam infan-"tibus necessariam." Maldonat. in Joan. vi. 53. Which words import no more than that this opinion remained in the Church, not for six hundred years *from the beginning of the Church*, but for six hundred years *from the time of Austin and Innocent I.*[t] Mr. Daillé, in this place, quotes only the *latter part* of Maldonate's words. "Sex-"centos circiter annos viguit in Ecclesia, &c." which looks as if he understood them of the *first six hundred years* of the Church; though he himself, in another place[u], had cited the *whole passage* as I have given it; which, by the mention of Austin's and Innocent's opinion, sets the matter clear, and shews the meaning of Maldonate to have been as here explained.

And from this observation it will appear, that there is not so wide a difference as Mr. Bingham makes between Maldonate's account and that of Bona. He observes, that Maldonate says, the custom continued even in the Roman Church for *six centuries:* but that Bona makes it *double the number*, who says, that it was not abrogated in France till the twelfth century[x]. Mr. Bingham seems to have thought, that Maldonate meant, that the custom continued in the Church for the *first six hundred years* from the *beginning:* and then, since, according to Bona, it was not abrogated till the twelfth century. Bona will indeed make it *double the number*. But if Maldonate only meant, (as I have before shewn it most probable he did,) that the custom continued in the Church for six hundred years *from the time only of Austin and Innocent*, about the beginning of the fifth century; then from thence to the twelfth century, the time to which Bona's account brings it down, is about *seven* or *eight* centuries; and so there will be, between him and Maldonate, the difference only of a century or two.

5. The *decree of the Council of Trent* on the point of *Infant communion* having been mentioned upon this occasion, I beg leave to throw in a word or two upon that matter. They decree, that "children, "before the use of reason, are under *no necessity* of communicating "in the *Eucharist*. For, as they are, by the laver of *Baptism*, rege-"nerated and incorporated in Christ, they cannot, at that age, *lose* "the grace they have obtained of being the *children of God*. Yet "*antiquity* is not for that reason to be condemned, if for some time, "and in some places, they observed that custom. For as those most

[t] Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. chap. 9. sect. 15. vol. ii. p. 436, 437.
[u] Dallæi de Usu Patrum &c. lib. i. c. 8. p. 176.
[x] Bingham's Orig. Eccles. book xv. chap. 4. sect. 7. vol. i. p. 776.

" holy Fathers had a *probable reason* for their practice, in regard to " the state of the times they lived in; so it is without dispute to be " believed, that they did not do it as being *necessary* to *salvation*[v]." To which was joined an *anathematism* " against him who shall say, that " the communion of the *Eucharist* is *necessary* for *children*, before the " *use of reason*[z]."

In this decree, the Fathers of the Trent Council declare, that the *ancients* gave not the *Eucharist* to *infants* out of any opinion of its *necessity* to their *salvation:* and in this account they are supposed to have been guilty of a *great mistake*[a]. And when the decrees of that session were published, it was much spoken of, that there should be an obligation imposed to believe, that the ancients did not hold the *communion of children* to be *necessary;* when St. Austin *so often affirms* the *necessity of the Eucharist* for *children*, and makes it even of *equal necessity* with *Baptism*, alleging the epistle of Pope Innocent, who plainly so declares it[b]. Mr. Wall supposes the truth to have been, that " the *Trent Fathers* knew that some *ancient Doctors* had *commended* " infants' receiving: but not that one of their own *infallible Bishops* " had so *absolutely determined* it to be *necessary* for their *salvation*[c]." He means the before-mentioned Pope Innocent, in his Synodical Letter to the Council of Milevis.

But now, after all, the learned reader, who considers what is said in the tract here published, may perhaps be of opinion, that the *mistake* was not in the Trent Council, but in *those* who have hitherto thought that the ancients *did* hold the *necessity* of *Infant Communion*.

Mr. Wall supposes, that the *motives* of the Trent Council for their *decree* was the doctrine of *transubstantiation*, " which created an " excessive and superstitious regard to the outward elements of the " Eucharist, and had, among others, this effect; that as the *wine* was " kept from the *laymen* for fear of slabbering, so the *whole sacrament* " was from *infants*[d]." But whatever share this motive might have

[v] Eadem sancta Synodus docet, parvulos usu rationis carentes nulla obligari necessitate ad sacramentalem Eucharistiæ communionem. Siquidem per Baptismi lavacrum regenerati et Christo incorporati adeptam jam Filiorum Dei gratiam, in illa ætate amittere non possunt. Neque ideo tamen damnanda est antiquitas, si eum morem in quibusdam locis aliquando servavit. Ut enim sanctissimi illi Patres sui facti probabilem causam pro illius temporis ratione habuerunt, ita certe eos nulla salutis necessitate id fecisse, sine controversia credendum est. *Synod. Trident.* sess. xxi. cap. 4. Conf. Paul's Hist. of the Council of Trent, book vi. p. 502. English edition.

[z] Si quis dixerit parvulis antequam ad annos discretionis pervenerint necessariam esse Eucharistiæ communionem; anathema sit. *Synod. Trident.* Can. 4. Conf. Paul's Hist. &c. ibid.

[a] Dallæi de Usu Patrum &c. lib. i. c. 8. p. 175, 176. Bingham's Orig. Eccl. book xv. c. 4. sect. 7. Peirce's Essay, &c. p. 16.

[b] Paul's Hist. of the Council of Trent, book vi. p. 504.

[c] Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. chap. 9. sect. 16. vol. ii. p. 445, 446.

[d] Ibid. p. 444.

in the *decree*, if it now appears that their decree was really *right*, let us allow that their knowing it so to be had likewise its weight with them.

Mr. Peirce observes, that "there is room for a *strong prejudice* in "*favour* of *Infant Communion*, because it was laid aside, and put down "by the worst of men, for the sake of their infamous superstition and "idolatry[e]." But if it be found that they really knew what they decreed to be *true*; it will be but common charity to believe that *that* was, at least, one inducement to it; however their superstition and idolatry might be another. And were Mr. Peirce now alive, to see our author's inquiry into the antiquity of this custom; he would, I dare say, no longer permit the *prejudice* which the character of the Trent Council had occasioned in him in favour of Infant Communion, to be any *argument* with him for reviving that practice.

Mr. Bingham makes use of this instance as an argument against the "*infallibility* and *unerring tradition* in the Church of Rome, in "matters of doctrine and necessary practice; since they themselves "have thought fit to *alter one point*, which their *infallible Popes* and "*forefathers* for *so many ages observed* as *necessary*, in *communicating* "*infants* upon a *Divine command*[f]." But we want not *sufficient evidence* against the *infallibility* of *Popes* or *councils*; though it be found true, that the *Council of Trent* has *not erred* in declaring, that the *ancients* did *not communicate infants* as of *necessity* to their *salvation*; nor, therefore, that that Council has *altered* any point of *ancient doctrine*, by decreeing that *children*, before the use of reason, are under *no necessity* of *communicating* in the *Eucharist*.

Though the character of the Trent Council (or rather the Trent Cabal, for it deserves no better name) be sufficiently known, wherein all things were carried by the art and stratagems of the Court of Rome; yet it would be hard, if, amongst such a variety of decrees, none of them should be right. There may be some wheat amongst that crop of tares: and an impartial judge will perhaps be of opinion, that they have really told truth in this article, so generally hitherto taken to be false, viz. that none of the *ancients*, no not St. Austin, who hath been thought to declare it in so many plain passages of his works, nor Pope Innocent, ever taught the *necessity* of the *outward Eucharist* to the *salvation* of *baptized infants*.

6. Mr. Peirce, in his Essay in Favour of the Practice of giving the Eucharist to Children, A. D. 1728, not only carries the *practice*

[e] Essay, &c. p. 18. [f] Orig. Eccl. book xv. chap. 4. sect. 7. vol. i. p. 777.

and the doctrine of its *necessity*, to Austin's, Innocent's[g], and Cyprian's[h] days; but even to the time of the Apostles themselves[i].

But this notion is only *mere conjecture*, without any thing like a *positive proof*. He does not pretend any *mention* of such practice before the time of Cyprian. All his reasons, upon which he would carry it higher, are nothing more than *doubtful inferences*, drawn from principles which by no means *necessarily infer* what he would have them[k].

I have thus represented the opinions of the learned concerning the *antiquity* of the *practice* of *Infant Communion*, and the doctrine of its *necessity*. It has been the *common opinion*, that the *custom* was begun as high as Cyprian's time, about the middle of the third century; and practised in the fifth century, on an opinion of its *necessity to salvation*, as taught by Austin and Innocent.

The design of the tract now published is to shew that this *common opinion* is a *mistake:* that the *early ages* never gave the Communion to *mere infants*, (unless we except the instance mentioned by Cyprian,) but to *children* of *ten*, or perhaps *seven* years old: and that not upon any notion of its *strict necessity* to the *salvation* of such *baptized children;* but upon *prudential reasons* only, or *general reasons* of *edification* pursuant to Christian principles; such as move us to bring them to church, training them up in the way they should go: or, if founded upon stronger motives, they were such as resolved into the then *present expediency*, or superabundant caution.

The necessity of Infant Communion hath been so commonly believed to be the doctrine of St. Austin, in many (as they are supposed) plain passages of his writings[l], that it may seem strange for any one to attempt to prove the contrary: and yet an impartial and considerate reader will, I believe, be satisfied, upon the perusal of the tract now published, that the learned author hath given reasons sufficient to make it appear, first, that St. Austin *could not*, consistently with his constant and standing doctrine of the *sufficiency of Baptism* to the salvation of infants, teach the *necessity* of the *Communion* over and above to *baptized infants;* and, secondly, that he *did not* really teach any such doctrine; but that the opinion of his having so done is owing only to a *misunderstanding* of his *principles* and writings.

[g] Essay, &c. part i. sect. 3, 4. p. 8—31.
[h] Ibid. sect. 6. p. 35.
[i] Ibid. sect. 8. p. 53.
[k] Ibid. sect. 8. p. 53—75.
[l] Wall's Hist. of Infant Baptism, part ii. c. 9. sect. 15. vol. ii. p. 441. Dallæi de Usu Patrum &c.' lib. i. c. 8. p. 175. Bingham's Orig. Eccles. book xv. c. 4. sect. 7. vol. i. p. 775, 776.

Having despatched St. Austin, the principal man, he proceeds to consider what may be urged likewise from Innocent I, Marius Mercator, Faustus Reiensis, Gelasius, and particularly Fulgentius; all within less than eighty years of St. Austin; and these, he shews, are all to be interpreted by the same rules by which he interprets St. Austin, and to stand or fall with him.

Our author having traced this matter down from the beginning of the fifth century to the beginning of the sixth, and shewn, that the *necessity* of the *Eucharist* to *baptized infants* was never taught by any of those *ancients* who have been produced for it in those ages; he observes, that so the matter rested till the *close* of the eighth, or *beginning* of the ninth century. From that time he dates the *first rise* of the doctrine of the *strict necessity* of *Infant Communion*. This is the substance of what the reader is to expect in the tract now published on this subject; where he will see the whole drawn out in a full and clear method, the arguments enforced, and the reasons supported, all along, by proper authorities.

As the author's manuscripts were, by his desire, committed to my care, in order for selecting and revising for the press such of them as should be thought most useful, and proper for the public view; I have endeavoured to discharge the trust reposed in me to the best of my judgment and abilities, and with all the care which an affair of that consequence required—a work I undertook with pleasure, not only in obedience to the author's request, but as having an opportunity of paying thereby a small tribute of gratitude to that great and good man now in his grave; at whose feet I had the honour to be educated; from whose Works, in common with the rest of the world, I have received so much pleasure and instruction; and from that frequent and improving conversation in particular, to which (and I esteem it one of the happiest advantages of my life) he was pleased to admit me, and to let himself down to one so much his inferior in age, as well as in every other respect. He was never *ostentatious* of *displaying* his learning *unasked*; but ever *willing* to afford *instruction* to all who *inquired* of him; and as *ready* to *communicate* his store of knowledge as he was *indefatigable* in *collecting* it. His whole life was spent (I might say *worn out*) in the service and advancement of religion and learning. He hath obliged the world with many valuable effects of it; and had he lived —— ! But he is now at rest from his labours—gone, to receive the crown reserved for those who have *fought the good fight*, have *finished their course*, and *with fidelity discharged their trust*—gone, to *enter into that joy*, which every *good and faithful servant* is promised, who improves and well employs the *talents*

committed to his charge: while the best way for *us*, whom he hath left behind, to *supply the loss* we suffer by his *death*, will be to *copy the pattern* of his *life*.

I have nothing more to acquaint the public with; but only to assure them, that the works now published are printed from the author's own manuscripts, without any other alteration than what the learned know to be necessary in papers which, at the time of their being written, were not designed, nor afterwards fitted by the author, for the press.

MARCH 4th, 1741-2.

SERMON I.

The Nature of Peaceableness, with the Foundation and Extent of its Obligations.

ROMANS xii. 18.

If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men.

THE words I have now read making a distinct and entire sentence of themselves, I need not observe any thing of their connection or coherence with what goes before or after.

They are an exhortation from the mouth of an Apostle, to live peaceably with all men, of whatever nation or religion, sect or profession, quality or condition: none are excepted. We are to live peaceably with all, on the score of humanity and Christian charity. But then this is to be so only upon supposition, that it is possible in the nature of the thing, and also reasonable: that is, that we be not under any either natural or moral incapacity of doing it: for then the obligation must of course cease; not wholly and entirely, but in part, for we are still to endeavour to the utmost of our power to live peaceably. "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with "all men."

The subject which this leads me to treat of, will not, I hope, be thought foreign or unsuitable to the time, the place, or the occasion. The time; when having peace with our enemies abroad, we have need of the strictest caution to be united in affections at home: the place; the honour and prosperity whereof are very nearly concerned in the offices of peace and love: the occasion; the design of which is, for the promoting of

peace and order, for composing dissensions, and healing of differences in a judicial way; that we may the better "live quiet "and peaceable lives in all godliness and honesty." I shall therefore, without further preface, propose the following method of discourse:

I. I shall inquire what obligations we lie under to peaceableness with all men, shew whereon they are founded, and how far they extend.

II. I shall consider the particular duties and offices implied in this duty of peaceableness, and therein give general directions for a peaceable conduct.

III. And lastly, I shall apply the general rules to some special cases and instances, particularly to that which the present occasion offers to us.

First, I am to inquire what obligations we lie under to peaceableness with all men, to shew whereon they are founded, and how far they extend.

Our obligations to this duty are very great and manifest. They are founded in the nature and reason of things, are in some sense antecedent to all laws human and divine, and are bound upon us by both, because it was reasonable and necessary they should be so. They arise *immediately* from the mutual relation we bear to each other, and the capacity we are put into of promoting each other's happiness; and if we run them up to the fountain and foundation of all, "God blessed for ever," we shall find that they flow more *remotely* from the unchangeable perfections of his nature, from his wisdom and goodness. When he was pleased to make such a creature as man, his primary end and design (excepting his own glory, which is coincident with it) was to make him happy for ever with himself in heaven; and his secondary was to make him in some measure also happy here in this state of probation. All his laws natural and positive plainly centre in these two, or rather ultimately terminate in the former. From hence spring all our obligations to peace and amity, in as much as by the very frame and constitution of our nature, and the circumstances of our being, they contribute greatly both to our temporal and eternal happiness.

With regard to this life, it is evident, that, had we no contests or quarrels with each other, the world would be a much more comfortable place to live in than now we find it: the earth would be a paradise compared to what it is, and mankind

happy beyond expression. Men are born for society, and designed for mutual helps and comforts to each other. Strifes and debates, anger, wrath, bitterness, are very pernicious and destructive, unnatural and irregular: they are the disorders and deviations of a depraved nature from the original rule, beside the primary intent of the kind Author of our beings. Private families cannot prosper, nor even subsist long, when torn asunder by heats and animosities: neither can a kingdom stand when "divided against itself," and crumbled into sects and parties. Even whole nations, though united within themselves, if in a state of war with others, are *often* ruined thereby, and *always* lose much of that prosperity and plenty which they might otherwise enjoy. This shews the necessity of our living friendly and peaceably, whether considered as private men or as societies; our temporal safety and happiness, our being and well-being, are bound up in it.

As to another life, the great concern we have therein, and the apparent necessity of the means toward the desired end, oblige us yet more strictly to live peaceably and friendly with one another. For how shall any sense or face of religion be kept up amongst us, unless we agree and unite in one common worship? How shall decency, order, and regularity be maintained, without peace and unity? How shall any have the means of instruction or improvement in wisdom and goodness, unless their condition and posture of affairs give freedom and leisure for it; unless their minds be calm and serene, their thoughts easy and cheerful, that is, unless they be at peace with one another? Hatred and revenge, rancour and malice, eat out the very vitals of religion, estrange us mightily from God and goodness, unqualify us for the offices of devotion and piety, and render us very unfit for the friendly and peaceful society of heaven. I need not dwell long on so clear an argument: every one that thinks must be sensible that to live peaceably is as necessary as it is to live and to be happy, to be easy and satisfied in this life, and to be for ever blessed in another. This may be sufficient to shew our obligation to the duty of peaceableness, and the foundation of it. The next consideration is concerning its extent, which will be easily stated from the principles laid down: and it is of great importance to understand it rightly for the regulation of our practice in many intricate cases.

The extent of our obligation to this duty may be considered under a twofold respect; either,

First, With respect to the obligation itself abstractedly, viz. the end and design of it; or,

Secondly, With respect to our power, capacity, or ability of discharging it.

For it can reach no further in itself considered, than the end and design of it; nor with regard to us, than we are capable of performing it.

1. As to the former, the great end and design of all laws which concern us, as I have before observed, is the present and future happiness of mankind. From hence they derive their obligation, and from hence we must state their measure. By the great law of charity founded hereupon, we are obliged to love all men, and to do them good: this always holds, and no change of circumstances whatever can make any alteration in this general and highest law. By the same law of charity we are likewise bound "to follow peace with all men;" because this is loving them and doing them good, generally speaking, as has been shewn. But yet in this, which is only a secondary and subordinate law, different circumstances may cause some variety, and make some abatement. It can oblige no further than the reason of it holds, that is, no further than it tends to the glory of God and the good of men. We may, nay we ought, at any time, to break peace in order to some greater good; and so the same law of charity which binds to peace generally, obliges to the contrary in different circumstances. If by disobliging and offending some persons we can do them the greater kindness; if we can reform and save them, or however can promote the public happiness by disturbing their present peace more than by leaving them quiet, easy, and unmolested; then considerations of peace so far cease, as they are inconsistent with piety and charity. I choose rather thus to state the measure of our obligation to peace, than to say, as is commonly said, that in all things lawful we are to comply, or that we must never sin against God for the sake of peace. For though that be always a true, and generally a safe rule to go by; yet it is neither so full nor so clear as it should be, nor does it go deep enough into the case before us. *That we must not sin against God for the sake of peace,* is no more than to say, that we must never sin on

any consideration whatsoever; which is very true, and the contrary would be absurd: but still, the great question of all remains undecided, namely, when it is a sin or no sin, when lawful or unlawful, to offend against peace: and this can only be determined in many cases by considering which is the greater good, or which the greater charity, to leave men easy and quiet, or to molest and disturb them in such particular circumstances. To clear this by an instance; it is a precept of Scripture to "rebuke them that sin before all," and yet we are commanded "to follow peace with all men;" which two precepts may in some cases seem to clash with each other. There may be danger of committing a sin either way, as circumstances may happen: against the precept of peace, by rebuking; against the other precept, by not doing it. Here if we apply the rule, that *we are not to sin for the sake of peace;* it is as true on the other hand, that *we are not to sin against peace:* and so we are left in an uncertainty. But since the end of both precepts is charity; if we can know in such particular circumstances which is the greater good or greater charity, to do *this* or *that*, we may then determine what to do; and upon this consideration seems to depend the whole case, whether it be a sin or a duty to rebuke offenders in such and such instances. For if it be a greater charity to do it than not, it ought to be done, and not else. Thus, separating and dividing from any particular Church is breaking the Church's peace; yet if that Church be corrupted and unsound in its doctrines, it is charity to them, to others, to ourselves, to *protest* against them first, and afterwards to break off from them. For it is for the good of mankind here and hereafter, that truth be defended against error; purity of faith and worship against corruptions; true and undefiled religion against idolatry and superstition. So again, if common swearers, drunkards, atheists, and libertines go on quietly and undisturbedly in their vices, it is breaking the peace with them to rebuke, censure, or chastise them. Yet this, if done as it should be, is kind to them, to us, to all; and, though a breach of peace, is no breach of charity. Hence a magistrate in the execution of justice, or a minister in the discharge of his function, must venture to disoblige any man, or any body of men, whatsoever be the consequence of it: because it cannot be so bad as that of suffering men to go uncontrolled in their wickedness, and to sleep securely in their vices. The Apostles of our

Lord did by their preaching occasion many tumults and disturbances, and were censured as men that had "turned the world "upside down[a]," by reason of the riots and confusions which were every where raised upon their coming: yet what they did was for the everlasting benefit of mankind, and therefore of far greater moment than a short and false peace. If they had resolved to offend nobody, but to have lived peaceably and quietly in a strict sense, Paganism and idolatry had remained still, and Christianity had made small progress in the world. But this would have been valuing peace against the very end and design of it; and betraying the cause of Christ to the ruin of their own and other men's souls. Our blessed Saviour, the Prince of Peace, had forewarned them of this long before. "Think not," says he, "that I am come to send peace on earth: "I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to "set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter "against her mother, and the daughter-in-law against her "mother-in-law; and a man's foes shall be they of his own "household[b]." This was no fault of his religion, which was as well peaceable as pure; but of the men of the world, who through pride and envy, and other lusts, made the worst use of the kindest and best designs. Our blessed Lord himself had many contests and warm disputes with the Scribes and Pharisees, which he might easily have avoided, if his concern for God's honour and for the good of men had not obliged him to engage in them. It is manifest therefore that we ought not, and in reason cannot seek peace any otherwise, than in regard and in subordination to the general end and design of it, the glory of God, and the happiness, present and future, of mankind. So much for the extent of the obligation to the duty of peaceableness with respect to the end and design of it.

2. We may consider it with respect to our ability, power, or capacity, natural and moral, of discharging it. So far as is *possible*, and so far *as lieth in us*.

That it is *sometimes* possible "to live peaceably with all men," I think the words of the text plainly suppose; as also, that it is not so *always*. It is possible for a man of a sweet temper and prudent conduct, in a private station, having few concerns in the world, to have the love and good word of all that know him,

[a] Acts xvii. 6. [b] Matt. x. 34, 35, 36.

and to live many years without so much as a controversy or difference with any. But this is the case perhaps of very few, and the instances of it are but seldom; and when they are, are hardly seen or observed. Generally speaking, it is not possible for any man, at all times and in all circumstances, to "live "peaceably with all men."

The wisest and best of men have their failings and imperfections. They cannot manage so nicely and equally, at all times, as never to speak a foolish word, or never to do a foolish thing. Troubles and afflictions will sometimes sour their tempers; passions will break out and disturb their reason; and some degree of partiality arising from self-love will cloud their understandings. A sudden heat will transport them; an unexpected accident surprise them. Or if no such case happens, yet doubts and perplexities will arise in matters of difficulty, and mingle with their wisest and coolest reasonings. Hence, unless their prudence be very extraordinary, and their caution more than human, some mistake will creep in, some offence be committed, a quarrel ensue, and for some time at least they will not "live peaceably with all men." Into some such principle as this we must resolve the warm debates, eager disputes, and at length open breaches, between very wise and good men; as between St. Paul and St. Barnabas, and some others. Such instances are not to be drawn into examples, but they may serve to very good use when applied to the purposes of humility. They may shew us what we are at best, and awaken our caution, considering what infirmities we carry about with us; and that neither the dearest of friends nor the best of men can be infallibly secure of their own temper and conduct, but may transgress sometimes, either giving or taking needless offence, and falling out with each other.

But were this the worst of the case, or had good men none to deal with but such as themselves, they might, and would, for the most part, live very peaceably; their differences would be few, and those soon ended and amicably composed. But they are obliged to live in a wicked world, which will industriously labour to molest and grieve them; and, notwithstanding their best endeavours to be kind and friendly, will find or make some occasion of quarrel with them. The humours and follies of mankind are so many and various, their capacities so different, and their opinions and taste of things so unlike, and even con-

trary to each other; that it is often impossible in the nature of the thing to please all, or not to offend some, however accurate and careful we be in our conduct. What fence can there be against the ignorance and stupidity of one who cannot, or against the prejudice and perverseness of another who will not, understand the good-will we bear him, nor distinguish between love and hatred, between good and evil? How shall a man guard against the misconstructions of envy; the ill effects of the spleen; the designs of ambition and self-interest; or the extravagances of pride? How shall he escape, if one shall injure him out of covetousness; and, because he has injured him, hate him, and take all occasions of destroying him? How shall he be at peace, if some be angry with him for being richer, others for being wiser, and others for being better than themselves? Or, to name no more, how shall he steer between two contending parties, where he can neither be neuter, nor comply with either, without offending one or both? I mention not the cursed practices of incendiaries, who, out of set purpose and design, study to set men at variance by whispers and rumours, by insinuations and forgeries, by aggravating circumstances that are, and feigning those that are not. These and many other considerations may hinder the wisest and coolest of men from living peaceably with all men.

Add to this, what has been before hinted, that if it were possible, in the nature of the thing, by yielding and complying, to please all men; yet we cannot in reason and conscience, as men or as Christians, comply any further than is reasonable, equitable, and pious. If therefore any will be so unjust, (and many such there will be,) as to refuse to be on any terms of peace with us, unless we violate our consciences, and sin against God; if they expect to be applauded and encouraged in their fond humours and passions; to be caressed in their vices, gratified in their lusts and vanities, and to be soothed and flattered to their own destruction; if they will not be friends with us unless we say as they say, and do as they do, and come into their schemes, however unjustifiable and unreasonable, wicked or impious; if these or such like conditions and articles of peace be imposed, and rigorously exacted of us, how shall we contrive to "live peaceably with all men?" And yet he must have been very happy indeed in his company, who has not often met with such cases, or does not meet with them almost every

day, if he be one of much business, and of a large and general acquaintance. From all which it appears, how impossible it is, even for the best of men, at all times, and in all circumstances, to "live peaceably with all men." Yet, notwithstanding, we are to use our sincere endeavours to do what we can; and no pretence whatever can excuse us from doing "as much as lieth in "us," towards "living peaceably with all men." What this is I am now to consider under my second general head, which is,

II. To shew the particular duties and offices implied in the duty of peaceableness, and therein to lay down rules and directions for a peaceable conduct.

The duty of living peaceably is of so large and comprehensive a nature, and implies so many particulars, that it were endless almost to enter into the detail of them. They may be referred to two general heads, the first relating to the *inward temper*, the second to the *outward carriage*.

1. As to the *inward temper* of mind, two things are requisite. One, that a man be free from unruly appetites, lusts, and passions; the other, that he be endowed with a large and diffusive charity, having a tender concern for the present and future welfare of mankind.

1st. The peaceable man must in the first place be free from the dominion of unruly appetites, lusts, and passions. He must suppress envy, curb the excesses of self-love, and above all things labour to mortify and bring down his pride. Every lust, passion, or inordinate affection, tends to create discord, and to sow dissension. "From whence come wars and fightings among "you?" saith St. James: "come they not hence, even of your "lusts[c]?" From lust of pleasure, which is sensuality; from lust of riches, which is covetousness; from lust of power and greatness, which is ambition or pride, the strongest and most contentious of any. "By pride only," says the Wise Man, "cometh con-"tention[d];" meaning chiefly or principally. It is the pride of the heart which commonly begins and carries on a quarrel, and blows it up to the height: not but that envy, malice, hatred, and other vile affections, have a hand in most differences; but pride goes along with all, and helps to inflame them. This is that root of bitterness which lies deep in our nature, which seems in a manner to be born and bred up with us; which, like poison,

[c] James iv. 1. [d] Prov. xiii. 10.

spreads itself through men of all ranks and orders; which, of all other vices and follies, is the greatest and commonest; and of which every one almost, more or less, has a share. It is one of the first things that we take up, and the last which we lay aside. Easy it is to be infected with it, hard to discover it, and yet harder to cure it. Special care therefore must be taken to find out this lurking viper in our bosoms, and to cast it far from us. There can be no peace where this reigns. There will be strife, bitterness, and perpetual feuds, wherever persons of proud and haughty spirits meet. The peaceable man then must have a mind clear of all lusts and inordinate affections; but especially of pride, *the devil's sin*, which made war in *heaven*, and does the like on *earth*, and will for ever foment the discord and fill up the misery of *hell*.

2. Besides this negative disposition in order to peace, a man must further be endowed with a large diffusive charity, having a tender love and concern for mankind. This will both incline him to peaceableness, and also fix its due bounds and measures, as before hinted. This will prevent his engaging as party in any contests, excepting only such as are for the glory of God and the good of men. One of this principle will have no quarrel with the *men*, but with their *vices*, no hatred to *them*, but to their *faults*. He will never commence a difference, but with reluctance; nor carry it on, but with justice; nor let it end, but in charity. He will not lengthen it beyond what is reasonable and necessary; nor push matters to extremities, but rather drop the contest than exceed in it. He will first consider what good may be done by it, and next by what fair methods it may most easily and speedily be attained. In fine, a lover of mankind will be meek and gentle, courteous and affable, just, humble, and merciful, which are all amiable qualities, and make for peace; contributing to the beginning, the growth, and the perfection of it. Having thus briefly considered what is implied in a peaceable temper, I come next to shew,

2. Wherein consists a peaceable *carriage*. This is the superstructure, whereof the other is the foundation. If *that* be well laid, *this* will easily be built upon it, and requires only prudence to complete it. It consists of many particulars, as well as the former, which may, I think, be reduced to these three heads:

1. That we give no needless offence.
2. That we take none.

3. That, when any has been either given or taken, we put a stop to it as soon as may be. The two first are necessary for the preventing of differences; the last for composing them: which though it be needful only upon some failure in the former, yet will be needful enough, and what we shall frequently have occasion for.

1. I say, the man of a peaceable carriage must be cautious not to *give offence* when needless, or when it may innocently be spared. This implies that he be careful to injure no man's person by unjust violence; nor his reputation by reviling or slander; nor his outward condition and circumstances by deceit, fraud, or circumvention. And this is the lowest, though not the smallest part of a peaceable man's character. Further, all arrogance, rudeness, and boasting are hereby condemned as enemies to peace. To which head may be referred the being too assuming, and forward in giving opinion or advice, intruding into things above him, or that do not belong to him, and being too hasty in reproofs, or too severe, at improper times, or to improper persons. To this we may add, that he should use great compliance and condescension in all matters indifferent, readily agreeing to every innocent usage, custom, fashion, or ceremony of the age, or the place he lives in: not affecting to be wiser in little things than others his contemporaries, or those before him; not to distinguish himself by singularities of behaviour, or other niceties of small consideration. In a word, in all matters of liberty he ought to yield and comply, avoiding the extremes of moroseness, rigour, and severity. If a superior, not to strain authority too high, nor to carry it too far, nor to choose to effect by threats and menaces what may better be compassed by milder and gentler methods. If an inferior, not to insist on every nicety of privilege, nor rudely to reflect on and censure authority; not to dispute any point beyond what is just, decent, and modest; nor to be too severe in exposing the failings and prying into the real or imaginary mistakes of his governors. If an equal, not to affect a superiority in place, nor to be too critically exact in weighing his own pretences and merits; but to be complaisant and yielding in matters of ceremony and respect; in honour preferring others before him; and in any doubtful case, rather receding from what might strictly be his right, than insisting so far upon it as to endanger his charity.

These and the like measures of conduct are very requisite, if we would live so as to give no offence to any.

2. Another part of the peaceable man's character is, not to *take offence;* especially in small matters, which are hardly worth a wise man's notice. This perhaps is a harder task than the former. Many are cautious enough as to the matter of *giving* an affront, who yet know not how to *take* one; the reason of which seems to be this, that civil or genteel carriage, or a carefulness to offend no man, is creditable and reputable, and many would use it for that single reason: but to pass by an offence, or to bear an injury, however slight and trivial, according to the foolish maxims of the world, is thought a disparagement; and so bears hard upon any man who has not a very good sense of things, or has not conquered his pride: and hence perhaps it is, that many who would not willingly be the first occasion of a quarrel, yet come easily into one upon a slight provocation. This is certainly a great fault, and what should carefully be avoided by him that would "live peaceably with all men." We are to bear one another's infirmities, and to pass by each other's failings. There can be no peace without this in such a world as ours is. The case is plainly thus; the generality of mankind will never be wise enough nor good enough to carry on an innocent, inoffensive, and unblamable conversation. Some flaw or other in their humour and conduct will discover itself frequently, which a good man will pass over, thinking it a greater fault to resent such matters than to offend by them. Some will be foolish and inconsiderate in discourse, rash and bold in their censures, rude and unmannerly in their reflections; others will be as disobliging in behaviour, not paying the respect which is justly due, nor observing a decency, or any rules of *decorum*. These and a thousand other such petty affronts and injuries a man must expect to meet with who converses much in the world. And what should he do in such cases? Would it not be a vain and foolish thing to resent such trifles? Can there be any end of differences, if this be done? Is it not much better to pity and pardon all such slight and trivial provocations? Can all men be wise? Will ever all men be good? Should we not make allowances for education, for temper, for custom, for frailty? Have we not all our passions and infirmities, our humours, our follies, which cannot perfectly be cured? We may as soon alter some

men's complexions and features, as make them change their humour or manner. And perhaps something there is in most men particular to them, which they are tenacious of; and they have as much right to be so, as others have to censure them for it. In these and the like cases we are to remember the Apostle's rule, to bear the infirmities of the weak; and though they are neither so wise nor even so good as they should be, yet to have patience with them, and not to make them worse by indiscreet and rigorous proceedings. If any are too eager and passionate, give them time to cool, and consider further: if they are stiff and untractable, wait till they may soften, and become more pliable: if they are prejudiced and prepossessed, have patience with them till their understanding may clear up, and years may wear out their prejudices: instruction and gentle usage may help towards it, when opposition and severity would but rivet them the closer, and harden them the more in them. Let not any man be offended at a few foolish words, or a disrespectful look or gesture. A lover of peace will have so much good-nature as to impute them rather to the indiscretion than ill-will of the offender; and so much charity as to forgive such slight trespasses, though really designed and proceeding from some grudge and hatred. Nay, though reproached and reviled in some grievous manner, he will pity the offender, despise the malice, and return good for evil; as a kind physician, when he finds his patient disordered and raving, is not angry with him, but pities him the more, and takes the more pains to heal him. There is nothing in this procedure but what is just, equitable, and Christian. If all men cannot be wise, let those that can, be so both for themselves and others, and supply their want of good-nature and prudence by the abundance of their own. Most quarrels might be prevented by a discreet management on either side; as the sending of a challenge would make no duel, were there none to accept it. There are few people so untractable but may be kept in temper by a wise management. Sometimes their passions may be suffered to spend themselves; and then it is only waiting a while, and they are calm. At other times a soft answer may pacify them, or a smile divert them, or a seeming compliance, or some obliging courtesy disarm them. Thus the sallies of ill-nature or peevishness, like some jarring notes, may, by a skilful hand, be so artfully set and played, as not to hinder the harmony of society, but sometimes to make it even the

sweeter. If any ask how far we ought to carry our compliance, and what sorts of affronts or injuries, or how many, we should thus bear with; the answer may be understood from the measures laid down above. We are to consider in those cases, whether we can do more good to the world or more honour to God by resenting and taking notice of any injury, than by passing it by: and upon this are to determine what to do. And if we lay aside prejudice and passion, and listen to our reason only, it will not be difficult to know how we ought to steer in cases of this nature. We are to remember that such reasons as these, *we are injured, we are provoked*, or *the man deserves to be punished*, and the like, are no sufficient reasons of resentment to wise or good men. But if they can do more good by resenting the offence and punishing the offender, than otherwise, then they not only may, but ought to do it. And so much for the second rule of peaceable conduct in order to prevent needless quarrels.

3. The third is in order to compose them: that if any needless offence has been either given or taken, that we endeavour to put a stop to it as soon as may be. If a difference is already begun, stifle it in the birth, and suffer it not to proceed further. This implies a willingness and readiness to acknowledge and confess any mistake committed by chance, by indiscretion, by passion, or frailty; to ask pardon for it, and to offer any reasonable satisfaction in order to reconcilement. A peaceable man in this case will not think it below him to own his fault, though it be to an equal or to an inferior, nor to make the first step toward reconciliation. He will rather exceed than come short in his reparation for it, and will choose with Zacchæus rather to restore fourfold for any injury done, than to continue it, or defend it. There are some proud and haughty spirits who will never own themselves to have committed a fault, but are sure to make the thing much worse by pretending to justify it. What was at first perhaps but an indiscretion is hereby made their crime: and they are much more unjust in defending what they have done, than at first in doing it. The foundation of all this is pride and folly: and it is hard to say whether such conduct be more injurious or more foolish, or whether it makes a man more hated or despised. Be it which it will, a lover of peace will abhor such practices, and will neither be afraid nor ashamed to own that he has done amiss, and to ask pardon for it. This is a point of good breeding and civility, as well as of

justice and charity. And considering our sundry failings and infirmities, and how in many things, in this sense also, "we "offend all," it is so necessary a point of Christian and peaceable conduct, that there could be no easy and quiet living in the world without it. Having thus shewn in the general what we may and ought to do in order to "live peaceably with all men," give me leave now only in the

III. Third and last place, to apply the general rules to some special cases and instances, particularly to what the present occasion offers to us. Our differences with one another are commonly of three sorts; religious, political, and personal. The first about religion, the second about matters of state, the third about *meum* and *tuum*, or some rights and privileges between man and man.

1. As to religious differences, they are generally the fiercest, and last the longest, and are of fatal consequence to peace and happiness; and therefore certainly ought, as much as in us lies, to be prevented or composed by us. I will not take upon me to say what our governors in Church or State might or should do in order to it; they have done a great deal, and they may perhaps do more, when affairs are more settled, and men's passions cool, and times more favourable for it. What concerns us as private men is, so to defend our religion, and to maintain the true faith and worship, by discourse or writing, as not to lose our charity. Religion is a cause that deserves our zeal; and if many will be offended with us for telling them the truth, and not complying with such errors as would lead both to their and our destruction, the fault is their own: we should still, as much as lieth in us, *live pecaeably* with them. Not by betraying the cause of Christ, not by ceasing to "contend earnestly for the "faith, which was once delivered to the saints," not by pleading for amendments and alterations in the purest and best constituted Church of any in the world, but by condescending to hearken to and answer any modest scruples, by meekness and gentleness, by patience and forbearance, "not rendering evil for "evil, or railing for railing, but contrariwise blessing." This is as much as in us lies, as private persons, towards living peaceably with them that dissent from us. Something more lies in *them*, who have no unlawful terms of communion imposed, and therefore might and should give up their prejudices, and submit to lawful authority and wholesome order for the Church's peace.

However, considering the prevailing bias, which education, custom, and prejudice lay upon weak minds, especially when they have neither leisure nor capacity to know better; and considering that mild and gentle usage may possibly win some over, whom reviling and rudeness would but harden and render worse; it is certainly a Christian duty not to upbraid and provoke them, not to be bitter against them, but rather to wait with patience till God may open their eyes or turn their hearts: to whose mercy we should therefore leave them, and in the mean while take care of our own souls. But,

2. Another sort of differences, near as fatal as the former, and in some respects more so, are those among ourselves, of the same Church and interest, our *party differences*. How have these soured men's tempers, inflamed their passions, and almost eaten out the heart of Christian charity! I have not time nor words to lament the visible decay of religion and piety owing to those heats and animosities, so rife amongst us: the whole nation feels it, and every good man mourns in secret for it. We shall not, I am afraid, find that these eager contests are founded either in a true love for our own country, in particular, or for mankind in general; or that our zeal arises from a real concern for truth, for justice, or for charity. What truth is there in applauding or condemning at all adventures, as well persons as things, as they are for or against one side? What justice in reviling and abusing one another with odious distinctions, and drawing peaceable men into one side or other, even against their wills, and then fixing a black character upon them? What charity in hating and reviling great numbers before we know them; making all merit, in a manner, consist in I know not what names, confounding the distinctions of praise and dispraise, virtue and vice, good and evil? But I shall urge this no further, considering how tender a point I am now upon; and that though it most of all deserves censure, yet perhaps can least bear it. I shall but just offer a hint or two to well-disposed persons in relation to their conduct, that they may not foment or increase those differences which they cannot cure. The best way certainly for private men is to be as little concerned in those disputes as may be; to leave the government and the affairs of it quietly and contentedly in the hands wherein God has placed them; to be modest and candid in their censures of, submissive and courteous in their carriage to, all without distinction: to let

angry men enjoy their own opinions; and instead of employing their time and thoughts about matters which tend only to stir up their passions, and cannot profit them, to mind their own business; and above all, to mind "the one thing needful," which is so seldom thought of amidst all our heats and contests, if not about trifles, yet trifles in comparison. While we are engaging with such warmth and eagerness about the affairs of this life, it might abate our fervour to consider how little a time we have to sojourn here, and how great a work we have upon our hands; and of what moment it is to go cool and quiet hence, if ever we hope to find a place within the calm and peaceful mansions of the blessed.

3. And lastly, a word or two about private differences between man and man, and then I shall have done. These are many and various, and would be of dangerous consequence to the public, were it not that under a wise and good government, when gentler methods fail, they may at length be judicially and authoritatively determined. This is the best human means to keep a wicked world in order: it secures in a great measure the outward peace of society, and makes some amends for the want of universal justice and charity. Were the rules, before given, universally received and practised, there would be less occasion for judicial proceedings; but since this is a happiness not to be expected on this side heaven, and that as the world is now, there could be no comfortable living without courts of justice, we may be highly thankful, that in a case of so great necessity, we have so good a remedy. A peaceable man however will yet be tender of having recourse to a method that is designed only as a reserve for the last extremity. He will bear some time, and suffer wrong; pass by little trespasses, and overlook some injuries; rather than bring trouble and expense upon, and occasion ill blood amongst his neighbours. Small damages may be sustained, and even greater losses may be repaired, but it is hard ever to repair a breach of charity. He will therefore, though the cause be weighty and considerable, try all gentle methods first to win over an adversary; and if matters can thus be amicably adjusted, and the point secured, he obtains his right and keeps a friend at the same time, and neither endangers his own nor another's charity. If, after all, the fairest offers of accommodation be rejected, and he must submit to a smaller evil to prevent a greater; he will still remember to proceed as

becomes a man and a Christian; with no hatred and revenge towards his adversary, with no railing and bitterness, but with an upright intention, and a calm and sedate temper of mind. He will use none but fair and just methods; will suborn no witnesses; nor attempt to practise upon juries; will not disguise the real truth, nor act against it; will seek justice only, and abide by it. And when at length his cause shall be decided by a competent authority, though it should happen to be against him, he will patiently and readily submit to it, and not take upon him to censure the proceedings of the court, or to be wiser than his judges. Or if sentence shall be given in favour of him, he will not insult or triumph over his adversary, but be willing and ready ever after to do him any good offices, and to live in entire peace and friendship with him. With these cautions, and with this temper, *Christians* may go to law with *Christians*, and be blameless. Yet I must observe, that however one of the contending parties may be of this temper, yet it rarely, or perhaps never, happens that both are so. For if neither desire any thing but what is fair and honest; if they are both willing to comply with any peaceable measures, and are in perfect charity with each other; it is hard to imagine how any quarrel can arise between them, or however proceed so far as to a judicial hearing. There seems to be but one case where this can happen: and that is, when the matter of controversy is very intricate and perplexed, and the reasons seemingly equal on both sides. Here both may amicably consent to refer the matter to a *legal trial*, and so finally determine it. And yet even in this case, there is another more friendly and less expensive way, which may do as well; and that is taking private counsel of men learned in the law, and submitting to an *arbitration*. But enough of this.

Having thus briefly endeavoured to lay down the rules and measures of a peaceable conduct both general and special; I shall now close all with a consideration or two, to induce us to the observance of them. We are born into a world where there is no such thing as joy, comfort, or security, but in peace and unity. Histories of times past may inform us, reason may persuade us, or experience convince us, that divisions are always destructive and pernicious, are the presages and causes of approaching ruin; and however some may take delight in them for a time, who were the first authors of them, yet at length they fall

heavy on their own heads, and are fatal to themselves. None are gainers hereby at last, but the common enemy of mankind; whose business it is to set us at variance with each other, that he may the sooner and the more effectually destroy all. Consider further, that we are sent into this life in order to a better, and are here only in a state of trial and probation. While we are striving and contending with each other about trifles, the great business of religion is almost at a stand, and nothing in a manner done to prepare for eternity. Life is short, time wears away, and death approaches, and all our great matters are to come hereafter. A few years must end our petty differences: we must sleep in the dust together, and within a while awake to judgment. Then what profit shall we find in all those vain janglings and contentions with each other; begun in folly, nursed up by pride, and at length ending in misery, eternal misery? May these and the like considerations serve to moderate our heats, and teach us to "put away from "us all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil-"speaking, with all malice; to be kind one to another, tender-"hearted, forgiving one another, as *we hope* that God for "Christ's sake *may* forgive us."

SERMON II.

The duty of loving our Neighbour as Ourselves, explained.

MATTHEW xxii. 39.

The second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

THE whole sentence or context runs thus: "Thou shalt love "the Lord thy God with all thy heart," and so on: "This "is the first and great commandment. And the second is like "unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these "two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets." My present concern is with the commandment *to love our neighbour*, which is a duty second and similar to that of the *love of God*. It is *second* only, or *subordinate* to the *first*, and therefore not of *equal* rank, order, dignity, or obligation with it: but still, because it is *second* to it, and *like it*, it is also of *high* rank, order, dignity, and obligation, and only short of the *highest* commandment of all, in which both this and every other commandment or duty centres. There is this honour done even to the *second* commandment, though it resolves into the *first*, that it is here represented as one of the two main beams upon which all other duties hang: not that any thing really hangs upon the *second*, which hangs not on the *first* also, (for the second *depends* upon the first,) but this *second* is so considerable both in value and extent, that our Lord was pleased to place it in that distinct view, and to set it in that honourable light, in order to recommend it the more strongly to the attention and affection of the

hearers. On *these two* commandments hang all the rest: every duty is summed up and comprised in the *love of God* and the *love of our neighbour*. There are some *self-duties*, which may be thought to make a *third* chief head; and Divines have frequently branched out the several duties incumbent upon us, into our *duty to God*, and our *duty towards our neighbour*, and our *duty towards ourselves*. Neither is that *threefold distinction* without its use, for the help of the memory, or for clearing our conceptions. Nevertheless it is very certain that even those *self-duties* do, in some view or other, hang upon both the other: for temperance and chastity, and other the like *self-duties*, shew our obedience towards *God*, and render us the more beneficial to *men*; and therefore do resolve at length into the *love of God*, and the *love of our neighbour*: so true is it, universally, that upon *these two* commandments hang all the rest.

These few general things premised, for the clearer understanding what our Lord was pleased to take notice of, as common to them both; I now proceed more distinctly to what properly concerns the *second* of the two: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as "thyself." It is not said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour with *all thy heart*, and with *all thy soul*, and with *all thy strength*: no, that would have been carrying the point too high, and scarce have left any sufficient note of distinction between what we owe to *man* and what we owe to *God* only. But it is said, "Thou "shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself;*" which is high enough, and is both an awakening and an affecting description of the love enjoined, as shall be shewn in the sequel. In discoursing further, it will be proper,

I. To shew what *neighbour*, in the text, means.

II. To explain what it is to *love* one's neighbour as one's *self*.

III. To lay down some considerations proper to enforce the duty here enjoined.

I.

The word *neighbour* primarily and properly signifies one that is situated near unto us, or one that dwelleth nigh us. But by use and custom of language, the same word *neighbour* has been made to signify one that we are any way allied to, however distant in place, or however removed from the sphere of our conversation or acquaintance. When a certain *lawyer*, a *Jew* by nation and religion, insidiously put this question to our Lord "Who is my neighbour?" our Lord replied to him in the way

of a parable, representing a case to him, and then leaving it to his own good sense to answer the question, which himself had raised. An unhappy man had fallen among robbers, and was left upon the road stripped, and wounded, and half dead. A *Jewish priest* came by, and took no notice of so pitiable a case: a *Levite* also travelled the same road, and looked upon the almost dying man, but moved not a finger to help him. At last, a *Samaritan*, who had some humanity, and a sense of compassion in him, came by that way, and he assisted the poor helpless man, and took all due care of him. Now the question arising from the case was, whether the *priest*, or the *Levite*, (both of them Jews,) or the good *Samaritan*, most truly acted the part of a *neighbour* towards the distressed man: and the *lawyer* immediately gave verdict in favour of the kind *Samaritan*. By this means our Lord extorted a frank confession even from a *Jew*, that the *Samaritans*, though of a *different country* and *religion*, and though *hated* for the most part by the *Jews*, were nevertheless to be looked upon as *neighbours*, whenever there should be occasion or room for any *good offices* between them. For if the *Samaritans* were to be esteemed as *neighbours* to the *Jews*, it would follow of course that the *Jews* should be considered as *neighbours* to the *Samaritans:* and so from the whole we are to learn, that no difference of *nation* or *religion*, no distinction of *party*, nor division of *interests* or *affections*, ever ought to restrain us from owning one our *neighbour*, whom we are capable of *serving* in a neighbourly way, by any kind offices whatsoever.

From these principles it follows, that *all mankind* are in some sense, or to some degree, our *neighbours;* because our *prayers* at least, if nothing more, may extend to all: and that is a friendly office, a neighbourly kindness, which, though the easiest and the cheapest of any, is acceptable however to God, when it is all that we are capable of doing. There are several texts of the New Testament which interpret the love of our neighbour to mean *universal benevolence*, or friendliness towards the whole kind, as opportunities may offer. "As we have opportunity," saith St. Paul, "let us do good unto all men[a]." And again; "Ever "follow that which is good, both among yourselves, and to all "men[b]." "Follow peace with all men[c]." "Be patient towards

[a] Gal. vi. 10. [b] 1 Thess. v. 15. [c] Heb. xii. 14.

"all men[d]," and "gentle unto all men[e]." "Shewing all meekness "unto all men[f]."

From all which it is plain, that in construction of Gospel law, *every man* whom we can any way *serve* is our *neighbour*. Be he far off or near; be he *friend* or *adversary;* be he *Christian* or *alien;* be he *Dissenter* or *Churchman;* be he *Papist* or *Protestant;* be he *Jew, Turk,* or *Infidel;* he is a *neighbour* in some sense, and in some degree, being allied to us, as one of the same species, and of the same flesh and blood, of the same human race, a descendant of Adam the common father of all below, a creature of God the common Father of all above. And as God is a lover of mankind at large, so ought every good man to consider himself as a citizen of the world, and a friend to the whole race; in *real effect* to many, but in *good inclination* and disposition, and in kind wishes and prayers, to *all.* So much for the extent of the name or notion of *neighbour.*

II.

Next, I am to explain, what it is to love our neighbour, or all men, as we love *our own selves.* This is not to be understood of the *degree* or *measure* of our love: for if we were bound to love all men *equally* with ourselves, there would be but one measure for all, and there would be no room left for loving one person *more* than another, or for *preferring* our *own* safety (under difficult circumstances) before that of *another* man. Such an *equal* degree of love is neither *practicable* nor *reasonable.* It is not *possible* to love friends and enemies, allies and aliens, worthy and unworthy, all in the *same degree:* or if it were possible, yet both *Scripture* and *reason* direct us to love with *distinction,* and to give the preference where it is found due. "Do good unto "all men," says the Apostle: but then he immediately adds, "especially unto them who are of the household of faith[g]." St. Paul had his particular and most intimate friends, such as Luke, Timothy, and Titus, whom he *loved above others:* and even our *Lord himself* (an unexceptionable example) had his prime *favourites,* namely his *Apostles;* and amongst *them,* he had one whom he loved above the rest, who was therefore eminently called, "The disciple whom Jesus loved[h]." From all which it is manifest, that the precept of the text does not mean that we should love our neighbours, that is, all men, as *highly,* or in an

[d] 1 Thess. v. 14. [e] 2 Tim. ii. 24. [f] Tit. iii. 2. [g] Gal. vi. 10.
[h] John xiii. 23. xix. 26. xx. 2. xxi. 7. 20.

equal degree with ourselves; but as *truly* and as *sincerely*, and in a degree proper to their *several circumstances*, *merits*, or *capacities*, and the relation they bear to us, nearer or more remote. Love a *Jew*, a *Turk*, or an *Infidel*, considered as a *man*, allied to us in the same common nature: but love a *Christian*, and particularly a *good* Christian, as allied to us not only by the same common nature, but also by the same common *faith* and *hope*, and by a conformity of *manners*, suitable to the Gospel of Christ. Deny not the common offices of *humanity*, prayers, good wishes, common justice, compassion, mercy, even to *strangers* and *aliens*, to the bitterest *enemies*, or to the most enraged *persecutors:* but reserve your *intimacies*, your endearments, your largesses, your double or your treble portions, for your more particular *friends*, kindred, and allies; and among them also preferring the kindest and the *best deserving*.

But some perhaps might here say; if such be really the case, that we are to love our neighbours with *distinction*, and in proportion only to their *worth in general*, or their *nearness to us in particular*, of what use or significancy was it for our Lord to enforce the rule by the words *as thyself?* How does that additional clause help us to understand the *nature* or *extent* of the *love* there prescribed?

To this I answer, that such additional clause is of great use in this matter. For whenever men are wanting in any part or branch of their duty towards their *neighbour*, be he friend or foe, countryman or alien, there is always something of *selfishness* at the bottom of it. It is either to save trouble, or to save money, or to gratify some weak passion of envy, malice, revenge, or the like. In short, some kind of *self-love*, ill directed, is what always stands in the way, whenever we deny a *neighbourly* kindness where due, in whatever proportion it is due. Now, our Lord, by saying, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself*," strikes at the very *root* of all unfriendliness, and pierces every hard unrelenting *self-lover* to the heart. Put the case, that an *enemy* is brought to some extremity of distress, so as to want sudden relief to save him from perishing: let not *selfishness* interpose in this case to intercept or obstruct your kind offices. For consider that you yourself may some time or other be brought into the like distress, and may stand in need of the like friendly offices; and how hard-hearted would you judge even the bitterest *enemy* to be, if he should refuse you some cheap assistance in

such circumstances; where he might do a generous act to another person, with no great danger or trouble to himself. Now what a man would judge so reasonable in his *own* case, he ought to judge as reasonable in the case of *another* person. Such is the use of considering one's *self*, in all cases of that nature. Let a man's own *self-love* give him a feeling sense of what passes in the breasts of others, upon such occasions; and according as he might reasonably hope or wish to be done to, so let him do. It is on all hands allowed, and universally expected, that every one should love *himself* in the *first place*, and in the *next* place, his *particular friends, relations*, and *allies:* but yet those *primary obligations*, or services, ought to be so conducted as to *leave room* for kind offices of a *secondary nature*, and ought never to interfere with the sacred rules of common humanity, justice, or equity towards *all mankind.* Serve yourself in the *first* place, and your friends in the *second* place; for that is right: but do it not at the expense of another man's *just claims*, nor do a *real injury* to any man whatever, out of favour or affection to *yourself* or to your *friend.* If you do, you act against the Gospel rule of dealing with others as you expect to be dealt with, and are convicted by Scripture and plain reason, as guilty in that article, not loving your *neighbour* as you love *yourself.* Every man feels, in his *own* case, without a monitor, when he is injured, or hardly treated; and he is apt to be very impatient and clamorous upon it, if it be safe to complain. He ought to have as quick a sense of feeling in his *neighbour's* case as he has in his *own;* and then he will not be inclined to take more liberties than he is willing to give, or to trespass upon others beyond what he would allow them to trespass upon him. He thinks it hard, in his *own* case, to be suspected of ill designs without any just colour for it, to be evil spoken of without a cause, or to have his life, liberty, or property invaded by those who have no authority or right so to do. For the same reason, he ought to be as tender of suspecting or aspersing his *neighbours:* and whenever he is tempted to invade any of their just rights, let him only ask himself this home question, Whether he should wish to be so used? Proper exercise and practice this way, till it comes to be *habitual*, would soon teach a man how to behave towards his fellow Christians or fellow men: and his own heart would be more to him than many lectures of Christian morality.

willing to express their love of him by caresses, compliments, and endearments to him, rather than by real and painful *services* done to *mankind* for his sake. They will be *religious* and devout; will offer up their prayers, praises, and thanksgivings; will be hearers of his word, but not doers of it; will wait upon him at his altar, perhaps with a warm devotion, and yet not remember or not consider, that they are all the while greatly defective in point of love and *charity* towards their *brethren*. But, after all, *religion* without *righteousness*, or *devotion* and *godliness* without *brotherly kindness*, is an inconsistent, romantic notion, a *contradiction* in terms. For, as St. James says, "If any man seem to "be religious, and bridleth not his tongue—this man's religion "is vain[i]:" so it may be justly, and by parity of reason, said in general, that if any man "seem to be religious," and bridleth not his *resentments*, his *malice*, his *rancour*, his *ambition*, his *pride*, and in short his *selfishness*, that man's *religion* is *vain*. St. John is very express to this purpose, where he teaches thus: "If any man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a "liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, "how can he love God whom he hath not seen[k]?" As much as to say, If men do not their *kind offices* to God's *appointed receivers*, who are *visibly* present with them; how can they be presumed to have any true love or good-will towards *God*, who is *absent* and *invisible*, and can receive no kindness from us but in and by his *receivers* so present with us? So our blessed Lord, elsewhere, interprets this matter, shewing by what marks and tokens, chiefly, he judges of our love towards him. "Inasmuch "as ye have done *a kind office* unto one of the least of these my "brethren, ye have done it unto me:" and again; "Inasmuch "as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to "me[l]." So then, for the enforcing the *love of our neighbours*, let it be duly considered, that it is the *proof* and the *perfection* of our *love to God*. He that really has the *first* has the *second* also, and he that has not the *second* has *neither*. His disaffection towards his *neighbour* shews that he has no true affection towards *God*: for "this commandment have we from "him, that he who loveth God love his brother also[m]." What God hath so joined and made inseparable, let not man put asunder.

2. It may further be considered, (which indeed is but the

[i] James i. 26. [k] 1 John iv. 20. [l] Matt. xxv. 40, 45. [m] 1 John iv. 21.

consequence of the former,) that by this very rule will the righteous Judge of all men proceed at the last day; as our Lord himself has sufficiently intimated in the twenty-fifth of St. Matthew. It will be in vain to plead at that day, how *holy*, how *religious*, how *devout* we have been; how frequent or constant in our attendance upon God in his house or in our closets; how zealous for the honour of his name, or how unwearied in contending for the faith once delivered unto the saints: all these things are good and commendable, if *accompanied* with true *brotherly love* and *Christian charity:* but without it, they are *nothing* in God's sight, not so much as deserving the names of devotion, or piety, or godly zeal; because *godliness* without *charity* is not *really* godliness, but a *semblance* only, or a *shadow* of it. The duties of the *first* table must take in with them the duties of the *second* also: otherwise, they will be construed, by an all-seeing God, as *compliments* only, or *empty ceremonies*, rather than as *acts of love* towards him. Therefore, if ever we hope to steer our Christian course aright here, and to be accepted at the mercy-seat hereafter, let us "give all diligence to add to our faith "virtue; and to virtue knowledge; and to knowledge temper-"ance; and to temperance patience; and to patience godliness; "and to godliness brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness "charity[n]."

[n] 2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7.

from this fountain. It is this which actuates all our powers and faculties, keeps the world awake, and prevents a general lifelessness and inactivity.

As God has implanted in us this principle of self-love, the *spring* of all our movements, so has he also endowed us with *reason* and thought for the *direction* of it. Reason and thought hold out the light, and shew us the way to happiness, while the instinct of self-love drives us on in the pursuit of it. The latter without the former would be no better than blind instinct: and the former without the latter would be but useless speculation, and dull lifeless theory.

Now self-love, while it is under the guidance of reason directing it to true and solid happiness, is rightly employed, and may be called a *rational* and *commendable* self-love. One general rule may serve to distinguish the true and *rational self-love* from that which is *culpable* and *vicious*. Self-love directed to and pursuing what is, *upon the whole, and in the last result of things, absolutely best for us*, is *innocent* and good: and every *deviation* from this is *culpable* and *vicious;* more or less so, according to the *degree* and the *circumstances* of it. I choose thus to state the matter with reference to ourselves and our own good, because this rule is the clearest from all ambiguity, as well as most certain in itself: besides that it is best adapted to the principles of those whom I am now concerned with; and is indeed such a rule as all other rules and measures must at length resolve into. If any man should rather state the rule this other way, or to this effect, *self-love pursuing the dictates of religion and virtue*, &c., it would at length amount to the same thing, and in the mean while would be more ambiguous. For if it be asked whether a man should adhere to religion and virtue, on supposition that *upon the whole*, and in the *last result*, he should become the *more miserable* for doing it; it must be answered, that it is neither *reasonable* nor *possible* for a man, with his wits about him, to do it: which comes to the same as to say, that there could be *no virtue* or *religion* in so doing. Be a thing ever so good otherwise, yet if it be not so likewise with respect to *ourselves*, first or last, it loses all its influence upon us; and cannot be the object of a *rational* and *deliberate choice*. It might seem perhaps reasonable, in the nature of the thing, (if we may be allowed to put an impossible case,) for a man to submit to die, and to be eternally extinct or miserable, for saving of many thousand souls;

because this is preferring a *public* to a *private* interest, the *whole* to a *part*. And yet this is what no one could *deliberately choose*, while he has a principle of *self-love* remaining, neither could it be *reasonably* expected of him. We can never be obliged to *choose* any thing which *upon the whole*, and in the *last result*, tends to *our destruction:* or to *refuse* any thing which *upon the whole*, and *finally*, tends to *our happiness*. For this would be obliging us to *hate* ourselves, which is impossible: it would be obliging us to something under *pain* of being *happy* upon *refusal*, and in *hopes* of being *rewarded* with *misery*, which is all over contradictory and absurd; and therefore no *obligation*. But the *wisdom* and goodness of Almighty God is highly conspicuous in this affair; that whereas the *general happiness* of the whole rational or intellectual system is what himself proposes as the noblest end, and holds forth to all his creatures; yet since no one can pursue any good but with reference to *himself*, and as his own particular good, God has been pleased so to *connect* and interweave those two, one with the other, that a man cannot really pursue his *own particular* welfare without consulting the welfare of the *whole*. His own *private* happiness is included in that of the *public:* and there is, in reality, no such thing as any *separate* advantage or felicity, opposite to the felicity of the *whole*, or independent of it.

Now, to resume our thread of discourse, we may depend upon it as a safe and certain rule, that "self-love, pursuing what is "upon the whole, and in the last result of things, absolutely "best for us, is innocent and good." This will take in all manner of virtues, and all degrees of them; and withal carries a sufficient *motive* along with it; namely, that into which the force of every *obligation* is finally resolved. From this *general principle*, thus asserted and vindicated, I may now proceed to *particular acts* and instances of an *innocent* and *commendable self-love*, for the clearer illustration of it.

It is evident to every considering man, that we are not born for an hour, or for a day, or for this life only, but for endless ages. And therefore the wisest course for any man to take, is to secure an interest in the life to come. *This* is certainly, *upon the whole*, and in the *last result*, absolutely *best for him*. He may love *himself*, in this instance, as highly and as tenderly as he pleases. There can be no excess of fondness, or self-indulgence, in respect of eternal happiness. This is loving himself in the

best manner and to the best purposes. All *virtue* and *piety* are thus resolvable into a principle of *self-love*. It is what Scripture itself, in other words, resolves them into, by founding them upon *faith* in God's promises, and *hope* of things unseen.

In this way, it may be rightly said, that there is no such thing as *disinterested virtue*. It is with reference to ourselves, and for our own sakes, that we love even God himself. "We love "him, because he first loved us[b]:" that is, because we love ourselves. He is our sovereign good, our prime felicity; and we most truly love ourselves in loving him.

Some Divines of the *mystic way*, not distinguishing carefully between *esteem* and *love*, pretend that God is to be loved for his *own sake only*, for his own intrinsic excellency and perfections. But this is a difference rather in words than in things. We do love God for his *own sake*, when we love him not for any *low regards*, or little sinister ends; when we love him as being infinitely more lovely, that is, infinitely more able *to make us happy*, than all things else besides. And yet this is loving him for our *own sakes*, and with regard to ourselves, who have our happiness in him, so amiable, and so kind a Being. In a word, to *love God* is in effect the same thing as to *love happiness*, eternal happiness; and the *love of happiness* is still the *love of ourselves*.

But will it not (may some ask) be giving the preference to *ourselves*, if we love God only for our *own sakes*? I answer, No. If we were to make our own selves the *object* of our happiness, pretending to be happy *from ourselves alone*, then indeed we might be thought to give the preference to *ourselves*: but while we acknowledge our own *nothingness*, and our entire *dependance* upon God for our felicity, we give *him* the preference in our love, as desiring him above all things. This matter may be made something clearer by distinguishing the double senses of the word *love*, which sometimes stands for *love of desire* and sometime for *love of good-will*. For instance, when Isaac is said to have loved *savoury meats*, or the Psalmist is said to have loved *God's law, precepts, testimonies*, &c., the meaning is, that they *desired* those things, found delight, pleasure, or complacency in them. This is *love of desire*. But when we are commanded to *love our neighbours*, or to love one another, the meaning is, that we *wish well* to each other, and be ready to do any kindnesses we can. This is *love of good-will*. To apply this distinction to

[b] 1 John iv. 19.

our present purpose: our love of God is most strictly and properly of the *former* kind; it is *love of desire*, rather than love of *good-will:* for God is above our best wishes; and it is not easy to say what *good-will* towards a Being infinitely happy, and not capable of any accession or improvement to his perfections, means. If then our love of God be properly *love of desire*, it is plainly loving him as being the *object of our desire*, and the *source of our happiness;* and so it is loving him for our *own sakes*. And there is no room for the question, *Whether we give him the preference to ourselves in this kind of love:* for *preference* must be supposed between *object* and *object*, not between the *subject* of such happiness, that is, *ourselves*, and *God* the *object* of it. And when we are said to love God *above all things*, the meaning strictly is, that we prefer him, not before *ourselves*, (who pretend not to be the *objects* of our own happiness,) but before all other *objects*, before all other things which might be supposed to contribute any thing to our happiness.

It may be said, perhaps, that there is a certain sense wherein we may be conceived to love God with a *love of good-will:* that we may bear a kind of good-will towards him, when we wish that his name may be exalted, his laws observed, and his glory promoted; and that we ought to wish for this in the first place, even before our own happiness, and without any regard to it. But these fine-spun notions, however they may appear in theory, and carry a resemblance of the most resigned devotion and most exalted piety, yet are, I am afraid, much too high for practice, and perhaps hardly reconcilable with the reason and nature of things. For not to mention that all *good-will* towards *God* and his *glory* is really, *in the result*, nothing else but *good-will* towards the *creature*, which is alone capable of receiving any advantage, or benefit, from a display of God's glory; I say, not to mention this, we may venture to assert further, that it is utterly impracticable for any reasonable creature, having a principle of *self-love*, to act at all without some *motive*, that is, without a view to his *own good*, present or future. And however any man may pretend to abstract from all *self-regards*, and to fix his aims, wishes, and desires upon *God's glory*, and that only; yet amidst all that seeming disregard to his own welfare, this thought will perpetually steal in, that the further he runs off from *self*, the more impossible will it be for him to fail of being *happy;* the more

he shuns it, the surer he must be of it: so that, at length, this seems to be only going a little more round about, to bring him back again to the same point: so necessary is it to regard *ourselves* in every thing: which is so true, that if any person should conceive that he had no *interest* at all to serve, here or hereafter, in the belief of a God, but that he must be for ever *miserable* on the supposition that there is one; his first and most natural wish would be that there were none. And it is upon this only principle that any thinking man can be an *Atheist.*

In opposition to the doctrine here laid down, some fanciful men have pretended that any view to our *own interest* and happiness is *mercenary*, and takes off from the merit of piety and virtue; leaving it less worthy of esteem: as if it were not sufficient for *perfect love* to cast off *fear*, but it must cast out *hope* too. Virtue, they say, must be *entirely disinterested*, separate not only from all low and *sordid views* of temporal things, but from *all views* whatever, all prospect of advantage, and chosen for its *own sake only*. But these gentlemen mistake the maxim of the old philosophers, from whom they seem to have borrowed their notion, attending more to the sound of words than to the truth of things. The meaning is no more than this, that true virtue is not, cannot be *founded* on any *low temporal regards*; neither ought it to be *forsaken*, however *unserviceable* it may sometimes prove to our *worldly interests* or pleasures. True and solid virtue is indeed *disinterested*, in respect of any *mean* and *sinister* views, but not *entirely* and *absolutely* so. Those who pretend to follow virtue for virtue's sake, yet are used to heighten and magnify the *delight* and *pleasure* attending it: they plead that it is agreeable to nature, as food is to the appetite; as beauty, order, and symmetry to the eye or to the mind: that is, it carries *temporal pleasure* and satisfaction along with it; and it is for the sake of that pleasure they embrace and follow it. And what else is this, but choosing virtue upon a principle of *self-love*, self-love pursuing a *present* satisfaction, and making *temporal* good its end? The difference then is only this; that they who practise virtue without any regard to a *life to come*, do it upon an *inferior* motive, of *meaner*, because *present*, consideration: and there will be so much the less of *virtue* in it as it comes short of that noble and generous principle of *faith*, by which a man can be content to wave all thought of *present* pleasure and advantage, and to wait for a reward hereafter. In a word then, there is no

higher or nobler motive to proceed upon (and *some* motive we must have) than a principle of *faith* and *hope*, a prospect of eternal happiness. This is so far from rendering our piety or virtue less worthy of esteem, that it most of all ennobles and enriches it; and is indeed the very flower and perfection of it.

What I have here said is illustriously confirmed by holy Scripture, in many places; and particularly in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is entirely spent in magnifying the virtue of *faith*. The sublimest virtues for which Moses is there justly celebrated are resolved into this; that "he had re-"spect unto the recompense of reward[c]." The same thing is plainly enough intimated of Abel, Noah, Abraham, and other ancient worthies there recited.

From hence then it appears sufficiently, that it is no *disparagement* to virtue or piety, to suppose it founded in *self-love* rightly understood, but that the very best of men are, in a good sense, "lovers of their own selves," in as high a degree as any others are or can be.

I may add, that they do not only love themselves *absolutely*, but *comparatively* also; or with a love of *preference* to other persons. For since they love others for their *own* sakes, it is very manifest that they do and must wish well to themselves in the *first place*, and to others in the *second place* only; in *subordination* to, or so far as is consistent with, the *superior* and prevailing *affection* of *self-love*. In matters of slight moment, (such as all *temporal* things are in comparison,) a good man may be content, however tenderly he loves *himself*, to give the preference to *others*. He may readily resign up his possessions, his peace, his liberty, or life, for the sake of his country or brethren. This may be doing the wisest and best thing he can do for *himself*; being only exchanging a few fading and transitory enjoyments for a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. But as to any thing further, above and beyond this; as to giving up deliberately any certain interest in a *life to come*, though it were to save a whole world; this it is not in his nature to do, if Almighty God could be supposed to admit of it. *Self* would prevail, and, in this case, ought to prevail: and here there would be nothing unreasonable or unjustifiable, nothing but what is just and necessary, in a man's loving himself better than

[c] Hebrews xi. 26.

he shuns it, the surer he must be [illegible] the world besides. The seems to be only going a litt[illegible]ours as ourselves" has no place back again to the same p[illegible] to reach this case.

in every thing: whi[illegible] may be objected the example of St. ceive that he h[illegible] "accursed from Christ" for the salva- the belief of [illegible] To which objection many answers have suppositio[illegible] perhaps not altogether satisfactory. I shall would h[illegible] both the shortest and the plainest solution of ciple [illegible] difficulty. The strength of the objection seems to [illegible] upon the common translations: for the words of the [illegible] will very well bear another rendering. I would trans- [illegible] thus: *I could wish* (or I could be content) *to be devoted to* [illegible] *after Christ*, (that is, as Christ was before me,) *for my bre-* [illegible] &c. The words ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, I render, *after Christ*, [illegible] *his example*, or as he was before me. There is the like phrase made use of by the same Apostle in his Second Epistle to Timothy: "I thank God, whom I serve ἀπὸ προγόνων, after "my forefathers," or, *as my forefathers have done before me*[c]. The phrases here and there are exactly parallel, and the construction alike in both. Now admitting such a translation of Rom. ix. 3. as I have mentioned, the objection is removed at once. For all that St. Paul declares is, that he should be content, willing, or even glad to *die* for the sake of his brethren and countrymen, *following Christ therein*, who had died for the same. There is the like thought in the first Epistle of St. John, "Hereby perceive we the love of God," (that is, of Christ,) "because he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay "down our lives for the brethren[f]." There is much such another wish as St. Paul's recorded by Clemens of Alexandria, as made occasionally by the Evangelist St. John. Speaking to a young man whom he loved, he says; "I could willingly suffer "death for you, as the Lord died for us. For thee I could lay "down my own life." The thought is much the same with that of Rom. ix. 3. and is a good comment upon it. But to return.

Having shewn that self-love, while pursuing eternal happiness, is allowable and commendable, and not so much as capable of any *excess* in measure or degree; we may from thence infer, that there can be no *culpable* self-love but in respect of *temporal* things. And yet, even in *this* respect, there may be a degree of

[d] Rom. ix. 3. [e] 2 Tim. i. 3. [f] 1 John iii. 16.

self-love, not only *innocent*, but *praiseworthy*. *Temporal* felicity may undoubtedly demand a share in our affection and concern. The first and most natural dictate of *self-love* is to endeavour to be always easy, and never to be afflicted with any degree of pain, misery, or trouble. *Present* happiness is what we all perpetually wish for, if really good for us; and it is what even the wisest and best of men would not submit to part with, while they can have it, but for the sake of something better. To deny ourselves any gratification, without an *equivalent* either in hand or in prospect, is *unnatural* and unreasonable. It is *refusing happiness* formally considered *as such;* and is therefore neither a *rational*, nor indeed a *possible* choice. For the like reasons it is natural for us to endeavour after a speedy deliverance from any present uneasiness, by all *proper* methods: and all are *proper* which do not in their consequences, here or hereafter, tend to involve us in more or greater. No man can be moved to submit to any thing painful, but in order to avoid something more painful: for that would be *choosing misery as such*, and would be a degree of *self-hatred*, of which our nature is not capable. What man, in his senses, would choose to be uneasy so much as for a moment, without a valuable consideration for it, or to prevent the suffering of something worse?

One would not indeed covet any satisfactions in this life, the enjoyment whereof might deprive us of greater good: nor would a wise man desire to be delivered from present pains, by any such methods as would draw after them a train of greater evils. That would be folly and madness; and therefore it is the height of imprudence to break in, at any time, upon the rules of religion and virtue, which are of *eternal* concernment, for the sake of any *temporal* good; besides that the practice of virtue is so generally necessary to happiness, even in a temporal respect, that it can seldom be of any real or lasting advantage, even in a worldly account, to deviate from it. But within these bounds, and with proper cautions, some degree of our love may be reasonably placed upon *temporal* things. And indeed there is no man so resigned, and dead to the world, as not to make it, in some measure, the object of his affection and care; looking upon the comforts and conveniences of life as the blessings of Heaven, and as contributing to his repose and tranquillity. It is possible (though it be a fault on the right hand, and not very common) to love the world *too little*. Some have been so superstitious, as

to think religion almost inconsistent with any worldly ease or pleasure; and have run into an extreme of *self-denial*, *mortification*, and *corporal austerities*. But this is a mistake. A cheerful and moderate enjoyment of the good things of this life is well-pleasing to God, as well as suitable to the nature of man. To torment and afflict ourselves needlessly, is not more unnatural in itself, than it is displeasing to God, who delights in the happiness of his creatures; and chooses rather an *easy* and *cheerful*, than an *austere* and *sour* obedience. If therefore we so love present happiness, in such only proportion or degree as may not interfere with a greater happiness to come; if our love of riches, honours, or pleasures be wisely and justly regulated, and kept in due subordination to those things which are more excellent, and of infinitely higher concernment; there is then no harm, but rather much good in it; and such a *self-love*, exerting itself in the pursuit of temporal things, may well become wise, great, and good men. Having considered *what sort* of *self-love*, and in what *degree*, is *innocent* or *commendable*, I proceed,

II.

To consider the nature and tendency of a *vicious self-love*, and to illustrate it by proper instances. This may be despatched in fewer words, upon the principles before laid down. From what hath been said, it may appear that there is no danger, no possibility of loving *ourselves too well:* but we may happen to love *some things too much;* and those are *temporal* things only. When we *blindly follow* the instinct or appetite of *self-love*, coveting every thing which looks fair and flattering, and running greedily upon it, *without weighing circumstances*, or *considering consequences;* or when, to get rid of any *present pain* or uneasiness, we take any method which first offers, without reflecting how dearly we may pay for it *afterwards;* I say, when we do thus, then it is that our *self-love* beguiles us, degenerates into a *vicious*, or at least silly appetite; and comes under the name of an *overweening*, *excessive*, or *inordinate* self-love: by which we do not mean that any man *loves himself*, or his own happiness, *too highly*, (for that is impossible,) but that he suffers the natural instinct of *self-love* to carry him *too far* after the *present* satisfaction, further than is consistent with his *more real* and durable felicity. There may be a fault in miscalculating even of *temporal* things, compared one with another: as if a man, for instance, should, for a small advantage in hand, give up the reversion of

a considerable estate; or should value his ease above his health, or suffer a gangrene to grow till it becomes incurable, rather than submit to the pain of an incision. These are all so many instances of an *ill-conducted, overweening* self-love; the very *essence* and spirit whereof consists in a *blind regard* to some *present* ease, convenience, or satisfaction; without attending to what it may *afterwards* cost us, or to the *final result* of things.

If the love of any *present pleasure, humour*, or *interest*, so entirely possess the heart, as to drive out all due regard to the *honour of God* and the *good of mankind;* then it is emphatically called *self-love*, and more properly *selfishness:* not that such persons love themselves more truly or more highly than others do; but they so love themselves, as to love none besides; they are lovers of *themselves only*. A good man loves *himself* as highly and as tenderly as possible; but then he takes into his scheme of happiness the *love of God and men*, as essentially requisite thereto. The *self-lover*, on the other hand, affects a kind of *separate, independent* happiness, without a due regard either to God or man; vainly hoping to make himself happy in despite to both. He is weak enough to expect happiness from a few fading and transitory enjoyments; in the mean while contemning, or at least neglecting, the two *essential ingredients* of all true and solid felicity. To understand the nature of this enchantment, and how it comes to pass that those who love themselves so well can thus consent to ruin and destroy themselves, both bodies and souls, for ever; let us trace its steps and progress, in two or three the most remarkable instances of it; as *pride, sensuality*, and *avarice;* from whence we may form a judgment of all the other instances that come under it.

1. To begin with *pride*. All the happiness of life is summed up in two articles; *pleasing thoughts* and *pleasing sensations*. Now *pride* is founded in *self-flattery;* and self-flattery is owing to an immoderate desire of entertaining some kind of *pleasing thoughts*. It is a pleasing imagination for a man to fancy himself possessed of uncommon privileges or endowments. The more he dwells upon the thought, and the more he magnifies to himself his real or imaginary perfections, the higher his satisfaction rises; and in a while it becomes painful and mortifying to him to think otherwise. Thus far it is no more than *self-flattery*, kept up purely by the inward *pleasure* attending it, and the sensible *pain* and *uneasiness* of being checked or contradicted in it. The next

step is to set a high *value* upon himself, for what he conceives great or considerable belonging to him; and he proceeds to demand respect and deference from others, suitable to the opinion and esteem which he has of himself. Thus commences *pride, haughtiness*, and *arrogance*. Within a while *envy, hatred, animosity*, and *revenge* ensue against all that stand in his way. He must depress others, in order the more to aggrandize himself; and must endeavour to obstruct his neighbour's happiness, lest it should prove in any measure prejudicial to his own. Thus the unhappy man, for the pleasure only of a fond thought at first, runs himself by degrees into innumerable irregularities, and withal anxieties. He gives up the most divine and transporting pleasure of this life, and entirely forfeits all just pretences to a better. So blind is *self-love*, in some instances, so inconsiderate is *selfishness*, that it most effectually baffles and defeats its own designs.

2. Another instance of *inordinate*, ill-conducted *self-love* is *sensuality*. This belongs to the *body* more than to the *mind;* is of a gross taste, and of the coarser kind, aiming only at *pleasing sensations*. It so far agrees with *pride*, that it makes men pursue the *present gratification* at the expense of the *public peace*, and to their own *future misery* and ruin. The happiness which it pretends to is in itself mean and disparaging; and inevitably draws after it innumerable mischiefs, either in this world or the other.

3. A third instance of blind and *inordinate self-love* is *avarice*, or *self-interestedness*. This is of larger and more diffusive influence than either of the former. So great a part of temporal felicity is conceived to depend upon riches, that the men of this world lie under the strongest temptations to this vice of any. If the case be such, that treachery and fraud, guile and hypocrisy, rapine and violence, may be serviceable to the end proposed; the blind self-lover will charge through all, rather than be defeated of his covetous designs, or bear the uneasiness of a disappointment. Thus he comes to prefer his own *private, present interest*, before *virtue, honour, conscience*, or *humanity*.

With respect to himself and his own *real happiness*, he runs into the same fallacy and misconduct which I before mentioned. He considers not what would be good for him *upon the whole*, and in the last result; but lives *extempore*, contrives only for a few days, or years at most, looking no further. The height of his ambition reaches not beyond *temporal* felicity; and he mis-

calculates even in that. He divests himself of all the soft and good-natured passions of humanity, kindness, pity, and tenderness; in the exercise whereof consists the most refined and delicate pleasure of life. He considers not that generosity, friendliness, honesty, &c. are qualities very agreeable to a rational nature, and come recommended by their own sweetness; that they are apt to attract the eyes and hearts of men, create reverence and esteem, and tend to render any person, who is remarkable for them, the delight and darling of mankind. Upon a just balancing the account, the *self-lover* will be found no gainer, in respect even of *worldly* happiness; and yet that is but a trifle and a shadow, mere emptiness and vanity, in comparison to joys eternal.

These instances may be sufficient to shew both the *nature* of *self-love*, in the *bad sense*, and the *folly* of it. I have insisted more upon the hurt which such *self-lovers* do to *themselves*, than upon the mischief they bring to *others:* because the former is indeed the most considerable; and yet, being less open and visible, is the least taken notice of. They are enemies to *all mankind:* but still they are the greatest enemies to their *own selves.* They hinder and obstruct the happiness of many, for a time; but they entirely defeat and destroy their own; and that to all eternity.

The Apostle has observed, and all men know, that times are *perilous* where such persons abound. For what a world of savages should we soon find, if the narrow, *selfish* principles prevailed; if beneficence, love, and kindness, which hold the world together, were to be banished from among men! The truly noble and generous principle for which every man is designed, and in which his own particular happiness is contained, is that of an *universal benevolence* and good-will towards all. And any affections or inclinations deviating from thence, or opposite thereto, are so many degrees of *selfishness*, or approaches towards it. From whence we may remark, that if any be lovers of their *own country*, and *that only*, regardless of the rules of humanity, justice, and equity with *other nations*, they are so far *selfish*, and are, in a loose or large sense, "lovers of their own "selves" only.

If any, still more straitened in their affections, instead of seeking the *common good* of their country, confine their good wishes, services, and endeavours to their *own tribe, sect*, or *party*,

is a mere dream and a delusion, a contradiction to the reason and nature of things.

2. A *second* consideration, proper to be hinted, is, that man is made for *eternity*, and not for *this* life only. No happiness can be true and solid, which is not lasting and durable as ourselves. And what if the *self-lover* could secure the greatest worldly felicity, still it is confined within the circle of a few years, may die before him, and must however with him, and leave him empty and destitute to all eternity. Is this all that his extreme love and fondness for himself amounts to? Is it not like feasting for a day, to starve ever after; or rejoicing for an hour, only to lament and mourn for endless ages? Is this the kindness they pretend to have for their own selves? The bitterest enemies could not hurt them worse, or be really more severe and cruel than they are to themselves.

To conclude: the way to arrive at *true happiness* is, to take into consideration the *whole extent* and *compass of our being;* to enlarge our views beyond our *little selves* to the *whole creation* round us, whereof we are but a slender part; and to extend our prospect beyond *this life* to remote and *distant glories.* Make *things future* appear as if they were *now present*, and *things distant* as if they were *near* and *sensible.* This, with the help of God's grace, may cure us of our *narrow thoughts*, and shew us the necessity of enlarging our hearts and affections. As to *self-lovers*, they are not advised to love themselves at all *the less*, but only to love themselves *more judiciously*, and to *better purpose;* not to *lay aside their concern for happiness*, for that is impossible; but to mix something more of *discretion* and *judgment* with it; that instead of pretending to be in any degree *happy* in *opposition* both to *God* and *man*, (a thing utterly impossible,) they may study and endeavour constantly to *love God* and to *love their neighbours*, that is, *all mankind;* and then they will the most *wisely* and *the most effectually love their own selves.*

SERMON IV.

The Duty of *keeping the Heart;* and the Importance of it illustrated, from the *Dependance* of our *religious Conduct,* in Faith and Practice, on the *inward Frame* and Disposition of the *Mind.*

PROVERBS iv. 23.

Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life.

AMONG the many wise and admirable precepts given us by king Solomon, there is none more worthy of our observation than this which I have here recited. We are exhorted, in holy Scripture, to "keep our tongues" from evil, and our eyes from wandering after insnaring objects; to "keep our feet" from going astray, to take heed to our ways, and to ponder our paths: but the shortest and the surest rule is to "keep our hearts;" to set a diligent watch there, where all our works and ways begin, and from whence they all derive their moral quality. "A good "man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that "which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his "heart bringeth forth that which is evil[a]:" which is the same in effect with what is observed in the text, that "out of the *heart* "are the issues of life." From thence proceeds all that is *blamable* or *praiseworthy* in us: and according as we are more or less careful in keeping or regulating the *heart,* so will our lives and conversations be better or worse.

By the *heart* we are to understand the *frame, disposition,* and

[a] Luke vi. 45.

temper of the soul, or mind. As the *head* is sometimes used to signify the seat of *reason* and thought; so the *heart* very oft denotes the seat of the *affections*, *passions*, and *desires*. The philosophy of this way of speaking is what we need not concern ourselves with. It is sufficient to observe, that this is frequently or generally the Scripture notion of the word *heart*. The instances are so many, and so easily occur, that it would be only misspending time, and trespassing on the audience, to produce any. Not to trouble ourselves therefore with the different senses of interpreters upon the text, the most obvious and natural meaning of it appears to be this; that we ought, with the utmost care and application, to attend to and regulate the *inward frame*, temper, and disposition of our minds; for this very good reason, because the whole course and tenor of our lives and conversations, and consequently our happiness and misery, depend upon it. "Keep thy heart with all diligence; "for out of it are the issues of life."

The reason or foundation of the precept is put last in the text: but in treating of it, it will be convenient to invert the order, and to consider it first. The precept, being a practical inference, may most naturally follow after, as the *conclusion* follow the *premises*: and we shall the more easily apprehend what is implied or contained in the *precept*, after we have seen what *foundation* it has in the nature and reason of things. I shall therefore endeavour to shew,

I. How the "issues of life," in a religious respect, depend upon the *heart*. And,

II. What is implied or contained in the precept of the text: "Keep thy heart with all diligence."

I.

I shall endeavour to shew how the "issues of life," in a religious respect, depend upon the *heart*.

All things relating to our religious conduct are reducible either to some matter of *belief* or *practice*: something to be *believed* or *done*. We are therefore to consider how far either our *belief* or *practice* is subject to be influenced by the *heart*; that is, by the *affections* and *inclinations*, the drift and bent of our minds.

1. To begin with *belief*. How much that depends upon the temper and disposition of the *heart* is very easily seen from Scripture, and history, and from daily experience. Our blessed

Lord hath told us, that "if any man will do his will, he shall "know of the doctrine, whether it be of God[b];" intimating that the *belief* of Gospel truths depends much on the *disposition* which men are in to receive them. If the *heart* be *well affected* towards them, they will find easy admittance: but if the *heart* be *disaffected*, or has entertained any aversion to them, it will be the hardest thing in the world to prevail for their reception. It was with a view to this, that our blessed Saviour said in another place, "Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as "a little child, he shall not enter therein[c];" insinuating, that *simplicity of mind* and *heart*, free from *prejudice* and *prepossession*, is highly requisite for the *receiving of the truth*. How readily did Nathanael believe in Christ! The reason was, that he was a man *without guile:* he had an honest and *upright heart*, no sinister or *secular ends* to serve, no *evil affections* to mislead him; therefore was he fitly disposed both to believe and embrace the Gospel. But the Scribes and Pharisees were men of *corrupt hearts* and *secular aims;* full of ambition, avarice, and pride, and other *vile affections*. This rendered them utterly averse to the Gospel of Jesus Christ: and accordingly miracle upon miracle, and all the other ways and means which an all-wise God saw proper to make use of for their conviction, proved ineffectual. "They loved darkness rather than light, because "their deeds were evil." The same or the like account may be given of the Gentiles, those that rejected the offers of life and happiness by the Gospel. They wanted not *sufficient means* of conviction; but they would not believe what lay so cross to the *inclinations* and *passions* of their *corrupt hearts*. The case of many who reject Christianity in general, or reformed Christianity in particular, is resolvable also into some *evil affection* or inclination of the *heart*. Why do the Jews, Pagans, or Mahometans persist in their errors, respectively, but because *education*, *authority*, *prepossession*, and *prejudice* have inclined them to think in such a way; and *inclination* has grown up into a standing and *unalterable persuasion?* Why do the Romanists adhere to their erroneous tenets, so contradictory, many of them, to Scripture and antiquity, and even to common sense, but that their *hearts* and *affections* are tied and bowed down to them by the weight of *education*, *custom*, *reputation*, *interest*, or other the like *prejudices* and *secular inducements?* As to parti-

[b] John vii. 17. [c] Mark x. 15.

cular men, it would be endless to observe how their *affections* and *passions* have often had the greatest hand in their *opinions*. Ambition and vainglory, malice and revenge, lust and avarice, have, in all ages, produced pernicious and monstrous tenets. There is hardly any thing so absurd, but some or other may be brought to *believe* it, provided their *affections* and *passions* lean towards it, and become parties in it. Were it not for this, our understandings, weak as they are, would very seldom deceive us. *Ignorance* is not the principal cause of *error*, but a *forwardness of judging* before we see reason for it; which is chiefly owing to the *corruption of the heart*, intercepting the due use and exercise of our *rational faculties*, and driving us on into *precipitate judgments*. But I proceed to consider what I principally intended,

2. Our *practice:* how that, as well as our *belief*, is subject to be influenced by the *reigning passion* or inclination of the *heart*. This may appear, in some measure, from what hath been already observed. For if the *belief* or *judgment* often takes its tincture from the *heart*, this may happen in points of *morality* as well as in any other: and then there can be no question but the *practice* will be suitable and conformable to the *persuasion*. If *inclination* and *judgment*, *heart* and *head*, both conspire; nothing can be wanting to determine the choice, and to influence the *outward practice*.

But it remains to be considered, how far the *practice* is apt to be governed by the *inclination of the heart*, without the *concurrence of the judgment*, or even in *opposition* to it. I am not supposing either an impossible or an uncommon case. Experience, history, and observation may too sadly convince us all, that it is neither. Men not only may be, but generally are, more swayed by their *affections* and *passions* than by their *principles:* and *principles* are of very little force or *efficacy*, except when they fall in with *inclination*, or grow up into it. We may observe Jews and Pagans, Mahometans and Christians, Papists and Protestants, Dissenters and Churchmen; men of *different principles;* but the *same inclinations, affections*, and *passions* prevail amongst all: and he that knows *human nature* well, may pass a truer judgment of any of them, than one who considers barely their respective *principles* or persuasions. Were we to form a judgment of Christians in particular, from the *Bible* only, rather than from the *temper* and disposition of *mankind in*

general, we should be widely mistaken. There is the same pride and ambition, the same treachery and deceit, the same luxury and lewdness, the same envy and hatred, the same rancour and bitterness; in a word, the same follies and vices, reigning among Christians, as we shall meet with in other men. It is not their *principles*, but the *disposition* and *temper*, common to them and others, which for the most part actuate and govern them. For can we think that they do not *believe* the religion they profess? Are they so many hypocrites and dissemblers, *pretended Christians*, but *real Deists*, *Pagans*, or *Atheists*? No certainly, but very far from it. They do *believe*, and that *sincerely* too, the Christian religion: they have not any doubt or scruple of it: they abhor those who have: they value and esteem it much: would, very probably, rather than renounce it utterly, even die for it: and they hope at length to be saved by it: and yet notwithstanding *live not up to it*. The number of Atheists or Deists, in our own or other Christian countries, is certainly very small and inconsiderable. There are not so many *infidels* as would be thought so, or perhaps *wish* to be such. *Inclination* and *impure affection* will do much with some men: but yet they cannot always believe or disbelieve just what they please. Besides, there is not temptation enough to infidelity, a very difficult thing to attain to in any Christian country. Men can *elude* their principles with much more ease than they can *renounce* them; and therefore need not take sanctuary in *atheism* or *infidelity*.

Shall we say then, that Christians, believing their religion *in the gross*, yet understand not its *particular doctrines*? That they do not know, for instance, that pride or luxury, avarice or intemperance, treachery or fraud, malice or revenge, is as opposite to their religion, as darkness is to light? No. This cannot be pretended. They know these things perfectly well: they condemn those vices in others, nay, even in themselves. Besides, it must be owned further, that many may have learning and abilities as great as any casuist; may be particularly versed in Scripture and morality; may make religion, and even practical religion, their familiar study and business; may be weekly or daily employed in instructing and reforming the world; and yet be ambitious and covetous, proud or luxurious, secular in their views, and hypocritical in their pretences. *Knowledge* is one thing, and *grace* another: *orthodoxy* is not *probity*: a

sound head may often be consistent with a *corrupt heart*. Good *principles* therefore are by no means *alone* sufficient to make us good *men*. It is not what we *believe*, but what we *affect* and *incline* to, that determines us. *Affections* actuate and govern the men, insomuch that *religion*, however really and fully *believed*, has yet no force upon us till it sinks deep into us, and becomes the *reigning passion* of our *hearts*. This is fact, and the truth and certainty of it is what we find and feel by experience.

I will not however conceal an objection which seems to run counter to our main position. It may be thought that our *irregular actions* are rather *ultimately resolvable* into the *false judgments* which we make, than into *affection* or *inclination*; and that the *head* is *first* tainted, and *then* the *heart*. For it may be asked, why any man is inclined to one thing more than to another? Is it not because he first *believes* or *judges* it to be *good* for him? It is a maxim with divines and moralists, that we cannot *choose evil* but *under the notion of good*, having a principle of *self-love* within; and that therefore there must be some error in *judgment*, before there can be any in *practice*. This is the objection in its full force; and I shall endeavour next as fully to answer it. It may be allowed, that some *error in judgment* always *precedes* every *error in practice*: and it is nevertheless true, that our *irregular acts* are *ultimately resolvable* into *affection* and *inclination*; because the *error*, both of *judgment* and *practice*, is owing to the *corruption of the heart*. The progress of the mind in such cases seems to be this. When some sensible good is presented to the eye or to the mind, the man judges it to be *agreeable*, or pleasant to the sense; and so far judges right. Yet this alone would not *determine his choice*, because *other considerations*, more, or *more weighty*, might keep him from it. But he dwells upon the thought till his *heart is inflamed*: then he *chooses*, and not *till then*. If he still retained an *indifference* towards it, as he easily might; if he did not grow *uneasy* and impatient for it; he would stay and consider, would examine all the consequences, and be well assured not only that the thing is *pleasant to sense*, or good *in part*, but that it is good *in the whole*, simply and absolutely so, before he *chooses* it. But the drift and bent of his soul leaning too much towards it, he cuts off all further consideration, and is *precipitately determined* by it. Thus the *judgment* upon which the man *acts follows* the *irregular*

inclination. It is the desire, the impatience, the *passion of his heart,* that hurries him into it. His *judging* the thing to be *good in part,* or in some respect, is indeed *antecedent* to the *inclination,* in *order of nature;* but his judging it to be *good in the whole,* entirely so, and therefore *eligible,* is *after* it. In a word, he believes that to be *best,* and *most eligible,* which he most *inclines* to; and upon this he acts. *Inclination,* at length, is the *ruling principle:* his *heart* betrays him.

This is applicable in a thousand cases, where men prefer *temporal* to *eternal* happiness. For though they act according to their *present judgment,* and, as they think, *best for themselves;* yet that *present judgment* is contrary to their *cooler sentiments* of things, and proceeds entirely from the *reigning passion* of the *heart.* Here then we may distinguish between the *habitual* and the *occasional* judgments which are made. The former are what we call *settled principles,* the work of reason and thought, when the mind is cool and sober: the latter are only *particular judgments* proceeding from some *affection* or *passion,* as temptations come in men's way, or as occasion serves. To illustrate this by an instance.

Any man who looks into his Bible knows that *adultery* or *drunkenness* is a great and crying sin; and cannot but judge it infinitely better to abstain from it, than to run the risk of everlasting damnation. These are his cool and sober sentiments, the *habitual* and *standing judgment* of his mind. Yet notwithstanding, through the prevalency of his *lusts* and *passions,* he *does* the very thing which he *condemns;* and, by so doing, shews that his *heart* has betrayed him into a *precipitate* judgment, contrary to what his *reason* and conscience dictate to him. Thus he *acts against principle,* being driven on by a *prevailing passion;* and *chooses* in that *particular instance,* and on that occasion, what he *acknowledges, in the general,* ought *never to be chosen.* This is the *fallacy* by which many so frequently and so fatally deceive their own souls, by which they *elude* and defeat the *settled judgments* of their own minds, and act counter to those good and sound principles which they believe and maintain. This being a matter of great importance, and well worth the considering, it may not be amiss to inquire a little further into it; that we may the more clearly understand by what sort of charm or enchantment our inclinations and affections can so work upon us, as to make us judge and act so inconsistently

with ourselves. It must be either by our *leaving out* or *taking in* something very differently from what we do when we form a *true* and *right judgment*. Now the mystery of the case seems, for the most part, to lie in one or more of the three following particulars:

First, Either we think not at all, for the time, of the *general* principles which we hold, but suffer them to lie dormant and useless to us.

Secondly, Or, if we think of them, we neglect to apply them to our own *particular* case, imagining ourselves to be unconcerned in them.

Thirdly, Or if we do apply them, and consequently are self-condemned, and sensible of it, yet we hope to *repent* and to be saved notwithstanding.

First, It may often happen that men, blinded with *passion*, and hurried on by their *appetite*, may, for the time, *entirely forget* the *good principles* which they have. The present object so fills and takes up the mind, that there is no room or place left for any thing else. The man is not at leisure to start difficulties or raise scruples. The temptation is too near, too importunate and pressing, to give any leave to think or recollect. The mind, in such cases, is too eager and too impatient to consider any thing beyond the present. Thus there being an appearance of good, but no apprehension of evil to counterbalance it; reasons for the thing, and no reasons thought on against it; *sense* pleading warmly on one hand, while *reason* and *religion* are asleep on the other; such being the case, it is easy to imagine how the man must determine. He judges indeed right enough upon the *present appearance* of things: but it is his *own fault* that things do not appear otherwise. It is his *passion* that gives the false colour to the object, and he is answerable for letting it have the ascendant over him, so far as to stupify and render useless those rational faculties which God has given him.

Secondly, A second case is, when we do not entirely forget the good principles which we have learned, but only neglect to *apply* them to our *own particular case*.

This comes to pass as often as men content themselves with a loose and superficial knowledge of their own case or temper; not examining carefully and impartially into either. *Partiality*, proceeding from self-flattery or mistaken self-love, perverts their

judgment; insomuch that they think favourably of themselves, while they do the very same things which they condemn in others: and it contributes very much towards their putting this cheat upon themselves, that they are able to find out some plausible name or colour for their vices.

A man may be very sensible that *covetousness*, for instance, is idolatry, and highly displeasing to Almighty God: but when the case comes to be his own, he calls it not *covetousness*, but *frugality*. Another believes *pride* to be an abominable vice, equally hateful to God and man: but still his *own pride* has no such appearing malignity in it: it is, with him, nothing but *magnanimity* and greatness of soul. A third is firmly persuaded that all *rancour* and *malice*, *bitterness* and *revenge*, are utterly repugnant to God's word, and diametrically opposite to the genius and spirit of the Gospel: but when he himself becomes guilty, he is not sensible of any rancour or malice, bitterness or revenge; he is a stranger to such abominations, washes his hands of them, and calls his own madness a *just resentment*, for a terror to offenders, and for the good of the world. To add an example or two for further illustration. A bigoted Romanist, warmed with a spirit of *persecution*, wreaks his spleen, revenge, and rage, trampling on the laws of humanity, as well as on the precepts of the Gospel; and yet flatters himself all the while that he is doing no harm, vainly imagining that it is nothing but a *laudable* and becoming *earnestness* for his *holy religion*. A zealous *party man*, while he is endeavouring to turn the world upside down, and almost to tear human society in pieces; while he deals about calumnies with an undistinguishing hand, throws his arrows and firebrands abroad without mercy, and discovers all the ill qualities one should expect to meet with in an angel of darkness; yet very gravely puts all to the account of the *cause* he is engaged in, and thinks nothing can be amiss which may promote the measures and interests of his *party*.

Such are the *false judgments* which men ordinarily make, in compliance with their *reigning passions*. They *act* against their *settled judgment* and principles, and are not *aware* that they do so. They do not carefully examine the pulse of their own *hearts*: they know not upon what *springs* they move, nor consider the *tendency* of their actions. Their *general notices* of good and evil are right and just; and they can apply them readily to every case but their *own*. There, *partiality* and fond *self-love* forbid

too strict inquiry, and prevent the use and *application* of their principles. As many see no blemishes in their *friends*, or else invent some kind excuses or cover for them; so these do with *themselves*. Their faults would be very great ones, even themselves being judges, if they were not their *own*.

Thirdly, There is a third way which many have of *eluding* the force of their *principles*, as effectual as any, and indeed the most dangerous of all. When a case is too flagrant, and too notoriously wicked, to admit of the more refined ways of evading and frustrating the plain rules of the Gospel; they have this reserve still, that they hope to *repent* some time or other, and to be saved at last. This prevails most with those who are addicted to the sins of the body, which are too gross and too scandalous to admit of those colourable pretences that are often made for the more gross and lurking vices of the *heart*. These men are sensible that they sin against God, and that they expose themselves to the danger of hell fire. But while they think the danger remote and distant, and that they have it in their power to prevent it when they please: while they have plausible hopes (and what will they not think or hope, upon a principle of self-love, and infatuated by a predominant passion?) that they may enjoy their sinful pleasures, and arrive at heaven notwithstanding: I say, while they think thus, there is nothing in human nature forbidding such a choice; a man may easily be determined so to act; and thousands are so determined every day.

Thus we see how the "issues of life" spring from the *heart*, from the predominant *affections* and *inclinations*, in contradiction to their *standing principles*. And there is no difficulty in solving the problem, how it comes to pass, that the generality of Christians, with all their reason, and understanding, and good principles about them, yet *practise* nothing less than the rules of their most holy religion. If they had not contrived those or the like ways of "holding the truth in unrighteousness," of retaining their *principles* and their *lusts* together; then indeed there would be many more *infidels* than there really now are. For if *affections* were importunate and clamorous against *principle*, and there were no other way to gratify them, and withal to make the mind easy; men would then bend all their aims to work themselves up into a *disbelief* of their *principles*, and take their last refuge in *Deism*, or even *Atheism*. Some benefit we reap from the very mischief whereof I have been complaining. We owe to it,

in a great measure, that outward form and face of religion which is still kept up in the world. For if the point lay here, that every man must of necessity be either a *Christian in deed* and *in truth*, agreeably to his principles, or else renounce his principles, and turn *infidel;* it is obvious and easy to imagine what condition the world must have been in long before this time. But I proceed to my second general head;

II.

To shew what is implied and contained in the *precept* of the text: "To keep the heart with all diligence." Having seen how much depends on the disposition of the *heart;* the reason and the necessity of the precept must be very apparent: and we have nothing now left to do, but to inquire what it contains, or whereof it consists. It must consist of *two parts*, or offices. 1. To *preserve our good dispositions;* and 2. To *correct our bad ones.* And these again will each of them imply two other things: first, a frequent examination of our own hearts; and, secondly, a constant endeavour to wean our affections from this world, and to fix them on another.

1. The first part or office implied in the precept of the text, is to use our best endeavours to *preserve* our *good dispositions*, to keep up and maintain such commendable inclinations as we find ourselves already endowed with. This I conceive to be principally intended in the text. The phrase of *keeping* the heart answers thereto; and besides, it is much more in our power to *keep* our hearts from going astray, than to *recover* them when once gone.

2. The second part or office implied also in the text, is to correct our *bad inclinations*, and reduce them to reason. This is a matter of labour and difficulty, to recover a heart after it is gone astray, to call back the wandering affections, and to give them a new turn. How far this may be within the *ordinary power* of man, or what degree of *grace* is required for it, I pretend not to determine, since it depends upon great variety of circumstances. If the *heart* be the *governing principle*, as we have before proved, it may be thought a kind of contradiction for a man *of himself*, and upon his *own free motion*, to set about the *correcting* or reforming it. How shall he correct his *reigning inclination*, without being *inclined* to do it? And how can *any inclination* be the *reigning one*, if there be a *superior* inclination to reduce and *correct* it? It comes at length to this; how shall a man be *inclined* to

what he is *not* inclined to? Here lies the difficulty: and hence it is that we so seldom see a thorough change of the heart; and when we do see it, we must impute it rather to the powerful hand of *God*, than to any thing which a man is able to do *of himself*. The inclinations of men (humanly speaking) once estranged from God and goodness, very rarely return, but rule and prevail over the unhappy creatures all their lives long. No arguments have any weight or force with them; no considerations can find entrance; they are deaf to all persuasion, refusing, like the deaf adder, to "hear "the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely." When men's *hearts* and affections are once gone off to this degree, their damnation is certain; unless it please God to visit them in some remarkable manner, and to give a turn to their thoughts. In the general we may say, according as the *heart* is more or less *abandoned*, so the *state of the man* is either *better* or *worse*, and his *recovery* more or less *doubtful*. All the hold that any instructions or advices have upon him lies in this, that he is incessantly desirous of his *own happiness:* and though he has placed his affections *chiefly* upon *temporal good*, yet *some degree* of *inclination* towards *eternal happiness* may abide and continue with him. The embers are not quite dead, but may some time or other kindle afresh, and break out into a flame. To come out of figure and metaphor, I apprehend the matter to lie plainly thus: though wicked men be under the influence of their corrupt, prevailing inclinations, in the *ordinary course* of their lives; yet at *some certain seasons*, and especially in the *absence of temptations*, their enchanted *reason* and understanding may *recover* its due force and spring, may represent the ill consequences of a wicked course, and press the consideration thereof close and home: and they may instantly resolve upon ways and means to prevent any such delusion and infatuation for the time to come. This I suppose to be ordinarily in the power of the mind of man, not excluding the influences of God's grace cooperating with him.

It may be thought, perhaps, that, in what hath been said, I have too much heightened or magnified the difficulty of *correcting the heart*, and that there is little or no difficulty in the thing. For, since God's grace is never wanting, but when men are wanting to themselves, any man may repent whensoever he will. This I admit. But is it so easy a matter for a man to *will* what he has *no mind to?* If the man be *willing*, the thing is as good as done: but there lies the difficulty. The *will* itself,

the first mover, the spring of action, is the very thing that wants to be *set right;* and what shall do this? If it be thought that a principle of *reason*, with which man is endowed, is sufficient for all; the difficulty still returns, how the *will*, enslaved to passions, shall incline to *follow reason*. Whoever well considers human nature, and how the generality of mankind must be kept in awe by temporal penalties, or that otherwise the world would immediately run into the utmost confusion, will be apt to believe, that it is a very rare and uncommon talent, to be ever ready and *willing* to hearken to *reason*. It is but throwing out so many empty words, to say a man can do thus, or thus, *if he will*. A man *may* wantonly throw himself off from a precipice without the least *reason* for it: or he *may* put himself to extreme torture upon a *rack*, without any *motive* for doing it: or *may* do things on purpose to make himself *contemptible* or *miserable* all his life long: all this a man *may* do if he *will;* he has a *physical* power of acting in this manner, and that is all: but he can never *exercise* this power in such manner, because he can never have the *will* to do it, there being no principle in human nature to excite him to it. Now, though the aversion which some persons have to repentance and holiness of life be not the same in *degree* with such as I have mentioned; yet it may be very great, strong, and forcible: and though it be true, that they *may* repent if *they will*, yet it may be no less true, that, in those circumstances, they cannot of themselves have the *will* to do it, nor without some extraordinary grace preventing and assisting in it. However, as I before said, there is always a principle in our nature, a *desire of happiness*, which may, at some time or other, call men off from their evil courses; and it will generally operate more or less, according as it hath run a longer or a shorter time in a wrong channel. But, not to weary your patience longer with matters of an abstract nature, whether the difficulty of correcting bad inclinations be greater or less, we may proceed to lay down the means proper for it: and they are the same, in a great measure, with those that are requisite for preserving good ones, as before mentioned.

The first is, a *frequent examination of our own hearts*. Such as find in themselves an inclination to make this first step will not, very probably, be much averse to going further. Without *examining*, we can never perfectly know what is good or bad in us; what we ought to preserve, and what to correct. It re-

quires serious reflection, and dwelling much at home, to understand ourselves thoroughly. We ought to search and examine upon what *springs* our *hearts* move; whether our views and purposes be chiefly *religious* or *secular;* and if *secular,* what they *are,* and from whence they *arise.* When there are several motives to the same thing, (as it often happens,) it should be considered, whether the *prevailing* one be *religious.* This is easily known, by setting aside all that is *secular* and *temporal,* and then trying the strength of *spiritual* motives. Thus for instance: if any one would know whether he gives alms upon a true *Christian* principle, let him only consider, whether he takes the same satisfaction in a *private* as in a *public* charity, and his question is answered. Or if a man would know whether he publishes any work out of a sincere love to truth, and a desire to improve the world, (as every writer pretends,) let him think and consider, whether he should be willing publicly to *retract an error* which might otherwise do mischief; and he will soon perceive how his *heart* moves. The same method will serve for a thousand other cases. There is another way of discovering how we stand affected; and that is, by observing the stream and current of our *passions.* As the *ambitious* man's passions turn upon *honour* and *power,* the *libertine's* upon *sensual pleasures,* and the *covetous* man's upon *money;* so the *religious* man's passions hang chiefly upon what relates to his *eternal salvation.* And it will be easy for him to observe, whether he be as heartily sorry for his *sins,* as for any *worldly losses,* crosses, or disappointments; and whether he be as *solicitous* about the *former* as he is about the *latter.* All the *passions* of our souls are nothing else but so many different expressions of the *love* we have for *ourselves:* and it may be seen from thence how our *self-love* stands directed; whether to this world or a better, and to which we are most strongly and invincibly attached.

A little use and observation this way will soon give a man a just idea of himself.

If he finds his inclinations and dispositions to be *right and good in the main;* he is next to observe where they are *most apt to step awry,* and there he is to set a *double guard,* as it were to defend the *weak side.* If he perceives them to be solely or chiefly *secular;* it concerns him to discover the *reigning passion* which gives the law to the rest; whether it be for *riches, honours,* or *pleasures:* and this will easily be understood from the stream

of his *thoughts*, the course of his *pursuits*, and the constant tenor of his life and conversation. When this is done, the last part of this office is to trace the thing up to its *fountain head*, to see from whence such disposition or affection *arises:* whether from *temper* or *constitution* of body, or from *education*, *authority*, *example*, or *custom*; from the *occupation* he pursues, the *company* he keeps, the *books* he reads, or any thing of like nature. This seems to be the proper order and method of examining our *hearts*, if we are desirous to be thoroughly acquainted with our own selves.

When we have thus discovered *what is amiss*, and *whence it arises;* nothing remains but to consider of ways and means proper to *correct* it. Many good rules and directions might be offered to this purpose: but instead of *particular rules*, which vary according to men's *particular circumstances*, it may suffice to lay down one *general rule*, which may equally serve either for preserving good dispositions or reforming bad ones; and that is,

Secondly and lastly, a *constant endeavour to wean our affections from this world, and to fix them firmly on a better*. Happiness, in general, we all pursue; eagerly, constantly, incessantly. Thus far we all agree, down from the prince to the peasant. But then we divide in the choice of the *means* or of the *object;* some pursuing *eternal* happiness, most *temporal* only, or however chiefly: and these subdivide again into almost as many kinds as the world affords vanities. All the difference between an evil man and a good man is, that the evil man makes *this world* his *chief* or *only aim;* while the good man makes the world to come his principal concern, and *religion* is the *reigning passion* of his heart. The different degrees of goodness depend very much upon keeping the eye more or less fixed upon *that*, the ultimate end and design of all their labours and endeavours. Such as lean with all the weight and tendency of their minds towards heaven, are of course solicitous and anxious to know whether their *principles* and *practices* agree together. They will not suffer themselves to be imposed on in a matter of so great importance: but carefully watch and guard against all those little *fallacies* which thoughtless men are drawn in by, to make *particular judgments* contrary to their *standing persuasions*. In a word, as *worldly men* are solicitous to secure a firm and strong title to their *estates or honours;* so the *children of light* are par-

ticularly watchful to make their "calling and election sure." All this naturally flows from a heart fixed upon heaven and eternal happiness: and such a disposition once firmly rooted and grounded, hardly needs any further rules. We easily perceive what we have to do, after we have fixed our aims and settled our main designs. All the sins and irregularities, either of our passions or our lives, ultimately terminate in our *inclination* to some *temporal good*, or *aversion* to some *temporal evil;* that is, in our love of this present world. There lies the root and source of all the distempers of our minds. Wherefore the true, the only remedy must be, to disentangle the mind, as much as possible, from things below, and to seek those things which are above. If it be asked, how this must be done? the ready answer is; by *retirement*, by *recollection*, by *reading*, and especially by *praying*. This is the way to make distant things have the same force upon us as if they were near at hand, and things to come as if they were now present.

If want of *leisure* be pleaded by men of action and business, it is a shrewd presumption that they have never yet seriously considered what *everlasting happiness* and *everlasting misery* import. However, it is not to be expected that either all or the greater part of our time should be laid out in religious exercises, properly so called. A great deal less may suffice. God designed us for *action* and business: our circumstances here, the health of our bodies, and the vigour of our minds require it, and can hardly be kept up without it. If the *heart* be once *set right*, and the *aim well directed;* business itself is but another kind of *religious exercise*, and *doing good in our station* is *serving God*. It is the *intention* which *sanctifies* it, while the *end* proposed is the *glory of God* and the *good of mankind*.

To conclude: let us be ever careful so to use and so to enjoy this world, as neither to be enchanted nor enamoured with it; always remembering, that it is an introduction only to another, that it will soon be over, and that *eternity* hangs upon it.

SERMON V.

Wicked Men, the providential Instruments of Good.

The First Sermon on this Subject.

PROVERBS xvi. 4.

The Lord hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.

THIS wise saying of king Solomon, if it be but rightly understood, is full of excellent matter, and most useful instruction, such as every good man will constantly have upon his mind. But the words, as they run in our version, are not altogether so clear as they might have been; for which reason it will be necessary, here in the entrance, first to open and explain the meaning of the text; that so we may come at the subject-matter to be discoursed upon. The verse going before the text, having a relation to it, will be of use to point out to us its real and full meaning. "Commit thy works unto the Lord, and thy thoughts "shall be established." Which words are an exhortation to us to repose our whole trust and confidence in God's good providence, and to submit all our thoughts and resolutions to him, as upon whom alone the success of them and their accomplishment depend. Then follows; "The Lord hath made all things for "himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil:" that is, for executing vengeance where God pleases. All things are in God's hands, and he makes use of all things as he pleases; for he created them all: yea even the wickedest and worst of men,

they are his creatures too, and under his direction and control: however they may be set upon mischief, they can proceed no further than God permits; being instruments only in his hand to afflict others, and to bring evil upon them. When he is disposed to shield and protect good men, then he restrains and ties up those engines of mischief: but at other times, when he is pleased either to exercise good men with trials, or to punish the wicked, he then lets loose those ministers of wrath to execute his discipline or his vengeance in the earth. And because all the instruments of mischief are thus in God's hands, and must have commission or leave for every step they take; therefore all kinds of calamities or disasters that befall mankind are ascribed to God as their sovereign Author, being the supreme arbitrator and disposer of all events. To which purpose God says by his prophet Isaiah, "I form the light, and create darkness: I make "peace, and create evil[a]." And by the prophet Amos, "Shall "there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it[b]?" In the Lamentations of the prophet Jeremiah it is expressed thus: "Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, when the Lord "commandeth it not? Out of the mouth of the most High "proceedeth not evil and good[c]?" By which it is intimated, that both prosperous and calamitous events are to be ascribed to God's overruling providence. The same thought occurred to holy Job under his troubles; "Shall we receive good," says he, "at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil[d]?" The same thing is frequently inculcated in several other places of holy Scripture, too long to mention: and the main design of all was to instil this instructive lesson into the minds of men; that as, on one hand, they could have no reason to hope for any thing *good* but from God; so, on the other hand, they could have no just ground to fear any *evil* but from the same Divine Being. Mankind were very apt to suspect, that there were two *opposite* powers in the world, *one* the fountain of *good*, and the *other* the fountain of *mischief:* this notion appears to have been very ancient among the Persians, and among the Egyptians before them. The consequence of which was, that they thought themselves obliged to worship and adore both the rival powers; *one*, in expectation to receive *good* from him; and the *other*, as it is said of the Indians at this day, for fear he should do them *harm*.

[a] Isa. xlv. 7. [b] Amos iii. 6. [c] Lam. iii. 37, 38. [d] Job ii. 10.

This is a superstitious and dangerous notion, which the Scripture every where obviates, by teaching that both *good* and *evil*, both *prosperity* and *adversity*, proceed from the *same fountain*, and are both to be ascribed to one and the same God. For though evil angels, or wicked men, may be the contrivers and executors of innumerable mischiefs; yet, considering that they are God's creatures, and both contrive and act under restraint, and under correction, as God sees fit, they are to be looked upon as God's instruments in all that they effect; as much as wild beasts, or fire, or storms, or floods, or any thing of like kind: they are but the ministers of God's wrath in all that they accomplish, while they see not the end which God aims at in it, but pursue their own wicked devices. They do not understand how God makes use of their rage or malice to serve his own wise purposes: they have quite other views and designs from what God has, and imagine only that they are serving their own ends in all: but it is true nevertheless, that God serves himself of them as his instruments, and permits them to act no further than he can turn to good. "The Lord hath made," and the Lord ordereth, "all things for himself," to serve the ends of his providence; yea, even the wicked are his creatures, and were both made at first, and are still preserved, to execute, in a *certain sense*, God's good pleasure. They are the *instruments* which God makes use of *in the day of evil*, in the day when he sends his judgments upon others for their sins. Enough hath been said to shew what the *general doctrine* of the text is. In discoursing further, my design is,

I. To open and illustrate the *general doctrine*, by a more *particular explication*.

II. To shew the *practical use* and improvement of it.

I.

First, I propose to open and illustrate the general doctrine by a more particular explication. "The Lord hath made all "things," or (as the words may be construed) he orders and disposes all things so, as one way or other to serve his own wise purposes. Whatever second causes there are, or however they act, still it is God, and God alone, that governs the world. His providence is so general, large, and comprehensive, as to take in the whole compass of the wide universe; and it is at the same time so very minute and particular, that the smallest atoms do not escape his notice. We are assured by our blessed

Lord, that not so much as a sparrow falls without his leave; and that he condescends to feed the fowls of the air, and to clothe the lilies of the field. Heaven, and earth, and hell, are all under his inspection. "If I ascend into heaven," says the Psalmist, "thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, "thou art there also[e]."

All occurrences, all affairs whatever, are observed, regulated, conducted by him; even those which seem merely *casual* and *accidental* are in reality *providential:* and what we corruptly call *chance* is truly *providence.* What more casual than a lot? and yet the Wise Man tells us in this very chapter, that when "the lot is cast into the lap, the whole disposal thereof is of "the Lord[f]." God's government of the natural world, his conducting the courses of sun, moon, and stars, his preserving the brute animals upon our globe, and his endowing them with their particular instincts proper to every kind, which to them are so many stated rules of conduct, is highly wonderful; but yet his government of the moral world is much more so: and the most mysterious part of all is, what my text mentions with a particular emphasis, his ordering even the wicked in a way consistent with *human liberty*, and so as to serve the ends of his providence, and to promote his glory. This is a profound speculation, to be touched upon only by us, and that with awful reverence. There is a great deal more in it than we are able to understand. The fact is certain; but the *manner how* is beyond our comprehension. I shall therefore endeavour rather to illustrate the fact, shewing what we are to believe or to suppose concerning it, than to give any tolerable account *how* it is done. There can be no mistake in conceiving, that God had his wise and gracious views in first creating those whom he foresaw would be wicked, and would ruin and undo themselves. He made men *free agents,* bidding them work out their own happiness by a *right use* of that liberty which he had invested them with. Many, he foresaw, would do so, and would of consequence arrive at a happy immortality: and it was for their sakes, and for his own glory, that he thereupon determined to create mankind.

It was by no means reasonable, that God should forbear creating such a race at all, only because *some* would be so foolish as to destroy themselves. For why should those who would

[e] Psalm cxxxix. 8. [f] Prov. xvi. 33.

make a good use of the favour be denied the advantage, on account only of others who would abuse it? or why should great numbers lose the opportunities of making themselves happy, because others would, by their own fault, abuse the same opportunities to their own undoing? It was undoubtedly kind and gracious in God to create men, though *many* of them would prove *wicked*, because it was certain, in God's foreknowledge, that *many* also would be *righteous*; and so for *their* sakes, or for the sake of as many as would be *such*, it was worthy of the Divine wisdom and goodness to make the world. In this sense we may understand, that God made all things, and "even the wicked, "for himself," and for his own glory: it was for his glory to create even such as would be *wicked*, rather than not create mankind at all, and so make *none* to be *happy*. But this being a deep and abstruse meditation, and not so proper for a popular discourse, I pass it over, and proceed to an easier thought, which I take to be principally intended in the text, though not very clearly expressed in our translation; which is, that God makes use of the wicked men who are his creatures, to serve the ends of his providence: they are all absolutely in his hands, and under his sovereign control: they can do nothing without his leave; and when he does give leave, it is to serve some wise end and useful purpose of his own, quite beside their intention. They mean nothing but *evil*, while God turns it to *good*. This certainly is one of the most delightful and comfortable theories which a good man can fix his mind upon; to consider, that amidst all the seeming distraction and confusion in this mad world, where wickedness prevails, and transgressions abound; yet there is a God in heaven, who sits, as it were, calm and undisturbed above; marks and views all that is here doing below; and not only observes, but interposes in every action, in every motion, in every contrivance and thought of the heart, either suspending or suffering it to proceed; and all the while so conducting its force, or turning its direction by secret springs, as to make it answer what himself intended, or had decreed, with all possible exactness. We are by no means able to reach the depth of this mysterious management; but we may take a view of some particulars which may help towards a more distinct idea of what is intelligible in it.

1. Let us first consider the power of God over the *minds* and *hearts* of wicked men. They are, without question, perpetually

bent upon mischief, of one kind or other. But yet God shall so overrule, that some particular mischiefs which they would be fond enough of, shall never so much as enter into their heads. If he is pleased, for instance, to preserve some particular person or place from their rage and fury; he may, he often does, prevent the very *thought*, and turns their minds off from pitching their aims there.

But suppose he permits a *thought* to come into their minds; he may yet stifle it there, and never suffer it to proceed so far as to a *resolution* or *design*. A thousand accidents may divert it, defeat it, or render it abortive, before it be formed into an *intention* to do any thing.

Next, suppose it carried on so far as to commence a *resolution;* yet how easily, how suddenly, are resolutions changed, and designs laid aside, upon any considerable *change* in mind, body, or outward circumstances, which are all in God's power, and at his disposal.

But suppose further, that with God's leave the *resolution* abides, and opportunity invites, and circumstances favour, and a man has all his instruments prepared and ready for putting the same in execution; yet even in that *critical juncture*, in the very article of action, Providence interposes, many times, and blasts and quashes all in one moment.

Admit further, that the *resolution* formed is suffered to proceed to *action;* yet Providence alone determines the time *when*, the place *where*, with the precise *measure* and *degree* of all that is doing; that the agent shall not be able to effect one tittle, either *more* or *less*, either *contrary to*, or *different from*, what God in his wise counsels had previously determined. "A man's "heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps," says Solomon in this chapter, verse the 9th. The meaning of which is, that men may invent, design, or contrive what they please, yet the Lord himself will have both the ordering and finishing of it in his own hands: "Many are the devices of "man's heart; but the counsel of the Lord, that shall stand[g]." God often executes his counsels by the hands of wicked men, making use of their wickedness, as he sees proper, for his own purposes; otherwise they never take effect. We see indeed a great deal of villainy and wickedness in the world, and too often

[g] Prov. xix. 21.

(as we may say) it thrives, and prospers, and triumphs; which it becomes us to lament, and to be heartily sorry for: and yet, if we look through the surface of things, and go to the bottom of the case, we must be obliged to say, that God's hand is in all; and though the *wickedness* is not *his*, yet the *success* that attends it, the *effect* it has, is really *his doing*. Wicked men, for instance, commit violence, rob, plunder, murder, or the like; they do it for their *own humour*, and God suffers it for quite *other ends*. He had determined, suppose, to take off such a person for his sins, to chastise another, or to prove, try, and exercise a third. He could command serpents, or other noxious animals, to do the work: or he could do it by fire, or floods, or storms, or other casualties: or if by none of these, yet by plague or famine, by fever or dropsy, or other wasting distemper: but since there are wicked wretches in the world, full of mischief in their hearts, and wanting only to be let loose; God chooses, in such cases, to make use of them, gives them the reins, till he has finished his own work by them, and then calls them to account for doing it, because they did it not as *God's* work, but as their *own*; not by his *order*, but by his *permission* only; not with any view to serve or obey God, but for their own humour or pleasure, and for the wickedness of their own corrupt hearts. The sacred history is every where full of examples of this kind, of God's making use of wicked instruments to bring about his own good and gracious designs: not that he could not have done the same thing in another way, and without them, but as they are his creatures, and are in his hands, as all other things are, he will have this use of them, and thus far at least serve himself by them. God made use of the devil's subtilty to try and prove our first parents, who were foolish enough to be deceived, and so fell from their innocence. And he again made use of the devil's malice to prove and exercise righteous Job; who was wise enough to stand it, and obtained a crown of triumph. God made use of the wickedness of king Saul to cut off the whole family of *priests* of the race of Ithamar, whom he had determined to destroy long before, for the sins of old Eli, and his two profligate sons. God made use of the lewdness and pride of Absalom, the cursed counsels of Ahitophel, and the impudent revilings of Shimei, to punish king David for his great transgressions in the matter of Uriah. In like manner he made use of the haughtiness and ambition of the Assyrians, to humble his

own people Israel; and of the Babylonians, to chastise Judah; and then again, by the same Babylonians, to crush the insolent Assyrians; and of the Persians to humble Babylon, and so on. God makes use of wicked men as scourges to chastise others; and afterwards raises up *others* to scourge *them;* especially if they assume and grow proud upon their success, and take it all to themselves, while instruments only in the whole thing. It is worth observing, how Almighty God, by his prophet Isaiah, reproved the proud Assyrian for his insolence in that kind. "I "will punish the fruit (the vanity) of the stout heart of the king "of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks[h]." "Shall the ax "boast itself against him that heweth therewith? or shall the "saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it[i]?" The Prophet here compares the proud Assyrian to an *ax* or a *saw* in the hand of a workman: and such are all wicked men in the hands of God, whenever he is pleased to use them as instruments to execute his vengeance upon sinners, or his discipline upon good men. I shall mention but one case more; a most famous one it is, where God made use of wicked instruments to effect his purposes: it was in the happy redemption of mankind by the death of Christ. God made use of the malice of the Jews, and the treachery of Judas, to bring it about; while, notwithstanding, he took most exemplary vengeance both upon Judas and *them,* for their unparalleled wickedness in doing it. For *their* part in the thing was base, vile, and *execrable;* and the *good* that was in it was all *God's.*

But some perhaps may be bold to ask, whether God's making use of the sins of men does not look like *concurring with* and *countenancing* their iniquities? No, by no means. For herein chiefly is seen the marvellous perfection of Divine wisdom, to make such use of sinners, undefiled with their sins, to serve himself of their impurities, remaining all the while infinitely pure. It is not that he needs men's sins or makes them; for he could bring about his all-wise purposes without such instruments: but as men, by abusing their liberty of choice, (proper to free agents,) will of course commit sins, which in their own nature and tendency are most pernicious, threatening nothing but destruction and misery to the world; in this case, God himself undertakes so to control, curb, and regulate this mis-

[h] Isaiah x. 12. [i] Ver. 15.

chievous quality, that it shall not disturb the peace and harmony of the world further than is useful for the ends of discipline; but shall be so directed and governed, as to prove, in the event, serviceable and beneficial to the world; and shall at length be hurtful to none, but to the authors and contrivers of it, who must suffer for it. Such is the admirable and most adorable conduct of Divine Providence in bringing *good* out of *evil*, and turning the rankest poisons into wholesome and salutary medicines. The sum then is, that all things whatever, and even moral agents, and the greatest sinners, are under the secret control of Divine Providence. God governs the world at all times: he would not have made such creatures, but that he well knew how to curb and manage them. He has them all under his command, as much as he has the waves of the sea or the tempests of the air. He sets bounds and compass to the exorbitances of the wicked. He bridles them by laws and government, and by the incessant labours of good men; and yet, more immediately, by his secret power over their hearts and wills, and over all their faculties; as well as over all occurrences, and all second causes through the whole universe: and if he still affords them compass enough to range in; yet, notwithstanding, he rules over them with so strict and steady a hand, that they cannot move a step but by his leave, nor do a single act but what shall be turned to good effect, and shall be made to serve some wise and beneficial purpose of Divine justice or Divine mercy and grace in the end. So much for this article. The explaining of this important matter has carried me so far, that I have no room left to do justice to my second head of discourse; wherein I proposed to shew the *practical use* and improvement of the present meditation: and that also is important, and well deserving a distinct inquiry at large; wherefore I shall wave it for the present, and, in the mean while, leave the subject to your own reflections.

SERMON VI.

Wicked Men, the providential Instruments of Good.

The Second Sermon on this Subject.

PROVERBS xvi. 4.

The Lord hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.

N a former discourse upon these words, I shewed their meaning to be this: that as God made all things by his power, so he governs all things by his providence; and that he serves his own wise ends and uses of all things and all men; yea, even of wicked men, whom he makes the ministers of his wrath and the executioners of his *vengeance* in his day of visitation, when he comes to punish bad men; or else of his *discipline*, when he designs only to prove and exercise good men. Having thus opened the *general* meaning of the text, I next proposed, in the further prosecution of it,

I. To open and illustrate the *general doctrine*, by a more *particular explication*.

II. To shew the *practical use* and improvement of it.

In treating of the first, I shewed, by an enumeration of particulars, how the whole universe, with all things in it, are in God's hands, and all second causes steered and conducted by his overruling providence. But because the most material consideration of all, which the text itself lays the greatest emphasis upon, and which most wanted explaining, was the *Divine conduct*, with respect to the thoughts, words, or actions of *wicked men*;

I therefore dwelt more particularly upon that article, endeavouring both to prove the thing by reason and by examples; and next to account in some measure for it. I proceed to the second thing proposed; namely, to shew the *practical use* and improvement of the doctrine before proved.

II.

1. I will begin with a practical inference which Solomon himself mentions in the verse before my text, and for the sake of which he subjoined the text itself. The practical inference which I mean, in his words runs thus: "Commit thy works "unto the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be established[a]." For if it be God that governs the world, and if all things depend upon his wise and good providence, it is very manifest, that it is both our duty and interest to submit all our concerns to him, upon whom all success and every blessing depend. If we would have our designs take, and our schemes prosper; the way certainly is to make an interest to him who alone can prosper them, and who alone can blast them. We ought in every undertaking to implore the Divine blessing, and to commit the care of it, and the success, to him; who, if he approves of it, will bring it to pass; or if he be against it, not all the powers in heaven or in hell can effect it.

But here perhaps a question may arise about the use of *means*, and the necessity or serviceableness of *human care* or industry, for the compassing any honest and just designs. For it may seem, at first view, that, if God had determined to bring the thing to effect, human care and industry are superseded: or, if God has determined otherwise, then all endeavours are fruitless and vain.

But to this I answer, that *miracles* are not to be expected in the ordinary course of affairs; neither does God ordinarily bestow his blessings upon men, but in the *use* of such prudent and honest *means* as he himself has prescribed. For though no human means can ever certainly promise, or, properly speaking, *procure* success, (which depends upon God alone,) yet *means* must be used, as being the *conditions*, without the use of which, God will not ordinarily grant his assistance. *Success* in affairs is proposed by God, as the *reward* consequent upon proper *care* and *application*: and though the reward does not always follow upon the use of the means, (God for wise reasons ordering

[a] Prov. xvi. 3.

otherwise,) yet means are necessary to procure success at all, in ordinary cases: for God suspends his blessings upon men's submission to the methods he has appointed. If we suppose at any time that God has determined thus or thus, (which yet we are ignorant of;) we ought to suppose, at the same time, that he has so determined, upon a view of the use of the ordinary means proper; and therefore, instead of loitering, or neglecting the means, we ought to use all diligence and care in applying them. In the New Testament you find a very remarkable instance to our present purpose. St. Paul, being on shipboard at a time when there was a great tempest in the sea, had an *angel* sent from heaven to assure him, that there would, in the event, be "no loss of any man's life;" as indeed it proved: but notwithstanding this *infallible assurance*, which he had received from heaven, and declared to the whole crew; a little after, upon a dispute that happened, whether to stay in the ship or flee out, he as peremptorily tells them, that except they stayed in the ship, they "could not be saved[b]." So *necessary* was it to use the *proper means*, though *secure* of the event by infallible prediction; because indeed the certainty of the event *supposed* the certainty of the means to be used, and *one* implied and included the *other*. *Means* therefore are to be used; and we are to look up to God for the *success:* which should make us careful to use no means but such as are strictly honest and pious, upon which we are secure to have God for our friend; and then, most undoubtedly, he will either accomplish what we aim at, or do what in the end will be better for us. So much for the first practical inference, which is *general*, drawn from the consideration that all things are God's, and that he directs, or moderates, as supreme arbitrator in all affairs, in all occurrences whatsoever.

2. The next practical inference I shall take notice of is drawn from the consideration of God's controlling and bridling wicked men in all their machinations, never giving the reins to them, but when he has some wise end and purpose of his own to serve by them; either making them ministers of his justice, when he is pleased to punish, or instruments of discipline, when he is pleased to prove and exercise good men.

This consideration, if carefully pursued as it ought to be, may afford matter of comfort to good men, and may be of

[b] Acts xxvii. 31.

excellent use, many ways, for the regulating both our judgment and practice.

From hence we may learn, never to be afraid either of wicked men or of devils; but to fear God, and him only. Wicked men, however malicious or mischievous, are yet weak in themselves. They are under correction and restraint. They are held, as it were, with bit and bridle, from falling upon any man; and can do nothing till God looses and slackens the reins. Fear not the men themselves, who have neither breath, nor life, nor limbs, nor thought, at their own disposal: but fear him who alone has the command of all, and does as he pleases. Strictly speaking, wicked men or devils can never afflict us: but God may afflict us by them. He may make use of them as *saws*, or as *axes*, or hammers, (as the Prophet Isaiah intimates,) to smite, wound, or to destroy us. But they are instruments only in all that they can do, instruments in the hands of God, and it is he only that can hurt us. He can do it by fire, or floods, or tempests without, or by diseases and distempers within. He can afflict us as well by wild beasts, or serpents, or any venomous creatures, as by wicked men; and they are all equally under his power, and either afflict or forbear, according as he in his wise providence orders. Of him therefore be afraid, and in him be your dread, and in none other; for all centres and terminates in him. No affliction can overtake us, but by his direction and permission; and he is constantly upon the watch, sees what is doing, nay more, conducts and governs the event. To what purpose is it to be afraid of mere men, unless we imagine, that God will take advantage of us by their means: but if that be the case, how many thousand ways are there besides for God to fall upon us, whenever he is pleased to take advantage of us, and is disposed to afflict us. There is no security against him, when he pleases to visit us: but against every thing else there is; by trusting in God, and committing ourselves solely to him.

A further use and improvement deducible from the same principle, is, to refer all the hard usage, all the injuries or troubles we meet with from men, to God the author of them. Men may deal unjustly, vilely, barbarously by us, when God permits: and when such cases happen, we should not look only to the *second* causes, which are merely *instruments*, but to God the sovereign disposer. Men may do very wickedly in taking our goods, which they have no right to, in aspersing our good

names by slander or calumny, or in committing violence upon our persons, which are not under their authority: but God has an unalienable right and power over our goods, reputation, or persons; over our minds, bodies, or estates; and over all that belongs to us; to deprive us of any part, or of the whole at pleasure: and what men cannot do to us without the greatest iniquity, God may permit to be done with all the justice imaginable; or perhaps is even kind and gracious in so ordering. Whenever therefore we receive any considerable injuries from men, the way is, to turn our eyes from them, and raise our thoughts higher up to God that governs them and us too. Consider why or for what cause God sends us these troubles; search and examine well and wisely upon what errand they come. Think whether we have not been guilty of some great offences, which have drawn down these sore judgments upon us. Examine and search diligently whether they are sent by way of punishment, or for trial only and further improvement: whether to lead us to repentance of some gross sins, or whether only to chastise us for smaller failings; to wean our affections more and more from the world; to exercise our patience, and improve our virtues to a higher degree here, in order to arrive at greater degrees of glory hereafter. This kind of *self-examination*, on such occasions, is much better employment for us, than complaining of the hard usage, and stirring our passions up against the men who have injured us. What said David to Shimei, who had reviled and cursed him in a most insolent manner, and who deserved to die the death for doing so? David was sensible that God's hand was in it, and that it was he who had brought that affliction, that shame, that reproach upon him, for the iniquity he had been guilty of in the matter of Uriah. For this reason, he put up the affront, and would not suffer the mad reviler to be punished, as he really deserved. "The Lord," says he, "hath "said unto him, Curse David[c]." "Let him alone, and let him "curse; for the Lord hath bidden him[d]." A very wise and a just reflection. Not that the Lord had *directly ordered* Shimei to *curse* David, neither did David so mean: but the Lord had let Shimei loose to revile and blaspheme, as his own brutal temper prompted him; and God gave him an opportunity of venting all his spleen and malice upon David, (a much better man than

[c] 2 Sam. xvi. 10. [d] Ver. 11.

he,) and this by way of punishment to David for the offence he had committed.

The example of David in thus looking up to God, and passing by the wretched instrument Shimei, may be of excellent use to us, whenever we sustain any unjust reproaches or injurious usage from men. It would not only direct us how to make a right use of such trials, but would be of service also to prevent a very ill use which we are too apt to make of them. It might prevent our entertaining rancour and malice, and revengeful thoughts against the man who hath injured us, instead of repenting of our sins, and humbling ourselves before God. It is a very wrong practice, to let our thoughts rest in the mere instruments, and not to look higher up to God, in whose hands they are, and by whose permission they act: and, however wicked and injurious the enemy may be, God is kind and gracious in so directing the event, and will abundantly recompense the sufferer, here or hereafter. From hence then let us learn what use to make of enemies, and how to behave under every trial of that kind. For considering that it is every one's case almost, more or less, and that few can escape without injuries of one kind or other from wicked men; it may be of service to us to remember this useful lesson, and to lodge it in our minds for the regulating our judgments, and the bettering our lives.

Not that I would have any one infer from hence, that a man should be careless and indifferent as to enemies; or that he should lay himself open to them, or not use all proper and prudent precautions against injurious usage; or not arm himself against them by all the honest methods which law, and justice, and common prudence prescribe. If a man neglects *these*, he may be thought rather to *bring* troubles upon himself, than to *receive* them at the hands of God. But to proceed.

3. Another inference deducible from the doctrine of the text, concerns our opinions and judgments of the ordinary stream of affairs, the common course of the world. The course of the world may be very bad: wickedness may prevail and triumph, in some places more, and in some less, and in one age more than another, too much in all: but still, let it be a comfort to every good man, that "the Lord is King, be the people never so un-"patient; he sitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never "so unquiet[d]." Whatever irregularities or disorders we observe

[d] Psalm xcix. 1.

in the moral state of things, still true it is, and it is a comfortable truth, that God governs the world. He does not interpose by an irresistible power to keep men from sinning; for *that* would be destroying human liberty, and governing men in such a way as cannot be at all proper in a state of probation: but, which is much more wonderful, amidst all that variety of wickedness which prevails in the earth, he protects and preserves *good men*, and suffers no attempts to prevail against them, while they keep their integrity. Not that he always preserves them from violence and wrong; for sometimes he thinks proper to chastise them, and sometimes calls them to lay down their lives for his name's sake: but this last case is extraordinary; while in the more ordinary course of affairs, good men, with respect even to the comforts of this life, find in him a very sure and safe retreat. This consideration may be of force to animate and encourage good men in troublesome times. God sits at the helm, and is no unconcerned spectator over human affairs. He can as easily change the face of things, and bring order out of confusion, as he can calm a troubled sea or lay a tempest. Let no man be dismayed at any doubtful appearances, or be filled with melancholy apprehensions on any view of things: a good man has nothing to do, but to preserve his own innocence, and to do the utmost he can to make the world better: the rest he may leave to God.

4. The doctrine of Providence duly considered is the best *preservative* against anxiety and multiplicity of cares; which our blessed Lord himself hath very particularly observed, and largely inculcated, as may be seen in the 6th and 10th chapters of St. Matthew's Gospel. He there reminds us how God's providence extends to the "fowls of the air," which neither sow nor reap; and yet our heavenly Father takes such care, that they are plentifully fed and provided for by him. He further observes, how the same kind providence extends even to the "lilies of "the field," which, though they neither toil nor spin, are yet finely clothed, and beautifully arrayed by the hand of God. He intimates still further, that every *sparrow* is under the care of Divine Providence; much more man; and that the very "hairs "of our heads are all numbered" with God. These are very lively expressions of a particular Providence superintending every individual man, woman, or child; and they are all so many cogent arguments against too much anxiety. "Therefore

"take no thought," (that is, no anxious thought,) "saying, "What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Where-"withal shall we be clothed[e]?" The sum is: be frugal, provident, industrious; but be not anxious to waste the body, and enfeeble the mind, and to eat out the very heart and spirit of devotion and godliness. Trust to God's blessing upon honest industry and moderate care about the things of this life. Among the thousands that die daily, how few do we hear of who die for want of bread or of clothing? Is it not demonstration that God, by his good providence, takes as particular care of mankind in these respects, as of the "lilies of the field," or the "fowls of "the air?" And yet if such a thing should sometimes happen, as a person's being starved, or famished for want of necessaries; it would be but a very rare example, of one among many millions; and probably owing, either to some very odd accident, or to some gross neglect or grievous fault of the person so suffering. Be not then so extremely anxious for the necessaries of life, which God himself has taken under his particular charge, with this special promise annexed; "Seek ye first the kingdom of "God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added "unto you." Can any thing be kinder than this promise is, except it be, his most exact and constant performance of it? As, upon these accounts, you have but little reason for being extremely anxious for yourselves, so have you still less reason for anxiety about your children after you: for that is more distant, and is what you have not so near a concern in. What if you should die, and should leave nothing behind you? *Providence* can never die. If God takes you away, your children are then God's care, and no longer yours: and he that made them, and gave them you, has the greatest interest in them, and the tenderest concern for them. They are your *children;* but they are his *creatures* and *children* too, and he the kindest of all fathers. Why should you imagine that you are able to do well for them, and that God cannot; or that you shall be kind and tender towards them, and that God will not? Away with those vain fears and superstitious cautions: cast your care upon God, who careth both for you and yours. Be not over solicitous about future portions: give your children a good sense of religion, and bring them up in the fear of God: be *that* their portion, for *that*

[e] Matt. vi. 31.

includes every thing. Be *that* your care, and God will do all the rest. What shall I say more to move you to trust in Divine Providence, and give over anxiety, which is but vain and fruitless for the present, and, which is worse, grievous both to body and mind; and in conclusion dangerous, perhaps fatal, with respect to your nearest, your everlasting concernment? But enough of this particular.

5. The *general conclusion* from the whole is, that we endeavour to fix in our minds an awful and constant sense of Divine Providence. Entertain it not as an empty notion only, but let it sink down into our hearts, and become habitual and familiar to us. Think upon it at all times and in all places; let it abide and dwell with us, when we lie down, and when we rise up, and under all circumstances and conditions of life. Recount we and consider with ourselves, what we owe to Providence, what dangers we have escaped, what blessings we have received; how we have been relieved in straits, comforted in distresses, and supported all along, under divers exigencies and casualties. It will be of great use to us in life, to have always a present, lively, feeling apprehension of God's presence with us, and his care over us. It will make us thankful in prosperity and patient in adversity. It will support our spirits under trouble or danger, and make us easy and well contented under checks and disappointments. It would be the best preservative against querulousness, pride, envy, and other foolish and hurtful vices or passions. When we consider all things as coming from God, and conducted by an all-wise and steady hand, we shall then take all things in good part, and rest content with any thing that befalls us. We shall live, as it were, under God's eye, and look up to him in all emergencies. And, what is more than all, by thus constantly thinking of him, we shall make it our daily study and endeavour to serve and please him, that so we may enjoy his favour and blessings here, and his presence hereafter.

SERMON VII.

The Case of *passing Judgments concerning Calamities* examined: what Kind of Judgment on such Occasions is *innocent* and *just* ascertained: and the *culpable extremes* noted and censured.

The First Sermon on this Subject.

LUKE xiii. 2, 3.

And Jesus answering said unto them, Suppose ye that these Galilæans were sinners above all the Galilæans, because they suffered such things?
I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

THIS answer of our blessed Lord was pursuant to some discourse which passed about the Galilæans, a seditious sect of men, who had refused subjection to the Roman government, upon superstitious principles which they had imbibed.

"There were present at that season," says St. Luke in the first verse of this chapter, "some that told him" (told our Lord) "of the Galilæans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their "sacrifices." Those Galilæans, probably, were the followers of Judas of Gaulonitis, who seems to have been the head of the discontented party, dissuading their countrymen from paying submission to the Romans. The plea or pretence was, that they were the *Lord's people*, and owed no subjection to any mortal upon earth, or at least to no foreign power whatever: they would therefore pay no tribute to Cæsar, or his officers, but to the Lord only, and his ministers, or, in one word, to the temple. At the time of the Passover, as is reasonably supposed, they came

up, as the custom was, to pay their devotions, and to offer their sacrifices at God's altar. Pilate, the Roman governor, took the advantage, and resolved to chastise the rebels, as he esteemed them to be. He sent soldiers after them into the very temple where they were sacrificing, and there he miserably slaughtered many of them, where the beasts for sacrifice had been newly slain, and so mingling the blood of one with the blood of the other. This massacre thus committed, in so sacred a place, and upon persons attending on the most sacred and solemn offices, had the appearance of something extraordinary, different from common providences; and so gave occasion, or umbrage, for a suspicion, that the dreadful usage they had met with was a judgment of God upon them for some great impieties. They could never have been sinners of an *ordinary* size, whose punishment was so *extraordinary*. Such were the thoughts and reasonings of many upon that sad occasion; as it is natural, in such cases, to load the unfortunate, and to trample upon those who are already fallen. But our blessed Lord, having more humanity, as well as a truer and more exact judgment of things, took occasion to reprove their uncharitableness, and to correct their gross mistakes. He does not indeed deny either that the Galilæans were *sinners*, or that their *sufferings* were brought upon them for their *sins:* but he condemns those that censured them yet more hardly, for their groundless and ill-natured conclusion, that the suffering Galilæans had been "sinners above all the "Galilæans;" had been the *greatest* of sinners, only because of their suffering *more* than others had: and he further tacitly reproves their fond and partial conceits in their own favour; as if they were comparatively innocent and righteous, only because no such calamity had as yet befallen them.

"Suppose ye," says he, "that these Galilæans were sinners "above all the Galilæans, because they suffered such things? I "tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." To this instance of the Galilæans he very appositely joins another of like kind, upon which also he makes the like reflection: "Or "those eighteen, upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew "them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that "dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay:" and so on. Commentators have taken notice, that these words of our Lord had very probably a particular reference to those temporal calamities which were to come upon the Jewish nation; and so were

spoken by our Saviour in the way of prediction, foretelling the fate of the Jews who should continue impenitent; that "they should "all likewise perish:" and so indeed it came to pass within forty years after. But my design from these words is, to consider the text in its *general* view only; as containing a very instructive lesson how to behave, and what reflections or use to make of it, whenever it pleases God to humble and afflict others by any severe visitations. It concerns us first to entertain true and just sentiments upon such occasions: and next, to make all proper and suitable improvement of them. There was something true and something false in what the Jews suggested of the Galilæans. They set out upon true principles, but reasoned ill from them; pushing the point too far, and running it to an extreme. The fault which they committed therein is very natural and common; such as all sorts of men, in all ages, are but too much inclined to. We are very apt to pass our opinions or censures upon our neighbours, when any calamities befall them; and do not always consider so carefully as we ought, *when* and *where* to stop: but forgetting the just bounds of moderation, we sometimes carry our reflections a great deal too far; till we both misinterpret the Divine dispensations, and defeat their use. Such being the case, it may be proper to consider this subject in its whole compass, with all due care and accuracy, for the right forming our notions of it, and for the regulating our conduct in it. In order hereto, I shall discourse as follows:

I. I shall observe what kind of reflections or conclusions we may justly raise upon any calamities or afflictions which befall other men.

II. I shall take notice of the *extremes* which many run into upon those occasions, and which we ought carefully to avoid. And,

III. I shall conclude with shewing what is, or ought to be, the *practical result* of the whole.

I.

I shall observe what kind of reflections or conclusions we may justly raise upon any calamities which befall other men.

1. In the first place, we need not be scrupulous of thinking or saying, that the persons so visited are visited for their sins. Our blessed Lord finds no fault with the Jews for suggesting, or supposing, that the Galilæans were *sinners*, and were punished by God for their sins. All mere men are sinners: and all afflic-

tions whatever have a retrospect to sins committed, and are, in strictness of speech, *punishments* of sin. It may be said, indeed, that good men are afflicted for their trial and improvement, to exercise their faith and patience, and to raise their virtues, as well as to heighten their rewards. All this may be very true, and very consistent also with the principle before mentioned: for if afflictions are sent upon good men, to cure them of some defects, and to advance their virtues higher than before; this, in other words, is *punishing* them for their *sins*; for those defects are sins in them, though of a less dangerous nature than the greater provocations. Besides, it is very certain, that all misery and pain, all trouble and uneasiness, have respect to sin; for it is sin only that hath brought forth sorrow, as well as death: and not mortality alone, but all the diseases and discomforts incident to mortality, are the fruits and consequences, the proper *wages* of *sin*. There is therefore no mistake in imagining, or affirming, that whenever men suffer, or whatever they suffer, they suffer for sin. Now, as to the Galilæans, in particular, our blessed Saviour, tacitly at least, admitted, that they were *punished* as *sinners*, and that their calamity was a *judgment* of God upon them for their *sins*. Whether they were good men or bad is not said; but *sinners* they certainly were; and they could not suffer *more* at the hands of God than their sins had *deserved*. Temporal afflictions, at the highest, come not up to the demerit of men's sins: and therefore the best men alive cannot suffer *more*, with respect to God, than is *due* to their transgressions. But probably, those Galilæans were wicked men, being seditious, turbulent, factious; only not *more* wicked than the rest of their brethren: and our Lord, by his saying to the Jews, "but, "except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish," seems to insinuate, as if the Galilæans were not *better* than the other Jews, though there was no sufficient reason for thinking them *worse*. However that were, there can be no question made, but that the Galilæans were sinners, and punished in that extraordinary manner for their sins: and the like may be very safely asserted of any other persons, when visited with afflictions; because all men are sinners, and suffer justly, whatsoever they suffer in this world, either by the direction or permission of Almighty God. For we may observe also,

2. That all calamities whatever are to be understood as coming from the hand of God. This is implied in the former; as it

was supposed also in the reasonings of the Jews upon the case of the Galilæans: and our blessed Saviour does not contradict nor condemn the notion, but rather allows and confirms it. The Jews, I say, supposed the Galilæans to be grievous *sinners;* and why? not surely because Pilate, a fallible and a cruel man, had punished them; but because God, they supposed, had done it by the hands of Pilate. They looked upwards to a higher hand than his, supposing Pilate to be the minister or executioner only of the Divine vengeance; and in this they judged right: for if all events whatsoever are in God's most sovereign disposal; and if not so much as a sparrow falls, or a hair of one's head perishes, without his leave; we may be certain, that the lives of men are more particularly under his providential care; and that they are never sacrificed to any man's rage, or taken away by violence, but when God sees fitting that the thing should so take effect. He can unloose the hands of wicked men to execute his righteous vengeance, as often as he pleases; at the same time withdrawing his protecting arm from those whom he has determined to punish. In this sense, God is the author and disposer of all calamities: they come not upon us but when he pleases, or when he has determined to withdraw his protection; directing or permitting second causes to hurt us. This was true in the case of the Galilæans, and the other case of the *eighteen* that were crushed in the ruins of the tower of Siloam: and it is no less true and undeniable in all tragical events whatever. Had the Jews carried their reflections upon the case no further than this, that the Galilæans had suffered for *sin*, and that God himself was concerned as the supreme author and conductor of what had happened to them; they had then kept within the bounds of sobriety and truth: and the consideration of the thing, thus far, might have been both instructive and useful. If the sufferings of the Galilæans came from God, it might teach others to look up to heaven, and to stand in awe of the Divine judgments: and if those sufferings were brought upon them for their sins, then might others also have reason to tremble and be afraid; inasmuch as *all* are *sinners*, and justly liable to the same condemnation. Such reflections as these would be highly reasonable upon all such occasions, and would be productive of many excellent fruits. This is thinking justly and soberly upon God's judgments, and bringing them home to ourselves in the use and application. And this is really what God intends by sending his

judgments abroad: it is to awaken and alarm all around, that so the inhabitants of the world may learn righteousness.

But this is a conclusion which human depravity takes no pleasure in, but rather studiously evades, or passes it over. And hence it is that the generality of men, not content with that easy, obvious, natural account of God's judgments, strain their inventions to find out something further; something that shall make the judgments of God look *particular*, and *personal* to the sufferers only; thereby to render the thing useless, in a manner, and unaffecting in respect to themselves. This is going into extremes, as I observed in the beginning: and I am now,

II.

To take notice of those *extremes* which many so run into, but which we ought above all things carefully to avoid. There are two noted excesses in this matter: one the text expressly mentions, the other is omitted, or only tacitly pointed to. That which is mentioned is, the drawing rash and uncharitable conclusions from *greater* sufferings to *greater* sins; as if they who have suffered *most* must of consequence have been the *worst* of sinners. The other, which is not mentioned, but yet is tacitly condemned, is, the being positive and peremptory as to the *particular* sin, or kind of sin, that draws down God's *judgments* upon any *particular* person or persons. These two excesses, or extremes, as I call them, often go together, being near akin to each other: for when we have once concluded that such a person, so and so suffering, must have been guilty of more than ordinary sins; curiosity or vanity, or some other worse principle, draws us on to be further inquisitive; and to fix upon some *particular* sins, or kind of sins, which we may lay to his charge. But if the case be obscure, and affords not so much as light sufficient for any plausible conjecture, then we are content to rest in generals; and to conclude that the *sufferer* must undoubtedly have been a very great *sinner*, though we can neither say *how* nor in *what*. This is more ungenerous and unfair than the former; and may always be pretended when there is no place for the other; wherefore this principally is what the text takes notice of, and our Lord condemns. But because *both* of them are bad enough, and deserve our censure, I shall consider *both*, one after another, as I go along: and because I shall not have room to speak largely and severally of each, at one and the same time; I shall confine myself to *one* only at present, and reserve the *other* for a

discourse by itself. That which I now intend to treat of, is the pointing out or specifying the *particular* sin, or sins, for which we suppose God's *judgments* to have fallen upon any *particular* person or persons. The *motives* for doing this are many and various, as circumstances vary, though all centring in self-flattery, or partial fondness to ourselves.

Sometimes it is *vanity* and *ostentation*, while we affect to make a show of more than common sagacity in discovering the hidden springs of events, and in interpreting the secrets of Divine Providence.

Sometimes *party prejudices* and *passions* have the greatest hand in it; while we are willing to measure God by ourselves, and to fancy that he takes the same side that we do. If our opposers or adversaries fall into troubles or disasters; how agreeable a thought is it to imagine, that it was a *judgment* upon *them* for their opposition to *us*, and that God has thereby declared himself a friend to *our* cause, and an enemy to *theirs!*

But the most common and prevailing motive of all, for censuring others in this manner on account of their afflictions, is to *ward off the apprehension of the like from our own doors*, and to *speak peace to ourselves*. Observe it carefully, and you will scarce find a man charging a *judgment* of God upon *others* for any *particular* sin, and at the same time acknowledging *himself guilty* in the *like* kind. No, he will be particularly careful to pitch upon some vice, which he himself, in imagination at least, stands clear of, and is the furthest from: and so he persuades himself, that he is perfectly safe and secure from suffering in such manner as others have suffered, because he has not sinned in the *like* instances as they have. Here lies the secret root and source of men's proneness to charge the unfortunate with such or such particular sins, as the ground of their troubles: it is to fence off home applications, to throw off all apprehension of danger from themselves. Having seen what *motives* men go upon in their constructions of God's judgments upon others; let us now proceed to observe how rash and unwarrantable a thing it is, generally speaking, to pretend to specify the *particular* sin, or sins, which draw down God's judgments on *particular* persons. It is difficult in most cases to determine, without a special revelation, (which now cannot be had,) upon what *particular* errand God's *judgments* come; or for *what sins*, exclusive of others, they have been sent. The designs of Providence are vast and large;

God's thoughts are very deep, his judgments unsearchable, his ways past finding out.

1. Sometimes the primary reasons, or moving causes, of the Divine judgments lie remote and distant in place or in time; several years, perhaps, or even generations, backwards. God may "visit the sins of the fathers upon the children, unto the "third and fourth generation of them that hate him." He has at any time full power and right to take away the life which he gives, or any worldly comforts which himself bestows: and if he sometimes chooses to exercise this right and power on account of things done several years or ages upwards, there can be no injustice in so doing; but it may more fully answer the ends of discipline, and God may shew forth his wisdom in it. This I hint, by the way, as to the reason of the thing: the facts are evident from the sacred history. When king Ahab had sinned, God denounced his judgments against him, but suspended the execution, in part, to another time; assigning also the reason for deferring it: "Because he humbleth himself before me, I "will not bring the evil in his days, but in his son's days will I "bring the evil upon his house:" which was accordingly executed, in the days of his son Jehoram, about fifteen years after. The case of the Amalekites is a very remarkable one: they were dreadfully cut off, root and branch, by the hands of king Saul, pursuant to the express orders of God: but we must look *three hundred* years backwards, to account for that heavy judgment; and there we shall find what the Amalekites did to the children of Israel in their passage through the wilderness. The case of the Amorites, and other inhabitants of Canaan, is not unlike to the former. Their iniquities had been growing *several hundred* years before the Divine vengeance came upon them; and we must take the sum total of the sins of the past and the then present age, in accounting for God's judgment upon them. This we know by the light of Scripture: but what human sagacity, unassisted by inspiration, could ever have suspected it?

In the First Book of Samuel, we read of the miserable slaughter of the Lord's priests, who fell a sacrifice to the rage of king Saul, for the civilities they had shewed to David in his troubles. Saul did very wickedly in destroying those innocent men, who had deserved no evil at his hands: but God did righteously, in so executing the sentence upon the house of Eli, which he had denounced against them about a *hundred* years

before. Revelation informs us as to this particular, otherwise it had been impossible for any mortal upon earth to have seen through it. When David had offended in the affair of Bathsheba, it pleased God that the first child he had by her should be smitten with death. The child suffered for the sin of the father: this we learn from Scripture, and we could never have learned it any way else.

I shall mention one instance more, which lies a little out of the compass of the sacred story. It is of the well-known destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, in the year of our Lord, *seventy*. Josephus, the Jewish historian, who relates the facts at large, imputes that terrible judgment of God to the monstrous wickedness of his countrymen of that time: and indeed, according to human appearances and human views, his conjecture was not amiss: but as many as know the New Testament, know that the Jewish nation had been sealed up to utter destruction *seven and thirty* years before; and it was for their condemning and crucifying the Lord of glory. The flagrant iniquities, which followed after, were but the natural consequences of that *judicial blindness* under which God had left them, to be a miserable spectacle, to all the world, of a most wretched and abandoned people. These instances are sufficient to shew, how the judgments of God may frequently have a retrospect to things transacted several years upwards, in the days of our ancestors: and since we cannot certainly know *when* this is the case, or *when* otherwise; it must be great presumption and rashness, generally speaking, to be *peremptory* as to the *particular* sin, or kind of sin, for which a *judgment* is sent.

2. It may further be considered, that sometimes the *best* sort of men are permitted to fall a sacrifice to the rage and violence of the *worst;* and this either because *the world is not worthy* of them, or because God gives them up, that their malicious persecutors may fill up the measure of their iniquities. In either view the thing is rather a judgment of God upon the wicked who remain, than upon the righteous so taken away. And if we cannot certainly determine *which* it is, as we seldom can, it will be a blamable presumption to be dogmatical or positive as to the *particular* sin for which the judgment is sent. But,

3. Supposing we were ever so certain, that any person is visited for his own sins only, without any respect to the sins of his ancestors, or of any man else; yet great mistakes may be

committed in conjectures made about the *particular* sins. We have a very remarkable instance of it in Shimei's censure upon king David. "Come out, come out," says he to the king, "thou bloody man, and thou man of Belial: the Lord hath "returned upon thee all the blood of the house of Saul, in whose "stead thou hast reigned; and the Lord hath delivered the "kingdom into the hand of Absalom thy son: and, behold, thou "art taken in thy mischief, because thou art a bloody man[a]."

Shimei was a violent party man, of the house of Saul, and attached to Saul's faction; disaffected all along to David's person and government, and looking upon him as an usurper of the throne, against right hereditary, against the family of Saul, who had been his father-in-law. Now to Shimei, observing that by a strange turn of Providence David himself had been supplanted, and in a manner dethroned by his own son Absalom, the case and circumstances looked almost parallel to what had been done by David with respect to Saul's family: and it was very natural, for a person of Shimei's persuasion, to fancy that, by this remarkable turn of affairs, God had declared from heaven in favour of Saul's friends, and in opposition to David's. The suggestion looked exceeding plausible, and carried in it a fairer colour of probability than such conjectures generally do. And yet we know for certain, that there was nothing of truth or justice in it. David had the clearest and best-grounded title to the kingdom that was possible for man to have: and he had done nothing amiss with respect to the house of Saul. That judgment of God upon him (for such it really was) respected quite another thing; being sent, as we learn from Scripture, on account of what David had transgressed in the matter of Uriah. This instance may be of use to teach us caution and reserve, as to passing our censures upon persons under affliction, and as to pointing out any *particular* sin, or sins, for which we may fancy the judgment to have been brought upon them. There is nothing more precarious, or fallacious, than our guesses of that kind: and we can never be certain, without revelation, that we have hit upon the truth. It is a large field for superstition and bigotry, for prejudice and passion, and great uncharitableness, as well as for bold presumption, and sometimes downright profaneness. The Pagans, of old time, played this engine upon the primitive Christians; as the Romanists of late years have also

[a] 2 Sam. xvi. 7, 8.

done upon the Protestants: and all sects and parties, more or less, as occasions have offered, have thus pelted one another, and have been pelted in their turns. The worst of the thing is, that it does no manner of service to any cause; but it does a great deal of harm, in turning men's thoughts from reforming their own lives, to condemning and censuring the lives of others; and, instead of answering the true design and purport of God's judgments, does nothing else but defeat both their meaning and use. I deny not, but that some kind of calamities have so plain a respect to some kind of vices, that one may even read the *sin* in the *punishment* consequent upon it. Thus, extravagance is often punished by extreme poverty, intemperance by diseases, and a dissolute life by an untimely end: but these, and the like, are rather the natural effects of vice, than judgments of God upon it.

There may be also some very peculiar circumstances in a punishment, as in that of Adoni-bezek, where the exact *resemblance* of the *penalty* to the *crime* may point out to us that the finger of God was in it. But such cases are very rare; and when they do happen, we must first know for certain, that the person has been really guilty of such or such crimes, before we can justly draw the parallel: and then the observation is of little use to us; because plain undisputed iniquities do not want any special notices from heaven for a warning against them; while we have the law of nature, and Divine revelation, to do it more effectually.

The result of what hath been now said is, that we learn to be modest and cautious, as to the naming or specifying any *particular* sins as the *causes* of God's *judgments* upon other men. Specify your *own* sins if you please, or if you can, in such cases: but as to *others*, be content to lay the charge upon *sin in general;* and then, considering that we all have sinned, the use and application of God's judgments upon others will be brought home to ourselves, and will be an incitement to us to repent and reform; lest we also suffer for our sins, as others in our sight have. I have thus finished part only of what I intended from the text: the remainder (God willing) shall be despatched another time.

SERMON VIII.

The Case of *passing Judgment concerning Calamities* examined: what Kind of Judgment on such Occasions is *innocent* and *just* ascertained; and the *culpable extremes* noted and censured.

The Second Sermon on this Subject.

LUKE xiii. 2, 3.

And Jesus answering said unto them, Suppose ye that these Galilæans were sinners above all the Galilæans, because they suffered such things?
I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

IN a former discourse upon these words, after shewing the occasion and the design of them, I proposed to treat of three particulars, as here follows:

I.

To observe what kind of reflections may be just and proper when any calamities befall our neighbours. And here I intimated that we may reasonably think, or say, that the calamities come from God, and that they are sent on the account of sin; inasmuch as all men are sinners, and all visitations have respect to sin in one view or other; either to *original* or *actual* sin; either to *past* or *present*; either to our *own* sins or the sins of *others*, or to *both*.

II.

In the second place, I proposed to take notice of the *extremes* or *excesses* which many are apt to run into in judging their suffering neighbours, in loading the unfortunate beyond measure.

One is, the charging them with some *particular* sin or sins. and pretending to be positive and peremptory, that their *afflictions* were a *judgment* of God upon them on that *special* account. And here I endeavoured to shew the rashness, folly, and uncharitableness of thus judging others; since we have no warrant for doing it, nor can we do it, except in very rare and particular cases, with any truth or certainty.

The other *excess* which I mentioned, and barely mentioned, is the drawing uncharitable conclusions from *greater sufferings* to *greater sins;* as if they that are most afflicted must of consequence be the most guilty of any, or more guilty than those who escape. The folly and rashness of so judging is what I now intend to set forth at large, and then to proceed to a third particular; namely,

III.

To point out the *practical use* and application of the whole.

The proposition then which I now design to go upon is this; that however apt men may be to imagine that the *greatest sufferers* are the *greatest sinners;* yet there is really no evident reason for making any such inference, no truth or justice in drawing such a conclusion; but that, generally, all such reasoning is precarious, false, groundless, and often very presumptuous, as it is ill-natured and uncharitable. Our blessed Lord's design in the text was chiefly to rectify this common mistake, and to correct that censorious humour. "Suppose ye," says our Lord to the Jews, "that these Galilæans were sinners above all the "Galilæans, because they suffered such things? I tell you, Nay:" for ye who have escaped, and have not suffered as they have done, may notwithstanding be *as great* or *greater* sinners than they were: and therefore it is but just to intimate, by way of caution and warning to you, that, "except ye repent, ye shall "all likewise perish." Now, in order to shew that there is no just reason or consequence in arguing this way from *sufferings* to *sins*, from *greater* sufferings to *greater* sins, I shall proceed by several steps and degrees, as follows:

1. Let it be observed, that religious and righteous men are often grievously afflicted: in which case it is most evident, that, though they may and do deserve as great temporal afflictions as can be laid upon them; yet they do not deserve them *more*, nor *so much*, as those *worse* men that escape. God, for many wise reasons, may sometimes punish good men in this life, and spare

the ungodly. The sins of the *former*, being of a *smaller* size, may be purged away by temporal calamities; while the *greater* transgressions of the *latter* are reserved for an after reckoning, a more solemn and dismal account. Good men may retain some blemishes, which want to be washed away in the baptism of afflictions: they may be appointed to pass through a purgatory in this life, (the only purgatory that we Protestants know of,) that so they may go away the more refined and purified to a better.

Or God may sometimes serve the interest of his Church, and set forth the power of his grace, and the efficacy of the true religion, by the sufferings of good men; which is the case of martyrs or confessors, who have been persecuted for righteousness' sake: or he may see good to afflict them for a trial and proof of their sincerity and constancy; or to draw them more and more off from the world, and so much the nearer to himself, to improve their virtues, and to raise their devout affections; that so arriving to a nobler height of perfection in this world, they may at length be qualified for the more glorious reward. It is very certain therefore, that we cannot reasonably infer from any man's afflictions, that he is *worse* than others; since, for any thing we know, he may be really *better*. It was very unjust and uncharitable in Job's three friends, to charge him with hypocrisy, and heinous but unknown crimes, on account only of the calamitous state they had found him in. Their groundless surmises were extremely provoking and grating to the good man in his troubles, and were more afflicting to him than his other sufferings. He had reason to say, as he did at that time, to them, "Miserable comforters are ye all[b]." For besides the ill-nature and ill manners of applying sharp rebukes, where the softest lenitives had been more proper, there was neither truth nor soberness in the reasonings they made use of. For who knows not that the dispensations of Divine Providence follow a different rule from what they supposed in the case before them; and that nothing is more noted or more certain in history or observation, than that calamities sometimes fall upon very good men; and in public, general visitations, are often common both to *good* and *bad*? Besides the instance of Job, there is another still plainer, and every way unexceptionable. You will

[b] Job xvi. 2.

apprehend I mean that of our blessed Saviour, who had no sin, but yet went through great variety of the most painful and ignominious sufferings. The Jews, who crucified him, laid hold of that afterwards, as a pretence for rejecting him. They would not believe that God should permit an innocent person to die in a manner so infamous. They made his sufferings an argument for charging him with guilt; rashly concluding, that he lived not the life of a righteous man, since he died the death of a malefactor. They had forgot what many of the wisest and best of their ancestors, their own prophets, had suffered, of like kind before; and what the same prophets had foretold of the afflicted state of the promised Messiah. However, from this instance we may plainly learn, that the greatest suffering may be consistent with the clearest innocence; and that therefore we cannot safely conclude merely from sufferings, that any man is a sinner at all, much less that he is a *greater* sinner than others who escape. But,

2. Suppose we certainly knew that any person who is under trouble, or who has remarkably suffered, and died by the hand of God, had been a wicked and ungodly man; yet we cannot justly conclude that he was at all *worse* than many who had not so suffered. For in some cases it may be an argument rather in his favour, to prove that he was not *so bad* as others: and in no case, as I conceive, will it prove him to have been *worse* than many who escape. Both these articles may be demonstrated in such a way, as may give reasonable satisfaction.

First, I observe, that in some cases the afflictions which a bad man suffers may be an argument in his favour, as affording a probable presumption that he is not *so bad*, but rather *better*, than those who escape. When God punishes sinners in this life, he either does it for the amendment of the sinner himself, by such afflictions as do not touch his life; or he does it for a terror and warning to other sinners, which may be compassed either way, either in cutting him off by an untimely end, or by lengthening out his life in pain and misery. Now, I say, when God punishes a sinner, in such a way as affects not his life, with a view to his amendment, (whether it be by extreme poverty or disgrace, or bodily hurts or diseases, or whatever else it be,) in these cases it may serve for an argument in his favour, to prove that he is somewhat *better* than many others that are spared. For God, who sees into the hearts of all men, may know what

effect his visitation will have upon him; and may therefore mercifully mark him out for sufferings, as foreseeing of what use they will be towards the bringing him to a sense of his sins, and to a serious repentance: whereas others, who are more hardened in their vices and follies, he may totally reject as past cure; and so may let them go on and prosper for a time, till death comes and brings them a summons to a higher and more dreadful visitation. From hence then it is evident, that such afflictions as are sent for the amendment of the sinner are an argument, so far, in his favour, as to signify that he is not incurable; and are a token of God's kindness to him, more than to other sinners who are permitted to escape. Conformable to this reasoning is that passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews; "Whom the Lord "loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he re-"ceiveth:" and, "If ye endure chastening, God dealeth with you "as with sons:" and a little lower, "But if ye be without chas-"tisement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye bastards, and "not sons[c]." It is to the same purpose that our Lord himself speaks by the Evangelist St. John in the Revelations; "As many "as I love, I rebuke and chasten[d]." And there are other texts of Scripture, which I forbear to mention, declaring the same thing. Seeing therefore that afflictions, when intended for the amendment of a sinner, are really tokens of God's love, and indications of his favour towards them; it is very manifest, that such afflictions are so far from proving them to be *more* guilty than other sinners who escape, that they rather prove the quite contrary; as intimating some remains, at least, of goodness in them, on which account they may be reasonably thought *better* men than those that are spared. So much for the first case.

I am next to shew that afflictions, whatever they be, do in no case whatever prove the man so visited to be *worse* than all others who are permitted to escape. Let us suppose (what perhaps is very rarely done) that a sinner falling under the just vengeance of God, and sealed up for destruction, is immediately punished by sudden death, or in some other more grievous way, not in order to his amendment, but for a terror and example, for others to take warning by. Let us consider now, whether even in this case the judgment so sent proves the man to have been a *greater* sinner than *others* that are spared. I humbly

[c] Heb. xii. 6, 7, 8. [d] Rev. iii. 19.

conceive it does not. For when many sinners are equally guilty, it may suffice to punish a few only, for a warning to the rest: not because others do not deserve the like vengeance, but because God is willing to spare some, in order to bring them to repentance, if possible, by such terrible examples before their eyes: or if they take no warning, nor repent in time, the like judgments may overtake them also, even in this life; or they are reserved for a much severer doom in a world to come. Thus does Almighty God, in his all-wise dispensations, temper his judgments and his mercies together. He does not *cut off all*, that, if possible, he may *save some:* he does not *spare all*, because *none* would then be brought to repentance; but wickedness would triumph uncontrolled, while no check is given to the most daring impieties.

But here, perhaps, you might ask, Why should such or such sinners be singled out for examples, rather than others, and refused the privilege of a longer time to repent in, if they were not *greater* and more grievous sinners than the rest? To which I answer:

First, Supposing them to have been all equally guilty, (which was indeed the supposition I have proceeded upon,) yet it might be necessary to cut off *some*, and *some* rather than *all:* and, in such a case, God might choose to single out such as he saw proper to animadvert upon, while his mercy is free to pass by others.

But further, it should be considered, that those who are spared, except they repent, are in a worse condition than those who have already suffered: their judgment is respited only, and deferred for a time, to fall the heavier at the last: so that though they have some favour shewn them, in being spared so long, they have the more to account for; and, without repentance, will at length pay dear for their privilege.

But I must add, thirdly, that, supposing the offenders not to be equally guilty, yet God may, if he pleases, and very justly too, cut off the *best* first, and spare the *worst*, for two very plain reasons: *one*, because the *best* may *sufficiently* deserve it, and God may do as he pleases: the *other*, because that, if it were his constant method always to take vengeance upon the *worst* first, many would be thereby encouraged to go on in their sins, as long as they should imagine there were yet any men left alive *more wicked* than themselves. And now considering how apt most

are to judge favourably of themselves, and very hardly of others in comparison; such a thought as that would be of very pernicious influence to many, would be a great encouragement to presumption, and a bar to amendment. Divine wisdom therefore has fixed no such certain rule as that of punishing the *greatest* offenders before others; but reserves to himself the liberty of taking vengeance upon offenders in general, whether *more* or *less* guilty. The result then of all is, that we cannot reasonably conclude, in any case whatever, that those who have suffered *most* were *greater* sinners than many others who have been spared.

The sum then of what I have been advancing upon the present argument is this: I have shewn that afflictions or calamities are often sent upon innocent and righteous men; and that therefore, in the general, there is no certain consequence to be drawn from *greater sufferings* to *greater sins*. I have further shewn, that when we are certain that the sufferers were or are wicked men; yet, as their afflictions may be intended for their amendment, those very afflictions are an argument of their *comparative* innocency, and that they are not altogether so wicked or desperate as other sinners who are spared. I have further put the case, that their punishments are not intended for their amendment, but for their excision and utter destruction; and have shewn notwithstanding, that, even on that supposition, there will be no sufficient ground for believing or judging that they have been *greater* sinners than many others who have hitherto escaped. So that in all views, and upon all suppositions, it will be uncharitable and rash judging to condemn others as being *sinners* above all men, on account only of the *sufferings* they have run through in this world. It is a false rule of judging, which neither Scripture nor reason nor observation countenances; but which ought to be corrected, or entirely laid aside for the *iniquity* there is in it, and because of the pernicious effects and influences flowing from it. For the very end and design which men have in judging so severely of *others*, is nothing else but to speak peace to *themselves*. They load the sufferers most unmercifully, only for fear of suspecting it should be their own turn to suffer next. They take all imaginable pains to distinguish themselves off, that they may have no concern in what befalls others, and may apprehend no danger to themselves from it. With these views they magnify the guilt of those that suffer to

the utmost, and comfort themselves with flattering thoughts of their own *comparative* innocency. While they are thus minded, the judgments of God upon *others* they never apply to *themselves:* they throw them off as things foreign and of no concernment; looking upon them only as extraordinary occurrences to talk of, and to pass their verdict or their censure upon; and not as *warnings* sent from above, to call them off from their evil ways, and to lead them to repentance. Having seen what ill effects and abuses arise from this perverse humour of censuring the miserable, let us now proceed to the third and last particular, which is,

III.

To point out the true *use* and *application* of the *whole;* shewing what we are to think, and how it becomes us to behave, when any remarkable calamities come upon *others.*

1. In the first place, it will be right and just to look up to God, as the author and conductor of all occurrences; and to believe that no misfortune or disaster happens, but by his direction or permission; and that when he either directs or permits second causes to afflict any man, he does it for the ends of discipline, either to correct sins past, or to prevent future. Every affliction whatever has, directly or indirectly, some respect and reference to sin. Thus far the Jews themselves soberly reasoned in the case of the Galilæans, without rebuke from our Lord; yea, with his tacit approbation. The Galilæans suffered at the hands of God, and suffered *justly;* for they were *sinners,* though not the *greatest of sinners.* And thus may we truly and safely judge of any person whatever, when visited by the afflicting hand of God.

2. The next step we are to advance to is, to consider that the Divine judgments or visitations are not sent on account only of the unhappy sufferers, but are intended as useful lessons or salutary warnings to the bystanders; to as many as see them, or hear of them, or otherwise observe them: so that we are not to think we have done what is sufficient upon those occasions, till we have duly considered how far our neighbour's calamity may be conceived to affect us, and what use and improvement we may draw out of it. It was in this article, chiefly, that the Jews were deficient with respect to the case of the Galilæans. They considered the thing as a piece of news, affording them matter for discourse and barren speculation; but they took no

care to apply or bring it home to themselves, by any self-reflections. The Galilæans (they would say) have felt the Divine vengeance; wicked wretches, most certainly, or else they had fared better. They were severely handled; but God is just, and, without all question, they had their deserts. What a comfort is it to us, that we have been *better* men than they were, and so have come to no misfortune, as they have done! Such were the reasonings or reflections of the Jews on that occasion; never considering, that the judgment upon the Galilæans was a warning to them; who, though they had not yet been *fellow-sufferers* with them, were however no better than *fellow-criminals*. It became them not therefore to insult over the miserable, and to charge them beyond measure, when they ought rather to have spared *them*, and to have turned the satire and invective upon *themselves*. When God's judgments are sent abroad, the inhabitants of the earth should learn righteousness, and be led to repentance. They should look upon them as matters of public and common concern, in which all, more or less, are interested, and have their use to make of them. We should never think that we have rightly and duly commented upon the Divine judgments that are before our eyes, till we have applied them in a proper manner to *ourselves*, and have made a suitable use and improvement of them.

3. Thirdly and lastly, to bring these general principles down to particular cases, we may next consider how to improve and turn to our use such special instances as we may happen to meet with. Suppose some calamities to fall upon righteous and good men, or whom we have reason to believe are such: the use we are to make of it is, to stand in awe, and to humble ourselves before God. For "if judgment begin at the house of God," and "if the righteous scarcely be saved," (that is, preserved,) "where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear[c]?"

If afflictions fall upon unrighteous and sinful men, yet judge not the more hardly of them upon that account, but rather the contrary. Let it be an argument to us, that God has not yet given them up as abandoned and desperate, while he keeps them under discipline, and, as it were, holds the rod over them. At the same time be assured, that his chastising a few only, is intended as an example and warning to all, inasmuch as all are sinners, more or less: and be thankful for the opportunity now

[c] 1 Pet. iv. 17, 18.

given you, of learning instructions from the sufferings of *other* men, rather than from *your own;* growing wiser and better by their misfortunes, and, as it were, at their expense; and reaping the same benefit which they may do from it, but without their pain and uneasiness. If there be any way of averting God's judgments from our own doors, and rendering them in a manner unnecessary to us, it is to be done by regarding and reverencing them before they come at us, and by making the same use of them, while resting upon *others* only, as we should incline to do, when brought upon *ourselves.* Let the sight and sense of God's afflicting hand upon our fellow-criminals teach us humility and godly fear, and move us to repentance and good works. Instead of censuring and loading them, (which becomes us not, and can do us no good, but may do a great deal of harm,) let us rather choose to censure and correct our own lives, to humble ourselves before God, to look into our many sins and failings, and to amend the same with all due care and exactness, and as soon as possible. This is making a right use and improvement of God's visitations upon others, to his glory, and to our own happiness now and ever.

SERMON IX.

The Nature and Kinds of *Sins of Infirmity.*

The First Sermon on this Subject.

MATTHEW XXVI. 41.

The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.

THESE are the words of our blessed Lord to his drowsy disciples. It was the night before his Passion, a night which he himself spent in prayer and watching, and he had entreated his disciples to tarry and watch with him. But their hearts were dull and their eyelids heavy; and, notwithstanding all their best endeavours to the contrary, sleep stole upon them, and overcame them. Hereupon, their indulgent Master, coming to them, thus gently rebuked them: "What, could ye not watch "with me one hour? Watch and pray, that ye enter not into "temptation." Then follows, "the spirit indeed is willing, but "the flesh is weak." Which words I understand, with the generality of interpreters, as spoken in the way of kind *excuse* or mitigation of their fault, in not watching at a time when it was their duty to have done it, and when even common prudence required it. One can scarce acquit them of some degree of negligence and want of respect in that affair: but our blessed Lord was pleased to put the mildest and most candid construction possible upon it. The night was far spent; sleep stole upon them unawares; and they were naturally slow and heavy, not apprehending how much depended upon that critical juncture.

They intended no affront or disrespect to their Lord: they had a true and real, only not so lively and vigorous a concern for him, as they ought to have had. Their *spirit* truly was *willing*, and they meant well; but yet, for want of quicker sentiments, they failed in the performance. It was natural infirmity which prevailed over their resolutions, which overpowered their very hearty and honest, but languid endeavours. "The spirit" truly was "willing, but the flesh" was "weak."

The words of the text have been thought to express, in very proper and affecting terms, the nature or essence of that kind of sins which we call *sins of infirmity*, or sins of human frailty: and it is under this general view that I now design to consider them, abstracting from the particular occasion of them. In discoursing further, my design is,

I. To consider *what sins* are properly *sins of infirmity*, and what not.

II. To inquire how our state and condition to Godwards is affected by them.

III. To shew what kind of management on our part may be prudent and proper in regard to them.

I.

I am to consider *what sins* are properly *sins of infirmity*.

Their *general nature* is briefly described thus; that they are rather *weak* than *wilful*, having much more of *frailty* than of *wilfulness* in them. Something of *wilfulness* they must have, otherwise they could not be imputed as *sins*: but as the degree of *wilfulness* is *small* in comparison, and the *frailty* so much the *greater*; they have therefore their denomination from their *most prevailing* ingredient, and so are called sins of *infirmity*. They are such, as by a very accurate caution and circumspection might be avoided or prevented, and therefore they are *sins*: but yet, because such exact caution or circumspection is but rarely seen, and is not generally to be expected, therefore it is that the sins of that kind have the favour of being numbered among *human frailties*. They are a kind of slips, failings, or deviations, issuing from an honest and good heart, and carrying no *malice prepense*, no *premeditated* guile, no ill-meaning in them; harmless almost as to the *matter* of them, and without any bad design. They are owing either to *inadvertency*, *forgetfulness*, *surprise*, strength of *passion*, and to the *suddenness* and *violence* of an unlooked-for *temptation*. But this *general* description of them will

not be so instructive or satisfactory to common hearers as a *particular detail* may be, while I descend to *special cases* and *instances*, which is what I now intend.

Sins of infirmity then may be branched out into *three several sorts*, respecting either our *thoughts*, our *words*, or our *actions*.

1. I begin with the *first* of them, such as have respect to the inward *thought*. And here we are liable to offend *two* ways, either in *not thinking* as we *ought to think*, or in *thinking* as we *ought not*.

Human frailty is too often and too sadly felt in what concerns the *government of the thoughts*. Who is there that does not often find distraction, and wanderings, and deadness at his prayers, *private* or *public*; but *public* more especially, as we there meet with more objects to divert the eyes and to turn off the attention. There is nothing which a man has less under command than his own *thoughts* in such cases. He may be very devout this minute, and design to be so all the way through, and yet be quite thrown off the next moment without observing it presently; and when he does observe it, he knows not how it came to him, but that it is like his waking from a dream. This kind of *non-attention*, or *absence of thought*, in *religious exercises*, so far as it is a sin, (for it is not so always,) is, generally speaking, a *sin of infirmity*, and no more. And it is *then* only to be reckoned among *wilful sins*, when a man makes a *habit* of it, and slothfully *submits* to it, without *striving against it*; or when it carries some *contempt* of the service with it, arising from some *vicious principle* of the mind.

Besides the *sin of infirmity* now mentioned, I may name some others reducible to the same head: such as the *not thinking often enough*, or *highly* enough, of *God* and his *good providence*; not having him *constantly in our thoughts*, nor *setting him before our eyes*; not *attending to his calls*, not *regarding his judgments*, nor being duly *thankful for his mercies*, and the like. As to *omissions* of this kind, more or less, we offend all: and such offences, we may hope, will rise no higher in account than *pitiable infirmities*.

To these we may add, the not thinking how to *lay hold of* and to *improve any opportunities* we meet with of *doing good* in the world; and this through *dulness*, through *inadvertency* or *forgetfulness*: for if we *wilfully* and *designedly* let slip the golden opportunity offered us, and despise the invitation, the sin is then *wilful*, and the offence *presumptuous*.

Among *sins of infirmity* belonging to this head may be reckoned some kinds of *unbelief*, as both *belief* and *unbelief* respect the *inward thoughts* of the heart. *Want of faith* or *trust* in God's words, or his promises, in some timorous minds, may justly pass for a *sin of infirmity*. Such was the sin of Zacharias, in doubting of the truth of the angel's message to him; and for such *unbelief* of his, he was struck dumb, and continued so, not able to speak for a season. Our blessed Lord often reproved his disciples for the like *want of faith* or *trust*, saying unto them, "O ye of little faith," and the like. Several of God's true servants under the Old Testament betrayed sometimes the like *diffidence* and *doubtfulness*. Moses, in his excessive shyness and modesty, durst not undertake to speak before Pharaoh, though he had God's commission for doing it: and Jonas the Prophet discovered the like tergiversation and backwardness as to the errand he was sent upon to the Ninevites. These are instances of *human frailty* in men otherwise very pious and religious. Thomas's unbelief was somewhat worse, and was carried further. It was a strange instance of *obstinacy* to resolve to believe nothing but what he should see and feel. This fault of his can but *hardly* come under the head of *infirmity;* except it were because there was something very particular in the temper of the man, which might render it the more excusable in him. But Mary's want of faith in respect to our Lord's raising up her brother Lazarus, before she saw it done, is a proper instance of a *sin of infirmity*, and falls under this head.

Many timorous persons, though otherwise very religious and devout, are apt to offend in this kind; not relying upon God's good providence, nor reposing their trust in him with such confidence as they ought. They despond and sink down in the day of adversity more than becomes them to do; as if they had forgot that the very "hairs of their heads are all numbered;" or as if they had never read, that not so much as a "sparrow falleth "to the ground," but by the order or with the permission of an all-knowing God.

Hitherto I have been considering such sins of infirmity as respect the inward *thoughts*, in such cases wherein we do *not think* as we *ought to think*.

There is another branch of the same head, which is, the *thinking* as we *ought not*. The *former* is a sin of *omission* only, *this* of *commission*, both resting in the *mind*. When we are *thinking of*

this world only, suppose in *prayer-time*, or *sermon-time*, instead of thinking of a *better*, as most of us are apt to do: this, we hope, may pass for a *sin of infirmity* if not *chosen* by us nor designedly *indulged*.

Sometimes *profane*, *blasphemous thoughts* will rise up in men's minds: but if they be *checked* as soon as observed, and are not *consented* to, they are, at most, no more than *sins of infirmity*, owing generally to *bodily indispositions*. The same, I say, even of *unchaste* or *malicious thoughts*, if they are only *short* and *transient*, which *abide not*, which do not gain our *consent*, but are *condemned* by us as soon as perceived; they are then either *sins of infirmity* only, or not *sins at all*. For what the *will* or *choice* has no hand in, is not imputable to us as a *fault*; it may be our *misfortune*. The *first risings*, the first dartings of a *thought* into the mind, are very little, if at all, *in our power*: we are mostly *passive* in them, and are no further *accountable* for them, than as we afterwards make them ours by *indulging* them, and *taking pleasure* in them: then indeed such evil thoughts become *crimes*, and grow up from *infirmities* into *wilful sins*.

The *first emotions* of the *passions* are as little in *our power* as the other. A sudden fear or astonishment, the first kindlings of wrath and anger, or the like: these a man cannot help: they come upon him unawares, and take him by surprise. So far he is innocent; and if they dwell with him a little time, they may amount to *sins of infirmity*: but if they are further *indulged*, as if anger, suppose, is suffered to grow into *rage*, or to settle into *malice*, it then becomes *wilful, deadly sin*.

Too much warmth and *eagerness*, in *some instances*, is a *sin of infirmity*. Such, I suppose, was Peter's eagerness, when he drew his sword, without staying for his Lord's commission, and smote off a servant's ear. Perhaps also St. Paul was too warm and eager when he so sharply rebuked the high priest, correcting himself however, presently after, and making an apology for what he had said.

Excessive fondness, in *some cases*, is another instance of *sins of infirmity*. Fond parents especially have great reason to hope that their partial and often foolish fondness shall pass for no worse; otherwise they would many times have a great deal to answer for. David's fondness for his son Absalom was very highly extravagant, and such as is not to be justified upon any principle of religion or reason: nevertheless it must admit of a

fair excuse upon the score of *infirmity;* it was no *wilful* sin. But Eli's indulgence and remissness towards his sons, whom he as a magistrate ought to have corrected, being more *deliberate*, and of much worse tendency, *that* was charged upon him as a *heinous crime*, and both he and his posterity remarkably suffered for it.

To this head I may refer *credulity*, or over-hasty belief, as being often a *sin of infirmity*, and pertaining only to the mind. Many an honest and good man may be *too credulous* in believing idle stories and false reports; when he ought to be upon his guard. Thus the *man of God* suffered himself to be deceived by the lying prophet of Bethel, and paid dear for his credulity; though, as I conceive, his sin was no more than a *sin of infirmity:* he meant well, and had an honest mind.

To the same head may be referred *over great carefulness*, or anxiety, in respect of *worldly things*. It is to be hoped, that much of this kind may be allowed to pass among our *pitiable failings*, and bear no harder a name than that of *sins of infirmity*. Martha, a very good woman in the main, was yet careful and cumbered about many things, more than she should have been; and she received a gentle rebuke for it from our blessed Lord. It was a *sin* to be so over-careful and anxious for trifles, to the neglect of better things: but she did not consider it; she intended well, and thought even her sister to blame for not doing as she did, though she was much better employed.

Hitherto I have been considering *sins of infirmity* as reaching no further than the *mind*, resting in *thought only*. I proceed now to a second article, or head of discourse, respecting our *speech*.

2. Many are our *sins of infirmity* reducible to this head: "If "any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man," a very saint upon earth, as St. James justly observes[a]. But where shall we find such a person? or has there ever been such an one, our blessed Lord only excepted, who had no sin, nor was "guile "found in his mouth?" Many are the offences of the *tongue:* our greatest comfort is, that several of them may pass for *frailties* only; and happy will it be for us, if we go no further. Moses, one of the best men that ever lived, stands charged in scripture, as one speaking "unadvisedly with his lips[b]," in an

[a] James iii. 2. [b] Psalm cvi. 33.

affair of high consequence. It was a *sudden passion* that betrayed him into it, and he had no *ill meaning:* it was a *sin of infirmity*. I am persuaded that even Peter's *denial of his Lord* was rather *weak* than *wilful:* he was *surprised* into it, had forgot himself, and had not yet time to recollect. He had a very *honest heart*, and had courage enough even to fight or die for his Lord at another time: and as soon as ever he perceived how meanly he had behaved in denying his Lord, he was sadly struck with it, and "wept bitterly" for it. All these circumstances plead in his favour, and make his sin appear rather as a *sin of infirmity* than a *presumptuous sin*.

I should be willing to hope that *hasty*, *heedless swearing*, or *taking God's name in vain*, in those who had unhappily got a habit of it from their childhood, may be but a *sin of infirmity*, for *some time:* but to such as *perceive* it, and *continue* it, and use not all *proper means* and *care* to *get the better of it*, and to *break the evil habit*, to *them* it is *wilful* and *deadly sin*.

Telling of lies I do not reckon among the *sins of infirmity;* it is, generally, at least, a *voluntary*, chosen thing: but *varying* a little from *strict truth*, or adding to it, as is sometimes done, *undesignedly*, *hastily*, *forgetfully*, in the making a report, if it be in things of slight *consequence;* that may be numbered among *human frailties*.

Angry and *passionate speeches* may mostly fall under the head of *infirmities:* but *bitter invectives*, and irritating, *injurious reflections*, made in *cold blood*, made *deliberately*, are *without excuse*.

There are sometimes sharp contentions between very good men and very good friends, where both sides mean well, but differ in opinion or judgment. Such was the sharp contention between Paul and Barnabas, recorded Acts xv, in which Barnabas appears to have been *blamable*, in favouring his kinsman Mark more than became him to do, where the public interest of the Church lay at stake: but this was his *infirmity;* and even the best of men will be subject to human frailties.

It would be endless to enumerate all the offences of the *tongue*, which men are liable to. It is a difficult matter to talk *much* and *well:* great talkers offend often; and they who say the *least* are generally the *most innocent*.

Yet there may be a fault sometimes in being too *reserved*, shy, and silent: as when a man neglects to exhort or reprove his

neighbour, as occasions offer, or when he can patiently sit by, and hear the name of God dishonoured, or an innocent absent man abused, without opening his mouth in defence of either. Such *reservedness*, in *some cases*, may rise no higher than a *sin of infirmity:* but *for the most part*, we may more justly call it a *wilful neglect;* betraying meanness of spirit, at least, or something worse.

But enough hath been said of *sins of infirmity*, so far as relates to *speech.*

3. I come now in the third place to the most material article of all, which concerns our *outward actions:* and here also we may offend two ways; either as *neglecting to do* what we *ought*, or as *doing* what we *ought not.*

Sins of infirmity are mostly seen in our manifold *omissions* and neglects, either forgetting what duties are incumbent upon us, or performing them but in part. Who can say how oft he offendeth in this kind? Who can say that he hath acquitted himself perfectly in every instance of duty towards God and towards his neighbour? to his king or to his country, to his family or relations, to his friends and to his enemies, to high and low, to rich and poor, to every man he has any relation to or concern with? Hard would be our circumstances, were we to give a strict account of all our *omissions;* or if much the greater part of them were not kindly overlooked by an all-merciful God, as *pitiable frailties.* Yet let not any man set light by *omissions. Wilful omissions* of *known duties* are *wilful* and *presumptuous sins:* and there are some kinds of *omissions* which will be always charged as *wilful*, and will be enough to exclude us from the kingdom of heaven: particularly, if we *omit* or neglect to *worship God*, or to *do good to man*, as our opportunities and abilities permit. If we neglect to "feed the hungry," or to "clothe the naked," or to "visit the sick," or to "comfort the afflicted;" our blessed Lord himself hath told us, that we shall not be admitted into the kingdom of heaven: and further, if we neglect or *omit* to "forgive our enemies," we can have no forgiveness at the hands of God. Briefly then, though *many* of our *omissions* or neglects amount only to *sins of infirmity;* yet there are *sins of omission* which are both *wilful* and *dangerous*, as any other sins are, and which will admit of *no excuse* upon any pretence of *human frailty.*

I come next to speak of sins of *commission*, the *doing* what we

ought not to do. Sins of this kind are *mostly wilful*: but *some* there are which may be justly looked upon as *sins of infirmity*. Drunkenness in righteous Noah, *once only*, might be a *sin of infirmity*. He was not aware of the effects of wine: he had not till then had experience of it: he was overtaken unawares, and *surprised* into it. I know not whether the like favourable excuse may not be admitted for others who may *once* unhappily fall into the like excess *unawares*. But, generally speaking, as the world now stands, a man can scarce be *surprised* into such excess, or overtaken without *his fault*. Many perhaps will say, that they did not, or do not, design to drink so far as to be drunken: that may be true; but still they are *wilful sinners* and drunkards, for *not designing* and *resolving* to be *constantly sober*, and for not using the *proper means* to avoid the temptation.

Some have been weak enough to plead *human frailty* even for crying and *scandalous sins*; such as *fornication* or *adultery*, or other sinful lusts: but all such pretences are vain. Sins of that kind never are, never can be, committed without *great degrees* of *wilfulness*. It is not *surprise* nor *inadvertency* which brings a man into the commission of such offences; but they are *chosen* and *premeditated* sins, and a man is drawn into them through lust and wantonness, by several steps and degrees, with *full consent* of a *depraved will*. Slight offences a man may be drawn into by surprise or incogitancy; but hardly into the great ones. The mind starts, and conscience generally gives the alarm beforehand, that a man must take some pains with himself, generally, before he can reconcile himself to any great and scandalous vices. *Such offences*, therefore, are not *sins of infirmity*, but they are *deliberate, presumptuous, damning sins*. If it be pleaded, that the object is inviting, and the temptation strong, violent, irresistible; that is just such a plea as any common thief or robber might make for invading property or making an assault. No doubt but that such persons are violently tempted to commit such outrages, or they would not do them: the temptation, probably, in that case, is stronger than in the other; for a thief or a robber does it at the utmost peril, and ventures his life in it; whereas it is more than probable, that if *fornication* or *adultery* were as severely prohibited, and punishable by the laws of the land, it would be found that the men of pleasure could command themselves, and resist the temptation: but they are encouraged, after

they have laid aside the fear of God, by the hopes of impunity from man; and then being got above restraint, they commit all uncleanness with greediness.

There are some other kinds of sins for which *human infirmity* is sometimes pleaded, and with very little reason. *Acts of hostility*, assaults, beating, striking, wounding, and the like. It is said by way of excuse, that they were *provoked* to it, and that flesh and blood could not forbear in such cases. But these are pretences only of vain men, who have not yet learned any thing of Christian meekness, but who have hearts too proud and stubborn to submit to the rules of the Gospel. *Sins of infirmity*, properly so called, are sins of quite another kind than those I have now mentioned. Good men run sometimes into excessive warmth and zeal in the discharge of a duty, or execution of an office: they may be guilty of indiscreet rigours, and push things too far; may be so afraid of not doing enough, that they will even over-do, and be too officious or too severe, exceeding the bounds of Christian prudence, and doing hurt, when they intended good.

These and other the like *indiscretions* of good men are properly *sins of infirmity*, owing to inadvertency, or surprise, or to some *natural weakness* adhering to their particular temper, complexion, and constitution.

From what hath been said, every intelligent hearer may competently judge which are *sins of infirmity*, and which *not:* and I thought it of moment, to be as distinct and particular as possible on this head, to prevent *mistakes;* by which means this part has been drawn out into a greater length than I at first supposed; and I have no room left for the *two other articles* I proposed to treat of. I shall therefore break off for the psesent, and, with your good leave, defer the remainder to another opportunity.

SERMON X.

The Nature and Kinds of *Sins of Infirmity.*

The Second Sermon on this Subject.

MATTHEW xxvi. 41.

The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.

IN a former discourse upon this text, I undertook to open and explain the nature of *sins of infirmity;* and to consider the most material points which might either fall within the subject or relate to it: and, that I might do this in some order and method, I proposed to throw the substance of what I intended into three general heads, which were these:

I. To consider what kind of sins are properly *sins of infirmity.*

II. To inquire how our *spiritual state* and condition are *affected* thereby.

III. To shew what kind of management on our own part may be prudent or proper in regard to them.

Upon the first of these heads, I found myself obliged to be so distinct, large, and particular, that I had no room left for prosecuting the *other two.* I considered of what importance it might be to us, to distinguish carefully and accurately between sins of *infirmity* and *presumptuous* sins: and therefore made it my business to shew, by what marks and tokens we may readily distinguish one from the other: and I endeavoured, further, to illustrate the several cases, as they came to be mentioned, by chosen and pertinent examples taken out of the Old or New Testament.

The sum of what I advanced was, that the essence, or distinguishing character, of a sin of *infirmity* was this: that it is a violation of some law of God, and in some degree *wilful*, but in a much greater degree *weak* and pitiable. It must be in some measure *voluntary*, to make it *sin:* and it must be in a much greater measure *involuntary*, to make it a *frailty*. Even the best of men have their defects, their failings, and infirmities, and do not always stand upright. They have either some flaw in their natural temper, or some weakness in their judgment, which betrays them often into slight mistakes, and almost innocent slips in life, while they retain a very honest and good heart. They lean perhaps a little too much toward the world, and their affections are not altogether so raised and heavenly as they might be or should be. They sometimes find desertion of spirit, coldness in devotion, and flatness in holy exercises: they are too anxious, fretful, and desponding, in the day of adversity; or too gay and too much alert in the day of their prosperity. Besides this, they are liable to sleepiness, forgetfulness, surprise, and inadvertency; either through the hurry and confusion of outward accidents, or through some inward disorder, or indisposition of the blood and spirits: so that sometimes they come short of their known duty, and sometimes they exceed and go beyond it; not observing the due medium, the golden mean between the two extremes. The slips or deviations of this kind are what Divines call *sins of infirmity:* and such I described at large under my *first head*, and in my former discourse. I proceed now secondly, as I proposed,

II.

To inquire how far our *spiritual state* and condition are *affected* by the sins of this kind. They do not *exclude* a man from the *kingdom of heaven:* they do not *put him out of a state of grace,* or out of *favour* with *Almighty God.* This may be proved several ways, both from *Scripture texts* and from the *reason of the thing* itself.

1. There are two or three special texts of Scripture, which number up and recite such particular sins, as will most certainly, if not repented of, exclude the offenders from the kingdom of heaven.

One is in the sixth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and runs thus: "Know ye not that the unrighteous "shall not inherit the kingdom of God? Be not deceived:

"neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effemi-
"nate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor
"covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall
"inherit the kingdom of God[a]." To the same purpose speaks the same Apostle in the Epistle to the Galatians: "Now the "works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; adultery, "fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, "hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, "envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of "the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time "past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the "kingdom of God[b]." Now, if we carefully look into this black catalogue of sins which exclude a man from heaven, we shall find them all to be of the *wilful, presumptuous* kind, and not *sins of infirmity*. They are all sins of a crying, provoking nature, whereof the injustice and wickedness, with respect to God and man, is palpable: and they are such as men do not commit merely through inadvertency, incogitancy or surprise, but knowingly, wilfully, presumptuously, against the light of reason and revelation, and against the clearest dictates of their own consciences.

Of the same kind also are the sins of *omission* which our blessed Saviour recites or points to, where he is describing the sentence which shall pass upon the ungodly at the last day. "Then "shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, "ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his "angels: for I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I "was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink: I was a stranger, and "ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: sick, and "in prison, and ye visited me not[c]." All these instances are notorious breaches of the great law of mercy and charity, and such as a man cannot be guilty of without knowing that he is so, and designing to be so. To deny one's bread to the hungry, or drink to the thirsty, or clothes to the naked, is inhuman and cruel; and is such a sin as a man is not led into by inadvertency, or frailty, or surprise, but by hard-heartedness, selfishness, covetousness, and other vile affections. The like may be said of a man's refusing to visit the sick, to comfort the afflicted, or to do the common offices of humanity and courtesy to all men.

[a] 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. [b] Gal. v. 19, 20, 21. [c] Matth. xxv. 41, 42, 43.

The neglect of such great and plain duties as these cannot be extenuated into a sin of *infirmity*; but it is a *wilful, presumptuous*, and highly culpable neglect, if it be at all.

The conclusion therefore which I am aiming at from all is this: that *sins of* mere *infirmity* are not the sins which either St. Paul or our blessed Lord refer to, as excluding men from the kingdom of heaven: they are quite of another kind from those now mentioned; and therefore they do not exclude the person from a state of grace, but are consistent with the love of God and the love of one's neighbour, and so are not mortal or damning sins. They are the spots of God's children, such as the best of men are not entirely free from, though they are not imputed to them. "In many things we offend all," says St. James, chap. iii. verse the 2nd. He could not mean this of *wilful, presumptuous* sins; for of such St. John tells us, that "he that "committeth sin is of the devil[d];" and that "whosoever is "born of God doth not commit sin." Righteous and good men do abstain consequently from *wilful, presumptuous* sins; otherwise they would not be righteous, or would cease to be so for the time: but still they are guilty of many slips, failings, and imperfections; and it is in this sense only that "we offend all." We read of Zacharias and his wife Elisabeth, that "they were "both righteous before God, walking in all the commandments "and ordinances of the Lord blameless:" and yet that very Zacharias was found faulty, in not believing the message which an angel brought him; and he was struck dumb, by way of punishment for his unbelief[e]. That is, as to any grievous, *presumptuous* sins, the man was *blameless*; but yet he was not *altogether* or *absolutely* free from blame: for he was guilty of sin in not believing the angel, but it was a sin of the slighter kind, a sin of *infirmity*, which he was led into by the surprise and suddenness of the thing, while his heart was sincere, and his intentions honest and upright. There is no man free from these slighter sins, called sins of *infirmity*; and if God should be extreme to mark them, and to impute them to us, no flesh could be saved. But the Gospel covenant is a covenant of grace, which makes allowances for human frailties, and does not charge them upon us as crimes that shall make a breach between God and us. Though we both live and die with these infirmities

[d] 1 John iii. 8, 9.

[e] Luke i. 6, 20.

about us, and with these sins hanging upon us, we may still die in his favour, and be admitted into heaven.

Indeed, the Gospel rule is a most perfect rule, requiring and enjoining every virtue, and every degree of virtue; and to fall short of it in any instance, with any degree of *wilfulness*, is a sin: but then the *Gospel covenant* is so mild and merciful, as not to exact any such *perfect, unsinning obedience* of us, under pain of *damnation:* neither doth God expect it of us, that we should be entirely innocent of all offences whatever. He is a merciful and gracious God, knows whereof we are made, and remembers that we are but dust. So long as our hearts are upright, and we use our best, though weak and imperfect endeavours to please him, he is so good as to accept it of us, and to pass by the rest. If we have but a prevailing and constant love of God in our hearts, abstaining from *wilful, presumptuous* offences, (which are inconsistent with such love,) God is graciously pleased to receive us *as innocent*, and to accept us *as righteous*. It is not every slight deviation from our duty, nor every failure in point of perfection, that can separate God and us, while our hearts are whole with him. A wise or good man will not break with his friend for every offence, for a hasty word, for a slight affront or disrespect, for some indiscretion in conduct or frowardness of temper, for some remissness or tardiness in good offices, or some neglects and failures in service; "but for upbraiding or pride, "or disclosing of secrets, or a treacherous wound, (as the Wise "Man observes,) every friend will depart[f]." The reason is plain: some kind of offences, of a slight nature, are very consistent with true and hearty affection, and are therefore no breaches of love or friendship: but others betray such an alienation of affections, or such intolerable negligence as to what the laws of friendship require, that it is highly imprudent or impracticable to keep up any friendly correspondence longer. In like manner, (to compare great things with small,) our peace or friendship with Almighty God may very well consist with many indiscretions on our part, many slips and failings, whereby we come short of sinless perfection: but if we offend of *malicious wickedness*, if we knowingly, designedly, presumptuously transgress against him, then, and then only, is our peace with him broken, and the alliance dissolved; dissolved I mean for a time, or till

[f] Ecclus. xxii. 22.

we return and repent: for true repentance will reinstate us, and reconcile us to God, even after wilful, and deliberate, and crying sins.

But to return to our point: there is the greatest reason and equity imaginable here shewn in making such distinction between sins of *infirmity* and *deliberate* sins: because this is estimating of men according to their sincerity, and according to the turn of their hearts, of which God alone is the unerring judge, and which he has chiefly respect to; because indeed the heart is the principal thing, the mind is the man. In this state of weakness and darkness, a man may easily be conceived to fall into several errors, or slight offences; though at the same time he retains a prevailing fear of God, and is sincerely endeavouring to please him in all things. Men who love money ever so well, may yet sometimes, contrary to their principle, and beside their main intention, take false measures, whereby they shall suffer damage; or may not be sharp enough, or sufficiently diligent, in taking all advantages of gain. It is no argument that a man does not value his health, if he accidentally and unwarily either draws distempers upon himself, or forgets now and then to use the means proper to prevent or cure them. In like manner, it is no argument of a man's disregard to religion, or of his casting off the fear or love of God, that he sometimes unwarily and indiscreetly falls short of his duty, or is not altogether so careful and punctual in his religious performances as he might have been. God will wink at such failures, and connive at such deviations, well knowing that men are men, and that *sincerity of the heart* is all that is necessary to be required or exacted of them.

The result then of what hath been said under this head is, that sins of *infirmity* are very consistent with a *state of grace*, do not break our peace with God, nor endanger our salvation. But it remains still thirdly,

III.

To inquire what kind of conduct or management, on our part, is prudent or proper in regard to them. As to which I may presume to say, that though sins of *infirmity* are not the *most dangerous*, nor in their nature *damning*; yet it concerns us highly to *repent* of them, and to *pray* against them, and to *labour* what we can to be *free* from them, and to get above them.

1. I say it concerns us to *repent* of them, that is, to express

our sorrow and contrition for them, and to humble ourselves before God on the account of them. That they are *sins* is supposed, though not *wilful* or *deliberate* sins: and as they are *sins*, they will stand in need of *pardon;* and if they need *pardon*, they will also require *repentance;* which is the *condition* on which *pardon* is *promised*, and by *means* of which it will be *given*. But then the question is, *what kind* of repentance? And the answer is, a *general* repentance may suffice, not extending to every *particular:* nor is it necessary that such repentance be *completely practical*, amounting to an *entire cessation* from the sins of *that kind*. Both these things shall be explained presently.

First I say, a *general* repentance may suffice. We need not, we cannot be *particular* in all our sins of *infirmity:* "Who can "tell how oft he offendeth in this kind?" We are not aware perhaps of one half or a tenth part of our failures; and therefore cannot particularly repent of them: and even those which we have been aware of, while fresh and new, yet easily slip out of our memories; and the very number of them, as they happen daily or hourly, is much too great to be distinctly considered or retained. David says of his own sins, that "they were more in "number than the hairs of his head." I suppose he took in his sins of *infirmity* to raise the account; otherwise this expression of his is by no means reconcilable with Scripture history, or the character of so good a man as David was. But from hence we may judge of the number of those slighter sins, which human frailty is ever liable to, and which therefore are sometimes called sins of *daily incursion*. It cannot be necessary either to remember them *distinctly*, or to make *particular* confession of them. It is sufficient if we think and speak of them in *general* as deviations from our duty, as imperfections known or unknown, repenting of them in the lump, and humbling ourselves before God for them. *Wilful* and *deliberate* sins, as they are *knowingly* committed, and as they leave a wound upon the *conscience*, as they are further very *provoking* and grievous, and make a *fatal breach* between the offender and Almighty God; these therefore require a *very particular repentance*, and a more *especial sorrow* and *humiliation*. They are very easily remembered, being few in comparison, and of such a kind as cannot easily be forgotten; and therefore a man ought, in his confession of, and humiliations for, *sins* of *that nature*, to be as *particular* and *distinct* as possible: but sins of *infirmity* are too many to be recounted, or

even to be observed, and very slight in comparison; and therefore it is that they neither require nor indeed admit of any thing more than a *general repentance.*

But there is a further difference between the repentance proper to *wilful sins* and the repentance required for *human frailties.* A man must not be content merely to *confess* and to *declare* his *sorrow* for *wilful sins;* but he must *renounce* and *forsake* them, and never rest satisfied till he has divested himself of them. But as to sins of *infirmity*, the case is different: they are such as a good man may be content to live with and die with; and that, because he never *can* entirely remove them from him. They are *inseparable from flesh and blood*, are interwoven into our very frame, and are as *natural* and *necessary*, in some degree at least, as it is to be *weak* or *frail*, *unthinking* or *unobserving;* or, as it is to be liable to *forgetfulness*, *fatigue*, *weariness*, and the like. We are never to expect to get above every *infirmity*, or to correct every *failing.* The best of men *cannot* do it; the greatest of God's saints *have not:* and therefore it is that we say of this case, that it is not necessary for our repentance to be *completely practical.* We may express our sorrow and concern even for the sins of *infirmity* which we fall into: but as we can never hope to gain the entire mastery over them, or to get above them; so neither is it required of us, in order either to our peace here or happiness hereafter. But then,

2. Besides a *general repentance*, though not *completely practical*, for sins of this kind; we should further add our devout *prayers* to God, to make us every day less and less liable to them, and not to impute them. The prayer of the holy Psalmist in this case is very observable, though a very short one: "Who "can tell how oft he offendeth? O cleanse thou me from my "secret faults!" So the words run in our *old* translation, Psalm xix. 12. The *secret faults* are well interpreted here to mean *sins of infirmity*, as opposed to known *presumptuous* sins, which he prays to be kept from in the verse next following. When he prays to be *cleansed* from secret faults, we may understand two things: first, to be *acquitted*, *pardoned*, *justified*, through the *mercy* of God, not *imputing* to him those *smaller offences;* and secondly, to be more and more *strengthened* by God's *grace* to *conquer* the infirmities he laboured under. Upon the whole, it is a petition for pardon of past sins, and for greater degrees of perfection for the future: and such a prayer may well become

every good man now, with regard to sins of infirmity. He ought to beg *pardon* of God for them, as they are really *sins:* and it is of near concernment to us, to pray to God daily for his *grace* to enable us to arrive to still higher and higher degrees of perfection. The greater perfection we attain to, the more secure are we against falling back; and not only so, but we thereby become qualified for a higher and nobler reward. Even *sins of infirmity*, the more numerous they are, and the oftener they occur, so much the more dangerous are they; and if they be not carefully watched against, they may gradually sink us into an ill state, may pave the way to *wilful, deliberate* sins. For this reason principally we ought to *pray* against them, and to implore God's mercy and assistance, that he may please to pardon and forgive what is past, and to guard and strengthen us for the time to come.

3. The third and last article of our conduct, is to use our best *endeavours* along with our prayers, to guard, as much as possibly we can, even against those smaller sins, lest they should lead to greater.

Sins of *infirmity*, if indulged, if consented to, if suffered to rest upon us, are no longer sins of mere *infirmity*, but grow up into *wilful, deliberate* sins. Their very name and nature supposes some unavoidable *weakness*, and not *wilfulness*, to have the principal hand in them. They are *infirmities*, because, though we strive against them, and do our best to avoid them, yet we are surprised into them, and overcome by them. When we have done, and still continue to do, as much as lies in our power to correct our failings, and to fill up our defects; we may then very fairly give the name of *infirmities* to what remains: but if we use not the proper means to correct and amend, so far as may be, such our failings; those very *failings* will be *imputed* to us as *wilful* and *deliberate sins*. For the purpose: wandering and distraction in prayer may, in the general, be justly reckoned among the *sins of infirmity:* but if a man tamely *suffer* such a *habit* to *grow* upon him, and take no pains to *prevent* or lessen it; if he neither *strive* against it, nor so much as *endeavour* to correct it, in such measure at least as it may be corrected; to him it shall be *imputed* as a *wilful* sin, and shall no longer pass under the soft name of *human frailty*. So again: angry and passionate words, upon some occasions, exceeding the bounds of moderation and meekness, may be rightly enough numbered

among the sins of *infirmity:* but yet, if a man *frequently* fall into such irregular heats; if he *choose* so to do, and use not his best *endeavours* to *subdue his passions*, and to *reform his tongue;* to him such intemperate sallies will be imputed as *presumptuous* sins, and not sins of *infirmity*. The same is the case in all other sins called sins of *infirmity;* they are no otherwise *such*, but as a man has done his *best* to *correct* them, and *yet* sinks under them: it is therefore *absolutely necessary* for every good man to *labour*, *strive*, and *endeavour* what he can, against every the *smallest* sin or slightest offence, (as it is thought,) because it is this *striving* and *endeavouring* against it which at length *renders* it slight and pitiable in the sight of God: for this is our *apology*, this our *plea*, for our committing sins of that kind; that we *did what we could* to *avoid* them; and at length fell into them by *surprise*, by *inadvertency*, by *weakness*, when we did not intend it, when we *intended otherwise*.

Upon the whole then, we are obliged constantly to *watch*, *pray*, and *endeavour* against all kinds of sins, sins of *infirmity* as well as *others;* and that in order to stand clear of *wilful* sin, and to preserve our peace with God. Venture not upon any sin, under the notion of its being a *small* sin only: for it is not *small* if it be *wilful*, or if it be readily and fully *consented* to. *Wilful disobedience*, even in a *slight matter*, is no slight *thing*. The *wilfulness* shewn in it makes the offence *grievous:* and however small the *matter* of it may seem, the *contempt* is great, and is itself a *high crime*. Let us therefore make it our conscientious care to avoid, as much as possible, *all sins whatever*, great and small, and to approach every day nearer and nearer to religious perfection. And may God enable us, by his grace, to get ground of our *infirmities*, and to improve daily in every good word and work.

SERMON XI.

The Nature and Danger of *presumptuous* Sins.

PSALM xix. 13.

Keep back thy servant also from presumptuous sins; let them not have dominion over me: then shall I be upright, and I shall be innocent from the great transgression.

THESE are the words of pious David, the undoubted author of this religious song or psalm. In the verse going before, he had put up his petition for pardon of all the failures and errors of his life past, even of such as had escaped his notice, or had slipped out of his memory: "Who can understand his "errors? cleanse thou me from secret faults." But besides those slighter offences, he was aware also of the offences of a more heinous kind; and therefore immediately subjoins a prayer against them likewise: "Keep back thy servant also from pre-"sumptuous sins; let them not have dominion over me: then "shall I be upright, and I shall be innocent from the great "transgression."

The words, as they run in our *new translation*, are not difficult to understand, and so will need the less opening. Indeed the words of the *original* have been thought capable of a very different version, and consequently of as different a sense: but I shall not take notice of niceties of that kind, which would be both dry and useless. The sense which they bear in *our translation* is a very good one, and is judiciously preferred before any

other. I proceed therefore to consider the matter contained in it. In discoursing hereupon I shall take this method:

I. To treat of *sins* in *general*, their nature, kinds, and measures.

II. To treat of *presumptuous* sins in particular, with the malignancy and danger of them, and the concern we ought to have to stand clear of them.

III. To close all with proper advice and directions how to avoid them.

I.

I propose to treat of *sins* in *general*, their nature, kinds, and measures.

Sin is rightly defined, a transgression of God's law; and is either the *doing* of something which God has *forbidden*, or the *leaving undone* what God has *commanded*. The *doing* what we *ought not* to do is called a *sin of commission;* and the *not doing* what we *ought* is styled a *sin of omission*. In the one, we commit a trespass; in the other, we neglect a duty; and either way we sin. Sins of either kind may differ in their degrees of *greater* and *less*, according to their different matter, circumstances, and aggravations.

The *Stoic philosophers*, and some few of the less considerate Christians, have pretended, that all sins are *equal*. Their reasons for it are not worth the mentioning; for the conceit is so groundless, and so repugnant to the common sense of mankind, that barely to speak of it is to expose it, and it carries its own confutation with it. For a man must be very weak to imagine that *theft*, suppose, is as great a sin as *murder;* or *fornication* as high a crime as *adultery;* or *telling a lie* as wicked a thing as *robbing a house*, or *plundering a church*, or *firing a town*. Every body is sensible of a difference between high crimes and trivial trespasses; between sins of the first magnitude and slight offences: our Lord therefore compares some to *gnats*, while he compares others to *camels;* some to *motes* in the eye, others to *beams*.

Seeing therefore that sins are *not equal*, but differing in *degree*, as the text also intimates; the next inquiry is, what *makes* the difference, or by what rules or measures we may judge of it.

There are two considerations to be taken in, which seem to be the principal in determining of the greatness of any sin. One is, the *matter* of the sin itself, or the *mischievous tendency* of it:

the other is, the degree of *malice* or *wilfulness* in the person committing it.

Moral evil, the same with *sin*, is the *choosing* something which is *naturally* evil, or is of *mischievous tendency*. The case is plain in all instances prohibited by the law of nature: and as to cases prohibited by the *positive* law of God, the *prohibition* brings them under the same rule: for then a man cannot break through the prohibition, without affronting, contemning, disobeying Almighty God; and that is *naturally* evil, and of *evil tendency*; it is rebellion against the Creator, which is of pernicious example, and carries many mischievous consequences in it, with respect both to man's temporal and eternal welfare. I say then, first judge we of the *heinousness* of a sin by the *mischievous tendency* of it. Thus, to instance in matters of a moral nature, stealing is not so hurtful as maiming; nor is maiming so mischievous as murder; nor is murder of an equal so mischievous as the murder of a superior, a magistrate, a father, or the prince we are subject to.

In matters of a *positive* nature, neglecting to defend or to maintain the Gospel, when commanded, is a grievous sin; because the salvation of thousands may be concerned in it: but the opposing the Gospel is much worse, and is of yet greater malignity. Neglecting the Sacraments, or other solemn ordinances of God, is a great sin, as it is slighting God's goodness, affronting his authority, and setting a very ill example: but rejecting them utterly, or contemning them, is high profaneness, and of most pernicious tendency, as it is striking at all *instituted* religion directly, and at *morality* in consequence; and so, in the last result, at the general happiness of mankind, here and hereafter. This may serve to explain what I mean by the *evil tendency* of any sin.

The other consideration is, the degree of *wilfulness* in the person committing it. Whatever mischief a man may do, he is no further chargeable with it than as he made it his *choice*; no further than he knew what he was doing, and wilfully chose it. A *madman* may do a great deal of mischief, but in him it is no sin: the like may be said of a *natural fool*, or *idiot*. Where there is no *reason* nor *choice*, there can be no *sin*. And supposing a man, under the use of reason, to do mischief, either being compelled to it, or not knowing that it is mischief, or not considering it, or not designing it; these will be all so many arti-

cles in his favour, either to acquit him entirely of blame, or to excuse and extenuate, in proportion to the degree of the necessity he was under. Hence it is that Divines have distinguished *sins* into *three kinds;* called *sins of ignorance, sins of infirmity,* and *sins of presumption.* The *will* is supposed to concur more or less in *all,* otherwise they could not be *sins;* but they have their names from what is *most prevailing* and predominant in each. If there be more of *ignorance* than *wilfulness* in it, it is a *sin of ignorance;* if there be more of *infirmity* than *wilfulness* in it, it is a sin of *infirmity:* but if there be more of *wilfulness* than of *either* or *both the former,* it is then a *wilful* sin; and that is what my text calls *presumptuous* sin. To say something more particular of each:

1. Of the sin of *ignorance:* such was the sin of Abimelech, when he *took unto him Abraham's wife,* not *knowing* her to *be his wife,* but supposing her to be his *sister* only. What he did was with an upright heart, so far; ignorantly consenting to adultery: but yet, because he might have made further inquiry, and might have informed himself better, if he had had patience, and had not been too precipitate; he was therefore not *wholly* innocent: a sin he was guilty of, but a *sin of ignorance;* and therefore he found mercy at the hands of God.

A second example, but more approaching to a sin of *presumption,* was St. Paul's "persecuting the Church of Christ." He did it *ignorantly,* and in *unbelief,* out of an *honest* and *well-meant zeal:* but he *sinned* in so doing, and *grievously* too; because he had had several opportunities of knowing better; and he had seen enough of the miraculous powers of the Church, to convince a man of his education and abilities, if he had duly attended to them. However, because his ignorance in that case was not entirely affected, nor owing to envy, malice, or other corrupt principle; his sin, in that instance, may pass among the *sins of ignorance,* rather than among the sins of *presumption:* it was blamable, but pitiable at the same time; for *ignorance* lessens and *extenuates* a fault, more or less, according as the ignorance was more or less *wilful.* If the ignorance had been perfectly *involuntary* and *unavoidable,* it would have entirely acquitted him of all blame: "If you were blind," says our Lord to the Pharisees, "you should have no sin[a]." But when the ignorance is

[a] John ix. 41.

in some measure *voluntary*, and in some measure *involuntary*, there it does not take off the guilt entirely, but lessens and extenuates it in proportion: "He that knew not his lord's will, "and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with "few stripes[b]." Such is the nature and description of a *sin of ignorance*.

2. Next to which is the *sin of infirmity*, owing to the *frailty of the flesh*, or impetuosity of the affections, as the former is to the *blindness of the understanding*. Our blessed Lord well describes the nature of it, where he says; "The spirit truly is willing, "but the flesh is weak." Sins of *infirmity* are mostly seen in sins of *omission*; in our neglect of duties or our defects in performing them; owing to forgetfulness, inadvertency, heaviness, listlessness, and the like. But there are other cases where sins of *infirmity* steal in, by surprise, by sudden passion, by the vehemence of a temptation, which overpowers the mind before the person has time to consider or recollect. I suppose, Peter's denial of his Lord may be an instance of such a sin. His heart was very sincere and honest; he was suddenly set upon by an unlooked for temptation; he fell unexpectedly, and that but once, against his usual courage and his repeated resolutions; and he no sooner recollected himself, but he repented in a flood of tears. All these circumstances shew, that there was a great deal more of *infirmity* than of *wilfulness* in it; and we may add, that there seems to have been a more than ordinary desertion brought upon him, in that instance, to check the over great confidence he had reposed in himself, and to teach him humility and caution for the future.

Much might be usefully said about *sins of infirmity*, to distinguish them from *sins of presumption*, and to prevent people's deceiving themselves with the plea of *infirmity*, where they have really no right or title to it. But the subject is copious, and would lead me too far. It may be sufficient just to have hinted what the name imports; and I pass on to the third kind of sins, sins of a scarlet dye,

3. Sins of *presumption*; such as have more of *wilfulness* and malice prepense, than of *ignorance* or *infirmity* in them; when a man sins with a high hand, against the dictates of reason, and the checks of conscience; not merely through *ignorance* or

[b] Luke xii. 48.

human frailty, but *wilfully*, through the stubbornness and perverseness of a depraved, distorted will. It will be easy to distinguish this malignant kind from either of the former. All premeditated offences, though the matter of them should appear slight, come under the name and notion of *presumptuous* sins: for wilful disobedience to a plain command, though in a small matter, is no small thing. This we see in the case of our first parents: the tasting of the forbidden fruit was seemingly a slight matter; but yet, because the command was express, and the disobedience *wilful* and *presumptuous*, God resented the contempt, and punished it with a very remarkable and memorable severity.

Among *presumptuous* sins we must reckon all those which are of a high and scandalous nature; such as *murder*, *adultery*, *perjury*, *sacrilege*, *fornication*, *robbery*, *extortion*, *oppression*, *blasphemy*, and the like; because those sins are in their own nature vile and mischievous, and known to be so; that a man cannot be supposed to fall into them through mere *ignorance* or *infirmity*, but through the wilfulness and stubbornness of a depraved will.

As to neglects or omissions of duty, many of these also are reducible to the class of *presumptuous* sins; such as customary neglect of known and plain duties; absenting from public worship, on the Sunday especially, without necessity; living in constant contempt or neglect of the holy Communion; refusing the common offices of humanity and Christian charity, when we see proper occasions for the exercise of them; neglecting to feed the hungry, or to clothe the naked, or to commiserate and assist the afflicted, in proportion to our abilities and circumstances. Those acts of mercy are so much the badges of our Christian profession, and are so strongly insisted upon as matters of indispensable duty, quite through both Testaments, that we can neither plead *ignorance* nor *infirmity* for our non-performance. Omissions of this kind are *wilful*, *presumptuous*, *damning*: so our blessed Lord himself intimates, where he tells us, that the articles of inquiry at the day of judgment will run chiefly on those heads; and men shall be either acquitted or condemned accordingly. So much in the general about the nature, quality, and kinds of *presumptuous* sins. I proceed now,

II.

To be more particular in setting forth the *malignancy* and

danger of them, and the concern we ought to have to stand clear of them.

You may observe of holy David in the Psalm before us, how he prays, that God would pardon his smaller sins, and *cleanse* him, by remitting, or not imputing them. But as to those greater *presumptuous* sins, he begs to be wholly kept back from them, to be undefiled with them. He speaks of them also as amounting to "great transgression," and which alone could debar him of the satisfaction of having an *upright* heart and a good conscience. His errors and infirmities, he believed, a merciful God would pass by and overlook, upon his general confession and repentance: but the *presumptuous* sins he was greatly afraid of, being such as might make a most fatal breach between God and him, hard to be made up again and reconciled. Nor were his fears, in this case, at all unreasonable or groundless, if we consider the malignant qualities and mischievous effects of *presumptuous* sinning.

1. For, first, *presumptuous* sins spring from the corruption of the heart, from some evil lust or affection, some predominancy of pride, avarice, or voluptuousness. Men will not run upon sins of that kind, to provoke Almighty God wilfully and daringly, till the world has taken hold of them, and estranged their hearts (in a great measure) from him. It is hanging out the flag of defiance, and entering into a kind of open war or rebellion against Heaven. While a man has ignorance or surprise to plead in excuse for himself, his heart may be still right with God: but when he *wilfully* and *presumptuously* offends, it is very plain that his heart is then alienated, and that he has struck up an alliance with the world in opposition to God.

2. We may consider further, that after sinning in this manner, and to this degree, it is very hard to repent. We see this in common friendships one with another. While a man knows that he intended no ill to a friend, but has unwarily done him a prejudice, loving and respecting him all the time; he easily returns, and with an open countenance makes his apology, and asks pardon: but if he has acted against his friend with malice prepense, and has designedly affronted or injured him; he grows sullen and shy, and perhaps shuns the acquaintance ever after. There is something of the like affection left upon the mind of a *presumptuous* sinner with respect to God. He from that instant contracts a strange aversion to him; he is afraid to approach

him, conscious to himself, that he has been acting treacherously; nay, and perhaps strongly inclined, if not resolved, even to do so again; at least not fully resolved against it: he has therefore little or no heart to pray to God, or to ask pardon, except it be in a slight superficial manner, as words of course. By degrees, the breach grows wider between God and him; and he stands off more and more, till at length he renounces, in a manner, all further acquaintance with his Maker. This is often the result of giving way, at first, to *presumptuous* sins. But,

3. Supposing, thirdly, that a man relents soon after, and is disposed to repent heartily and turn to God; yet it will be difficult for him so to heal the breach which those sins have made, as to come with delight and humble confidence to his God, as before. The remembrance of his sins of unfaithfulness will, for some time, bring a cloud over his mind; and he will, of course, be full of fear, doubtfulness, and anxiety; hardly knowing how to trust himself for the future, hardly daring to look up with cheerfulness to God.

I do not know a more affecting or more melancholy example of what I am mentioning, than David himself. From the time he fell into presumptuous sins, in the matter of Uriah, (though he was penitent for it, and a pardon was granted him by the hand of a prophet,) yet how sorrowful and troubled was his afflicted mind all his life after! He never recovered his wonted courage and vivacity; he hung down his head, and went mourning all the day long; his spirit was bowed down with grief, and he was scarce able to bear up under the afflicting hand of God. He seems not to have been the same man as formerly, nor to have kept up either the figure or the character in life which he had before done. What with the afflictions God sent him in his family and his kingdom, and what with his remorse for his transgressions, he appears to have been, as it were, unmanned, and sunk in his spirits for the rest of his life, and to have behaved and acted below his character. *Repentance* is the best thing we can retreat to, and is indeed the only *plank* left whereon to escape, in such a case: but in the mean while, how much better is *innocence* than the most holy and solemn *repentance!*

It may indeed be said, that David's sin in that instance was very great for the *matter* of it, as well as its being presumptuous. Very true: but *every presumptuous* sin, in proportion, brings its

train of mischiefs with it. We see it in its best light, when we take a view of it in a person who was sincerely penitent. The most melancholy consideration of all is, that *presumptuous sins* generally harden the conscience, and carry the man off from bad to worse, till they sink him down to a state of stupidity here, and to perdition hereafter. From all which it is manifest, how highly it concerns every man to be extremely cautious how he ventures upon sins of this kind, and to use all possible endeavours to stand clear of *wilful* and *deliberate*, that is, *presumptuous* sins. It remains now thirdly,

III.

To offer some proper advice and directions how to avoid them.

1. The first care, most certainly is, to be instant in *prayers* to Almighty God, to preserve us, by his preventing grace, from falling into them. There is no firm security but in God's mercy, so disposing the affairs of life, and all outward occurrences, as not to expose us to temptations beyond our strength. There lies our principal security, to throw ourselves into his arms, and to commit ourselves entirely to his protection. This, as I said, is to be done by our constant and fervent *prayers*. God expects to be asked and entreated by us, and has made it the condition and instrumental means of conveying his grace and blessing to us. But besides this, *prayer* has naturally a good effect upon the mind of the supplicant: it preserves a constant awe and reverence for God; and is keeping up a kind of acquaintance and intercourse with heaven. It carries in it a repugnancy and opposition to all *wilful* sins, and has the force of a standing declaration or remonstrance against them. With what heart, with what face, can a man carry on a daily correspondence and converse with God in prayer, and at the same time be in confederacy with Satan, presumptuously rebelling against the God he prays to? One would conclude, that, either continuing to pray would make a man afraid and ashamed to sin in that high manner; or else, that his so sinning must make him leave off his prayers: for those two things seem to stand at the greatest distance possible, and are scarce consistent with each other. But, secondly,

2. After *prayers* to God to assist us, we must next use our best *endeavours* to help ourselves; exerting to the utmost those powers and faculties which God hath given us, for his glory, and for our own happiness. We should consider seriously, of all the

most proper and likely *means* to be made use of, in order to prevent our falling into *presumptuous* sins.

The first and principal is, to look well to our *hearts*, that they be set *right*, and "kept with all diligence." We may observe, that sinning *presumptuously* is, as it were, revolting from God, and running off into another interest. Our hearts are not *whole* with God when we do it. We have let our affections go astray from him, placing them somewhere else; upon the alluring objects of worldly riches, honour, or pleasure. This is undoubtedly the case, as often as men run into *presumptuous* sins. Wherefore the true and most effectual way to prevent our doing so is to look well to our hearts, and to keep them fixed where they ought to be, upon God alone: "Set your affections on "things above, and not on things on the earth." This is striking at the root of all *presumptuous* sins, is stifling them in their birth. We shall not wilfully sin against God, till we have learned to love the world more than we love him; till we have suffered Satan and his emissaries to steal our affections from God, and to transfer them to other objects. Take we care then, in the first place, to govern our affections, and to point them to their true object.

And in order to do this the more effectually, our next care should be to be often *reflecting* upon the infinite *value of heavenly things* above all *earthly enjoyments:* how far eternity is preferable to time, and God to the world: how slight, empty, and transient all secular things are; not worthy to be compared with the joys that shall be hereafter. These and other the like considerations, often repeated and treasured up in our minds, will be of use to fix our affections upon things above, and so to prevent our falling into *presumptuous* sins.

Our further care should be to keep out of temptations as much as possible; that so we may carry the same good thoughts the more constantly about us, and not let them slip. The misfortune of man is, that, though he has resolved ever so well, and has armed himself with many excellent meditations; yet new occasions and unexpected occurrences may suggest new thoughts, and give quite another turn to the mind. The safest way therefore is to avoid, as much as we can, all such occasions: and, as we pray not to be led into temptation, so let us take care not to run into it of our own accord.

The last thing I shall mention is, to be watchful and cautious,

in our whole conduct, and especially to beware of the beginnings of things. It is the policy of Satan to draw men on by degrees, to entice them first into something of doubtful appearance, something that borders upon sin, and yet strictly is not sin, or has an innocent look however; and so to proceed step by step to what at length is undoubtedly sinful and dangerous. The way to avoid this snare is, to be wary and circumspect; not to venture to the utmost limits of what is lawful; but to keep at a due distance, and to observe our compass; to deny ourselves some innocent liberties, for fear of their betraying us further; and not to trust ourselves where we suspect the combat may be unequal, or our strength fail us.

By these and other the like prudent precautions, God's grace preventing and assisting us, we may preserve ourselves from *presumptuous* sins, may be undefiled and "innocent from the "great transgression."

SERMON XII.

The Misery, Causes, and Remedies of a *dejected Mind.*

PROVERBS xviii. 14.

The spirit of a man will sustain his infirmity; but a wounded spirit who can bear?

THIS passage of scripture may be rendered otherwise with a slight variation in the latter part of the sentence, thus: *The spirit of a man* (of a brave man) *will sustain his infirmity; but a wounded* (dejected) *spirit, who shall raise it up?*

The words, as I conceive, carry in them an important lesson of instruction, though it is rather *obliquely* insinuated than *directly* expressed. Here is a caution given, or intimated rather, against yielding too far to any misfortunes or troubles; against letting our spirits sink or our courage fail us in our day of calamity. It is of infinite advantage, under all emergencies, to keep up strength of mind, and to bear up against disasters or difficulties, with a firm and undaunted heart. For a vigorous mind, a manly spirit, will support us under bodily infirmities within, or cross accidents without: but if the spirit itself be broken and cast down, if the mind becomes feeble, and sinks under the weight, what can be then thought on to raise it up? When the buttresses themselves give way, and the main underprops fail, what can then be expected but sudden and irrevocable ruin? The turn and the manner of the expression in the text is

very like to what our Lord makes use of in a different subject; where he says, "If the salt hath lost its savour, wherewith shall "it be salted[a]?" If that which should season other things does itself want seasoning, what can then be done to it? And so in the instance of the text, if that which should support the weaker parts does *itself* want supporting, what remedy can then be hoped for? The case is then melancholy indeed, and beyond all recovery. Great care therefore should be taken in time, to prevent, if possible, so sad a crisis, and that no calamities whatever be permitted to reduce us to this so disconsolate extremity. Such I take to be the general drift and purport of the text now before us. The subject therefore of my discourse must be *a troubled and dejected mind.*

I. The *misery of* it.

II. The *causes* which lead to it.

III. The proper *remedies* or *preservatives* against it.

The subject is undoubtedly very useful, and may well deserve our attentive thoughts and serious application.

I.

I shall begin with some brief strictures upon the *miserable case* of a *dejected, broken mind.*—"A wounded spirit who can bear?" as *our* translation renders it; or, *who can raise it up?* as the *other*. Both renderings are grammatical, and we may very well take in both senses, as they are both of them true and pertinent: for the *misery* of a *broken spirit* is, that it is *intolerable* to bear, and is *without support*, or *remedy*.

The words of the text have been vulgarly understood of a wounded *conscience*, tending to *despair:* but I see no reason for confining the text to that case only. The words are spoken of a *wounded spirit* in the general, wounded by grief, and sinking under its load of troubles; but not expressing either the *particular* kind of troubles or the *special* causes they spring from. I shall enumerate the several causes which may be supposed in such cases under my *next* head of discourse. But at present all I have to take notice of is, the sad and disconsolate condition of a dejected, broken mind, be the cause of it what it will.

But, in order to have a right understanding of this case, let us consider, in the first place, what a dejected mind, or a wounded spirit, means.

[a] Matt. v. 13. Mark ix. 50. Luke xiv. 34.

We may observe, that all manner of *trouble* and *misery*, as felt by the patient, is resolvable into *pain of body* or *pain of mind;* into some *uneasy sensations*, which we commonly call *pain*, or *uneasy thoughts* and reflections, which we commonly call *anguish*. Strictly speaking, all *pains* that we feel are in the *mind*, or in the soul. The *body* is but the *organ* or instrument which transmits the pain to the soul. The *soul* only *feels*, in and through the *body:* so that every uneasy sensation of the *body*, as we call it, is properly the *soul's*. And besides *uneasy sensations*, the mind, over and above, hath many *uneasy reflections*, which *increase the pain*, and more than double the misery.

These things being premised, we may the more clearly perceive of what advantage it is in all kinds of uneasinesses, to have a mind well fortified and steeled against them. The mind, by fencing against the mischief, keeps it out in a great measure, and does not let in one half of the anguish: while the spirit bears up against it with manly courage, it wards off the blow, or breaks the force of the impression. And if you would know more particularly *how* it does it, you may please to consider, that no pain whatever is so much as felt, any longer than while it is *attended to*, or *reflected upon:* but there is that force in the mind, when firm and well resolved, that it can turn the thoughts off from dwelling upon the present or threatening pain, and can employ itself with brave and comfortable reflections. This is what the text means in saying, that "the spirit of a man will "sustain its infirmity." It will bear up against danger or trouble, will be so flushed with a sense of honour, and other generous views, and with high and noble expectations, that the sense of pain shall scarce be felt at all, or shall be slight in comparison. Those other joyous reflections will counterbalance it, or will so fill the mind, as scarce to leave room for the reception of any thing else. This is what we call *strength of mind*, and sometimes *fortitude:* and it is of admirable use to repel uneasiness and pain, and to prevent its making any deep or durable impressions. Something indeed will be felt by us after we have done all we can: for there is no being perfectly insensible to smart, or unconcerned at misfortunes. But the smart being less attended to, in such a case, receives no increase by any galling reflections; yea, it is much abated and deadened by joyous thoughts and high expectations. Thus "the spirit of a man," while firm and erect, "sustains its infirmity," and becomes a

kind of armour of proof against either *inward* pains or *outward* disasters.

But if once the spirit itself begins to yield and give way; if the mind, by continual troubles, or long struggling, at length faints and sinks under them; then comes the case which the text speaks of, the case of a "wounded spirit," a dejected, broken mind. The misery of it is manifest, in some measure, from what hath been already said. It is like giving up the fort or citadel, upon which the enemy enters, and makes terrible havock and devastation. While the mind retained its force and strength, the adversary was kept at some distance, and not suffered to do much harm: but as soon as ever the mind loses its courage, and lays down its arms, the adversary rushes in, and makes fearful ravages. To speak out of metaphor; when the spirit thus sinks, and bears up no longer, then every calamity puts on the blacker face, and every pain and uneasiness stings to the quick, and is much increased by galling reflections. The mind is haunted with dark images, with melancholy scenes of horror and distress. The man sits down and indulges his sorrow, hugs his grief, abandons himself to impatience, bitter wailing, and despair, refusing to be comforted, or so much as to hear of the name. This may serve for an imperfect description of "a wounded spirit," and of the misery attending it. But as the mind may be more or less wounded, with almost infinite variety of degree; so the calamity of the case is *more* or *less* grievous, and of consequence *more* or *less* removed from possibility of recovery.

Having described the case as briefly as I well could, I now proceed, as I proposed, to my second general head:

II.

To point out the principal *causes* which lead to this *melancholy extremity*. The occasional and immediate causes of this malady are either from *without* or from *within;* either from *outward* afflictions, or *inward* disorder of body, or trouble of conscience. I shall consider them severally and distinctly.

1. The *outward calamities* of life are many and various. The most afflicting, generally, are not those which bring the greatest smart or the acutest pain with them; but those rather which bear hardest upon the *soft* and *tender passions*.

One shall scarce know a man overtaken with *melancholy* on account of what he suffers by the *gout*, or *stone*, or by an *ulcer*,

or the cutting off limbs, or other *bodily pains:* and yet for the loss of *sons* and *daughters*, or other *dear friends* and *relations*, one may find several overwhelmed with grief unconsollable. The reason, I suppose, is, the exceeding great delicacy and tenderness of those *soft passions*, by which we are carried to love those whom we have chiefly set our hearts upon: crosses and disappointments in things of that *tender* nature are very *affecting*, and often overset the mind.

Loss of honour, estate, subsistence, is likewise very afflicting to some persons; to those especially who have long supported their credit, and have made a handsome figure in the world, having at the same time fair and promising hopes that they should ever do so. When such persons unexpectedly fall to decay, the calamity sits hard upon them; and the more *honest* and *ingenuous* they have all along been, so much the *sorer* is the affliction; because they have a *quick sense* of shame, and are most tenderly affected with the thought, that they can no longer look up, and appear like their neighbours.

As to men of profligate lives, I do not perceive that they are half so much affected, though they come to be stripped of all. They are more hardened in their tempers, and are not very sensible of shame; besides that they might have expected it beforehand, having really deserved it: and so it is no wonder if sometimes a condemned felon is not much afflicted with his confinement in a dungeon; or if he goes with less concern in his looks even to execution, than many an honest man discovers upon some family losses, or upon the decay of his credit in the world.

These *smaller calamities* to an *ingenuous mind* are *more affecting* than the *greatest* can be to *hard*, *stupid*, and *incorrigible* wretches: and the reason, as I before hinted, is, because the *passions* of those are *more tender*, and the mind more susceptible of impression. Hence arises sometimes deep melancholy in such persons. Their minds become dejected and sunk, their spirit wounded and broken with losses, crosses, and disappointments. The like sometimes happens when men have set out into the world with fair hopes and expectations, have been flattered with golden promises, and been long dependant upon persons in power, and at last defeated and sent away empty. The regret and indignation which such treatment is apt to raise may be enough to overpower the succours of the mind, and to break

their spirit beyond recovery. These instances may suffice for illustration of the first particular, the head of *outward calamities.*

2. A second cause of breaking a man's spirits I must not omit to mention, (though I question whether it be very common,) which is, the sense of some grievous sins lying hard upon the conscience. It is very certain, that the *greatest calamity* that can be is an *ill-spent life*; and the remembrance of it, if seriously laid to heart, may well break the spirit, and overwhelm the strongest mind. But it rarely happens that any man falls into deep melancholy on any such account. Much the greatest number of the most profligate sinners die hard and impenitent, and go out of the world without any signs of true godly sorrow or remorse at all. And if some discover a kind of relenting sorrow, yet it is so slight and superficial, and they think so well of their state, and so flatter themselves with the hopes of mercy, that there is infinitely more danger of their dying in a fond presumption, than of their dying in the depth of despair. The truth is, men are very hardly brought to have any feeling sense of a *world to come*, like to what they have of *this*; and so they are the *less* in danger of being affected with their *sins*, or the consequence of them, to a degree of melancholy or despondency. Yet some examples there have been of *religious despair*: and I suppose Judas was one; who being struck with the sense of his cursed treachery, sunk under its weight; and being wounded and sore broken in his spirit, went and hanged himself in grief and despair. There have been some few dreadful instances of like nature besides, enough to justify the reckoning a *guilty conscience* as one among the many other causes of a *wounded spirit.*

I am sensible, that there is such a thing as *religious melancholy*, and the case is not very uncommon. But I take *that* to be quite another thing from what I have been speaking of, and falling properly under quite a different head, which I now proceed to speak to, in the third place; namely,

3. Bodily indisposition, which is frequently the *sole cause* of a broken, dejected mind. By this I do not mean, that men fall into melancholy, as being troubled for the ill state of health they are under: but as the soul and the body *sympathise*, any disorder of the nerves, blood, or spirits, will naturally affect and discompose the mind; and it is in this sense that a *wounded spirit* may be sometimes owing to an ill habit of body, in like manner as *lunacy* also may, of which this may be a degree.

Religious melancholy, generally speaking, seems to be nothing else but a *disordered imagination*, owing to some *ill disposition of the blood*, or some *distemper in the nerves*, or in the *brain*, the centre of them. The *fine spirits*, which are the *instruments* the soul makes use of to *think* by, move *irregularly*, and raise odd *fantastical ideas*, like as they do in *dreams:* hence come very odd conceits, and perhaps profane and even blasphemous thoughts, in persons otherwise very piously disposed; and who at the same time abhor those thoughts, and are deeply concerned on that very account. Here seems to be nothing in all this, but a *bodily indisposition*, which is indeed a *misfortune*, but no *fault* of the person suffering under it.

There may indeed have been a fault sometimes in a person's conduct, to occasion such an ill disposition of body; as, if it hath been brought on by hard drinking, or indulging some foolish passion more than was meet: but yet the effect might arise from *other causes*, wherein the person had not been accessory to it at all. It might be the remains of a fever, or other bodily distemper, which the patient had been afflicted with; or it might have been owing to several other *natural causes*, too tedious for me to mention, and which it more concerns a *physician* to inquire into than it does a *divine*. I mention this case however for two reasons. One, for the satisfaction of *scrupulous consciences;* that if any persons find themselves so affected, they should not be *cast down* on that account, nor suspect that they are guilty of a crime in what they cannot help: and the other reason of my taking notice of the case is, that we may *pass the more charitable judgment* upon any unhappy persons who have been *afflicted in this way*. But I proceed.

Besides *religious melancholy*, there are also several other kinds which often arise from some bodily indisposition, which may be presumed to have the greatest hand in them, in such particular constitutions. For when misfortunes or disappointments, though slight and trivial, (and none are without some,) fall in with a temper or disposition inclined to melancholy, they have a much greater force upon them than they would otherwise have; and the effect produced is really owing partly to the *outward* calamity and partly to the *inward* disorder; it is the result of *both* together, *both* contributing, as it were, their *share* towards it. In such cases it is not always easy to say *which* is the *principal cause* or which the *subordinate;* for in compounded powers of that

kind, it may be difficult to compute their respective forces, or to determine exactly *which* is the *more* prevailing. But I have said enough of the *causes* which lead to dejection of mind, which break or wound the spirit of a man within him.

III.

I now pass on, thirdly, to prescribe some proper *remedies* or *preservatives* against it.

It is worth the pains, to keep up our spirits, and to maintain the vigour of our minds, in all cases, if we can. For it is a lamentable thing to be overset with trouble, or to be overwhelmed with grief and despair. It makes life miserable as life can be for the time, and then brings men down to the grave. When the mind is sunk, the spirit wounded, or, as we vulgarly say, the heart broken, life does not hold on much longer; or if it does, it is a *burden*, and a weary load, worse than death. There is no remedy for it, when the malady seizes us in any deep degree: for when the mind itself is seized, a man has no longer any command over his own thoughts; there is no room left for advice or instruction; no handle for reason and counsel to take hold of. This makes me speak rather of *preservatives* than *remedies*; supposing the text to mean by a *wounded spirit*, a spirit *quite broken*: but if it may be understood of the *approaches* only, or the intermediate degrees, short of *extremities*; there may then be some *remedies*, the same which I also call *preservatives*, and am now going to lay down. It must be owned, that natural courage, inborn strength of mind, is one of the best *preservatives*, or strongest securities against it: but as *that* is a blessing of *nature*, and I am only to speak of what may be *acquired*, I shall pass that over as foreign to this head. My business will be to lay down rules either for *preserving* that *natural* courage where it is, or for *acquiring* an *artificial* courage, (if I may so call it,) which may answer or more than answer the other.

1. And here undoubtedly the first and principal rule must be, to trust in God, and to live a life conformable to the doctrine of Christ. There is no prescription so infallible, no cordial so comfortable, as this now mentioned: "Come unto me," says our blessed Lord, "all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I "will give you rest[b]." There is nothing so fortifies the mind, or

[b] Matt. xi. 28.

so invigorates the spirit, as faith and trust in God, joined with a good life; that we may be able to say with St. Paul, "Herein do "we exercise ourselves, to have always a conscience void of "offence towards God and towards man." This consideration taken together with the comfortable hope and expectation of joys eternal in a life to come; I say, these two, taken together, are sufficient to warm the coldest heart, and to give courage and bravery to every drooping spirit. The strength of these principles has been tried and proved; and it appeared most to advantage in the early ages of the Church, when persons of the most tender age or timorous sex would run to a stake or to a rack, without discovering the least uneasiness in look or gesture; and never fainted in heart, nor became broken in spirit, for any trouble or terror that wit and malice combined could expose them to. Now, if a principle of religion was thus effectual in the very hardest circumstances which human life could fall under, why might not the same principle be of like force in the ordinary and common casualties incident to mortality? If therefore you are desirous to keep up your spirits, and never to sink under a misfortune; fortify your minds by *faith*, and by a serious and constant endeavour to *please God*. This will inspire courage when nothing else will, or when the world itself fails: it will do it at all times, and under all circumstances, even upon the bed of sickness, or at the hour of death; provided only, that you have then your thoughts awake, and that the bodily indisposition does not disorder the freedom of the soul.

2. Next to a thorough sense of religion, I shall mention a second *preservative*, nearly allied to it, and rather a branch or part of it, than distinct from it; which is, to sit as loose as possible to this world; to wean and disentangle our affections from temporal things: for since it is impossible not to meet with infinite crosses and disappointments here, if we set our hearts on this world; the surest way is, not to expect or desire any great happiness here, but to become more and more indifferent to all worldly enjoyments. If we can be content with a moderate share of temporal prosperity, we shall be the less concerned at disappointments, and, of consequence, the better prepared to meet afflictions, and to bear up under them. These two first rules which I have mentioned both meet together in one rule of St. Paul's, "Set your affections on things above, not on things on

"the earth[c]." As to other inferior rules for preserving cheerfulness and vivacity of spirit, such as agreeable company, good books, employment in an honest calling, innocent diversions, and the like; as they are none of them comparable to what I have before named, it may be sufficient barely to have hinted them. I have not mentioned the *drinking* away cares, as some call it, among the *proper* expedients; because indeed it is highly *improper*, and tends to enfeeble both the body and the mind, by vitiating the blood, wasting the spirits, and disordering the nerves: not to mention that it is expensive and vain, and is an offence against God; and so, in all views, is more likely to wound and break the spirit, than to fortify or strengthen it. Seek not therefore to any of those vain and deceitful expedients, which will by no means answer: but rely upon the true and solid ones before intimated; such as *faith*, a *good life*, and a *good conscience* consequent thereupon, together with fixed and constant *meditations* upon the joys of a life to come: if ye do these things, ye can never fail.

[c] Coloss. iii. 2.

SERMON XIII.

The true Nature of Charity; its Value, Measures, and Proportions stated, from the Gospel Account of the *poor Widow's Offering.*

A Charity Sermon.

MARK xii. 43, 44.

And he called unto him his disciples, and saith unto them, Verily I say unto you, That this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which have cast into the treasury:
For all they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want did cast in all that she had, even all her living.

THE story of the poor widow, who threw in her two mites as an offering to God's temple, and was applauded for it by our blessed Lord, is related by two of the Evangelists, St. Mark and St. Luke; and it is a thing so well known, that the *widow's mite* is noted even to a proverb. It was at the time of the *Passover*, the fourth and *last* Passover our Lord was at, that he was present at the temple, in one of its courts, called *the court of the people*, and in that apartment of it which belonged to the women, and for that reason called *the court of the women*. Here it was that the chest, or the almsbox, stood; and hither the people brought their offerings, either for the use of the temple, or for the relief of the poor; and here it was that the poor widow made her humble offering of two mites, to the value of a farthing, while richer persons gave very considerable sums. "Many that were

"rich cast in much," but it was out "of their abundance," and what they could very well spare: while she threw in a very small gratuity, but it was what she even wanted to subsist upon; for it was "all that she had, even all her living." Our blessed Lord, standing by, and well knowing her hard circumstances, (as he knew all things,) was pleased to observe thereupon, much to the honour of the poor widow, that she had really shewn herself more bountiful and generous than any of the rest: for she had given more, in proportion to her circumstances, than any one else had done: for they had contributed only what they had to *spare*, and but a *part* even of *that*: whereas she had generously quitted what she could not so well spare, wanting it for herself; and not a part only of that, but *all*; not a *single* mite, which was half her substance, but *both*; which was *all* she had.

By this account of the poor widow, we may reasonably judge, that she was one who lived by her labour, or by the kind assistance of friends. She had no estate, no certain fund to subsist upon, no money beforehand above the value of a single farthing; which was barely sufficient for one day's sustenance; and *that* she gave away in *charity*. This so memorable act of hers, and which our Lord himself has been pleased to set so high a value upon, will deserve our close inspection and most attentive consideration. It will be of excellent use, for shewing wherein the true *nature* and *value* of charity consists; as also for pointing out to us the proper rules whereby to fix its *measures* and settle *its* proportions. My design then is,

I. To make some *general observations* upon the instance now before us, for the clearer understanding the *duty of charity*, or *almsgiving*. And,

II. To *apply* those *general rules* or remarks to the *particular purposes* of the present occasion.

I.

First, I propose to make some *general observations* upon the instance now before us, for the clearer understanding of the *duty of charity*, or *almsgiving*.

I have before hinted, that it may be in some measure doubtful whether the *widow's* quota was given for the service of the temple or for the relief of the poor; but whichsoever it was, the difference is not material. It was a *religious offering* to God, as is plainly intimated by St. Luke, chap. xxi. ver. 4. And whether it was intended for the use of the temple of Jerusalem,

(which was God's house,) or for the use of the poor, who, in another sense, are God's temple likewise, it comes to the same thing. But this I observe by the way only, and proceed now to what I intend.

1. One of the first and most obvious remarks upon the case now in hand is, that the *real value* of any *charitable gift* is to be estimated, not by the *quantity* or the *price* of the thing given, but by the *affection of the mind* and generosity of heart that is seen in it. The *widow's* mites added but *little* to the treasury, and were but of *small* account in the poor's box: but notwithstanding that, they were of *great esteem* in *God's sight*, and *more acceptable* to him than the *largest* and *richest presents*. He saw under what circumstances the poor *widow* was, what difficulties she was pressed with, how hard she laboured, and with what *warmth* of *zeal*, *ardency* of *affection*, and *strength* of *faith*, she had made her offering. These were the things which recommended it to God's acceptance; and made it more valuable in his eyes than much larger contributions, where there was not the *same temper* of *mind:* and this indeed was most highly just and equitable; for we may observe,

2. Secondly, that there may be more of *real charity* and *true generosity* in a *poor* man's offering a *mite*, than in a *rich* man's contributing a *talent;* and that upon several accounts. A rich man gives, in such a case, *no more* than he can spare, nor indeed quite so much: the poor man gives *more* than he can well spare, or (like the widow) leaves himself nothing. One spends out of his *superfluities*, the other parts with his *necessaries*. It is very easy to observe, that there is much more of hard struggle, much more of self-denial, and consequently much more of true charity and generosity, in *one* case than in the *other*.

3. From hence then, thirdly, I remark, that the generosity or liberality of any person, in his charitable contributions, is to be measured chiefly by the *proportion* it bears to his *circumstances*, justly considered. He who gives most in *proportion*, and not he who gives *absolutely* the most, is the most charitable and generous man. And the principal thing to be considered in such cases is, what every man has to spare, upon a fair computation, and a just balancing of his accounts: after comparing his present incomes with his present necessary expenses, his future provisions likewise with his future occasions; then what is the

overplus, to expend in charities? This, I say, is the material question; what can a man conveniently spare? He that gives *more* than he can spare, in some cases, is not *prudent*, or perhaps not *just* to his creditors: though if he does it in such a way as to pinch himself only, abridging *himself* in some measure to relieve *others*, it may be an excellent instance of generosity and charity: as seems indeed to have been the case of the poor *widow* in the text. She parted with all she had, and *that all* was no more than the value of one day's sustenance. Perhaps she had just so much beforehand, and no more; or she denied herself for one day, and trusted to God's providence and to the labour of her hands for the morrow. This she could do, and it was the utmost she could do; and the most generous person living could not have done more. She had a *willing mind*, which carried her through, and made her strive to her power, yea, and beyond her power; that is, beyond what she could well spare: and though the gift was *small*, the generosity of it was *great*; and as such it was accepted according to what she had, and not according to what she had not.

4. From hence I must observe, fourthly, and particular notice should be taken of it, that even the *poor* and low are not totally *excused* from the duty of *almsgiving*: for if God accepted the *widow's* mite, who is there so poor from whom he will not accept it? And if he accepts of such small offerings, nay, and applauds them too as the most valuable charities; no doubt but he expects them also, yea, and strictly requires them.

We are used indeed to address ourselves chiefly to the *rich* when we are raising contributions, because they are the men most able to assist in such cases: and I know not whether many of the *inferior sort* may not have taken up a false notion, that *they* have no concern in, nothing to do with things of that kind: and perhaps the *negligence of collectors*, or even the *silence of preachers*, may have contributed too much towards the leading them into that persuasion. But a *mistake it is*, and a *dangerous* one too. *Rich* and *poor* are all *equally* concerned in the duty, but in *proportion to their circumstances*: and he that has *little* is as strictly bound to give something, however small, out of that *little*, as he that has *more* is obliged to give *more*. It is excellently well said in the book of Tobit: "If thou hast abundance, "give alms accordingly: if thou have but little, be not afraid to

"give according to that little: for thou layest up a good trea-
"sure for thyself against the day of necessity[a]." The reason and foundation of the whole thing lies here: the principal end and design of almsgiving looks not so much at the relief of the indigent, (whom God could have provided for a thousand other ways,) as at the training men up to mutual love, charity, and friendliness, to qualify them for heaven. It is upon this account chiefly, that God has appointed and ordered the distinctions of rich and poor; and has so contrived, that we have the poor always with us, and when we will we may do them good. And as the *rich* are obliged to relieve the *poor*, so even the *poor* also, in proportion to their circumstances, are bound to help *one another*. It is not only their *duty*, but their *privilege;* and if they understand it rightly, they will look upon it *as such*. What an advantage and an honour was it to the poor *widow*, that she, by bringing her *mite* only into the treasury, could therein exercise a nobler charity than the greatest of all there had done; and should at length gain the prize of liberality from them all, God himself being judge of it.

Let no man therefore think himself *too poor* to be *charitable*, upon pressing exigencies or upon some solemn occasions. Why should not the poor, as well as rich, have the privilege of doing what they can do, to inure their minds to the practice of virtue, and to fit themselves for heaven? Have they but little to give? *Charity* does not consist in *much* or in *little*, but in doing the *best* we can, and doing it with a *willing mind*. The single instance of the poor *widow* is enough to shew, that even a *beggar*, in proportion, may be as *generous* as a *prince;* and that sometimes the *smallest present* imaginable may be the *greatest bounty:* and if, by the smallness of it, it proves but of little service to the *receiver*, whoever he be; yet it will be of inestimable use and benefit to the *giver*, which is most to be considered in all acts of charity. And if, while the rich and affluent contribute somewhat out of their superfluities, a *day-labourer*, suppose, contributes a *day's work*, or the value of an *ordinary meal*, denying himself for it in the mean while; such a *charity* as this will *weigh more* than *large sums* from *others*, and will be "in the sight of God of great "price."

5. But having sufficiently considered the case of the *inferior*

[a] Tobit iv. 8, 9.

sort, I come now, in the fifth place, to observe what concerns the rich and wealthy.

The use which they are to make of the instance of the text is, to be charitable and generous according to their circumstances; and in so much *greater proportion* than others, as they are *more able* to do it.

It may be asked then, how shall they, if inclined to it, contrive to come up to the generosity of the poor *widow* in the text? What! must they strip themselves of all they have, and reserve nothing to subsist on, as she did! No, by no means. Different circumstances require different management; and there is a way of coming up to the poor *widow's* attainments, without doing exactly as she did. If a rich man were to give away his whole estate, and reduce himself to poverty, or to hard labour; this would not only be doing *as much*, but a *great deal more* than the poor widow did: for she did not make any such great change in her circumstances, nor did she sink her state or condition at all lower than before. Her example therefore, or our Lord's applauding it, is of no force as to obliging any one to throw himself out of that rank, station, or condition of life wherein God has placed him. If he has been born to an estate, or by honest industry has acquired one, let him live and enjoy it. But further: neither does the instance of the text oblige a man, when in a thriving way, to dispose of all the overplus, all the clear gains, at the year's end; for how then could he go on to support that rank and station he is in, and to provide for his family? The poor *widow* might, by what she did, straiten herself for a day or two, and after that be in as good a condition as she was before: but were any trading or thriving men to give away all their increase, they would soon find their affairs running backwards, and would not be able to recover them. Well then, how must we state the case with a rich man, to make it answer to this in the text? The *rule* of *proportion*, I conceive, is *this*; that the *richer sort*, in order to *give the more* away in charity, should be content to practise some degree of *self-denial*, in like manner as the poor *widow* did. Let them retrench unnecessary expenses at least, abridge their pleasures, shorten their diversions, cut off as much as possible from the pomp and pride of life, to spend upon the poor. Besides this, let them not be over solicitous as to futurities, providing handsomely (as they will call it) for their children, or raising their families. The poor widow trusted God

for her own necessary subsistence, rather than make no offering at all to the treasury. And thus much at least may be expected of every man; that he contribute according to his *present circumstances;* and that no anxiety, either for himself or his children after him, ever hinder him from doing in proportion to what he at present enjoys. Be content with a moderate provision, rather than grow covetous, and defraud the poor: for, after all, God's providence is the best security, and his friendship the richest treasure we can have.

As to the *proportion* to be observed in charitable contributions, no one *certain* rule has been or can be set, which shall indifferently suit with *all* circumstances. Should we say a tenth, or a twentieth, or a thirtieth part of every one's increase, *that* might be too much for *some* persons to give, and too little for *others,* as their circumstances might *widely* differ. The *proportion* therefore, or quota, must be left to every man's *private judgment* and *conscience,* upon a careful consideration of his ordinary expenses and incomes, and the occasions he may have to provide for. One thing is certain, that God demands of us *some part* of our substance, in *proportion* to what he has blessed us with; and he expects that it should be paid to the poor on his account; not sparingly nor grudgingly, but liberally and generously; for he loveth a cheerful giver. The two great obstacles to acts of charity are the two extremes of *prodigality* on one hand and *covetousness* on the other. The prodigal who wastes his substance has nothing left to lay out in charity; and the miser who sets his heart upon wealth, or is greedy of gain, has no inclination to acts of beneficence. Both are in extremes, and both are very much to blame. The middle way is the best; so to be *frugal,* as not to be *covetous;* and so to be *generous,* as not to be *lavish.* Frugal we must be, if we mean to be charitable: for if we know not how to save money, where we decently and properly may, we shall have little to spare either for charity or any thing else. The growing folly of these times is luxury and extravagance; many affecting to live above their circumstances, and to vie with their superiors. This is not the way to do good with what we have, or to be instrumental in relieving and supporting the poor. Know the *value* of money, without valuing it *too much:* and learn first how to *save,* if you would have wherewith to *spend.* But I have said enough of the general rules and measures to be observed in the duty. I proceed now briefly,

II.

To apply the whole to the present occasion. The objects now before us are the charity-children. No question at all can be made as to the usefulness of this charity, or of our obligations to support and encourage it as far as lies in our power. There are all the reasons to be pleaded for it, as for any other poor; and besides those, there are many other very considerable arguments to be urged, which are peculiar to *this*, beyond *other* charities. I shall not enter into a detail of them: they have been often repeated, and are abundantly known and understood. All I need do is, to endeavour to stir you up to bear a part in this excellent charity, from such considerations as the instance of the text may naturally suggest to us.

From this instance of the poor *widow*, high and low, rich and poor, in proportion to their circumstances, are concerned to bring in their charitable contributions.

1. As to the *inferior sort*, I cannot too often repeat, that it is both their *duty* and *privilege* to contribute with others: for it is not so much for the sake of the *receivers* that God demands this service of us, as for the sake of the *contributors*. It is to give *them* an opportunity of doing a thing acceptable to him, whereby to purchase to themselves an everlasting reward. The *poor man's penny* is, in this case, as valuable an offering as the *rich man's pound*; while it carries in it as much love to God, and as hearty and fervent a zeal for the blessed work which we are engaged in. Whoever rightly considers it, will be ambitious to bear a share in this "labour of love," that he may also put in his claim to the reward it brings with it. And since this does not at all depend upon our having plentiful fortunes, (for a *little* out of a *little* is as *great* a charity as the *greatest*,) he must be very unwise, who, because of his low circumstances, excuses himself from bearing a part in this duty, and thereby forfeits his claim and title to the rewards of it.

2. As to the *richer sort*, I have the less need to say any thing, because no one can make a question of *their* obligations to contribute largely and liberally. They enjoy what they have by this very tenure and upon these conditions, that they pay to Almighty God their pension and tribute out of it. And it is a favour and blessing of Almighty God towards them, that he has been pleased to appoint them his *stewards* and *almoners*, to distribute his *bounties* among the *poor* charged upon them. The

design is, to give them an opportunity of being kind, as God is kind, and of being merciful, as he is merciful. And the end and aim of that is, that being hereby improved and perfected, and becoming like unto God in good works, they may at length have the honour of being admitted into his presence, and be meet partakers of eternal glory.

And now, to draw to a conclusion, give me leave only to add, that if ever there was a time when it concerned us to be more than ordinary zealous for our schools of charity, it is now. Numbers are falling off from the faith of Christ; and meanly, as well as impiously, apostatizing from their most holy religion: and this they do, for the sake of their lusts, and, like Demas in the apostolical times, "having loved this present world." The greater care should be taken to promote the knowledge and practice of the Christian religion amongst us; and no care is so effectual, or so well answers the purpose, as the training up children in the fear of God. If we cannot altogether reform the *present* generation, provide at least that the *next* may be *better*, or may not proceed from *bad* to *worse*. There is none so likely a method of doing it, as the encouraging these charity schools, which (God be thanked) are now become *numerous*, and are spread over the three kingdoms. Let every man, according to his abilities, give a helping hand for their support. It is a slight and small thing, in comparison, only to throw in our quota of money towards it, when many both of clergy and laity (who have large hearts and generous minds) do not only lay out their substance, but their time also, and labours, and their hourly thoughts and cares upon it. May God give a blessing to their pious endeavours, and stir up others also to follow their bright examples; that so religion may yet thrive and flourish amongst us, and we may be daily improving "in every good word and "work."

SERMON XIV.

Shame and Contempt the End of Pride.

PROVERBS xvi. 18.

Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall.

THE observation is trite and common, and such as might have been made without the wisdom of Solomon. But though the thought be *obvious*, it is *important* too, and can never be too often inculcated; so that for its use and value, it was well becoming his wisdom to take notice of it, and to minute it down, as a proper caution and warning to be transmitted, upon the authority of his great name, to latest posterity. It adds some weight and dignity to the thing, that it was observed so long ago, and by the wisest of men, conducted also in what he wrote by the *Holy Spirit* of God. The proposition here asserted is of the *moral* kind, and is one of those which may be said to be *commonly*, and for the most part, true, though not *universally*. The *exceptions*, if there be any, are yet few and rare, and shake not the credit of the *general remark*. The thing is generally true, true, as we say, even to a *proverb*, that "pride goeth before "destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall." Which is the same as to say, that *pride* and *haughtiness* commonly bring men to *destruction* and *shame*; they lead to it, and they end in it. In discoursing upon this subject, it may be proper,

I. To shew what *pride* and *haughtiness* mean; that so it may be distinctly perceived what it is that we are treating upon.

II. I shall endeavour to illustrate the truth of the observation from Scripture and reason. And,

III. I shall briefly apply the whole by suitable reflections.

I.

I begin with shewing what *pride* and *haughtiness* mean. The *names* are *common*, but the *ideas* often not very *distinct;* from whence arise confusion of thought, and mistakes sometimes in judging both of ourselves and other persons. *Pride* is a word of great latitude, and ought to be set clear; as the thing meant by it should be also carefully distinguished by its several kinds. In the general, *pride* is *thinking more highly of ourselves than we ought to think.* It is a corruption of *self-love*, and is, in its root and principle, nothing else but *self-flattery.* There is a sensible pleasure in conceiving that we stand possessed of any considerable advantages, either of mind, or body, or of outward circumstances. The higher we can raise the idea of ourselves, the greater is the inward pleasure. Here lies the bait and the temptation to *pride*, that is, to a man's *thinking too highly of himself*, instead of *thinking justly* and according to truth.

And now, if any one desires to know when or wherein he may be said to *think too highly of himself*, it is either when he thinks that *any thing he has* is *his own;* or when he conceives himself to *have* what he really *has not;* or when he sets *too great a value* upon what *he has*, and challenges to himself *more respect* than is *due to him* upon that score.

If a man supposes any advantage he has to be strictly *his own*, he is therein forgetful of *God*, from whom he received it, and to whom he owes every thing. This is properly *pride towards God:* for as to *men*, they consider this but little, as being little concerned in it. They allow a man to call what he has *his own*, as a man's *estate* is *his own:* by which, however, in strictness is only meant, that it is *his own*, in *opposition* to any claims from *other men*, not in *opposition* to *God.*

The second article I mentioned was, a man's conceiving himself *to have* what he really *has not;* as when he judges himself to be *wiser*, *richer*, *greater*, *better*, than *he is.* This is *pride*, and is so clear a case, that it needs no further explaining.

The third article I mentioned was, the setting *too great a value* upon what *he has*, and upon *himself for it*, challenging to himself *more respect* than is *due to him* upon that score. This is *pride*, and very *troublesome pride* too, because now it is reduced

to *act*, appears *outwardly*, and causes great disturbances; as all disputable claims must of course do. There is one very common weakness, one species of *pride*, belonging to this head, which deserves to be here taken notice of; and that is, a man's valuing *an advantage* above *many greater*, only *because it is his*, to draw respect and honour into *such a channel*, where he is the surest to *have a share:* as if a *rich man* despises all who are *not rich*, though they may have what is *more valuable;* or if a *learned man* despises all who are *not learned*, though perhaps *wiser* than himself; or if one, learned in *one particular way*, despises all who are *inferior* to him in *that respect*, though perhaps in *other* and *greater* respects they may be much his *superiors:* this is *pride* and *vanity;* and the like may be said of any other kind of men *overvaluing* their *real advantages*, whatever they be.

Now the *advantages* which men have are reducible all to *three kinds;* advantages of *mind*, or of *body*, or of *outward circumstances*. To the *mind* belong *understanding* and *virtue*, which if a man be *proud* of, it commonly goes under the name of *conceitedness*, or *vanity*. To the *body* belong *strength* and *beauty*, which if any one be *proud* of, I do not know whether it has any other name besides the *general* name of *pride*. To *outward circumstances* belong *riches*, *honours*, *birth*, *quality*, *station*, *office*, and the like. As to *riches*, the vulgar name for that sort of pride is *pride of life:* for the rest, *haughtiness* is the proper name to express it by, the name used in my text. There are some other names or sorts of *pride*, as it appears outwardly in *conversation* or in *conduct*. *Assuming* too much to one's self, either by *words* or by *actions*, is a species of *pride*, and is called *arrogance* or *insolence*. As also a stubborn *refusing* to *pay respect* where *respect is due* goes under the same names. Affecting to appear *above* what *belongs* to one's *station*, *character*, and *circumstances*, and therein vying with our *superiors*, is *pride*, but is mostly called *ambition*, or *vanity*.

From what hath been said, it may appear, that *pride* is not *peculiar* to persons of *any rank*, but is *common* to men of *all ranks*, *orders*, and *degrees*. There is as much *pride* shewn in *denying respect* where it is *due*, as in *demanding it* where it is *not due:* and there may be as much *pride* covered under a *threadbare garment*, as under the *richest embroidery*. The *pride* and stomach of the *inferior sort* discovers itself in *stubbornness*, *captiousness*, *querulousness*, *rudeness* towards their *superiors*, and

disobedience to their *just commands.* Having now said what I think sufficient of the *nature* and *kinds* of *pride* and *haughtiness*, I proceed,

II.

To *illustrate the truth* of the *observation* of the text, that *pride* and *haughtiness* will *generally have a fall*, will *end in shame* and *contempt.* This may be shewn *two ways:* either from the *reason of the thing* itself, and its *natural tendency;* or from the *vindictive justice* of *Almighty God*, taken with what he has declared in holy Scripture.

1. First, we may argue the point from the *reason of the thing* itself, and its *natural tendency.*

Some kinds of *pride* are very *expensive*, and so lead to *beggary* and *shame* of course; as when men affect to *make a figure above their rank* and *beyond their circumstances:* the *pride* of *equipage* and *furniture*, of *dress* and *attire*, and all that *vain pomp* and *luxury* which goes under the name of *pride* of *life;* and really is so, when used by those whom it *belongs not to*, and who are not *able to maintain* it. This commonly ends, as naturally it must, in *beggary* and *ruin.* It is but a ridiculous part a man acts all the time, who affects to vie with his betters, and to move out of his *proper sphere*, assuming a foreign character: he is but despised and ridiculed for the *vanity* of it by discerning judges all along: but in conclusion, *shame* and *disgrace* come pouring in upon him in full measure, when "poverty cometh as one that "travelleth, and his want as an armed man[a]." Such is the *usual fate* of *one kind of pride*, the *pride of high living* and luxury, where the *circumstances do not answer.*

There is another consideration, which concerns *all kinds* of *pride.* It is very well known that *pride* is a very *contentious* and *disobliging* quality. Nobody *loves* or *really respects* a *proud man:* all mankind naturally *hate* and *slight* such a person. He *loses friends* every day, and *procures enemies* more and more, by his disobliging and insolent behaviour. And if ever a time comes when he may stand in need of those whom he had despised, or may lie at the mercy of others whom he had provoked, (as there are often sudden and unexpected turns of affairs,) then, *wanting friends*, and *having many enemies*, his *destruction* comes upon him like a tempest, and he is no longer able to abide the storm.

[a] Prov. vi. 11. xxiv. 34.

Another thing which makes *proud persons* most *liable to fall* is, that being *full of themselves*, and highly conceited of their *own sufficiency*, they are exceeding *confident*, and of course not so *wary* and cautious as other men. Their *pride blinds them*; their vanity runs them into error and mistakes. And yet this is not the worst of it, that they are liable to *judge amiss*, (as humbler men also, though in a less degree, are,) but when they are under any mistake, they can scarcely ever recover it. For, as they see not the thing themselves, so neither will they suffer others to undeceive them. They shut the door against *instruction*, and will not accept either of *advice* or *warning*. They are *above* being *admonished*, and *too conceited* to be advised. "In the "multitude of counsellors, there is safety," saith Solomon[b]; and he repeats it afterwards to make the deeper impression. But what *safety* can there be for a *proud man*, who generally *thinks by himself*, and *consults his own humour* and *vanity?* It will be nothing strange, if such persons, pursuing their *own folly*, and not foreseeing the danger, nor accepting of other men's eyes to discover it; I say, it will not be strange, if they run blindly upon ruin, and make haste to be undone. Thus far we may presume to judge of the case before us, from the *common course* of the world, from the *nature* and *tendency* of the thing.

2. But there is still greater force in this reasoning, if we consider, secondly, that the course of the world and all occurrences are in *God's hands*, who has particularly *declared* his *detestation of pride*, and his *resolution to punish it*.

St. James takes notice that "God resisteth the proud," while "he giveth grace" (that is, sheweth favour) "unto the humble[c]." St. Peter repeats the same[d], and both of them take the thought from Solomon[e]. We read in this chapter, from whence I take my text, that "every one that is proud in heart is an abomina-"tion to the Lord[f]." And in the chapter before, it is expressly said, that "the Lord will destroy the house of the proud[g]." Among the *six* or *seven* things, which the Lord more *especially* hates, "a proud look" is one[h]; which implies a *proud heart*. The whole tenor of the holy scripture intimates how exceeding hateful *pride* is to Almighty God. The reasons for it are

[b] Prov. xi. 14. xxiv. 6. [c] James iv. 6. [d] 1 Pet. v. 5. [e] Prov. iii. 34. [f] Prov. xvi. 5. [g] Prov. xv. 25. [h] Prov. vi. 17.

obvious. *Pride* is extremely improper, and unbecoming our *condition* and circumstances. "Pride was not made for man," (says a wise and grave writer,) "nor furious anger for them that "are born of a woman[i]." "Why is earth and ashes proud[k]?" *Pride* is not a *single vice*, but a *complicated wickedness*, big with great injustice towards God and towards man, a grievous *insult* upon both. It robs *God* of his *due honour*, and breaks in upon the *common liberties* and privileges of *mankind*, only to bring in stolen incense and ravished glories to itself. *Pride* is an *inlet to all vices;* as it is breaking off from God, and making a separate interest independent of him: and it is a bar to all goodness; inasmuch as the *first step to goodness* is *humility*. What aggravates all the rest is, that *pride* is scarce ever to be *reclaimed*. It owns no faults, it knows none: it is blind in itself, and obstructs every passage where light should enter from abroad: so that *hardness* and *impenitence* commonly go along with *pride;* and the *proud* are, of all men, the *last to be reformed:* the very "publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God "before them[l]." These things considered, we need not wonder if pride be most odious in the sight of God, and if he every where testifies his just resentment against it.

If we look into *Scripture history*, we shall find terrible *examples* of God's avenging justice upon *proud* and *haughty men:* as upon Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, and their confederates[m]; upon Sennacherib the proud Assyrian[n]; and upon prouder Haman[o]. We shall scarce read of a city destroyed, or a kingdom demolished, but *pride* is mentioned as one of the *principal sins* that brought down the heavy judgment upon them. The *pride* of Israel, and the *pride* of Judah and Jerusalem, led on their ruin. And even the Pagan kings and states, as Moab and Ammon, Tyre and Sidon, the Edomites and Philistines, the Egyptians, Assyrians, and at length the Chaldeans; when they grew *proud* and insolent, God sent his sore judgments upon them, and destroyed them utterly.

Seeing then that Almighty God has thus frequently and terribly *executed judgments* upon the *proud;* we have the greater reason to apprehend, that even in the *common course* of his providence he will likewise *testify his displeasure* against it. I

[i] Ecclus. x. 18. [k] Ecclus. x. 9. [l] Matt. xxi. 31. [m] Numb. xvi. [n] 2 Kings xix; 2 Chron. xxxii; Isai. xxxvii. [o] Esth. vii.

have before observed, that, in the *natural tendency* of things, *pride* commonly borders upon *ruin:* but if it be considered further, that all *second causes* are conducted by the *hand of God*, and that all occurrences of life are under his guidance and direction; there may be reason to believe that, in some special cases, God himself may interpose his secret providence, to baffle the stout heart, and to bring down the high looks, by a sudden destruction.

Let this suffice for *illustration of the proposition* laid down in the text.

III.

It remains now only to *apply* what hath been said by suitable reflections.

We may observe, how proper and well chosen a consideration that of the text is, for the dissuading men from *pride*, or the curing them of it: for what can be of greater force than this, that *pride* can *never reach the end it aims at*, that instead of *respect*, it shall only meet with *contempt;* instead of *honour*, *shame;* instead of *greatness*, a *downfall?* Could the *covetous man* be once convinced, that no *profit* were to be gained by *covetousness*, he would never be covetous more; or if the *ambitious* were certain, that they could not arrive to *preferments* and high places by *ambition*, they would be no more ambitious: but a *proud man* may have *demonstration* that he shall never have the *more honour* or *respect* for his *pride*, but quite the *contrary:* why then should he be *proud?* It would be a point of wisdom in a *proud man* (if ever *proud* and *wise* can go together) to *conceal his pride*, and to put on the *face of humility:* for *humility* is indeed the way to *get* what the *proud man* aims at; and the very *appearance* of it would be of some use, at least in the sight of men. Men gladly honour the person that *merits it*, and does not *demand* it: and they cheerfully pay respect where it is taken *modestly*, and not *exacted* of them as a tax or a tribute. *Seek* not praise, thirst not after glory, and you are *sure to find it.* Certainly, it must be a great mortification to a *proud man* to observe (if he observes any thing) that the *humble* man, only by *modest silence*, and *keeping his place*, easily *acquires* all that *respect*, honour, and glory, which a *proud person*, with infinite pains and sharp contentions, had been long *labouring after*, and could *never obtain.* A *proud man* considers not that *respect*, reverence, and esteem, are things never to be *snatched* from others, never to be *extorted:* they must

come freely, if they *come at all:* force is a contradiction to their nature; and they lose their very name and *essence* as soon as *exacted*. There may be *fear*, there may be *awe* and *dread*, or *servile flattery*, extorted of another; but *real respect*, esteem, or honour, never come *that way*. Humility and modesty beget reverence and real esteem; being tokens of real worth: besides that God's providence often interposes to promote the humble: "Before honour is humility," says Solomon[p]; and a greater than he has said, that "he that shall humble himself shall be "exalted[q]."

But it may be asked perhaps, what is this *humility*, so much commended in Scripture? Is it for a man to make himself *cheap* and *common?* Is it to *submit* and give way to *every one?* Is it to *stoop below one's place, station*, and *character?* No, by no means. *Humility* is no *levelling principle*, no enemy to any distinctions of age, rank, place or dignity. A man need not forget his *station* or his *character*, to shew his *humility*. A man may think *very humbly* of himself, and yet *know his place*, and act up to *his station* and dignity. St. Paul was not *proud* when he said of himself, (having a just occasion for saying it,) that he was "not "a whit behind the very chiefest Apostles[r];" nor when he insisted upon the benefit of his birth, and claimed his privilege as a Roman[s]. This was thinking *highly* of himself, but *justly* at the same time; for he was deeply sensible at the same time from whom he had received all, and therefore he humbly added, "though I be nothing[t]." A modest opinion of ourselves does not oblige us to idolize other persons, or to submit below our place or character. A man should know as well what is due to *himself*, as what is due to *others;* and if he goes no further than he *really knows*, but judges *strictly* according to *truth*, and acts by *that judgment*, without *partiality*, he shews *no pride* in *such a conduct;* but approves himself as a wise and an honest man. If inferiors expect *improper condescensions* from their governors, or take it amiss not to be received upon an equal foot with them; the *pride* is in them who *ask what they ought not;* and not in those, who, mindful of their *place* and *station*, support it with *dignity*, and expect from their inferiors a *becoming* respect and *a proper distance*. There is therefore no *pride* in *maintaining one's*

[p] Prov. xv. 33. xviii. 12. [q] Matt. xxiii. 12. Luke xiv. 11. xviii. 14.
[r] 2 Cor. xi. 5. xii. 11. [s] Acts xxii. 25. [t] 2 Cor. xii. 11.

just authority or *character:* but when there is *pride* among persons of fashion and figure, it is seen chiefly in their not condescending to hear the just complaints of the humble and afflicted, poor and miserable; or, which is still worse, in their taking advantage of their superior station, to insult and tyrannize over others, and *to oppress* their inferiors. This is not *supporting* dignity, but *lessening* it; and is disparaging and disgracing both themselves and their station. The true character of greatness is, to afford protection and relief to the innocent, humble, and distressed; and to exert all the strength and force of their authority in crushing the sturdy and insolent, and all such as endeavour to make a prey of the weak, or a spoil of the honest and well deserving.

I have now done with the objection proposed; and I have been the larger in answering it, that the true notion of *humility* or of *pride* may be the more clearly understood. This indeed is the most material point. All mankind *condemn pride*, but they do not always know distinctly *what it means*. I have endeavoured to describe it in as plain characters as I could, for our information: not to teach any one to find it in his neighbour, (for that is no token of *humility;* the *proudest* men generally complaining most of *pride* in *others*, because their *own* can least *bear* it,) but to examine the more carefully into *our own selves;* and that, in order to discover whether any thing of this poisonous vice be yet lurking in us; and if we find it so, to use all proper means to purge it out. May we all seriously endeavour to do thus, for the satisfying our own consciences, and the saving our souls.

SERMON XV.

The Wisdom of true Simplicity of Mind and Integrity of Manners.

JOHN i. 47.

Jesus saw Nathanael coming to him, and saith of him, Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!

THE Apostle Bartholomew is, by good interpreters, supposed to have been this very Nathanael, of whom our Lord here speaks in such high terms of commendation. Nathanael might be the name which he commonly went under before his conversion to Christ, and Bartholomew might be the Christian title which he assumed afterwards.

The memorable character here given of him is, that he was "an Israelite indeed," or true Israelite, "in whom was no guile:" he was a person of great simplicity and integrity; remarkable for his honest and upright heart, his frank and open conversation, and for his plainness and sincerity in all his dealings: he had no sinister or selfish views, no deceit nor craftiness in him; his designs were all just, fair, and honourable; his conduct equal, clear, and uniform: in a word, his tongue, his hand, and his heart, all went together.

Such was his general character; and, by the particular notice which our blessed Lord was pleased to take of it, we may perceive that he looked upon it as somewhat *rare* and *uncommon*, above the ordinary pitch of human virtue. In discoursing further, my design is,

I. To inquire how it comes to pass, that guile and insincerity are so apt to prevail amongst men.

II. To set forth the *wisdom* of true *simplicity of mind* and *integrity of manners*, both with respect to the world that now is, and that which is to come.

I.

As to the first particular; if we look back to the original of *guile*, and search to the bottom of it, we shall find it chiefly owing to that *natural selfishness* which is, in a manner, born in us, and bred up with us; and which nothing can ever thoroughly correct or cure, but a deep and due sense of God and religion. Men naturally feel their *own* cravings and uneasinesses; but they feel not, in like manner, the cravings and uneasinesses of *other* persons: and therefore they are naturally prompted to indulge *themselves* as far as they can, though it be at the expense of their *neighbours*, who have the like inclinations and aversions with them. A little time and experience sufficiently convinces every man, that there is no forcing all around him to yield to his single will or humour; but he is certain to meet with strong resistance and opposition on every side, as often as he directly attempts any thing of that sort. Hence arises a kind of *moral necessity* of making use of management and address, in order to compass that by *wile* and *artifice* which cannot be obtained by open *violence*. Here lies the *foundation* of guile, treachery, and deceit. They are the natural result of an overweening self-love, meeting with opposition from *without*, and not yet restrained by true and right principles from *within*.

It is one chief aim of the laws of every well-governed society, or community, to bridle, in some measure, the *exorbitances* of *selfishness*; that it may not break out to that *degree*, as totally to destroy or disturb the *public harmony*: but, notwithstanding all the *outward legal* restraints that can be enacted, there is still room enough left for guile and treachery to range in. Human laws may be eluded or perverted; and the men of guile may often manage so artfully, as to turn the very laws themselves, which were made for the protection of innocency, to the oppression or destruction of it: so that the laws of any state are by no means an effectual *remedy* against *guile*.

Besides the laws of the land, there is a kind of *law of reputation*, which generally is a much stricter and closer restraint upon deceitful practices than the other. Many are afraid of being detected and exposed, if they should deal unhandsomely by their neighbours: and so the tender regard which they bear towards

their own reputation restrains them from several iniquitous practices, which they might otherwise safely venture upon, within the laws of the land. In such cases, where the common courts of judicature can take no cognizance, the *tribunal* of *fame*, however, often strikes men with awe; for reputation is a tender point, and a man's livelihood often depends upon his fair and good character: but, though this may be an additional restraint upon guile, and of considerable force; yet it goes not deep enough to effect any *change* of *heart;* neither does it sufficiently obviate the more refined and exquisite contrivances of human subtilty. Some will lay their insidious schemes with such closeness and secrecy, that it may be next to impossible to detect them; or however to convict them by any clear and certain evidences. Others, taking advantage of their superiority of fortune or station, will boldly carry on their deceitful practices; while those who see them, and suffer by them, are afraid to complain, or so much as to appear sensible of the hardships they lie under, for fear of *suffering worse.* Others, lastly, who, through the strength of habit and long custom in the arts of guile, are once got beyond the sense of shame, may securely go on in the same track, and even boast of fraud and circumvention when discovered; nay, and perhaps may find means to turn the ridicule or disgrace upon the unhappy sufferers. From hence therefore we may perceive, that the *law* of *reputation* is no certain, no universal *security* against the *practice* of *guile.*

Neither indeed can any thing be justly looked upon as a *sovereign preservative*, which shall effectually answer in every respect, excepting only an awful *fear* and *dread* of the *Divine Majesty*, a lively and vigorous expectation of a judgment to come. This *religious principle* is the only *certain* and *constant security* against *guile;* and this will prevail to all intents and purposes, wheresoever it fixes firm root. A man, truly pious and conscientious, will consider that guile is not more odious in the esteem of men, than it is abominable in the sight of God, and must be one day accounted for before the high and awful tribunal. While he reflects hereupon, and at the same time loves his own soul, he will be sensible that it is not only his *duty*, but his real and lasting *interest*, to act always a just, and equal, and generous part with all mankind. He will see good reason for loving his neighbour in like manner as he loves himself; and so of course will be inclined to deal with others as he desires to be

dealt with. He will be true and faithful in all measures, whether transacted in secret or in the face of the sun. He will take no unfair advantages of the *weakness* of one, or of the *ignorance* of another, or of the *necessities* of a third, or of any other unhappy circumstances or contingencies. He will be equal and impartial in all his dealings, though it were towards an *idiot* or an *infant*, or other thoughtless, helpless persons; as well as towards the sharpest, and shrewdest, and greatest, whose *capacities* or *resentments* he may *stand in awe of:* and that, because he considers Almighty God as infinitely more discerning and more powerful than all; and that it is to him we must give account of our dealings with our fellow creatures. No artifices, no colourings can be of any avail in God's sight; for God is not mocked: he sees into the inmost recesses of the mind, and searches even the reins and the heart. This consideration strikes at the very *root* of all *guile* and treachery, when nothing else will.

However, from hence may be perceived how it comes to pass, that guile prevails so widely amongst men: it is, because this world is *present*, and *sensible;* while the other is *distant*, and mostly out of sight. There are few, in comparison, who retain a lively, constant, prevailing sense of God and a world to come; and therefore there are but few such Israelites as Nathanael was, "a man in whom was no guile." Good nature and common humanity will sometimes go a great way: and if to both be added a certain frankness and nobleness of temper, together with a sense of honour and a quick perception of shame; all these in conjunction will almost be sufficient to make up *a man without guile*. But yet, unless a deep and due *sense* of *religion* be superadded to all, the character will not be complete; neither will the man's other principles be effectual to restrain him from the more refined sort of guile, whenever he has any great advantages to make by it. Trust not too far to any man's *natural* honesty or probity, if he appears not, in his general conduct, to have the *fear of God* before his eyes: for he that is *false to his God* will be *false to all the world*, as often as any present engaging *interest* persuades to it, or any strong *temptation* comes in his way.

I take leave to add, that *guile* may be often found even under great *appearances* of *religion;* either because men may be hypocrites, or because their very religion may be of the *corrupt kind*,

adulterated with wrong principles; or because, at the best, it amounts only to a faint and feeble principle of life, lodging more in the *head* than in the *heart*. From whence again we may infer, that the character of the text is the more rare and uncommon, since none but the *religious* can ever fully come up to it; and not *all they*, but those *only* who have the honour and the happiness to be deeply tinctured with *piety*, and who constantly make it the *ruling principle* of their *hearts* and *lives*.

Having thus largely accounted for the prevailing growth and influence of guile and insincerity, I proceed now, secondly,

II.

To set forth the *wisdom* and *excellence* of *sincere* and *upright conduct*, both with respect to the world that now is, and to that which is to come.

1. No doubt but many and great worldly advantages may ordinarily be obtained by the practice of guile; otherwise there would be no temptation to it, or none great enough to draw such numbers into it. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged likewise, that there are ordinarily many and great worldly advantages arising from honest and sincere conduct; so that, upon the whole, it may justly be questioned, whether the men of *guile* are generally the *greatest gainers*, even with respect to this *present life*. It is true, we may sometimes observe immense riches gathered by dishonest or treacherous practices; and it is certain, that crafty deceivers do sometimes raise their own fortunes upon the ruins of much better men: but such instances may perhaps be justly looked upon as a few glittering prizes among a multitude of blanks: for it is certain, on the other hand, that great numbers are daily undone by dishonest courses; while their indirect practices first blow up their credit, and soon after sink the men. I believe it will be generally allowed, as to matters of trade and commerce, that *honesty* is, for the most part, the *truest policy*, the surest way to thrive. One that is known to make a conscience of telling the truth, who is remarkably faithful in all his dealings, who is exact and punctual in his contracts or covenants, who is content with moderate and reasonable gains, and who scorns to take any indirect or mean advantages; I say, such a person as I have here described will, generally speaking, find favour amongst all men; and, by the strength of his friendships, and God's blessing upon them, will be able to bear himself up in the world: whereas, when once a

person begins to be marked as a dishonest or designing man, few will choose to have dealings with him; few will contribute to support or countenance him. In the general therefore, and in the ordinary course of affairs, a *plain honest* man appears to stand upon a *surer* foot than a *master of guile;* and is much more likely to thrive and prosper in the world.

Another considerable advantage which he has lies in the ease, and peace, and tranquillity of his mind. He has no laboured schemes to lay, no perplexing difficulties to torment him, no contradictions in conduct to reconcile; but his way is plain, easy, and clear before him. He can meet his acquaintance with a free and open countenance, with a pleasing and cheerful aspect. As his conduct is all fair and clean, and he is conscious of it, he is under no pain or uneasiness about future discoveries or after-reckonings, nor about any the most prying or even malicious inquiries. Search his conduct to the utmost, and the better will it appear: his righteousness, upon the scrutiny, will in the last issue be made as clear as the light, and his just dealing as the noonday.

Such is the security and comfort of the upright man, (generally speaking,) and there is no other pleasure of life comparable to it. This I take to be almost universally true, with respect to that kind of honesty of which I am now speaking, such as concerns matters of *property*, or belongs to trade and commerce. But withal I must own, and it may not be improper here to observe, that there is another *kind* of honesty, which often lies under hardships, and does not ordinarily meet with such favourable acceptance in the world; I mean the honesty of resisting importunate solicitations to something ill, and preserving a conscience clear of all *undue compliances*. There are few persons of a general acquaintance, or of any large scene of business, who may not frequently upon occasion find, that some designing man or other (having *sinister ends* to serve, for which they want *instruments*) may importune them vehemently to do *wrong things*. If an honest man declines and hangs back in such cases, (as in duty he is bound to do,) he is certain to get ill-will for the time, and both to lose friends and to raise to himself enemies. Most of us have either relations, or benefactors, or allies, or companions to please, who may severally in their turns request *improper* favours; and at the same time may be so *partial* to their *own schemes* or interests, as not to bear a repulse with any *candour* or

patience. When party differences happen to run high, such difficulties will occur very frequently; and they often prove *sore trials* upon honest and upright men, who have no guile of their own, and who cannot, with a safe conscience, consent to be made *instruments* to the *guile* of *others*, or to be partakers of other men's sins. If they are persecuted or maligned for their non-compliance in such cases, (as commonly happens,) they must be content to bear it as becomes Christians. Virtue would be no virtue, or very slight, if it met with no *trials* to exercise, improve, and perfect it. In such instances chiefly is the proof made, whether we are *really religious* or are only *men-pleasers;* whether we value the solid and lasting praise of God, or the vain and transient caresses of men. Honesty, in this view, may sometimes (perhaps often) *fail* of its *due reward* here; but it is certain to have it in *full measure* hereafter.

2. Therefore, secondly, the *wisdom* and *excellency* of a sincere and upright conduct, with respect to a life to come, is very plain and indisputable. It is securing the main chance, and laying up for eternity. "Providing things honest in the sight of all "men" (whether men observe it or not) will infallibly recommend a man to God, who sees it, and marks it, and will finally reward it. The securing this great point is *true wisdom*, as it is pitching upon the noblest and *best end*, and pursuing it by *fair* and *just means*. An honest and good heart is the top perfection of man, and is, in the sight of God, of the greatest price. With persons so qualified, God chooses to abide here; and such shall also eternally abide with him hereafter. There will be no guile or hypocrisy in the regions of the blessed. Those ill-natured qualities are calculated only for the low interests of this life, (and not for them always,) but will have no place in the other. All things are naked and open to God now, and will be also both to men and angels hereafter. There is nothing hid, but what shall then be revealed; nor any thing kept secret, but what shall then be made known: for God will make manifest the counsels of the heart. How mean, how despicable will all deceitful contrivances and all ungenerous practices appear at that day, when every mask of dissimulation shall be thrown off, and every studied refinement of guile and malice disclosed, and nothing but sincere and undisguised honesty will be found able to *stand the test*. Then will be seen what complicated folly there always is in every the most artful contrivance of guile; and

what a depth of wisdom and good sense there constantly is in plain and sincere dealing.

I do not say, that the *innocency* of the *dove* may not be frequently found where the *wisdom* of the *serpent* may be wanting. An honest *heart* and a discerning *head* do not always go together: there may be perfect *sincerity* (humanly speaking) where there is not perfect *wisdom*. But this I may presume to think and say, that the first and best part of wisdom always goes along with sincere and upright conduct. There is a *wise choice* made of the noblest and *best end*, and due provision laid for the *main thing*, which, in effect, is *every thing*.

We may observe, in our blessed Lord, a bright example of the most *perfect innocency* joined with *consummate wisdom*. No guile was found in his mouth or in his life; no slip, no failure in point of discretion, through his whole conduct. Numberless traps and snares were laid for him, to entangle him in his talk, or to overreach him in business: but he had wisdom sufficient to defeat them all, and even to turn the insidious craftiness of his adversaries upon their own heads. This he was able to do; for he was *God* as well as *man*. He is a finished pattern for his disciples to copy after in some measure, though never to come up to. Their integrity, after all, must come vastly short of his; and so must their wisdom also: for we can neither resemble the *dove* nor the *serpent* to any such degree of *perfection* as he did. Nevertheless, we ought to use our best endeavours to attain to such perfection as we may in both respects. Or, however we may be found wanting in point of *wisdom* or *capacity*, (which is no crime to fail in,) let us labour to be as exact as possible in point of *sincerity*, which is more in our own power. In order thereunto, give me leave, by way of application to what hath been said,

III.

To subjoin a few plain and brief directions, for our *improvement* in so admirable a quality.

1. Let no one ever persuade you, that the practice of guile and circumvention is any argument of superior parts or understanding. It is the easiest thing in the world to be deceitful and disingenuous. Children are capable of it soon after they can speak; and they will daily improve in it by mere *instinct* of *nature*, if not seasonably restrained by *wholesome discipline* or wise instruction. Persons of very low capacities are often

capable of a great deal of low cunning, when they are scarce found capable of any thing besides. And though sometimes men of very bright parts may be observed (under strong attachments to this world) to take into the ways of guile; yet it must be owned to be a great disparagement to their parts that they do so: and had they sense or consideration sufficient to look forwards to the end of things, and to lay all circumstances together well and wisely, they would abhor that very guile, which now perhaps they are proud of. Honesty and wisdom are but words of the same import in holy scripture, and mean the same thing; because, in reality, there is no *true wisdom* but in *true integrity*.

2. Let no one ever be offended or chagrined, if he should any time observe, that some particular persons thrive and prosper by fraud, guile, or treachery. Such instances are rare in comparison, as I before hinted: and for one that grows considerable in such a way, hundreds perhaps fail and sink in their circumstances by these very means. Besides, what enjoyment have those few thriving deceivers in their ill-gotten advantages? Little, very probably, or none. But suppose the very best we can imagine in their favour; yet scripture more than once assures us, that in the last issue, even the "prosperity of fools "destroys them." Were they to gain the whole world by unrighteous practices, it would profit them nothing; since, in the last result, they are certain to lose their own souls, and to perish utterly.

3. Let not the sense of any perplexing straits or difficulties ever move you to go out of the plain road of duty, for the sake of any present relief. Those are temptations which Satan throws in our way, and by which he leads the unthinking into the crooked paths of guile and dishonesty. Perhaps, by some convenient use of fraud, some seasonable treachery, a man may rid himself at once of some pressing difficulties: but then, let it be considered on the other hand, that this is only serving a *present exigency*, to lay in for *future troubles* and future repentance; and is *losing* more in the *general*, than can be *gained* in the *particular* instance. Let a man be content, in such cases, to venture no further for the extricating himself out of difficulties, than he honestly and justly may; leaving the rest to God, who often relieves good men in the *greatest extremities*, and works

their deliverance in *marvellous* ways, such as they could neither foresee nor so much as imagine.

4thly and lastly, If any inviting opportunities should offer (as sometimes happens) that by once or twice straining a point, and breaking through the unerring rules of Christian sincerity, you might make some very considerable advantage, to set you, as it were, up in the world ever after; reject the alluring bait at once, with the utmost horror and disdain. Consider, not so much what may flatter your present desires in point of interest or worldly honour, as what is strictly *just*, *honest*, and *fair*, and will bring you solid and lasting *felicity*. Consider not *consequences* in a *secular* account, when *strict duty* is concerned. Leave the issue of all in God's hands; only, do you what is *right*, and what it becomes you to do. To take into any indirect, unjustifiable courses, is to throw yourself at once out of God's favour and protection, and is renouncing all reasonable claim to his blessings here or hereafter. Remember the pious and prudent resolution of holy Job: "Till I die," says he, "I will not remove my "integrity from me.—My heart shall not reproach me so long "as I live[a]." This noble resolution he held to, as his *sheet-anchor*, to his dying day: in this was he happy even amidst his troubles, (much more when they were over;) and by adhering to this principle he is now a blessed saint above; as well as our Nathanael, of whom our blessed Lord hath given such an excellent character.

Learn we from such admirable examples to be true and faithful in all that we say and in all that we do; deceiving no man, beguiling no man to his detriment; punctual to our word and promise, much more to our oaths; firm and constant to our just engagements; honest and impartial in all our dealings; every way behaving, as becometh men professing godliness, "Israelites "indeed, in whom is no guile."

[a] Job xxvii. 5, 6.

SERMON XVI.

The *Joy* in Heaven over *one repenting* Sinner, *more* than over *ninety and nine just* Men, explained.

LUKE xv. 7.

I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance.

THESE words of our blessed Lord are introduced with a noted *parable* of the *lost sheep:* a parable recorded in the eighteenth chapter of St. Matthew, as delivered by our Lord upon a special occasion; but recorded by St. Luke as again delivered, and reinforced by our Lord, upon an occasion more general, as shall be shewn presently.

The parable is to this effect. A person is supposed to have had an *hundred sheep* of his own, and all of them safe, except *one,* which had happened to wander from the flock, *lost* for the time. The owner, in this case, being much concerned for the loss of a *single sheep,* goes immediately in quest of it, leaving the *ninety-nine* for a while to themselves, till he finds the sheep that went *astray,* to bring to them. Having found it, he returns with joy; yea, he *rejoices more* over *that sheep,* in that particular case, *than* he does over the *ninety and nine* which *went not astray:* "He "cometh home, he calleth together his friends and neighbours, "saying unto them, Rejoice with me; for I have found my "sheep which was lost[a]." Our blessed Lord, having thus opened the parable, proceeds next to apply it, in this grave and

[a] Luke xv. 6.

weighty moral: "I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in "heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety "and nine just persons, which need no repentance."

To enforce this doctrine, he adds *two parables more*, containing the *same thought*, in the main, or illustrating the *same thing*, and serving the *same purpose*. One is, of a woman having *ten pieces of silver*, but *losing one* of them for a time, and seeking diligently till she finds it: upon her so finding it, she rejoices over *that piece* which she had *lost*, more than over the *nine other pieces* which she had *constantly enjoyed*.

The third parable is of a *father recovering his prodigal*, his *lost son*, who had long gone from him, and was, in a manner, lost and undone. The good man, in this case, is more *sensibly affected* at the *recovery* of that *lost son*, and makes greater rejoicings for it, than he had ever done for his *other son*, who had *never offended* in like kind, nor ever *gone from him*.

These three parables are all drawn from nature, and are founded in self-evident facts: but the *justness of the application* of them to the *case mentioned in the text* may not perhaps be *obvious* at first hearing, but may want some explication. I shall therefore endeavour so to explain the particulars, as to render both the *design* and the *use* of our *Lord's doctrine*, in this instance, clear and perspicuous to an attentive hearer.

I.

The *design* of all is to be learned chiefly from the *occasion* given for those *three parables*.

The first *occasion* given for the *first* of the *three* appears in St. Matthew, chapter the eighteenth. Our Lord, perceiving that there was too much of *selfishness*, or narrowness of spirit, in his own disciples, while every one was contending for the *first place* in heaven, little concerned *how few* might come thither, provided *they themselves* were but *secure* of the Divine favour; I say, our Lord, perceiving this meanness of temper to prevail too much amongst them, endeavoured to correct it, by representing to them, that they ought to look upon *others* as *parcels of themselves*: and to *rejoice* as much at the *recovery* of any *lost brother*, as at the recovering a *lost limb* of their own, or any *lost part* of their *own substance* or *treasure*: for that such was the tender compassion of Almighty God, the common Father of all, that he would have "none of his little ones perish [h]:" and such also was

[h] Matt. xviii. 14.

the benign and generous temper of the blessed *angels* in heaven, that they *rejoice exceedingly*, as often as any *new converts* come in to them, to share with them in glory. Such is the purport of the parable of the *lost sheep*, as *first* delivered by our Lord, and recorded in St. Matthew's Gospel.

Upon *another occasion*, the Scribes and Pharisees were disposed to murmur at our Lord for *receiving sinners*, and *eating with them*[c]. Here the like *selfishness* and narrowness of spirit (which our Lord had before reproved in his own disciples) brake out in a much greater degree, and attended with more malignant symptoms. Wherefore our blessed Lord did not only *repeat the parable* of the *lost sheep*, but he *pressed it* in a *stronger manner* than before; illustrating and enforcing it every way, and superadding *two parables more*, of *like purport* with it.

The *chief design* of all was, to insinuate to those murmuring, repining, envious Jews, who conceived themselves *righteous*, and who were for *engrossing heaven*, in a manner, to *themselves*, that such temper of theirs was altogether wild, unnatural, and inhuman: that, however they might scorn and reprobate *sinners*, they ought to remember that even *sinners* were their *near allies*; and, if they were gone from them, were worth the *recovering*: and that, instead of *envying* them the benefit and privilege of *returning* to the fold, they ought rather to take all imaginable *pains* to *reduce* them; and to *rejoice exceedingly* in it, as in the recovering any *lost treasure*: for the admitting of repenting sinners to a *share* with them in happiness would really be no *detriment* to them, but so much entire *gains*; and, if they had but any thing of a godlike temper and disposition, or any just notion of the case, they would be sensible that so it must be. A man rejoices at the recovering his *lost sheep*: why? because he looked upon *that sheep* as *part* of his *own substance*. A woman rejoices at the finding the *lost piece* of silver: why? because she had made it a *part* of her beloved *treasure*. A kind father rejoices at the fetching home his *lost son*: why? because he loved him as a *son*, and could not but be glad of so agreeable an *addition* to his family. How then could the Scribes and Pharisees murmur and repine at our Lord's *receiving sinners*, in order to *reclaim* them; or why should they desire to *engross* the *Divine favours* entirely to *themselves*? The reason was, that they were *selfish* and ill-natured, and had nothing of a large soul or a Divine

[c] Luke xv. 2.

spirit in them: for if they had but looked upon sinners with an eye of *love* or *tenderness*, they must have *rejoiced* in *their* happiness, as being part of their *own*. The *angels* in heaven understand this matter rightly; and *they* are so far from *repining* when *others* come in for a *share* with them, that they *rejoice* at it; and so much the *more*, if the case was before *doubtful*, or almost *desperate*——"There is joy in heaven over one sinner "that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, "which need no repentance."

But here it may be asked, *Who* or what are those *ninety-nine just persons*, needing *no repentance?* And again, be they who they will, why *more joy* for the *recovering* of *one*, than for the *keeping* or retaining of *many?* These are seeming difficulties, which may arise upon the case. I shall endeavour briefly to account for both.

1. As to the *just persons*, who are said to *need no repentance*, we may best understand such persons as *lead good lives in the main*; and who have no need to *change* their *general course* of life, but to *persevere* in it, and to carry it on to *higher perfection*. In a certain sense, the very best of men may be said to *need repentance*, that is, *daily repentance*, for *sins of infirmity*, sins of *daily incursion*: but as the word *repentance* often means a *thorough change* of *heart* and *life*, not from *good* to *better*, but from *bad* to *good*; in that sense there may be many who *need no repentance*, having long been in a *good state*, in a *state of grace* and salvation. With respect to *such*, our Lord elsewhere says, "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance[d]." Our Lord came not to call *such* to a *different course* of life, or to a *thorough change* of state; but to *improve* that course which they *were before in*, and to make it, by his *merits* and satisfaction, *accepted* to salvation. Of such religious and exemplary men, we may reasonably interpret what our Lord says in the text, that they *need no repentance*.

2. But a more difficult question still remains, namely, why our Lord should say, that there shall be *more joy* in heaven over any *one repenting sinner*, than over *ninety-nine just persons*, such as I have described. As to which, we may be confident, that our Lord had no design to put any *slight* upon men who constantly lead a *regular life*; nor to *prefer* a *returning penitent* before a person who has held an *uninterrupted course of virtue*

[d] Matt. ix. 13.

and piety. The *parables* which he was pleased to make use of for this very case are alone sufficient to shew, that he could have no *such* meaning, nor any intention to inculcate so foreign a thought. The man who had lost *one sheep* out of the *hundred,* did not *value* that *lost sheep* above the *ninety-nine* left; no, nor above *any single sheep* of the whole number, so far as appears; to be sure, he would not have *parted* with *any one* of the whole, for the *recovering* of *what was lost;* because that would have been *doing nothing,* but endeavouring to repair *one loss* by *another;* and indeed by a *greater,* all things considered.

So again, in the case of the *woman* represented as having lost *one* of her *ten* pieces of silver; her *searching* so *diligently* for what she had *lost* was no argument of her *valuing* that *single piece* above *all the rest,* or above *any other* piece that remained with her. She would have taken the *same pains* to recover *any other* of the ten, had she had the misfortune to lose it; so that her *care* and *solicitude* in that affair could be an argument of nothing but of her valuing *all alike:* neither would she have *parted* with *any single piece* which remained sure, in order to *regain* that piece which she had *lost.*

Once more: the *father,* in the parable, who shewed himself overjoyed at the recovery of the prodigal *son* before *lost,* cannot reasonably be supposed to have *valued him more,* or *so much* as he *really valued* his *sober son,* who had remained constantly with him; neither would he have *parted* with *that good son* for the sake of *that other;* who at the best was but a *reformed offender,* though not to be *despised* in that view. To the one the father said, "Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine[c]." How kind and gracious! What could he have said more? As to the other, he *rejoiced* in him, as in a son *restored from the dead,* but not *preferring* him to the son who had been *all along alive* and well. The sum then is, that the very turn and structure of the three several parables abundantly shew, that it was no design of our Lord to *prefer* a *late penitent* before a person of an even and *uniform life;* much less to *prefer one single such penitent* before *numbers* of the *better kind.* The parables themselves convey no such thought: but it would be absurd to interpret a few particular words of somewhat doubtful meaning, against the plain and undoubted drift or *tenor* of the whole discourse.

[c] Luke xv. 31.

[illegible] that our Lord can be supposed to mean by saying, that "joy shall be in heaven over one returning sinner, more than over ninety and nine just men," &c. The meaning lies deep, but it may be drawn out, as I conceive, by attentively considering the occasion of the words which I have before explained. Our Lord's intent was to correct an envious, narrow, selfish disposition of mind; such as leads men to value a blessing the more, for its being confined to them singly in preference to many others; and to look upon any privilege as the less for being shared in common. This is very ill-natured towards men of our own species, as if they were not our brethren, and members with us; and it is greatly affronting the goodness of God, as if it were not extensive or diffusive enough to take in any number whatever, fitly prepared, and to make the very *largeness of the number* a considerable circumstance for the *advancing the felicity of every individual*. Now in order to confront and confute such envious and ill-natured jealousies, our Lord was pleased to intimate, that the *angels* of heaven are of quite *another temper* and principle: for though they are most highly in God's favour, yet they desire of all things, for God's glory, and for their own greater happiness, to have *men* brought in to *share with them* in it. And as they are *grieved* and concerned (so far as is consistent with their blissful state) when men *revolt from God* to their own undoing; so they are particularly *joyful* and thankful, as often as *deserters return to their duty*, and become capable of enjoying the inheritance of the saints in light. If but *one* in a *hundred* should happen to *go astray*, and fall off, (so our Lord puts the case in the *first* parable,) they would think it of high moment to *recover* that *one*; and *rejoice* in it, *more* than in the *other ninety-nine*: because an *hundred* is *more* than *ninety-nine*, and a *new addition* becomes matter of *new joy* to them: not that *that single person* is *better* than the *ninety-nine*, (that were absurd;) but, while *that single one* was *wanting*, the *satisfaction was less*, and the *joy impaired*; which, by the *recovery* of the *lost member*, becomes again full and *complete*. The narrow-spirited Pharisees, in their *selfish* way, would have said, What signifies the loss of *one sinner*, or *more*, so long as *we are* but *happy*, and have *all to ourselves?* For the *fewer* we have to *share* with us, the *more distinguished* are *we* above the *rest* of mankind. So thought they, in their pride and vanity. But our Lord understood better; and he endeavoured to make them understand it like-

wise, by the *three several parables* which I have been explaining; which indeed were all intended to teach us, not to think ourselves the *more happy*, for being eminently distinguished as a *select few, exclusive of our brethren*; but rather, then to judge ourselves *most happy*, when the *greatest numbers* can be persuaded to come in and *partake* with us. Many are apt to please themselves in a thought, that they have something to boast of *above others*, which they retain to themselves, and in which none can equal them or share with them; as if *happiness* consisted in *singularity* or *superiority*: the heavenly temper is just the reverse, and it is brotherly love that makes it so. True and dear *friends* can scarce *relish any happiness* in which *both do not share*. Where *universal benevolence* reigns, the effect is as universal: the *felicity of every one* becomes the *greater* for *every one's partaking* of it and *sharing* in it. This, I presume, was our Lord's thought in the text, suitable to one that is a *friend to all* who will accept him, and a constant lover of mankind.

Enough has been said for the opening the *general design* and intention of the text which I have been upon.

II.

It remains only to consider the more particular *use* and improvement of it; and that by way of *application* both to *good* Christians and *bad*.

As to *good* Christians they may from hence learn, how acceptable a service they are performing, while they are endeavouring, either by example or persuasion, to draw many unto God. It is contributing to the enlargement of God's kingdom: it is afflicting and weakening the powers of darkness, and bringing fresh matter of joy and triumph to the blessed above. It is, at the same time, putting on and improving that heavenly disposition here, which will be both their perfection and happiness hereafter. The *angels* themselves are employed constantly in these pious cares; and it is both their business and delight to assist in converting sinners, and to draw them off from Satan unto God. Our Lord, in the text, has intimated as much to every good Christian, for the inciting them to follow their bright example; and he has further instructed us to pray daily, that God's will may be done in earth, as it is in heaven. So much with respect to Christians of the *better sort*, who have their minds set towards heaven.

As to the *ungodly* and *impenitent*, if disposed to hear and

attend, they may learn a most *comfortable lesson* from the doctrine of the text; namely this, that though they are for the present, through their own default, shut out from the kingdom of heaven; yet a door stands open for *repentance*, whensoever they shall think it their duty and interest to look up to heaven, and to return to God. For their further encouragement, our Lord has been pleased to hint, that the *angels* themselves stand, in a manner, waiting for *their conversion*; and will not only be content, but even *joyful* to receive them, when they shake off their evil habits, and become new men, thoroughly reclaimed both in heart and life. In the mean season they are considered as *lost* and undone, dead in trespasses and sins: and that is the very reason given, why the *joy* in heaven will be the *greater* upon their *recovery*, if ever they shall recover; because it is *doubtful*, and almost *desperate*. "Thy brother was dead," says the kind father in the parable, "and is alive again; and was lost, and is "found[f]." And therefore he judged it meet to make the *more solemn rejoicing* for a *recovery* of so *extraordinary* a nature, somewhat resembling even a resurrection from the grave.

There are indeed many and great difficulties in the work of *correcting inveterate habits*: but there are also many and great encouragements, sufficient to countervail the difficulties of it, if a man will but seriously set about it, with such care and earnestness, such resolution and endeavour, as any other business of weight requires. It should be resolved upon *instantly* without delay, because *necessary* to be done, and *delays are dangerous*: it should be pursued with *resolution* and vigour; for *faint endeavours* will never *effect any thing* considerable, either in that or any other grand affair. It should be conducted with great *deliberation* and forecast, foreseeing every obstacle or impediment which may stand in the way, and providing wisely against them. It is the want of such *prudent forecast* which generally keeps sinners in their *former courses*: and renders their *faint resolutions* and endeavours *fruitless* or *ineffectual*. They *sincerely wish*, perhaps, to *live better*; and they *resolve sincerely*, at seasons, so to do: but yet they *set not about the work* in any *proper method*, or with *due precautions*. They *aim well*, with respect to the *end*; but they *use not the right means*. They *aim to reform*; but still they take no care to *avoid such temptations* as will be *too hard* for them; or to

[f] Luke xv. 32.

shun such company and such entanglements as will, probably, deceive and ensnare them. And hence it is, that their *warmest desires* after godliness prove *ineffectual;* and their *best resolutions* are not strong enough to secure them against *frequent relapses.* The only way to *make sure of the end* is *to look well to the means.* Let but any person *consider well beforehand* what he has to do, and *how by degrees it is to be effected;* and *then resolve* (with the help of God's grace) to *pursue those proper measures* with care and assiduity; and then he need not doubt but this work of the Lord will more and more prosper in his hands; and there will be joy in heaven over every such thoughtful sinner so repenting.

SERMON XVII.

Charity and Kind Offices, the best Conquest over an Enemy.

ROMANS xii. 21.

Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good.

THE advice is *short*, comprised in a few words: but it is withal *full* and *instructive*, and carries a great deal of good matter in it. It relates to our *behaviour* towards our *enemies*; shewing both what we ought *not* to do, in that case, and what we *ought*. The Apostle's *manner* of wording the thing is observable; for there is a particular *force* and *beauty* in the very *expression*. Being sensible, that the forgiving an injury, or the not revenging it, is commonly looked upon as a kind of *yielding* and *submitting* to an adversary, (which is what the pride of human nature is most averse to,) he prudently anticipates the thought, and gives it quite another turn; handsomely insinuating, that all *desire* of *revenge* is *yielding* and submitting to an enemy; is as much as confessing, that he has disturbed, pained, and disconcerted us to that degree, that we are no longer able to command our temper, and to be really *masters* of *ourselves*. Overflowing with rage and resentment upon such occasions is betraying a *littleness* of mind, and proclaiming our own defeat. It is as good as declaring, that the enemy has got within us, has thrown us off our guard, and put us into disorder and confusion. Whereas, if a man can

stand the shock unmoved, and be *above* being concerned at it, he undoubtedly shews a more *manly spirit*, and true *greatness* of *mind*. He is then seen to be *master over his passions*, and above being disturbed by little things: and there is none so generous a way of conquering an enemy, as the letting him see, that the worst he can do shall not so much as ruffle him, or put him out of humour. "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with "good."

The text then consists of *two parts*, or *precepts*; the one *negative*, and the other *positive*: of which I shall treat in their order.

I.

The *negative* part, or precept, comes *first*: "Be not overcome "of evil." Suffer not any affront or injury to get the better of you, to afflict and conquer you. More distinctly; suffer it not to get the better of your *reason*, your *piety*, or your *charity*: for if it does so, you are really vanquished and worsted by it.

1. I say, let not any affront or injury have the superiority over your *reason*, considering yourself now only as a *man*, without taking in the additional consideration of your being a *Christian* also.

Reason is designed for the *governing part* of man, which is to regulate and command the passions. While reason holds the reins, and keeps its seat of government, all is right and regular, and a man is *master* of *himself*: but if the passions get the *upper* hand, and domineer over reason, the person, for the time, is, as it were, quite *unmanned*, and is driven on to any the most extravagant freaks and follies, below the *dignity* of his *nature*. A man can never expose himself more to the attacks of his enemy, than when he suffers himself to be heated into a passion, and thereby thrown off his guard. While he can *command* his *temper* and *preserve* his *reason*, he will know and consider what he does, and conduct with *prudence* and *discretion*; and will at length very probably both defend himself, and become *superior* to his adversary: but if once he lets go his reason, and resigns himself up to *heat* and *passion*, he both exposes his own safety, and surrenders his person to the mercy of his adversary. A passionate furious warrior neither sees an advantage nor knows how to use it: while he is all fire, and no conduct, he does but expose his *forces*, and at length becomes himself an easy prey to the enemy. But a man of *cool* and *steady courage*, who does

nothing precipitately, nothing rashly, he is the man that maintains his ground, and comes off victorious in the end. Let *reason preside* always in any private contests between man and man: and by the help of reason all will proceed regularly, and with honour and advantage. Reason will consider always, not what the *offender* or injurious person might *deserve*, but what may be *prudent* and *proper* for the *offended* party *to do*. Perhaps the injury is slight, not deserving notice, or deserving only contempt. Whatever it be, there is more *dignity* and *greatness of mind* shewn in being *above feeling it*, than in *fretting* at it. *Revenging* it is still worse, because it betrays still greater impatience; besides that it is imprudent, as *provoking* the *adversaries*, and bringing on fresh injuries; which again will call for rejoinders, and so on in an endless circulation. This is, generally speaking, the case as to revenge: so that, if we consider it merely upon a *rational* foot, apart from *religion*, there appears to be very little sense or discretion in it. And as to *greatness* of *mind*, every one must be sensible, that it is brave and generous to put up wrongs and overlook offences; and that they, generally, are persons of the *weakest* and *feeblest* minds, who are most *sensible* of *injuries*, and most impatient for revenge.

Seeing then that wrath and revenge is really nothing else but the *triumph of passion over reason*, and of folly over discretion and good sense; every wise man would take care to assert and maintain the superiority of his reason, and not suffer himself to be enslaved and overcome by mean and foolish resentments.

2. But further, to advance to a yet *higher* consideration, put the case thus, or in these terms: suffer not any affronts or injuries to get the better of your *piety*, or of your *duty towards God*.

We learn from *Scripture* at least, if not from the *light of nature*, that all manner of vengeance belongs to God alone; so that the taking upon us to avenge ourselves is presuming too far, is usurping upon the undoubted rights and prerogative of the Supreme Being. "To me belongeth vengeance and recompense," says Almighty God[a]; or, as St. Paul words it and explains it at the same time, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay[b]." God permits us not to revenge or resent our own wrongs. We are no more than fellow creatures and fellow servants one with an-

[a] Deut. xxxii. 35. [b] Rom. xii. 19.

other: and if any offence be committed, it is sufficient for us to refer the complaint to him, the Judge of all, and our common Lord and Master. This is no more than every master of a family will demand; that any disputes or differences in his family among his servants be decided by him, and left to his censure and correction. God is an all-knowing Judge, and will exactly weigh the merits of the cause; and will, first or last, do us justice most effectually, when we are really wronged, if we leave it to him. But if we take the affair into our own hands, and resolve to do ourselves justice, we do not only run the risk of provoking and bringing upon us fresh injuries from men; but as we are provoking God all the time, we take the likely way to draw down his vengeance, not upon our *enemies*, but upon our *own heads*. The question then, in case of offences, lies plainly thus: will you leave it to God to punish them as they deserve; or will you take the matter into your own hands? Supposing the injury done you to be real and great, it may be *better* indeed for your enemies that you should take it in hand, to revenge it; but it is much the *worse* for yourselves. *Human power*, at best, is *weak* and *frail*; and, besides, is under the irresistible *check* and *control* of the *Divine hand*; so that it is infinitely uncertain, whether a man, ever so much disposed to revenge, can effect it. But if God undertakes to *do vengeance*, he does it *effectually*, and no arm can resist him. I say then, that in case of real injuries, the surest method of having them revenged is to commit the cause to God. And this is certainly the *best* and *safest method* that the injured party can take, in order to have redress and satisfaction. God can recompense us a thousand ways for any wrongs we receive at the hands of men: and if we entirely commit our cause to him, he will not only do us *justice*, but will shew us *mercy* also, and make us ample amends.

But a question here arises by the way, whether, after a man has referred his cause to God, laying aside all thoughts of revenging himself, he may then pray to God to avenge him; or may take pleasure in observing that the Divine vengeance has fallen down upon his adversary.

Much may be pleaded on both sides; but I must not run out into too tedious a digression. I shall however offer a few hints, and as briefly as may be. Our blessed Lord upon the cross prayed for his murderers; "Father, forgive them," &c. And St. Stephen also did the like; "Lord, lay not this sin to their

"charge." And even under the Old Testament, Solomon is commended, that, among other things in his prayer, he had not asked "the life of his enemies[c]." All this looks as if we were neither permitted to take vengeance ourselves upon any man, nor so much as to desire, or to take pleasure in, the Divine vengeance when brought upon our enemies; though one might think it should be matter of joy and comfort to us, as being of God's doing, being also a kind of *vindication* of our own *innocency*, or of the justice of the cause we had engaged in.

On the other hand, it may be observed, that there are many passages in the Old Testament, in the Psalms more especially, which look like plain *imprecations* upon the wicked: and even in the New Testament, God comforts his elect, by assuring them, that "he will avenge them speedily," that is, of their adversaries, as appears by what goes before[d]; which seems to suppose, that God's avenging a good man of his enemies may be a reasonable ground of joy and comfort to him. Add to this, that St. Paul, speaking of Alexander the coppersmith, as of one who had *done* him *much evil*, immediately subjoins, "The Lord reward "him according to his works[e];" which is a kind of imploring God's judgments upon him. And lastly, when St. Paul says, "If thy "enemy hunger, feed him; and if he thirst, give him drink," he enforces his advice by this consideration; "for in so doing thou "shalt heap coals of fire on his head[f];" which words, in their most natural construction, and as interpreted by the context, seem to mean, that in so doing thou shalt *accumulate* the *Divine vengeance* upon him, if he repents not. All which looks as if it were allowable, in *some cases*, both to *imprecate* the *Divine vengeance* upon *adversaries*, and to *rejoice in it* when it comes.

I have thus briefly represented the force of the arguments on both sides the question, for every reasonable man to judge of; and I will not presume to be dogmatical and positive either way: but what seems to me to come nearest to the truth is as follows.

The peace of the world is much concerned in this; that we never *avenge ourselves*, but refer *all vengeance to God*. This is the main thing; and if this be carefully observed, we may be the less solicitous about the rest. There is a *just pleasure* which a *good man* may take, in seeing the Divine vengeance fall upon very

[c] 1 Kings iii. 11. [d] Luke xviii. 8. [e] 2 Tim, iv. 14. [f] Rom. xii. 20.

bad men, because such men are enemies to mankind; and so *rejoicing* in *their fall* is *rejoicing* in the *public good:* and for the same reason it may not be improper, in some cases, to beg of God to curb, restrain, or punish them, in such a way as his wisdom shall see proper: and it is of such cases as these that I understand some scripture imprecations, if they be really such; which, besides, were pronounced by persons *extraordinarily commissioned* to imprecate, as from God.

As to *private injuries*, in which the public is very little or not at all concerned, there, as I conceive, there is no room left for *rejoicing* in the *Divine judgments* upon the *adversaries;* first, because we are very *uncertain* whether those judgments are brought upon them on any such account as we might fondly suppose; and next, because, as we are *all sinners*, we know not whether *we ourselves* are not justly liable to the *same* or *greater*. This only we may presume to think and do, if at any time God remarkably delivers us from the rage of an enemy, by afflicting him, or taking him out of the world; we may rejoice in our happy deliverance, and thank God for his indulgence towards us; but at the same time retaining a compassionate tenderness and charity for the unhappy man. So much for this point, which came in only by the way; and from which now I return to what I was before upon.

I had been observing, that we are in no case to avenge ourselves, but humbly and modestly to refer all vengeance to God. If we do otherwise, we suffer ourselves to be "overcome " of evil," contrary to the advice of the text: we let our *passions* prevail over us; that is, over *religion, conscience, duty*, and the reverence we owe to God; which, at length, is not *triumphing* over an adversary, as some may vainly imagine, but it is *meanly submitting* to sin and folly, and suffering the world, the flesh, and the devil to triumph over us.

3. Having shewn how we ought not to suffer any offence or injury to get the better of our *piety* towards God; I have but one step more to advance; namely, not to suffer it to prevail over our *charity* towards man.

This article I make *distinct* from the former, inasmuch as not *taking revenge* upon an adversary is one thing, and doing him *kind offices* is another. I say then, let not any injurious usage of an enemy prevent our *doing him good*. A great deal of what might be said upon this article may more properly fall under my

next general head; and therefore thither I refer it. Only here I may observe, that if any injuries *provoke* a man to withdraw such *friendly offices* as belong to *humanity*, he is then overcome by his resentments, and is too much a *slave to his passions*. It is one kind of revenge, and sometimes all the revenge which a man has in his power to take; and so is altogether *ungenerous* and *unjustifiable*. All that reason or scripture allows is, to defend and guard ourselves, as far as we *innocently* can, against such as mean us hurt; but not to *afflict them*, or put them to pain by way of retaliation; nor to leave them under hard necessity or distress, when we can, with safety to ourselves, step in to relieve them. When an enemy is reduced so low, as even to want the necessaries of life, or any way to stand in need of the succour of the man he hates, it would be a *mean* thing to refuse it. Every one who has any *spirit* of *generosity* or *Christian charity* would be glad, when such occasions offer, to have the *pleasure* of doing a kind thing, and to have it *kindly* accepted from him. "If thine "enemy hunger, feed him;" and "if he thirst, give him drink," says the Apostle, in this chapter: which now leads me to treat of the *second* part or precept of my text, which is *positive*.

II.

"Overcome evil with good." This implies all the *kind offices* towards an enemy which we are capable of doing, consistent with our *own safety* or with our *obligations* to *others*. Our blessed Lord's instructions upon this head may serve as a good comment upon this part of the text; "Love your enemies, bless them "that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for "them which despitefully use you, and persecute you: that ye "may be the children of your Father which is in heaven[5]," &c. This is what we are to do towards enemies, and this the way whereby we are to "overcome evil with good:" only it remains to shew *how*, or in what sense, this kind of conduct towards them is here called by the Apostle "overcoming evil with "good."

There are two ways of understanding this matter; as "over-"coming evil" may either mean conquering the enemy by *kindness*, so that he shall *cease* to do us evil; for then *the evil is overcome*, is quashed, and put an end to: or it may mean persisting and persevering to the last in *doing good against evil*,

[5] Matt. v. 44, 45.

(when the adversary is not at all softened or altered by it;) for this, if it be not quashing, or putting an end to the adversary's malignity, is yet being *above* it, and maintaining a kind of *superiority* over it. But both these articles will want to be explained more distinctly.

1. First, I say, the "overcoming evil with good" may be understood of *conquering an enemy by kindness*, so that he may cease to malign us: for then *the evil is overcome*, as it is quashed and put an end to. A generous enemy will be wrought upon this way, and become a friend: though it must be owned, that men of mean and abject tempers will be always both more insulting and more cruel for such kind usage. Nevertheless, the same kind usage is to be shewn to *both*; because we know not *who* may at length prove to be of a generous temper, and *who* not; but principally because *God requires it*; and if such conduct has not the desired effect, as to melting the adversary into kindness, yet we are sure to have our reward for our charity *another way*, at the hands of Almighty God. But to proceed. It may frequently be observed, that, after contests or differences have arisen between man and man, if *either* side does but leave off saying or doing *spiteful things*, a quarrel soon dies, and the men become friends. How much more may we suppose such effect to follow, if either of the parties does not only forbear every thing provoking, but, over and above, says and does *kind* and *good-natured things* to oblige his adversary; the breach will then probably be made up the *sooner*, and the friendship afterwards last the *longer*. Such a conduct contributes much to the peace of society and to the general good of mankind; which is alone sufficient to recommend it with every wise and considering man. And that it may not be suspected that there is any thing of *tameness* or *mean-spiritedness* in this conduct, the advantage, in point of *dignity* and esteem, really lies on the side of the good-natured and peaceable man. There is a *greatness of mind* shewn in being *above* little piques and childish altercations; there is triumph and *conquest* seen in the *command* a man has over his own *temper* and *passions*; and there is further a most glorious *victory* gained over his adversary, while he thus conquers him by kindness, and goes beyond him in wise conduct and generosity. Upon all which account, the kind and peaceable man is so far from *sinking* his character, that he *raises it the more* by such handsome demeanour, and attracts the reverence

and esteem of all discerning judges. Besides all which, he has the pleasure and comfort of having a friend and companion to himself, instead of an enemy; and the satisfaction also of having *made* him *such*, which is like the making of a convert or the healing of a patient; as it is laying his passions, and correcting the disorders of his mind. And this is the first way of "overcoming evil with good." But because such effect does not *always* follow, for there are some stubborn tempers which no kindnesses can mollify, I must observe, secondly,

2. That there is yet another kind of conquest to be obtained, by persisting and persevering in *doing good against evil*. For though you do not thus conquer the man's *pride* or ill-nature, yet you conquer your own *passions;* and at the same time maintain such a *superiority* over the enemy's malice, that it shall not be able either to conquer your good nature, or draw you off from your steady principles of *love* and *charity*. There is a kind of contest and emulation in such a case, which shall be first weary and vanquished, the *malice* and *iniquity* of *one*, or the *patience* and *goodness* of the *other*. He who abides and persists in doing good against evil, may be said to be a person of *invincible* kindness and generosity, unconquerable love and charity. In this manner Moses held out against the infinite obloquies, murmurings, and revilings of the Israelites in the wilderness, still obliging and serving them, and praying for them. Thus also David persisted in his duty and loyalty towards Saul, notwithstanding all the ill usage he met with from him; and no imaginable rudeness, malice, or persecution, could at all move or shake his most invincible constancy and fidelity. And to name no more, our blessed Lord himself was a bright example of the like love and charity to the last, "going about doing good," both to friends and foes, weeping over Jerusalem which thirsted for his blood; and at length praying for his murderers while he hung upon the cross. This is "overcoming evil with good;" to stand firm and unshaken in love and kindness, against all provocations and ill usage. It is triumphing over the adversary, to shew that, with all his rage and inveteracy, he shall *never be able* so much as to tempt you to *retaliate*, or to move you to do like him. Let him proceed as he pleases, he shall never make you stoop to do any thing *mean*, or to act a part *unworthy of yourself*. This is noble and manly carriage: and he who thus acts, though he does not *soften* his adversary, yet has plainly the

advantage of him, and triumphs over him. God so deals with sinners, and so should we: for when neither his sunshine warms them into a love of him, nor his showers have any force to soften them into compliance with him; yet he persists in sending both, making "his sun to rise on the evil and on the good; and "sending rain on the just and on the unjust[h]."

I know but one objection of any moment against this conduct, which is this; that it may seem to give too much encouragement to malicious men to persist in their iniquity; and may also strengthen their hands against ourselves, to do us the more mischief: to which I answer, that, were it really true, that it carried this *single inconvenience* with it; yet, so long as there are *innumerable conveniences* on the *other* side, more than sufficient to counterbalance it, this *single* difficulty ought to be no objection against it. But I have this thing to add further; that the principles which I have been maintaining do not oblige a man to lay himself open to his enemy, or to give *himself* up into *his power*. He may do him *kind offices*, without making a *friend* or a *confident* of him; may oblige and serve him, without running into his arms. "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, "give him drink." The scripture bids us be kind and generous; and yet bids us also *beware of ill men*, and not to deliver ourselves up tamely and thoughtlessly into their hands. Love and charity are *one* thing; easiness and folly *another*. Be well assured of a man's friendship, before you admit him into your retirements and confidence; but be he ever so malicious, yet serve him, at a *proper distance;* and oblige him also if you can, but without betraying or exposing *yourself*. Indeed as to any distant and imaginary dangers from an enemy, strengthened in some measure by your favours towards him, those must be risked: and God's *providence* is our *security* in *such cases*, as in a thousand others, where a thing equally *may* or *may not* happen. Distant surmises and mere suspicions are too slight to deserve any regard, or to bear any weight in this *important* matter.

To conclude then: let the duty of the text stand in its full force, notwithstanding the objection which I have been answering. And now, after explaining the duty as far as seemed necessary, it remains only that we go and put it in practice. Which that we may, God of his mercy grant, &c.

[h] Matt. v. 45.

SERMON XVIII.

The Nature and Purport of our Lord's Parable of the *Publican* and *Pharisee*.

LUKE xviii. 14.

I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.

THESE words are the conclusion of a noted *parable*, which our Lord delivered for a just rebuke upon pride and censoriousness. He "spake" it "unto certain" persons, who trusted in "themselves that they were righteous and despised others." The parable itself runs thus: "Two men went up into the "temple to pray; the one a Pharisee, and the other a Publican. "The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, God, I "thank thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, "unjust, adulterers, or even as this Publican. I fast twice "in the week, I give tithes of all that I possess." So said the assuming, self-admiring Pharisee. But in the mean while the modest and humble Publican, "standing afar off, would not lift "up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his "breast, saying, God be merciful to me a sinner." Now our Lord's reflection upon the whole case, after thus comparing the two men and their manners, was; "I tell you, this Publican "went down to his house justified rather than the Pharisee: "for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he "that humbleth himself shall be exalted."

The Pharisee, it seems, was a man of a strict, regular life, *religious* in his deportment towards God, and *righteous* also in his outward dealings towards men; but withal he was full of *spiritual pride* and *censoriousness*. The Publican was a man of the world, given perhaps to *extortions* and exactions, (the common vices of his *profession*,) but *modest* however, and *unpretending*, and if not *thoroughly penitent*, yet in a *fair way* towards it, in a *fit disposition* for it. Our Lord does not say, *absolutely*, that *either* of the two was *justified*; but he speaks *comparatively*, that *one* was so "rather than the other." The Publican's *loose life*, if not thoroughly corrected and reformed, would *condemn him*; and the Pharisee's *pride* and *censoriousness* would *condemn him*: but still, in the mean season, the Publican's *humility* before God would be found *more acceptable*, notwithstanding his *otherwise irregular life*, than the Pharisee's *religious strictness could be*, while *tarnished with censoriousness, ostentation*, and *pride* of heart: for "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the "humble[a]." So much in the *general*. But for our clearer understanding the *nature* and *purport* of this parable, and the *practical uses* to be made of it, I shall proceed to a more *distinct view* of its *several parts*, pointing out the *doctrinal observations* which naturally arise from them.

1. We may take notice, that, be a man's life and conversation otherwise ever so *religious* and *regular*; yet, if he is *proud* and *censorious* all the time, *assuming* upon his *performances*, and *reflecting* hardly on his *neighbour's*, that man's *religion* and *regularity* is vain; he shall not be justified in God's sight. His *self-admiration* and his *contempt of others* will more than counterbalance his pretences to virtue, and will cancel, in a manner, all his godliness.

The Pharisee began well; "God, I thank thee:" he should have added, "if I have any thing praiseworthy in me, or have "done any thing acceptable in thy sight; for it is all owing to "thy *grace*, and in *myself* I am *nothing*." Such an address to the Divine Majesty might have been modest and becoming; especially if he had gone on to enumerate his many or great offences, and humbly to implore pardon for them: but instead of this, he says, "God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men "are, extortioners," &c. What had he to do, to come before

[a] James iv. 6. 1 Pet. v. 5. Prov. iii. 34.

God with *accusations* in his mouth against *other* men; perhaps false and injurious, but most certainly foreign and impertinent? The sins or failings of *other* persons was no concern of his in his prayers: but *self-accusation* or *self-humiliation* might have come very decently and properly from him, in his supplications to an offended God. He was disposed to *dwell only* on his *imaginary perfections*, and to *throw a veil* over his *sins*. His *self-flattery* prompted him to magnify his *own services*, taking a *false estimate* of himself from an ill-natured *comparison*, which could serve only to deceive him, rather than justify him. For what if some others were really *worse* than *he* in *some* certain respects? it would not follow from thence, that he was *better* than *they* upon the *whole*; much less, that he had any just pretence for *boasting* before God.

The Publican, with better colour, (had his modesty permitted,) might have said, "God, I thank thee, that I am not as some "men are; *proud, uncharitable, censorious*, or even as *this Pha-* "*risee:* I *boast not* of my *own virtues*, I confess my transgressions, "and am ready to make all due allowances for the failings of "others, as much as for my own." Such a prayer as this (though far from becoming or proper) might as reasonably have been offered up by the Publican, as the other by the Pharisee: but *both* would have been wrong: for the important question, which every conscientious person has to ask himself, is, not whether his life and conversation be *comparatively* better, in whole or in part, than what he *commonly sees*; but whether it be *simply* and *plainly such* as the *Gospel requires*. He may often *mistake* in thinking *himself better* than his *neighbours*, whom he may chance to judge too hardly of: but were he ever so clear and certain in that point, it concerns him little; because, allowing it to be true, *he* may still be *far from perfect*, and may *fall very short* of the *Gospel rule*.

Besides, if, instead of looking into his *failures*, he chooses only to make *ostentation* of his own real or imaginary advances in *godliness*; and if, instead of *condemning himself*, he affects rather to lay heavy charges upon *others*; he may then be certain, that he is *proud* and *censorious:* and those black vices of the mind are as odious in God's sight, or perhaps more odious, than any other offences which can be named; being utterly repugnant to the two great commandments, the *love of God* and the *love of our neighbour*.

And there is this further consideration to shew the dangerous nature of those vices; that while they render a man *vain* and *self-confident*, they leave him in no disposition to *repent*, but serve only to buoy him up under a *false conceit* that he *needs no repentance*. They who are once swelled with an high opinion of their *present attainments* will be the last who will ever think of *reforming* or *improving* their lives.

This is what our blessed Lord had an eye to, when he said to the chief priests and Pharisees, in the way of solemn rebuke, "Verily I say unto you, that the Publicans and the harlots go into "the kingdom of God before you[b]." Why so? might some ask; what, were those loose and *profligate creatures* at all worthy to be compared with those devout and religious men, men of *strict life* and exemplary conversation, to all appearance? Yes, *they* were *worthy* so far: because those *profligate creatures* were sometimes *humble* enough to *repent*, and they *did* repent; but the other sort, who had faults also, and great ones, (though not so scandalous,) had withal so much *pride* and high-mindedness, that they imagined it more their business to sit as *censors* and correctors over *all mankind*, than to confess their *own sins*, or to *repent* of them. In this view, though they were *otherwise* persons of *sober lives*, and of great regularity, in the eyes of the world, they were yet the *furthest of any* from the *kingdom of God*. *Spiritual pride*, accompanied with *censoriousness* and haughty disdain, are vices of so *malignant* a nature, and so *provoking* in *God's sight*, that they effectually *cancel all our virtues*, if we may call them *virtues*: in a strict sense, we have *no virtue, no religion, no acceptable grace* at all, if we are *void of humility*.

2. I may next take notice, that the Publican's *humility* before God and man, though joined with an *irregular life*, was what gave him the *preference* in our Lord's esteem: not that he could be *justified* in a loose course of life, but he was in a *nearer way* to it than the proud Pharisee; because *nearer to repentance* and *reformation*. His faults indeed were great, (extortion perhaps, and such other irregularities as are commonly met with in secular men,) but nevertheless they were faults of such a kind, as did not *foreclose* all *reformation* or amendment. While there was *humility* yet left in him, and a becoming sense of his own sins and infirmities, and of his need of divine mercy, there was good

[b] Matt. xxi. 31.

hope of *repentance*, and some *fair advances* made towards it. He durst not *presume* so much as to *look up* towards heaven, *conscious* of his *own vileness:* there was *modesty;* there was *remorse* and *profound reverence* for God whom he had offended. He had *no claims* to make, *no services to boast of,* at least not *before God:* but yet he cast not away all hopes of favour, while he smote upon his breast, and said, "God be merciful to me a "sinner!" Merciful, first, to *give him grace* to amend his life; and next, to *pardon all his offences* duly *repented of:* for so, as I conceive, we may presume to interpret. We cannot well understand this his *humble* and *modest* ejaculation as so many words of course, such as *hardened sinners* might at times be willing to throw out; for then our Lord would not have said what he has said in his favour: neither, on the other hand, do I see reason sufficient in the text to persuade us, that the Publican had yet *changed his sinful course* of life; for what great matter were it to say, that a *reformed* Publican is a better man than an *unreformed* Pharisee, a *proud, censorious* Pharisee? But the truth of the case, and the true purport of the *parable,* appears to be, (as I have before hinted,) that an *humble* Publican, disposed towards repentance, is, with all his *vices*, more *acceptable to God,* than a *proud, censorious* Pharisee, with all his strictness, sobriety, and regularity. And the reason of the *preference* here given resolves into this; that the *one* was *penitent in part*, or in *some degree,* and was in a *fair way* to a thorough change of *heart* and *life;* while the *other* remained *altogether impenitent;* so far from *correcting* or *amending his life*, that he had not so much as a *sense of his being a sinner,* or of his *needing any repentance.*

God has such regard to *humility of spirit,* even in persons *otherwise vicious*, that he looks the *more favourably* upon them on *that score;* which appeared in the case of king Ahab: "Seest "thou" (said God to Elijah the prophet) "how Ahab humbleth "himself before me? because he humbleth himself before me, I "will not bring the evil in his days[c]," &c. Ahab's *humiliation* was real and *sincere, for the time;* but it amounted not to a full and *perfect repentance.* He continued a very *bad man* in many respects, notwithstanding such his *sincere humiliation* for the *time being:* yet, because he did not behave *proudly,* as some before him had done, after divine sentence passed upon him, but *humbled*

[c] 1 Kings xxi. 29.

himself before God and the world; therefore God *remitted* part of the punishment *otherwise due* unto him. *Such regard* was had to *humility* in that instance, shewing itself only in some *transient acts*, which were far short of a full and *perfect repentance*.

These things considered, we may from thence learn to *judge the more favourably* of some kind of persons, whom we may sometimes see led away by the *vehemence* and *impetuosity* of their *vices* or *passions*; but *condemning themselves* all the time, and *humbly suing* to God for mercy and pardon. For though God will not *pardon* them till they *change their sinful course* of life, and thoroughly amend their ways; yet their *present humiliation* and *self-abasement* is a *promising symptom*, which may have its use, and will not *want its reward*. God will, on *that account*, be the *more inclined* to give them *grace* to *perfect their repentance*. It is a scripture maxim, laid down in the Psalms[d], repeated in the Proverbs[e], inculcated also by St. James[f], and again by St. Peter[g], that "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the "humble." An *humble* sinner is in a way to *forsake* his sins. His *self-abasement* is *one degree* of *penitence*; and according as he becomes more and more *humble*, so God will supply more and more *grace*, to work in him a *thorough change* both of heart and life. The *proud* Pharisee, though he had made great advances in *outside virtue* and godliness, yet, by indulging his *pride* and *self-flattery*, he not only *checked his further progress*, but really *went backward* and lost ground: while the *humble* Publican, though hitherto *unpractised in virtue* and piety, was however *entering upon it*, and was upon the *improving hand*: and therefore it was, that *this man* went down to his house *justified* rather than the *other*. But,

3. The use which we are to make of the *two cases* taken together is, to *reject* what was *bad* in *both*; and to *adopt* what was *praiseworthy* in *either*. The Pharisee was a person of a *strict and sober life*, but he was *proud*: the Publican was *humble*, but withal he was a person of *loose morals*. Both were *blamable* in their *several ways*, while, in *other respects*, both deserved *commendation*; the Publican especially, to whom our Lord gave the *preference*. What then are we to learn from all? *Reject* the Pharisee's *pride* and *censoriousness*; and *reject* also the Publican's *loose morals*. Put on the Pharisee's *strict kind of life*, together

[d] Psalm cxxxviii. 6. [e] Prov. iii. 34. [f] James iv. 6. [g] 1 Pet. v. 5.

with the Publican's *humility*, and then all will be right. To make the advice the clearer, I shall now severally treat of both parts.

1. First, I say, let it be our care to follow what was really *good* and *commendable* in the Pharisee. He was no *extortioner*; he *wronged* no man in his property; he was no *adulterer*, or the like: our Lord does not charge him with saying any thing *false* of himself: his report, probably, was *true*: but he was blamable for *boasting* even of what was fact. Besides his *negative* accomplishments, that he was *no extortioner*, *no unjust dealer*, and *no adulterer*; he had something further to plead: he made up his weekly accounts with God; he "fasted twice in the week;" and with his fasting, we may presume, he joined serious and solemn devotions: and, to shew his further respect for God, he *paid* what the *Law* had ordered to God's *authorized ministers*; he *paid tithes* of all that he possessed, in a punctual manner, and in a way altogether blameless; excepting that he was *proud* of doing it.

We have here, to all appearance, a very fair and very exemplary character drawn to the life, and allowed also to be true. Follow him therefore *so far*, namely, in his *sobriety*, his *temperance*, and his *chastity*; in his *honest* and *upright dealings* between man and man; and likewise in his *weekly care* to *settle his accounts with God*. *Fasting* may properly be added to *devotions*, in order to raise them higher, or to fix them yet stronger upon the heart: but this must be understood with allowances, according as health, or leisure, or opportunities, or other circumstances favour. The Pharisee found leisure, or he made leisure, sufficient for it; and he did well in it, if he could but have been content not to *boast* of it, nor to *value himself too much* upon it, nor to pass hard *censures* upon *others*, as falling far short of *him*, in those respects.

Take we care then, to distinguish the *good part* from the *evil part*, and to set it before us for our approbation and imitation. Follow not the Publican in his *loose life*, in his irregular or careless ways; but rather follow the Pharisee in his *strict course* of life, and in his circumspect conduct, whereby he hoped to please God; and wherein he could not have failed, if he had but been as *humble* and candid in heart, as he was *strict* and exemplary in life.

2. Therefore, secondly, after taking care to live the *sober* and *exemplary life* of the Pharisee, make we it our chief endeavour to superadd thereto the *humility* and *candour* of the Publican; that so we "may be perfect and entire, thoroughly furnished "unto every good work."

But this, perhaps, may be thought a very hard lesson. I could be content, says one, to live a *pious, sober, exemplary life*; but surely, after taking so much pains, I have a right to *value myself* upon it, and to think much better of myself than of my less considering neighbours. I could be content, says another, to entertain very *low opinions* of *myself*, and to become vile in my own eyes, and often to cry out, "God be merciful to me a "sinner," provided only that I may but be permitted to indulge my own heart's *lusts*, and continue in my *darling sins*.

But neither of these ways will answer the purpose. We must be *holy* in all conversation and godliness, and yet as *humble* as if we had no virtues at all: we must every one of us do our utmost to serve and please Almighty God; and when we have done all, be content at length to smite our breasts, and say, "God be merciful to me a sinner." The reason is, because our very best services are imperfect; and "if we say that we have "no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Now, when we come to make our addresses before God, he does not want to be told how holy, or how religious, or how perfect we are: he is a better judge of that than we can pretend to be; and he knows our failings and deficiencies. Neither can it be of any use to us, to look only on the brighter side, and to hide the rest, lest we be tempted to stop there, and to conceive that we need nothing further. Our business is to be always advancing and pressing forwards, and not so much to consider what we have *already gained*, as what we *still want*. Look we therefore upon our *failings*, and lay them before God: not because he *does not know* them, but because he alone can *supply* them, either with new succours of his *grace*, or with repeated acts of *pardon*. This is the reason why *confession of sins* (which the Pharisee omitted) ought always to make a principal part of our prayers: and another as essential a part is, to throw ourselves entirely upon the all-sufficient *merits* and *mediation* of Christ Jesus our Lord. *Innocence* of our own we have none to appear in before God: broken innocence, made up in some measure by true *repentance*, is the utmost *perfection* that fallen man can pretend to: and all

that would be too little and too impure for God's acceptance, were it not further recommended, and made worthy, by the all-prevailing *atonement* and *intercession* of Christ.

Enough has been said to take away all pretence or colour for *spiritual pride*. It was not *pardonable* in the *angels;* because, though they had very *great perfections*, yet they *owed* them all to *God:* but it is *monstrous* in *man*, because *man* has *no perfection* in comparison to the other; and even *that little* which he has is all *owing* to the *grace* of God.

I would not be understood, by any thing I have here said, to lessen the real and *solid satisfaction* of a *well-spent life*. The *most profound humility* is *perfectly consistent* with *full peace of mind*, and will rather add to it, than take any thing from it. A man may be very *sensible* of his having faithfully *discharged his duty*, without *over-valuing himself* upon it. And though he knows that his *best services* are *imperfect*, and that his *infirmities* are *great*, and his *failings many*, and that he can have no strict *claim to a pardon*, much less to a *reward;* yet he knows withal, that such his *sincere*, though *imperfect* services, (being as much as, *humanly speaking*, he is capable of performing,) will be accepted *as perfect*, through the *merits* and *mediation* of him who *is perfect:* and from these considerations taken together, there will arise an *inward calm*, a *peaceful serenity* in every good man's breast. And though I will not say, but that a *self-admirer* may, through some strong delusion, depart hence as *confident*, or *more* confident of his *own salvation*, than the *most humble saint* may do; yet I know not whether such *false confidence* brings with it so *divine a pleasure*, as a more *rational* and more *modest assurance* will do: or if it should, yet the changing of the scene will soon manifest the difference between a *wise man's humble expectations* and a *fool's paradise*.

So much for the Publican's *humility* with regard to *himself:* I should next throw in a word or two of his *candour* or his *charity* with respect to *others;* as to which also he deserves both our admiration and imitation. He brought in no *invidious*, no *ill-natured reflections* upon *others:* he condemned no man, he accused no man but *himself*. He might have pleaded the many evil examples of a wicked world, to screen himself the better behind a crowd, or to make himself appear the fairer, by producing them as foils to himself: but he was wiser than to offer such poor excuses, such thin coverings as those, to an all-seeing God:

neither would he be hasty to *condemn others*, while he was *imploring mercy for himself*: he *knew* what offences *himself* had been guilty of: he *knew nothing* certainly of *others*, but that it was *no business of his to accuse* them before God, or to make *himself* a judge over *them*: this part of his conduct was wise and commendable; and *so far* he stands *recommended to us*, as a pattern for us to copy after.

Not that we are hereby totally prohibited forming *comparisons* between *ourselves* and *others*; for how is it possible altogether to avoid it? Neither is there any thing amiss in endeavouring to go beyond many, in our religious advances, or in *believing that we do so*, when we have *grounds sufficient* for it: neither is it necessary for an *humble man* to think himself *worse* than he *really is*, or to *condemn himself* as the *vilest* of sinners, and the like: he may be allowed to think *justly*, and according to *truth*, as well with respect to *himself*, as with respect to *other* persons; for nothing *unreasonable* or *untrue* can be expected of us, or be well-pleasing to God. The fault of the *assuming* Pharisee lay in the making a *false* estimate of *himself*, and a *false* judgment also of *others*, upon the comparison. He was not so good a man, in the main, as the despised Publican; but his *pride*, *disdain*, and *insolence*, (as black vices as any can be,) shewed him to be one of the *vilest* of sinners.

Take we care then to live circumspectly in our whole conduct, obeying every commandment of God, and guarding against all kind of vices; but more particularly against *pride* (spiritual pride) and *censoriousness*; uncreaturely sins, odious and abominable in God's sight. An *humble temper* of mind is the *root of all virtue*, and the perfection also of all godly living. The way to attain it and to preserve it is to dwell much and often upon our *failings* and *miscarriages*, upon our natural *proneness to evil*, and upon the many *imperfections* even of our *best services*; remembering that we are *nothing in ourselves*, but that all *our sufficiency* is *of God*; and that *that very sufficiency* will not render us accepted, without the additional *imputed merits* of our Saviour Christ.

If we are minded to compare ourselves with other persons, we may look into the exemplary lives and deaths of *saints* and *martyrs*, recorded in Scripture or in Church history; observing what *labours*, what *watchings*, what *fastings*, what *fatigues*, what *torments* they waded through, for the kingdom of heaven; *humble*

all the while, and *lowly* in their *own eyes*, looking upon themselves as no better than *unprofitable servants* of the Lord whom they served; as indeed they were no better.

May we follow such bright examples, at an humble distance, and in such a degree as we are capable of doing! that, while *they* shine as stars of the *first magnitude* in the kingdom of heaven, *we* may hope, however, after a well-spent life, to be received into some *lower* rank in the same everlasting habitations.

SERMON XIX.

The *general* Rule of God's Dealing with Mankind; and the *same* applied to the Case of Jews and Gentiles at large, and of Christians in particular, compared with each other.

MATTHEW XX. 16.

So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many be called, but few chosen.

THESE words conclude the parable of the labourers hired into the vineyard at several different hours of the day; the *morning* hour, the *third* hour, the *sixth*, the *ninth*, and the *eleventh*.

The Jewish way of computing their time was, to begin with sunrise, and to end with sunset; reckoning *twelve* hours to the day: whereas our way, now in use, begins at midnight, and ends at mid-day; which makes six hours difference in the order of computation.

To understand the several hours at which the labourers were hired, they were, in our style, and according to our reckoning, thus: early in the morning, about *six*, the *first* labourers were hired; then again at *nine* in the morning were hired *more;* at *twelve*, our noon, *more* still; and at *three* in the afternoon, *more;* the *last* of all at *five* in the afternoon, answering to what the Jews called the *eleventh* hour.

At these several times, the householder in the parable hired

labourers to work in his vineyard: and when "the even was "come," that is, *six* o'clock at night, the lord of the vineyard was to pay them for their day's work. Some of them had been labouring the *whole day*, from *six* to *six*, twelve hours; others from *nine* to *six;* others from *twelve* to *six;* others from *three* to *six;* and the last of all but a *single hour*, from *five* to *six*. Now the lord of the vineyard, however unequal their times of labour had been, was yet pleased to give them all the very same wages: that is, he paid every man the usual wages for a *whole day's work;* beginning at the last, and so going on to the first. The *first* had no just reason to complain, because they were paid their *full hire*, as much as they had agreed for, and as much as any man could reasonably demand for a day's work: they had therefore no injustice done them: but yet, it seems, they were not well pleased, but "murmured against the "good man of the house," for being so beneficent and liberal to others: "These last," say they, "have wrought but one hour, "and thou hast made them equal unto us, which have borne the "burden and heat of the day." They could not pretend that he had given them *too little*, or that their work deserved *more;* but their complaint was, that he had been barely *just* to them, when he had been *kind* and liberal to others: and upon this they were disposed to murmur; putting in their claim to an *equal share* in their lord's goodness and generosity. In return to their complaint, the lord of the vineyard thus answers one of them: "Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me "for a penny? Take that thine is, and go thy way: I will give "unto this last, even as unto thee. Is it not lawful for me to "do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil, because I am "good?"—And thus ended the parable. The moral of it then follows: "So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many "be called, but few chosen." The parable was undoubtedly intended to represent *God's dealings with mankind*, in regard both to their *outward call* to the *means of grace*, and to the *future retribution* in a state of glory. For the further clearing of the whole, my design is,

I. To state the thing in *general;* shewing upon what *general rules* and maxims *God's dealings* with mankind are founded.

II. To apply those *general rules* to the case of Jews and Gentiles at large, and of Christians in particular, compared with each other.

I.

I shall endeavour to state the thing in *general;* shewing upon what *general rules* and maxims *God's dealings* with mankind are founded.

1. We may lay it down for a certain truth, or maxim, that "God is no respecter of persons," nor subject to any partial fondness in the distributions of his favours. All his disposals are *strictly just* and *equitable*, founded in reasons of consummate wisdom, goodness, and equity. His favours indeed are free; and he may "do what he will with his own:" he may call whom he pleases to the *means of grace* here, and so to *eternal happiness* hereafter. It is of his own pure goodness that he either *created* or has *redeemed* any man; or that he shall confer eternal happiness upon him. No one has any strict claim upon him in any of these respects, that he should presume to call God his debtor, or to murmur against him, as doing him any wrong, by withholding from him such blessings as are merely matter of free bounty and favour. And this is intimated in a lively manner by the parable, to prevent all aspiring thoughts and proud assumings; to keep men humble and modest, especially in their claims upon God, the Lord of the whole universe, and the sovereign Judge of all the world. Nevertheless, we may be allowed to think, nay, we are bound both to think and say, that, saving to God his absolute freedom and sovereignty, he has such a regard, not only to strict justice, but even to equity too, in all his dealings with men, as to observe an *exact equality* and *proportion* in his distributions towards them: which in many cases may appear plain to us; and would so in all, were we let into the whole secret of the Divine conduct, and could see through all the circumstances: and therefore, whenever God is represented in holy scripture as acting *arbitrarily*, and after his own *will and pleasure*, the design of it is only this; that it is sufficient for us low creatures to know that it is *his pleasure;* we ought to acquiesce and rest satisfied in it; though at the same time it be certain (and so much we ought to infer) that, *because it is* his pleasure, it is *therefore* wise, just, and good; whether we see the reasons for it, or whether we do not. We are certain in the general, and so much scripture itself, as well as true and sound reason, informs us, that a strict *proportion* is observed in *God's dealings* with men; and that all *equitable considerations* are constantly taken into account. "To whomsoever much is given, of

"him shall be much required;" and to whomsoever less is given, the less shall be demanded of him.

It appears likewise from scripture, compared with scripture, that there will be *degrees* both of *rewards* and *punishments* hereafter, in *proportion* to the *merits* and *demerits* of persons here; that so all *seeming inequalities* will then be fully *adjusted*, and every account equitably balanced at the great day of retribution.

This being premised, and fixed as a general and standing rule of God's dealings with men, I now proceed to observe in particular,

2. That, as to the instance of the *labourers* in the parable, who were not rewarded in *proportion* to their *respective services*, all we ought to conclude from it is this; that the *length* of their labours, or the *time* taken up therein, was *not* the *only thing* to be considered: there were *other* circumstances to be taken into account, in order to a due and just *proportion* in the *retribution*. Perhaps, those who wrought but a *few hours*, or but *one hour*, were *as willing* to work as others could be; only they had not the good fortune to be hired so soon. Perhaps they might be in *more pain* and *uneasiness* for *want* of work, and might really suffer more trouble on that account, than others found in their day's labour. Perhaps, after they were hired, they might work with *ten times* the *diligence* and application that the others did. When an all-wise God appoints the work, and is to distribute the wages, every minute circumstance shall be exactly weighed and considered. It is not with him as with an earthly master, so much service, so much wages; neither is it computed by the *time* spent in the mere *outward* service: men thus deal with one another; because they can look no further than to the *outward* work; and because they propose only to have the work done, for the supplying their own occasions: but a wise and good God knows and considers *all* circumstances; makes allowances for necessary lets and impediments; looks at the *men*, as well as at the *work*; at their *tempers*, their *dispositions*, their *heartiness*, and *forwardness*, in what they do; and, upon the whole, states and balances the account with an unerring exactness. And when he gives us no other reason for what he does herein, but that it is his pleasure to do so: *that* ought to satisfy us, because his pleasure is always founded upon great and weighty considerations, though perhaps not known to us, or such as we are not capable of knowing. That the case is really so, we may learn

from some plain intimations given us by our Lord himself. Mary, the sister of Martha, is represented as a *late penitent*, and one who had once been a very *sinful woman:* but then, as her *sins* had been extraordinary, so was her *repentance* also: and accordingly our Lord said of her, "her sins, which are many, are "forgiven, because she loved much." Here we may perceive, how the *rule of proportion* was exactly observed in that particular instance: and we may justly infer from thence, that the same equitable measures are as exactly followed in all God's dealings whatsoever.

3. I may observe, that the same thing is intimated, though more obscurely, in the *parable itself;* and especially in the *conclusion*, which makes part of my text, in these words, "many "are called, but few are chosen;" which is the reason given, why sometimes "the last shall be first, and the first last." It is an advantage, most certainly, to have been *first called:* it is an advantage likewise to have been long listed into God's service, and to have been, as it were, all the day working: but still these advantages, great as they are, may be more than compensated by a *superabundant zeal*, *fervour*, and *earnestness*, in those who *came later*. By their *greater alacrity* and *redoubled speed*, they may *outrun* those who had got the *start* of them. They may advance far in a little time, by taking large strides and quick paces; and so may get *beyond those* who had *set out* long before them, but had been *slack*, and *loitering*, in comparison: and thus "the last may be first, and the first last."

It is true, if the *first* had been exceeding active and diligent, and had made the *utmost advantage* possible of their *early setting out;* it would not then have been *possible* for those who *came later* to *outstrip* them, or ever to *come up* to them: but here lies the case; there are but few such persons in comparison: few who have so much zeal, perseverance, and assiduity in a long course: "many are called, but few are chosen." Many are called into God's service, and many also go on with it, faintly however, and languidly: but there are few of that *eminent*, that heavenly, that *chosen* and godlike stamp, as to *begin*, *continue*, and *persevere to the end*, with *due fervour* and *constancy:* and because many grow *weary*, or *faint* upon the progress, and do not make all the use they might of the advantages they have had by their *early call;* therefore it is, that the *last comers* will many times be *preferred* to the *first*, and so *the last will be first*

in God's favour and esteem, and the *first last*; though *both* shall be *rewarded*, not in proportion to the *time spent* in the service, but to their *respective zeal* and *earnestness* in it.

The meaning of the word *chosen*, in the text, is much the same with *eminent*, or *extraordinary*; in such a sense as St. Paul is called a *chosen* vessel, and Christians a *chosen* generation: so we read of *chosen* men of Israel, *choice* cedars, *choice* city, *choice* gold, *choicest* vines, and the like; meaning *excellent* or *eminent* in their *respective kinds*. There are but few such *chosen* or *eminent* saints, in comparison to the whole number *called*: yet they, and they only, shall be reckoned of the *first* rank in God's kingdom, whether they came in soon or late. Such is the main drift and *purport* of the parable, with the *application* of it: which being understood, it is so far from arguing any *partiality* or *unequal dealing* on God's part, in respect of his favours, that it is a full proof of the *contrary*: for he is not led by any *outward appearances*, or by any *length of the work*, merely considered as *outward* work; but his disposals are founded upon true and *real virtue*, upon those *inward qualities* and ornaments of the mind which make a *truly good man*, and which distinguish God's best and most faithful saints and servants from others of much lower attainments. But because the parable carries in it *two several views*; one respecting the case of the Jews and Gentiles at *that time*; the other respecting *all persons* in *all times* to come; I design now,

II.

To apply these *general principles* to the *two particular cases* now mentioned.

1. As to Jews and Gentiles, there was this remarkable difference betwixt them; that the Jews had the advantage of a more *early call*; *they* had been entered into covenant *from the first*: while the Gentiles were not *hired* till the *third*, *sixth*, *ninth*, or *eleventh* hour. The *first invitation* in the *morning* is a plain allusion to the *case of the Jews*; as the *later invitations* set forth the *case of the Gentiles*. Every circumstance almost of the parable carries in it a tacit allusion to *one* or *other* of them.

The Jews had, for several ages backwards, been taken into *God's vineyard*, and admitted into *his service*; while *other nations* were suffered to walk in their *own ways*: and even in the *Gospel times*, when the Gentiles also were to be brought in; yet the *Gospel* was *first preached* to the Jews, both by our Lord himself

and his Apostles after him. The Jews had constantly the *preference* given them; the *first tenders* of salvation were made to *them;* and nothing was so much as *offered* or *proposed* to the Gentiles, till the Jews had the *first refusal* of the same privileges. The Jews also were the men who *murmured* and complained, as having "borne the heat and burden of the day," and as expecting, on that account, to be *eminently distinguished* above the Gentiles in the nature, and quality, and greatness of the *final rewards.* Even the best kind of Jews, those who *accepted the Gospel terms,* and came into *Christ's covenant,* yet had a tincture of pride and *partiality,* on account of their *special prerogatives;* and were much offended that the Gentiles, who *came in so late,* should be admitted to *as high* and *as great privileges* as *they.* They thought themselves *hardly dealt with,* and *their services* not *sufficiently considered,* when the Gentiles were taken in, and set upon the *level* with *them.* The parable therefore, thus far, exactly answers to the *case of the Jews* at *that time.*

We may observe further, that the Gentiles of that time, as they *came in late,* so the principal reason was, that *no one had hired them:* as soon as ever they had a *call,* they came in with all *readiness* and *alacrity.* They are represented in the New Testament, as *crowding in* with *eager* and *impatient zeal,* pressing into the kingdom of heaven *with violence,* and, as it were, *taking it by force.* They esteemed it as a very valuable favour to be admitted, and were exceeding thankful for it. In these respects they shewed themselves much superior to the generality of the Jews, and were therefore much *more acceptable* in God's sight; and so the *last* became *first,* and the *first last,* in God's favour and esteem, on account of their *different tempers, dispositions,* and *qualities.* The Jews were *first called;* but then they *claimed* it as *their right,* and were *too assuming:* while the Gentiles were *more modest, humble,* and *thankful.* The Jews accepted the call, many of them; but still they *murmured* and *complained,* and were *envious* at the favour shewn to *others:* while the Gentiles were kindly and *charitably disposed* towards *all,* and were very willing to *unite* with the Jews, and to work together with them for the *common salvation.* This was what our Lord well saw; and therefore principally designed the parable as a lively representation of what was then doing; partly to curb the *pride, partiality,* and *ill-nature* of the Jews; and partly to

encourage and *recommend* the *contrary qualities* and *dispositions* of the Gentiles.

The parable however, besides its *first intention*, might have a *secondary view* and respect to *all Christians* in *after-times*.

2. And therefore I come now so to apply it. *God* is the *supreme householder*; his *vineyard* is the *Christian Church*; the *labourers* are *as many* as have been *admitted into his Church* by Christian *Baptism*; the *service* is the work of *faith* and *charity*; and the *reward* offered is *eternal happiness*.

It is our honour and privilege, that we have been called at the *first* hour, in the *morning* of our lives, from our *early* infancy: it concerns us therefore to inquire, whether we have made the *right use* and *improvement* of our *early call*; or whether we have not *loitered* a great part of our time, and done the work of the Lord *slothfully* and *negligently*.

Besides our *first* and *principal call*, in our *Baptism*, we have had *repeated invitations* since; at the *third*, *sixth*, or *ninth* hours, through every stage of our lives, as we live daily under the *Gospel ministry* and under the benign influence of God's *holy ordinances*. If we have made a right use of these advantages, and continue so to do, no labourer who comes later in can ever be able to go beyond us, or even to come up to us: but if we have been slack and *negligent*, our *early call*, and those repeated offers of salvation, will turn to a sad account, and will increase our damnation. Such as have fewer calls, or have come in but at the *eleventh* hour, if *more sincere* and *hearty* in their profession than we, will be *preferred* before us, and be in a much better condition than we.

From God's receiving those who came in late, at the *eleventh* hour, we may learn this; that true repentance at any hour may however be acceptable; it is never too late to amend; or it is always the best thing we can do: not that the parable gives any encouragement for putting off our repentance from day to day; for we are none of us in the case of those who had *never been hired*, or had never had any call: we have been *hired*, or listed into God's service from the time of our Baptism, as before hinted, and have had repeated calls and invitations all our lives long. We ought to have been labouring the *whole time*, and to have "borne the heat and burden of the day:" but if we have not done so, it is better, however, to begin to work at the *eleventh*

hour, than never to begin at all: and God may accept it even then, making merciful allowances for what is past, if care be taken to do it with *sincerity* and *zeal*, and with *proportionable sorrow* and *contrition* for the *time misspent* in vanity: and such late repentance will undoubtedly be the more acceptable, if begun while a man is in health and strength, before the approaches of death or the languors of a sick bed. It is not *dying well*, but it is *living well* which the Gospel requires of us. It is therefore dangerous to presume upon what some call a *death-bed repentance*, of which it is very hard to know whether it be really *repentance* or not.

The result of what hath been said comes to this: that it concerns us all duly to *examine* and *consider* what *privileges* and *mercies* we have *already received* at God's hands; how *many calls* have been sent us, how *many offers* have been made us, and *what use* we have turned them to. According as we have been *more* or *less diligent* in our Christian calling, so will our *reward* be in *proportion* to our *zeal* on one hand or our *negligence* on the other; so will our final estate hereafter be the *more happy* or the *more miserable*. We ought always to be labouring in God's vineyard, and doing the best we can to serve and please him: the sooner we begin, the more we shall be able to improve and grow in all virtue and godliness; which, as it will raise our hope and confidence in God's promises, so will it also help to increase our rewards. No labour of this kind can be in vain; every the least addition to it or increase of it will turn to account. It is a good point gained, to advance so far as to be secure against *condemnation* in hell fire: but if any man can advance further, there are *infinite degrees of glory* in heaven, and the higher he rises, so much the better will it be for him to all eternity.

We have seen then what room there is left, and what encouragement is given for *improving*, and growing daily and hourly in every good word and work. Let it therefore be our constant endeavour so to do; and God of his mercy send us his assistance both to enable and incite us to a careful performance.

SERMON XX.

St. Paul's wish, ἀνάθεμα εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, explained and illustrated.

ROMANS ix. 3.

——I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.

THE occasion and general meaning of these words of the Apostle are obvious enough: for St. Paul having, in the foregoing chapters taught some doctrines which he knew would be extremely grating and offensive to the Jews, thought it the more necessary to profess how warm an affection he had for them all the while, in order to convince them, that his telling them unwelcome truths proceeded not from any aversion or resentment he bare towards them, but from the love and tenderness he had for them, as well as from a just regard to the honour of Almighty God. In the words therefore of the text, he expresses his sincere and great affection for them, declaring how much he was concerned at the spirit of slumber fallen upon them, and how contentedly he could suffer any thing, (that could be reasonable for him to suffer,) if he might but be any way instrumental in rescuing them from the sad circumstances they were in, and might procure for them pardon and salvation: "I could "wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren," &c. Very affectionate words, strong and pathetic, the language, doubtless, of a most generous love and a most exalted charity.

But while we acknowledge the warmth and ardency of his affection, take we care to understand it in such a sense, that it may be rational too; that it may be worthy of a wise and a great man, yea of a great Apostle, and him conducted in what he wrote by the Holy Spirit of God. What then could he mean by wishing himself "accursed from Christ?" Is this a sober or a Christian wish, as it sounds at first hearing, and as expressed in these broad terms? Some Divines of the mystic way have thought it reasonable for a man to submit himself even to everlasting misery, to serve the ends of God's glory and the general good of mankind: but the thought is shocking, and the thing impracticable: no man can do it; neither is it rational or pious, either to suppose that God could admit of so absurd a thing, or be pleased with a wish so wild and extravagant. The more judicious Divines therefore, being sensible of this, while they have understood St. Paul's words of the *curse everlasting*, yet have had recourse to *figure* in the other parts, and called it, upon the whole, a strong *hyperbolical* expression, such as ought not to be rigorously interpreted up to the letter.

But still there may be a third way thought on, better than either of the former; which is to examine strictly into the *original Greek*, whether it may not justly bear a milder and less exceptionable rendering. It is observable, that the words *ἀνάθεμα εἶναι*, which we render by *accursed*, often signify no more than being *devoted* to *temporal death*, or being made a *sacrifice* of: and the words *ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, which we render *from Christ*, may signify *after Christ*, that is, after the *example* of Christ. Let the whole sentence then run thus: *I could be content*, nay I should rejoice, to be *made a sacrifice myself, after Christ*, (or as Christ has been before me,) *for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh*. The Greek words [*ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*] will signify *after Christ*, as well as the like phrase [*ἀπὸ προγόνων*] elsewhere used by St. Paul, signifies *after my forefathers*, or as my forefathers have before me. "I thank my God, whom I serve from my fore-"fathers[a]," or *as my forefathers have done before me*. So then the true and the literal sense of the Apostle in the text is neither more nor less than this, that he wished to be *devoted* even to *death* for the eternal salvation of his brethren the Jews, in like manner as Christ, his high leader, had been *devoted* before him. For

[a] 2 Tim. i. 3.

as he taught his doctrine, so he was desirous also to follow the example of his sufferings, as far as he might be capable of so doing.

The rendering of the text being thus corrected, and the sense cleared, what I have more to say upon it may be easy and plain. In the text, as now construed, two things are offered to our serious and devout meditation:

I. The exceeding great love of Christ, in submitting himself to death, to be made a sacrifice for the salvation of mankind.

II. The good Apostle's ardent zeal and desire to die in like manner, after Christ's example, for the salvation of his brethren. Of these two articles I shall distinctly treat in their order.

I.

Let us duly weigh and consider the exceeding great love of our Saviour Christ, shewn in submitting himself to death, *to* be made a sacrifice, for the salvation of mankind. The height and depth of his love towards mankind will best appear from a consideration of the circumstances of that so generous and so adorable an act of lovingkindness. Consider *who* it was that did it, *what* he did, for *whom*, and for *what ends*. All these circumstances have their weight, and very much enhance the value of the thing done, as well as heighten the obligation.

1. The *person* who submitted to suffer for us was a very great and extraordinary person; not a mere man, not an angel, or an archangel, but infinitely higher still, even the eternal Son of God; who took flesh upon him, that he might be capable of suffering, bleeding, and dying for us. Here lies the particular stress and emphasis of the thing, according to the scripture account of *it*; that God sent so great, so dear, and so Divine a Person to die for us: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only be-"gotten Son[b]." "In this was manifested the love of God "toward us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into "the world," &c.[c] The majesty and greatness of the Person sent heightens the favour, and endears it to us; as it is the greater condescension in him, and does the greater honour to us. St. Paul expresses the whole thing in very strong and lively terms, thus: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery "to be equal with God; but," nevertheless, "made himself of

[b] John iii. 16. [c] 1 John iv. 9.

"no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant," and so on[d]. See what an emphasis is here laid upon the *dignity* of the *Person* doing it. He was one that had the form, the majesty of God, and had a right to be revered, honoured, and adored as God; and yet he submitted to become a servant, by taking upon him the nature of man, and in that nature he died. Wonderful condescension and most disinterested love, such as no inferior person could have shewn towards us! Had the highest angel or archangel, had the brightest cherub or seraph done it, the kindness had been nothing in comparison; because they are all creatures of God, infinitely short of the dignity of the Son of God: and however great they are, they are yet capable of being made greater, and of receiving fresh honour and dignity as a reward for well-doing; so that their serving us would have been at the same time serving themselves. But the eternal Son of God was so high and so Divine in himself, that he was above being promoted higher: he could have no interest of his own to serve, no ambition of his own to gratify, in what he did: it was all done purely for our benefit; was perfectly free and generous, such as no *creature* whatever could have shewn towards us. In a word, his kindness excelled all that ever was done by created beings, as much as the dignity of his person excelled theirs; and that is infinitely.

2. Next, let us consider *what* he did, as well as *who* did it, to give us the more lively and affecting idea of his love towards us. "He made himself of no reputation," says the Apostle, "took "upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness "of men:" that is to say, he veiled his glories, he drew a curtain, as it were, over his high and adorable Godhead, condescending to take part with frail mortality, and to converse with dust and ashes. But this was not all: for the Apostle goes on; "being "found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself" yet further, "and became obedient to death," to the most painful and ignominious death, "even the death of the cross[e]." This was descending, as it were, from the highest pinnacle of glory to the lowest circumstances of disgrace. For crucifixion was a punishment inflicted by the Romans upon slaves only and fugitives, and was looked upon as the most shameful of all their ways of despatching criminals. Besides which, it is to be considered, that,

[d] Phil. ii. 6, 7. [e] Phil. ii. 7, 8.

according to the maxim of the Jewish law, "he that is hanged "is accursed of God[f]," which is the text that St. Paul refers to, where he says, "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the "law, being made a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is "every one that hangeth on a tree[g]." He was *made* a *curse* for us in the same sense as he was "made sin for us[h]," and as St. Peter expresses it, "bare our sins in his own body on the tree[i]." That is to say, he stood in the place of sinners, and was contented to suffer in their stead, and to be treated in such manner as they ought to have been treated, or as their sins had deserved. This was an instance of exceeding great love and condescension, submitting to appear as a criminal, and to take upon him all the shame, and odium, and ignominy that belong to sinners, though he had no sins of his own. He was content to be *accursed*, in a certain sense, that is, to be *devoted to death*, and to bear the punishment of sin, which sin had the curse of God attending it; a curse, which Christ alone was able to take off. The sins of the whole world were laid upon him: he bare them, and took them upon himself, suffering and dying for them; so great was his condescension, so wonderful his love towards mankind. And this reminds us,

3. Of another circumstance in this affair, the persons *for whom* he died; not for the well-deserving, or innocent, but for *sinners*, and sinners against himself. St. Paul takes particular notice of this circumstance also, making use of it as a proper consideration for the magnifying and illustrating the love of Christ, "Scarcely for a righteous (or just) man will one die: *yet* "peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. "But God commendeth his love towards us, in that, while we "were yet sinners, Christ died for us[k]." As much as to say, that it is a very rare thing, that any one should die for the sake of an honest or just man: and not very common to do it even for a kind and most obliging friend: but to be content to die for those who were neither *kind* nor *just*, but the contrary; to die for sinners and rebels, this is a height of generosity beyond the common measures, is without precedent, and above all comparison. Such was the love of Christ towards mankind, who had deserved no such favour at his hands, having rebelled against him, and acted in opposition to him. "Greater love hath no man

[f] Deut. xxi. 23. [g] Gal. iii. 13. [h] 2 Cor. v. 21.
[i] 1 Pet. ii. 24. [k] Rom. v. 7, 8.

"than this, that a man lay down his life for his friend[l]." But our Lord's love was vastly greater, that he laid down his life even for his *enemies*. "—When we were enemies, we were re-"conciled to God by the death of his Son[m]." "The just suf-"fered for the unjust," as St. Peter observes[n]; which is such an instance of generous love, as no history can parallel, nor any human thought or imagination reach up to.

4. But there is a further consideration, which enhances the value of it, and still more abundantly endears it to us; which is, the *end* and *design* of it, and the happy consequences which it is directed to, and aims at. It is not barely to rescue mankind from punishment and from eternal misery, but it is to exalt them to the highest and most desirable privileges; and to confer upon them everlasting life, glory, and happiness. "In this was manifested the "love of God toward us, because that God sent his only begotten "Son into the world, that we might live through him." But in another place, St. John is yet more expressive and emphatical, in these words; "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begot-"ten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but "have everlasting life[p]." So then every way, and in every light, the love of Christ towards us is very apparent, and is beyond all parallel. The eternal Son of God, equal with God, vouchsafed to humble himself, to suffer, bleed, and die for sinners, in order to purchase for them, not *pardon* only, but *rewards*, great and everlasting rewards in the highest heavens. Having thus endeavoured, however imperfectly, to set forth the exceeding great love of Christ in dying for us, I now pass on to the second article contained also in the text;

II.

The good Apostle's ardent zeal and desire, to die in like manner, and after Christ's example, for the salvation of his brethren. "I could wish that myself were accursed from (or after) Christ;" that is, as Christ was before me, "for my brethren," &c. We are not to suppose, that the Apostle had a thought of coming up, in any perfect measure, to the great example set by our blessed Lord: but he was willing and desirous to copy after him, in such measure and degree as he was capable of, and to follow his pattern as far as he was able, by an humble and awful imitation of him. He very well knew, that one great use among

[l] John xv. 13. [m] Rom. v. 10. [n] 1 Pet. iii. 18.
[o] 1 John iv. 9. [p] John iii 16.

others, of our Lord's sufferings was, to instruct and stir us up to follow the example. This is the use which St. Paul points to, where he says, "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ "Jesus; who being in the form of God," and so on[q]. St. John, the beloved disciple, is very express and particular, in setting forth the love of Christ, as an example and pattern for our imitation. "Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his "life for us: and we (in conformity) ought to lay down our lives "for the brethren[r]." Observe, it is not here said, for *enemies*, for *persecutors*, but for the *brethren*. I know not whether St. Paul's example, in the text, did not go beyond what St. John here mentions as the bounden duty of every common Christian. It should seem, by the emphatical manner of expression which St. Paul made use of, that he himself thought it no ordinary degree of affection, no common protestation, "I could wish that "myself were accursed," and so on. And indeed the very nature of the thing shews that it was not. For the persons for whose sake he was so very willing to die the death were not his particular friends, no, nor so much as Christian brethren: his brethren they had been, and they were now hardened and obstinate Jews, whom he had deserted, and whom God had abandoned, and who were St. Paul's bitterest enemies, and as great enemies to the Gospel; yet such was his affection even for them, such his friendly disposition towards them, that he could have been content, yea glad, to have been *made a curse*, that is, to have *suffered* any the most painful and ignominious *death*, to do them service; to avert their misery, and to promote their true happiness. This was noble and generous, as well as charitable; was an instance of heroic love, much resembling our blessed Saviour's, being almost above human, and coming as near to Divine, as flesh and blood was capable of doing. There is one more instance of like kind in holy scripture, and but one, that belonged to mere man: it was of a very great prophet, lawgiver, and saint; I mean Moses, the meekest man then upon earth. When the Israelites had grievously affronted him, and offended God as much, by making the golden calf, yet then (as it were forgiving and forgetting all their rudeness towards him) he begged to be himself *blotted* out of the book of life rather than the people should suffer extremities: "Yet now, if "thou wilt (says he, in his prayer to God) forgive their sin; or

[q] Phil. ii. 5, 6. [r] 1 John iii. 16.

"if not, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast "written[s]." Blotting out of *God's book* is of the same importance with "blotting out one's name from under heaven[t];" which is an expression signifying temporal death and destruction. Accordingly, Moses desired to die, or to be destroyed himself, from off the land of the living, rather than live to see his nation perish, his people suffer, however justly they had deserved it. That instance of Moses, though very like this of St. Paul, yet does not fully come up to it; because Moses was more nearly related to the Israelites of that time, and had a closer interest and concern with them, than St. Paul could have with the Jews of his time, whose religion and party he had left for the Christian church. However, both those instances are very admirable, and come the nearest to the Divine pattern set by our Lord of any we shall meet with. The use which we are to make of all these instances, or examples, is to learn to put on tenderness and compassion towards all men; and even towards those who are not of our society, profession, religion, or party; those who have no respect for us, or are even prejudiced against us. There is a degree of pity and regard due even to very ill men, to ungodly, and sinners; not to be shewn by caressing them, and smiling upon them, but by earnest and ardent endeavours to reclaim them. It is afflicting to a good man to observe how sinners run headlong on to their own ruin: and though it may be said, that they deserve the less pity because it is their own fault, and they choose to do so; yet there is something really pitiable in that depravity of will and blindness of heart which drives them on to make such ill choices. There is not a more forlorn and miserable wretch under heaven than an overgrown sinner, become mad, desperate, and incurable in his sins. For, though such persons regard neither God nor man, nor have any mercy or tenderness for friend or brother, but would go any lengths in mischief, and set the world on fire, (if it lay in their power;) yet we very well know, all the while, that they are weak and impotent, are under bridle and restraint, and must wait for God's leave before they can do any thing. The utmost they can do is only to afflict and torment good men for a time here, while they themselves lie exposed to eternal vengeance, to torments everlasting hereafter. This consideration may some-

[s] Exod. xxxii. 32. [t] Deut. ix. 14.

times move a good man's pity and tender compassion, as was St. Paul's case in the text, while he lamented over the hardened Jews, his adversaries and persecutors, and would have wished even himself to die a thousand deaths for them, so he might but reform and save them. This affectionate temper of mind, this benevolent disposition towards all men, is what the text recommends to us in two examples, one of our blessed Lord himself, and the other of our Lord's Apostle. Learn we from both to be kind, friendly, and compassionate one towards another, and to have a true value and concern both for the bodies and the souls of men. We shall find matter enough for our exercise and improvement in this heavenly disposition, and shall have occasions, more than one would wish, to excite us to it; for sin and wickedness abound daily. "Evil men and se-"ducers wax worse and worse, deceiving, and being deceived[u]." But let it be our care, in the first place, to continue steadfast in the things that we have learned, knowing of whom we have learned them: and in the next place, to do our best to convince and reclaim sinners from their evil ways, to save their souls from death, and thereby to bring glory to Almighty God, and to make joy in heaven over every sinner so repenting.

[u] 2 Tim. iii. 13.

SERMON XXI.

A *sinless Perfection* and *Security of Salvation* no Prerogative of a *regenerate State.*

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1 JOHN iii. 9, 10.

Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil: whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother.

FOR the right understanding of these words, it will be proper to note something of the occasion and design of them, so far as may be probably learned from Church history. The Apostle had said but two verses before, "Little children, let no man "deceive you: he that doeth righteousness is righteous, even "as he [that is, Christ] is righteous." It seems, there were some, at that time of day, who presumed to think themselves *righteous*, and *born of God*, without the *practice of holiness*; and they had endeavoured to seduce others into that strange and absurd, or rather wicked, persuasion. Therefore said the Apostle to his own converts or followers, "Little children, let no "man deceive you;" that is to say, by fair speeches, plausible insinuations, or false colourings. Those deceivers, probably, were some disciples of Simon Magus; for that impostor had taught, that men are saved by grace only, without any regard to

good works[a]. As if *Gospel righteousness* were no necessary *condition* for the enjoying *Gospel privileges*; or as if men might be *born of God*, and become heirs of salvation, independent of Christian holiness, though scripture is express, that "without "holiness no man shall see the Lord[b]." In opposition to such dangerous principles, the good Apostle asserts, and strongly inculcates, the necessity of a *pure heart* and *life*, to denominate any person *good*, and to entitle him to the privileges of Christian sonship. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin:" and a little after, "Whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of "God." He fixes the point both ways, to enforce it the more strongly: if a person *is of God*, he will of course abstain from the practice of *sin*: or, if he *does not*, besides, practise *righteousness*, performing his bounden duty, he is *not of God*, but is a *child* of the *devil*. Words so full and so express, as to bear no dispute, nor to admit of evasion. In discoursing further, I shall endeavour to state and clear the particulars here following:

I. To shew, *negatively*, what the text does *not mean*.

II. To shew, *positively*, what its *true* and *full* meaning is.

III. To point out the practical use and improvement of the whole.

I.

I shall endeavour to shew, *negatively*, what the text does *not mean*, in order to prevent scruples, and to obviate misconstructions.

1. The text most undoubtedly concerns *grown* persons, and does not *directly* concern *infants*. Infants are not capable of *doing* righteousness, though capable of being *born of God* in Baptism: they preserve that *regenerate* state, once entered into, till they become guilty of *actual* and grievous sin. Of this there can be no dispute: they are *justified* at the same time that they are *regenerated*, and are therefore *righteous* in God's sight; and accordingly they are *interpretatively* included in St. John's rule, though not *specially* considered by him. The gainsayers, whom he opposed, pretended that even *grown* persons, not practising righteousness, but living under the dominion of sin, were in a state of salvation notwithstanding. That was the doctrine which the Apostle here laboured to correct: *infants* were no way

[a] Iren. lib. i. c. 20. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. i. c. 1. Grabe, Annot. ad Bull. Harm. Apost. p. 13, 33. Exam. cen. p. 5.

[b] Heb. xii. 14.

concerned in it, and so there was no need to make an exception for their case.

2. I must further observe, that the text does not mean to exclude any persons from salvation who are really *penitent*, or whose *hearts* are really *changed*, or *renewed*, and only want *time* to bring forth the *fruit* of *good works*; such, for instance, as the *penitent* thief upon the cross. Indeed, *good works* are justly interpreted to mean either *inward* or *outward* works. There are the *inward* works of sincere *faith*, humble *contrition*, *detestation* of sin, *trust* in the Divine mercy, firm *reliance* on the *merits* of Christ, together with cordial *resolutions* of a thorough *amendment*: works of this kind transacted *within*, if such a person should be suddenly taken off, will be interpreted as works of *righteousness* by God, who knows the heart. Therefore this also is a case which falls within the equity, or even the *letter* of the Apostle's rule, Ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, *he that doeth righteousness*, or he that *makes* righteousness, be it *outwardly* or *inwardly*, he *is righteous*. The false teachers, whom the Apostle here opposed, required neither *outward* nor *inward* righteousness, but promised salvation to their deluded hearers without regard to either, independent of both alike. Therefore St. John's rule may reasonably be understood with a tacit exception to the case of *inward* righteousness, which had nothing to do with the main question then in hand: for the question was not about *dying* penitents, but about persons living in impenitency, and under the dominion of sin.

3. I must add, thirdly, that the text does not mean to exclude all that are in any degree *sinners* from a state of salvation; for in some sense all men are *sinners*; and the same Apostle, in the same Epistle, says, "If we say that we have no sin, we de-"ceive ovrselves, and the truth is not in us[c];" and "if we say "that we have not sinned," we make Christ "a liar, and his "word is not in us[d]." St. John does not say that God's children *have no sin*, but that they *do not commit sin*. The phrases are somewhat *alike*, but they are not the *same*; neither do they bear the same signification, but widely different. *To have no sin* means to be altogether *sinless*, from first to last; which no mere man ever was or will be: but *not to commit sin*, or not to *make sin*, not to be a *sin-maker*, in this place means only, the forbear-

[c] 1 John i. 8. [d] 1 John i. 10.

ing to sin with an high hand, or abstaining from the *grievous* and *presumptuous* kind of sins. The children of God, as such, are not altogether *sinless*; but if they have formerly sinned in any grievous manner, they are truly *penitent*, and they do so no more; and the sins which they remain yet subject to are sins of *infirmity*, such as all are in some degree liable to, and such as are not imputed under a covenant of grace. This distinction of sins into sins of *presumption* and sins of *infirmity*, (otherwise called sins of *daily incursion*,) is an old distinction in the Church, and is abundantly warranted by many scripture texts, which I need not here mention. It is sufficient to have observed, that the Apostle is here to be explained by that distinction; for it is certain and manifest, that he did not mean to teach that the children of God, as such, are, or can be, altogether *without sin*, like as our blessed Lord himself was: "There is no" mere "man that sinneth not[e]." "There is not a" perfectly "just "man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not[f]." "For "in many things we offend all[g]." Which is chiefly to be understood of our many *omissions* and *failures* of duty, through unavoidable *ignorance* or *infirmity*, either forgetting and overlooking some articles of duty, or not performing them with all that care and exactness which might have been used by us. But I proceed.

II.

Having observed to you, *negatively*, what the doctrine of the text does *not mean*, I am next to shew, *positively*, what it *does mean*. The true and full meaning is, that the children of God, considered as such, do, by the assistance of God's grace present with them, lead a good life, discharging every duty incumbent upon them, with a *conscientious care* to the *utmost of their ability*, and abstaining from *presumptuous* and *damning* transgressions. Such were Zacharias and Elisabeth, of whom it is recorded by St. Luke, that "they were both righteous before God, walking "in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blame-"less[h]." That is to say, they lived in so holy and so exemplary a manner, as to be both *acceptable to God and approved of men*, in St. Paul's phrase, on another occasion[i]; or having "always a "conscience void of offence toward God, and toward men[k]."

[e] 1 Kings viii. 46. 2 Chron. vi. 36. [f] Eccles. vii. 20. [g] James iii. 2.
[h] Luke i. 6. [i] Rom. xiv. 18. [k] Acts xxiv. 16.

These are such as our Lord speaks of, under the name of "just "persons, needing no repentance[l];" and *righteous* persons, whom he came not to call to *repentance*[m], that is, to an *entire change*, but to *improvement* and *increase* in godliness: not but that *repentance* belongs to *all men*, in the same sense as *all men* are *sinners:* but as *repentance*, in a stricter sense means an *entire change* of heart and life towards God; if a man's heart was before *set right*, he will not want to be so *changed* in the main, but to be carried on in the same good way he was in to higher perfection. Now to return to the words of the text: the Apostle here supposes that the *children of God* are *righteous, just*, and *blameless* in such a sense as I have mentioned, walking in the ways of God, conscientiously keeping God's holy will and mmandments, and not living under the *dominion of sin*, or the power of *evil habits*. In this sense, he declares that they "do "not commit sin," subjoining this reason, that God's "seed re-"maineth in them," therefore they do not sin. And he further adds, which is yet a stronger expression, that they *cannot sin*, because they are *born of God*. How *cannot?* May not *regenerate* persons fall into sin, or fall from grace, yea, and fall *finally?* Yes, certainly they may: all the scripture exhortations to perseverance or steadfastness manifestly suppose it; and some scripture texts directly teach it: and even St. Paul, that chosen vessel, did as good as intimate, that he might himself be in danger of falling off, when he said, "I keep under my body, and "bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have "preached to others, I myself should be a castaway[n]." How then must we understand that the regenerate *cannot* sin, *cannot* fall away? We may best understand the words in a qualified sense, not so as to mean that they *absolutely* cannot, but that they cannot *without great force* and *violence* to their *regenerate* nature, to their *renewed* frame and disposition of mind, and to that principle of *grace* within them, which powerfully restrains them from it. So we commonly say of a *good-natured* man, that he *cannot* do an *hard* thing; or of a *well-bred* man, that he *cannot* do an *ungenteel* thing: it would be a *force* upon his *nature*, and a *contradiction* to the *principle* upon which he *commonly acts* and *conducts* himself. In like manner, but in a higher degree, a true *child of God*, or a sincere disciple of Christ, *cannot* allow himself

[l] Luke xv. 7. [m] Luke v. 32. [n] 1 Cor. ix. 27.

in *sinful courses:* his *own heart* will *reproach* him warmly if he does; and the *principle* of *grace* within him will *warn* him back very strongly, only not *irresistibly:* for the Holy Spirit of God does not so move or overrule our wills, as to render us mere *machines*. Such a qualified sense of the words *can* and *cannot* is very common in ordinary discourse, and in all writings, and particularly in the *sacred* writings. I shall take notice but of one remarkable instance, namely, of Joseph, when tempted to commit sin: "How can I," says he, "do this great wickedness, "and sin against God[o]?" thereby intimating, that he *could not* do it: he had more sense, he had more grace, than to do a vile thing. He had God before his eyes; he had a prevailing principle of religion within; he had an honest and an upright heart; and while he had, he *could not* act wickedly. In short, a good man may by degrees grow careless and negligent, secure and thoughtless, and so his conscience may be laid asleep; the Holy Spirit may thereupon desert him, and Satan may enter in: but as soon as this comes to be the case, he is no longer the *good man* he was, no longer a *child of God*, in St. John's sense of the name. Therefore the Apostle's meaning in the text is no more than this, that a good man, *as such*, cannot do a *wicked thing:* he must first lose that principle of goodness, that *seed of God* sown in his heart; he must lose it, I say, by some very blamable negligence of his own, before he *can* consent to sin with a high hand against God. God has no where promised that his *Spirit* shall abide with any man, any longer than while he *watches* and *prays*. Therefore our Lord says, "Watch and "pray, that ye enter not into temptation[p]:" and again; "What "I say unto you, I say unto all, Watch[q]." But here, perhaps, some may be bold to object or argue: How can a *child of God*, who, as such, is the temple of the Holy Spirit, how can he grow *careless* or *negligent?* Will not that same Spirit, dwelling in him, keep him awake and attentive, exciting, instructing, and assisting him both to *watch* and to *pray?* For is it not said, that "the Spirit helpeth our infirmities?" Are we not told, that "we "know not what we should pray for as we ought," unless *the Spirit* itself assist us in it[r]? It is so said, and all that is said is strictly true: but it is no where said, that the Spirit *does every*

[o] Gen. xxxix. 9. [p] Matt. xxvi. 41. [q] Mark xiii. 37.
[r] Rom. viii. 26.

thing, and we *nothing at all;* for then the act would not be in any sense *ours*, or however not ours in such a sense as to render it *virtue* in us, or to make us capable of what is properly called *reward*. The Spirit does *excite*, he does not *compel:* he instructs and assists, he inclines and moves; but by soft calls and gentle whispers, such as *may be resisted*, and often *are* resisted; otherwise, how come we to hear of "grieving the Holy Spirit of "God[s]," and of "quenching the Spirit[t]?" And if the *Spirit* were to do *all*, and *man* himself *nothing*, how comes it that St. Paul exhorts Timothy to "stir up the gift of God which is in him[u]?" An eloquent Father of the ancient Church illustrates the whole case by an apt and familiar comparison: "As fire must have "fuel laid on, from time to time, that it may have something to "work upon, and may not go out; so the grace of God must "find submission and compliance, alacrity and readiness of "mind on our part, for it to thrive upon, and to keep up the "holy flame of the Spirit." To sum up this matter in few words: this is certain, that in the *works of grace*, the Holy Spirit bears a *principal* part, and man a *subordinate* one, and both *concur* to the same good act; so that while the act is *ours*, the *glory* of it is entirely *God's*. But it is not for us to determine precisely the exact boundaries of the *Divine* operations, so as to be able to say, so much and no more is the *Spirit's* share in the act, and so much *ours*. It is sufficient, that all our good works are some way or other, in some proportion or other, the result of *grace* and of *free will* together: and if any man falls from that *grace*, and so falls into sin, the true account of it is, that while the *Spirit* does all that *Divine* wisdom saw proper in that case, the *man* was wanting with respect to *his* part, refusing to be led, or taking no care to *watch* and *pray* with that fervour and diligence which was reasonably expected of him. Thus the *children of God* may, by their own *sloth* and *supineness*, cease to be such, for the time being, till they repent and recover; or for ever, if they repent not at all: but in the mean while St. John's doctrine stands firm and unshaken; that God's children, *as such*, or *so abiding*, do not commit sins of a *grievous kind:* it is a contradiction to the very principle which they are supposed to be governed by, to say that they do. They may lose that principle, and thereupon lose their sonship also: but while they keep it

[s] Eph. iv. 30. [t] 1 Thess. v. 19. [u] 2 Tim. i. 6.

alive and awake, they can no more act against it, than a man can act in any other case against his *prevailing* or *predominant* principle, whatsoever it be. If you could suppose him to act against it, it could not then be called, in that instance, his *prevailing* or *ruling* principle: for if it were, it must have *prevailed* and *ruled.*

III.

Having now done with my first two heads, intended to state and clear St. John's doctrine in the text, it remains now only to point out the *practical use* and *improvement* of it, in some few pertinent considerations built upon it.

From hence we may competently perceive, upon what *terms* we stand with Almighty God, and what *title* we have to be upon the list of his domestic servants, his real and faithful children. True *faith* and *obedience* are the *tenure* by which we must hold; and there is no other ground whereon we can safely stand. Many expedients have been thought on whereby to shift off *duty*, and to secure, if it were possible, the *reward.* The prize of our high calling is great, noble, and infinitely desirable: but the burden of duty, the restraints of obedience, are found to bear hard upon flesh and blood: and how have men's wits been at work, now for seventeen hundred years together, to find out some one expedient or other, for the reconciling a bad life with true peace of mind and with expectations of heaven! It would be tedious, perhaps impossible, to recount the several ways that have been made use of for that purpose. I shall content myself with naming one or two, such as *whole sects* have taken into, passing by innumerable others which private persons have contrived for themselves. A *naked faith* was an old device: it is particularly confuted by St. James; and more need not be said of it. Some have pleased themselves with the thoughts of being among the *elect*, and thereupon *secure* of *salvation:* but their misfortune is, that they can never be *certain* of their being in the number of the *elect*, in their sense of the word, but by living a *good life*, and *persevering* in it all their days. St. Paul understood perfectly how this matter is; and he says, "We are "made partakers of Christ, if we hold the beginning of our "confidence steadfast unto the end[x]." "If we hold fast the "confidence and the rejoicing of the hope firm unto the end[y]."

[x] Heb. iii. 14. [y] Heb. iii. 6.

Some perhaps may presume to say, we *can* hold fast our *confidence*, our strong *assurance* of our own salvation to the end. But St. Paul did not mean *vain* confidence, or *groundless* assurance, but a *rational* and *well-grounded* hope, built upon the *merits of Christ*, and the consciousness of living an *holy life*. Therefore, in another chapter lower down, he varies his phrase, and says, "We desire that every one of you do shew the same diligence "to the full assurance of hope unto the end: that ye be not "slothful, but followers of them who through faith and patience "inherit the promises[z]." *Confidence* will not answer, without something very solid and substantial to build such confidence upon.

Many have flattered themselves, that they have had the *revealing* evidence of the *Spirit*, the *voice* of the *Spirit of God*, bearing inward testimony to their *spirits:* for, St. Paul says, "the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are "the children of God[a]." But St. Paul also says, in the same chapter, that "there is no condemnation to them—who walk "after the Spirit," and who are "led by the Spirit of God[b]." So that, at length, this *testimony of the Spirit* resolves entirely into the certainty we have of our bringing forth the *fruits* of the Spirit. Strong *assurance* will signify little, for that may be *groundless:* fulness of *joy* will avail as little, because it may be a *false* joy, or a golden dream. Besides that, when St. Paul told the Philippians, that "it was God that worked in them both to "will and to do of his good pleasure," he did not therefore bid them be *confident* of their salvation, or full of *assurance* on that score: but he bade them "work out their own salvation with "fear and trembling[c]." As much as if he had said, *God is your helper*, therefore do not *despond:* but then again, because *God is your helper*, and works with you, therefore behave as becomes you before the tremendous Majesty, with humble reverence, with anxious care and dread, with the utmost diligence and ready compliance, lest, if you should work under such a guide, in a negligent and careless manner, altogether unworthy of so Divine a Master, he should at length desert you, and leave you to go on by yourselves.

Indeed, Divine wisdom knows human frame too well to give any of us *infallible* assurances of our *reward*, before we have done our *work;* lest those very assurances should make us

[z] Heb. vi. 11, 12. [a] Rom. viii. 16. [b] Rom. viii. 1, 14. [c] Phil. ii. 12, 13.

secure and *negligent*, and render us altogether *uncapable* of being received into those pure and bright mansions above. God has told us plainly upon what *terms* he will accept us, through the merits of Christ; and he leaves us to discover the rest, as far as we reasonably and honestly may, by comparing our own lives with those Gospel terms. This is all, and this is sufficient for a state of probation: only, the further to check vain presumption, whatever *present* advances we may have made, we are still left in the dark as to our *future* behaviour, and all depends upon our *persevering* unto the end. St. Paul, as I have before hinted, above twenty years after his conversion, still spake so humbly of himself, as almost to fear, lest he might "become a castaway." Five years after that, he began to discover some degrees of *assurance*, but still supposing himself not very far from his end. At the very last, which was five years later, when he had *fought* his "good fight, kept the faith," and "finished his course," and was preparing to die a martyr, then, and not till then, he thought it became him (and he had the revelation of God to warrant him) to express the strongest assurances of his high reward in heaven. Let Christians of a much lower class learn from thence to think and speak modestly of their own case. If they wait for their full and complete *assurance* till they are on the other side the grave; they will, probably, be the *surer* to find it there, for their speaking and thinking so *humbly* and *modestly* of themselves here. Comfortable hopes, along with a life suitable, are sufficient encouragement for a good Christian to proceed with: more than that might be *hurtful* to us, as rather obstructing than furthering the great work of salvation: not but that God may sometimes, in cases extraordinary, fill pious minds, especially if very near their departure, and when such indulgence can do no harm, with joyous raptures and superabundant assurances: but I speak of what may ordinarily be expected in our Christian warfare. To conclude: as our acceptance hereafter depends entirely upon our careful and conscientious conduct here; so let every man take care to walk warily and circumspectly, and to rise in assurance in proportion to his so doing, growing in grace, and increasing in all virtuous and godly living, and so at length making his calling and election sure.

SERMON XXII.

The Scripture Doctrine of the *Unprofitableness* of Man's *best Performances*, an Argument against *spiritual Pride;* yet no Excuse for *Slackness* in *good Works* and Christian Obedience.

LUKE viii. 10.

So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do.

THESE words are the conclusion of a parable, a kind of *moral* subjoined to it, to signify the use and application of it. Our blessed Lord had put the case of a labouring servant coming home from the field, to wait upon his master at the table, performing that *additional* service after his other labours of the day; providing a supper for his master, in the first place, and attending him patiently all the time, and after that, content to provide for himself. After our Lord had thus represented the case, he makes his reflections upon it in these words: "Doth "he" (that is, the master) "thank that servant, because he did "the things that were commanded him? I trow not:" I suppose not. "So likewise ye," with regard to your heavenly Master, "when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded "you," it will become, it will behove you to "say, We are "unprofitable servants; we have" only "done that which" it "was our" bounden "duty to do." Therefore we deserve no

thanks from him, nor have any strict *claim* to a *reward* from him: but it is sufficient if our service is but *accepted*; for to have neglected it where it was due would have deserved stripes. This I take to be the general sense and purport of the text: and the main design of it was, to curb and keep down all *spiritual pride* and *self-assumings*, with respect to God, and to teach men *modesty* and *true humility*. Presume not to article strictly with him, or to make any proud *demands* upon him. *Boast* not before him of any even your *best* services, and reckon not at all upon your *own deservings*. Do as he has commanded you to do, to the utmost of your power, assisted by his Spirit: (for without that you are not fit to be called his servants at all, but rather to be discarded as none of his:) but after you have done all, and all reasonably well, still remember how insignificant you are in comparison, and how high God is; and therefore make no unbecoming *claims* upon him, because of your *services*, (poor enough at the best;) but choose rather to refer all to his favour and goodness, than to your *own deservings*. In discoursing further, I shall endeavour,

I. To explain what the phrase or title of *unprofitable servants* here strictly means.

II. To shew how much it concerns such servants to make their humble acknowledgments before God, of the *worthlessness* of all their *services*.

III. To observe, that such *acknowledgments* must not however be made an *excuse* or colour for any culpable *slackness* in our *bounden duties*, or for pleading any *exemption* or *discharge* from using all possible *diligence* in our Christian calling, to perform all that is commanded us.

I.

I propose to explain what the phrase or title of *unprofitable servants* here strictly means. There is the more need of explaining it, because it is used but *twice besides* in the New Testament, and in a sense which perhaps will not so conveniently suit the place which we are now upon. We first find it in St. Matthew, where our Lord says, after delivering the parable of the talents, "Cast the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall "be weeping and gnashing of teeth[a]." Here *unprofitable servant* means the same with a *wicked* or *profligate* servant; which is *too hard* a sense for our Lord to have intended in the present text,

[a] Matt. xxv. 30.

where he applies it to his own true and sincere disciples. In the Epistle to the Romans, in a quotation there taken from the fourteenth Psalm, we read, "They are all gone out of the way, "they are together become unprofitable; there is none that "doeth good, no, not one[b]." This appears to be a description of very ill men, of abandoned libertines: accordingly, in the Psalm itself, in the *old* translation, the style runs, "They are corrupt "and become abominable;" and according to the *new* translation, "They are all gone aside, they are all together become "filthy[c]." The words *abominable* and *filthy* are there made to answer what in Romans is rendered *unprofitable*. And that, again, is too hard a sense to put upon the word *unprofitable* in the text we are now upon: therefore we must look out for some softer and milder construction, in this single place, to make the context answer.

It may be considered, that no man can, by any services of his, be *profitable* to *God*, who is *all-sufficient*, and is above *needing* any benefit, or receiving any real advantage[d]. But then it may be said that neither man, nor angel, nor archangel, nor any creature whatever can indeed be *profitable* to God: and what great matter were it for *lapsed* men to profess themselves *unprofitable servants* in such a sense only, as all the company of heaven must for ever profess the same? This appears to be a sense as much too *high* for the phrase in the text, as the other was too *hard* and severe. Let us therefore pitch upon some *middle* meaning, such as may neither be too degrading for a sincere Christian to own, nor yet too high or exalted for man in a fallen state. Had our first parents preserved their innocence entire to the last, yet they would have been but *unprofitable servants* after all, as bringing no *profit* to God. Lapsed men are *unprofitable* in a more disparaging sense than that, being all of them *sinners*. Some may think that the text itself explains the meaning of the title, by the words, "When ye shall have done all those things "which are commanded you;" and again, "We have done that "which was our duty to do." But what man is there that *sinneth not?* or what man ever performed (Christ only excepted) *all that his duty* required of him? The text neither says nor supposes that any man has, or ever will, do all that is commanded

[b] Rom. iii. 12. [c] Psal. xiv. 3. [d] Job xxii. 2, 3. xxxv. 7. Psal. xvi. 2.

him. It supposes only, that in some particular cases men may and will do all that is required of them in *those cases* or instances, like as the *servant* in the *parable* is supposed to have done in providing his master a supper, and then waiting upon him till the supper was ended. Thus may good men punctually perform all that was required of them in some particular affairs, while they fail in other matters, more or less, through human frailties. Had our first parents, through the grace of the Spirit, (for they could not without,) continued *upright*, they could not indeed have *profited* the Divine Majesty, nor have claimed a *reward* as *of debt:* but this they could have demanded, (because it would but have been doing them justice,) to be pronounced *innocent;* and they might have claimed *impunity*, because a *righteous Judge* cannot *condemn* the *guiltless*. Now *lapsed man* cannot demand even so far, being that he is *guilty*, and therefore liable to *blame*, liable also to *penalty:* so that, upon the whole, when any, even the best of fallen men, profess themselves to be *unprofitable servants* of God, they may reasonably be supposed to mean, that they are *creatures* who can make no beneficial returns, no proper *requitals* to their Creator; that they are creatures of a *low* order, comparatively; human, mortal creatures, who can neither *will* nor do any thing without the aids of Divine grace; and further, that they are also *sinners*, who, instead of *meriting* a *reward*, or claiming it as a *debt*, cannot so much as claim *impunity*, or *glory* in God's sight, but must be content to sue to him in the humble *petitionary* form for *reward*, for *grace*, and even for *impunity*, referring all to God's *mercy* and *goodness*, and that also *purchased* for them by the alone *merits* of Christ Jesus.

II.

I proceed now, secondly, to consider how much it concerns, and how fitly it becomes, such *unprofitable* servants to make their humble acknowledgments before God, of the *worthlessness* of all their services; *worthless*, I mean, with respect to *God*, not otherwise: for they are not *worthless* with respect to *angels*, or to *other* men; more especially not to our *own souls*, but that, by the way, only to prevent mistakes.

Now to understand the more clearly how much it concerns us, and how indispensably necessary it is to make such humble acknowledgments; we are to consider the infinite holiness and purity of that tremendous Deity with whom we have to do;

that he is "of purer eyes than to behold evil," or to "look" favourably "upon iniquity[e];" that "his angels he hath charged "with folly[f];" and that even "the heavens are not clean in his "sight[g]." "What is man then, that he should be clean? and "he who is born of a woman, that he should be righteous[h]?" Now, though God's goodness disposes him always to be as merciful to sinners as the reasons of government or the nature of things permits, yet the honour and dignity of his unspotted holiness and purity must be kept up, in the sight both of men and angels. Therefore when God was so kind to his own people of Israel, he took particular care to have it often inculcated, that it was not for their *righteousness* that he so highly favoured them[i], but upon other accounts; and particularly for his *own name's sake*[k].

One thing we know, that if our first parents had remained *sinless*, God could, consistently with the honour of his purity, have admitted them, as *righteous* in themselves, to life eternal. But since the fall, the rule has been, (according to the Divine counsels, founded on unerring truth,) that *no man* living is in himself *righteous*, nor can be *received* as *righteous*, but in and through the *merits* of a *Divine* Mediator, his only *Son* and our only *Redeemer*, Christ Jesus our Lord. So stands the case: and God will have it acknowledged by the best of us, for the honour of his high name, that we are, as to ourselves, *unprofitable* servants and *sinners*, and can no otherwise be *justified* in his sight, or permitted to appear before him, but in the lustre which we borrow from his "beloved Son, in whom" only he is "well pleased." With this key, you may very easily understand all that St. Paul meant (in two of his Epistles especially, viz. to the Romans and Galatians) by insisting so strongly upon *justification by faith*. There were at that time Pagans, in great numbers, who valued themselves much upon their *exalted virtues*, (for so their pride persuaded them,) and upon their good *moral* lives; conceiving that they had no *need* of Christ, and so they would not embrace the Gospel. There were also multitudes of Jews (Pharisees especially) who were even prouder in that point than the Pagans, strongly conceited of their spiritual improvements and privileges, as if they had known no *sin*, nor had any

[e] Habak. i. 13. [f] Job iv. 18. [g] Job xv. 15. xxv. 5. [h] Job xv. 14. 1 Kings viii. 46. Prov. xx. 9. Eccles. vii. 20. 1 John i. 8. [i] Deut. ix. 6. [k] Isaiah xliii. 25. xlviii. 9. Ezek. xx. 9, 14, 22, 44.

need of *pardon.* Against both those kinds of men the Apostle disputed with great strength and clearness, in order to beat down their vanity, and to convince them of the absolute necessity of looking out for some *better righteousness* than their *own*, the *righteousness* that rests in the *meritorious atonement* made by Christ Jesus. That was to be received by *faith;* that is to say, by a submissive and humble *acknowledgment* of their own *unprofitableness*, and *insufficiency* as to *salvation*, and by reposing their whole trust and confidence in the Gospel covenant of *grace*, in what Christ had done and suffered for them. This is the *justification by faith*, in the style of that great Apostle. For *faith*, in this case, is a *virtual acknowledgment* of our own *sinfulness* and of God's *unspotted purity;* and withal, a kind of *silent prayer* sent up to the Divine Majesty, beseeching him to admit us, not for any *pretensions of our own*, not for *our own services*, (which at the best are too *weak* and *imperfect* to stand before him, or abide his strict scrutiny,) but *for the sake* of Christ Jesus *only*, and out of his own *free grace* and mercy towards us. Such *acknowledgment* being made on our part, and such *obedience* also performed as is required by that *covenant of grace* which we rest ourselves upon, then may the Divine Majesty, without any impeachment of his holiness, admit us into favour, and own us for his servants. For then it cannot be said that he receives sinners *as sinners*, but he receives them as *washed* and *purified* in the *blood of the Lamb;* yea, as perfectly *righteous;* not in *themselves*, but in Christ the righteous; who by his all-prevailing *atonement* hath *merited* this for all sincere and penitent offenders, that they shall be treated *as if* they were *perfectly righteous*, and shall be recompensed accordingly.

Abraham, of ancient time, to whom the Gospel was preached[l], and who beforehand "saw Christ's day, and was glad[m];" he was *justified* by that kind of *faith:* and so was David, and the ancient Patriarchs and Prophets; and after them, the *Apostles* and all good Christians. This is a sober truth, which ought deeply to be imprinted in every one's mind, in opposition to all *proud claims:* and so much the rather, because there are at this day, even under this Gospel sunshine, some that pretend to *merit* and works of *supererogation;* as if they were not *sinners*, or needed no *pardon;* some that presume to think and say, that God is obliged in justice or in goodness to accept of them, with-

[l] Gal. iii. 8. [m] John viii. 56.

out any amendment, or, however, without *atonement;* some that ascribe so much to *free will,* as to exclude the need or use of *Divine grace;* some conceive so highly of *natural religion,* and of *virtues* merely *moral,* as to despise that *righteousness* which the Gospel teaches; and some likewise there are, who fear not to boast even of *sinless perfection,* and who, for that reason, forbear to pray for forgiveness of God. Now St. Paul's doctrine concerning *justification* by *faith* is a standing evidence against all such *proud boasters,* confuting their big pretensions, and beating down their assuming claims. It is fatal oversight for a man not to consider well beforehand what to rest his salvation upon, or what chiefly to trust to, before the high tribunal. Come we before God in the way of *humble petition,* or in the way of *strict claim?* Stand we upon *our own righteousness,* or upon the *merits of Christ?* Seek we to be judged by the *letter of the Law,* or by indulgent favour, and a *covenant of grace?* In a word, stand we upon our *perfect innocence,* or upon the *tender mercy* of the Judge? St. Paul has directed us how to move in this case, how to form our plea, and what course to take: move by *faith,* and *trust* in the *merits* of Christ Jesus: drop your plea of *works,* because there is a flaw in it, and there is no abiding by it; for we have all sinned, more or less, and God is of purer eyes than to accept of any thing in that way short of *perfection.* But if you sue to the throne of grace by *faith* in Christ's blood, that is the same thing with dropping all plea from your *own deservings,* and glorying in nothing, "save" only "in the cross of our Lord "Jesus Christ[n]." That is the method, the only true method, whereby to escape punishment, and to arrive at heaven and happiness. Make your humble *acknowledgments* of the need you have of a Saviour, and rest your salvation upon *him;* and then the Divine Majesty can, with a salvo to his strict justice and holiness, have mercy upon you, while it is by *his* interest, and upon *his* account, not upon *your own.* So much for that article.

III.

I proceed now, thirdly and lastly, to observe, that such humble acknowledgments as I have been here mentioning, must not however be so understood as to afford any *excuse* or colour for *slackness* in our *bounden duties,* or for pleading any *exemption* or *discharge* from true *Christian obedience:* for what if St. Paul

[n] Gal. vi. 14,

directs us to apply to God by *faith?* Doth not the same St. Paul tell us, that it must be a "faith which worketh by love[o]?" And what if he advises us not to insist upon our *works* as *perfect*, nor to stand upon that plea, in opposition to a better; yet does he not also tell us, that we are "created in Christ Jesus unto "good works[p]?" and that "the end of the commandment is "charity[q]?" It is right, and our bounden duty, to renounce all *claims* and *strict demands* while we stand before God, and to throw ourselves entirely upon a *covenant of grace:* but still that very *covenant of grace* has several *reserves* and *exceptions* in it to exclude all *impenitent* offenders, and carries its own *conditions* along with it; which are many, but are all summed in these two, an humble well-grounded *faith*, and a *sincere*, though imperfect, *obedience*.

There were some foolish persons in the days of the Apostles, who having heard, very probably, of St. Paul's doctrine of *justification* by *faith* and by *grace*, laid hold of it as an handle or colour for throwing off *good works* and *Christian obedience*. Any handle will serve, where either the judgment is exceeding *weak*, or corrupt inclination exceeding *strong:* otherwise one might justly wonder, how so wild a thought could have possessed any man that should call himself a Christian. However, St. James took care, in few but very expressive words, to obviate those *loose principles*, thereby to prevent the deception of the ignorant and undiscerning[r]. St. Paul had before determined the *general* and *previous* question, about the right *method* of applying to God, and the *plea* that would be safest to stand upon, giving it on the side of *humble faith*, against all *proud claims* from our *own performances:* and now St. James determines a *second question*, about the *true* and *full import* of that *plea* of *faith*, evidently demonstrating that that very plea of *faith* is so far from excluding *Christian obedience*, that it *necessarily takes it in*, and cannot be understood without it. For *faith* without *obedience* is but a *dead* faith, or, in effect, no faith at all. Abraham's faith was a lively and *working* faith, exerting itself, as opportunities offered, in all kinds of *virtues* and graces, in every good word and *work*. Such must every man's *faith* be, if he hopes to be *justified* by it here, or *saved* by it hereafter.

Perhaps what I have hinted of the *two several questions*,

[o] Gal. v. 6. [p] Ephes. ii. 10. [q] 1 Tim. i. 5. [r] James ii. 14—26.

decided by the *two Apostles*, may be made a little plainer, by an easy and familiar example. Imagine a *criminal* going to be tried for his life. It is proposed to him, in that case, whether to stand upon *strict law* and his own *perfect innocence*, or to plead some *act of grace*, some *act of indemnity*. He deliberates upon it, as the *first* question, and at length comes into the plea of *grace*, as his safest plea: this is doing what St. Paul advised in another case.

After that, *another* question comes on, very distinct from the former; viz. What are the *conditions* of that very *act of grace* which the criminal had submitted to, and resolved to abide by? This the lawyers determine upon the trial, and upon that depends the *final issue* of the cause. In like manner, after St. Paul's decision of the *previous* question about pleading the act of grace, St. James comes in to shew what *conditions* that act contains.

Now the *practical conclusion* from all that has been here said is, to guard the more carefully against *two very dangerous extremes*, which some or other have, in all ages, unhappily fallen into, and to keep the *middle path*, the plain and even road, where you may be safe, not *turning* aside either to the "right hand or "to the left[s]."

If you come before God full of your *own selves*, reckoning upon your *own deservings*, trusting in your *own holiness*, or *righteousness*, and not humbling yourselves as *sinners* and *unprofitable* servants, or not resting your salvation upon the rich *mercy of God* and the all-prevailing *atonement* made by the blood of Christ, then you are "proud, knowing nothing," or nothing considerable; having no right knowledge either of your own frailties, failings, and omissions, or of God's all-searching eye, and his tremendous justice, were he once to be extreme to mark whatever has been done amiss, and to exact it of us.

If, on the other hand, (considering how mean and worthless, in the sight of God, even our best services are, and that all our hope and comfort lie solely in *his mercy* and *Christ's merits*,) you should thereupon neglect to cleanse your hands and purify your hearts, (as far as by God's grace you may,) or should grow *slack* and *careless* in Christian *duties*, fainting by the way, and not persevering to the end, but presuming upon God's *mercy* to save

[s] Prov. iv. 27.

you, though you live and die in your *sins*; then you run into the other extreme, not less pernicious than the former.

What then is the way to take into and pursue, so as not to miscarry here or there? The way is to aspire to *righteousness* and true *holiness* with all your might, and not to be *proud* of it when you have done. Think it *worthless* in the sight of God, and infinitely below *his acceptance*, were it not for the *merits of Christ*: but still remember, that it is as much *worth* to *you* as *heaven* is *worth*, because "without" such "holiness, no man shall "see the Lord[t]."

To conclude: be as ambitious of leading a *good life*, as if you were sure even to *merit* by it: at the same time be as *humble* before God, as the great St. Paul was, who besides keeping the faith, after he had done perhaps more in the way of *good works* than any mere man had done before him, yet summed up his own life and character in a very few and very humbling words, that *he was nothing*[u]. He remembered that *God was all*; in whom "we live, and move, and have our being[x]."

[t] Heb. xii. 14. [u] 2 Cor. xii. 11. [x] Acts xvii. 28.

SERMON XXIII.

The Care required in *choosing* our religious Principles, and the Steadiness in *retaining* them when so chosen, *stated and cleared.*

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1 THESSALONIANS V. 21.

Prove all things; hold fast that which is good.

THE text contains two very weighty and important precepts, which have a near relation to each other; and which may well deserve both to be rightly understood and carefully retained by all.

The first is, to *prove*, *try*, or *examine all things*, (proposed as of any consequence to our belief and practice,) that so we may discern what is really good: the next is, to close in with it heartily as soon as found, and firmly *to adhere* to it. The design of which precepts is to caution us against two pernicious *extremes*, which many unthinking persons are prone to run into: one is the taking opinions *upon trust* from others, without ever *examining* or considering what or why: the other is, being too *unsettled* and *irresolute* even *after examination*, not being able, after a wise choice, to fix and *abide* by it. It is hard to say which of the two extremes is the most unreasonable; whether the being *too credulous* in *receiving* any thing or every thing *without distinction*, or the *not receiving* and *retaining* what upon due *examination* well *deserves* it. *Credulity* on one hand, or *unsteadiness* on the other, are *equally dangerous:* both contributing to multiply mistakes, and to confound all distinction of *true*

and *false, good* and *evil.* The way to prevent both is, first, to *examine* into any opinion or doctrine propounded to us, in order to direct or regulate our *choice;* and then, after we have made a *wise choice,* to *hold* to it resolutely and unalterably, in order to reap the full benefits of it. We must indeed be cautious in the *choice* of our principles, as in the choice of our friends, not admitting them as such till they have been well *approved:* but when they have been once *well chosen,* we must be *constant* to them, and never *lightly* part with them. My design then is, in my following discourse, to recommend two things to our more especial notice:

I. Care and discretion *in choosing*—"Prove all things;" and,

II. Firmness and steadiness *in retaining*—"Hold fast that "which is good."

I.

To begin with the first, namely, the precept to "prove all "things." Here it will be proper to consider the *persons* to whom this precept belongs; the *rule* whereby they are to proceed; and the *qualifications* necessary to a right performance thereof.

1. The *persons.* And here I must remark, that the precept is not given to the *guides* and *pastors* only, (though they may indeed be conceived *principally* concerned in it,) but to *Christians at large.* It is to the *church* of the Thessalonians, and so to *every church,* and not to the *pastors* only, that the advice is directed: it is to as many as are obliged to "hold fast that "which is good;" therefore most certainly to *all;* both *clergy* and *people;* only in such proportion and degree, as their several stations, capacities, abilities, or opportunities, respectively, may permit. To this agree those other precepts of like kind, recommended in holy scripture to Christians at large; to "try "the spirits whether they are of God[a];" to "examine them-"selves, whether they be in the faith," and to "prove" their "own selves[b];" to be "ready to give a reason of the hope that "is in them[c]," and the like. Accordingly the Bereans are commended for their ingenuous freedom, in examining before they gave their assent even to the Apostle's doctrine; "search-"ing the scriptures, whether those things were so[d]." Vain therefore are the pretences of the *Romish bigots,* for confining the precept to the *clergy* only, excluding the *laity,* without distinction,

[a] 1 John iv. 1. [b] 2 Cor. xiii. 5. [c] 1 Pet. iii. 15. [d] Acts xvii. 11.

from the duty or privilege of *examining* and *judging* for themselves. It is the right and duty of *all* persons to believe no further than they have *reasons*, and to look *themselves* (as far as they are able) into the *strength* and *force* of those reasons, before they give their assent; or however before they fix and *abide* by it. Neither is this peculiar to us as *Christians;* but it concerns us as *men.* It is one of the *natural rights* of mankind, founded in the very nature of things, and necessarily resulting from their being made *rational* creatures. No man can be bound to follow others *blindly*, who has faculties given him to discern between *true* and *false*, between *good* and *evil.* His *own* judgment and conscience, and not *another's*, is the *immediate* guide of his faith and practice; which he must give account of at the great day. It is therefore his duty and his business to inform himself as carefully as he can; and then, and there only, to trust to *other* men's eyes, where he cannot see clearly with his *own.* And even in these cases he is still to judge for himself, as reasonably as he can, who or what persons are to be taken for his *guides* or *instructors*, upon the best and most impartial judgment he is able to make of their *authority*, *integrity*, or *abilities.* We are none of us able to examine particularly into the whole compass and extent of things: something there must be of implicit faith in other men's labours. There are very few persons but who *must* or who *will* take some things upon trust; wanting either *ability* or *leisure* to run through all the parts of inquiry, and to search every thing to the bottom. But so far as any man is *qualified*, and furnished with *leisure* and *opportunity* for it, so far he ought to *search for himself:* and as to the rest, he is still to judge, as he will answer it at the great day, whose *report*, or whose *judgment*, he may most safely rely on, in matters beyond his reach or capacity. Very *able Divines* will, in many things, rely upon the report or judgment of professed *linguists*, *critics*, or *grammarians:* the *younger* and *less furnished Divines* will very much confide in the *older* and *more learned:* the *common people* will, in many things, trust to their immediate and proper *guides:* and, perhaps, the very illiterate and ignorant will much rely upon the judgment of any (be they clergy or laity) whom they take to be *wiser* and *more knowing* than themselves; or of whose *integrity* or *friendship* towards them they have no reason to doubt. We see then, that in the very nature of the thing, a great deal must and will be taken upon *trust* from others; and

that more or less, according to the great variety there is of men's *abilities*, *opportunities*, *qualifications*, and *circumstances*: so that the precept, to "prove all things," comes at length to this; to examine into all things, *directly*, so far *as we can* do it; and where we *cannot*, there to examine *whose learning*, *whose integrity*, and *whose judgment* may be most *safely trusted* for the rest: for the purpose.—The *bulk of common Christians* must in a great measure depend upon the integrity and ability of *others*, as to the *authority* and *divinity* of the sacred *canon*, the *uncorruptness* of the *copies*, the *faithfulness* of the *translation*, and the *construction* of some of the more *difficult* texts. These things supposed, they may themselves competently judge, from scripture itself, of the most important or fundamental points of faith or practice. In plain and common cases, ordinary capacities may examine and judge for themselves: and they ought to do so, for the reasons before hinted. They may judge for themselves *what religion* they ought to be of, and *what church* to unite with, and *what doctrines* of *that church* they are to receive or not to receive; only paying this reasonable and just deference to the united sense and verdict of synods or councils, as not to *oppose* it, however not *publicly*, before it be *understood*; nor to set up their own *private opinion* against the *public sense* of the church, before they have carefully examined the case, and have well considered the strength and force of those reasons upon which the *public decisions* were founded. Under these *restrictions* and *limitations*, a *liberty of private judgment* should be *allowed to all*, as being the common and undoubted *right* of all, whether considered as *Christians* or as *men*. I come now,

2. To consider the *rule* by which they are to proceed in the exercise of this *right* or duty of *proving all things*. The most *general* and comprehensive *rule*, in which all *other rules* centre and terminate, is the rule of *right reason*. Whatever, upon the best and last inquiry, appears to be *most reasonable*, that we are to receive and embrace: and what appears *otherwise*, we are to reject. This is a rule so certain and so indisputable, (when rightly understood,) that it is supposed in all debates, and seems to be equally allowed on all hands, whether by arguing for or against it. For what do men mean by *arguing* at all either way, but to make *reason* umpire in the question, and, tacitly at least, to acknowledge, that the *best reasons* ought ever to prevail in it. There are indeed two kinds of men, who seem to differ from us

in this article: one advises to resign up our *reason* to the dictates of a pretended *infallible* chair; the other would obtrude their *own dreams* upon us for *divine oracles;* resolving all into I know not what *secret* dictates or *impulses* of the *Spirit.* But the wild inconsistency of such pretences is alone sufficient to destroy them: for either they must give us *reasons* for what they pretend, and then they plainly *suppose* the very thing which they deny, making every man a judge for himself of the force and strength of those *reasons;* and how far he *may* or *may not* resign himself up to them: or if they give *no reasons,* nor pretend any, there cannot be a surer token of the *weakness* of their plea, and of their *betraying* the very cause which they are labouring to defend. They are used to plead, that human reason is *weak, blind,* and *fallible;* liable to sundry *mistakes;* a very *dangerous* guide in matters of religion; fruitful of *heresies, schisms,* and what not. Be it so: yet how know they but that, in *this* very argument whereby they would persuade us to *lay aside reason,* reason may be as *blind, weak,* and *treacherous,* as in any *other?* If, therefore, there be any force in their argument, it must necessarily destroy itself; proving the quite contrary to what it pretends, or proving nothing. Let *reason* be supposed ever so blind and fallible; yet, blind as it is, we must be content to submit to it or to something *blinder;* namely, to *humour,* or *fancy,* or *passion,* or the *prejudices* of education. But, after all, there is no such danger as some pretend from the use of *reason* in matters of religion, but very much rather in the disuse of it. It is no part of religion to lay aside the use of our reason: for besides the inconsistency of it with a rational nature, to pretend to unmake the *man,* in order to make the *Christian,* there is this further absurdity in it, that to discard *reason* in such a sense is to discard *faith* too, which is *ultimately* built upon *reason:* for we ought always to have a *reason* for what we *believe:* and without this, it would not be *true faith,* but *presumption* rather, or *blind credulity.* Faith is itself an *act of reason,* as really and truly as any other *assent* founded upon *natural principles.* For example, we believe such a doctrine, *because* we find it in the *scriptures;* we believe the *scriptures, because* they speak the mind and will of *God;* we believe they do so, *because* they have been *proved* to carry with them all possible marks, outward and inward, of a *Divine authority,* which a wise and good God would never suffer to be set to any *imposture,* to lead mankind into an *inevitable error;* so that

if God be true and just, that is, if there be a God, our faith is *well grounded*. And, now, why should not an assent, thus *founded* upon the *nature* and *reason of things*, be looked upon as an *act of reason*, as well as any *demonstration* drawn from undoubted axioms, or first principles? Is there then *no difference*, may some ask, between *faith* and *science?* Yes, certainly there is; but they do not so differ, as if one were the work of *reason* and the other *not:* both are the work of *reason*, only with this difference, that in matters of *science* our assent is founded on *intrinsic* evidence, or the *nature of the thing* assented to; while in matters of *faith*, our assent is founded on *extrinsic* evidence, the *authority of the revealer*. It may be asked then, are the articles of *faith* as *certain* and as *demonstrable* as matters of *science?* I answer, that thus far, *whatever God reveals is true*, is as clear and *self-evident* a principle as any *maxim* in *science;* and whatever has a *necessary connection* with *that principle*, or is *deducible* from it, is strictly and properly *demonstrable*. But whether we have that certainty, that such a proposition *is revealed*, and that we *understand it rightly*, (both which must be supposed in our assent to it,) is more disputable; and therefore it is, that matters of *faith* generally fall short of *scientifical demonstration*. But still our assent, in either case, is wrought out by *reason;* by *demonstrative* reasons, where the case is *demonstrable;* by *probable* ones, where *probable;* and in *both*, our *assent* is an *act of reason*. If it be said further, that *faith* is built upon *testimony*, and therefore not upon *reason;* it is to be observed, that *testimony*, barely considered *as such*, is not the *ground* of *faith*, but rather the *means of conveying* it: for the *reasons* why we think the *testifier* could not or would not *deceive* us, *these* are what we properly build our *faith* upon: so that an assent founded upon *testimony* is as properly the result of *reason*, if it has any just ground at all, as any other assent whatsoever. From this account it may appear, how little service can be done to *faith* by crying down *reason*, rightly understood. For whatever tends to weaken the evidence of *reason* must so far tend to weaken *faith* too, which is built upon it: and as it must necessarily lead to *scepticism*, in *natural truths;* so must it also lead to *infidelity*, in *religion*. *Reason* and *faith* therefore are by no means *opposite*, but are *assistant* to and *perfective* of each other. It is the strength and glory of the *best religion* to have always the *best reasons* to go along with it. Never any man revolted from the *true faith*, but he revolted as

much from *right reason*, and abandoned *both* at the same time. He certainly either laid down *false principles*, or formed *false conclusions* from true ones, and was in reality as weak a *reasoner* as he was a *Christian*. True religion loves to be *examined* by the nicest *reason*, can abide the *trial*, and invites all persons to lay aside *prejudice*, *pride*, *lusts*, *passions*, and *vile affections*, and to put the matter upon a *fair hearing* at the bar of *unbiassed* and *impartial reason*. And this, give me leave to say, ever has been and will be the glory and triumph of our excellent religion, that her adversaries, with all their *vain pretences* to *reason*, have betrayed the greatest *want* of it, and have never been able either to answer *her* arguments or to defend *their own*. Let *reason* then be our *rule* for *proving all things;* and let that be received as *most credible* which stands upon the *strongest* and *clearest reasons*.

The use and application of this rule is of wide compass and vast extent in matters of religion, and is either *general* or *special*.

First, *general*, in directing us how to find out, among the many pretenders, *which* is the *true* and *right* religion; whether *Pagan*, *Jewish*, *Mahometan*, or *Christian;* or, supposing the *Christian* to be (as it undoubtedly is) the best of the four, then, among several *sects* and *parties* of Christians, *which* of them is preferable; whether the Greek Church or the Roman, whether of England or Geneva, whether of Luther or of Calvin, and so on. Here our *reason* has a large field to move in, in order to direct and guide us *what religion* to be of, or *what Church* to join ourselves to.

Secondly, The use of reason is more *special* in stating and clearing the *particular doctrines* of Christianity. Christians of all sorts, however divided in opinions, yet plead the same scriptures commonly in defence of them; each abounding in their *own sense*, and resolutely adhering to their *own construction* or *interpretation*. And what can give us any light, or what can lead us to the *truth* among the contending parties, but the laying together and considering, with all sincerity and impartiality, the *reasons* offered here or there respectively? This must be the way to discover what is at length *really scriptural*, and what *not:* and thus it is that we may be able to distinguish the vain fancies and comments of men from the true mind and will of God. Here the office of *reason* is various and manifold, according as *scripture* or the matters it treats of are *more* or *less* clear and positive.

In some points, *scripture* is *very plain* and clear, and the *reason* of the thing too; as in the *moral* doctrines of Christianity. In such a case, reason proceeds upon *double evidence, extrinsic* and *intrinsic*, either of which might stand single, and be a sufficient proof of the thing. But both together make it the more *indisputable;* and our assent rests fast and firm upon a *twofold* foundation.

Sometimes *scripture* is very *clear* and *express*, but the *reason of the thing dark* and *obscure;* as in the venerable *mysteries* of our *faith*. Here *reason* proceeds only upon *extrinsic* evidence, the *authority* of the *revealer*, and the *pooofs* brought to shew that this is revealed, and this the sense of it: not pretending to say *how* or *why* those things are, but that they *really are*, because *God* has *declared* them.

In other points, *scripture* may be *obscure* or *silent*, but the *reason of the thing* (taking in what scripture has elsewhere plainly asserted) very *clear* and *manifest;* as in the case of *infant baptism*. The use of *reason* in this, and other the like cases, is to shew what by *analogy* or *consequence*, though not *directly*, scripture either allows, commands, or condemns. There is yet a fourth case, where neither *scripture* nor the *reason* of the thing are *clear;* both together affording only *dark* hints of what is or is not; as in the case of *heathens* or *unbaptized infants;* what *their portion* shall be in a *world to come*. In these and the like cases there is ground only for a *probable* assent. It is, however, the business of *reason* to lay things carefully together, to make the best of its materials, and to lean to the *safer* or *more charitable* side, without being too *positive* or *dogmatical* in either. Thus we see how the office of *reason* runs through all the parts of religion, and is very serviceable to it; directing us how to form our judgment and fix our faith, and next enabling us to defend it. Thus are we to *prove* and *examine* all things, so far as our *abilities, leisure*, or other circumstances permit: but we must remove, as much as possible, every impediment which may obstruct the *free exercise* of our reason; such as love of *novelty*, or a *superstitious* veneration for *antiquity;* either *too great* deference to *authority* on one hand, or *too little* on the other; either an *overweening regard* to this or that church, sect, or party; or a *supercilious contempt* of, and envenomed hatred against any. We are to remove all such obstacles to *free* and *ingenuous inquiry*, and at the same time to take in all *necessary*

helps for the due improvement and advancement of our understandings. When, by the careful observance of those good and wholesome rules, we have done our parts in *proving all things;* then are we to remember also the other precept of the text, which is,

II.

To "hold fast that which is good."

After *due care in examining*, naturally follow *wisdom in choosing*, and *firmness in retaining;* without which all we have before done becomes vain and fruitless. To be always *seeking* without *finding* the thing we want; to be "ever learning, and never "able to come to the knowledge of the truth;" to be, "like "children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind "of doctrine," is but a mean and a disparaging character, neither becoming a *Christian* nor a *man*. Care and caution are proper in the entrance to the *work* of *faith;* but resolution and steadiness must help it on, and carry it up to perfection. It is the distinguishing mark and property, the pride and glory of every wise and good man, *not to be soon shaken in mind;* but to be *steadfast* and *unmovable*, after he has once *well deliberated* and made a *wise choice*. But here it may be asked, Must we then *unalterably resolve*, after we have *once settled* our *opinions*, and, as we are verily persuaded, upon *good reasons*, never to *recede* the least tittle from them? Must we turn the deaf ear to all reasons or arguments offered to convince us of a presumed mistake, or to convert us from it? There is no man of so solid and correct a judgment but he may sometimes *err:* few so careful in their *inquiries*, but who, at some time or other, may take a thing for demonstration which hath little or no ground; or reject another thing as false which may prove a certain truth. And then it is notorious that men's judgments commonly ripen with their years; and they may often see reason to *retract* some things which, upon the best reason they *before* had, they might think it necessary to *receive*. It would be hard to preclude a man, at any age of his life, from growing *wiser;* which seems to be the case, if he is never to permit any matter of his *faith* to be brought in question before him, or to hear what may be fairly offered against it. What then must be done in this case? or *how far* are we to carry our *resolution* and *steadfastness*, in what we have once made the subject of our belief? To this I answer, that there is certainly a just *medium*, a golden mean to be ob-

served by every wise and good man, whether in his religious or secular concerns. It is no reproach to any man's *constancy*, sometimes to *alter his judgment*, or *vary his measures*, in matters of *civil prudence*. And so neither is it any reproach upon Christian *steadfastness*, sometimes to correct our *former judgments*, or to alter them for the better. But then, as in *secular affairs* to be ever *unsteady* and irresolute is a certain mark of a very *weak man*; so in *religious* also is it a certain token of a very *weak* or very *dissolute Christian*. And as in *civil* matters *wise* men generally have fixed upon some *certain maxims*, some prime and leading principles of action, which they will never *alter*, nor so much as *call in question* all their lives after; so also in our *religious* concernments every wise and good Christian will fix upon some plain and *fundamental* articles of faith, which he will never after *recede* from, nor so much as think himself obliged to hear *debated* and *canvassed* a second time. There are some things *so clear* and *evident* upon the *first examining*, that it will not be necessary to give them a *new hearing*: all pretended objections against them may be reasonably rejected in the lump, as not worth the notice, nor deserving a wise man's care, after he is once *fully enlightened* with a *clear perception* of the *contrary truth*. For example: after a man has been but tolerably instructed in the grounds of the Christian religion, which carries so much *force* and *evidence* in it, it will not be necessary to allow *Paganism*, *Judaism*, or *Mahometanism* so much as a *hearing*, except it be for the sake of others only, who may want to have those pretences exposed or confuted. The like may be said of *Atheists* or *Deists*: the proofs of a *God*, and of the Christian revelation, are so *full*, *clear*, and *strong*, that after a man has once seen into them, he need not stay to deliberate, or wait till he has examined the *contrary pretences*; well knowing beforehand, that they *can* have no real weight or solidity in them. As to other cases, this procedure is justifiable more or less, in proportion to the *greater* or *smaller* evidence upon which any doctrine is founded. And some allowance must be made for such doctrines as have been *often* and *fully debated* by wise, great, and good men, and constantly *determined* the *same way*. There is a strong presumption in their favour, that they are most certainly true, or at least that there neither is nor can be any sufficient reason for rejecting them as *false*; and that therefore they may very safely and justly be received as true, without more *particular* examination;

unless there should be some appearance of *new light* and *additional* evidence, such as our predecessors had been strangers to. In a word then, there may be cases so plain and clear, either in *faith* or *morality*, that it may be sufficient to examine the *proofs* upon which they stand, without attending to the *objections* on the other side, which may be known beforehand to be nothing else but *cavil* and trifling. And in these cases it may be our duty to "hold fast that which is good," without so much as giving the least ear to any contrary pretences. But then, as there are many other cases of a more *doubtful* nature, our obligations to *hold fast what* we have once *received* must admit of this *restriction* or *limitation*, that we be nevertheless ready and willing to submit the cause to *debate*, and to give it a *new hearing*. In such a case our ears must be always open to *reason*, when offered in due manner and form, with sobriety, and in the fear of God: and there we are to take care to suffer ourselves to be influenced by *reasons*, and *reasons only*: not by *humour* or *caprice*, or *fickleness* of temper; like some who, for the sake of *one pressing difficulty*, will give up what was founded on *many plain* and *convincing reasons*: not by *vanity* or *self-conceit*; like some who are desirous of giving up *old* truths, only because they have *prevailed*, to become the *leaders of a sect* and the *heads of a party*: not by *ambition*, *avarice*, or vile *affections*; like many who make shipwreck of their *faith*, to serve a *present turn*, or to gratify their lusts and passions: not by *fear* or by *complaisance*; like those who have no *principles* of *their own*, but are blindly led or overawed by *others*; who can flit from church to church, from party to party, as they are directed; prepared to be of *this* or *that*, or of *all* religions; and to be sincere and constant in *none*. In a word, nothing but *reasons*, and *good* reasons, will ever move an honest and a wise man to *change* his belief or persuasion. And then indeed to *change* is the truest *constancy*; as the *parting with an error* is in reality the "holding fast that which is good." Only this we may say, that after a man has once *deliberately* made his choice, and formed his persuasion, he ought then to lean to that side with some degree of assurance and confidence, and not to be apt to take up scruples, or to entertain suspicions of it. Perfect *indifference* may be the proper temper of mind to *begin* with, and to *continue* in, during the time of the *examination*; but no longer: afterwards, it will be no fault, but a commendation rather, to lean to one side more than to another; and to

expect *very clear* and *strong* reasons, before we are prevailed with to recede from it. As I before instanced in the choice of *friends;* great *caution, diffidence, suspicion,* and *distrust,* are very proper and necessary in the *choice:* but when the choice has been made, it would be very unreasonable to be *still* full of *scruple* and *doubt,* or not to confide with great assurance in those whom we had *so cautiously* and *deliberately* chosen. It would be great injustice towards them to be still *prone* to *suspect* them, or not to be *partial* in some measure in their favour, requiring *very full* and *clear* reasons against them before we entertain any doubts of them.

Such is the case also in relation to matters of *faith,* or principles of *religion* once *deliberately* received. They ought, from that time forwards, to be allowed all favourable presumption and equity of construction: and now all the jealousy, diffidence, and distrust is to be thrown upon the other side, till *very plain* and *cogent* reasons can be brought to overturn or overrule that which we have espoused.

This appears to be the true and right method of avoiding both the *extremes;* that of *implicit* and uncautious *credulity* on one hand, or of *fickleness* and desultorious *levity* on the other.

Now to apply very briefly what hath been here said to our own particular case and circumstances. As many of us as are here present may be presumed to have *fixed our choice,* first, of the *Christian religion,* in opposition to *Pagan, Jewish,* or *Mahometan:* and, secondly, of a *reformed* religion, in opposition to *Popish* novelty and superstition: and, thirdly, of the religion of the *Church* of *England,* in opposition to all other *sects, parties,* or *denominations* of reformed Christians. They who *have examined* into these three things *know* them to be *good:* and they who *have not,* ought to examine so far as they are able, that they also *may know:* and then nothing remains but to *hold them fast,* and to make suitable improvements of them in our lives and conversations. "Let us," then, "hold fast the profession of our "faith without wavering; (for he is faithful that promised;) "and let us consider one another to provoke unto love and to "good works[a]."

[a] Heb. x. 23, 24.

SERMON XXIV.

The *precise Nature* and *Force* of Christ's Argument, founded on Exod. iii. 6. against the Sadducees.

LUKE xx. 37, 38.

Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him[a].

THESE words are the concluding part of our Lord's reply to the Sadducees, a libertine sect of the Jews, who, (like the Epicureans before, and other infidels since,) for the sake only of indulging their lusts, and to remove the dread of an after reckoning, thought proper to reject the belief of a *resurrection* and a *life to come*. But yet, to save appearances, and to keep up an outward show of religion among their countrymen, they professed a great regard to the same common scriptures, as the oracles of God, and sought out colours from those very scriptures, whereby to countenance, or seemingly to authorize, their wanton and wicked opinions. They came to our blessed Lord, and propounded a captious question to him, grounded upon Moses's Law, artfully insinuating, as if Moses himself must have been in their sentiments; for he had ordered that several brothers in succession should take the same surviving wife: a law

[a] Conf. Matt. xxii. 31. Mark xii. 26.

which seemed to preclude any future resurrection; since, upon that supposition, there could be no adjusting the contradictory claims. "Whose wife," said they, "is she in the resurrection?" Our blessed Lord, in reply, corrected their fond mistake in judging of a life to come by the life that now is, when circumstances would be widely different. In this world, where mankind go off and die daily, there is a necessity of a constant and regular succession to supply the decays of mortality: but in a world to come, where none die any more, the reason then ceases, inasmuch as there will be no occasion for any further supplies. Our blessed Lord, by thus distinguishing upon the case, defeated the objection: but to shew further, how ill the Sadducees had contrived, in appealing to Moses as a favourer of their sentiments, he reminds them of a famous passage in Moses's Law, which was directly contrary to their principles, being indeed a full and clear proof of a *resurrection* and *future state*. "Now that "the dead are raised," (or shall be raised,) "even Moses shew-"ed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, "and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a "God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him." In discoursing upon which words, I propose more particularly to consider,

I. What the *distinguishing principles* of the ancient Sadducees really were.

II. Why our Lord chose to confront them with a text *out of* Moses's writings, rather than with any other out of the Old Testament.

III. Wherein *precisely* the force of our Lord's *argument*, built upon that text, consists.

I.

As to the first article; the distinguishing principles of the Sadducees are briefly summed up by St. Luke in the twenty-third of the Acts, thus: "The Sadducees say, that there is no "resurrection, neither angel nor spirit; but the Pharisees con-"fess both[a]." From whence we may observe, that the Sadducees did not only reject the *resurrection* of the body, but they denied a *future state*; they did not allow that the soul survived the body: they looked upon the doctrines of a *resurrection* and *future state* to be so nearly allied, or so closely connected with

[a] Acts xxiii. 8.

each other, that they might reasonably be conceived to stand or fall together: wherefore they denied *both;* as, on the other hand, the Pharisees admitted both. For if the *soul survived* the body, it was very natural to suppose, that some time or other the *body* would be again *raised* up, and *reunited*, to make a *whole man:* but if the *soul died* with the body, it was obvious to infer there would be *no resurrection;* since that would amount, in such a case, to a *new creation*, rather than a *resurrection* properly so called, and the parties so raised would not be the same persons as before. This observable *connection* of the two several doctrines seems to have made the Sadducees deny *both;* and the consideration thereof will be of use to us in explaining the force of our Lord's argument; as will be seen in the sequel.

There is one noted difficulty in St. Luke's account of the Sadducees, relating to their denial of the existence of *angels*. Other accounts of Jewish writers are silent on that head; and it might seem very needless for the Sadducees to clog their cause with it, since it was *sufficient for their purpose* to reject only the *separate subsistence of human souls;* and it is odd that they should run so flatly counter to the history of the Old Testament, (which is full of what concerns *angels*,) when they had really no great necessity for it, nor temptation to it, so far as appears. But, perhaps, they thought it the shortest and surest way to reject the whole doctrine of *spirits*, or, at least, of *created* spirits, and so to settle in *materialism*, after the example of some *Pagan philosophers;* and therefore they at once discarded both *angels* and *separate souls:* and as to the Old Testament standing directly against them, with respect to *angels*, there are so many various ways of playing upon words, especially in dead writings, that men, resolute to maintain a point, (whatever it be,) can never be at a loss for evasions. This appears to be a fair account of the whole case, if it be certain that St. Luke is to be understood of their denying *angels*, properly so called. Nevertheless, I apprehend, there may be some reason to question whether he might not use the word in a *particular sense*, so as to mean no more by it than a *human soul*. It is certain that the *Pagan writers*, before his time, had been used to give the name of *angels* to *good souls departed;* and that the Jews also sometimes did the same may appear from the writings of Philo the Jew, who lived in that age. Possibly, St. Luke, knowing that the word *angel* had been so used, might mean only to say, that

the Sadducees rejected the doctrine of the *resurrection*, and the other doctrine of *separate souls*, whether called *angels*, as by some, or *spirits* only, as by others. There is another place in this book of the Acts where the word *angel* seems to have been used in the like improper sense; when some, speaking of Peter confidently reported to be at the door, and the thing was thought impossible, said, "It is his angel[a];" as much as to say, It is his *ghost*: for they had reason to believe that he had been *executed* by that time. I am aware, that interpreters give quite another gloss to that passage: but it is obvious to observe withal, how much they are perplexed with it, and how difficult it is to make tolerable sense of the place in their way, or in any way, excepting such as I have mentioned.

However, I would be understood to offer this other interpretation as *conjecture* only, and as tending to clear up some noted difficulties in St. Luke's account of the Sadducees in the *easiest* manner; while we do not want a solution of them, if this should not satisfy; for I have myself given one before: but *if* this second solution, which I have here offered, appears preferable to the other, we may then acquit the Sadducees of the charge of discarding *angels*, properly so called, and condemn them only as rejecting a *resurrection* and a *future state*. This account will appear the better, when it is considered that St. Luke says the Pharisees admitted *both*. Both what? there had been *three* things mentioned, if *angel* makes a *distinct* article: but if *angel* there means no more than an *human soul*, then the articles are reduced to *two* only, and so it was very proper to say *both*; namely, both the *resurrection* and the *separate state* of the *soul*.

However that be, (for I would not dwell long upon a *by*-point,) this is certain, that the captious question put to our Lord, and his answer to it, concerned only the case of *mankind*, and had nothing to do with *angels*. The point in dispute was only this: whether men should *live again* after death, and live in the *body*; which though seemingly *two* points, yet in effect amounted but to *one*, as I before observed.

II.

I proceed now, secondly, to inquire, why our blessed Lord chose to confront the Sadducees with a text out of Moses's writings, rather than out of any *other* part of the Old Testament.

[a] Acts xii. 15.

For it is thought that there are several other texts there, plainer and more express to the purpose, than that which our Lord has cited; as perhaps there are; for I need not dispute that point, or run out into comparisons.

Some have given it in for a reason of our Lord's choice, that Moses's books were the only ones which the Sadducees received as *canonical scripture*. But the fact is disputable at least, if not certainly false. Others say, that our Lord chose to confute them out of the book of our Law, as being of prime value, and of *greatest authority:* and that indeed is a consideration which is not without its weight. But yet I humbly conceive that we have no occasion to look far for reasons, when the text itself, with what goes along with it, sufficiently accounts for the whole thing. The Sadducees had formed their *objection* upon the *books* of Moses, claiming Moses as a *voucher* on their side. In such a case, it was extremely proper and pertinent (if it could be done) to confute the men from Moses himself: it was vindicating Moses's writings, at the same time that it was doing justice to an important truth: and so it was answering two very considerable ends, both at once. Our blessed Lord therefore applied himself entirely to the clearing up Moses's sentiments in that article, and he effected it *two* ways: first, by observing, that what the Sadducees had *cited* from him did not *prove* what they wished for; and, secondly, by shewing that what he had *taught elsewhere* fully and clearly *disproved* it. Our Lord perhaps might have found either in the Psalms or in the Prophets many other as clear, or clearer texts, to prove a *resurrection* or *future state:* but all of them together would not so well have suited his purpose, as one text out of Moses; because they would not have been so well fitted to turn off the edge of the *objection* here brought. They might have served to balance it, or overrule it, and to break its force; but the way which our Lord took disabled it at once, and threw it quite out, that it should rise up no more. So then, if we consider him merely as *maintaining a position*, he might perhaps have chosen some clearer or stronger texts; but if we consider him in capacity of *respondent*, and as defeating a subtle and plausible objection, there could not have been a more effectual way of doing it: and he very well knew, that sometimes the hitting off an objection in a neat, clear, and strong manner, has more weight with the generality, than the pouring in many demonstrations on the other side. Accordingly

we find, by the event, how well the thing answered. The Sadducees were effectually put to *silence:* so sensible were they of the force of what he had said. The Scribes, they highly applauded it, and complimented him upon it, "Master, thou hast "well said[a]." And even the common people readily understood the strength of his reasoning, and mightily admired it, and assented to it: for St. Matthew tells us, that "when the multi-"tude heard it, they were astonished at his doctrine" on that head[b].

III.

Come we therefore, thirdly, to consider the *force of our Lord's argument*, which was then so clearly apprehended, at first hearing, by learned and unlearned, by friends and adversaries, and admired by all. We may judge from thence, that it requires no long train of thought to comprehend it, no intense application to be master of it, if we happen to take it right. But it may be reason sufficient for *rejecting* any interpretation, if it appears *laboured* and subtle, and not well accommodated to ordinary capacities. Let us see then: the words which the argument is grounded upon occur in the sixth verse of the third chapter of Exodus; "I am the God of Abraham, and the God "of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." I *am*, not, I *was:* God was *then* God of those *three Patriarchs*, the latest of which had been *dead* above 170 years; still he continued to be *their* God. What could that mean? Is he a God of *lifeless clay*, of mouldered carcasses, of dust and rottenness? No, sure: besides, with what propriety of speech could the ashes of the ground be yet called Abraham, or Isaac, or Jacob? Those names are the names of *persons*, not *of senseless earth*, and *person* always goes where the *intelligence* goes: therefore Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were still *living* and *intelligent*, somewhere or other, when God declared he was still *their* God; that is to say, they were alive as to their better part, their *souls;* "He is not a God of the dead, but of "the living:" therefore the *soul survives the body:* therefore the Sadducees, who denied the *separate subsistence of souls* or *spirits*, were *confuted* at once, and that by a very clear and plain text, produced even from the books of Moses.

But it will here be asked, how does this prove the *resurrection of the body*, which was the point in question? I answer, *that* was

[a] Luke xx. 39. [b] Matt. xxii. 33.

not the *only* point, nor the *main* point, though it follows this other, as I shall shew presently: but we may observe, in the mean while, that if the argument really reached no further than what I have mentioned, yet it was a very considerable point gained, and the rest was not worth disputing; or, however, the Sadducees would not dispute it. What they were afraid of was a *future account:* now whether it be, that men shall give an account *in the body* or *without the body*, it would come much to the same; for still there would be an *account* to be given, and there would remain the like dreadful apprehension of a *judgment* to come. Here lay the *main stress* of the dispute; and therefore when our Lord had undeniably proved a *future state*, he had gone to the very *root* of the Sadducean *principles;* and if they once yielded thus far, they might readily grant the rest. Our blessed Lord knew the men thoroughly, and took the shortest way of confuting them, by striking at the very heart of their heresy. If he proved no more than the *soul's subsisting* after *death*, he proved *enough* to make the rest needless: for as the principles of the Sadducees hung all in a chain, the breaking but one link rendered the whole unserviceable. Admit but of a *future state*, and then their fond hopes were defeated, and their guilty fears alarmed; and it was all to no purpose for them to contend any further upon that head. This our Lord, being a discerner of the thoughts, perfectly knew; and so by aiming his darts aright, he at once silenced the men and quashed the dispute. Such was his constant way in all his contests with his captious adversaries: he instantly perceived where the *whole stress* of the cause lay, and there pointed his *replies* with inimitable force. But to proceed:

Though the argument made use of by our Lord proved no more, *directly*, than what I have said, (and even that was enough,) yet it might be easy to proceed upon it, till it would at length *conclude* in the doctrine of a *resurrection*, to make all complete. For if it be considered, that *death* was the *punishment of sin*, and that every person, remaining under that sentence and under the dominion of death, still carries about him the badges of the *first transgression*, and the marks of Divine displeasure; I say, the case being so, it cannot reasonably be supposed that the *souls* of *good men*, whom God has owned for *his*, shall for *ever remain* in that *inglorious state;* but will some time or other be *restored* to their *first honours*, or to what they were first ordained

to in Paradise before *sin* entered. Wherefore, since God is pleased to acknowledge himself still God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: it is highly reasonable to presume, that he will in due time restore them to their *original privileges*, removing from them the chains of *death*, by reuniting soul and body together in a happy and glorious *resurrection*. Thus the same thread of argument which our Lord began with, and which *directly* proves the *immortality of the soul*, does also in conclusion lead us on, by just and clear *consequences*, to the *resurrection of the body*.

It may perhaps be objected, that the argument thus explained proves only that *good souls* shall survive and receive their bodies new raised; not that the *wicked* shall; and therefore the Sadducees were not entirely confuted. But since the *main principle* of the Sadducees was, that *none at all* do so survive; they are abundantly confuted by proving that *some*, at least, do; and every man's common sense will easily supply the rest: for if *good* men subsist after death, and are to be amply rewarded for their *obedience;* who can make any question, but that the *wicked* also shall subsist, to receive the reward of their *disobedience?* Those *two points* have so natural a *relation* and *congruity* together, that they *imply* or infer each other; and the proving *either* is in effect proving *both*. *That* the Sadducees well knew; and therefore, in order to avoid *one*, they saw no other way but to reject *both:* therefore when our blessed Lord had so plainly established *one*, he might be understood, by certain inference and implication, to have established the *other* also.

I have but one thing more to observe upon the text; namely, that some persons have presumed to argue from the words, "for "all live to him," that souls do not actually *live* in a separate state, but only that dead men shall be recalled to life, and that for the *present* they *live* only in *God's decree*, and in a *metaphorical* sense: but this is a forced construction of very plain words, without reason or foundation for it. To *live to God* is a phrase which is to be understood in opposition to *living in the flesh*, or *living unto this world:* and it is of the same import with what we meet with in Ecclesiastes, where it is said, "The spirit shall re-"turn unto God who gave it[a];" or with that of the book of Wisdom, "The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God[b]." This is what is meant by *living to God:* they are under his eye,

[a] Eccl. xii. 7. [b] Wisdom iii. 1.

and within his protection, in the invisible world, after having taken their farewell of this: in short, when they have done with the life that now is, they yet remain, and are alive unto God, enjoying his presence, and rejoicing in his favour and protection.

The sum then of what has been said is, that the *soul* of man is of a substance distinct from the body; that it *subsists* in a *separate state*, after the *animal dissolution*, and never dies; and lastly, that all men shall one day *rise again with their bodies*, and shall *give account* for their own works. The *practical use* of these principles is obvious; that since a future judgment is certain and inevitable, and that disbelieving it (with the Sadducees of old, or with others since) can do a man no service, except it be to swell the sad account; and since there is no possible way of fencing against it, but by taking all due care to be provided for it; since these things are so, the best, and indeed the only expedient we have to trust to, is to *lead a good life*, to endeavour after universal righteousness, both of faith and manners: so may we be able (in and through the all-prevailing merits of Christ) to abide the tremendous judgment, and be received with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, into those blessed mansions which God has prepared for as many as sincerely love him and keep his commandments.

SERMON XXV.

A *good Life* the surest Title to a *good Conscience.*

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1 JOHN iii. 21, 22.

Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God. And whatsoever we ask, we receive of him, because we keep his commandments, and do those things that are pleasing in his sight.

THESE words will lead me to treat of the nature and quality of a *good conscience*, and the comforts of it. The Apostle had been before speaking of *assuring our hearts* before God by the strongest evidences possible, by a true and unfeigned love of the brethren. "Hereby," says he, "we know that we are of the "truth, and shall assure our hearts," that is, pacify our consciences, "before him." Then he adds, "For if our own heart "condemn us," God will much more condemn us: inasmuch as "God is greater than our hearts," his knowledge is of greater extent than ours, he "knoweth all things." But "if our heart "condemn us not," after close and impartial examination of our conduct, "then have we," with good reason, "confidence toward "God;" not doubting but that he will freely grant *whatsoever* we may properly *ask* of him, so long as "we keep his command-"ments, doing those things that are pleasing in his sight." Such appears to be the tour or turn of the Apostle's sentiments,

collected from the text and context. In discoursing further, it may be proper,

I. To state the *nature* and *quality* of a *sure conscience*, or *clear conscience*, or what we commonly call a *good conscience*.

II. To set forth the *advantage* and *comfort* of it.

I.

The *nature* of a *sure* or *clear conscience* ought to be first justly stated, lest we should mistake shadow for substance, appearances for realities, presumption and vain confidence for truth and soberness. The Apostle points out the general nature of a *good conscience* by this mark; that "our heart condemn us not," and that "we know that we are of the truth;" know it by some certain rule, namely by this, that "we keep God's commandments," doing that which is "pleasing in his sight." Here is a rule given whereby we may first measure our *conduct;* and if our *conduct* be found, upon a just examination, to square with *that rule*, then our *consciences* are *clear*, and we may look up with a becoming confidence to God. This is a matter of great weight, and of the last importance: and yet there is no where more room for self-flattery and self-deceit. It is extremely natural for a person to bring in a verdict in favour of himself, when he has made no examination at all, or a very superficial one, or however not so strict and severe a scrutiny as an affair of such delicacy, and withal of such moment, deserves. A man will often call it acting according to his *conscience*, when he acts according to his *present persuasion*, without ever examining how he came by that persuasion; whether through wrong education, custom, or example; or whether from some secret lust, pride, or prejudice, rather than from the rule of God's written Word, or from a principle of right reason. This cannot be justly called keeping a *good conscience:* for we ought not to take up *false persuasions* at all adventures, and then to make those *persuasions* our *rule of life*, instead of that rule which God hath given us to walk by.

It may perhaps be said, that St. Paul himself has warranted that way of speaking: for though he had once very wrongfully and grievously, under *rash* and *false persuasion*, persecuted the Church of God, yet he scrupled not to say, upon a certain occasion, afterwards, "Men and brethren, I have lived in all good "conscience before God until this day[a]." But as there is no

[a] Acts xxiii. 1.

necessity of construing the words in that large sense; so there are good reasons to persuade us, that St. Paul had no such meaning. How frequently does he charge himself, in his Epistles, as having been a very grievous sinner, yea, "chief of sin-"ners[b]," on account of his having once persecuted the Church of God! How then could he modestly pretend, or with truth say, that he had lived "in all good conscience," all his life, to that day? At other times, whenever the same Apostle speaks of his having a *good conscience*, he constantly understood it with a view only to what he had done as a Christian, in his converted state. "Herein," says he, "do I exercise myself, to have always a "conscience void of offence toward God, and toward men[c]." This was said in the way of answer to the false accusations of the Jews, like as the former, and occurs in the chapter next following: and the words plainly relate only to his Christian conversation; not to his former Jewish one. He had lived in all good conscience, with respect to what the Jews had *accused* him of: for, "neither against the *law* of the *Jews*, neither against "the temple, neither yet against Cæsar," had he "offended "any thing at all[d]," from the time of his conversion to Christ. So St. Paul's phrase of a *good conscience* did not mean merely the living up to one's *persuasion*, of whatever kind it were, but living up to a *just* and *well-grounded* persuasion of what is consonant to the *will of God*. If a person acts merely according to his present *ill-grounded* persuasion, which he never seriously and impartially examined into, he cannot be properly said to maintain a *good conscience*; because, if he has any self-reflection at all, his *conscience* must smite him, and his *own heart* condemn him, for not taking more care to inform himself better. Every person is in duty bound to "prove all things," so far as, humanly speaking, in his circumstances, he may; in order both to admit and to "hold fast that which is good[e]." It is deceiving ourselves to imagine that we have a *good conscience*, when we have used no reasonable care in examining whether it be a *right* conscience, a *well-grounded* persuasion that we proceed upon, or not.

There is another common method of *self-deceit*, when a person who well enough *understands* the rule he is to go by, yet forgets to *apply* it to his own particular case, and so speaks peace to himself all the while that he transgresses it. It is irksome and

[b] 1 Tim. i. 15. [c] Acts xxiv. 16. [d] Acts xxv. 8. [e] 1 Thess. v. 21.

painful to make home reflections: and it is a much easier way, to take it for granted that we have done nothing amiss, than to be critical, and prying into our own bosoms. King Saul could say confidently, even after the prophet Samuel had reproved him, that he had "obeyed the voice of the Lord, and had gone "the way which the Lord sent him[f]." He had done it indeed in part; and, under a kind of confusion of thought, (natural or artificial,) he was disposed to pass that *part* off for the whole, till his mistake was pressed so close upon him, that there was no room for evasion. A much better man than he, (I mean David,) after two very grievous transgressions, appeared to be under the like insensibility and the like self-confidence, (either blinded by the height of his station or the strength of his passions,) till the prophet Nathan, by an affecting parable, shewed him his mistake, and then charged the matter home to him by saying, "Thou art the man[g]." There is a kind of fascination in self-flattery, for the time, which makes a man blind to his own failings, and prompts him to speak peace to himself, when he has no foundation for it, but a fond presumption or an overweening vanity.

But the way to have *solid* and *abiding satisfaction*, is first to examine ourselves, strictly and impartially, by the rule of *God's commandments*; in order to see clearly how far we have come up to it, or how far and in what instances we have transgressed it, or come short of it. If, after a strict scrutiny, we can pronounce assuredly that our heart is right, and our ways good, (due allowances only made for sins of daily incursion or human infirmities,) we may then presume to think, that we have a *clear conscience* in the main, and such as may embolden us to look up with a good degree of confidence towards God, as one that will mercifully accept of our prayers here, and of our souls and bodies hereafter.

I am aware of a difficulty which may arise from some words of St. Paul, which at first hearing may appear to clash with the doctrine of the text, as I have been expounding it. St. Paul says, "I judge not mine own self. For I know nothing by "myself; yet am I not hereby justified: but he that judgeth "me is the Lord. Therefore judge nothing before the time, "until the Lord come," &c.[h] Do not these words sound, as if

[f] 1 Sam. xv. 20. [g] 2 Sam. xii. 7. [h] 1 Cor. iv. 3, 4, 5.

no certain judgment could or ought to be made by any man of his own spiritual state to Godwards? And if so, what becomes of the comfort of a *good conscience?* Or how can we have that "confidence toward God" which the text speaks of? In answer to the seeming difficulty, I may observe, first, that it is certain St. Paul could not mean to detract from the joyous comfort of a *good conscience*, since he more than once declared expressly, that it was what he himself enjoyed, and he was fully assured of it: besides that no man ever expressed a more satisfactory assurance of his own *final justification* than he once did, in these words; "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have "kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of "righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give "me at that day[i]." So far St. Paul: how then could he say, "Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come," if that were his meaning, that a man might not judge of his own spiritual state beforehand, nor speak peace to himself upon the strength of a *clear conscience?* Those two suppositions are evidently contradictory to each other, and can never stand together. Wherefore we must of necessity look out for some other meaning of what St. Paul says, concerning the impropriety of judging any thing of ourselves before the final day of judgment. He was there speaking of the fulfilling the "work of the "ministry" with the utmost exactness; and he would have no man presume to *judge beforehand* that he had so *fulfilled* it: for though he should be able to espy nothing in himself wherein he had been to blame, had no sin to charge himself with on that head; yet that would not suffice to clear him perfectly, that is, to *justify* him in the strictest sense, because *God might see faults*, either of *omission* or *commission*, which the *man himself* might not be *aware of:* therefore, says the Apostle, "judge nothing" as to your *faithful fulfilling* your *duty* in every point, "before "the time:" presume not so far: *God only* can judge whether you have been altogether free from blame in that article. So the meaning of the Apostle, in that place, was only to check vain *presumption*, and to prevent proud *boasting:* and it comes almost to the same with what St. James says, "In many things we "offend all[k];" and what St. John says, "If we say that we have "no sin, we deceive ourselves," &c.[l]: or to what the Psalmist

[i] 2 Tim. iv. 7, 8. [k] James iii. 2. [l] 1 John i. 8.

intimates by saying, "Who can understand his errors? Cleanse "thou me from my secret faults[m]." Now the doctrine of a *good conscience*, or of an *humble assurance* of our being in a *state of grace*, is very consistent with this *other* doctrine, that the very *best* of men are *sinners* in God's sight, and may in sundry instances be found worthy of blame, more than they themselves had been ever aware of. The Gospel remedy for those *secret* sins, those which have either escaped our notice or have slipped out of memory, is a *general repentance*, together with such kind of prayers as the Psalmist put up to the throne of grace, when he said, "Cleanse thou me from my secret faults." Such kind of *sins of ignorance* or of *infirmity* are no bar to true *peace of mind*, or to the comforts of a *good conscience*, or to a *modest assurance* of our being in a *state of grace* and favour; provided only, that, upon a serious examination of our own hearts and lives, we do find that we *indulge* no *known habits* of sin; but use our careful endeavours, by the help of God's grace, to discharge our bounden duty in that station of life whereunto God has called us. So then, this place of St. Paul, rightly understood, interferes not at all with the doctrine of the text as before explained. And I may further hint, that there were some ministers of the Gospel of that time who were too much *puffed up*, and affected to be thought *more considerable* than St. Paul *himself*; and it was chiefly with a view to *those men* that St. Paul here spake so exceeding modestly of *himself*, in order to teach *them* modesty in such a way, as might give them least offence: wherefore he says, in verse the sixth of the same chapter, "These things, brethren, I have in a figure transferred to "myself and to Apollos for your sakes; that ye might learn in "us not to think of men above that which is written, that no "one of you be puffed up for one against another." He was sensible that some of the church of Corinth magnified themselves too much, and were too much magnified by others, in the way of emulation: but it was a very tender point to speak plainly of, or even to touch upon, for fear of widening the breach, and heightening the divisions: therefore he chose that softest way of rebuke, not naming the persons who were most to blame, but naming *himself* in their stead; and describing in his own person,

[m] Psalm xix. 12.

as a minister of Christ, how *humbly* and how *modestly* every one ought to think of *himself*, and behave in his station.

But I return to the business of a *good conscience*, from which I have a little digressed, for the clearer reconciling of the several texts, and for the removing scruples. No doubt but a serious considerate man may know when he behaves as he ought to do, and may reap the comfort of it: and though we are none of us without sin, of one kind or other, but "in many things we "offend all," yea more than we know of, (but God knows,) yet a *good life* is easily distinguished from the *life* of the *ungodly*, and a *state of grace* from a *state of sin*: and so there is room enough left for the joy of a *good conscience*, where men live as becometh the Gospel of Christ, "perfecting holiness," to such a degree as man can be perfect, "in the fear of God."

II.

Having thus stated the *nature* and cleared the meaning of a *good conscience*, I now proceed to discourse of the *comforts* of it. These are pointed out, in very expressive words, by the Apostle in the text; "If our heart condemn us not, then have we con-"fidence toward God. And whatsoever we ask, we receive of "him." What greater comfort can there be than *conscious virtue*, drawing after it the *favour*, the *countenance*, the *friendship* of *God*, in whom all *happiness* centres, and upon whom *all things* entirely *depend?* If God be with us, who can be against us? What friends can we want, while in him we have all that are truly valuable? or what blessings can we desire, but what he is both willing and able to shower down upon us, only leaving it to him to judge what is safest and most convenient for us. *Whatsoever* a good man *asks* in faith, if it be for his soul's health, *that* he is sure to *receive;* as the Apostle in the text informs us. Will he ask *temporal* blessings? He may, but with reserve and caution; not forgetting to add these or the like words; "yet not my will, but thine be done." Will he ask rather (as sure he will) *spiritual* blessings, as pardon and grace, holiness here, happiness hereafter? Those he may ask earnestly, absolutely, freely, and without reserve; and is sure to be heard in doing it, so long as he keeps God's commandments. There is no pleasure in life comparable to that which arises in a good man's breast, from the sense of his keeping up a *friendly intercourse*, a kind of familiar acquaintance with *God*. I do not mean

an *irreverent*, a kind of *saucy familiarity*, such as hath been seen in some fawning *hypocrites* or *wild enthusiasts*; and which is as different from the true *filial reverence*, as the affected cringings or nauseous freedoms of a *parasite* are from the open, decent, humble deportment of a *respectful admirer*. The text expresses a good man's comfort, by his having "confidence toward God:" and in the next chapter the same Apostle says, "Herein is our "love made perfect, that we may have boldness in the day of "judgment," or against the day of judgment: "because as he "is, so are we in this world:" that is to say, we are in the *same interests* with him, are his retainers, and domestics of his family and household. The Apostle adds; "There is no fear in love; "but perfect love casteth out fear: because fear hath torment[n]."

I have cited these other texts for the clearer apprehending of what the "confidence toward God" means. To make it still plainer, I may add, that, like as a dutiful and obedient child, conscious of a parent's love, and of the reciprocal affection there is between them, approacheth not with fearful looks or downcast dread, but comes with smiles in his countenance and joy in every gesture; so a *truly good man* appears in God's presence under a joyous sense of the Divine love towards him, and has none of those dreadful apprehensions which *guilty men* have, or ought to have, as often as they come before him. An *awful distance* there ought indeed to be between the *creature* and his *Creator*: but where an union of wills and affections has made us, as it were, one with Christ, who is essentially one with *God*, then that *awful distance* brings *no torment* with it, but rather fills the mind with *inexpressible joy* and admiration.

Though St. John has said, that "perfect love casteth out "fear;" yet St. Paul hath said, "Work out your own salvation "with fear and trembling[o]." How shall we reconcile the seeming difference? It may be reconciled thus: St. John by *fear* meant a *tormenting* fear; for he observed, that *fear*, such as he spake of, *hath torment* in it: but St. Paul understood by *fear*, that kind of *filial fear* tempered with *love*, which has no such *torment* in it. St. Paul, in the same place where he speaks of working out our salvation with *fear* and *trembling*, immediately adds; "for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do "of his good pleasure[p]." Observe how *comfortable a reason* he assigns for *fear* and *trembling*, sufficient, one would think, to

[n] 1 John iv. 17, 18. [o] Philipp. ii. 12. [p] Philipp. ii. 13.

remove all *melancholy* fears, *doubts*, or *diffidence*: and so it is. But who can think of the immediate presence of the tremendous Deity without some trembling awe and concern upon his mind! Whenever God has been pleased to signify his *approach* by *visible symbols* and *sensible appearances* to *frail mortals*, they have instantly been filled with *dread* and *horror*. The prophet Daniel upon such occasions sunk down into a trance[q]; and even the Apostle John fell down *as dead* for a season[r]. So dreadful are the approaches of the Divine Majesty, though coming in love, when made in a sensible way, in some dazzling and glorious form. But when God comes to us to *make his abode with us*[s], and to *work within us*, (which he certainly does, because he has so promised,) we feel no sensible emotions: because neither the senses nor the imagination is struck by any outward appearances, but all is *invisibly* and *spiritually* performed; and there is nothing but *abstract thought* and Christian recollection that can give us any notion of the Divine presence, in such his silent and unseen approaches. However, a lively faith in it, and an undoubted experience of it, may be sufficient to affect a devout mind with a kind of trembling awe of the Divine Majesty conceived to be present, and working in us: and that consideration may best account for St. Paul's meaning, where he says, "Work "out your own salvation with fear and trembling: for it is God "that worketh in you;" and so on. There is nothing in this matter which takes off from the transporting pleasure of a *clear* and *good conscience*, grounded upon the stable support of a *well spent life*, the only sure anchor to rest upon, and that no otherwise than as it finally rests in the all-sufficient *merits* of Christ Jesus, which alone can supply the defects of our *own righteousness*, or render even our best services accepted.

But the greater the comfort of a *good conscience* is, the more solicitous ought we to be, that we proceed upon *sure grounds* in the judgment which we make of our own selves; and that we mistake not *presumption* or *self-admiration* for true peace of mind. Many marks might be mentioned, whereby to distinguish *one* from the *other*: but it may suffice to point out *one* which is the *surest* of any; namely, *growth* in goodness, *growth* in grace. The progress of a Christian life is *gradual*; and our highest attainments here are a still *growing* perfection. Examine your title to

[q] Dan. viii. 17, 18.—x. 9. [r] Rev. i. 17. [s] John xiv. 23.

the comforts of a *good conscience* by this rule; and you shall find it will not deceive you. If we are daily *improving* in wisdom and *virtue*, *gaining ground* of our *vices* or *passions* more and more; if we find ourselves more patient under adversity, and less puffed up in the day of prosperity; if we perceive that we can bear affronts or injuries with more calmness and unconcernedness, and are more disposed than formerly to forget and forgive; if we have greater command over our appetites, and can take delight in temperance, soberness and chastity: if, instead of doing wrong to any man, we find ourselves more and more inclined to kindness, friendliness, and charity; if, instead of hanging back, with respect to religious duties, we find our relish for them heightened, our devotions raised, and our ardours more inflamed; if our attachments to the world grow weaker and weaker, and our aspirations towards heaven every day stronger and stronger, the nearer we approach to the end of our race; I say, if we find matters thus to stand, (upon the strictest inquiry we can make into our hearts and lives,) then may we, upon sure grounds, judge favourably of our present state and circumstances, and may humbly presume that God is in us of a truth, and that we are, by the grace of God, through the merits of Christ Jesus, in the high road to salvation.

SERMON XXVI.

The *Nature* and *Manner* in which the *Holy Spirit* may be supposed to *operate* upon us: and the *Marks* and *Tokens* of such Operation.

ROMANS viii. 14.

As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

OUR present high festival[a], which is of ancient standing in the Church of Christ, is peculiarly dedicated to the honour of the *Holy Spirit*, a Divine Person, partner with the *Father* and the *Son*, in the one eternal, all-glorious *Godhead*. Divine wisdom has vouchsafed herein to apprise us of the relation we bear to each Person, and the dependence we have upon them all, that we also (among other creatures) may pay our dutiful homage and adoration accordingly.

All the Persons of the Godhead are represented, in sacred Writ, as *jointly concurring* in our *creation* and *preservation*, and *jointly contributing*, in mysterious order, to our *redemption* and final *salvation*: but the present occasion obliges me to confine myself chiefly to what concerns the *third Person*, his *presence* with us, and his kind *offices* towards us.

He is set forth, in the New Testament, as our *Comforter*, *abiding among us*[b], and as *dwelling in us*[c]: and that, not with respect to our *souls* only, but even our *bodies* also, these tabernacles of clay: for they likewise have the honour to be considered as the sacred

[a] Whitsunday. [b] John xvi. 7. xiv. 16. [c] 1 Cor. iii. 16.

temple wherein he is pleased to reside[d]. They are thereby *sanctified*, for the present, and *sealed* also, for the time to come: "sealed unto the day of" their "redemption[e];" that is to say, marked out, and insured for a happy and joyful *resurrection* to life eternal. "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they "are the sons of God;" and therefore, (as soon after follows in the same chapter,) "if children, then heirs, and joint heirs with "Christ—that we may be glorified together[f]." In discoursing further, it will be proper to shew,

I. *What it is* to be *led by the Spirit;* or what it is that the *Holy Spirit* does for the furthering our salvation.

II. *How* and in *what manner* he may be supposed to *act*, or *operate*.

III. By what *marks* or *tokens* it may be seen that he *does* operate upon us, and that we are *led* by him.

IV. What is the *use* and *improvement* which we are concerned to make of the whole.

I.

As to the first particular, which relates to the *Spirit's leading us* in our way to salvation, it is observable, that our blessed Lord, taking his solemn leave of his disciples, a little before his Passion, consigned them, as it were, over to the care and guidance of the *Holy Ghost*, the *Comforter*, who would "guide them into all "truths," and would "abide with them," and with the Church after them, "for ever[h]." He repeated the same promise to them a little before his ascension into heaven, as appears from the history of Acts i. 5, 8.

This, however, is not to be so understood, as if the *Holy Ghost* were now our *sole* conductor, *exclusive* of the *other two* Divine Persons: for our blessed Lord, in the very same place where he promises to send the Comforter to "abide with us for ever," promises also, that the *Father* and *himself* shall make the *like abode* with good Christians. "If any man love me," says he, "my "Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make "our abode with him[i]." Elsewhere he promises to his disciples his own *spiritual presence*, to continue with them, as long as the Church or the world should last. "Lo, I am with you alway, "even unto the end of the world. Amen[k]." From all which it

[d] 1 Cor. vi. 19. [e] Eph. iv. 30. [f] Rom. viii. 17. [g] John xvi. 13.
[h] John xiv. 16. [i] John xiv. 23. [k] Matt. xxviii. 20.

is plain, that God the *Father*, God the *Son*, and God the *Holy Ghost*, are *equally present* to good men in all ages of the Church; and that when our Lord spake of his *departing*, and *leaving the world*, he meant it barely of his *bodily* absence: and because, from the time of his ascension, he was to be *present*, only in a *spiritual* and *invisible* way, as a *spirit*, and together with the *Holy Spirit*; therefore he considered his *Church* from thenceforwards as being *peculiarly* under the guidance of the *Holy Ghost*: though, strictly speaking, it is under the *spiritual* guidance of *all the three Persons*. Hence it is, that such *spiritual guidance* (which often goes under the name of *grace*, in the New Testament) is sometimes ascribed to the *Father*, sometimes to the *Son*, and sometimes to the *Holy Ghost*, as it is the *common work* of all; and may be indifferently and promiscuously attributed to *any* of them singly, or to *all* of them together. So we find mention made, more than once, of the "grace of our Lord Jesus "Christ;" and of the "grace of God," meaning God the Father: and yet the Holy Ghost is emphatically and eminently styled "the Spirit of grace," as being, some way or other, more *immediately* concerned in the work of grace, and thereby uniting true believers both with the *Father* and the *Son*.

Now, for the clearer conception of what *grace* means, in this *emphatical* sense, and of what the *Holy Spirit does* in the *work of grace* upon the minds of the faithful; we may distinctly consider it under its several views or divisions.

1. There is a kind of *illuminating* or *enlightening* grace given, as often as the Holy Spirit *conveys* and *instils good thoughts*, *wholesome counsels*, or *salutary instructions*; opening the *understanding* to receive and embrace them. To this head belongs what the Psalmist says; "Open thou mine eyes, that I may "behold wondrous things out of thy law[l]." And in the New Testament it is recorded, that the "Lord opened the heart of "Lydia, that she attended unto the things which were spoken "of Paul[m]." It is the *Spirit* that gives us *true light*, and likewise gives it *reception*.

2. There is also a kind of *sanctifying grace*, when the *Holy Spirit* of God *rectifies the heart*, *inclines the will*, and *meliorates the affections*; for it is "God that worketh in us both to will "and to do of his good pleasure[n];" as St. Paul testifies. This

[l] Psalm cxix. 18. [m] Acts xvi. 14. [n] Philipp. xi. 13.

sanctifying grace is commonly distinguished into *three parts* or branches, called *preventing, assisting, perfecting;* being considered, first, as laying the early *seeds* of that spiritual life; next, as contributing to its *growth* and progress; and lastly, as adding the *finishing* hand to it.

3. There is one *peculiar work* of the *Spirit*, which, though it may be reduced to one or other of the *three heads*, of *preventing*, *assisting*, or *perfecting* grace, (as before mentioned,) may yet deserve some *special* notice here; and that is, the grace of *true devotion*, attended with deep *compunction* of heart. St. Paul speaks of it in the Epistle to the Romans, in these words: "The "Spirit also helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we "should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh "intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered[o]." That is to say, the *Holy Spirit* of God, working within, sometimes strikes the mind of good men with such *ardency* of devotion, and such vehement compunctions, that their hearts are too full to utter what they think; and so, for the present, they are not able to vent the pious breathings of their souls in any other way than that of sighs and groans. The *Holy Spirit* is the *impulsive* cause of all such *religious ardours*, such strong convulsions of *godly remorse* or *godly affection;* it is the *work of God* upon the *humble minds*.

These few hints may suffice to give you some *general* idea of the *work of grace*, or of what the *Holy Spirit does* for the furthering the *spiritual life* here, in order to our *salvation* hereafter.

II.

The next inquiry is, *how*, or in *what manner*, he may be conceived to *operate*, and to effectuate what he does?

In this inquiry we ought to proceed with all becoming modesty and reverence; since we are not able perfectly to unfold the *mysterious workings* of the tremendous Deity upon the spirit of man. But one thing we are certain of, in the general, that whatever is ordinarily done of this kind, is done in a *gentle, moral, insinuating* way, and not by *mechanical, irresistible impulses*, such as would take away *human liberty*, or reduce men to a sort of *intelligent clockwork*, or *reasoning machines:* for, upon that supposition, every good work, word, or thought would be so *entirely God's*, that *no part* of it would be *ours;* and so all

[o] Rom. viii. 26.

our *virtue* would be mere *force* upon us, (and therefore no virtue of *ours* at all,) and there would be no room left for the numberless exhortations to well doing which *Scripture* so much abounds with, nor for any *proper title* to *future rewards*. It is manifest therefore that the *operations* of God's *Holy Spirit* upon us only *prepare* us for godliness, or *incite* us and *enable* us thereto; the rest must come from *ourselves*. Accordingly, *Scripture* always supposes that, notwithstanding any the strongest *interpositions* of *grace*, men are still left capable of *resisting* the *Holy Spirit*[p], and *grieving* the *Holy Spirit*[q], and even *quenching* the *Holy Spirit*. For the Holy Spirit *moves* and *inclines* only, and does not *compel*: he *leads* and *conducts* as many as *will* be led and conducted by him; but does not so *forcibly* attract them as to *overrule* all stubborn *resistance* or reluctant perverseness. God has provided no remedy for *malicious wickedness* and *proud obstinacy*: but in such cases, the *Holy Spirit* commonly *retires* and withdraws, leaving the incorrigible and incurable to themselves, and to their own certain destruction.

If we may presume to be a little more *particular* upon so *awful a subject*, it seems that the *Holy Spirit* of God works upon the minds of men by proper applications to their *reason* and *conscience*, to their *hopes* and *fears*; suggesting to them what is *right* and *good*, and *laying before them*, in a strong light, the *happiness* which they may attain to by *obedience*, and the *misery* consequent upon *disobedience*. And I may add, that one very considerable article of Divine wisdom and goodness lies in the providential ordering all human affairs in such a manner, as may most fitly serve the purposes of *grace*; not preserving good men altogether *from temptations*, (for how then should they improve in virtue, without the exercise proper for it?) but so *restraining*, *limiting*, and *governing* the temptations, that they shall not press harder or continue longer than may best answer the end and design of God's permitting them. Let this suffice, in the *general*, with respect to the *ordinary methods* of *grace*, and the *manner* of the *Spirit's operating*. It consists partly in the *outward direction* of all *sublunary affairs*, and partly in *inward* and gentle *applications* to the *minds* of men, suited to the times, seasons, and circumstances before provided.

There have been instances of other methods of grace, which

p Acts vii. 51. q Ephes. iv. 30.

may be called *extraordinary;* as was once seen in the *miraculous* conversion of three thousand persons at once; and again, more particularly, in the *miraculous* conversion of St. Paul. Of such cases it is observable, that though the *outward means* were *miraculous,* and certainly *effectual* with all who were *fitly disposed;* yet even *there* the *inward grace* was not absolutely *irresistible.* Paul was a *religious* well disposed man before his *miraculous conversion,* and only wanted *new light* and a *better direction.* The *outward call,* in that case, was *miraculous;* but the *inward grace* which went with it was no other than what *might* have been *resisted,* and *would* have been resisted, had it fallen upon a *perverse temper* and a *stubborn heart.* St. Paul himself intimates as much, where, speaking of himself, he says, "Whereupon, O "king Agrippa, I was not *disobedient* unto the heavenly vision[r]." He *might* have been *disobedient;* but he chose to *obey,* being, in the main, a person of good *natural probity,* and not under the dominion of any *malicious wickedness* or *stubborn passions.* We do not find that any *miracles* could convert the hardened Pharisees, or Sadducees, or Simon Magus: and though Elymas the sorcerer was *miraculously* struck blind, yet it had no *saving effect* upon his heart. There is a *certain degree of obstinacy* which the *grace* of God *extends not to,* or attempts not to conquer. "My "Spirit shall not always strive with man," said God, with respect to the *old world*[s]. They were gone too far to be curable by the *ordinary* methods of *grace:* and an all-wise God would not send them an *irresistible* grace (which had been improper) to *convert* them; but he sent a *flood* to *destroy* them: so in the case of Sodom and Gomorrah, he attempted not, by any *ordinary* or *extraordinary grace,* to *reclaim* them; but rained down *fire and brimstone* from heaven to *consume* them. The reason of all which is, that men, considered as *free agents,* must be reformed by the *gentler measures* or none: if they will not be *led by the Holy Spirit of God,* they shall not be *driven;* because then their *virtue* would have nothing of *choice* in it, and consequently would be *no virtue* at all, in any proper sense of the word, nor meet for a *reward.* So much for my *second general head.* I proceed now, thirdly,

III.

To inquire by *what marks* or *tokens* we may discern *when* the

[r] Acts xxvi. 19.

[s] Gen. vi. 3.

Holy Spirit *operates* upon us, and *when* we are *led* or *conducted by him.*

The *marks* or *tokens* of the *Spirit's operating* appear chiefly, either in *checks of conscience* dissuading us from evil, or in *godly motions* inciting us to what is right and good. For though what passes within us *of that kind* is not *distinguishable*, by the *manner* of it, from the *natural workings* of our own minds; yet *revelation*, in conjunction with our enlightened *reason*, does abundantly assure us, that every *good thought*, *counsel*, and *desire* cometh *from above*, and is the work of *supernatural grace* upon the *heart.*

But before we draw such conclusion, with respect to any *particular* thought which passes within, special care should be taken, that we proceed upon *sure grounds* in the forming our judgment of it: otherwise we may be apt to ascribe the *rovings of fancy*, or *mere dreams* of our own, to the *Holy Spirit* of God.

Some very good men, but of a melancholy cast, have been observed to make it a rule to themselves, in cases of perplexity, to lean to that side wherein they find most *ease* to their *own minds*; concluding that the *peace* which they experience is itself a *symptom* of *Divine direction.* The rule is a good *general rule*; because, in most cases, a man's *own mind* is his best *casuist*, in judging of right and wrong, of good and evil. But yet sometimes it happens, that a person may be under the influence of unperceived *prejudices* or *passions*, which warp him to a *side*, and lay a *bias* upon him: and therefore there is no safe and *certain* rule to go by, in such cases, but a strict examination into the *nature* and *quality* of the action: and if, upon cool reflection, we find that what we are inwardly *dissuaded from* is really *evil*, or what we are inwardly *prompted to* is really *good*, then may we *safely* and justly ascribe *such motions* to the *Holy Spirit* of God.

As to our judging of our *whole conduct*, and whether, or how far, we are therein moved or conducted by the Holy Spirit, we have a safe rule to go by; namely, the rule of *God's commandments*: "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin[t];" that is, doth not *allow himself* in any *known sinful habit* or practice. "He that keepeth God's commandments," as St. John observes, "dwelleth in God, and God in him[u]." St. Paul also to the same purpose says, that "if we live in the Spirit," we shall

[t] 1 John iii. 9. [u] 1 John iii. 24.

"walk in the Spirit[x]:" and because such walking is best seen by the *fruits*, he enumerates the *fruits of the Spirit* in the same place: "The fruit of the Spirit," says he, "is love, joy, peace, "longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temper-"ance[y]." In short, the only *sure marks* and tokens of our being *conducted by the Spirit of God*, are a serious and steadfast *belief* of what the *same Spirit* hath taught us, and a conscientious *obedience* to all the *laws of the Gospel.*

IV.

I pass on to the fourth and last particular, namely, the *use* and *improvement* to be made of the whole.

1. One great *use* is, to be *ever mindful of the world of spirits* whereunto we belong; and particularly of that *blessed Spirit* who *presides over us*, and whose *temple* we are, while we behave as becomes us. We are used to look upon ourselves as the very *lowest order* of intelligent beings, and perhaps very justly: but yet I know not what other order of creatures there is which can boast of *higher privileges* than we; while God the *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost* vouchsafe to *make their abode* with us, and to accept even of our earthly *bodies* (while clean and undefiled) as their *common temple* to dwell in.

This consideration, by the way, may serve to shew us the folly of all those who have thought it *below* the *Divine* Majesty to *take upon him flesh and blood*, and have made *that* their pretext for disputing the *divinity* of our *blessed Saviour*. For if it is not *below the Majesty* even of *God the Father*, to *abide*, in some sense, *with flesh and blood;* how can it be thought *beneath the dignity* of *God the Son* to *take our nature upon him?* Besides, true *essential* Majesty can suffer no detriment, can never be *impaired* by any gracious *condescensions:* but the *greater* the *Divine condescension* is, the *brighter* is the *glory:* therefore all the *three Persons* of the *eternal Godhead* have *condescended* to dwell, in *godlike manner*, even with *mortal man*. Should not this consideration move us to set the less value upon *things below*, and to elevate our affections to *things above?*

2. Another *use* to be made of the present meditation is, to be ever mindful of putting up our *devout prayers to the throne of grace*, that the *Spirit* of God may alway *dwell with us*, and never depart from us: but then, to make our *prayers* the more *effectual*,

[x] Gal. v. 25. [y] Gal. v. 22, 23.

we should take care to avoid all such *evil practices* as may offend or grieve the Holy Spirit of God, and move him to desert us, or to grow estranged from us.

3. Thirdly and lastly, since the *benefit* of all depends, at length, upon our own *willing compliance* and *hearty endeavours*, let us make it our *constant resolution* to *attend the motions* and to *obey the suggestions* of God's *Holy Spirit;* and so to "work out "our own salvation with fear and trembling[z]." While *God* works in us and for us, *we* must also work for *ourselves;* or else his *grace* is sent in vain. Therefore, though the Psalmist prays to God, to *create* in him a *clean heart* and a *new spirit*[a]; yet elsewhere God himself, speaking to his people, says, "Cast away "from you all your transgressions, make you a new heart and "a new spirit[b]." So then a good heart and a good life are *God's work*, and they are *our work* also: they are a mixture or compound of *both*. God will never fail to perform *his* part, provided only that we are not wanting in *ours*. Use we therefore first the *appointed means* of grace, (appointed by God,) such as *hearing, reading, praying,* and *receiving* the holy *Communion;* for these are the *ordinary instruments* of grace, the *conduits* or *channels* in and by which God *conveys* it. Take we care to *comply* with and *obey* the *grace* of God *once received*, and to bring forth the *fruits* of it in our lives and conversations.

[z] Philipp. xi. 12. [a] Psalm li. 10. [b] Ezek. xviii. 30, 31.

SERMON XXVII.

The Springs and Motives of *false Pretences* to the *Holy Spirit;* with the *Rules* and *Marks* of *trying* and detecting them.

1 JOHN iv. 1.

Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God.

OUR present festival[a] is the memorial of the awful coming of God's *Holy Spirit* upon the Apostles, pursuant to our Lord's promise; and is particularly dedicated to the honour of that Divine Person, the *third Person* of the adorable Godhead. Him we ought to honour in every way that either sacred Writ or our own enlightened reason hath pointed out to us: more particularly, in guarding with utmost care against all *abuses* of that high name; against imputing any *fond fancies,* or follies, or phrensies to the blessed Spirit of God. Simon Magus, disturbed in head and corrupt in heart, was ambitious of the *thing,* for the sake chiefly of the *name;* affecting to give it out, that himself was "some great one[b];" or some "great power of God[c]." And when he could not obtain it, being altogether unworthy of it, he endeavoured (as we learn from Church history) to make up with *fiction* and *ostentation* what was wanting in *fact;* pretending that

[a] Whitsunday. [b] Acts viii. 9. [c] Acts viii. 10, 18, 19.

at some times he had been the great oracle or representative of God *the Father* to the Samaritans, and at other times of *the Son* to the Jews, and again of *the Holy Ghost* to the Gentiles. So industrious was he to magnify himself under fair pretences, thereby hoping to draw the world after him; as he did some part of it, gaining proselytes among the ignorant, credulous, and undiscerning. This kind of traffic for fame was constantly carried on by some or other, under some shape or other, during the first ages of the Church; and it has been continued in various ways and in different forms, through all succeeding ages, down to this day. It is one of the most refined artifices of Satan's policy: and God has permitted it for the *trial* of his faithful servants; that they may be proved and exercised every way, and may learn to be as much upon their guard against any surprise of their *understandings* as against any seduction of their *wills*. It is sufficient, that both the New Testament and Old have given strong, repeated warnings against every temptation of that kind: and have not only commanded us to stand upon our guard, in such cases, but have also laid down *marks* and *rules*, whereby to discover, and whereby to repel every wile of Satan, and every the subtlest engine amongst all his devices.

As to this particular, there are many cautions against it inserted up and down in the sacred writings: and I have here made choice of one which appears to be as expressive and affecting as any, delivered by St. John, the *latest Apostle*: "Be-"loved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they "are of God;" and so on. Which words very plainly pointed at the *false pretenders* to the *Spirit*, appearing in those early days: men that vainly boasted of their being filled with *the Holy Ghost*, instructed *extraordinarily* from above, illuminated from on high, and commissioned to *teach* and *gather converts*, in opposition to the *truly authorized* and *regular ministers*. The Apostle does not exhort us altogether to *neglect* or pass by every vain pretender, (for then how shall we know whether they are vain or not?) but he bids us *suspend* our faith, and withhold our assent from them; and, in the mean while, to try and examine what their boasted pretences amount to. In discoursing further, my design is,

I. To inquire somewhat particularly into the *springs* or *motives* from which those *false pretences* to the *Spirit* generally proceed.

II. To consider by what *rules* or *marks* any pretences of that kind may be *tried*, and *discovered* to be *false* and *vain*.

III. To observe, how much it *concerns* every pious and considerate Christian to *make the trial*, and to be upon his guard in such cases.

I.

I am first to inquire, from what *springs* or *motives* the *false pretences* to the *Spirit* generally proceed. I have before hinted that *vainglory*, or a thirst after *fame*, is often the *moving spring*, the most prevailing motive. But to go a little deeper; *self-love*, of some kind or other, is the *general foundation*, the root of all. Many and various are the *illusions* of *self-love*; and they often prevail, not only with *hypocrites*, and men of double hearts, but even with *well-meaning* persons of honest minds, but of weak or distempered heads. Were none but ill designing men to make false pretences to the Spirit, the temptation would be but coarsely laid, and would be less apt to deceive. The fineness of Satan's policy chiefly lies in making use even of pious, honest, well-meaning, but unwary persons to work with. God may pity and pardon the men so made use of for the trial of others, if their ignorance was unconquerable or their infirmities unavoidable: if they were naturally half-witted, or half-distracted, God may make them merciful allowances: but he will make no allowances for persons of better sense or stronger faculties, if they suffer themselves to be misled by such infatuated instruments. A warm zeal for religion may often go along with want of knowledge or sound discretion: and nothing is more common, than for unthinking men to misreckon their own talents, and to take false measures very ignorantly of themselves. *Self-love* is natural to all men, and is the abiding pulse of every one's heart; which, if it be not carefully watched and guarded will sometimes grievously impose even upon wise and shrewd men; but much more upon the careless and undiscerning. Who does not *wish* to be one of the favourites of heaven, and to be *extraordinarily illuminated* or *conducted* by God's *Holy Spirit?* Let but a fond *self-lover* dwell often and long upon this deluding thought, and he will be apt by degrees, especially if otherwise full of *conceit*, to *fancy* himself *so illuminated*, and *so conducted*, as he *desires to* be: and then every *warm sally* of *imagination*, or every *unusual emotion* in his breast, (coming perhaps from the *tempter*, or from his *own fond dreams*,) will immediately be construed as a *godly*

feeling, and an *infallible mark* of some *Divine impulse*, some *secret contact* of God's *Holy Spirit*. When the pleasing delusion is once indulged thus far, the man begins presently to fancy himself a kind of *saint* upon earth, or perhaps an *apostle*: or, if the distemper runs higher, (as we have known several instances,) he may conceive himself *greater* than *any prophet* of the Old Testament, or *apostle* of the New: all *self-illusion*, and little short of downright phrensy!

It is not to be doubted but that persons of this unhappy complexion must have some *colours*, some *appearances*, whereby to deceive their own hearts. The colours commonly are some great corporal *mortifications* and *austerities*, long *watchings*, long *fastings*, and perhaps *immense pains* taken in *uncommanded* services, such as God has not required at their hands. Their submitting to such *painful services* they look upon as *infallible proofs* of their own *sincerity*, and of some *marvellous grace* of God: wherein again they often deceive their own hearts, and are not aware of the secret workings and fond delusions of their own *self-love*: for, after all, there is not half so much *self-denial* shewn in those voluntary *austerities*, accompanied with *pride* and *ostentation*, as there is in a *less pretending* conduct, squared by the rule of *God's commandments*.

If persons, suppose in a *green age*, by the practice of those *austerities*, can once come to *think themselves wiser* and *greater*, and every way more considerable as *teachers*, than the *oldest* and *wisest* and *best studied* Divines; what a *compendious* method is thereby laid of arriving suddenly to deep learning without study and to profound wisdom without the pain of thought! And who would not wish, at so cheap and easy a rate, and in so short a time, to come at the top of their profession? especially if neither their *natural talents* nor *acquired furniture* could afford them any reasonable prospect of ever becoming considerable at all in the *common* and *ordinary* methods. A *forward ambition*, joined with as much sloth and impatience, may easily prompt a man to flatter himself in such a way: and certainly the *self-denial* which he exercises in some religious *austerities* is not worth the mentioning, in comparison to the prodigious *self-indulgence* which, upon the whole, is manifestly seen in it. It is compounding for fame, reputation, and authority, by a few short voluntary *penances*, and by making very familiar with the *Holy Spirit* of God; at the same time saving all the weariness of the flesh felt in *hard*

studies, all the irksome labour of *languages*, *history*, and *critical inquiries*, which are ordinarily requisite to form a *judicious interpreter* of God's word, and a *faithful guide* of souls. While others are content to wait for *wisdom* till an advanced age, and to go on, the mean while, in the slow methods of labour and industry which God has appointed; these pretenders to the *Spirit* affect to be *wise at once*, and wise in a *most eminent degree*, wise by *inspiration*. Who sees not that *laziness*, and *love* of *ease*, and *self-flattery*, and eagerness for an *early preeminence*, may naturally tempt weak men to such self-delusions? I do not say that they themselves are commonly aware of the secret springs by which they are so moved, not being used to cool reflection or sober thought. There are no charms more delusive than the charms of *self-love*; and the simpler men are, the less do they perceive them, and the more liable are they to be misled by them. Even children often discover a great deal of cunning which their *self-love* teaches them, and which they never reflect upon; neither do they so much as perceive by what springs they are actuated; though a judicious stander-by will easily look through it, and as easily account for it: such may be, such probably is the case with every *well-meaning* false pretender to the *Spirit*. As to subtle and *designing hypocrites*, I meddle not with their case: the finest hypocrisy may soon be discovered, and so is the less apt to deceive much or long: but the *well-meaning* pretenders to the *Spirit*, who through a secret *self-flattery*, and a cast of melancholy, first deceive *themselves*, are, of all men, the best fitted to deceive other persons. Their artless *simplicity*, together with their *hearty* and *affectionate professions*, are very apt to win upon the best natured and best disposed Christians, which the *tempter* knows full well; and he never exercises a deeper policy, or gains a greater triumph, than when he can thus decoy some of the most religious of God's servants, deluding them in a pious way, and, as it were, foiling them with their own weapons. But let every considerate Christian, in such cases, call to mind the good advice of the text; first, to *try* and *examine* the *spirits* pretended, whether they are *of God*. We are not commanded to examine, whether the pretenders are *sincere* men or *hypocrites*: that may often be doubtful, and it may be hard to pass any certain judgment upon the case: besides that it does not so much concern us. For *our fault* will not be the *less*, whether we are misled by a *designing hypocrite*, or a *blind zealot*, or a *raving enthusiast*.

Care must be taken not to be misled by any; neither by the *cunning craftiness* of one, nor by the *simpleness* of another, nor by the *madness* of a third. But we must *try* and *examine* the *pretences* of each, and guard equally against all. I proceed therefore to my second head of discourse, namely,

II.

To consider by what *rules* or *marks* any *pretences* of that kind may be *tried*, and *detected* to be false and vain.

1. *Boasting* and *ostentation* are a flat *contradiction* to the very *supposal* of the *ordinary* graces boasted of; because *humility* and *modesty* are the very *chief graces* upon which all the rest hang. If a man thinks himself endowed with the *graces of the Spirit*, let him shew it in his *meek deportment* and by his *good works:* but let him not *trumpet the fame* of it through the world, lest his *very doing it* should be taken for a *demonstration* that he *has not* the *Spirit of God;* but that some *spirit of delusion* has crept in, in his stead. For as a man, by *boasting* of his *good breeding*, does, in that very act or instance, prove himself *ill bred;* and, in *boasting* of his *wisdom*, shews his *want* of it; so a man, who presumes to *boast* of the *grace of the Spirit*, betrays his *want* of grace in that *very instance*. Our blessed Lord rebuked the Pharisees for *sounding a trumpet* before them in the synagogues and in the streets, that they might have "glory of men," when they did their *alms*[a]: but what would he have said to men, who should be *noising it abroad*, how full they are, not of *one virtue* only, but of *all virtues* and of *all graces?* For *that* must be meant by being *full of the Spirit*, if it means any thing. This way of *sounding the trumpet* before them, to draw the eyes and attention of the world after them, (without miracles to prove their mission,) is much more indecent and immodest, than what the Pharisees did; besides the additional profaneness of making a very irreverent use of the *tremendous name* of God's *Holy Spirit*. To be short, you may depend upon it, that a religion so *noisy*, so *pompous*, so *theatrical*, as what I have mentioned, is very little akin to the *humble*, and *modest*, and *unpretending* religion of Christ.

2. Another sure mark of a *false spirit* is *disobedience to rule and order*, *contempt of lawful authority*, and especially any *intruding* into what does not *belong to them*, or the attempting to *draw off*

[a] Matt. vi. 2.

the people of God from *that regular* and *standing ministry* which God has ordained, to follow teachers set up by their *own authority*, that is, by no authority at all. Such *irregular* practices come not of the *Holy Spirit:* "God is not the author of "confusion, but of peace, as in all churches of the saints[b]." St. Peter's rule is; "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of "man" (that is, *lawful* ordinance) "for the Lord's sake[c]." Indeed the *Apostles* had *special commission* from God to oppose *human ordinances*, and to *disturb the religions* then prevailing, which were *false* religions: but they had the power of *working miracles*, which were their *credentials* to authorize them in it, and their *heavenly* warrants for what they did: otherwise their methods of proceeding would have been both unwarranted and vain.

When our pious Reformers, about 200 years ago, went about the *restoring religion* to its ancient purity, they did it in a *regular* and *orderly* way, under the *direction* and *countenance* of the *ruling powers*, and with a due regard to such a *regular ministry* as Christ had appointed in his Church. Those excellent men were indeed *full of the Spirit*, which appeared in their *wise counsels* and *exemplary conduct*, and was visible, in a manner, to all good men; unless we may except themselves, whose great *humility* and *modesty* would scarce permit them to see those shining graces of their own, which could not be hid from the observing world. Under such a *regular* and *authorized ministry*, so justly settled, *our Church* (God be thanked) had subsisted and flourished, and does to this day: and they who any way presume to *disturb* that *comely order*, or to throw any *contempt* upon it, only to *draw disciples* to *themselves*, cannot be *led by the Spirit* in *such attempts;* except it be a spirit of *delusion*, altogether opposite to the *Holy Spirit* of God.

What, though they pretend to be *ministers of righteousness*, and affect to outvie others in some *strictnesses* of their own, (loose all the while in the *main things*, which are of the last importance to *peace, order*, and *unity*,) is there any thing strange in such conduct? There were Christian teachers in the first age, who vied even with St. Paul, and affected to set up a *stricter* and *purer religion* than he could pretend to, in order to bring him under contempt. But what said he of them, writing by the *Spirit of*

[b] 1 Cor. xiv. 33. [c] 1 Pet. ii. 13.

God? He said thus: "Such are false apostles, deceitful workers "transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ. And no "marvel; for Satan himself is [sometimes] transformed into an "angel of light. Therefore it is no great thing if his [Satan's] "ministers also be transformed as the ministers of righteous-"ness; whose end shall be according to their works[d]." What avail magnificent words and smooth speeches? Perhaps some *false pretenders* may labour earnestly to convert men from *gluttony* and *drunkenness*, from *cursing* and *swearing*, from *fornication* and *adultery*, or the like. Well: what is there of this kind which is not done by the *regular ministry*, and done also in a *more regular* and much *more edifying* way? But if, while such *pretenders* endeavour to draw men off from *some vices*, they lead them into *others* as *bad*, or *worse*, namely into *faction* and *schism*, into *sidings* and *parties*, into a *contempt* of *rule, order*, and *authority*, and into a *secession* from their *proper pastors*, their much *more knowing* and *more faithful* guides, (besides turning the minds of the people off unto *fables* and *reveries*, instead of *wholesome truths*, and encouraging them in the wantonness of *itching ears*;) I say, if such *pretenders* behave in *this way*, it will be manifest to all men who have their senses exercised, that they *have not the Spirit of God* to direct them in what they do.

3. Another sure mark of a *false spirit* is the *laying down deceitful rules* or tokens *whereby to judge* whether or when a man *has the Spirit* of God. There have been many, both in former and later times, who have laid great stress upon I know not what *sensible emotions*, or *violent impulses*, coming upon them at times, which they boldly and rashly impute to the *Holy Spirit*; presuming also to date their *conversion*, or *new birth*, (as they call it,) from such fanciful impressions. There is not one syllable in sacred Writ to countenance the notion of *such impulses*: it is all mere *fiction*, *invention*, *presumption*, and exceeding dangerous in its issue or tendency. For by that *blind rule*, a man may very easily mistake the *suggestions of Satan* for *Divine impulses*: therefore, if they do indeed feel any *emotions extraordinary*, the first and most important inquiry is, whether *those emotions* are not really Satan's *illusions*, rather than *Divine impressions*; or whether they are not rather marks of *possession* than of *inspiration*? *Confidence* is no argument in a dark affair:

[d] 2 Cor. xi. 13, 14, 15.

but it is the grand deceiver's artifice to hoodwink *forward men* in a *blind presumption*, and to *blow them up* into an *assurance* beyond their *evidence*.

There is but *one certain rule* whereby to know when we are *led by the Spirit;* and that is the *rule of God's commandments*. When we so think, and so do, as the *Spirit* of God has directed in *God's holy word*, then, and *then only*, are we sure that we are *led by the Spirit*, or *born of the Spirit*. St. John has said all in a very few words; "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit "sin[e];" that is, doth not *allow himself* in any *known* sinful practices. *There* is the *mark*, and the only *true mark* of *regeneration*, and of the *spiritual life*. Let every man examine himself by *this rule:* and when they can, upon *sure* grounds, speak *peace* to their own consciences, then let them attribute the glory of it to God's *Holy Spirit*, for that is right: but let them not *blaze it out* to the world, however certain they are of it: for that will be seeking *honour* of *men*, and endeavouring to *share* with the *Holy Spirit* in that glory which belongs to *him only;* and it will be *forfeiting the favour* of that *very Spirit* whereof they so *proudly boast*. The *Spirit* has not given us leave to boast of his favours for our own glory or fame; much less to do it for the sake of *preeminence*, or to make others look less in comparison. Such affectation of *preeminence* cometh not from above, but is a sad token, yea, and a *fatal symptom*, of an *earthly* and a *sensual spirit*.

I am aware, that the *false pretenders* to the *Spirit* have often laid hold on that text of St. John, warping it unnaturally, so as to draw it to favour their own *fond delusions*. They first *take for granted* that they are *born of God*, (which is their fond presumption,) and then they *conclude* that they are *without sin*. This is vilely *perverting* and abusing the text: for they ought *first to know* that their *ways are right*, and *then* to draw their *conclusion;* and not vainly to *presume first* that they *have the Spirit*, and then *from thence to conclude* that their *ways are right*. But such has often been the self-delusive method of *vain pretenders:* and they have sometimes carried it so far as to argue, that since they are *saints*, and *born of God*, (that is, in their own fond imagination,) they *cannot* be guilty of *sin;* but let them do what they please, the Spirit is to warrant and *sanctify* all; for *God sees no sin in his saints*. This is turning the tables much in the

[e] 1 John iii. 9. v. 18.

same way as the Romanists have often done with respect to their pretended *infallibility*. Give them a thousand plain proofs that they *have erred*, and *do err*; and they will answer all by telling you, that they *cannot* err. In like manner, tell some *false pretenders* to the *Spirit* that they are *guilty* of such and such manifest *iniquities*, and *prove* it upon them by plain *evidence of fact*, they will persist in it that they *cannot sin*, because (which is their vanity) they are, in their own conceit, *born of God*, and *led by the Spirit*. How dangerous a principle this is, how productive of all ungodliness, and of the most shocking impieties, was too sadly seen in the *last century*, and stands upon record in the histories of those distracted times. But enough hath been said of the *rules* or *marks* whereby to *try* and *detect* every *false pretender* to the *Spirit*.

III.

And now, for an *application* of the whole, give me leave briefly to suggest, how much it concerns us to be upon *our guard* in such cases.

Religion, like all other weighty concernments, is best carried on in the calm, regular, and sedate way; and therefore great care should be taken to keep up the old and well tried methods, rather than to change them for new devices, which will never answer. If sinners will not listen to the *Spirit of God* speaking by the *scriptures*, and by a *regular ministry*, they will not listen to the same Spirit supposed (but vainly supposed) to speak in the *undigested*, *incoherent*, extemporary effusions of *raw teachers*. It is easy for warm zealots of distempered minds to throw reflections upon the wiser and more considerate guides, who come not up to *their* degrees of *unnatural heat* and *ferment*: but a small knowledge of mankind will suffice to shew, that they who will not be converted by the cool, calm, rational methods, will never be wrought upon, as to any good and lasting effect, by eagerness and passion. If sinners, wedded to their darling vices, will not be *regularly reasoned* into a change of life, we must not become as mad in one way as they are in another, in hopes to recover them to their senses: for that, instead of reclaiming, would but harden them so much the more. The world indeed, generally, is bad enough, always was, and always will be; but still we must not take upon us to use any *affected* and *unjustifiable* methods in order to mend it: which in reality would not mend it, but make it worse. We must bring men to God in *God's*

own way, if we hope to compass it at all. The making use of *wrong means* for the sake of a *good end* is nothing else but *doing evil* that *good may come;* which is a dangerous and detestable practice[f]. I say then, that when the ministers of Christ have done all that is prudent and proper, and the effect does not answer, they must not run wild lengths in order to gain their point: for God will say to such persons, if you could not prevail by methods of *my appointment*, how could you hope to do it *by weak* devices of *your own?* You have run wide and far to make proselytes: but who sent you? or who required it at your hands? There is as much mischief in overdoing as in underdoing: both are equally transgressions of the Divine laws, and deviations from the *rule of right.* Are they eager and impatient to bring sinners to a sober life? It is well they are, and we commend them for it. But there is one thing of still greater importance to them, which ought to be attended to in the first place, which is, to rest content with *God's appointed methods* of reforming the world, and to proceed no further than he has given leave; to make use of *sound judgment* and *discretion* in an affair of that *high concernment;* and to submit to stop where God requires it, as well as to run on where he has sent: otherwise religion will not be promoted, but greatly obstructed and exposed; and the world will not be made wiser or better, but ten times wilder than before.

These things I have here laid before you in as plain words, and in as strong a light, as I could.

May that *Divine Spirit*, whereof I have been speaking, dwell richly in us, in all wisdom, and in all virtues and graces; particularly in *soundness of mind*, and in *humility of heart*, and in *purity of life* and manners. Such are the *fruits*, such the *marks* of the *Spirit's presence* with us, and of his love towards us: which, that we may evermore plentifully enjoy, here and hereafter, God of his mercy grant, through our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. *Amen.*

[f] Rom. iii. 8.

SERMON XXVIII.

The *precise Nature* of the *Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.*

MATTHEW xii. 31, 32.

Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men.

And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.

THESE words will lead me to treat of the *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost;* a matter which has been much talked of, and not always rightly understood: for which reason I the rather choose to discourse upon it.

It will be convenient, in the *first place*, to observe how, and upon *what occasion*, the words of the text were brought in. We have an account in this chapter of our Lord's healing a blind and dumb man who had been possessed by a devil. The Scribes and Pharisees who came from Jerusalem, and observed what was done, very maliciously attributed that great miracle, which our Lord had wrought by the *Spirit of God*, to the assistance of the *Devil*. "This fellow," said they, (speaking in contempt of him,) "doth not cast out devils, but by Beelzebub the prince "of the devils[a]." Our blessed Lord, well knowing the spite and

[a] Matt. xii. 24.

venom of that execrable calumny, takes them up roundly for it; first confuting their cavils, and next rebuking their insolence, in very plain and strong terms. He puts them in mind how absurd and contradictory to common sense it must be, to imagine that the devils should be no wiser than to differ and disagree among themselves, in a matter relating to their common interest, which would be destroying their own kingdom. "If Satan cast out "Satan—how shall then his kingdom stand[b]?" After this, he retorts their own calumny upon them, in order to manifest their grievous partiality and self-condemnation. "If I by Beelzebub "cast out devils, by whom do your children" (your own friends, the *exorcists*) "cast them out[c]?" If they cast out devils by the help of God, calling on the God of Abraham; why am I, who do the same things, and greater, in the name of the same God, charged with doing them by the help of the *devil?* He goes on to a third consideration, drawn from the nature of his doctrine, and from the whole tenour of his life and conduct, as being directly opposite to the *devil's* interests, and plainly shewing that he was so far from being a confederate with Beelzebub, that he was his most avowed and formidable enemy; binding that strong prince in chains, rifling his house, and spoiling his goods. These things being plain and undeniable, what unaccountable malice must it be in the Pharisees, and how grievous their sin, to impute the miracles wrought by a *divine power* to the *prince of the devils!* Our blessed Lord therefore closes his reply with this smart and tremendous rebuke: "Wherefore I "say unto you, that all manner of sin and blasphemy shall be "forgiveu unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy "Ghost shall not be forgiven—neither in this world, neither in "the world to come."

The *phrases* and *idioms* of speech (here made use of) may require some explanation, before we come to the matter contained in them. "All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven." The words are not to be taken *absolutely*, as if all kinds of slanders and calumnies should be forgiven; (for many, without question, while unrepented of, never will be forgiven;) but they are to be understood *comparatively*, as amounting to this; that all other unrighteous blaming or censuring, either of things or of persons, shall *sooner* and *more easily* be forgiven, than the

[b] Ver. 26. [c] Matt. xii. 27.

blaming and slandering the *Holy Spirit* of God, that is, *God himself.* To revile *angels* or *men* is tolerable and pardonable in comparison: but to strike higher still, and to revile even *God himself,* is an unpardonable impiety. "Whosoever speaketh a "word against the Son of man," (against Christ considered merely as a *man,*) calling him, for instance, a *deceiver,* a *glutton,* a *wine-bibber,* and the like; *that,* though a grievous sin in itself, yet being slight in comparison, may the more easily *be forgiven:* "but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not "be" so easily "forgiven, neither in this world, nor in the world "to come." In discoursing further, my design is,

I. To examine *what the sin or blasphemy against the Holy Ghost means,* and wherein *precisely* it consists: where, by the way, I shall take notice also of some *erroneous accounts* of it.

II. I shall consider the *heinous nature* and aggravations of it, together with the *penalty* attending it, or consequent upon it.

III. I shall inquire whether any sins committed at *this day* are the *same thing with it,* or *which* come the *nearest* to it.

I.

I am to examine *what the sin or blasphemy against the Holy Ghost means,* and wherein *precisely* it consists.

I said *sin* or blasphemy against the *Holy Ghost,* because some call it *the sin against the Holy Ghost,* though scripture itself never calls it any thing else but *blasphemy;* which is worth the observing. For from thence we may be assured, that this sin (whatever it be) ought to be reckoned among the *sins of speech,* among the offences of the *tongue.* All the sins which men commit are reducible to three heads, as being either in *thought,* in *word,* or in *deed:* now the blasphemy against the *Holy Ghost* can properly be referred to the *second* only of the three now mentioned; it lies in *words,* is committed by *speaking,* and particularly by *evil speaking;* by *reviling* and *defaming* the *Holy Spirit* of God. In the text it is called "speaking against the "Holy Ghost." And by St. Mark it appears that the sin consisted in something which the Pharisees *said:* for it is there remarked as the sum and substance of the guilt they were chargeable with, that *they said* of Jesus, that "he hath an "unclean spirit[d]." And it is further observable, that our blessed Lord, in the close of his discourse upon that occasion,

[d] Mark iii. 30.

pronounces thus: "Every idle word that men shall speak, they "shall give account thereof in the day of judgment[c]." *Idle words* here mean *malicious* or *impious expressions;* alluding still to the main subject of his discourse, the *spiteful* and *opprobrious words* which the Pharisees had impiously thrown out against the *Spirit of God.* To be short then, the *sin* or *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost* was the *belying, slandering,* or *reviling* the *Divine Spirit* by which our Lord wrought his miracles, ascribing them to the *devil.*

There may be and there have been several *offences* committed *against the Holy Ghost,* which yet do not amount to the *blasphemy against him* specified in the text. There is such a thing as *grieving the Holy Spirit*[f], and *quenching the Spirit*[g], when men refuse to hearken to his counsels, to follow his motions, or to obey his calls: but *this* is not *blaspheming him.* There is also what St. Stephen calls *resisting the Holy Ghost*[h], which is opposing him with an high hand, and rebelling against him, and is a very heinous sin; and yet neither is *that* the same with *blaspheming* and slandering him, which is what those Pharisees were guilty of. Ananias and Sapphira grievously *affronted* the *Holy Ghost* in telling him a lie, either presuming upon his *ignorance* as not knowing it, or upon his *patience* as if he should have connived at it: but yet *that* was not so bad as what the Pharisees did in ascribing his *works* to the *devil.* The *malicious* telling a lie *of* him, to *defame* and *slander* him, was a *more heinous offence* than the telling a lie *to* him, under a weak and foolish persuasion. There is also another way of *affronting* the Holy Ghost, by *vilifying his operations;* which yet comes not up to the sin of the text. Upon the day of *Pentecost,* when the disciples, full of the *Holy Ghost,* began to "speak with other tongues, as the Spirit "gave them utterance," there were some standing by, who mocking said, "These men are full of new wine[i]," vilifying the *operations* of the *Spirit* as the effects of *drunkenness:* but the men who said it, said it perhaps *wantonly* or *ignorantly,* rather than *spitefully* or *maliciously.* They might not know that the disciples really spake with other tongues; but being unacquainted themselves with the languages then spoken, they took them all to be jargon, such as men might utter under some disorder of

[c] Matt. xii. 36.
[f] Eph. iv. 30.
[g] 1 Thess. v. 19.
[h] Acts vii. 51.
[i] Acts ii. 13.

mind, occasioned either by wine or by phrensy: and so they accounted (as they thought) for the thing in a natural way, not suspecting any thing supernatural in it. But the Pharisees who are charged with being guilty of *blaspheming* the *Holy Ghost*, they very well knew that what they had seen done could not be accounted for in a *natural way;* and yet such was their *spleen* and *rage* against the Gospel, that they chose rather to impute the miracles of our Lord to the *devil*, than to acknowledge the *Divine hand*, which was so visible in them, that they themselves could not but see it, had they been at all disposed to it.

I may here also mention Simon Magus, as a person who very highly *affronted* the *Holy Ghost*, when he *offered money* for the purchasing his miraculous gifts. But neither was *that* any such direct *blasphemy* against the *Holy Ghost*, as what the text mentions: for he had some *respect* and *veneration* for the miracles he saw wrought, and for the *Author* of them; and was very far from imputing them to the assistance of the *devil*.

The *blasphemy* against the *Holy Ghost* was something worse still than any thing I have yet mentioned: it was *defaming* the *Holy Spirit* of God, and *God himself*, under the execrable name of Beelzebub; it was *reviling*, and that *knowingly* and *desperately*, the *Divine works*, as *diabolical operations*. In *this*, as I conceive, and in this *precisely*, consisted that *blasphemy* which shall *never be forgiven*, the *sin against the Holy Ghost*.

Nevertheless it must be owned, that many wise and good men, both ancient and modern, have been of different sentiments in this article.

Some, with St. Austin, maintaining that *all sins* are *pardonable* upon *repentance*, have resolved the *blasphemy of the Holy Ghost*, *unpardonable* sin, into *final hardness* and *impenitency:* but *final impenitency* is one thing, and *blasphemy* is another: and *final impenitency* is an error in a man's *whole conduct;* whereas the *blasphemy* of the text *is one particular crime*, and committed by *reviling words*, as observed above. So that *final impenitency* is not the sin here signified: and for the same reasons we may conclude, that *a total and final apostasy*, which some take to be the *sin against the Holy Ghost*, is very different from it, though it is certainly *unpardonable*, as much, or perhaps more than the other.

Some, with Origen and the Novatians of old, have imagined that sins committed *after baptism* are *sins against the Holy Ghost:*

but there is the same objection, besides many more, against this opinion, as against the two former, and it has very long and very deservedly been exploded by all sober Divines.

Some say, that every *malicious resisting* or opposing the *Gospel truths*, when sufficiently propounded, is the *sin against the Holy Ghost:* but *infidelity* is one thing, and *blasphemy* another: and the *sin* which the text censures consists more in *reviling* than in *resisting*, as before observed: so that neither is this account at all satisfactory.

There is one more remaining still, which has been esteemed as highly plausible, and which has met with several very considerable abettors. It is, that the *holding out obstinately against the last dispensation*, the *dispensation* of the *Spirit*, commencing after Christ's *ascension*, was the sin against the Holy Ghost. They who maintain this opinion are obliged also to maintain, that the Scribes and Pharisees, who attributed our Lord's miracles to the *devil*, were not *then* and *therein guilty* of the *sin against the Holy Ghost.* They plead, that those *blaspheming* Pharisees were not yet *excepted* out of the *general pardon* offered to as many as would *repent* and *believe;* but that our Lord himself *prayed for their forgiveness* upon the cross, which shews that they were yet *capable of pardon.* They further add, that the *Holy Ghost was not yet given* till our Lord *ascended*, and therefore could not, properly speaking, be *blasphemed before that time:* and that the *blaspheming* and resisting him *then*, being holding out against the very greatest miracles, the strongest proofs, and the *last remedies*, this of course must be the *most sinful* and provoking *obstinacy* that could be, and on *that account* is pronounced *unpardonable.*

These reasons are specious: but then here is no account given how it comes to pass, that neither in the Acts of the Apostles, nor in any of the Epistles, is there a word said by way of reproof, or of *caution* against *blaspheming the Holy Ghost;* and that it should never have been mentioned but by our Lord himself at a time when nobody was *capable* of committing it: and yet, by all the circumstances of our Lord's discourse at that time, one would be very apt to conclude, that those blaspheming Pharisees were *then* verily *guilty* of the *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.* Nay, it seems further, that St. Mark's comment upon the case may be alone sufficient to decide the doubt. For after reciting our Lord's dreadful sentence against such as should blaspheme

against the *Holy Ghost*, he immediately adds, "because they said, "He hath an unclean spirit[k]." What is this but declaring in so many words, that the *reviling* the *Holy Spirit*, as an *unclean spirit*, was the *blasphemy* our Lord spake of, and was *then committed by* those blaspheming Pharisees.

As to what is objected, that those very Pharisees were yet *capable of pardon*, because our Lord upon the cross *prayed* for their *forgiveness*; it may as reasonably be said, on the other hand, that those also who rejected the *last dispensation* of the Holy Ghost were *capable of pardon*; for St. Stephen prayed for the *forgiveness* of those who stoned him, though he had before told them, that they had "resisted the Holy Ghost[l]." This objection therefore returns upon the *objectors*, and equally affects either *their* interpretation of the sin against the *Holy Ghost* or *ours*. Besides, the objection goes upon the supposition that the *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost* is *absolutely* unpardonable, which indeed the text does seem to say: but yet good critics have observed, that according to the *Hebrew idiom* the words may, or rather must, bear a softer construction; importing only, that of all kinds of slander and calumny, slandering the *Holy Ghost* is most *daring* and *impious*; and that any other calumnies will *sooner* meet with pardon than *that* will. But supposing the sin to be *absolutely* unpardonable, then it must be said, that our Lord's praying for the *forgiveness* of his enemies upon the cross is to be understood only of his praying for the *Jews in general*, and not of his praying for *those persons in particular* who had been *guilty* of the *unpardonable* sin.

As to the other objection, that the *Holy Ghost could not* be blasphemed at *that time*, because he was *not yet given*; it is of very little weight. Our blessed Lord most undoubtedly had the *Holy Spirit always residing in him* without limitation or measure[m]: and he himself professes, that it was "by the Spirit of "God" that he cast out *devils*[n]: so that the blaspheming that *Divine power* by which he wrought his miracles was plainly blaspheming the *Holy Spirit*. It is true, that the *Holy Ghost was not yet given* in full measure to our Lord's *disciples*, but to our *Lord himself* he most certainly was; and therefore the objection, in this case, is slight, and comes not up to the point.

Upon the whole then, I conclude as before, that the *blasphemy*

[k] Mark iii. 30. [l] Acts vii. 51. [m] John iii. 34. [n] Matt. xii. 28.

against the Holy Ghost was the *imputing our Lord's miracles to the devil;* and that *that* dreadful sin was committed by *those* very men who so reviled, slandered, and traduced that *Divine power by which he wrought them.*

II.

The *heinousness* of that sin, which was the *second particular* I proposed to go upon, may be competently understood from what hath been already said, and will not need many words more.

It was a most wicked and impudent lie and slander upon the *Holy Spirit*, and was flying, as it were, in the face of God. One would think, when God himself interposes, giving the Divine signal in plain uncontested miracles, that it might become all men to be mute, and to lay aside their otherwise unconquerable rancour and prejudice: but the Pharisees were so resolute, and so outrageous in reviling every thing that gave any countenance to Christ and his Gospel, that they would not spare even God himself, but called him Beelzebub, spitefully defaming his most Divine works, as being nothing else but *diabolical impostures.* They saw the miracles of our blessed Lord, and were very sensible that they were *real* and *true* miracles: they knew also that they were wrought in *direct opposition* to the *devil* and his kingdom, having all the fair appearances possible of being *divine:* nor would they have scrupled to have received them as *divine*, had they been wrought by any one else, excepting Christ or his disciples: but such was their envenomed hatred and inveteracy against him and his, that, at all adventures, contrary to all candour or equity, and in contradiction to reason and common sense, they resolved to *say* however, scarce to *believe*, (for they hardly could be so stupid,) that he was in *league with the devil;* and that all his mighty works, which he wrought in the name of *God*, were the works only of Beelzebub the prince of the devils. There could not be a more insolent slander or a more provoking outrage against the *Divine Majesty* than this was. All other calumnies, against *men* or against *angels*, come short of this; for it was calumniating *God himself*, the tremendous and most adorable Deity; and was done very *maliciously* and *designedly*, to hinder and obstruct, as much as possible, the first planting of the Gospel, to the universal hurt and detriment of mankind: in a word, it was sacrificing the honour of Almighty God, and both the present and future happiness of men, to their own private

humours and party passions; being resolved to take up with any wretched cavil, any improbable and self-contradictory lies and slanders against God, rather than permit the honest and well-meaning people to believe in Christ Jesus, upon the brightest evidence of his miracles.

Such was the heinous nature and the *transcendent guilt* of *blaspheming* against the *Holy Ghost*, in that instance: and therefore it is, that our blessed Lord took so particular care, first, to *confute the calumny*, and next, to pass a most *righteous* but *dreadful censure* upon the *sin* contained in it. The Divine vengeance should pursue a crime of that deep die, both in this world and in the world to come. The offenders in that kind, being unreclaimable and incurable, should, by the just judgment of God, be sealed up to everlasting destruction; like Pharaoh or like Judas, like Sodom or like Gomorrah, ripe for perdition, and fit to be delivered over to eternal ruin.

Having thus largely considered *what the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost means*, and how *heinous a sin it was;* it remains now only,

III.

To inquire whether *any sins committed at this day* are the *same thing* with it; or which of them come the *nearest* to it. Of this very briefly, having no room to enlarge.

1. First, for the sake of the over-tender and scrupulous consciences, I would observe, that *roving*, and which some call *blasphemous thoughts*, which rise up *accidentally*, and as accidentally go off again, are nothing akin to the sin which I have been speaking of; which consisted in *premeditated lies* and *slanders* against God, formed with design to obstruct or darken the evidences of the true religion, and to prevent others from looking into them, or being convinced by them. None but *professed Atheists* or *infidels* can be guilty of such *spite* and *malice* against the *Gospel salvation*. No one, while he *believes the Christian religion*, and *seriously* professes himself a *member of Christ's Church*, can be guilty of the *blasphemy against the Holy Ghost*.

2. I observe, secondly, that even the *Atheists* or *infidels* of these times can scarce come up to the *same degree of guilt* with the Pharisees of old; because *they* have not *seen* the miracles of Christ with their own eyes. It is some mitigation of their sin, and it makes their infidelity the more excusable, that they have

not altogether so *strong* and *glaring* evidences of the truth of Christianity, as those had who lived in the *first ages*, and *saw* the "wonderful works of God." *Rational* and *historical evidence* may be as convincing as the other, when *duly considered:* but as it strikes not upon the senses, it does not awaken the attention, and alarm every passion of the soul, in such a degree as the other does. For which reason the unbelievers of our times, though abandoned and profligate men, are not altogether so blamable in the opposition they make to Christianity, as the unbelievers of old time were. They may indeed, at this day, *attribute the miracles* of Christ and his Apostles, (which they read of in credible history,) to the *devil*, as the Pharisees of old did; and this will be *blaspheming the Holy Ghost:* but it will not be *exactly the same sin;* not the same in *degree*, (though in *kind* the same,) because *circumstances* are *different;* and upon the *circumstances* depend the *heightening aggravations.*

Nevertheless it must be said, that the *obstinate rejecting* the miracles of our Lord and of his disciples, (which have been so *fully attested,*) and much more the *ridiculing* and *bantering* them, and the endeavouring to run them down by *lies* and *slander*, (as the way of some is;) this is a *very high* and *heinous crime*, as well as *horrid blasphemy;* especially if committed in a Christian country and in a knowing age, and where men have all desirable opportunities of learning the truth, as well as the strongest motives offered for submitting to it. *Scoffers of this kind* come very little short of the Pharisees of ancient time, either in spleen and malice, or in perverseness and hardness of heart, or in an impious and desperate defiance to *God* and *Christ*, and to the *Holy Spirit* of both. From such *blasphemers* turn away, and have nothing to do with the tents of these wicked men, lest ye be consumed in their iniquities. Look upon them as vessels of Divine wrath, sons of perdition, prepared for vengeance, which will either suddenly overtake them in this world, or will fall the heavier upon them in a world to come. The Christian religion has been so abundantly proved and settled by great *variety of evidences*, beyond *reasonable exception*, that all gainsayers are now left *without excuse.* It has had the *concurrent testimony* of Christ and his Apostles, and both established by many and *great miracles*, unparalleled and *uncontrolled:* and were there nothing else, its *prevailing* and triumphing so much, so early, and so long,

over *Jewish superstition* and *Pagan idolatry*, is itself a *miracle* as great as any, and manifestly shews that the finger of God was in it, and that an Almighty power went along with it. What remains then, but that we learn from all to set a *just price* and *value* upon this our most holy profession; evermore defending and maintaining it against all opposers, and adorning the same, as it becomes us to do, with suitable lives and conversations.

SERMON XXIX.

The Case of *Deceivers* and *Deceived* considered.

EPHESIANS iv. 14.

That we henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.

HERE are *two sorts* of persons marked out by the Apostle in the text, the *deceivers* and the *deceived;* the one, *subtle* and *crafty,* and full of *intrigue;* the other, *easy* and *credulous,* and *unsuspecting;* the one supposed to have all the *wiliness of the serpent,* without the *innocency of the dove;* the other, all the *tameness* and *simplicity of the dove,* without the *serpent's wisdom.* Both are *blamable,* though in *different respects,* and not in the *same degree;* one, for *abusing* and *misemploying* their *talents,* and the other, for *not employing them at all* to discern between true and false, between good and evil. Both are accountable to God as delinquents; one, for high *contempt,* and the other, for great *supineness* and *neglect.* The world has never been without both these kinds of men, since men have multiplied upon the earth, and sin and folly have taken place among them. The Church of Christ, from the beginning and downwards, has suffered much by both. *Heresies* and *schisms* have disturbed its peace and broken its union; while *crafty* and *intriguing* men have *begun* the quarrel, and *weak credulous* men have *run blindly* into it. It

was the design of our blessed Lord, when he first founded his Church, to prevent, as much as possible, all confusion and discord, and to provide for its then present and future peace.

With this view, as the Apostle here in this chapter observes, he instituted a *ministry*, and appointed *proper officers* to instruct his people, and to lead them in the way everlasting. "He gave "some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; "and some, pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the "saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the "body of Christ: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and "of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, &c.[a]" Such was the provision made at the *first planting* of the Church, to preserve its *unity*, to bind and cement it together by the ministry and good offices of *apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors* and *teachers*. The first three offices lasted for a *time* only, and ceased by degrees, as there was less and less occasion for them; but *pastors* and *teachers*, as they will be always needful, so will they be continued always in constant succession till the end of the world. As there is no *new Church* to form, after the *foundation* laid by Christ and his Apostles; nor any *new doctrines* to be *published* beyond what *they* have taught; so there is no need of *officers extraordinary*, such as were *apostles, prophets*, and *evangelists*, after a *Church* has been once *raised*, and a *rule* fixed and *settled* for all *times to come:* it is sufficient *then* to have a *standing ministry*, in *succession*, to preach and publish *that rule*, and so to keep up in all after-ages what was once delivered to the saints.

But as neither the *apostles* themselves, nor *prophets*, nor our *Lord's own presence* with mankind, was then sufficient to hinder *evil-minded men* from *sowing divisions*, or *unstable men* from *running in with them;* so neither is it to be expected that the *ordinary ministers*, in after-ages, can with all *their* endeavours prevent the *like irregularities*, supposing them ever so sincere and intent upon it.

But it is further to be considered, that they themselves are but weak and frail men, and they have no such *infallible assistances* or *Divine inspirations* as the Apostles had, nor are they proof against such *temptations* as are common to men; so that it is not impossible even for them to fall from their own steadfastness, and to desert their rule; and so, in effect, to become *deceivers*

[a] Eph. iv. 11, 12, 13.

and *seducers*, instead of being *proper instructors* of the Church of Christ. And whenever such cases as these happen, it is a dangerous snare to *common Christians*, who will be most at a loss what course to steer, when the very *guides* themselves differ, and draw contrary ways. This however is a case which may be supposed, and which has often appeared in fact. Divine wisdom has not thought proper to provide any infallible remedy against it, but leaves it for a trial of men's ingenuity and sincerity in such instances; that it may be seen what care and pains honest men will take to inform themselves right in any doubtful circumstances, and that they who are approved may be made manifest. In discoursing further, my design is,

I. To consider the case of *deceivers*, or seducers, who, in their *sleight* and *cunning craftiness, lie in wait to deceive.*

II. To consider the case of the *deceived*, who, in their great *simplicity* or *credulity*, are apt to be *tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine.*

III. I shall suggest some *advices* proper to *prevent our falling in with either;* concluding with some brief *application* of the whole, suitable to our *present circumstances.*

I.

First, I propose to consider the case of *deceivers*, or seducers, such as, by their *sleight* and *cunning craftiness, lie in wait to deceive.*

And here it will be proper to inquire, upon *what motives*, or with *what views*, men are led thus to beguile and misguide others. The particular *motives* in such cases may be many; but they are all reducible to these three heads, *pride, avarice, voluptuousness;* that is to say, *love of honour*, or *profit*, or *pleasure.*

1. To begin with the first. There is oftentimes a great deal of *pride* and *vanity* in starting *odd notions* and broaching *new doctrines.* It is pretending to be *wiser* than the rest of the world, and is thought to be an argument of *uncommon sagacity.* Upon this foot, some are perpetually in quest of *new discoveries.* Nothing pleases them, if they have not the honour of *inventing* it, or of *reviving* it in their times. It is objection enough against *common truths*, that they are *common*, and in every body's hands. There is no *glory* to be gained by traversing this *beaten road;* it is but *low* and *dull* employment: but if they can open a *new way*, and strike out a *new track* which no man has discovered;

there is the *triumph* and the exultation. When once a man has thus far given a loose to his vanity, and thinks himself significant enough to be *head of a sect;* then he begins, first, to *whisper out* his *choice discoveries* to a *few admirers* and *confidents,* who will be sure to *flatter* him in it; and next, to tell aloud to all the world, how *great a secret* he had *found out,* with the *inestimable value* of it. And now at length comes in the use of *sleight* and *cunning craftiness,* and all imaginable *artifices;* first, to find out *proper agents* to *commend* and *cry up* the *conceit;* next, to *spread it* in the most artful manner among the *simple* and *least suspecting;* and after that, to *form interests* and make *parties;* and so, if possible, to have a *public sanction* set to it, or a majority at least contending for it. This frequently is the *end* and *aim* of *novelists* and *seducers.* They are first fond of their *own conceits,* which is their *pride* and *vanity;* and next, impatient to make *proselytes,* and to draw the world after them, because every *convert gained* is a *compliment to their judgment,* and the greater the *numbers* are, the greater their *glory.* Love of *fame* and glory is a very strong passion, and operates marvellously in persons of a warm complexion. Even St. John the Apostle, with all his *gifts* and heavenly endowments, was slighted by Diotrephes, who set up against him. "I wrote unto the Church," says that divine man, "but Diotrephes, who loveth to have the preeminence "among them, receiveth us not[b]." Diotrephes was a *Christian,* and probably a Christian *priest* too, and thought himself considerable enough to *form a sect,* and to *head a party* in the *Church,* even against St. John. "He loved to have the preeminence:" ambition, it seems, was his *motive:* and as he wanted not *sleight,* or *cunning craftiness,* whereby he could impose upon the weak and ignorant, and mislead them with "every wind of doctrine;" he was able, in a good measure, to maintain his ground, and to keep himself in countenance, though in direct opposition to the greatest man in the *Church,* the only then *surviving* Apostle. Having seen how *pride* and *ambition* prompt and incite many to become *deceivers* or *false teachers,*

2. Next let us observe how *avarice* or *love of profit* may sometimes do the same thing. There is a *gain* to be made, in some junctures, by *perverting the truth* and *deceiving the populace.* Men who are not worthy to teach in the *Church,* or who have

[b] 3 John i. 9.

been set aside for their *insufficiency* or *immorality*, may bring up *new doctrines*, and *draw disciples* after them, for the sake of *protection* and *maintenance*, or for *filthy lucre*. With such, the *vending of false doctrine* is a *trade*, and *preaching* a *merchandise*. They must of course contrive to teach what will be most for *their interest*, not so much considering what is *true* and *right*, as what is most *palatable* and *pleasing*, and will bring them in *most profit*. Men of this stamp are the *meanest* and *vilest* of men: yet such there were even in the *apostolical times*: for St. Paul thus complains, in his Epistle to Titus; "There are many "unruly and vain talkers and deceivers, especially they of the "circumcision: whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert "whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy "lucre's sake[c]." They *invented* and *propagated palatable doctrines*, pleasing errors, such as took with the *vicious*, and brought in *gain* to the *teachers*. Those *false teachers* were Jewish Christians, and taught among other things, that Israelites, all in general, were *secure of their portion* in the *life to come*; a doctrine as *pleasing* to many, as it was *pernicious* to their souls. Another doctrine which they taught, as false as the other, was the *necessity of circumcision* to Gentiles; and this they did, only to *humour* and *flatter* the Jews, for their *own interest*, "lest they "should suffer persecution" of the Jews "for the cross of "Christ[d]." Of like sort were the Nicolaitans or Balaamites, whom St. Peter, St. Jude, and St. John speak of, as "running "greedily after the error of Balaam for reward[e]." They taught several doctrines, *false* and *scandalous*, but agreeable enough to *flesh and blood*; and such as, upon that account, brought them in both *honour* and *profit*, among the *libertines* of the age, among the dissolute and profane. Thus has *avarice* been the *mother of heresies*, and has brought in many *deceivers* into the *Church* of Christ: but they have contrived generally to give some *plausible turn* and colour to their *inventions*, through their "sleight and "cunning craftiness," in order to *deceive* the hearts of the *simple*, and to beguile *unwary* and *unstable souls*.

3. One motive more I mentioned, namely, *voluptuousness*, or *love of pleasure*. As *religious restraints* set not *easy* upon *flesh and blood*, but *bear hard* upon *corrupt nature*; so men of *corrupt*

[c] Titus i. 10, 11. [d] Galat. vi. 12. [e] Jude 2. 2 Pet. ii. 15. Revel. ii. 14.

minds will be ever labouring to *invent* and *publish smooth* and *softening doctrines*, such as may either *qualify* the *strictness* of the *Gospel rule*, or *sap the belief* of a *future reckoning*. Many ancient heretics had such views as these in the *first broaching* of their heresies: but I shall look no lower than the *scripture accounts*; that it may appear from thence, that neither any respect even to living Apostles, nor any regard to the attestations of the brightest *miracles*, can sufficiently deter those who are disposed to set up for *heads of a sect*, and to disperse and propagate their own *crude conceptions*. Hymeneus, and Philetus, and Alexander the coppersmith, were men of this perverse stamp, and gave great disturbance to the holy Apostle St. Paul[f]. They pretended that "the resurrection" was "already past, overthrowing the faith of "some[g]." They *explained away* the *scripture doctrine* of a *real resurrection* to quite another sense, and gave out their own *false glosses* for *scripture truths*, as is the manner of *deceivers*. Their *design* was, to take off the *awe* and *dread* of a *future judgment*, and thereby to open a door to all licentiousness of life and dissoluteness of manners. St. Paul therefore reprimanded them sharply, as became his high office; and, by his apostolical authority, he "delivered them over unto Satan," that they might take warning for the future, and "learn not to blaspheme[h]." These instances are sufficient to shew how *deceivers* arise, and with *what views* they endeavour to *make converts* to their respective persuasions, all centring in the *love of honour*, or *riches*, or *pleasure*; or more briefly, in the *love of the world*: for when men desert either the *true faith* or *sound morals*, we may say of them as St. Paul said of Demas; "Demas hath forsaken me, having "loved this present world[i]." But having done with the *deceivers*, I come now secondly,

II.

To consider the case of the *deceived*, who suffer themselves to be "tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine."

They are supposed to be *ignorantly*, and in a manner *blindly*, *led* on by *others*; otherwise, they would be rather *confederates* and *confidents* in *managing the deceit*, and so would be more *deceivers* than *deceived*. Now as to those who are so *ignorantly* imposed upon, they are *more* or *less to blame*, according as *their*

[f] 1 Tim. i. 20. 2 Tim. ii. 17. iv. 14. [g] 2 Tim. ii. 18. [h] 1 Tim. i. 20.
[i] 2 Tim. iv. 10.

ignorance is *more* or *less blamable:* and that again will be *more* or *less blamable*, according as it is *more* or *less affected* or *wilful.*

There are, I think, *three cases* which will take in all sorts of men who suffer themselves to be *deceived* in things of this kind.

The *first* is, of those who have *no opportunity*, no *moral possibility* of *informing themselves better.* The *second* is, of those who *might* inform themselves better, but *do not.* The *third*, of those who *might* also be better informed, but *will not.* Of which in their order.

1. As to the *first sort*, since they are supposed to lie under *invincible ignorance* and *incapacity*, their case is pitiable. Perhaps it may be the case of a poor *servant* under an *overbearing master*, whom he is taught to reverence in all things, and to take his word for a law. Or it may be the case of a *raw* and *ignorant youth* while under a *bad father:* or of any plain *labouring man* in the way of *low life*, who can neither read nor examine for himself, but must take every thing *upon trust* from the hand of such *superior person* or persons as he chances to be listed under. These and the like cases I refer to *simple, unaffected ignorance:* and so far as their *ignorance* or *infirmity* is really *unconquerable;* so far are they *blameless*, or *not accountable.* If they be "like "children tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine;" yet, if they are *really children* in *understanding*, and are *overborne by others* in such a way as is *morally irresistible*, considering their *circumstances;* then it seems to be their *misfortune* to be so *imposed* upon, rather than their *fault*, and so is *not imputable.*

2. A *second case* is, of those who *may* inform themselves better, but *neglect* to do it. I suppose it to be merely *neglect* in them, not *design.* Perhaps they have little or no *leisure* for inquiries: they are taken up with worldly cares and business: they have a very great esteem and value for the man who so *misleads* them, and they know no better, but swallow every thing he says, without considering; or they are not *aware* of any *ill consequences* of the doctrine, see or suspect *no harm* in it. This, I think, is a true description of the *unthinking* and *careless*, who take up their opinions *by chance*, and *inquire no further.* They are much to *blame* in this affair; because God has given them the faculty of *reason*, which ought not to be thus left to *lie dormant* and *useless.* Men who can be sharp enough in *secular affairs* to prevent being imposed upon, may and ought to have some guard upon themselves with respect also to their *spiritual concernments.* It is not

enough to say, they have *something else to mind*, or that they do *not think of it*: such *negligence* betrays a *culpable carelessness* as to the *one thing needful*, and a great *contempt* of *God and religion*. We ought to think it as much *our concern* in *spiritual things*, not to have *errors* and *false doctrines put upon us*; as we do in *things temporal*, not to be *imposed upon* by *false weights* instead of *true*, or *false money* instead of *sterling*. So much for those who are *merely careless* in a matter of this high concernment.

3. There is yet a *third sort* of men, worse than the former, who suffer themselves to be *deceived*, and *might* know better, but *will not*: that is to say, their *ignorance is affected* and *wilful*: they "love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are "evil." These are such as *readily run in* with "every wind of "doctrine" which hits their *taste*, and chimes in with their *favourite inclinations*. They *admit* the doctrine, because they *like it*; and they easily *believe it true*, because they would *have it so*. It is with this kind of men that *deceivers* prevail most, and make their harvest. *False teachers* commonly observe and study the several *weaknesses* and *corrupt dispositions* of those whom they apply to; and so, by *flattering their passions* and *humouring their follies*, they lead them about where they please, and make a property of them. The persons *so deceived* first *deceive themselves*, being led away and enticed as much by their *own lusts* as by the *tempter's subtilty*. They are very near as deep in *guilt* as the *deceivers themselves* are, because the *same corrupt principles* are *common to both*; only there is this difference, that one *spreads* the false doctrine, the other *gladly receives* it, and by receiving *encourages* it, and so is *passively instrumental* in *seducing others*, and is but *one remove* from the *more active seducer*. Having thus considered the several cases both of *deceivers* and *deceived*, it remains now only, in the third and last place,

III.

To subjoin some *advices* proper to *prevent our falling in with either*.

The *best preservative*, in this case, is an *honest and good heart*, well disposed towards truth and godliness, having no *by-ends* to serve, no *favourite lust* or *passion* to *indulge*. If any man is but *willing* to know and do God's commandments, he will easily *discern*, in most cases, whether a doctrine be *of God*, or whether it be *of men*. The evidences of the *true religion* and of its *main doctrines* are so *bright* and *strong*, when *carefully attended* to, that

common sense and *reason* are sufficient to *lead us*, when there is *no bias* to *mislead* us. If we *intend well*, and *sincerely aim* at truth, and have *no inclination* to *turn from it*, either to the right or left, we shall not *miss of it*; at least, not in any points of *weight* or *concernment*. Retain but this *honest* and *upright disposition of heart*, and then, as you can have no inclination to *deceive others*, so neither will you be liable to be *grossly* or *dangerously deceived* yourselves. Many particular cautions might be given, which I have no room to mention: but he who has once well learnt the *general rule* before mentioned, will need no other, or will himself find out, as occasion offers, all the rest.

And now to *apply* very briefly what hath been here said to our *particular case* and *circumstances*. We live in an *age of deceivers*, and so did the Apostles themselves: and if *their authority*, even among their *own disciples*, was not *sufficient* to *keep out false doctrines* and dangerous; so neither will any *more disputable* authority be able to do it now. It is our happiness however, that both the truth, and the whole truth, purged from every gross error or superstition, is here publicly professed and taught, and every one that runs may read it. What has been calmly, wisely, and deliberately settled by excellent men, *martyrs* here, and now *saints* with God, let none lightly depart from, lest they justly fall under the censure of the text, of being "like "children tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine, by the "sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in "wait to deceive." Such *deceivers* we are to expect, and such we have had lately, more perhaps than ever.

For several years last past, rude and bold attacks have been making against the *important doctrines* of Christianity, and against all *revealed religion:* and this is what they are still carrying on with exquisite *subtilty* and *craftiness* many ways, and with a great deal of fruitless pains and labour. For I may have leave to suppose, that no man can in this case be *deceived*, who has not first a *desire to be so*, and is not the *dupe* and *bubble* to his *own lusts* and *vices*. Attempts have been made to persuade us, that *private vices are public benefits:* who sees not that their *lusts dictate* what their *pens write*, and that the very *corruption of the heart* is come up into the *head?* Others presume to tell us, that man is no *free agent*, and has no *liberty of will;* from whence it would immediately follow, that there is *no virtue* nor *vice*, no *future reckoning*. Such *dogmatizers* as these only betray

their *own guilty fears*, and, if there be any such thing, have *prejudged* themselves beforehand to everlasting damnation. Others, lastly, have run riot upon the *miracles of our blessed Lord*, and have thrown out more blasphemies in a few months' time, than hath ever been known in any Christian country in a course of ages. Can any serious person be *deceived* by these things, which are frightful and hideous enough, almost to chill his blood, or to make it run backward in his veins?

It would be affronting a *Christian audience*, to exhort them not to be carried about with any *such* wind of doctrines as have been taught by *these blasphemers*. The *cunning serpent*, in these instances, seems to have gone *beyond himself*, and to have forgot his *wonted subtilty*. The imposition is *too gross*, and the language too coarse to fetch in *converts*. All it can do is, to make those *worse* who were *always bad*, to render them perhaps ten times more the children of hell, than they were before.

As to men of any good sense or sobriety, I presume, such attempts will only fill them with horror and astonishment, and stir up their *pious zeal* for *God* and *religion*. May all attacks upon our most holy faith, or against any branch of it, have no other effect: and may our blessed Lord God, who alone can bring good out of evil, direct and overrule all things for the good of his *Church*, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

SERMON XXX.

The Case of St. Paul, in *persecuting* the Church.

ACTS ix. 4, 5.

And he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?

And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks.

THE festival of St. Paul's *conversion* is of great note, and of long standing in the *Church*, not much short of a thousand years. The memorial of that happy, miraculous conversion, may suggest to us many pious and useful reflections; for which reason, I choose, conformably to our Church Offices, to entertain you, this day, upon that subject. Saul was once a grievous *persecutor* of the Church of God: but, by the Divine blessing, he at length changed his principles, changing also his Jewish name Saul into the Roman Paul, and became a *chief Apostle*. None of the Apostles had so considerable a hand in converting men to the Christian faith as this St. Paul had. He "laboured more "abundantly than they all." He had for his province the *whole Gentile world*, being therefore called the *Apostle of the Gentiles*. And as his sermons, while living, drew many thousands, or even thousands of thousands after him, to profess the faith of Christ; so the writings which he left behind him, making up a great part of the Canon of the New Testament, have been of admirable use to feed and support the *Christian Church* ever since. Of

this great man and blessed saint I am now going to treat. The history of his conversion is particularly related in this chapter by St. Luke, and by St. Paul himself once and again in chapters the twenty-second and twenty-sixth of this book of the Acts. Such particular care has been taken by Divine Providence that an event so memorable should be transmitted down to posterity with marks of honour and advantage.

It was above two years after our Lord was gone to heaven, that this so famed conversion was wrought. Saul, for a year or two before, had behaved as blind zealots are used to do, with great warmth and fury. He was then in the heat of his youth, about thirty years old, very honest and sincere in his way, and exceedingly zealous for the *law* of his God. As he had been bred up a Jew, and of the *strictest sect* among them, "a Hebrew of the "Hebrews" by *descent*, and by *party* a Pharisee; he thought it became him to maintain the religion of his country, and the faith of his ancestors, with all imaginable vigour against all opposers. The *prejudices of education* were so *strong*, and his *natural temper* withal so *eager* and *impetuous*, that he stayed not to *examine* into the merits of the *Christian cause*, into the *truth* or *credibility* of the then new and just *commencing religion*: but as he very well knew that his *own religion* was *from God*, he too hastily concluded that this other, now pretending to rival it, could not be Divine also. Under this *false persuasion* he laboured to *destroy* it, believing it his *duty* so to do, and that the *honour of God* required it at his hands. Fired with the thought, he entered a kind of volunteer into the service, went of his own accord to the *magistrates* to take out his *warrants*, for *persecuting* the poor Christians. He had *commission* given him to break open their houses, to seize and apprehend Christian men or women, and to hale them by force to prison, in order to have still greater severities exercised upon them. While he was thus driving on with unbridled zeal, he distressed the Christians all about Jerusalem, and pursued them even to *strange cities*. One of those *strange cities*, about 160 miles from Jerusalem, was Damascus; and thither was he marching with all haste to search for Christians, that he might bring them away bound in chains, to be tried and executed at Jerusalem: but while he was yet upon the road near to Damascus, it pleased the blessed Jesus to look mercifully down from heaven, and to take pity both upon the *Church* and *him*. He calls to him through a gleam of light, brighter than the

sun at mid-day, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" To which Saul, trembling and pale, replied, "Who art thou, Lord?" The voice again answered, "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: "it is hard for thee to kick against the pricks." Hard for thee to *contend with me* thy *Maker* and *Governor*, who can crush thee at pleasure. All thy attempts against me are like kicking against the spikes: they will not hurt *me*, but they will prove fatal to *thee*, if persisted in. Saul, after this so friendly and heavenly warning, instantly submitted; and from that time forwards put off the *persecutor*, to become a *convert* and an *apostle* of Christ. This is a short account of the fact which the text relates to: and now I proceed to make the proper reflections and observations upon it.

I. Consider we Saul as a *persecutor*, and the *guilt* he contracted in *being such*.

II. Consider we the *alleviation* of his guilt, on the *account whereof* he *found mercy*.

III. Observe we the exceeding great goodness of our blessed Lord, both to him and to the Church in this affair.

IV. Consider we the proper use or application to be made of the whole.

I.

Consider we Saul as a *persecutor*, and the *guilt* he contracted in *being such*.

However *honest* and *sincere* he had been in doing it, however *fully persuaded* in his own mind that he was *serving God* in it, yet he never reflected upon it afterwards but with *shame* and *regret*, with a *penitential sorrow* and *remorse* for it. "I verily "thought with myself," says he in one place, "that I ought to "do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth[a]." He did it, it seems, in a *full persuasion*, with an *upright conscience*, and in the *integrity of his heart*: notwithstanding which, he elsewhere ranks himself among *sinners* on that very account.

By our translation it should seem he was *chief* of sinners; because it is there said, "of whom I am chief[b]:" but I conceive ὧν πρῶτός εἰμι ἐγὼ should rather be rendered, *of whom I am first*, meaning not that he was either the *chief* or the *first* of sinners, *absolutely*, but the *first* or *chief* of *those sinners* whom Christ, in a *remarkable manner*, had *shewn mercy* to; as it follows in the next

[a] Acts xxvi. 9. [b] 1 Tim. i. 15.

verse: "Howbeit for this cause I obtained mercy," ἵνα ἐν ἐμοὶ πρώτῳ, "that in me first Jesus Christ might shew forth all long-"suffering," &c.

But to proceed. In another place, humbling himself for his sin in this particular, he says, "I am the least of the apostles, "that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted "the Church of God[c]." He takes shame to himself, and confesses his *guiltiness*, in that he had "persecuted the Church of "God." For though he had *commission* from the magistrates, and might perhaps have been *justified* in prosecuting those who should *disturb the peace* for the sake of an *imposture*, or for any *false religion*; yet *no commission* could *justify* or *wholly excuse* any man in *persecuting* the *truth*, in *persecuting* the *Church of God*. No concerns of *temporal peace* are of any moment in such a case: but both they who *commission*, and they who *act under it*, are alike *guilty*, in opposing the will of Heaven, in fighting against God. No *persuasion* of mind, no *sincerity* of heart, can *altogether justify* in such cases; because God never does send out any religion, but he gives also *sufficient credentials* with it; which, if *calmly considered* and *carefully attended to*, in such a manner as all men ought to do in a matter of that *high concernment*, will be found to be abundantly *full* and *satisfactory*. Saul was *too eager* and *hasty* to consider well the case. Prepossession had blinded him, and he suffered his passions to run before his reason. He took it too easily for granted, that *truth* was on *his side*, without so much as allowing the *other side* a *fair hearing*. This was *wrong judgment*, and a *very great fault* in a person of his good sense and great abilities of mind. It was the greater, because it was a *cause of blood*, and the lives of many thousands might be concerned in it. It is exceeding *sinful* and *dangerous* to mistake in *such* a case: for if the *supposed offence* of those whom he so persecutes be not *proved*, and the *crime clear*, it is *murdering* men, instead of doing justice. St. Paul, afterwards, did not forget to make mention of this high aggravation of his fault: for thus he speaks: "When the blood of thy martyr Stephen was shed, I "also was standing by, and consenting unto his death, and kept "the raiment of them that slew him[d]." It is very true, that, by the Jewish law, *blasphemers* and *false prophets*, and such as attempted to *seduce the people* from the *true religion*, were to be *put*

[c] 1 Cor. xv. 9. [d] Acts xxii. 20.

to death: and accordingly the prophet Elijah, and king Jehu, made no scruple of shedding the blood of the *priests* and *worshippers* of Baal, as was proper and necessary to do: but then those *priests* and those *worshippers* were really *impostors, seducers,* and *gross idolaters,* and deserved to suffer. The Christians were quite contrary: their *cause was just,* their *religion true,* their *commission Divine;* which the persecutors themselves might easily have perceived, had they but *duly attended* either to the *nature of the doctrine,* or to the *miracles wrought* in confirmation of it, or to their own *prophecies,* which long before had made way for it, and given testimony to it.

Upon the whole then, Saul, considered as a *persecutor of the Church of God,* cannot be *acquitted of prejudice, partiality,* and *precipitate judgment,* in a cause which demanded *cool deliberation,* and the most scrupulous *care, caution,* and *sedateness.* Proceed we next,

II.

To consider what may be pleaded to *soften* and *alleviate* his guilt in it, on *account of which* he *found mercy.*

He himself has intimated how the case stood with him; observing, that, though he had been some time a "blasphemer, "and a persecutor, and injurious;" yet he "obtained mercy, "because he did it ignorantly in unbelief[e]." He *did not know* that the *Christian religion* was *from God,* and that the *Jewish* was to cease and *give way to it.* He had no suspicion, no thought of any such thing: he *meant* and *intended* well, while he was *doing amiss:* this is his *excuse.*

It may be said in answer, that he *might* have known better, if he had been pleased to *examine:*—very true. he *might;* and therefore he is *blamable:* but still his *heart* was *honest* and good, and therefore his *mistake* was *pitiable* and *pardonable.* His ignorance was not altogether *affected* and *wilful,* but had a great mixture of *natural temper* and *human frailty,* to *alleviate* and *qualify* it. The Jews who crucified our Saviour did it "through ignorance[f]:" and therefore our blessed Lord, praying for them upon the cross, says, "Father, forgive them; for they "know not what they do[g]." And yet it must be observed, that *their* ignorance was much *more affected* and *culpable* than St. Paul's was; as proceeding from a much more *corrupt heart.* Envy, pride, malice, and other *vile affections,* had blinded *their*

[e] 1 Tim. i. 13. [f] Acts iii. 17. [g] Luke xxii. 34.

eyes and corrupted *their* understandings: whereas St. Paul's ignorance seems to have been owing chiefly, or solely, to the almost *insuperable prejudices* of *education*, and the *natural warmth* and vivacity of his spirit. He had *zeal without knowledge*, more heat than light: but it was a zeal *for God*, and not for any of the *honours*, or *riches*, or *pleasures* of this world. His mistakes proceeded from *no evil principle*, no *sinister* aims, or *corrupt views*; but from an *over eager* desire of *promoting*, as he believed, the *honour and glory of God*, in the way which he had *been bred up to*, and which he had never yet presumed to call in question. "He had lived in all good conscience before God[h];" a *strict observer* of the *Jewish law*, and *true to his profession* and *principles*: but a *new case*, a new *turn of religion* came, which he had not *suspected*, and which he was *too hasty* to allow himself time to *consider*. All this was *consistent* with a very *honest* and *good mind*, sincerely *zealous for the honour of God*, but misguided by an *erroneous conscience*. Our blessed Lord, well knowing the *integrity of his heart*, was pleased to overlook his failings, and to receive him into his own more immediate service. He approved his *upright zeal*, which wanted nothing but *clearer light*, and a *better direction*. He indulges him the favour of an heavenly vision, condescends to speak to him from above, and finds him as *willing* and *ready*, upon *correction*, to *embrace* and *propagate* the Christian religion, as he had before been to *persecute* and *destroy it*. Which brings me to consider in the third place,

III.

The exceeding great goodness of our blessed Lord, both to St. Paul and to the *Church* in this affair.

How kind and how gracious were the words which our Lord spake: "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" intimating the love and tenderness he had for all his true followers; insomuch that he looked upon any injuries committed against *them* to be as so many injuries done to *himself*. Next, he gave the good man a seasonable and a very affecting caution: "I am Jesus "whom thou persecutest:" I am Jesus, the *Saviour of the world*, (so the name signifies,) it is hard for thee to contend with one so much mightier than thou art: stop thy career, and retreat in time. These were moving arguments, and pierced to the very soul. But to make the impression still stronger, he was pleased

[h] Acts xxiii. 1.

to surround him with dazzling light, and to strike him quite blind for a time. He had the better opportunity of *retiring inwards,* to consider the more closely, and to recollect. These *outward means*, together with *inward grace*, had their full effect, and made Saul become a very obedient and humble *convert* to the *faith of Christ*. Thus the man was marvellously rescued from the jaws of death and hell, in order to become a great and glorious saint in heaven. Such was our Lord's kindness to him in particular.

But what is still more considerable, was the exceeding goodness therein shewn to the *Church* in general. It was not only taking off a very furious and dangerous *enemy*; but it was making of him one of the kindest and best of *friends*. There was no man *better qualified* to serve the *Church*, both by preaching and writing, than St. Paul. He had great *natural abilities*, improved by a *liberal* and *polite education*; to which also were superadded many extraordinary *supernatural gifts*: and one advantage more he had above the *rest* of the *Apostles*; that he could tell both Jews and Pagans, whom he went to convert, that *he* had been once as *vehemently prejudiced* against Christianity as *they* could be; that he had been mad enough even to *persecute* it; that he knew the *utmost* they could have to *object* to it, for *he* had been one of the *objectors* himself, and upon as good reasons as any man else could be: and yet, after all, he had met with *full conviction* of the folly of his former course, and of the necessary obligation which every man lay under to submit their *prejudices* to the *law of Christ*. When any leading or considerable man of a sect *changes sides*, and there is no visible *interest*, no *worldly prospects* which could invite him to it, his example carries very considerable force and weight with it. It is reasonably presumed, in such a case, that nothing less than *demonstration*, or some *Divine impulse*, could work *conviction* upon a person so *strongly prepossessed*, and *prejudiced* another way. On this account, St. Paul's preaching up Christ among Jews and Gentiles was more affecting and forcible than *that* of St. Peter, or St. John, or any other of the *Apostles*. *They* had been friends to Christ's *religion* from the *beginning*, and might perhaps be suspected of some *partial fondness* towards it: but Paul had been a *professed adversary* to it, and *very bitter* against it; so that nothing but a strong conviction of its *truth* and *certainty* could have made *him* espouse it. It is from this very man, once

an avowed and declared *enemy* to Christianity, that we have, at this day, fourteen Epistles written in *defence* and *confirmation* of it. He was the "chosen vessel," the principal instrument which God made use of, for converting and reforming the world; because he, of all men, having been *once an enemy*, and *now become a friend*, was the most likely to persuade. What advantage that single circumstance gave St. Paul in his preaching may be learned from what is said in the 21st verse of this ninth chapter of the Acts. "All that heard him were amazed, and said, Is "not this he that destroyed them which called on this name in "Jerusalem?" &c. And St. Paul himself takes notice of it in these words; "They had heard, that he which persecuted us in "times past now preached the faith which once he destroyed: "and they glorified God in me[i]."

IV.

It remains now only to consider the proper use and application to be made of the whole.

1. And first, let us learn from the instance of St Paul, how much it concerns every man to take care, that he *judges right* in all matters of high consequence especially, and that his *conscience* be *duly informed*. Let no man trust to a *mere persuasion* of mind, which may be owing only to *prepossession* and *prejudice*; but let him well and wisely *examine* upon *what foundation* his present *judgment* is grounded. Infinite mischiefs may arise from an *erroneous conscience* and a *misguided zeal*. It is not *sufficient* to *mean* and *intend well*, in such cases: but it is further necessary to take all reasonable *care* to be *rightly* and *fully informed*; that so we may know certainly what we do, and may be able to justify it upon true and *sound principles*. Ignorance of the *rule* will not *excuse* a man in acting *against* it; because he *ought to know* the rule he is to act by; which he *may* do, if he will be at the pains to *attend* and *look into* it. Yet it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that many *merciful allowances* will be made for men of *sincere virtue* and *probity*, who have been misled only by the almost insuperable *prejudices of education*, and whose mistakes have been owing more to *natural infirmity* and *human frailty*, than to any *evil disposition* of a *corrupt heart*. St. Paul found mercy, on *this account* chiefly: and so may other misguided zealots who have the *same probity* of mind which St. Paul, even before his conversion, had.

[i] Gal. i. 23, 24.

2. From the same instance of St. Paul learn we a *ready submission* and obedience to *truth* and godliness, when *sufficiently propounded* to us. Lay we aside all *inveterate prejudices* and stubborn reluctances, as soon as ever we have *light enough to see* that we *have been in an error*, and that we ought to *retract*. There is a great deal of pride and obstinacy in some tempers, which renders them proof against conviction. They are averse to *own* they have ever been in the *wrong*, lest it be a reflection upon their judgment, and lessen their esteem in the world. This is folly and vanity. There is no *real discredit*, but *honour* rather, in *growing wiser:* and it is much more creditable to *correct* our follies or mistakes, than to *persist* in them. How resigned and tractable was the good Apostle of this day! how ready both to *own* and to *retract* his *former errors and misconduct!* how *sincerely penitent* for them, and zealous to *amend* them! He valued not the imputation of *levity* or inconstancy: to *change for the better* shewed the *truest constancy* of a well-disposed mind. He regarded not the flouts or reproaches of his *party*, whom he had deserted for Christ. Let them call him a deserter, a renegade, an apostate, or what they pleased: he knew that he had weighty and *unanswerable reasons* for leaving them, and that *they* ought also to follow, under pain and peril of being themselves deserted and abandoned by God. Such was St. Paul's wise and willing compliance with what was right and just, as soon as apprised of it; which shewed a *large soul* and a *generous probity* of mind, and is an admirable pattern for others to copy after.

3. Thirdly and lastly, learn we from the whole transaction, which we this day commemorate, the *truth and certainty* of our Lord's *resurrection* and *ascension* into heaven, his power and majesty there as Lord of all, and his exceeding goodness in looking down from thence to take care of his Church here below; and how dangerous a thing it will be, and how fatal to the undertakers, to persist in any attempts against him. It will be "hard for them to kick against the pricks." What account then shall those men have to give, who still *oppose*, and, as much as in them lies, *persecute* the religion of Christ? I speak not now of Jews, Pagans, or Mahometans, who may have the *prejudices of education* to plead, as St. Paul had, to *alleviate* their sin in doing it: but I speak of *such* as have been *baptized* and *bred up* in this *very religion*, and have *revolted* from it, and *labour*, if it were possible, to *destroy* it. *Their* conduct is plainly *monstrous*

and their crime *unpardonable*. They have *no colour* for it, no *temptation* to it, more than what springs from a wicked and *corrupt heart*. Either the pride of singularity, or the spirit of contradiction, or malice towards the profession of this religion, or the aversion they have to rule and restraint, or, in a word, their *strong attachment* to their *lusts* and *vices*, makes them wild and outrageous, and so of course drives them upon any desperate lengths. The time will come, when the Lord Jesus, *whom they persecute*, will take sad vengeance upon them in flames of fire. In the mean while, let every serious Christian detest and abominate such flagrant instances of impiety: and let us however make this good use of them, as they are occasions offered, to stir us up and to awaken us to a more fervent zeal for our most holy profession, endeavouring also to adorn the same with a *conversation* suitable to the *Gospel of Christ*.

SERMON XXXI.

Christ's Sacrifice of himself explained; and *Man's* Duty to offer *spiritual Sacrifice* inferred and recommended.

EPHESIANS V. 1, 2.

Be ye therefore followers of God, as dear children; and walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweetsmelling savour.

THESE words carry in them an instructive lesson concerning Christ's *death* and *passion*, together with a *practical conclusion* drawn from it, to shew the use and improvement which we ought to make of it. As Christ hath loved us, and gave *himself a sacrifice* to God upon the cross for us, (a sure pledge and token of his kindness towards us,) so ought *we* to *give up ourselves* to God in all *holy obedience*, but more particularly in the offices of *love* towards our *brethren*, as such offices are the most acceptable sacrifices that we can offer to God most high. The *general meaning* and intendment of the text being thus briefly opened, I may now proceed to a *particular consideration* of the two *main branches* of it; namely, our *Lord's unexampled sacrifice* made in his death, for the honour of God and the good of men; and *our own sacrifice of ourselves* in the whole course of our lives, which ought to bear some *analogy* to our Lord's, and to be, as it were, a copy drawn from it, as an humble imitation of it.

I.

I begin with *our Lord's sacrifice*, that great sacrifice which was from all eternity forelaid in the high counsels of Heaven; which was intimated to mankind as soon as there was need for

it, (that is, immediately after the *fall*,) which, probably, gave birth and rise to *all other sacrifices* whatsoever, whether in the Jewish or Gentile world; but which undoubtedly was as the pattern in the mount to all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, (Mosaical or Patriarchal,) all which pointed to it, rested upon it, and centred in it. No sooner had man forfeited the favour of God by committing sin, but there appeared a necessity of a *sacrifice for sin*, to reinstate him. Divine wisdom appointed it, and called for it: from whence we may certainly infer, that reasons of justice, or (which comes to the same) the unerring rules of Divine government, required it. God would not, or in reason could not, be appeased without it: but with it he might, and he has declared that he would. He accepts of our *Lord's sacrifice* as a grateful odour, a "sweetsmelling savour" delightful to him, as *reconciling* his *justice* and *goodness* together, securing the honour of his laws, and at the same time providing for the felicity of man.

The first time we meet with the phrase of "sweetsmelling "savour," or *sweet savour*, (which comes to the same,) is in the eighth chapter of Genesis, ver. 21, where Noah having offered burnt offerings, the Lord is said to have "smelled a sweet "savour," or a *savour of rest*. When God speaks to men, he accommodates his expressions to the *language* of men, in order to be understood by them. He condescends to make use of their low phrases, to express high and sublime truths in the most affecting and sensible way. The figure or similitude here made use of is very easily understood: for as perfumes are grateful to man's sense, so are virtuous and godly acts or exercises grateful to the Divine mind. Our Lord's obedience unto death, even the death of the cross, was eminently a godly service, the most exalted instance of true *piety* and *charity* that ever was or ever could be performed. It was more than all men or all angels, more than the whole creation in a body *together*, could have done towards the pacifying of God and reconciling of man; and therefore it was as the *richest perfume*, having a most *delightful fragrancy*, such as none other can come up to, inasmuch as that therein God is well pleased.

To make this appear the more distinctly, we may consider, first, the PRIEST: secondly, the SACRIFICE: thirdly, the ALTAR: and lastly, the Divine LAWGIVER to whom the *offering* was made, and by whom it was and is accepted.

1. A PRIEST, properly speaking, is a person "taken from "among men," authorized by God to be an *advocate* for them at the court of heaven[a]. As a *prophet* or an *apostle* properly is an *ambassador from God* to *treat with men*; so a *priest* is an *agent* or solicitor, in *behalf of men*, to *treat with God*. Our Lord was both a *Prophet* and *Priest*, in different views: but here we are to consider him in his *sacerdotal* capacity only; in which capacity he made his *offering* and *sacrifice* for sins. He is a *Priest* of an higher order than the order of Aaron, the order of Melchizedek, whose priesthood was *royal*: for he was *king* of *Salem*, which, in *mystical construction*, is *king of peace*. Melchizedek undoubtedly was a mortal man; yet, to make him the fitter *type* of Christ, he is introduced as a *priest*, and no notice taken either of his *birth* or his *decease*: as if, like Christ, he had had no *beginning* of days, nor were to have *end* of life. He was introduced as *blessing* Abraham, the father of the faithful, to intimate that Christ's *priesthood* was to extend to all the *faithful*, in all past, present, and future ages; and not to be confined, like Aaron's, to the Jews only, commencing with their economy, expiring with it. And it is further observable, that Melchizedek, as introduced in Genesis, brought no *typical* offerings or sacrifices, as Aaron was wont to do: he presented nothing to God but *himself*, and his *pious* and *benevolent* offices; in which he was so far a *type* of Christ, (though very imperfectly,) as Christ also offered *himself* and his all-sufficient services, active and passive, unto God. Melchizedek further exercised his high priesthood, in *blessing* the *father* of the *faithful*, and feeding him with *bread* and *wine*; correspondently to which, *our Lord*, as *High Priest*, *blesses* all the *faithful* with all spiritual blessings[b], and feeds them with the bread of heaven, the wine of angels, with his own *body* and *blood*. But my business at present is, not with the *blessings consequent* upon our Lord's sacrifice, but with the *sacrifice itself* of which the text speaks.

2. The text mentions both offering and sacrifice: our Lord was *both*. He "hath given himself for us an offering and a "sacrifice." The word *offering* is of somewhat larger meaning than the word *sacrifice*: for *every sacrifice* is an *offering* to God, but *every offering* to God is not a *sacrifice*. However, the word *offering*, in this place, does not mean *offering* as *different* from

[a] Heb. v. 1. [b] Ephes. i. 3.

sacrifice, but as *sacrifice taken in a larger sense*, and different from sacrifice in a *stricter acceptation*. There were under the *Old* Testament offerings of *fine flour*, otherwise called *meal offerings*, or *bread offerings*; and there were *animal sacrifices* of sheep, goats, bullocks. The *meal offerings* are here alluded to under the name of *offering*, and the *animal sacrifices* under the name of *sacrifice*. They were both of them *gifts* to God, both of them *sacrifices* in a just and proper sense, as *sacrifice* means a *present* made to God: and they were both of them *types* or figures of what Christ was to *give* to God in the *sacrifice* of *himself*. *He* is the *bread of heaven*, corresponding to the Jewish *bread offering*: *he* is the *Lamb of God*, corresponding to all the *animal sacrifices*. To *him* all those *material* and *typical* services pointed, by *him* they were fulfilled, and in *him* they expired. *He* was both the *beginning* and the *end* of all those ordinances: he established them at the first, to give notice of his coming; and by his coming he removed them, and took them away, when he took away our sins, "nailing them to his cross[c]."

The text says, Christ gave *himself*: that word *himself* may want some explanation. His *person* is constituted of *two natures*, the *Divine* and *human*: he is in *himself* both *God* and *man*. The *Priest* who made the sacrifice is the *whole* Person: the *sacrifice*, that *self* in *part* only; for the *Divine* nature could not *suffer*, nor be made a *sacrifice*; only it *might* and *did* give *value* and *dignity* to the *human nature*, which *alone* was, in strictness, the *sacrifice*. Giving *himself* therefore must be understood to mean giving himself *in part*. For as a *martyr*, who gives his *body* only (not his *soul*) to be burned, is rightly said to give *himself* to the flames, because he gives what is *part* of *himself*; so also our *blessed Lord*, in sacrificing his *human nature*, a *part* of *himself*, is rightly said to have sacrificed *himself*. This *sacrifice* is variously expressed in holy scripture: for sometimes it is called giving his *body*, sometimes his *blood*, sometimes his *soul*, sometimes his *life* for us; all which expressions amount to the same thing, namely, that he *died* for us, died in *our stead*, a willing sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. And yet none of those expressions, however well they are adapted to the customary forms of speech, are, in strictness of propriety, to be compared with St. Paul's saying, that he was "obedient unto

[c] Coloss. ii. 14.

"death[d]." For, in truth of notion and precise accuracy of expression, it was his *obedience*, active and passive, which was *properly* the *sacrifice*, the acceptable *offering* unto God. God is a *Spirit*, and the *spiritual* services are properly his delight. *Perfect innocence* and *consummate virtue*, both in *doing* and *suffering*, were, in strictness of speech, not only the flower and perfection, but the *very form* and *essence* of *our Lord's sacrifice*. There was found in that unfathomable mystery of Divine love, in our Lord's dying for us; there was found, I say, not only spotless holiness and purity, but a most upright heart, and the most devout affections, breathing nothing but the most ardent affections and services for the *glory of God* and the *salvation of men;* for the general happiness, if I may so speak, of the whole *rational system*. Those *benevolent services* taken together, and all recommended by the *supereminent dignity* of the *Person* so doing and so *suffering*, were the *sacrifice of sweet odour*, the spiritual perfume, acceptable to him who alone could judge perfectly of the *infinite worth* and *merit* of it. So much for the *sacrifice*.

3. The third thing to be considered is the ALTAR. *Priest*, *sacrifice*, and *altar* have commonly been thought *relatives*, supposed to infer and imply each other: though that is not strictly and universally true; as might be shewn at large, were this the place for it, or were it at all proper to enter here into niceties of that kind.

In this case however, Divines both ancient and modern have thought of an *altar*, as well as of a *priest*, and of a *sacrifice:* and from the *third century* at least, down to this time, the *cross* whereon our Lord suffered has been generally esteemed and called the *altar*. For as the Jewish sacrifices were lifted up upon the *altar* erected for that purpose, so was the Son of man lifted up by the *cross*[e]. And as the *altar* among the Jews was used to *bear* or sustain the *sacrifice*, so the *altar* of the *cross* bore or *sustained* our Lord's humanity, while "himself bare our sins in his own "body on the tree[f]."

Thus far the *resemblance* and analogy between the *Levitical altar* and the *altar of the cross* seem to hold very aptly; and to these two circumstances of the comparison there might be others

[d] Phil. ii. 8. [e] John iii. 14. xii. 32. [f] 1 Pet. ii. 24.

added of inferior note. Nevertheless, similitudes should not be strained too far: because, though they may hit in several circumstances, yet will they not be found to answer in all.

One circumstance of an *altar* is, that it *sanctifies the gift*, or sacrifice offered upon it[g]. This circumstance cannot properly be applied to the *altar of the cross*, as *sanctifying* the *great sacrifice*. Wherefore some very judicious Divines have here thought of *another altar*, besides the *cross*, a *spiritual* altar; namely, the *eternal Spirit*, the *Divine nature* of our Lord, which in this case *sanctified* the *human*. It is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews[h], that "Christ through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot "to God." In this view Christ was the *Priest*, his *human* nature the *sacrifice*, and his *Divine* nature the *altar* which *sanctified* the sacrifice, which supported it under all sufferings, and under the weight of the world's iniquities laid upon it, and finally added infinite value and dignity to it. So then, the *cross* might be the *altar* in some respects, and our Lord's own *eternal Spirit* might be the *altar* in others.

But after all, it must be owned that scripture is not clear either for *this* kind of *altar* or *that*. The doctrine of the *sacrifice* is plainly *scripture doctrine:* but the doctrine of the *altar* stands only upon *scripture consequences*, drawn by interpreters, and not perhaps with such evidence as must extort the assent of every reasonable man. What need is there of a *proper altar* to every *proper sacrifice?* The notion of a *sacrifice*, which means a *gift to God*, is independent of the notion of an *altar* to present it upon. It was *accidental* to the Jewish sacrifices that they required *altars*, because they were generally to be consumed by *fire*, in whole or in part, and therefore wanted a *fire hearth* for that purpose: and it is far from certain that all *proper* sacrifices were offered upon *altars*. An *altar* seems to be no more *necessary to every sacrifice*, than a *case*, or a *patine*, or a *pix* is to every *gift* or *present* which any person may bring to another. It is a *circumstance* perhaps of *decency*, not of the *substance* of the present. A *gift* is not the less a *gift* for being presented naked and simple, without the formalities of a case to inclose it, or of a *plate to* offer it upon. In a word then, the *sacrifice* of Christ is an undoubted *scripture truth:* but as to a proper *altar* for that *sacri-*

[g] Matt. xxiii. 19. [h] Heb. ix. 14.

fice, it is a more disputable point; about which very wise and good men may be allowed to think very differently, or to judge as they see cause.

4. The fourth article to be considered is the supreme LAWGIVER, to whom the *sacrifice* of the cross was made, and by whom it was graciously accepted. *God the Father*, without dispute, as *first Person* in the Godhead, is *Lawgiver in chief;* and to *him* our blessed Lord paid the price of our redemption, the *sacrifice of himself.*

If it be asked, what need there was of any sacrifice to a person so benign, and so mercifully disposed to pardon all repenting sinners; I say, if this were asked, it might be sufficient to reply, that we know the *fact:* God *did* require a *sacrifice*, and *such* a sacrifice; and he knows *what need* there was for it. However, without pretending to fathom the Divine counsels, or to understand all the *reasons of state*, by which an all-wise Governor proceeds, we may presume to observe that two special articles, the *glory of God* and the *felicity of man*, have been admirably served by this mysterious dispensation.

It is for the *glory of God* that he is seen not to connive at offences, nor to be too indulgent towards sin, while he requires a *valuable satisfaction* for offences committed. His *justice*, his *holiness*, and unspotted *purity* are hereby glorified before men and angels, and the *honour* of his *laws* supported in the face of the whole world.

On the other hand, man's *eternal felicity* appears to be best secured by the same means, because hereby provision is made to keep him the *more humble* and modest to all eternity. *Pride* is reasonably supposed to have been the sin of Lucifer, which *heaven* itself, and even the presence of God, did not keep him from. The more exalted his privileges were, the greater was his danger, and the surer his downfall. God has taken care that mankind shall have *less occasion* to *assume*, or to grow *high minded*. Their salvation shall stand entirely in the *merits* of *another person*, not at all in their *own:* and as often as they hope to be *accepted* in God's sight, it must not be with robes of their own cleansing, (full of spots and stains at the best,) but with robes "made white "in the blood of the Lamb[i]." This may be to them for ever a constant lesson of *humility*, which is the mother of all virtue, and

[i] Rev. vii. 14.

a sure foundation of all happiness, securing them from the *temptation* which even *angels* before lay under, and which at length turned them out of heaven, since "reserved in everlasting "chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day[k]."

Seeing then that the *glory of God* and the *felicity of man* appear to have been thus most effectually provided for by the *sacrifice* of Christ; no wonder if that sacrifice has a very "sweetsmelling savour," or is received as the most *delightful perfume* by him whose *goodness* is infinite, and whose mercies boundless; and who, having no interests of his own to serve, takes pleasure in every thing whereby his creatures may be made to come near him, and be rendered happy in the enjoyment of him.

Having thus run through the *doctrinal* part of the text, I come next to the *practical* conclusion drawn from it, drawn by the Apostle in the text itself.

II.

"Be ye therefore followers of God as dear children [of God] "and walk in love," that is, in *love of the brethren*. If our blessed Lord condescended to make a *sacrifice of himself* to God for the *general good* of mankind; *we* ought likewise to make the like tender of *ourselves*, our hearts, wills, and affections, and all our services, to the same God, and on the same account, namely, for the *general good* of all our brethren. Such a *tender* as I now speak of is that *sacrifice* which the *Gospel* every where points out to us, and which God expects of us; to sacrifice the *old man*, with the *affections* and *lusts*, and to put on the *new man*, devoting ourselves wholly to the *glory of God* and the *happiness of our fellow creatures*. In this respect, all Christians are represented in the New Testament as making one "holy priesthood," (saving to God's commissioned officers their peculiar presidency in it,) "to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God by Jesus "Christ[l]." Those "spiritual sacrifices" are reducible to two heads, to the two great commandments, the *love of God*, and the *love of our neighbour*. To the first head belongs the *sacrifice of prayer*, which is the Gospel *incense*[m]; as also the *sacrifice of praise*, which St. Paul exhorts us to *offer* up *continually*[n]. To the *second* head belongs the sacrifice of *almsdeeds*, and of all other *friendly* offices towards one another. "To do good and to commu-

[k] Jude 6. [l] 1 Pet. ii. 5. [m] Rev. v. 8. viii. 3, 4. [n] Heb. xiii. 15.

"nicate, forget not: for with such sacrifices God is well pleased[o]."
There are other *spiritual* sacrifices recommended in the New Testament, which are expressive of the *love of God* and of *man*, both in one: as the sacrifice of an "humble and contrite heart[p]," and the presenting our "bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable "unto God[q]." We cannot do greater honour to our *Lord's sacrifice*, than by thus *copying* after it in the best manner we are able; and following it (though at an infinite distance) in our own religious offerings and sacrifices, such as I have been mentioning. Be we thus "followers of God, as dear children" of God, and true disciples of Christ.

But more particularly, as often as we come to commemorate our Lord's high sacrifice at his holy table, be we mindful to make a *tender of ourselves to him*, as he made a *tender of himself to God*. While we plead the merits of *that sacrifice* in our offices here below, (which he also pleads in his intercessions on our behalf above,) let us throw in our own *secondary* sacrifices to it; not to *heighten the value* of it, which already is infinite, but to *render ourselves capable of the benefits* of it. As there is *merit* sufficient on his part, so there must be competent *qualifications* on ours: while Christ, by the visible signs of *bread* and *wine*, conveys to *us* the *fruits* of his *natural body* and *blood*; so ought we, by the same signs, to present to *him* the *mystical body* whereof we are a part. By the *Levitical law*, there was to be a *meat offering* and a *drink offering* thrown upon the *lamb* in the daily service, and both together were reputed but as *one* and the *same sacrifice*. The *lamb*, without question, signified Christ and *his sacrifice*: and why should not those *secondary* oblations thrown upon the *lamb*, be supposed to signify or prefigure the *secondary* sacrifices or *services* of Christians, thrown, as it were, upon Christ's *sacrifice*, to strengthen our claim to it, and to fix our interest in it? Therefore, while our *Lord's sacrifice* is represented and pleaded before God on our behalf, in the *holy Communion*; take we care to send up our *devout prayers* and *praises*, our *humble minds* and *contrite hearts*, our *almsdeeds*, and our *forgivenesses* of all who have offended us, our holy *resolutions* and *pious vows*; and in a word, *ourselves*, our *souls* and *bodies*, to be *a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice* unto God. So may the *sacrifice* of Christ *commemorated*, and *our own sacrifices* therewith

[o] Heb. xiii. 16. [p] Psalm li. 17. [q] Rom. xii. 1.

presented, be considered as *one sacrifice* of the *head* and *members*, in union together: and so may the *united offering* be *received above*, as an "offering and a sacrifice to God of a sweetsmelling "savour;" acceptable unto him, through Jesus Christ our Lord: to whom, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, be all honour and glory henceforth for evermore. *Amen.*

SERMON XXXII.

The History and Character of Balaam.

NUMBERS xxii. 10, 11, 12.

And Balaam said unto God, Balak the son of Zippor, king of Moab, hath sent unto me, saying,
Behold, there is a people come out of Egypt, which covereth the face of the earth: come now, curse me them; peradventure I shall be able to overcome them, and drive them out.
And God said unto Balaam, Thou shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people: for they are blessed.

THE story of Balaam fills up three whole chapters in this Book of Numbers; and it is frequently referred to in several other places both of the *Old* and *New* Testament. Seeing then that it makes so considerable a figure in the *sacred history*, (though it comes in but occasionally,) I have thought it may well deserve a distinct consideration; and do therefore choose it for the subject of our present meditations.

The Israelites, in their passage through the wilderness, were to march through the land of the Moabites, a people descended of Lot, and over whom Balak was king at that time. The Moabites, Ammonites, and Midianites, near neighbours, were all alarmed at the march of the Israelites, and were afraid of them; knowing what great things God had so lately done for them;

and that neither Sihon king of the Amorites nor Og the king of Basan had been able to stand before them. The Israelites had entirely routed and ruined those two potent princes, taking possession of their lands: and they had done it with such despatch, and in so surprising a manner, that the nations round about had reason to suspect that there was something very *extraordinary* and *supernatural* in it. It seems to have been owing to some *such apprehension* as this, that none of them durst oppose the Hebrews, without endeavouring first to engage Heaven on their side, which they hoped to do by the help of *enchantments*.

There was a famous magician, or prophet, of that time, whose name was Balaam, mightily celebrated through all the east: him they resolved to court with high promises, and, if possible, to bribe him over to their interests in this exigency. The notion they had of him was, that he was so divine a man, so highly favoured by Heaven, that he could turn the fate of war which way he pleased, by his *benedictions* and *imprecations*: for thus said Balak in his message to him: "I wot that he whom "thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest is cursed[a]." The Midianites and Moabites were both of them full of the same persuasion, as we learn from this chapter: and we find from other places of Scripture[b] that the Ammonites joined with them in the design of sending to Balaam. Despatches were ordered to him, desiring him to come and take a survey of the camp of Israel, and to curse them in solemn form in order to their destruction.

It may look a little strange, that they should trust so little to their *own gods* at home, and should send as far as Mesopotamia for a *prophet* to assist them. Certainly Balaam's reputation must have run very high; or there must have been some very peculiar reason for that uncommon method of proceeding. Perhaps they imagined, that the gods of their own country were not able to defend them against the God of Israel; having so lately seen what the Israelites had done to the Amorites their neighbours: or they might fancy that Balaam had an interest with all kinds of gods, and might engage them all to come in to their assistance: or rather, I incline to think that they knew Balaam to be a *prophet* of the *same God* which the Israelites worshipped; and that therefore by *his* means they

[a] Numb. xxii. 6. [b] Deut. xxiii. 3, 4.

hoped to draw off the *God of Israel* (whom they were so much afraid of) from assisting the Israelites, and to incline him to favour the Moabites, and those who were joined with them.

The learned are not perfectly agreed as to Balaam's *character*, whether to call him a *magician* or a *prophet:* but it is very evident that he was well acquainted with the name of the *God of Israel*, and that he *applied himself* to *him*, and to *him only* in that affair. For when the elders of Moab and Midian came first to him, he desired them to lodge with him that night, promising them to bring them word in the morning, what *the Lord* (that is, what Jehovah the *God of Israel*) should say to him, in relation to their errand[c]: which accordingly he did; and the *answer* he brought was what Jehovah the *God of Israel* had really put into his mouth. This circumstance plainly shews that he had been used to consult the *true God* in former times: for otherwise he could never have pretended now to *promise* beforehand to *bring an answer* from him, or to know for certain that it was his.

There is no absurdity in supposing that God might have some *prophets* (abroad in the *heathen* world) who were not of Israel. Job was undoubtedly such an one: and why might not Balaam be another? It is the more likely, because, from the time of Abraham, God had spread the knowledge of himself about the idolatrous world: and all Abraham's *posterity* were *originally* circumcised, and became worshippers of the *true God;* though in process of time they *revolted*, and fell into *idolatry*. The Moabites and Ammonites, whom we are now speaking of, were of *distinct* consideration from the *rest* of the *heathen world*, being the *descendants* of righteous Lot, who was of the *same religion* with Abraham. The Midianites too, of whom most probably Balaam was, were the posterity of Abraham, by Keturah; and who therefore certainly had, for some time, the knowledge of the *true God* amongst them: which makes it the more probable that God might plant some *prophets* amongst them in those early days, to preserve that *true religion* and *worship* which they had received from their progenitors.

Upon the whole then, I take the liberty to conclude, that Balaam was really a *prophet;* and so he is called by St. Peter[d]. And as he had an *interest* and *correspondence* with the *true God*,

[c] Numb. xxii. 8. [d] 2 Pet. ii. 16.

so the meaning of the Moabites really was, that he should come and endeavour to draw off the *God of Israel* from assisting the Hebrews. He did make the attempt, (being hired and bribed so to do,) and without effect. Accordingly it is observed in Deuteronomy, that "the Lord would not hearken unto Ba-"laam[e]." And God himself says by the mouth of Joshua to the same purpose, "Balak sent and called Balaam the son of "Beor to curse you, but I would not hearken unto Balaam, "therefore he blessed you still[f]." These considerations shew that Balaam had addressed himself to the *God of Israel*, in hopes to have *his license* and *authority* for cursing the Israelites. From whence we may reasonably infer, that Balaam had been *his prophet* some time before, and that, in confidence of such his *high relation* to God, he presumed to consult him once and again upon that occasion. Having thus far cleared our way, we may now proceed,

I. To consider more distinctly the *history of Balaam*, as laid down in scripture.

II. To make some reflections upon it.

I.

The first mention which we have of this man is in this chapter of the Book of Numbers. The occasion of his being concerned with the children of Israel has been already intimated. Next, let us observe how he behaved himself upon that occasion, what the effect was, and what became of him in the end.

To do him justice, he behaved himself extremely well when the message was first brought him from king Balak. He *consulted God* upon the matter laid before him, made a *faithful report* of the *errand* which the ambassadors came upon, received God's answer, and *submitted* to it; acquainting the messengers that *God would not give him leave to curse that people*; no, nor so much as to *go along with the ambassadors*. Thus far he carried himself *well* and *wisely*, like an *honest*, *pious*, *upright man*. But afterwards came other messengers, more in number, and greater in dignity than the former: and they pressed him vehemently to comply with Balak's request; promising him *rich presents* and *honourable preferments*; in a word, any thing, or every thing, which he could ask or desire. To this again he made answer, that "if Balak would give him his house full of silver and gold, "yet he could not go beyond the word of the Lord his God[g]."

[e] Deut. xxiii. 5. [f] Josh. xxiv. 10. [g] Numb. xxii. 18.

This was well said, and was the plain truth. And here by the way observe, that Balaam, in these words, *professes his attachment to the Lord Jehovah*, as *his God:* which is a further confirmation of what I before hinted, that he was *really a prophet* of the *true God.*

But to proceed: after this, whether prevailed upon by importunity, or softened too much by the charms of honour and riches, (which dazzled his eyes,) the good man began to stagger; and he yielded so far as to consult God again upon the same thing, though he had before had an *absolute* and *peremptory denial:* this was his *first false step;* for it *was tempting God*, and *making too free* with the *Divine Majesty*, forgetting both his duty and distance. God then gave the man *leave to go* with the *princes;* but in such a manner, as might have made him sensible that it *had been better* if he had not *asked* it; and that his going would be to *no purpose*, since he should still be *restrained* from *cursing the people;* which was what he went for, and was the sole end and design of the *princes* who came to call him. Balaam however, having already set his heart too much upon the *bribes*, readily accepted of the *concession* made him; and that very morning he set out on his journey with the princes of Moab. God was angry with him for being *so forward* in this matter, which he might more wisely have *declined*, though leave was given him: and besides, Balaam conceived *hopes* that he might at length have *permission* to *curse* the children of Israel: otherwise it was a wild undertaking to pretend to go at all. God seeing the temper of the man, and what he had in his heart, sent an *angel* to stop him in the way, and to deter him effectually from his purpose. He "loved the wages of un-"righteousness," as St. Peter observes, and "was rebuked for "his iniquity: the dumb ass speaking with man's voice, forbad "the madness of the prophet[h]." The history of that prodigy is related at large in the Book of Numbers, and is a matter well known.

Some have been of opinion, (with Maimonides the famous Jew,) that the whole story of *Balaam* and the *ass* was a *vision only*, or a *dream*, and transacted merely in *idea.* But there is nothing in the text of Moses to countenance such a persuasion; nor are the reasons, suggested for this opinion, of weight

[h] 2 Pet. ii. 16.

sufficient to persuade us to lay aside the *plain literal* construction.

It is with better colour that others, admitting the *literal construction*, have further thought that the whole affair was *symbolical*, and might admit of a *mystical*, as well as a *literal interpretation*; though this also is no more than conjecture. But they who take this way, suppose that the beast which the prophet rode upon might be an *emblem* of Balaam spurred on by Balak his master. The *ass* saw the *danger* by the way, and made some *efforts* to *avoid* it, while the rider was perfectly blind: and in like manner the *prophet* had seen that *God was against the design*, and he made *some efforts* to *turn aside* from it; but was still vehemently pressed on and pushed forwards by king Balak. I forbear to mention other resembling circumstances, which have afforded reason for supposing that the whole was *emblematical*, and intended for Balaam's instruction, that he might see his folly, and retreat in time.

But he went on; and God permitted him now to proceed, (according to his own devices,) to reap the fruits of his ambition and avarice; only taking care all the time, that he should not drop the least *curse* upon the Israelites; but should speak as directed by God himself, and deliver nothing but *blessings*. The *prophet* accordingly, after several fruitless essays to prevail with God to let him *curse* the people, was still constantly withheld from doing it; and instead of *cursing* them, he altogether *blessed* them *three times*; and at length concluded, *prophesying* of the *downfall* of the Moabites, and foretelling many and prodigious *successes* of the people of Israel. Thus was king Balak's design utterly frustrated; and, instead of *rewarding* the *prophet*, he was bitterly *incensed* against him. And now Balaam, being reduced to these straits, began to perceive how foolish an errand he had come upon, and how little he had gained by the expedition. However, having *failed in one way*, he hoped now to make Balak *some amends in another*: and, as God had now given the man up to his own mad counsels, he next entered into as wicked and impious a design as could well be imagined. He advised the Moabites to think of some means of drawing the Israelites into some *heinous offence* against *their God*; assuring them, that there was no possible way of getting an advantage over Israel, unless they could be first drawn into *sin*, that so a *breach* might be made between *God* and *them*. This was a kind of *Machiavilian*

policy, shrewd and deep laid, but cursed and diabolical. It had not the effect which Baalam aimed at in it, (God so far defeating his counsels,) but the event was, the seducing great numbers of Israelites into *whoredom* first, and then into *idolatry*; and it ended in the destruction of twenty-four thousand of God's people.

This wickedness of Balaam is particularly taken notice of by St. John, in the Revelations; who, speaking to the Church of Pergamus in the name of Christ, says, "I have a few things "against thee, because thou hast there them that hold the "doctrine of Balaam, who taught Balak to cast a stumbling-"block before the children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed "unto idols, and to commit fornication[i]." St. Peter also alludes to the same thing; speaking of some persons, who, as he says, had "forsaken the right way, and were gone astray, following "the way of Balaam the son of Bosor, who loved the wages of "unrighteousness[k]." St. Peter calls him *son of Bosor:* in the *Old* Testament he is called son of Beor: but Beor and Bosor are both the *same name* in the *original*, only *differently pronounced:* and perhaps this may be one instance among others wherein St. Peter followed a *Galilean pronunciation*; but that by the way only. I should take notice, that St. Jude also alludes to the same thing with what St. Peter and St. John refer to; rebuking some persons for "running greedily after the error "of Balaam for reward[l]." The persons there pointed to were a wretched sect of *false teachers* which started up in the very infancy of the Christian Church. They held it lawful to follow *carnal lusts*, to commit fornication, adultery, incest, and other impurities. This palatable doctrine suited the corrupt taste of the *voluptuous*, and brought the teachers in much applause, and many a fair *present* from their carnal hearers. And now, because their doctrine was very like Balaam's, and the principal *motive* to it in the teachers was *avarice*, and a desire of *flattering* and *pleasing others* in their lusts; therefore *those teachers* were compared to Balaam, and their doctrine to his. Their *Hebrew name* also was Balaamites, as their *Greek name* was Nicolaitans; both which signify the *same* thing, viz. *lords*, or *leaders of the people*. And thus the name of Balaam revived, as it were, in the first ages of the *Gospel*, but much to his *dishonour*, to make his

[i] Rev. ii. 14. [k] 2 Pet. ii. 15. [l] Jude ver. 11.

memory the more odious and detestable to latest posterity. But I return to the history where I left off.

After Balaam, by his cursed counsels, had led Israel into a snare, and God had taken severe vengeance of his own people for being so weakly misled; he then gave orders to Moses and the Israelites to march against the Midianites, and smite them, in revenge for the wiles which, by the advice of Balaam, they had practised, and thereby beguiled Israel. Accordingly, they went out, and made a dreadful slaughter of the Midianites, destroying their country, and dividing the spoil. And here it was that Balaam at length reaped the wages of his iniquity, being slain among the rest with the edge of the sword[m]. Such was the end of that unhappy man; once a *prophet*, and, as it seems, highly in *favour* with Almighty God; but beguiled with the charms of ambition and covetousness, falling off by little and little, (as God withdrew his grace, which he had made an ill use of,) till at length he came up to the highest pitch of wickedness; becoming a *seducer*, and *setting himself at the head* of the *rebellion against God*, doing infinite mischief by his diabolical counsels; and instructing *princes* in such arts of cursed policy, as ought to render his name infamous to all posterity.

I should further observe, that, for a standing memorial of God's resentment for what had been done by the Ammonites and Moabites against his people of Israel, he *made an order* that no Ammonite or Moabite should be permitted to "enter into the "congregation of the Lord," till after the "tenth generation," because of what they had done in the *matter of Balaam*. The words of the law are; "An Ammonite or Moabite shall not "enter into the congregation of the Lord, even to the tenth "generation.—Because they met you not with bread and with "water in the way, when ye came forth out of Egypt; and "because they hired against thee Balaam the son of Beor of "Pethor of Mesopotamia, to curse thee[n]." The meaning of which law is, that though an Ammonite, or a Moabite, should become a *convert* to the *Jewish religion*, and *conform* to their *law* and *ceremonies* in every respect, and become a *complete member* of the *Jewish church*; yet he should not have the *privileges* of *marrying* with an Israelite, but should be debarred from it, *he* and his *posterity* for *ten generations*; which is interpreted, in

[m] Numb. xxxi. 8. Josh. xiii. 22. [n] Deut. xxiii. 3, 4.

Nehemiah, to mean *for ever*[o]. Such was the mark set upon the Ammonites and Moabites for their offence in that instance: and Balaam's *infamy* was perpetuated by the same law, being expressly mentioned in it as the man who had been *hired* to *curse God's people.* But enough hath been said of the *history of Balaam;* pass we on now,

II.

To make some reflections upon it; as it may indeed afford us plentiful matter for it.

1. In the first place observe, that there is *no time* of man's life wherein he may not be tempted, or may not be in danger of *falling off* from God and goodness; which should be an argument to us for *constant care* and watchfulness over ourselves. Even *those* whom God hath *favoured* in a *very particular manner,* and with *heavenly gifts* and *graces,* are no more *secure* than *others,* if they take not proportionable care. I say nothing of Solomon, or others who might here be mentioned: Balaam is the instance now before us, a *prophet* of the *most high God,* and probably *advanced in years,* since his fame had spread wide and far. His *standing* was not so *firm,* but that an *unlooked for* and a *powerful temptation* shook his steadfastness, and *brought him down* from the heights he had attained in *God's favour,* to a most forlorn and *wretched condition.*

2. Observe further, how *dangerous a thing it is,* so much as to *attend* or *listen* to the *charms of wealth and honour:* for a *gift* will sometimes *blind the wise,* and a *bribe* will *beguile their hearts.* Balaam looked too much upon the *golden presents,* and was too sensibly struck with the *sound of honour* and *preferments;* which made him the *less consider* upon how slippery ground he stood, and how dangerous an affair *that* was to concern himself in. Put it even in the best light, and imagine that he *might* have had God's leave to do what Balak desired: yet would a wise and a good man have been *forward* to *set God to sale,* and to *make a trade* of the *favours sent him from above?* Elisha would not suffer so much as his *servant* to *take a gift* of a great man whom he had cured of a leprosy: so *unbecoming a thing* did he think it to *sell* and *make merchandise* of *spiritual privileges.* Had Balaam been of *that temper,* he would never have been *misled* in the shameful manner he was, but would have held fast his *integrity* to the end.

[o] Neh. xiii. 1.

3. Observe, thirdly, that when God sees men *leaning too far* to *ambitious* or *covetous desires*, and not wise enough to take such *gentle hints* as might be sufficient to call them back; he then leaves them to pursue their own hearts' lusts, and lets them follow their own imaginations. When he at first *prohibited* Balaam from *cursing the people*, and from *going with the messengers*, *that* was *indication sufficient*. A wise man, after *that*, would have *absolutely refused* to *treat* or *parley* with any ambassadors whatever upon the same errand. But Balaam had *set his heart* upon the *bribes*, and was become warm and eager in the business. So God permitted the foolish man to go on as his inclinations led, and to run his utmost lengths of folly and madness. Since he would not retreat in time, nor know when he had done enough, (though God had given him *sufficient intimations*,) he was at length permitted to proceed in his own way, and to his own destruction.

4. Observe next, how foolish a part a man acts, and how he exposes himself to contempt and scorn, as well as danger, when he takes upon him to follow his own way and humour, and will not have God for his guide. It was a weak thing in Balaam to ask God a *second time*, after God had abundantly signified his pleasure: and it was still weaker, after he had received a *second answer* discouraging him from any thought of cursing the people, for him to go on with the princes of Moab, and to offer himself to Balak, when he could do him no service. But to shew some good inclination towards serving Balak, he resolved to make very free with Almighty God; though he had carried his irreverent familiarity too far before. He was now come to Balak, and *something* he must do; though as to the *main thing*, which was *cursing the people*, he knew very well that God had *tied up his mouth*. However, he makes Balak prepare *altars* and *sacrifices*, and he would thereby try again and again what God would say to him. A dangerous thing thus to tempt and trifle with the eternal God! Well: the effect was, that, much against his inclination, he was made to *bless* the people whom he came to *curse*; which highly offended Balak, and made the *prophet* ridiculous in the eyes of all there present. Yet this was not sufficient, but the foolish man goes on to *tempt God again*, and with the *same success*; till Balak was perfectly enraged against the *prophet*, and God let them *both* see, that *his will* should prevail, and not *theirs*.

5. Observe further, that when once stubborn and wilful men have run such lengths in *opposition* to the *will of Heaven*, God then gives them up to a *reprobate mind*, and lets them fall from one degree of wickedness to another. So it was in Balaam. He had been provoking God, time after time, by the foolish, irreverent, and conceited part he had been acting: and now God left him to do a great deal worse; to be *counsellor* to Balak in as *wicked policy* as hell itself could invent; to *seduce the Israelites* into *fornication*, and into the abominable lewdnesses which went along with the *feasts* and *revellings* made in honour of Baal-peor. A man who could give *such counsel* as that, must have first shaken off all *honour*, *respect*, or *reverence* for the *living God;* which indeed appears to have been Balaam's case in the end.

6. One thing more we may observe from his history, which is this; that the *Spirit of God* may sometimes *vouchsafe to come* upon a *very wicked man*, (so far as concerns the *extraordinary* gifts,) without *reforming* or *influencing* the *same man* as to his *life* and *morals*, in the way of *ordinary operation*. These *two things* are very *distinct*, and may often be *separate;* as in Balaam at that time, and in Judas afterwards. Balaam had undoubtedly the *gift of prophecy*, even while he was *doing amiss*, and tempting Almighty God. For "the Spirit of God came upon him[p]," and made use of his organs in the delivering several *remarkable prophecies* fulfilled in their season: as the *rising strength* and *growing greatness* of the Israelites: the *fall of Moab* and of *Edom*, which was to be effected in the time of king David: the *destruction of Amalek*, which came to pass somewhat sooner, in king Saul's time: the *overthrow* also of the Kenites by the hand of the Assyrians: and, what is more than all, the *overthrow* of the *Assyrian conquerors themselves* by the hands of the Chittim, that is, of the Macedonians; which was executed under the conduct of Alexander the Great. These were great and valuable prophecies, and most of them, besides their more *immediate reference*, had a *further view* to the *coming of Christ:* and hence it is that *this history* of Balaam deserved the more especial notice, and is made to fill up so many chapters in Moses. But when we find such considerable *prophecies* delivered by the mouth of an *ungodly man;* give God the glory, and let the shame rest where it ought. The *prophecies* are of *standing use* in the

[p] Numb. xxiv. 2.

Church; but the *prophet* will be no *gainer* by them: our Lord himself has fully interpreted this case, in the words following; "Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not "prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out "devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And "then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from "me, ye that work iniquity[q]."

[q] Matt. vii. 22, 23.

SERMON XXXIII.

The Appearance of Samuel to Saul at En-dor.

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1 SAMUEL xxviii. 15, 16.

And Samuel said to Saul, Why hast thou disquieted me, to bring me up? And Saul answered, I am sore distressed; for the Philistines make war against me, and God is departed from me, and answereth me no more, neither by prophets, nor by dreams: therefore I have called thee, that thou mayest make known unto me what I shall do.

Then said Samuel, Wherefore then dost thou ask of me, seeing the Lord is departed from thee, and is become thine enemy?

THIS chapter contains a most remarkable passage of sacred story: melancholy indeed it is, but entertaining withal, and, when considered in all its views, highly instructive. King Saul is here introduced, not in his glory and splendor, as when first called to the throne of Israel, but in his decline of life, and his most deplorable circumstances; which his many and grievous transgressions had brought him into. Vengeance, which had long hovered and waited, now advanced with large and quick strides, and his fate drew on apace. He perceived it, and was very sensibly affected with it. One cannot express, nor indeed conceive, the pains and agonies he must then have felt in his mind. He had abandoned God for some time, and he was now sadly sensible that God had abandoned him: yet he had a great desire to consult him once again, and to obtain a kind answer from him in his day of distress. He put on the outward garb of a devotee, while his heart was still hard as ever, and his

mind not changed. His present fears, rather than any thing of true penitence, roused him up, and made him have recourse to God; prepared at the same time, if God should not answer, to make his next resort to a *sorceress*, and by her to come at Samuel's ghost.

But first he applies to God. The Philistines bore hard upon him at that time with a formidable army, and so near to him that there was but a valley between them and him; whereupon he was greatly distressed. In such pressing exigency, he attempted every method he could think of (by *dream*, or by *Urim*, or by *prophecy*) to obtain some instructive answer from God: but God would not hear him, nor take the least notice of him, knowing him still to be the same wicked man as before; afflicted indeed, but not more humble; sorrowful, but not penitent, nor at all changed in the inward man.

Saul, thus finding himself repulsed and rejected, like a distracted man resolved to struggle with his fate to the utmost, and to run any lengths of madness. Though God had deserted him, yet he was weak enough to imagine that Samuel however (that is, the *ghost* of Samuel; for he had been dead about four years before) might be prevailed upon to listen to him, and to return him a kind answer. But in order to come at Samuel, he repairs to a *sorceress*, a woman of En-dor, skilled in *magic art*, and famed for conjuring up *ghosts* (as the world believed) by her *sorceries* or *enchantments*. It is not material here to inquire into the mysteries of that art, or whether it ever hath, or can perform so much as it pretends to. It is sufficient that fame so reported of *that woman*, and Saul believed it; and the *woman*, trusting to her art, undertook the thing: but God himself, as it seems, interposed, and both conducted and governed the whole transaction. There hath been great variety of sentiments among the learned, and very different accounts have been given, of this famed adventure.

I. I will therefore endeavour to settle what I take to have been *the truth of the case*. And,

II. Proceed to the *practical use* and application of it.

I.

Some have thought that there was nothing more in it than *trick* and *legerdemain*, whereby a cunning woman imposed upon Saul's *credulity*; making him believe that she saw an apparition, when she really saw none; at the same time contriving that a

voice should be heard speaking unto Saul in such manner, and in such words, as are related in that chapter.

But this opinion is highly *improbable.* For if the *woman* had the *sole conducting* of that affair, intending only to *impose* upon Saul, she would most undoubtedly have contrived to make the *pretended* Samuel's *answer* as *agreeable* and *pleasing to the king* as possible, and that for her *own sake* especially; for fear of *offending* Saul, and to *save her own life*, as well as to procure from him the *larger gratuity.* She would never have told him, (she *durst not* have told him,) that *he himself* should be *shortly slain*, and *his sons* with him, and that the *host of Israel* should be *delivered into the hand of the Philistines;* as we read verse the 19th. Indeed, the whole turn of Samuel's *speech,* in this chapter, is *too rough* and *ungrateful,* too *grave* and *solemn*, I may add also, *too full of truth and reality*, to have been owing *only to her contrivance* or *invention.*

For it must be observed further, that what was here spoken as from Samuel was really *prophetic*, and was punctually *fulfilled* a few days after. Here were things foretold, which neither the *woman* herself, nor even her *familiar spirit* could certainly have *foreseen.* None but *God himself* could have *revealed the secret.* And how unlikely is it that God should make use of this *sorceress* as a *prophetess*, and should give her the *honour* of revealing *his counsels;* at the same time *concurring with her* in the *imposition* put upon Saul, making him believe that Samuel appeared and talked, when there was no Samuel there.

For these reasons, we may presume to think and judge, that the matter here related was not all a *mere juggle* or contrivance of an *artful* woman, but *something more.* There was most certainly an *apparition* in the case, either of Samuel's *ghost*, or of some *other* spirit *personating* Samuel. And here again *critics* are much divided, which to choose. Upon considering this matter very carefully, with the reasons offered on both sides, I incline to think that Samuel *really appeared*, that is, Samuel's *ghost;* not by any *power of enchantment,* but by *God's direction and appointment*, for a *rebuke* to Saul, and in the *way of punishment* to him for his great *presumption* in doing what he did. For the message, thus brought him, was exceeding rough and severe, greatly added to the load of his misfortunes, and enhanced the weight of his troubles. The reasons for this interpretation are as follow:

1. This *method of proceeding* is very *conformable* to what God

had been pleased to do before, in *other cases* of *like nature*. As when king Balak had recourse to *sorceries* and divinations, in hopes to procure some *relief* or *fair promises* at least from them, *God himself interposed*, and so *overruled* Balaam, and all his *divinations*, that king Balak could obtain *no favourable answer* from them, but *quite the reverse*[a].

In like manner, when king Ahaziah had sent to consult Baalzebub, the demon of Ekron, to know whether he should recover of the sickness he then lay under, hoping, no doubt, to obtain a *favourable answer* there, as probably he might have done; *God himself* took care to *anticipate the answer* by Elijah the Prophet, who assured the messengers, meeting them by the way, that their master Ahaziah should *not recover*, but should *surely die*[b].

Thus probably was it in the case of Saul: when he was in hopes of a kind answer from Samuel, and, it is likely, would have had a very favourable one from some *pretended* Samuel, some *demon* in his shape, if the wretched *woman* could have raised such a one by her *sorceries*; God was pleased to disappoint both the *sorceress* and him, by sending the *true* Samuel with a *true* and *faithful* message, and quite contrary to what the *woman* or *Saul* had expected; which so confounded and disordered him, that he instantly fell down into a swoon, and could no longer bear up against the bitter agonies of his mind.

2. This interpretation is *plain* and *natural*, and least forced of any, agreeing well with the words of the text. The story is here told in such a way as one would *expect to find*, upon the *supposition* it *really was* Samuel. It is said, that "when the woman "saw Samuel, she cried out," &c.[c] and that "Saul perceived "that it was Samuel[d]." How could he *perceive* it, if it was not so? Or why is it said, that he *perceived* it, rather than that he *imagined*, or *supposed* so? In the sequel of the narrative, it is added, "Samuel said unto Saul[e];" and again, "Then said "Samuel[f];" which would not be true, if it were only a *personated* Samuel, a *familiar* in Samuel's *shape*: and it is strange that the text should thus word it, if Samuel were not *really* there. It is as *plainly said* here, that Samuel *appeared* and *talked*[g], as it is elsewhere said that Moses and Elias appeared and talked with our blessed Saviour[h]. So that if we consider the *letter* of

[a] Numb. xxiii. [b] 2 Kings i. [c] 1 Sam. xxviii. 12. [d] Verse 14.
[e] Verse 15. [f] Verse 16. [g] Verse 12, 14, 15, 16. [h] Matt. xvii. 3.

the text, and the *most obvious* and *natural construction* of it, (which we should not depart from without the greatest necessity,) we shall be obliged to confess, that the apparition was *really* Samuel, and no other.

3. *This* construction is *very ancient*, the *most ancient of any;* and seems indeed to have been the *general persuasion* of the *Jewish church*, long before the coming of Christ.

The author of the Book of Ecclesiasticus lived about three hundred years before Christ, within one hundred years, or less, of the last *prophet* Malachi. He was a considerable man in his time, and as likely to know the true sense of scripture, and to give the general sentiments of the *Jewish church*, as any man of that age. What he thought of this matter which we are now upon, may be there seen, where, speaking of Samuel, he says thus: "After his death he prophesied, and shewed the king his "end, and lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy, to "blot out the wickedness of the people[i]." This author plainly enough supposed, that it was Samuel *himself* who appeared in person, and prophesied to king Saul.

The *Greek translators* of the Old Testament, who lived not long after that time, were in the same persuasion; as appears by an additional note which they inserted in the tenth chapter of the first Book of Chronicles, where they say, that "Samuel "the Prophet gave the answer to king Saul, when he inquired "of the sorceress[k]."

In the same sentiments was Josephus the *Jewish historian*, who lived in the Apostles' times; and thus thought many of the *earliest Christian Fathers*. So that *this construction* of the text is certainly *very ancient*, and for a long time passed current: nor do I see any sufficient reason why it should be rejected. But because *later critics* have some slight things to object, which have been thought material, I shall briefly consider what those *objections* are which have moved them to depart from the *letter*, and from the *ancient construction*.

1. They object, that the text speaks of *bringing up* Samuel as it were, *out of the ground;* whereas, if it had been Samuel, he should rather have *come down from heaven*. But this objection is no more against the supposition of its being Samuel's *ghost*, than against the supposing it to be *any other spirit* whatever: for we have reason to believe, that even *evil spirits* have not

[i] Ecclus. xlvi. 20. [k] 1 Chron. x. 13.

their dwelling *under ground*, but in the *air* rather; and the *devil* therefore is styled, in the New Testament, "the prince of "the power of the air[1]." But the true reason why Samuel is represented as being *brought up*, is, because his *body* was *under ground*, to which his *soul* was still conceived to *bear a relation*; and it was upon this chiefly that the popular prevailing notion, of all *separate souls* being in the *heart of the earth*, was founded: which *popular notion*, as it obtained among the Jews, and is often *alluded to* in the *language of scripture*, adapting itself to *vulgar capacities*, it is no wonder that the relation of this *apparition* of Samuel should be *accommodated thereto*: so that nothing can be concluded, in this case, merely from the *manner* in which Samuel is said to *come up*.

2. But it is further objected, that the *apparition* here in the person of Samuel, complains to Saul, of being *disquieted* or *disturbed* by him: and it is thought not likely, that the *rest* of *God's saints* should be liable to be *disturbed* by *enchantments*, or *any power of witches or devils*. Very true; neither the *sorceress* nor all the *powers of hell* could have given any *disturbance* to his peaceful ghost: but *God Almighty*, with whom the "spirits of "just men made perfect" dwell, *might please to send Samuel upon that occasion*, to *deliver the message* from *him*: and as Saul's *presumption* and rashness was the *occasion* of the whole thing, he deserved a *reproof* for what he had done: and what can one better call it, than *disquieting* and *disturbing* the *repose of Samuel*, and *bringing him out from his rest*, which Saul is said *to have done*, because *he occasioned* the doing it? Nevertheless, Samuel, to be sure, thought it no *trouble* to come upon *God's errand*, and to execute the Divine commands; though it was proper to rebuke Saul for *his* part in it, and to speak of that affair after a *natural way*, and in conformity to *common apprehensions*.

3. But it is further objected, that it is hard to give a reason why God, who had *refused* to answer Saul either by *dreams*, or by *Urim*, or by *prophets*, should at length vouchsafe to *answer* him in *such a way as this*, and by the mediation of a *wicked sorceress*. But as to this matter, if the *fact be true*, it is not *necessary* for us to *assign the reason* for *God's dispensations*: be that as it will, it is very certain that God *did* interpose and conduct that whole affair, as I before remarked; otherwise there could

[1] Ephesians ii. 2.

not have been so plain and so *true a prediction* of things to come. But it may be easy to account for God's answering Saul in *this way*, as it was *exposing* and *afflicting* him *more severely* than in *any other*, after he had richly *deserved* it: and God might hereby shew his *prevailing power* even *over enchantments* and *charmers*; that, when vain men attempt even to go to *hell for counsel*, HE will *meet them* and *baffle them* even *there*.

4. But it is still further objected, that the *predictions* of the apparition, under the name of Samuel, were not *true*, and therefore could not be Samuel's. This objection is to the purpose, and would be *decisive*, if it were *just*: but the *things foretold* were *exactly verified*, and the *event* answered to the *prophecy* in every particular: only it is observed, that the things came not to pass till *four or five days after*, whereas the *prediction* seems to limit the time to the *next day*; for it says, "To-morrow "shalt thou and thy sons be with me[m]." But then again it must be acknowledged, and *is acknowledged* by the *best critics*, that the word which we render in English *to-morrow*, may as well be rendered *very shortly*, which it *really signifies* in this *place*.

5. Well, but is it not said, "To-morrow shalt thou and thy "sons be with me?" Was Saul then, so *wicked* a man, to go after death to the same *blessed place* with *righteous* Samuel? No, nor is it likely, upon the *other* supposition, that so *good* a son as Jonathan should fare no better in another state, than so *bad* a father: but, in truth, the text determines nothing at all of the *state of either* after death. All that is meant by the words, "thou shalt be with me," is, thou shalt *die*, thou shalt be as I am, that is, *dead*, and in the *regions of separate spirits*; and so it proved.

I have now run through the most considerable objections which have been pleaded against interpreting the words of Samuel *himself*, that is, of Samuel's *ghost*, as I interpret them: but none of those objections seem to be of weight sufficient to persuade us to depart from the *letter*, and the *most ancient* construction. I conclude therefore, as before, that it was Samuel *himself who appeared and prophesied; not called up by that wretched woman, or her demons*, but *sent thither by God to rebuke Saul's madness*, in a most affecting and mortifying way; and to *deter all others from ever applying to witches or demons for assistance*, when refused comfort from God.

[m] Ver. 19.

II.

Having thus settled the sacred story, I shall now proceed to the *practical* use and application of it. For indeed I would not have set so light either by *your* time or *my own*, as to have chosen a subject of *mere curiosity*, to *entertain the ear only*, without *improving the heart*. But I take this part of scripture history to be *highly instructive* and edifying; and therefore well deserving our close and serious meditations.

1. First, observe how *careless* and *unthinking* men are apt to be in their *prosperity*, and till the *hour of distress* comes. Saul was a man of as much coldness and indifference in religion, as any man could be; swayed, for the most part, by his own humour and vanity. He never thought of *consulting God*, or asking directions, all the time he was *persecuting righteous David* from city to city, hunting him through every quarter of the kingdom, and driving him out into a strange land. He never thought of *consulting God*, when he barbarously undertook to *murder fourscore and five of the Lord's priests*, innocent men, and who had deserved no ill at his hands. But now at last, when he perceived *his own life to be in danger*, as if *that alone* were precious *in God's sight*, or *that alone* worthy of the *Divine care* and notice; *then* he began to *apply to God*, and *pretended* a respect and *reverence for him*, though all the while his *heart* was *far from him*. Danger and *distress* will sometimes *frighten* and dismay a hardened sinner, and *that is all:* for it is not any *relenting sorrow for his sins* which troubles him, but the sense of what he apprehends of the pain and the *destruction just falling upon him*.

2. Observe, secondly, that in such cases, generally, God very justly turns away his ear, and will *vouchsafe no answer* in the *ordinary way*, to such *grievous offenders*. Of such as these it is that God says, in the Proverbs, "They shall call upon me, but "I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not "find me[n]." And good reason why; because he had before called, and they *refused;* he had "stretched out his hand, and "no man regarded;" they had "set at nought all his counsel, "and would none of his reproof[o]." There is a *certain degree of forbearance* and longsuffering, *beyond which* even the *Divine goodness* will *not extend*. Provocations may proceed to such a *height*, as to leave no room for further mercy. *Patience long abused* will at last *give place to vengeance*. God will then withdraw his grace, and lock up his favours, deserting the impenitent hardened

[n] Prov. i. 28. [o] Prov. i. 24, 25.

wretch, and abandoning him to the wild pursuit of his own inventions. This is a matter of dreadful consideration to all inveterate, impenitent offenders: and yet it should not be a *discouragement* to any man against *repenting;* because the very *disposition*, or inclination to *repentance* is a *hopeful symptom*, and is a promising argument in his favour, that his *day of grace* is *not past*, and that it is not yet too late to return.

3. Observe *further*, from the history before laid down, how miserable, how melancholy a thing it is, for a man to have *sinned to such a degree* as to be *entirely abandoned by God*, and to have the *best friend* in the world *become his enemy*. There is no condition so disconsolate, so deplorable as that is: let him sit down to invent and contrive ever so long; there is no expedient that can help him, no contrivance but what will turn against him, and will *increase* his misery, instead of *relieving* it. What could unhappy Saul do in his pressing difficulties? God *would not* assist him, and no one else *could*. He might think of his court flatterers, or of his ablest counsellors, and of his troops and armies: but nothing in this world could give him comfort, or afford him relief. Then he thought of *dead* Samuel, whom he had often despised and slighted while *alive:* and, to shew how a sinking man will lay hold on every twig, he was foolish enough to imagine, that he might *steal a favour* from *God's servant* Samuel, when he *could not obtain one* from *God himself*. He made the experiment, and in a very odd way, as you have heard; and how at length it ended, I have described at large. Let this sad example convince every man who attends to it, how impossible, *how impracticable it is, to lay any scheme of happiness which shall at all answer*, without first taking care to *make God his friend:* without this, all our toils and endeavours come to nothing: it is but building in the air, or labouring for the wind. What can a man do, when *God becomes his enemy*, or but *ceases to be his friend!* Can he hide himself from *his* presence! Can he run beyond the reach of *his* power! If he could climb up into heaven, God is there; and if he goes down into hell, even there also will his hand find him, and his vengeance pursue him. Search the whole universe for a moment's protection, and it is all to no purpose: for *all is in God's hands;* to him all creatures bow, and every element submits to his will and pleasure. The sum then is, that the *only way to happiness* is, to *strike up an interest*, a *league of amity with God*, and never to swerve from it,

for any temptation, any allurement whatsoever. Make but *him* your *friend*, and in *him* you have *all*; as on the other hand, by losing *him*, you are sure to lose every thing that is *valuable* together with him.

The practical conclusion from the *whole* is, that we learn to set a true value upon God's favour and friendship, and that we use our utmost endeavours both to procure and to preserve it: and as nothing will do it but a good and holy life, and that certainly will; we may from hence infer the absolute, indispensable necessity of making religion our first and principal care, as it is our last and our greatest concern. So much for the *use* and *application* of this famous part of sacred history.

4. There is a slighter, incidental use, which might have been taken notice of by the way, which yet I passed over, and shall here but just mention; and that is, the argument to be drawn from this instance, to prove that *souls exist separate from the body after death*; and do not only *exist*, but are *awake* and *active*, and have their intellectual powers in perfection. But as that may be abundantly proved from other places of scripture less liable to dispute, we need not insist much upon this. Indeed I cannot say that there is, in the whole scripture, any plain and unexceptionable instance of a *departed soul's appearing* and *talking* upon earth, if this be not one: Moses once, and Elias came down and talked with our blessed Saviour; but whether in the body or out of the body, we cannot tell, God knoweth: however, the question, as to *separate souls existing and acting after death*, does by no means depend upon any examples of *apparitions*, but is sufficiently proved by many and clear *testimonies* of *sacred Writ*, as might be shewn at large, were this the proper place for it: but I designed only a short hint of this matter, that I might not seem entirely to have passed it over through forgetfulness or haste.

And now I should beseech you, after this short interruption, to let your thoughts return to the *principal thing* of all; namely, the necessity of looking after and procuring God's friendship by a good and holy life: which, that we may all seriously think of, and with good effect, God of his mercy grant, through Jesus Christ our Lord!

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